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5. The applicant was born in 1987 and lives in Tallinn. 6. He was charged with causing serious health damage. According to the charges, at 4.30 a.m. on 22 April 2006, he, together with I.J., had repeatedly hit L. on the head outside a nightclub on Harju Street. L. had fallen to the ground and had then been kicked several times. He had sustained serious head injuries which had been life-threatening and caused him permanent health damage. 7. Criminal proceedings in respect of I.J. were discontinued after his death in a car accident on 25 February 2007. 8. The Harju County Court (“the County Court”) heard evidence from the applicant and nine witnesses and examined certain other evidence such as a written forensic expert opinion on L.’s injuries, a telephone activity report concerning the time and location of the applicant’s communications, identification reports based on photographs and a video-recording from a closed circuit television camera near the scene. It also examined I.J.’s statements given during the preliminary investigation. 9. The County Court found that the witness statements were incoherent and that some were contradictory. The witnesses had given different accounts of the events, regarding the number of persons who had been at the scene and attacked L., as well as the attackers’ actions during the scuffle and after L. had fallen to the ground. The court noted that according to I.J.’s statements given during the preliminary investigation, he had hit L. twice, L. had fallen to the ground, and the applicant had arrived afterwards. The court had no reason to doubt what I.J. had said. It also noted that it could not give less credit to the statements of S.G. – according to whom the fight had been between L. and I.J. – merely because he was a friend of the applicant. 10. The court rejected witness statements from K.A., K.S. and K.M. as evidence, as well as identification reports drawn up during the pre-trial investigation identifying the applicant as one of the (probable) attackers of the victim, as their statements in the identification reports did not match their statements before the court. It also pointed to the lack of credibility of some of the witness statements, such as K.M.’s statement, which said that she had recognised the applicant’s eye colour and the look in his eyes, but that she had not seen the colour of his jacket. 11. The County Court considered that there was only indirect evidence against the applicant and concluded that it could not be established beyond doubt that he had committed the offence he was charged with. By a judgment of 30 April 2007 the County Court acquitted him. 12. The prosecutor appealed to the Tallinn Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”). He mainly challenged the County Court’s assessment of the evidence. He did not request a re-examination of the witnesses. He requested that the Court of Appeal quash the County Court judgment and adopt a new judgment convicting the applicant. A copy of the prosecutor’s appeal was sent to the applicant and his lawyer. 13. The Court of Appeal summoned the applicant, his counsel and the prosecutor to a hearing. However, the applicant informed the court in writing that he did not wish to take part and asked for the case to be examined in his absence. 14. At the Court of Appeal hearing, which took place on 4 September 2007, the applicant’s counsel confirmed that he was aware that the applicant did not wish to take part. The prosecutor did not object to examination of the case in the applicant’s absence. The Court of Appeal disclosed the records of the County Court hearings at the prosecutor’s request, to which the applicant’s counsel did not object. Subsequently, the court heard the parties’ arguments. No requests to summon witnesses were made and no witnesses were examined. 15. The Court of Appeal assessed the evidence differently, based on the material in the case file, and found that the applicant’s guilt was established. It considered that it was incorrect to describe the witness statements as contradictory; rather, the witnesses’ attention had been focused on different details and the scope and precision of the information contained in their statements varied. The court provided a comprehensive analysis of the evidence in its judgment, delivered on 18 September 2007, and explained in detail why, and to what extent, it assessed the statements given in the County Court differently from the lower court. 16. Notably, the Court of Appeal considered that the County Court had not been justified in rejecting K.A.’s, K.S.’s and K.M’s statements and identification reports as evidence. In respect of K.S., it noted that at the identification procedure she had recognised the applicant by his eyes and eyebrows. The fact that she could not describe his clothing did not discredit her evidence. The court found that it could not be required of a witness to note everything necessary for criminal proceedings. A person could only focus on a single detail rather than on the full picture. Nor was her evidence discredited by her failure to recognise the applicant at the court hearing, as at court hearings witnesses were in a particularly stressful situation. Similar considerations were applied to K.M., who, moreover, had recognised the applicant at the County Court hearing. The fact that K.M. and T.S. (another witness) – who had been together at the time of the events – had taken note of different aspects of the events did not render those statements unreliable; rather, it reflected the fact that the perception and memory of different people differed. Nor did the different expressions used by K.M. at the identification procedure and in court render her statements unreliable. Furthermore, the Court of Appeal found no radical differences between K.A.’s statements in the identification report and in court, and therefore considered that the rejection of his statements as evidence had been not justified either. In conclusion, the Court of Appeal considered that K.A.’s, K.S.’s and K.M.’s statements, as well as their identification reports, had to be taken into account and assessed together with the other evidence. 17. The Court of Appeal also disagreed with the County Court’s position concerning the reliability of S.G.’s statements. It pointed to the fact that his statements, according to which the applicant had arrived at the scene after L. had already fallen to the ground, did not match any of the other witness statements. It also noted that the applicant, S.G. and I.J. had been friends, whereas the other witnesses had had no connection with them. Considering a number of statements by independent witnesses, the court found that I.J. had not been credible in assuming full responsibility and noted that there was no way of finding out why he had done so. It also noted that the applicant’s statements had been inconsistent. He had said during the preliminary investigation that he had seen I.J. hitting L., whereas in court he had said that he had been further away from the scene and denied having seen anything. The court also referred in that connection to the words heard by witnesses from a person whose appearance corresponded to that of the applicant: “Why then did he come to start a quarrel?” If the applicant had arrived at the scene after L. had been knocked down, he would have known nothing about the reasons and initial stages of the conflict and would have had no reason to express himself in such a way. 18. The Court of Appeal noted that since the applicant had acted jointly with another person, it was legally irrelevant which of them had struck L., causing him to fall, although it also referred to K.S.’s statements according to which the last blow had been given by the applicant. The court further analysed at length the subjective element of the offence and concluded that the applicant had acted with the indirect intent of causing serious health damage. Both the intellectual and volitional aspects of intent required under the pertinent case-law had been present in the applicant’s behaviour. 19. The Court of Appeal convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to five years’ imprisonment, of which he immediately had to serve two months, the remainder of the sentence being suspended. In sentencing, the court had regard to the fact that the applicant had no previous convictions and that he was a young person in his formative years. A short immediate prison sentence gave him a serious warning for the future. 20. The applicant appealed to the Supreme Court. He challenged the Court of Appeal’s assessment of the evidence and argued that it had not convincingly substantiated its different conclusion from that of the County Court. He pointed out that the Court of Appeal had not directly verified the evidence; he referred in that respect to the conduct of the witnesses, which was of paramount importance in assessing their credibility but which was not reflected in the record of the court hearing. In particular, he referred to K.M.’s hesitant behaviour at the hearing. He considered that the Court of Appeal had assessed the evidence in a selective and arbitrary manner and had given the benefit of the doubt to the prosecution. 21. On 14 November 2007 the Supreme Court decided not to examine the applicant’s appeal.

5. The applicant was born in 1965 and lives in Samobor. 6. On 20 April 2009 she sustained an injury in a car accident while returning home from work. On 8 May 2009 her injury was recognised as a work-related injury by the Croatian Health Insurance Fund for Health Protection at Work (Hrvatski zavod za zdravstveno osiguranje zaštite zdravlja na radu). On the basis of her work-related injury the applicant was granted sick leave between 21 April 2009 and 3 July 2009. 7. On 26 October 2011 the applicant visited the Emergency Medicine Centre of the University Hospital Centre Zagreb (Centar za hitnu medicinu Kliničkog bolničkog centra Zagreb) owing to the pain in her neck and back. There it was established that she was suffering from a severely sore spine with a deformity. 8. The following day she visited her chosen general practitioner, who found that the applicant was unable to work and granted her sick leave starting from 27 October 2011 on the basis of an illness. 9. On 3 November 2011 the applicant lodged a complaint against her general practitioner’s assessment of the reason for her sick leave. She argued that she should be granted sick leave entitlement on the basis of the work-related injury that she had sustained on 20 April 2009. She submitted medical documentation in support of her argument. 10. Following the lodging of the complaint, the applicant’s general practitioner referred the applicant for an expert medical evaluation, enclosing her medical documentation with the request for expert evaluation. 11. On 6 December 2011 an authorised doctor of the Zagreb Office of the Croatian Health Insurance Fund (Hrvatski zavod za zdravstveno osiguranje, Područni ured Zagreb – hereinafter “the Zagreb Office”), specialised in physical medicine and rehabilitation, examined the applicant’s medical documentation and reported finding no direct causal link between the work-related injury sustained by the applicant in 2009 and the sick leave she had begun on 27 October 2011. 12. The Zagreb Office forwarded the report to the applicant and informed her of her right to seek the delivery of a written decision on the matter of her sick leave entitlement. The applicant availed herself of that right and asked for a written decision. 13. By a decision of 23 January 2012 the Zagreb Office, relying on the report of 6 December 2011, refused the applicant’s request that the sick leave from 27 October 2011 be granted on the basis of her work-related injury. It also dismissed her claim for compensation for lost salary during the period of sick leave. 14. The applicant challenged this decision before the Central Office of the Fund (Hrvatski zavod za zdravstveno osiguranje, Direkcija – hereinafter “the Central Office”), submitting further medical documentation and requesting that her sick leave be granted on the basis of her work-related injury. 15. Following the appeal by the applicant, the Central Office asked an in-house medical commission to conduct an expert examination regarding the matter. On 16 March 2012 the medical commission, consisting of three doctors of medicine, examined the applicant’s overall medical documentation and reported that her sick leave from 27 October 2011 could not be granted on the basis of the work-related injury that she had sustained in 2009. 16. On 5 April 2012 the Central Office, relying on the findings of the medical commission, dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the decision of the Zagreb Office. 17. The applicant then brought an administrative action in the Zagreb Administrative Court (Upravni sud u Zagrebu). She contested the findings of the Fund’s expert medical bodies, relied on her medical documentation and alleged that it indicated a causal link between the work-related injury she had sustained in 2009 and her sick leave. She requested that she be heard and that an expert medical report on the matter be obtained. 18. On 27 June 2012 the Central Office submitted a response to the applicant’s administrative action. This response was forwarded to the applicant. 19. On 27 August 2012 the Zagreb Administrative Court held a public hearing, to which the applicant was duly summoned. She did not attend the hearing, but was represented by a lawyer. Her lawyer reiterated the arguments adduced and evidence proposed in the administrative action. The representative of the Central Office contested this. The Zagreb Administrative Court then dismissed the proposal to hear the applicant and to obtain a further expert medical report on the matter and closed the hearing. 20. On 31 August 2012 the Zagreb Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s action as unfounded. It stressed, in particular, that two expert medical bodies of the Fund, as well as the applicant’s chosen general practitioner, had established without a doubt that the applicant’s sick leave beginning on 27 October 2011 was not linked to the work-related injury she had sustained in 2009. It also stressed that the applicant, by the submissions in her administrative action, did not manage to put into doubt the findings of the expert medical bodies and that thus there was no need to hear her or to obtain a further expert medical report on the matter. 21. The applicant lodged a constitutional complaint, alleging that the proceedings had been unfair in that she had been excluded from the procedure of commissioning and obtaining the administrative authorities’ expert reports, whereas the Zagreb Administrative Court had refused to hear her and to obtain an independent expert medical report on the matter. 22. On 6 February 2013 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s constitutional complaint as manifestly ill-founded. This decision was served on the applicant’s representative on 22 February 2013.

6. The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Bucharest. 7. In 2005 a businessman, G.B., lodged a criminal complaint against the applicant and the rector of the University of Agronomy concerning the sale of a 224-hectare plot of land located in Băneasa, near Bucharest. He claimed that the applicant had purchased the plot of land for significantly less money than its actual worth. He also alleged that the plot of land was not the property of the University but of the Romanian State. 8. On 14 February 2008 the General Prosecutor’s Office decided not to start an investigation, for lack of evidence. However, on 31 July 2008 the Chief Public Prosecutor quashed this decision and relinquished its jurisdiction in favour of the National Anti-Corruption Prosecution Service (“the NAP”). 9. On an unspecified date in March 2009 the NAP officer in charge of the inquiry made an accusation that he had been pressured to stop the investigation. According to his statements, two senior directors from the Ministry of the Interior, namely the head of the Ministry’s Internal Protection and Intelligence Department and the head of the Anti-Corruption Department’s Operation Division within the same Ministry, asked him to resolve the case quickly and to provide a favourable response. 10. On the basis of the NAP officer’s testimony, the initial investigation concerning the applicant and the rector was extended to include the two senior directors from the Ministry of the Interior. 11. On 12 March 2009 the applicant was invited to NAP headquarters. He gave a statement. 12. On 20 March 2009 the NAP started a criminal investigation in respect of the applicant on the ground that he was an accomplice to an offence of abuse of position committed by the rector of the University of Agronomy. 13. On 23 March 2009 the NAP started another criminal investigation in respect of the applicant in connection with the offence of active bribery on account of the influence exercised on the NAP officer in charge of the inquiry. 14. On the same day the prosecutor issued orders to appear before the investigators against the applicant and five other co-defendants. In the order to appear issued against the applicant it was stated that the order’s objective was to ensure that the applicant was heard in his capacity as a suspect (“învinuit”) in connection with the offences of abuse of position and active bribery under Articles 248 and 255 in conjunction with Article 26 of the C.P. 15. On 24 March 2009, at about 3 p.m., the applicant was taken by police to NAP headquarters in accordance with an order to appear before the investigation body. 16. When the applicant arrived at NAP headquarters the questioning of one of his co-accused, S.I.C, was in progress and lasted until 7.50 p.m. 17. Subsequently, another co-accused, P.P.D., was questioned between 8.30 p.m. and 10.05 p.m. 18. Two lawyers chosen by the applicant were called and invited to NAP headquarters to assist him. 19. According to the Government’s submissions, one of the applicant’s lawyers arrived at NAP headquarters at 4 p.m. and the other at about 7.45 p.m. 20. The applicant stayed at the headquarters of the prosecuting authorities without being questioned until 10 p.m. According to his allegations, which have not been contradicted by the Government, he was not free to leave. 21. The Government did not contend that they had informed the applicant that he had been free to leave; on the contrary, in their written submissions to the Court they maintained that the applicant had remained at their disposal for questioning between 3 p.m. and 11.30 p.m. 22. Between 10 p.m. and 10.55 p.m. the applicant was informed of the charges against him and was heard by the investigators. 23. From 11 p.m. to 11.20 p.m. the prosecution authorities questioned another co-accused, A.I.N. 24. The applicant was kept at NAP headquarters until 11.30 p.m., when he was informed of the decision taken by the NAP on the same day concerning the charges against him and the other defendants. 25. The NAP charged the rector of the University of Agronomy with abuse of position with aggravated consequences, the applicant with complicity in abuse of position, and the two senior directors of the Ministry of the Interior with favouring the offender. By the same decision all the defendants were remanded in custody for twenty-four hours, the period of detention starting to run at 11.30 p.m. 26. The next day, on 25 March 2009, at about 6.40 p.m., the NAP asked the Bucharest Court of Appeal to remand the applicant and the other two defendants in custody (the rector was released) for twenty-nine days, from 25 March 2009 until 22 April 2009. 27. On the same date, the Bucharest Court of Appeal, ruling as a single judge, dismissed the prosecution’s request. 28. It ruled that keeping the applicant in pre-trial detention was not necessary. In this connection it stressed that the applicant had not evaded criminal proceedings, but had complied with every summons from the prosecution service. It also stated that bringing the accused on the basis of an order to appear before the investigation body was not justified as he had never refused to come when summoned to the NAP. It concluded that there was no evidence that the release of the accused posed any specific threat to public order or would impede the criminal proceedings. 29. However, the court imposed on all of them a prohibition on leaving the country for thirty days, on the ground that there was reasonable suspicion that they had committed the offences with which they had been charged. 30. An appeal on points of law lodged by the NAP against this decision was dismissed by the High Court of Cassation and Justice on 1 April 2009. The High Court endorsed the decision of the Bucharest Court of Appeal, noting that the applicant’s pre-trial detention appeared excessive, given that the applicant had no criminal record, had been of good standing in society, and there was no evidence in the file that he had evaded criminal proceedings. The court considered that the prohibition on leaving the country ensured the right balance between the general interest of society in the good administration of justice and the applicant’s interest. 31. By a decision delivered on 22 April 2009 the NAP extended the prohibition on the applicant’s leaving the country for another thirty days, from 23 April to 22 May 2009. The reasons provided by the prosecutor for taking such a measure were that there was reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offence, and that it was necessary to ensure the proper administration of justice. 32. The applicant contested the measure before the Bucharest Court of Appeal, arguing that the prosecutor’s decision did not provide sufficient reasons for the extension of the restrictive measure, adding that he had willingly attended each time he had been summoned by the investigators. He stressed that the restriction on leaving the country had been imposed in 2009, but in connection with an offence that he had allegedly committed in 2002. He relied on the fact that he was an important businessman for whom freedom of movement outside the country was vital for conducting his business. 33. In his oral submissions before the court the prosecutor added that the restriction on the freedom of movement was justified by the necessity to ensure the speediness of the proceedings. The applicant replied that he had not been invited to the NAP to give a statement since 24 March 2009. He added that the speediness of the proceedings was in his own interest too, because as a well-known businessman his reputation and integrity were being harmed as long as there were proceedings pending against him. 34. The measure was upheld by an interlocutory judgment rendered by the Bucharest Court of Appeal on 27 April 2009, which found that the reasons provided by the prosecutor were sufficient. It held that since there were no new circumstances which could change the applicant’s situation there was no reason to revoke the preventive measure against him. 35. An appeal on points of law lodged by the applicant was dismissed by the High Court of Cassation and Justice as inadmissible on 8 May 2009. It held that the applicable law did not provide for an appeal on points of law against an interlocutory judgment by which a request for revocation of a preventive measure had been dismissed. 36. On 19 May 2009 the NAP again ordered the extension of the prohibition on the applicant’s leaving the country for another thirty days. The reasoning of the decision was exactly the same as in the previous decision of 22 April 2009. The applicant challenged the measure before the Bucharest Court of Appeal. He stated that he needed to leave the country as he had been invited to a business meeting abroad. 37. By an interlocutory judgment of 1 June 2009 the Bucharest Court of Appeal ordered the revocation of the measure. It held that the applicant had not tried in any way to hinder the investigation or to leave the country, and that he was observing all the obligations imposed on him by the judicial authorities. It also stated that there was still reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offence, but the revocation of the restriction would not impede the proper administration of justice. It concluded that although the imposition of a preventive measure should be justified by the necessity to ensure the proper administration of justice and to protect society by preventing the commission of new offences, in the instant case the NAP had not managed to explain why allowing the applicant to leave the country could have negative repercussions on the administration of justice. At the same time, it stressed that maintaining the restriction would not prevent the applicant from contacting all the parties in the case and influencing them. 38. The appeal on points of law lodged by the NAP was allowed by the High Court of Cassation and Justice on 9 June 2009. It dismissed the applicant’s complaint, and upheld the NAP’s decision to extend the restriction. It held that the restriction should be maintained because of the negative social impact caused by the offence committed by the applicant and the complexity of the case, which involved multiple procedural acts. 39. On 18 June 2009 the NAP extended the restriction on the applicant’s right to leave the country for another thirty days. The applicant’s complaint against the measure was allowed by an interlocutory judgment of the Bucharest Court of Appeal. The court held that there were no reasons to justify the maintenance of the preventive measure. It noted in this connection that no procedural act had been carried out in the case since 21 May 2009, and the applicant, a well-known businessman, had been present whenever the investigators summoned him. An appeal on points of law lodged by the NAP was dismissed by the High Court of Cassation and Justice on 3 July 2009. 40. On 19 May 2009 the applicant was invited to NAP headquarters and informed that he was charged with the offence of active bribery. The applicant refused to give a statement, availing himself of his right to silence. A report was drafted and signed by the applicant, his lawyer and the prosecutor on that occasion. 41. On 21 December 2012 the file was registered with the Bucharest Court of Appeal. According to the most recent information provided by the applicant, the criminal proceedings against him are still pending.

5. The first applicant was born in 1959. From 2004 until 16 January 2012 he was Minister (Landesrat) of the Regional Government of Carinthia (Kärntner Landesregierung). He was also head of the Austrian Peoples’ Party in Carinthia (Österreichische Volkspartei Kärnten – ÖVP Kärnten), which was coalition partner of the Alliance for the Future of Austria (Bündnis Zukunft Ӧsterreich, BZӦ) under the leadership of J.H. 6. The second applicant was born in 1970 and lives in Klagenfurt‑Wölfnitz. He studied law and worked as a lawyer before becoming an employee of the Landes-und Hypothekenbank (“H. Bank”) in 1999. In 2004 he became a board member of that bank. In 2007 he became a member of the board of Kärntner Landes- und Hypothekenbank-Holding (hereinafter referred to as “Landesholding”). 7. The third applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Maria Wörth. He studied law and worked as a lawyer before becoming an employee of the law department of the H. Bank in 1999. In 2001 he was appointed head of that department. In 2005 he became a member of the board of the Landesholding. 8. The Landesholding is a corporate body governed by public law (Anstalt öffentlichen Rechts). It was set up to manage the estate of the Land of Carinthia considering its interests (unter Berücksichtung der Interessen des Landes). The Land of Carinthia is liable as a guarantor in the event of Landesholding’s insolvency. 9. The Landesholding is governed by a board of management (Vorstand), consisting of two people, which represents it. The board is supervised by a supervisory body (Aufsichtsrat), which appoints the board’s members and participates in special commercial transactions specified by the law. The supervisory body itself is appointed by the Regional Government of Carinthia and is composed of representatives of the political parties to the regional parliament (Landtag). 10. It is the task of one member of the regional government – the commissioner (Aufsichtskommissär), a position defined by the relevant law – to monitor the supervisory board. He or she has the power to appeal against decisions of the supervisory board if they run counter to the interests of the Land. 11. On 1 January 1991 the H. Bank was disjoined from Landesholding and became a public limited company (Aktiengesellschaft). The majority of its shares were held by Landesholding until 2006. Following an increase in capital stock at the end of 2006, Landesholding still owned 44.91% of the shares. 12. From 1999 to 2008 Regional Governor and Head of the Regional Government of Carinthia was J.H. 13. In 2007, as Governor of Carinthia, J.H. was the commissioner. The first applicant was chairperson of the supervisory board of the Landesholding. 14. After careers as managers in H. Bank, the second applicant and the third applicant were appointed as members of the board of management of Landesholding. 15. In 2007 B. Bank showed an interest in taking over H. Bank by buying a certain number of its shares. The ensuing negotiations involved J.H. and the first applicant as the political leaders of the Regional Government of Carinthia, the head of the management board of H. Bank, the head of another shareholder, as well as an investors group. The main negotiations were carried out by investment banks and law firms. J.H. and the first applicant appointed D.B., an accountant and financial consultant (Wirtschaftsprüfer und Steuerberater) based in Villach, Austria, to take part in and supervise the negotiations. 16. The board of management of Landesholding itself was not informed and did not participate in the negotiation process. Not only did it not appoint D.B. but it was not informed about his mandate. It was informed about the negotiation process just a short time before the signing of the contract. D.B.’s mandate was not communicated to it. 17. The Landesholding management board had to sign the contract for the transfer of the shares and the supervisory board had to authorise the transaction in advance. On 21 May 2007 the supervisory board was informed by the first applicant on behalf of the management board, and the deal was confirmed by four votes to three. The contract was signed on 22 May 2007. 18. On 9 October 2007 all the legal arrangements necessary for finalising the transaction were completed. B. Bank bought around 25% of the shares previously held by Landesholding for 809,544,534 euros (EUR). 19. In a plenary debate of the Carinthian Regional Parliament on 9 August 2007, J.H. stated that the costs of the consultation service connected to the share deal would not exceed EUR 250,000. 20. In February 2008 the first applicant and J.H. informed the second applicant that they had entrusted D.B. with supervising the negotiations on behalf of Landesholding and that he was entitled to a fee of 1.5% of the total sales profit (EUR 12,143,168). They said that Landesholding should pay that fee. The second applicant informed the third applicant, and on 12 February 2008 they both presented D.B.’s claim for fees as reasonable to the supervisory board of Landesholding. The lawfulness of the claim was a matter of discussion at the supervisory board meeting. No final conclusion was reached in that regard. 21. After the meeting of the supervisory board, the media reported on D.B.’s claim and expressed doubts as to his contribution to the negotiation process and the amount of the fee. Following the media coverage and the discussion at the supervisory board’s meeting, the Landesholding management board (the second applicant and the third applicant) commissioned lawyers and legal experts and asked them to confirm the appropriateness and reasonability of the claim for fees. 22. Three external legal experts examined the case put before them. They assessed the risk of civil claims being raised and the potential consequences under criminal law, under the explicit assumption that the bill for D.B.’s services was reasonable. The core question – whether D.B.’s claim for fees was reasonable – was to be answered by another three external experts. One of those experts, however, informed the second applicant, the third applicant and their lawyers that he would not conclude that the claim for fees was reasonable. According to a note of 7 March 2008 written by a lawyer appointed by the second and the third applicant, they tried to persuade the privately commissioned expert in a telephone conversation to make several changes to his report and to declare that the fees were reasonable. The expert refused to do so. In the end, he agreed to delete one paragraph which had stated that the services provided by D.B. were not equivalent to those of an investment bank. 23. As the media controversy did not cease and the expert had not confirmed the reasonableness of the fee, D.B. agreed in talks with J.H. and the first applicant to reduce his claim for fees by half. The expert was then asked to amend his report and in March 2008 he concluded that a fee of EUR 6,000,000 could be considered reasonable considering the fees generally charged by investment banks. 24. Based on this expert’s report, the supervisory board discussed the payment of the fee at its meetings held on 25 April and 29 May 2008 and finally agreed to the payment by four votes to three. 25. On 4 June 2008 the third applicant ordered the payment of EUR 4,500,000 to D.B. On 17 December 2009 the second applicant and the third applicant ordered the payment of the remaining amount to D.B. 26. The share deal was the subject of intense debate within the Carinthian Regional Parliament and the Bavarian Regional Parliament, as B. Bank’s head office was in Munich. That led to parliamentary enquiries (Untersuchungsausschuss) in both parliaments. 27. The Carinthian branch of the Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPӦ Kärnten) and R.H., a Member of the Carinthian Regional Parliament, lodged separate criminal complaints (Strafanzeige) against J.H., the first applicant and D.B. In March 2008 the public prosecutor opened preliminary proceedings against J.H., the first applicant and D.B. for breach of trust and fraud. 28. On 21 June 2008 the second applicant and the third applicant submitted four expert reports indicating that the fees claimed by D.B. for his services in the negotiation process had been appropriate and reasonable. 29. J.H., the first applicant and D.B. gave statements to the public prosecutor and refuted the accusations. 30. On 2 September 2008 the second applicant and the third applicant gave statements and submitted a contract of 28 April 2008 concluded between J.H., the first applicant, Landesholding and D.B. in which D.B. had reduced his claim for fees from EUR 12,143,168 to EUR 6 million. 31. On 19 January 2009 the Klagenfurt public prosecutor closed the preliminary proceedings. The investigations against J.H. were closed because he had died on 11 October 2008. The preliminary proceedings against the first applicant and D.B. for breach of trust were closed because a new contract had been concluded fixing a lower fee and the expert reports submitted by the accused had indicated that the claim for fees was appropriate and reasonable. The proceedings against the first applicant for perjury (Falsche Beweisaussage) committed at a hearing of the parliamentary enquiry carried out by the Carinthian Regional Parliament were closed because it could not be proved that he had intended to commit that crime. 32. On 13 February 2009 R.H. filed a request for the reopening of the preliminary proceedings. 33. On 17 September 2009 the Graz Court of Appeal rejected the request for the reopening of the preliminary proceedings. 34. On 1 March 2010, eleven people lodged criminal complaints with the Procurator General’s Office (Generalprokuratur). They accused all of the Klagenfurt public prosecutors of abuse of authority. They asked for the reopening of the preliminary proceedings and the transfer of the case to another public prosecutor’s office. The Procurator General’s Office transferred the file to the Public Prosecutor’s Office for Crimes of Corruption (Korruptionsstaatsanwaltschaft) (“the KStA”). The KStA conducted an investigation, closed the preliminary proceedings against the public prosecutors and transferred the file to the Klagenfurt public prosecutor’s office, proposing the reopening of the preliminary proceedings. 35. On 19 January 2011 the public prosecutor reopened the proceedings against the first applicant and D.B. On 9 February 2011 the investigations were extended to the second applicant and the third applicant for breach of trust. 36. On 6 April 2011 the public prosecutor appointed F.S. as an expert in the preliminary proceedings and instructed him to submit a report dealing with the following questions: “- whether the services of D.B. as described in a letter of April 2007 and the progress report of 20 February 2008 were comparable to the services normally offered by an investment bank in similar circumstances - what fee was appropriate and reasonable for the services D.B. had provided.” 37. The accused were informed about the appointment of the expert and told that they could object to his appointment within three days. The applicants did not object. At an unspecified date the case file was transferred to F.S. 38. On 28 June 2011 F.S. delivered his expert report. The report stated that the services provided by D.B. were not comparable to the services of an investment bank and that a fee of EUR 200,000 would be appropriate and reasonable for the services provided by D.B. 39. The report was served on the applicants. 40. On 19 September 2011, the second applicant submitted reports by two court-approved experts which he had commissioned on a private basis. The private expert reports stated that fees of 1.5% of the sum of the transaction were reasonable for the services provided by an investment bank when negotiating a share deal in a similar situation. The services provided by D.B. could in part be seen as those of an investment bank. The second expert certified that D.B. had carried out 43% of the activities normally carried out by an investment bank. Those expert reports were transmitted to F.S. for further consideration. 41. On 28 September 2011 F.S. commented on the private expert reports submitted by the second applicant. He said that he had examined carefully the findings of the two experts and that the methods used to assess which activities D.B. had been involved in within the negotiations were not plausible. F.S.’s comment was served on the accused. 42. On 5 October 2011 the third applicant submitted another expert report by a court-approved expert which he had commissioned on a private basis to counter the findings of F.S. The expert report stated that F.S. had overstepped his competence by weighting the evidence. He had also not fulfilled the formal requirements of an expert report. The calculation of EUR 240,000 as a reasonable fee was criticised as wrong. 43. On 6 October 2011 that expert report was sent to F.S. for further consideration and, if necessary, amendment of his report. 44. On 14 October 2011 F.S. commented on the expert report commissioned by third applicant and concluded that there was no need to alter his findings. His comment was submitted to the accused. 45. On 16 December 2011 Landesholding submitted another expert report which its supervisory board had commissioned from a private limited company. The report examined the liability of the board members under civil law and concluded that the second applicant and the third applicant could not be held liable for their actions under civil law. 46. On 19 December 2011 the second applicant commented on that expert report. 47. On 21 March 2012 the public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment, charging the second applicant and the third applicant for breach of trust under Article 153 of the Criminal Code and the first applicant and D.B. for aiding and abetting in breach of trust. Based on the expert’s report prepared by F.S., the public prosecutor claimed that the applicants and D.B. knew that only a fee of a maximum of EUR 240,000 was reasonable for D.B.’s assistance in the negotiation process, but had nevertheless instructed Landesholding to pay a fee of EUR 6 million. Therefore they had caused damage amounting to EUR 5,760,000. 48. The Klagenfurt Regional Court sent out summonses and appointed F.S. as official expert to the trial. 49. All the applicants and D.B. submitted statements disputing the contentions of the public prosecutor but none of them appealed against the bill of indictment. The second applicant submitted eleven reports by private experts commissioned by the accused in the preliminary proceedings and requested that two of those experts be summoned as official experts to the trial. 50. On 4 July 2012 the trial started. 51. After several hearings D.B. conceded on 11 July 2012 that the findings of the official expert, F.S., were correct inasmuch as his services to the negotiation process had not corresponded to a fee of EUR 6 million but only to a fee of EUR 300,000. He further stated that, in his view, the second applicant and the third applicant had known at the relevant time that his fee was inappropriate and unreasonable. Also, his bill had been established together with the second applicant in February 2007 when the latter had stated that he needed documentation to present to the supervisory board of Landesholding. 52. The applicants disputed D.B.’s confession and argued that the fee paid to him had been reasonable. 53. On 18 July 2012 the third applicant asked the court not to include the expert report of F.S. in the case file. He argued that F.S. had to be treated as a witness for the prosecution and not as an impartial expert assisting the court. Moreover, F.S. was a professional lawyer and university professor in Germany and not registered in Austria as an expert for book-keeping, cost accounting or financial auditing in the list of court appointed experts and therefore lacked the necessary expert knowledge for assessing whether the remuneration of D.B. had been appropriate. Lastly he submitted that F.S. had been biased because in the course of the preliminary investigations he had answered questions of assessment of evidence and questions of law. Should the court not appoint another official expert for the trial, the third applicant requested that the privately commissioned expert reports presented to the court be included in the file. He also requested that the experts who had drawn up those reports be summoned for questioning as official experts in the trial. The other applicants joined those requests. 54. The Regional Court dismissed all the requests. As regards the challenge for bias of F.S. and the request not to hear him as expert or to read out his report, it found that from the case file and the evidence collected hitherto it did not appear that there were reasons for considering him as being biased. Since F.S. had been summoned to the hearing by the trial court, he had at the same time been appointed as expert by that court. As regards the argument that he had answered questions of assessment of evidence and questions of law in the preliminary proceedings, the court found that, even assuming that this had been the case, such statements had to be disregarded by the court. As regards the private experts commissioned by the applicants as court appointed experts the Regional Court pointed out that only after having examined and discussed the report by the court appointed expert, the necessity of appointing other experts could be decided. 55. The public prosecutor extended the charge, claiming that the damage caused by the accused amounted to EUR 6 million. 56. On 25 July 2012, D.B. confessed that in 2007, after his bill had been paid by Landesholding, the first applicant had asked him to share the money with him and J.H. D.B. had handed over part of the payment to the first applicant. Other leading members of the Alliance for the Future of Austria party had asked for money as well. 57. At the same hearing, the first applicant conceded that after the deal with B. Bank had been concluded, he and J.H. had decided that part of D.B.’s fee should be used to finance the Austrian Peoples’ Party in Carinthia and the Alliance for the Future of Austria party. He further confessed that he had received a portion of the fee from D.B. 58. The second applicant and the third applicant maintained their initial statements and claimed that they had acted in good faith without knowing that D.B.’s fees were not reasonable. 59. On 9 August 2012 F.S. was heard by the court. He gave a brief summary of his written expert report and answered the questions raised by the court and the parties to the trial. While F.S. was being questioned, an expert commissioned by the defence sat next to the applicants’ lawyers and advised them but was not allowed to question F.S. on his own. There is no indication that F.S. took part in any other hearing or put questions to witnesses or the accused. 60. After the questioning of F.S., the applicants and their co-accused reiterated their request to appoint another official expert. In their view, the answers given by F.S. had shown that his expert report was deficient. They further argued that the appointment of another expert was necessary because F.S. had to be considered as a witness for the prosecution and not as an impartial expert assisting the court. 61. The court dismissed those requests. 62. On 1 October 2012 the Klagenfurt Regional Court reached a verdict. It convicted the accused as charged and sentenced the first applicant to five and a half years, the second applicant to three years, the third applicant to two years and D.B. to three years of imprisonment. In addition, they were ordered to repay EUR 4,765,193 plus interest to Landesholding for compensation. The Regional Court found that the services provided by D.B. in the negotiation process only corresponded to fees in the amount of EUR 300,000 and that the second applicant and the third applicant had been aware of that fact but had breached their obligation of diligence by authorising the payment of EUR 6 million to D.B. As the first applicant had asked them to authorise the payment, he was guilty of abetting them. 63. The applicants lodged pleas of nullity and appeals against the sentence. D.B. also lodged an appeal against the sentence. The public prosecutor appealed against the sentences imposed on the second applicant, the third applicant. and D.B. 64. In their pleas of nullity the applicants, relying on Article 281 sub‑paragraph 4 of the Code of Criminal Proceedings (Strafprozessordnung, hereinafter referred to as CCP), stated that the Regional Court should have appointed another official expert. The proceedings had made it clear that F.S.’s expert report had been deficient. F.S. had been appointed by the public prosecutor and had delivered the basis for a bill of indictment, which showed that he was biased. F.S. had to be considered as a witness for the prosecution and not as an impartial expert assisting the court. Moreover, under Article 126 § 4 of the CCP a challenge for bias against an official expert could not be made on the grounds that he had previously been appointed as official expert in the preliminary investigations. They argued that this provision was not in line with the right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the Convention, as they did not have a real chance to counter F.S.’s expert report. This was aggravated by the fact that the expert reports commissioned by the applicants and their co-accused and submitted to the trial court had not been admitted to the file and the experts had not been summoned as requested. They therefore asked the Supreme Court to request a review of the constitutionality of Article 126 § 4 of the CCP by the Constitutional Court. 65. On 11 March 2014 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicants’ pleas of nullity and the appeals of the second applicant and of the public prosecutor, but partly granted the appeals of the first applicant, the third applicant and D.B. The sentence imposed on the third applicant was added to a sentence previously imposed on him on of 2 February 2013 (Zusatzstrafe), and the sentences imposed on the first applicant and D.B. were reduced to four and a half years and two and a half years of imprisonment respectively. 66. With regard to the alleged violation of Article 6 of the Convention, the Supreme Court found that Article 126 § 4 of the CCP should in general ensure that two different official experts were not appointed in the preliminary proceedings and the trial, as this would result in delays in the proceedings. Article 126 § 4 of the CCP did not exclude a challenge for bias, except when it was merely argued with the fact that the expert had been appointed previously in the preliminary proceedings. The requests to appoint another expert had been dismissed by the court not on the grounds of Article 126 § 4 of the CCP but for other reasons. In fact, it had dismissed the requests because the applicants had not given valid reasons for their bias challenge. It had not been shown that the expert had a close relationship with the public prosecutor that would cast doubts on his objectivity. 67. Moreover, the neutrality of the expert was ensured as he or she was obliged by law to act in an objective manner. His or her findings had to be based on facts established using scientific methods and principles. Criminal law (perjury) as well as the provisions on challenge for bias would ensure that his or her findings and conclusions were in accordance with the law. The expert was not part of the public prosecutor’s office, and the results of the proceedings had no effect on his or her payment. In the event of a dispute between the public prosecutor and the accused about the amount of the expert’s fees, it was up to the court to fix the amount and to pay the expert. 68. The Supreme Court also reasoned that in preliminary proceedings as well as in a trial, an accused could address written questions to the official expert and question him or her in court and, in so doing, the accused could be assisted by a privately appointed expert. The Supreme Court noted that the applicants had made use of this opportunity. In that way, the accused had an opportunity to show that the official expert’s report contained errors or shortcomings. If those errors or shortcomings could not be corrected by the official expert, the court had to dismiss him or her and appoint another expert to draw up a report. Furthermore, the findings and conclusions of the official expert could be challenged even before the trial stage by lodging an objection (Einspruch) against the bill of indictment, but this had not been done in the case at hand (see paragraph 50 above). 69. The Supreme Court rejected as inadmissible the first applicant’s complaint that contacts between the public prosecutor and F.S. had influenced the latter and rendered him biased vis-à-vis the accused as this complaint had not been submitted following the proper proceedings. It added, however that such a complaint was in any event ill-founded, since the initial contact between the public prosecutor and F.S. merely had the purpose of clarifying under which conditions F.S. would accept the task of drawing up an expert report and subsequent contacts consisted in supplementing the case file which had been transmitted to F.S. for drawing up the report. Thus, it could not be seen how this kind of contact could give rise to doubts as to the neutrality of the expert. 70. The Supreme Court held further that the applicants in the present case had not used their opportunity to question the competence of F.S. or to object to his appointment in the preliminary proceedings. Moreover, the Regional Court had based its findings and decision primarily not on the expert report, but on D.B.’s confession. Citing the Court’s case-law (Brandstetter v. Austria, 28 August 1991, Series A no. 211; Bönisch v. Austria, 6 May 1985, Series A no. 92; and C.B. v. Austria, no. 30465/06, 4 April 2013), the Supreme Court found that the applicants had had sufficient opportunities to question F.S. during the hearing of 9 August 2012. Consequently, the Supreme Court had no doubt that the right to equality of arms in the trial had been maintained. 71. The written decision of the Supreme Court was served on the applicants on 27 March 2014.

5. The applicants, who are husband and wife, were born in 1932 and 1926, respectively, and live in Bat-Yam, Israel. 6. In 1990s the applicants emigrated from the USSR to Israel and obtained Israeli nationality. Before emigrating, they were receiving old-age pensions from the Soviet authorities. Once the applicants left the USSR, the payments were discontinued in accordance with the USSR pension law in force at the material time. 7. On 4 August 2006 the applicants brought civil proceedings against the competent regional department of the Pension Fund of the Russian Federation (Пенсионный Фонд Российской Федерации) (hereinafter “the Pension Fund”) seeking reinstatement of their right to the pension payments. 8. On 4 December 2006 the Kirovskiy District Court of Astrakhan found in the applicants’ favour and ordered the Pension Fund to set up monthly pension payments backdated to 15 June 1998. 9. On 12 January 2007 the Astrakhan Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal and it became binding and enforceable. 10. On 10 July 2007 the Pension Fund lodged an application for supervisory review, seeking to have the judgments quashed. The application was addressed to the President of the Supreme Court. 11. On 27 July 2007 a judge of the Supreme Court requested the case file from the District Court and subsequently suspended enforcement of the judgment of 4 December 2006. 12. On 4 December 2007 another judge of the Supreme Court sent the case for supervisory review to the Astrakhan Regional Court. 13. On 22 January 2008 the Astrakhan Regional Court dismissed the supervisory review application and endorsed the judgment of 4 December 2006, as upheld on 12 January 2007. 14. On 8 April 2008 the Pension Fund lodged another application for supervisory review, again addressed to the President of the Supreme Court. 15. On 24 June 2008 a judge of the Supreme Court sent the case for supervisory review by the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court. 16. On 1 August 2008 the Civil Chamber of Supreme Court quashed the judgment of 4 December 2006, as upheld on 12 January 2007, and rejected the applicants’ claims.

5. The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Garðabær. At the material time, the applicant was a journalist and a freelance writer for the web-based media site Pressan. 6. The Federation of Icelandic Fishing Vessel Owners (hereafter “the LIU”) represented fishing vessel owners in Iceland and safeguarded their common economic, financial, legal, technical and social interests. 7. The applicant claimed that a private website, B, was publishing anonymous blogs, constantly lobbying for the LIU and discrediting persons who spoke against it. 8. On 21 July 2010 a newspaper, DV, published an article regarding rumours that the LIU was providing financial support to website B. It was alleged that this support amounted to 1,500,000 Icelandic Krónur (ISK) each month. In the article, no mention was made of the LIU’s chief executive office (hereafter “A”). 9. On the same day the applicant published an article on Pressan under the headline “LIU pays 20 million for offensive material” and referred to the article in DV. A sent a short statement to Pressan submitting that the LIU had not supported website B. The statement was published on Pressan on 23 July 2010. 10. On 24 July 2010 the applicant published an article on Pressan where he responded to A’s statement. The article stated that A had to do better than just denying that direct payments had been made to website B and that the LIU, directed by A, was accountable for the offensive material published anonymously on website B. Furthermore, the applicant called into question whether or not the respectable representatives of the LIU’s member companies had agreed to the organisation’s funds being paid through intermediaries to gossips such as the owners of website B. 11. On 26 July 2011 the applicant published a third article on the matter on Pressan. The article stated that the LIU supposedly supported website B with ISK 20 million annually through companies owned by [Mr Y], who was also the owner of website B. Furthermore, the article stated that the applicant knew that not all LIU board members were aware of the organisation’s support for the offensive material on website B since the payments were well-disguised in the organisation’s financial records. 12. Moreover, it stated that the applicant had been told that it was possible that none of the LIU’s board members knew about the organisation’s millions being used to support anonymous slander on website B and that A alone had decided to use the funds in this way. The applicant added that he had not received confirmation of the last statement. A picture of A appeared beside the text of the article. 13. On 28 December 2011 A lodged defamation proceedings against the applicant before the Reykjaness District Court and requested that the following statements be declared null and void: “A. The LIU, directed by [A], is left accountable for the offensive material that is published anonymously on the gossip [website B] 14. By judgment of 29 November 2012 the District Court found that only one of the statements, namely that under item D above, had been defamatory and ordered the applicant to pay A ISK 300,000 (approximately 2,500 euros (EUR)) in non‑pecuniary damages under the Tort Liability Act, plus interest, and ISK 450,000 (approximately 3,750 EUR) for A’s costs before the District Court. It declared the statement null and void. 15. The judgment contained the following reasons: “... [A] is the chief executive officer of the Federation of Icelandic Fishing Vessel Owners or LIU, as the Federation is called in everyday speech, and he has held the job for almost 12 years. Part of his job is, inter alia, to participate in public debate on maritime affairs and to express the views and policies of the LIU. ... In recent years there has been extensive debate on the advantages and flaws of the current fisheries management system. There are different views on this system in society, and it is of great concern, as the fishing industry is one of the fundamental and most important industries of this country. [A] has, because of his occupation, appeared publicly on behalf of the LIU and advocated the organisation’s views. The defendant, who writes on a regular basis about various social matters, has discussed the fisheries management system though his writings and criticised certain aspects of it. ... According to Article 73(1) of the Constitution no. 33/1944 everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and belief. Article 73(2) of the Constitution states that everyone shall be free to express his thoughts, but shall also be liable to answer for them in court. The law may never provide for censorship or other similar limitations to freedom of expression. Article 73(3) of the Constitution states that freedom of expression may only be restricted by law in the interests of public order or the security of the State, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights or reputation of others, if such restrictions are deemed necessary and in agreement with democratic traditions. Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms contains an equivalent provision, cf. Act no 62/1994 on the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Therefore, the present case concerns balancing the fundamental provisions on freedom of expression and the right to respect for private life. ... In the court’s view the following statement applies directly to [A]: “I know that some of the LIU board members are not aware of the financial support for the offensive writings on [website B], because the payments are well-disguised in the organisation’s financial statements. I have been told that it is possible that no members of the LIU board know that the organisation’s millions are being used to support anonymous slander on [website B] - that the CEO alone decided to use the organisation’s funds this way”. [The applicant] does not maintain that this does not apply directly to [A], his plea for acquittal is based on the fact that the statement does not imply that [A] has committed a criminal offence; furthermore he claims that this is not something he maintains, since he pointed out [in the article] that he was not able to confirm that statement. The evaluation of whether or not the statement includes an accusation of a criminal act or is defamatory will not be based on how [the applicant] understands it but on how readers are expected to perceive and interpret it. The claim that the payments to [website B] have been disguised in the organisation’s financial statements seems to imply that [A], who is responsible for the LIU’s financial accounts as the CEO of the organisation, condones accounting deception to hide the alleged support to [website B]. [The applicant] cannot prove the statement so it is considered not to be proved. The court considers that the second part of the statement, “I have been told that it is possible that no LIU board members know that the organisation’s millions are being used to support anonymous slander on [website B] - that the CEO alone decided to use the organisation’s funds in this way”, can be understood as an insinuation of fraud by abuse of position [umboðssvik] and negligence at work as it implies that [A] allocated LIU funds against the board’s will and without authorisation. [The applicant] has not shown that the statement is true, for this he carries the burden of proof. The aforementioned statement is considered to be defamatory for [A] and likely to damage his reputation and honour. In accordance with the aforementioned, and with reference to Article 241(1) of the Penal Code no. 19/1940, the statement is declared null and void.” 16. The applicant sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, which was refused on 25 February 2013.

5. The applicants were born in 1970 and 1965 respectively and live in Moscow. 6. On 13 June 2000 the prosecutor’s office opened a criminal investigation against the applicants on suspicion of fraud and tobacco smuggling. 7. On 24 November 2000 the applicants were arrested. On 27 November 2000 the prosecutor authorised their pre-trial detention. They remained in custody during the investigation and study of the case file. 8. On 12 January 2004 the City Court set a trial date of 19 January 2004. The court ordered that the applicants remain in custody pending trial. The applicant’s detention was subsequently extended on several occasions. 9. On 3 February 2005 the jury delivered a verdict of not guilty in the applicants’ case. On 4 February 2005 the City Court pronounced the judgment and ordered the applicants’ release. 10. On 22 July 2005 the Supreme Court quashed the judgment of 4 February 2005 on appeal and remitted the matter for fresh consideration. 11. On 29 July 2005 the City Court ordered the applicants to be remanded in custody pending a new trial. The court reasoned as follows: “It can be seen in [the judgment of the Supreme Court] that the verdict was quashed in view of breaches of the rules of criminal procedure by both defendants, which influenced the opinion of the jury. Therefore, the court considers that, if released, [the applicants] might interfere with the establishment of the truth and the administration of justice by putting pressure on witnesses. Regard being had to the above, to the gravity of the charges and in order to ensure compliance with the objectives of the criminal proceedings, the court grants the prosecutor’s request to remand [the applicants] in custody.” 12. On 20 September 2005 the Supreme Court upheld the decision of 29 July 2005 on appeal. 13. On 13 February 2006 the jury delivered a verdict of not guilty in the applicants’ case. On 16 February 2006 the City Court pronounced the judgment and ordered the applicants’ release. In the operative part of the judgment, the court noted that the applicants had a right to rehabilitation and could apply for compensation in respect of pecuniary damage by bringing a claim to the court which delivered the judgment in their criminal case. They could also bring a civil action seeking compensation in respect of non‑pecuniary damage resulting from the criminal prosecution against them. 14. On 21 September 2006 the Supreme Court upheld the judgment on appeal. 15. According to the official version of events, on 22 August 2002 the first applicant destroyed certain documents which had been admitted as evidence in the criminal case against him, and on 28 August 2002 he assaulted a trainee investigator. 16. On an unspecified date a criminal case was opened against the first applicant on multiple charges, including the use of violence against a law‑enforcement officer and the destruction of official documents. 17. On 30 July 2003 the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow found the first applicant guilty and sentenced him to two years’ imprisonment. 18. On 19 November 2003 the City Court upheld the first applicant’s conviction on appeal. 19. It appears that the first applicant finished serving his prison sentence on 29 July 2005.

4. The applicant was born in 1984 and lives in Volgograd. 5. On 26 October 2002 the applicant was arrested on a charge of murder. On 28 October 2002 the Traktorozavodskiy District Court of Volgograd authorised his pre-trial detention. The applicant remained in custody during the investigation and pending the trial. 6. On 24 November 2003 the Volgograd Regional Court scheduled the trial of the applicant and seven other defendants for 24 December 2003. The court also ruled that the trial was to be held in camera. 7. On 26 April 2005 the Volgograd Regional Court convicted the applicant of murder committed out of national hatred and sentenced him to nine years’ imprisonment. The applicant appealed. 8. On 22 February 2006 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the applicant’s conviction on appeal. The court decided to hear the applicant’s case in his absence. His lawyer was present and made submissions to the court. 9. On 30 August 2010 the applicant was released on parole. 10. On 8 December 2010 the Presidium of the Supreme Court quashed the judgment of 22 February 2006 by way of supervisory review and remitted the matter for fresh consideration. 11. On 1 February 2011 the Supreme Court held a new appeal hearing. The court found that the case had become time-barred under the statute of limitations and discharged the applicant from serving a prison sentence. The applicant’s lawyer was present and made submissions to the court. The applicant did not attend the hearing.

5. The applicants were domestic court judges. Proceedings were brought against them, resulting in their dismissal from the post of judge. The facts giving rise to their dismissals were established by the High Council of Justice (Вища рада юстиції, hereinafter “the HCJ”). The HCJ’s decisions were submitted to Parliament or to the President of Ukraine (depending on which of those authorities had appointed the applicants to the post of judge) for the final decisions on their dismissals. 6. The applicants further unsuccessfully challenged their dismissals before the Higher Administrative Court (“the HAC”) or other courts. 7. On 4 February 2004 the HCJ established that the applicant had breached the judicial oath. It decided to make submission to Parliament to have the applicant dismissed from the post of judge for “breach of oath”. The HCJ noted that the applicant had ignored the instructions given to him by the chairman and deputy chairman of his court. In addition, the applicant had unlawfully instituted criminal proceedings against the chairman of the court. The HCJ further noted that the applicant had disregarded the internal rules of the court, his professional competence had not improved and he had had communication difficulties with colleagues from the court. It rejected the applicant’s contentions that the dismissal proposal had not been based on the real facts and that the chairman of the court had been biased against him and had interfered with the applicant’s professional activity. The HCJ concluded that the applicant had not fairly and duly performed his duties and had to be dismissed. 8. On 22 May 2008 Parliament voted for the applicant’s dismissal and adopted a resolution to that effect. (a) Challenging the HCJ decision 9. The applicant challenged the HCJ’s decision concerning his dismissal before the courts. 10. On 13 July 2007 the Shevchenkivskyy District Court of Kyiv rejected the applicant’s claim as unsubstantiated. 11. On 26 October 2010 the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal upheld the judgment. 12. On 2 November 2010 the applicant unsuccessfully applied to the court of appeal for a copy of the decision of 26 October 2010. 13. On 17 and 19 November 2010 the applicant lodged cassation appeals against that decision with the HAC. He was not informed about the outcome of the proceedings before the HAC. (b) Challenging the parliamentary resolution 14. On 22 April 2009 the applicant challenged the parliamentary resolution of 22 May 2008 before the Kyiv Administrative Court. 15. On 13 October 2009 the court suspended the proceedings pending the outcome of the proceedings concerning the lawfulness of the HCJ’s decision. 16. On 16 August 2012 the court decided to leave the applicant’s claim without consideration on the merits. 17. On 7 June 2010 the HCJ established that the applicant had breached the judicial oath. It decided to make submission to the President of Ukraine to have the applicant dismissed from the post of judge for “breach of oath”. The HCJ noted that the applicant, acting as a first-instance judge, had disregarded the rules governing territorial jurisdiction in a case concerning a labour dispute in a State company. It further found that he had violated the rules governing the interim measures in that case. Substantial damage to the State had been caused as a result of the interim measure ordered. 18. On 6 July 2010 the President of Ukraine issued a decree dismissing the applicant from the post of judge on grounds of “breach of oath”. 19. The applicant instituted proceedings in the HAC challenging the HCJ’s decision and the Presidential decree concerning his dismissal. 20. On 28 July 2010 the HAC upheld the factual findings and legal assessments of the HCJ in the applicant’s case and dismissed the claims as unsubstantiated. 21. On 17 May 2010 the HCJ established that the applicant had breached the judicial oath. It adopted two decisions on making submissions to Parliament to have the applicant dismissed from the post of judge for “breach of oath”. The HCJ noted that the applicant had systematically made procedural mistakes when administering justice, had adopted decisions in breach of domestic law and had wrongly applied interim measures. The HCJ also considered that the applicant had incurred expenses which were manifestly incommensurate with his official income. The HCJ concluded that the facts of the case suggested that the applicant had dishonoured the judicial profession and cast doubt on his objectivity and impartiality. Objections raised by the applicant were rejected as unsubstantiated. 22. On 3 June 2010 Parliament voted for the applicant’s dismissal and adopted a resolution to that effect. 23. The applicant instituted proceedings in the HAC challenging the HCJ’s decisions and the parliamentary resolution concerning his dismissal. 24. On 13 August 2010 the HAC rejected the applicant’s claims as unsubstantiated. 25. On 11 June 2009 the HCJ established that the applicant had breached the judicial oath. It therefore decided to make a submission to Parliament to have him dismissed from the post of judge for “breach of oath”. The HCJ noted that the applicant had adopted several unlawful and unsubstantiated decisions and had failed to follow procedural rules when administering justice. Objections raised by the applicant were rejected as unsubstantiated. 26. On 3 June 2010 Parliament voted for the dismissal of the applicant and adopted a resolution to that effect. 27. The applicant instituted proceedings against Parliament challenging his dismissal before the HAC. In his claim he also argued that the conclusions of the HCJ were unfounded and unlawful; there had been violations in the proceedings before the HCJ. The HCJ joined the proceedings as a third party. 28. On 18 August 2010 the HAC rejected the applicant’s claims as unsubstantiated. It found that the HCJ’s conclusions were well-founded and that the decisions of the HCJ and Parliament were lawful. 29. On 26 May 2010 the HCJ established that the applicant had breached the judicial oath. It adopted three decisions on making submissions to Parliament to have the applicant dismissed from the post of judge for “breach of oath”. The HCJ noted that the applicant had adopted a number of unlawful and unsubstantiated decisions and that she had failed to follow procedural rules when administering justice. The HCJ considered that the applicant’s procedural mistakes had dishonoured the judicial profession, cast doubt on her objectivity and impartiality, and suggested that she had to be dismissed. Objections raised by the applicant were rejected as unsubstantiated. 30. On 17 June 2010 Parliament voted for the dismissal of the applicant and adopted a resolution to that effect. 31. The applicant instituted proceedings in the HAC challenging one of the HCJ’s decisions of 26 May 2010 and the parliamentary resolution concerning her dismissal. 32. On 23 September 2010 the HAC considered the case. It found that the HCJ’s decision was lawful and substantiated. As to the other two decisions taken on the same day by the HCJ, the HAC noted that the applicant had not challenged them. The HAC concluded that there were no grounds to examine the lawfulness of the HCJ’s other decisions. The HAC further found that the applicant’s right to participate in the plenary session of Parliament had not been respected and declared the parliamentary resolution in respect of the applicant unlawful. 33. On 23 December 2010 Parliament once again voted for the dismissal of the applicant (on the basis of the HCJ’s decisions of 26 May 2010) and adopted a resolution to that effect. 34. The applicant instituted proceedings in the HAC challenging the second resolution of Parliament. 35. On 31 May 2011 the HAC rejected the claim as unsubstantiated. It found that the procedure for the applicant’s dismissal in Parliament and the resolution to that effect were lawful. 36. On 7 June 2010 the HCJ established that the applicant had breached the judicial oath. It therefore decided to make submission to the President of Ukraine to have him dismissed from the post of judge for “breach of oath”. The HCJ noted that the applicant had wrongly applied an interim measure in a case where the Ministry of Justice had been the defendant. It concluded that the violation had cast doubt on the applicant’s objectivity and impartiality, and suggested that he had not duly performed his duties and had dishonoured the judicial profession. 37. On 18 June 2010 the applicant was dismissed by decree of the President of Ukraine. 38. The applicant challenged his dismissal before the HAC. 39. On 27 January 2011 the HAC found that the HCJ’s decision was unlawful. It then noted that the applicant had not sought to have the presidential decree concerning his dismissal “declared unlawful” but had sought the “quashing” of that decree. However, such a measure was outside the competence of the HAC. In that regard the HAC referred to Article 11 of the Code of Administrative Justice (“the CAJ”) considering that it was prevented by that provision from examining the case beyond the scope of the claims. 40. On 18 March 2014 the Acting President of Ukraine reversed the Presidential decree of 18 June 2010 concerning the applicant’s dismissal, having regard to the HAC’s decision of 27 June 2011. 41. On 19 March 2014 the applicant resumed his office of judge. 42. On 6 December 2010 the HCJ established that the applicant had breached the judicial oath. It adopted two decisions on making submissions to Parliament to have the applicant dismissed from the post of judge for “breach of oath”. The HCJ noted that the applicant had violated procedural rules when administering justice and that he had interfered with the activities of the law-enforcement authorities when they carried out a search operation. Those violations had cast doubt on the applicant’s objectivity and impartiality, and suggested that he had not performed his duties properly. The HCJ rejected the applicant’s contentions challenging the dismissal proposal. 43. On 23 December 2010 Parliament voted for the dismissal of the applicant and adopted a resolution to that effect. 44. The applicant challenged the decisions of the HCJ and Parliament concerning his dismissal before the HAC. 45. On 6 April 2011 the HAC rejected the applicant’s claims as unsubstantiated. According to the applicant, on that day the HAC delivered only the introductory and operative parts of the decision. 46. On 5 May 2011 the HAC dispatched a copy of the full text of the decision to the applicant. Allegedly, the applicant received that letter on 7 May 2011. 47. On 1 March 2011 the HCJ established that the applicant had breached the judicial oath. It therefore decided to make submission to Parliament to have the applicant dismissed from the post of judge for “breach of oath”. The HCJ noted that the applicant had adopted several unlawful and unfounded decisions, had wrongly applied an interim measure, and had committed procedural errors when administering justice. The HCJ considered that those violations had cast doubt on the applicant’s objectivity, impartiality and independence; they also suggested that she had ignored requirements of domestic law and had failed to perform her duties properly. The HCJ rejected objections raised by the applicant as unfounded. 48. The applicant challenged the HCJ’s decision before the HAC. 49. On 2 June 2011 the HAC rejected the applicant’s claim as unsubstantiated. 50. On 7 July 2011 a draft parliamentary resolution concerning the applicant’s dismissal was not adopted by a majority vote in Parliament. 51. On 3 November 2011 Parliament voted for the dismissal of the applicant and adopted a resolution to that effect. 52. On 17 May 2012 the HAC rejected as unfounded the applicant’s claim against the HCJ and Parliament concerning her dismissal, noting in particular that the HCJ decision of 1 March 2011 had been earlier reviewed by the HAC. The HAC further found no violations in the parliamentary procedure for the applicant’s dismissal. 53. On 26 May 2010 the HCJ established that the applicant had breached the judicial oath. It therefore decided to make submission to Parliament to have him dismissed from the post of judge for “breach of oath”. The HCJ noted that the applicant had participated, as a presiding judge, in the consideration of a case in which Judge V., a relative of his, had been a third party. The consideration of that case had resulted in a wrong decision, which had been quashed by a higher court. The HCJ further noted that the applicant had concealed the fact that he and Judge V. were related. The HCJ considered that those facts had cast doubt on the applicant’s objectivity and impartiality; they suggested that he had dishonoured the judicial profession, neglected the ethical rules of judicial conduct, and failed to carry out his duties properly. The HCJ rejected objections raised by the applicant as unfounded. 54. On 17 June 2010 Parliament voted for the dismissal of the applicant and adopted a resolution to that effect. 55. The applicant instituted proceedings in the HAC challenging the resolution of Parliament and arguing that the conclusions of the HCJ were unfounded and unlawful. 56. On 15 September 2010 the HAC considered the case. It noted that the applicant had not challenged the HCJ’s decision as such; nor had he indicated the HCJ as a party to the proceedings. The HAC concluded that there were no grounds to examine the lawfulness of the HCJ’s decision in respect of the applicant. It further found that the applicant’s right to participate in the parliamentary procedure had not been respected and declared the parliamentary resolution concerning the applicant unlawful. 57. On 23 December 2010 Parliament once again voted for the dismissal of the applicant (on the basis of the HCJ’s decision of 26 May 2010) and adopted a resolution to that effect. 58. The applicant instituted proceedings in the HAC, challenging the second resolution of Parliament. He claimed that the conclusions of the HCJ were unfounded and unlawful, and that there had been violations in the proceedings before the HCJ. He requested that the HCJ be admitted to the case as a third party. 59. On 5 July 2011 the HAC considered the case and rejected the claim as unsubstantiated. It noted that the applicant had not challenged the HCJ’s decision as such and found that there were no grounds to review its findings. The HAC further found that the procedure for the applicant’s dismissal in Parliament and the resolution to that effect were lawful. 60. On 6 December 2010 the HCJ established that the applicant had breached the judicial oath. It decided to make submission to Parliament to have the applicant dismissed from the post of judge for “breach of oath”. The HCJ noted that the applicant had wrongly applied domestic law in land and administrative cases and had not followed procedural rules when dealing with those cases. It concluded that those violations had cast doubt on the applicant’s objectivity and impartiality; they suggested that he had failed to carry out his duties properly and had dishonoured the judicial profession. Objections raised by the applicant were dismissed as unfounded. 61. On 21 April 2011 Parliament voted for the applicant’s dismissal and adopted a resolution to that effect. 62. On 19 May 2011 the applicant applied to the HAC challenging the HCJ’s decision and the parliamentary resolution concerning his dismissal. He also claimed that he had missed the deadline for challenging the HCJ decision because of the serious illness of his child. 63. On 21 June 2011 the HAC left the applicant’s claim against the HCJ without consideration, finding that the applicant had missed the deadline for challenging the HCJ decision without a valid reason. 64. On 21 July 2011 the HAC dismissed the applicant’s claim against the parliamentary resolution as unsubstantiated. It noted in particular that the applicant had been informed of the plenary meeting of Parliament and that his failure to appear did not give grounds for declaring the parliamentary resolution unlawful. 65. On 26 May 2010 the HCJ established that the applicant had breached the judicial oath. It therefore decided to make submission to Parliament to have the applicant dismissed from the post of judge for “breach of oath”. The HCJ found that the applicant had failed to follow procedural rules when administering justice in a corporate dispute and had adopted an unlawful decision in that case. It considered that those violations suggested that the applicant had dishonoured the judicial profession and had not acted diligently and impartially. Objections raised by the applicant were dismissed as unfounded. 66. On 17 June 2010 Parliament voted for the dismissal of the applicant and adopted a resolution to that effect. 67. The applicant instituted proceedings in the HAC challenging the HCJ’s decision and the resolution of Parliament. 68. On 18 August 2010 the HAC found that the decision of the HCJ was lawful. As to the proceedings in Parliament, the HAC found that the applicant’s right to participate in the parliamentary procedure had not been respected and declared the parliamentary resolution in respect of the applicant unlawful. 69. On 23 December 2010 Parliament once again voted for the dismissal of the applicant (on the basis of the HCJ’s decision of 26 May 2010) and adopted a resolution to that effect. 70. The applicant instituted proceedings in the HAC challenging the second resolution of Parliament. At the applicant’s request, the HCJ joined the case as a third party. 71. On 28 September 2011 the HAC considered the case and rejected the claim as unfounded. It noted that the HCJ’s decision of 26 May 2010 had been earlier reviewed by the HAC. It then found that the procedure for the applicant’s dismissal in Parliament and the resolution to that effect were lawful. 72. On 14 June 2011 the HCJ established that the applicant had breached the judicial oath. It decided to make submission to Parliament to have him dismissed from the post of judge for “breach of oath”. The HCJ noted that the applicant had adopted several unlawful decisions and had committed procedural errors when administering justice. It considered that his errors had cast doubt on his objectivity, impartiality and independence, and suggested that he had not performed his duties properly. 73. On 22 September 2011 Parliament voted for the applicant’s dismissal and adopted a resolution to that effect. 74. On 4 October 2011 the HAC dismissed a claim brought by the applicant concerning the alleged unlawfulness of the HCJ decision. 75. On 21 February 2007 the HCJ established that the applicant had breached the judicial oath. It decided to make a submission to Parliament to have her dismissed from the post of judge for “breach of oath”. The HCJ noted that the applicant had wrongly applied an interim measure in a corporate dispute by which she had groundlessly interfered with the economic activities of a company; she had also failed to follow procedural rules when administering justice in that case. The HCJ found that those violations suggested that the applicant had not acted lawfully, impartially and independently. Objections raised by the applicant were rejected as unsubstantiated. 76. On 5 June 2008 Parliament voted for the applicant’s dismissal and adopted a resolution to that effect. 77. The applicant challenged her dismissal before the Vinnytsya Administrative Court, arguing that the HCJ and Parliament had acted unlawfully. 78. On 28 November 2008 that court rejected the applicant’s claim as unfounded. 79. On 16 December 2009 the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal lodged by the applicant. 80. On 6 March 2012 the HAC dismissed a cassation appeal lodged by the applicant. 81. On 24 January 2012 the HCJ established that the applicant had breached the judicial oath. It decided to make a submission to Parliament to have him dismissed from the post of judge for “breach of oath”. The HCJ noted that the applicant had on several occasions taken leave without obtaining the relevant approval from the court administration; he had failed to appear in the office without valid reasons; he had prevented his judicial assistant from performing his functions; he had refused to take cases for consideration; and he had not complied with the requirement to submit income-tax declarations. Having regard to those facts, the HCJ found that the applicant had neglected his professional duties, dishonoured the judicial profession and had to be dismissed. 82. On 12 April 2012 Parliament voted for the applicant’s dismissal and adopted a resolution to that effect. 83. Between February and August 2012 the applicant attempted to institute proceedings in the HAC challenging the HCJ’s decision. By several decisions the HAC refused to open proceedings, noting that the applicant had failed to prepare and submit his claim in accordance with the requirements of the CAJ. 84. The applicant instituted proceedings before the HAC, challenging the parliamentary resolution on his dismissal. 85. On 5 June 2012 the HAC rejected the applicant’s claim as unsubstantiated. 86. On 24 January 2012 the HCJ established that the applicant had breached the judicial oath. It decided to make a submission to Parliament to have him dismissed from the post of judge for “breach of oath”. The HCJ noted that the applicant had on several occasions taken leave without obtaining the relevant approval from the court administration; he had failed to appear in the office without valid reason; he had refused to take cases for consideration; he had delayed the examination of criminal cases; he had prevented his judicial assistant from performing his functions; and he had not complied with the requirement to submit income-tax declarations. Having regard to those facts, the HCJ found that the applicant had neglected his professional duties, dishonoured the judicial profession and had to be dismissed. 87. On 12 April 2012 Parliament voted for the applicant’s dismissal and adopted a resolution to that effect. 88. Between February and August 2012 the applicant attempted to institute proceedings in the HAC, challenging the HCJ’s decision. By several decisions the HAC refused to open proceedings, noting that the applicant had failed to prepare and submit his claim in accordance with the requirements of the CAJ. 89. The applicant instituted proceedings before the HAC, challenging the parliamentary resolution on his dismissal. 90. On 27 June 2012 the HAC rejected the applicant’s claim as unsubstantiated. 91. On 24 January 2012 the HCJ established that the applicant had breached the judicial oath. It decided to make a submission to Parliament to have the applicant dismissed from the post of judge for “breach of oath”. The HCJ noted that the applicant had on several occasions taken leave without obtaining the relevant approval from the court administration; he had failed to appear in the office without valid reason; he had refused to take cases for consideration; he had shown disrespect to the officers of the court registry; and he had not complied with the requirement to submit income-tax declarations. Having regard to those facts, the HCJ found that the applicant had neglected his professional duties, dishonoured the judicial profession and had to be dismissed. 92. On 12 April 2012 Parliament voted for the applicant’s dismissal and adopted a resolution to that effect. 93. Between February and October 2012 the applicant attempted to institute proceedings in the HAC, challenging the HCJ’s decision. By several decisions the HAC refused to open proceedings, noting that the applicant had failed to prepare and submit his claim in accordance with the requirements of the CAJ. 94. The applicant instituted proceedings before the HAC, challenging the parliamentary resolution on his dismissal. 95. On 20 September 2012 the HAC rejected the applicant’s claim as unsubstantiated. 96. On 29 May 2012 the HCJ established that the applicant had breached the judicial oath. It decided to make submission to Parliament to have the applicant dismissed from the post of judge for “breach of oath”. The HCJ found that the applicant had committed numerous procedural errors when reviewing, under newly discovered circumstances, a case involving local authorities. The HCJ considered that the errors had been committed intentionally; they cast doubt on the applicant’s objectivity and impartiality and called for his dismissal. Objections raised by the applicant were rejected as unsubstantiated. 97. The applicant instituted proceedings in the HAC, challenging the HCJ’s decision. 98. On 21 June 2012 a draft parliamentary resolution concerning the applicant’s dismissal was not adopted by a majority vote. 99. On 4 July 2012 the HAC rejected the applicant’s claim against the HCJ as unsubstantiated. According to the applicant, he received the full text of the decision between 24 and 26 July 2012. 100. On 5 July 2012 Parliament voted for the applicant’s dismissal and adopted a resolution to that effect. 101. The applicant instituted proceedings before the HAC, challenging the resolution of Parliament. 102. On 4 September 2012 the HAC considered the case and rejected the claim as unfounded. It noted that the HCJ’s decision of 29 May 2012 had been earlier reviewed by the HAC. It further found that the parliamentary procedure for the applicant’s dismissal and the resolution to that effect were lawful. 103. On 16 October 2012 the HCJ established that the applicant had breached the judicial oath. It decided to make submission to Parliament to have her dismissed from the post of judge for “breach of oath”. The HCJ noted that the applicant, as a member of a panel of judges, had participated in the consideration of a criminal case and the adoption of the judgment in that case. Subsequently, that judgment had been partly quashed by a higher court on the grounds that it was unsubstantiated and the sentence was too lenient. The HCJ considered that the first-instance court’s judgment had had negative consequences: it had caused discontent in society, since the criminal case had been widely discussed in the media. The HCJ concluded that the applicant had disregarded the requirements of procedural law, had not acted diligently and impartially when considering the criminal case and had to be dismissed. Objections raised by the applicant were rejected as unfounded. 104. The applicant instituted proceedings before the HAC, challenging the HCJ’s decision. 105. On 28 February 2013 the HAC rejected the applicant’s claims as unsubstantiated. It noted, among other things, that the HCJ had repeatedly postponed the hearings due to the applicant’s failure to appear and had properly informed the applicant of the hearings. 106. On 23 May 2013 Parliament voted for the applicant’s dismissal and adopted a resolution to that effect.

4. The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Chișinău. 5. On 2 October 2008 the Chișinău Court of Appeal delivered a judgment acknowledging the applicant’s entitlement to a disability pension. Owing to the lack of an appeal, the judgment became final on 22 October 2008. 6. On 1 December 2008 the Ministry of Defence lodged an appeal on points of law. 7. On 4 February 2009 the Supreme Court of Justice allowed the appeal on points of law, quashed the judgment of 2 October 2008 and remitted the case for a fresh examination on the merits. After several rounds of proceedings, on 2 March 2011 the Supreme Court of Justice finally acknowledged the applicant’s entitlement to a disability pension. 8. Meanwhile, after communication, the Prosecutor General, following a request from the Government Agent, lodged an application for revision with the Supreme Court of Justice, seeking the reopening of the proceedings and redress for the violation of the applicant’s rights. In those proceedings, the applicant claimed 29,069.17 Moldovan lei (MDL) in respect of pecuniary damage, MDL 25,000 in respect of non‑pecuniary damage, MDL 29,784.60 for legal costs and MDL 4,000 for miscellaneous expenses. On 23 June 2011 the Supreme Court of Justice found a violation of the applicant’s rights as a result of the quashing of the final judgment in his favour. It set aside the judgment of 4 February 2009 and the subsequent judgments adopted in the reopened proceedings and decided to restore the final judgment of 2 October 2008 in the applicant’s favour. The court then awarded the applicant MDL 15,000 (equivalent to 890 euros (EUR)) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, MDL 15,000 for legal costs and MDL 1,000 for miscellaneous expenses. The court dismissed the applicant’s claims in respect of pecuniary damage, arguing that they could not be examined by direct application of Article 41 of the Convention.

4. The applicants were detained in Korydallos Prison in Athens when they lodged their application with the Court. 5. The first applicant was detained in Korydallos Prison on 7 March 2013, and was still in detention at the time his observations to the Court were submitted. His detention in Korydallos Prison was temporarily interrupted when he was transferred to Ioannina Prison from 3 July 2013 until 11 July 2013, and to Komotini Prison from 2 December 2013 to 17 December 2013. The second applicant was detained in Korydallos Prison on 22 March 2013 and the third applicant on 21 August 2013; they were still in detention when they submitted their observations to the Court. The fourth applicant was detained in Korydallos prison from 26 June 2013 to 1 May 2014, except for the periods from 17 July 2013 to 3 September 2013, from 27 November 2013 to 10 December 2013, and from 6 February 2014 to 17 February 2014, during which time he was detained in Chania Prison. The fifth applicant was detained in Korydallos Prison from 22 May 2013 to 19 June 2014, except for the period between 20 March 2013 and 28 March 2013. The sixth applicant was detained in Korydallos Prison from 30 January 2013 to 15 August 2014. 6. The applicants alleged that the prison held 2,400 prisoners, while it had been designed to accommodate 700. The applicants were detained in wings A and D in various cells which all measured 9 sq. m, including the space for sanitary facilities, and accommodated three or four prisoners; the living space for each prisoner was therefore less than 3 sq. m. 7. The toilet facilities were partially separated from the rest of the cell. In addition, there was insufficient heating and hot water. Inmates had to use a washbasin to wash themselves, as well as their dishes and clothes. Cells were dirty and overrun with cockroaches and other pests, and no attempt was made to exterminate them. Rubbish was not properly collected and food remains were left in the cells and corridors for days. Prisoners were not sufficiently separated according to their health conditions or whether or not they were drug users. There was no adequate medical care, in particular as regards psychological health. 8. The inmates were confined to their cells for sixteen hours per day, as recreational or educational activities were not provided. They had to take their meals, which were poor in terms of quality and nutritional value, inside their cells. 9. Moreover, the prison was understaffed and unable to secure the prisoners’ safety. 10. The Government asserted that the first to fifth applicants had been detained in various cells in wings A and D. All cells measured 9.60 sq. m. and accommodated three or, on rare occasions, four detainees. The first applicant had also been detained in two cells in wing E: one which measured 10.44 sq. m., and another which measured 42.78 sq. m. and accommodated ten to twenty-two detainees, although it had only accommodated twenty-two detainees for a short period of time. 11. All cells had a window ensuring sufficient light. Every cell was furnished with a washbasin, a toilet, beds, a table, chairs and, usually, wooden shelves. Wings A, B, C and D had twelve communal showers each, and wing E had nine communal showers. Each wing could provide 2,000 litres of hot water every day. Detainees were provided with sheets and blankets, except for when they chose to use their own. 12. The prison had a central heating system, and inmates were provided with fans during the summer. Cells were regularly disinfected and cleaned twice a day by cleaning crews consisting of detainees. All wings had rubbish bins. 13. All detainees had access to the prison’s infirmary, which was open twenty-four hours per day, and there were eighteen doctors with different areas of specialism and three nurses who offered appointments to the prisoners. When inmates’ conditions could not be dealt with in the infirmary, they were transferred to Korydallos Prison Hospital, Korydallos Psychiatric Hospital or an external hospital. The Government submitted the applicants’ medical records, to demonstrate that they had been treated on various occasions. Additionally, the prison’s social services took care of detainees’ needs, including those of the applicants, who had used those services on a number of occasions. 14. As regards prisoners’ meals, the Government submitted the menu for ten days selected at random to demonstrate that meals were varied. 15. Prisoners were able to spend four to five hours in the prison yard every day, practising sport. They were allowed to have a television in the cells, and the prison had a lending library and a book club. In addition, detainees had the opportunity to take one of the available jobs or attend “second chance” school. 16. The Government did not submit observations concerning the sixth applicant (see below, paragraphs 24-26).

5. The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Yerevan. He owned a house measuring 223.9 sq. m. and a plot of land measuring 770.3 sq. m. jointly with his mother. 6. On an unspecified date the applicant lodged a civil claim against several individuals, who were apparently his relatives residing in the house (hereafter, the respondents), seeking to terminate their right of use of accommodation in respect of a part of the house by paying compensation and to evict them. The applicant’s mother also lodged a similar claim. 7. On 24 August 2006 the respondents lodged a counter-claim seeking to invalidate the ownership certificate and to have their ownership recognised in respect of the part of the house and of the plot of land used by them by virtue of acquisitive prescription. 8. On 14 September 2006 the Shengavit District Court of Yerevan dismissed the applicant’s and his mother’s claims and granted the respondents’ counter-claim. 9. On an unspecified date the applicant lodged an appeal against the judgment of the District Court. 10. On 19 January 2007 the Civil Court of Appeal examined the appeal and granted the applicant’s claim in its part concerning the termination of the respondents’ right of use of accommodation through payment of compensation. At the same time it dismissed the respondents’ counter‑claim. 11. This judgment became immediately effective and was subject to appeal on points of law within six months from the date of its delivery. 12. On 24 April 2007 the respondents lodged an appeal on points of law with the Court of Cassation against this judgment, claiming that it had been adopted in violation of substantive law. As a ground for admitting their appeal, the respondents submitted, pursuant to Article 231.2 § 1 (1) and (3) of the Code of Civil Procedure (the CCP), that the judicial act to be adopted by the Court of Cassation might have a significant impact on the uniform application of the law and that the violation of the substantive law might cause grave consequences. 13. On 2 May 2007 the Court of Cassation decided to return the respondents’ appeal as inadmissible for lack of merit. The reasons provided were as follows: “The Civil Chamber of the Court of Cassation ... having examined the question of admitting [the respondents’ appeal lodged against the judgment of the Civil Court of Appeal of 19 January 2007], found that it must be returned for the following reasons: Pursuant to Article 230 § 1 (4.1) of [the CCP] an appeal on points of law must contain a ground [required by] Article 231.2 § 1 of [the CCP]. The Court of Cassation finds that the admissibility grounds raised in the appeal on points of law[, as required by] Article 231.2 § 1 of [the CCP], are absent. In particular, the Court of Cassation considers the arguments raised in the appeal on points of law concerning a possible judicial error and its consequences, in the circumstances of the case, to be unfounded.” 14. This decision became final from the moment of its pronouncement and was not subject to appeal. 15. On 19 July 2007 the respondents lodged another appeal on points of law with the Court of Cassation against the judgment of the Court of Appeal of 19 January 2007, alleging violations of substantive and procedural law. As a ground for admitting their appeal the respondents indicated, besides the grounds mentioned in their first appeal on points of law, that the contested judicial act contradicted a judicial act previously adopted by the Court of Cassation. 16. On 2 August 2007 the Court of Cassation decided to admit the appeal for examination, finding that it complied with the requirements of Articles 230 and 231.2 § 1 of the CCP. 17. On 10 October 2007 the Court of Cassation examined the appeal on the merits and decided to grant it by quashing the judgment of the Civil Court of Appeal of 19 January 2007 and validating the judgment of the Shengavit District Court of 14 September 2006. 18. On 15 November 2007 an ownership certificate was issued in the name of the respondents in respect of 115.4 sq. m. of the house and 387 sq. m. of the plot of land.

5. The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Bela Crkva. 6. He was employed by “Betonjerka”- DP, a socially-owned company based in Bela Crkva (hereinafter “the debtor”). 7. On 20 May 2003 the Bela Crkva Municipal Court ordered the debtor to pay the applicant specified amounts on account of salary arrears and social insurance contributions, plus the costs of the civil proceedings. On the same day this judgment became final. 8. On 14 October 2003 upon the applicant’s request to that effect, the Bela Crkva Municipal Court ordered the enforcement of the said judgment and further ordered the debtor to pay the applicant the enforcement costs. 9. The Government in its observations maintained that the said judgment had been fully enforced by the domestic decisions of 2 December 2004, 4 November 2005 and 19 May 2006 respectively. The applicant did not contest this submission. 10. On 10 February 2009 the Bela Crkva Municipal Court ordered the debtor to pay the applicant other specified amounts on account of salary arrears and social insurance contributions. In addition the domestic court ordered each party to pay its own costs of the civil proceedings. This judgment became final on 18 February 2009. 11. On 30 April 2009 upon the applicant’s request to that effect, the Bela Crkva Municipal Court ordered the enforcement of the said judgment and further ordered the debtor to pay the applicant the enforcement costs. 12. The said decision remains unenforced to the present date. 13. On 12 May 2009 the Pančevo Commercial Court opened insolvency proceedings in respect of the debtor. 14. On 22 September 2009, upon a submission to that effect, the Pančevo Commercial Court recognized the applicant’s respective claims. 15. On 27 August 2012 the Pančevo Commercial Court terminated the insolvency proceedings against the debtor, having decided to continue with the insolvency action against the debtor’s estate. 16. The insolvency proceedings are still pending. 17. On 8 August 2013 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal complaining firstly about the fairness of the insolvency proceedings. Further, he requested the Constitutional Court to adopt a decision obliging the respondent State to pay from its own funds his unpaid salaries. In particular, the applicant had referred only to the judgment which had been adopted in his favour on 10 February 2009. In so doing, the applicant also relied on the Court’s case-law related to the non-enforcement of domestic court decision rendered against socially-owned companies in Serbia. 18. On 31 March 2015 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal finding that it is not vested with the power of the insolvency court to enable the payments of the claims recognized in the insolvency proceedings.

5. The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Kharkiv. 6. Late in the evening of 15 August 2010 the applicant had a fight with his neighbour. The neighbour complained to the police that the applicant had injured him. 7. On the morning of 16 August 2010 the police took the applicant to the Kyivskyy District police station in Kharkiv (“the district police”). The applicant was at the police station from 7 a.m. to 9.45 a.m. and gave evidence in relation to the fight with his neighbour. The applicant claimed that he had acted in self-defence. According to the Government, at 9.45 a.m. the applicant left the police station and had no further contact with the police during the period at issue. His presence at the police station from 7 a.m. to 9.45 a.m. was noted in the police’s records. 8. According to the applicant, at 9.45 a.m., as he left the police station, police officers took him and drove him to a forest where they beat him up and tortured him using handcuffs and an electric shock device. The police officers then took the applicant to another part of the police station that he had just left, where they continued to ill-treat him. During that time the police officers put pressure on the applicant to admit that he had intended to murder his neighbour. On 19 August 2010 they released him. 9. On 21 August 2010, following the applicant’s complaint to the internal security unit of the Kharkiv Region police, he was examined by a forensic medical expert. The latter found that the applicant had sustained bruises on his head, nose, upper lip and chest. The expert considered those injuries as being minor and that they could have been caused by blunt, solid objects during a period of three to five days before the medical examination. 10. On 25 August 2010 the assistant prosecutor of the Kyivskyy District prosecutor’s office of Kharkiv (“the prosecutor’s office”) inspected the premises of the police station where the applicant had allegedly been ill-treated. He found traces of a brown substance on the floor, wall, and balcony, as well as on the pillowcase and two mattress covers. Samples of the substance were taken and submitted to an expert for examination. 11. On 26 August 2010 the expert stated that the brown substance was blood. 12. The prosecutor’s office then questioned police officers A., M.B., M.A. and G. They all denied the allegations of ill-treatment and submitted that the applicant had sustained the injuries before being taken to the police station, namely during the scuffle with his neighbour. The officers stated that the applicant’s nose had been injured before and that it bled from time to time, that he had been offered an antiseptic tissue, that he had declined an offer by the police officers to go to a hospital and that he had continued voluntarily to give evidence about the fight with his neighbour. They also mentioned that the applicant had gone on to the balcony to have a smoke where he might have left traces of blood. 13. On 7 and 8 October 2010 the applicant submitted further complaints of ill-treatment to the internal security unit of the Kharkiv Region police and the prosecutor’s office. 14. On 29 October 2010 the prosecutor’s office, having completed its pre-investigation inquiry, refused to initiate criminal proceedings concerning the applicant’s allegations that he had been ill-treated by police officers between 16 and 19 August 2010. According to that decision, the applicant had only been present at the district police station between 7 a.m. and 9.45 a.m. on 16 August 2010 and there had been no evidence suggesting that the police officers had been involved in any alleged ill‑treatment or unlawful detention. The applicant challenged that decision in the courts. 15. On 23 February 2011 the Kyivskyy District Court of Kharkiv (“the District Court”) found that the decision of 29 October 2010 by the prosecutor’s office had been lawful and substantiated. The applicant appealed. 16. On 11 April 2011 the Court of Appeal upheld the District Court decision of 23 February 2011. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. 17. On 9 February 2012 the Higher Specialised Court for Civil and Criminal Matters quashed the District Court decision of 23 February 2011 as unfounded and remitted the case to the District Court for fresh consideration. 18. On 10 May 2012 the District Court reversed the decision of the prosecutor’s office of 29 October 2010, finding that the measures taken to examine the applicant’s allegations had been insufficient. The court ordered a further pre-investigation inquiry to establish the applicant’s whereabouts between 16 and 19 August 2010 and the circumstances in which he had sustained his injuries. 19. On 27 June 2012 the prosecutor’s office refused to initiate criminal proceedings against the police officers for lack of corpus delicti. According to the decision, which referred to the explanations by the police officers and other evidence, the applicant had left the police station at 9.45 a.m. on 16 August 2010 and there had been no involvement of the officers in any unlawful action in relation to the applicant. 20. On 19 May 2014 the applicant lodged a complaint under the Code of Criminal Procedure of 2012 (“the CCP of 2012”), alleging that he had been ill-treated by police officers. 21. On 11 August 2014 the Kharkiv Region prosecutor’s office commenced a pre-trial investigation in relation to the alleged events of 16 to 19 August 2010. 22. On 13 November 2014 a forensic medical expert issued a report repeating the findings of the forensic report of 21 August 2010 as regards the documented injuries. 23. On 15 December 2014 the Kharkiv Region prosecutor’s office terminated the investigation, finding that the applicant’s allegations had been refuted by the statements of the police officers, other witnesses, and documentary and medical evidence which suggested that the applicant might have sustained minor injuries during his fight with the neighbour on 15 August 2010. 24. On 15 September 2010 a forensic medical expert issued a report stating that the applicant’s neighbour had sustained three incised wounds, one of which had been on the neck. 25. On 23 September 2010 the district police opened criminal proceedings in relation to the moderately severe injuries sustained by the applicant’s neighbour during the fight of 15 August 2010. Subsequently, the case was classified as attempted murder. 26. At 2.45 p.m. on 9 December 2010 an investigator with the district police arrested the applicant on suspicion of attempted murder. The investigator relied on Article 115 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1960 (“the CCP of 1960”). As regards the grounds for the applicant’s arrest without a court decision, the investigator cited the three sub-paragraphs of the first paragraph of Article 106 of the CCP of 1960 (see paragraph 45 below). He further noted in his report that the applicant had been suspected of attempted murder, that he had a record of serious offences, and that his arrest would prevent the applicant from absconding and impeding the execution of a judgment. The investigator then charged the applicant and questioned him in relation to the case. 27. On 10 December 2010 the District Court ordered the applicant’s pre‑trial detention. It stated that the applicant had been charged with a serious crime, that he had two criminal offences on his record, and that he had no official income. The court concluded that there was a risk that if the applicant remained at liberty he might impede the establishment of the truth, hide evidence, influence the investigation, abscond or reoffend. The court further considered that a personal guarantee, which had been offered by an NGO in respect of the applicant, would not ensure his proper conduct during the criminal proceedings. Furthermore, there had been no suggestion that the applicant could not be held in a detention facility for health reasons. 28. On 16 December 2010 the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”) dismissed an appeal by the applicant against the decision of 10 December 2010, finding that there were sufficient grounds to keep him in custody. 29. On 4 February 2011 a bill of indictment was approved by the prosecutor and the case file was sent to the District Court. 30. On 25 February 2011 the District Court committed the applicant for trial on a charge of attempted murder. As regards the preventive measure, the court ruled that the applicant should be held in custody. It stated that the applicant had been charged with a serious offence, that he was unemployed, had refused to admit his guilt, and that he had two serious offences on his criminal record. The court pointed out that no new information had been added to the material which had been examined earlier by the District Court and the Court of Appeal when deciding on keeping the applicant in custody. 31. On 11 May, 1 July and 29 September 2011 the District Court dismissed applications by the applicant for a change in the preventive measure and maintained its earlier decision to keep him in custody. The court stated that the applicant had been charged with a serious offence, was unemployed, had a criminal record, and had refused to admit his guilt. As to the question of bail, the court noted that no document had been produced to suggest that any funds were available for that purpose. 32. On 12 March 2012 the applicant was released from custody after giving a written undertaking not to abscond. The District Court stated that the trial was in its final stages so the applicant could no longer impede the establishment of the truth. The applicant also had a permanent place of residence where he lived with his family. 33. On 13 August 2012 the District Court convicted the applicant of inflicting minor bodily injuries on his neighbour. The court found that attempted murder had not been established during the trial. It sentenced the applicant to two years of restriction of liberty. Having regard to the period of the applicant’s pre-trial detention, the court found that the sentence had been served. 34. On 14 February 2013 the Kharkiv Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of 13 August 2012. 35. On 9 December 2010, following his arrest and questioning (see paragraph 26 above), the applicant was placed in a police cell. According to the applicant, on the evening and night between 9 and 10 December 2010 police officers beat him up at the police station. 36. As the applicant had complained about his health, he was examined late in the evening of 9 December 2010 by a panel of doctors who found no injuries on his body. 37. On 10 December 2010 the hearing before the District Court concerning the preventive measure in the applicant’s case was interrupted because the applicant had to be provided with medical care. The ambulance team which arrived at the court stated that the applicant had concussion, a haematoma by the left eye and a bruise on his chest. The applicant complained that the injuries had been inflicted by police officers. 38. On the same day the deputy prosecutor of the Kyivskyy District of Kharkiv ordered that the applicant be examined and asked the medical expert to detail, among other things, the nature, quantity, location, and severity of his injuries. He also asked the expert to state whether the injuries could have been inflicted by the applicant himself. 39. On 11 December 2010, following the court decision of 10 December 2010 to hold the applicant in custody (see paragraph 27 above), he was taken under escort to the Kharkiv pre-trial detention centre. Upon arrival he was examined by the medical staff who documented the following injuries: a haematoma by the left eye, bruises on the left abdominal area and neck, a haematoma on the right thigh, and swelling in his genitals. 40. On 13 December 2010 a doctors’ panel examined the applicant and found that he had sustained bruising on the soft tissue of his head and had a haematoma on his left eyelid. 41. On 14 December 2010 the applicant was examined by a forensic medical expert as requested (see paragraph 38 above). In his report of 15 December 2010 the expert stated that the applicant had sustained bruises on his face, neck, chest, left shoulder, right leg and right shin. The expert considered the injuries to be minor and that they had been inflicted by blunt, solid objects during a period of between three to six days before the examination. The expert added that all the injuries could have been self‑inflicted. 42. On 21 December 2010 the prosecutor’s office, having concluded its pre-investigation inquiry, refused to open criminal proceedings concerning alleged police brutality against the applicant on 9 and 10 December 2010. According to the decision, there had been no evidence suggesting that the applicant’s injuries documented after the alleged ill-treatment had been caused by police officers. The decision referred to the police officers’ statements that the applicant had inflicted the injuries on himself. 43. The applicant challenged that decision before the District Court, but received no reply. In 2012, 2013 and 2015 he made applications to the District Court in relation to his complaint, but to no avail.

5. The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Węglówka. 6. At about 5 p.m. on 26 January 2009 the applicant and his wife went by car from their home to another village. The applicant’s wife was driving. The car had been borrowed from the applicant’s friend. On a narrow section of the road they saw a police car trying to stop another car. The applicant’s wife, who apparently considered it an unsafe place to stop other cars, overtook the police vehicle and sounded the horn, though she claims to have done this by accident. 7. While being overtaken, the police officers noticed that the car driven by the applicant’s wife had no left rear light and that its rear registration plate was not lit. They decided to stop the car to inspect it. 8. They overtook the applicant and his wife, stopped the car and requested the relevant documents. They considered that the registration document of the car was partly illegible. According to the applicant, he read the contents of the registration document aloud to the officers. They tried to contact the Nowy Targ police station to confirm the identity of the driver but to no avail. The applicant and his wife spent about half an hour in the car at the side of the road. He then requested that they all drive to the police station because he wanted to speak to the officers’ supervisor. They all drove to the police station in Jabłonka, but there was no one there, so the police officers continued the inspection on the street outside. 9. They found that, apart from the light that did not work, the fire extinguisher in the car was too small. They wanted to fine the applicant’s wife 200 Polish zlotys (PLN). The applicant then told her: “do not sign anything for those beggars” (“Nie podpisuj nic tym dziadom”). The officers felt offended and one of them told the applicant that he would be arrested for insulting police officers. 10. According to the applicant, by that time the “routine” inspection had already lasted for about two hours, and he and his wife were getting nervous. His wife began to cry because the officers wanted to take her to the police station for questioning. The policemen repeated “this will cost a lot” each time they found a fault with the car. He therefore considered that they wanted him to bribe them and referred to them as “beggars”. According to the applicant, he was trying to defend his wife who, after two hours of intervention, was very anxious and upset. The officers claimed that the applicant had been disturbing their routine activities. As established by the domestic courts in the set of proceedings against the police officers, when one of the police officers had told the applicant that he would be arrested, the applicant pushed the police officer and started to run away. 11. As established by the domestic courts in the set of proceedings against the applicant, on the basis of the testimony of the policemen, after the comment made by the applicant the police officers tried to apprehend him, however he resisted arrest and moved a few steps back. Officer J.B. then forcefully put the applicant onto the ground and pressed down on him with his knee. The applicant continued to resist and try to get away and then kicked J.B. several times in his left leg. The other officer, D.B., then used pepper spray against him. When the applicant calmed down he was handcuffed. 12. The applicant was subsequently taken to the police station. His wife informed the policemen that her husband had heart problems, so they called an ambulance. The doctor who came to the police station considered that the applicant needed to be examined in a hospital so he was taken to Nowy Targ. After examination he was placed in police custody (Policyjna Izba Zatrzymań). He was released the following day. Apparently after his release he was examined again in a hospital in Myślenice. 13. The relevant notes from the hospitals, in so far as they were legible, contained the following information. 14. Notes by the Nowy Targ Hospital on 26 January 2009 read: “Skin bruising on the right hand. Chemical burn to the right eye.” 15. A document dated 27 January 2009 confirming the applicant’s release from the Myślenice Hospital read: “He claims that yesterday he was beaten up by the police officers who used pepper spray on him. Skin bruising on the right hand, chemical burn to the right eye, reddish conjunctivitis in the right eye.” 16. The applicant also submitted a copy of a medical certificate requesting that he be examined by an ophthalmologist, because of “burns from pepper spray”. The note was marked “urgent” but bore no date. 17. On 28 January 2009 the applicant lodged a complaint about his arrest with the Nowy Targ District Court (“the District Court”). He submitted that he had been apprehended by force and put onto the ground, that the police had used a whole container of pepper spray and that he had many scratches and bruises. He had been released from the police custody facility at about midday and let out by the back door without a jacket or any money. He had had to walk until he had found a taxi driver who had agreed to give him a lift and call his wife, who had apparently been waiting at the police station since 10 a.m. and had had no idea that he had been released and let out by the back door. 18. On 4 February 2009 the District Court refused to allow the applicant’s complaint. It found that in his complaint he had presented “his own version of events” and that his arrest had been lawful because “although there was no fear that he might go into hiding there was a reasonable suspicion that he might influence the testimony of a witness to the events in question”. The court also considered that at the moment of the arrest there were grounds to suspect the applicant of having committed the offence referred to in Article 226 § 1 of the Criminal Code and there were grounds to bring proceedings against him in an expedited manner. Having examined the grounds, legality and appropriateness of the applicant’s arrest, the court found no shortcomings. It appears that the court did not hear evidence from any witnesses; it based its findings on a note made by the police and the arrest and examination records. The court did not refer to the applicant’s allegations as regards the use of excessive force by the police. 19. On 22 February 2009 the police lodged an indictment against the applicant with the District Court. He was charged with offending police officers on duty and breaching the personal inviolability of a police officer by kicking him. On 8 April 2009 in his reply to the bill of indictment, when describing the “kicking” he stated that these could have been involuntary movements as he had been pushed to the ground and pressed down on with a police officer’s knee and pepper spray had been directed into his face. He submitted that he had not intended to hit anybody. 20. On 28 May 2009 the District Court found the applicant guilty as charged and conditionally discontinued the proceedings against him. The court held that in his statements the applicant had not actually denied kicking the police officer J.B. as he could not rule out that he had made the movements with his legs involuntarily, without the intention of hitting anybody. He was also ordered to pay PLN 200 to charity and the costs of the proceedings. 21. On 24 July 2009 the applicant appealed. He submitted that he did not feel guilty; on the contrary, he had been a victim. He also considered that he could not have violated anybody’s personal inviolability because he had been pressed against the ground and two officers had been sitting on his back trying to handcuff him. 22. On 8 September 2009 the Nowy Sącz Regional Court quashed the first-instance judgment and discontinued the proceedings, finding that the prohibited acts committed by the applicant had not constituted offences because the resulting harm to the public was insignificant (znikoma szkodliwość społeczna czynu). 23. On 28 January 2009 the applicant reported the two police officers who had arrested him on 26 January 2009 to the Nowy Targ District Prosecutor for abuse of power. 24. On 25 February 2009 the District Prosecutor opened an investigation into their alleged abuse of power. 25. On 11 March 2009 the applicant and his wife were questioned. On 9 April 2009 the prosecutor questioned officers D.B. and J.B. 26. On 16 April 2009 the District Prosecutor discontinued the investigation, finding that no offence of abuse of power had been committed. Referring to the relevant provisions of domestic law, in particular the 1990 Police Act, the prosecutor found that the police had had the right to use force because “the applicant had not obeyed their orders, had behaved nervously and had tried to run away”. 27. The applicant appealed. He argued, among other things, that the prosecutor had not properly examined the circumstances of the case; the officers had apprehended him for no legal reason. The applicant admitted that he had been nervous because of the inspection which had lasted for about two hours, but considered that this could not have been the basis for his arrest. He further submitted that the officers had used excessive force, inappropriate in the circumstances; they had put him onto the ground with his face down and had sat on his back and used pepper spray to incapacitate him. He had had injuries afterwards and had to take over a month’s sick leave. He also referred to the circumstances of his release from the police station and the fact that his wife, who had been waiting there for him, had not been informed that he had left by the back door. 28. On 12 August 2009 the District Court upheld the challenged decision discontinuing the investigation. It found that the applicant had again repeated his version of events which the prosecutor had found not to be credible. The court did not refer in any way to his submissions as regards his injuries. It found that the “circumstances of the applicant’s arrest [had already been] examined because the applicant had complained about his arrest and his complaint [had been] dismissed”. The court further held that “it had been reprehensible not to have informed the applicant’s wife of the applicant’s release but this had not constituted any offence”.

5. The applicant was born in 1981 and lives in Niš. 6. On 2 February 1999 the applicant gave birth to a daughter, A.C. One year later, she married V.C. (“the respondent”), her daughter’s biological father. 7. On 1 February 2005 V.C. lodged a claim with the Niš Municipal Court, seeking dissolution of the marriage, custody of A.C. and child maintenance. 8. On 16 May 2005 the Niš Social Care Centre granted the applicant interim care and custody of A.C. until the marriage was dissolved. 9. On 23 June 2005, while the applicant and A.C. were visiting a mental care institute where the child was undergoing treatment for her disturbed mental health as a result of her parents’ divorce, V.C. forcibly removed A.C. from the applicant’s custody and, in so doing, assaulted the latter physically, knocking her unconscious. 10. On 25 July 2005 the Niš Municipal Court issued an interim custody order requiring that V.C. surrender custody of A.C. to the applicant until the end of the marriage dissolution proceedings. 11. On 5 August 2005 a bailiff accompanied the applicant to the respondent’s home, requesting that the child be surrendered. The respondent’s father and A.C. were also present. The respondent stated that he would not prevent the mother from seeing her child but refused to hand her over, even if it meant paying a fine, claiming that the applicant could not provide suitable living conditions for A.C. and that A.C. preferred living with him. 12. Faced with the respondent’s failure to comply with the enforcement order, on 12 August 2005 the Niš Municipal Court ordered him to pay a fine in the amount of 10,000 Serbian dinars (RSD; approximately 120 euros (EUR)), within three days and to return the child to her mother by the same deadline. 13. On 18 August 2005 the bailiff again went to the respondent’s home, but there was no one there. On the same day the court contacted the Niš Social Care Centre asking for urgent action, since the applicant alleged that domestic violence was taking place there. 14. On 22 August 2005, the social care centre informed the court that it had advised the applicant and the respondent to visit a mental care institute in order to be provided with appropriate guidance in communicating with each other and in order for the child to resume the interrupted course of treatment. The court was informed that the Doljevac Social Care Centre had taken over responsibility for the case, since that was where the respondent’s residence was located. 15. On 12 September 2005 the Municipal Court ordered the respondent to pay a further fine in the amount of RSD 50,000 (approximately EUR 590) and to return A.C. to her mother. 16. On 15 September 2005 the respondent and his father contacted the court, declaring that the child did not want to go to her mother and refusing to pay the fine. 17. On 20 September 2005 a new attempt was made to enforce the interim order, this time in the presence of a psychologist from the Doljevac Social Care Centre, civilian police officers, the enforcement judge, a bailiff and the applicant. The child started to cry and refused to go with the applicant. The respondent stated that he had spoken with the child, encouraging her to go and live with her mother if she wanted, but the child had refused. The applicant was of the opinion that the child had been given instructions and put under pressure and was in fact strongly attached to her. She wanted to take the child immediately, regardless of her behaviour. The psychologist was against forcible transfer of the custody, claiming that it could have a negative influence on the child’s mental health and lead to autism. The child had already showed some of those symptoms, but they stopped after she had moved into her father’s home, where she had been living for five years. The psychologist proposed that mother and child start to meet under the supervision of the Centre on its premises. She also noted in the minutes that the parents should cease their manipulation of the child. 18. On 3 October 2005 the first meeting between mother and child was held on the premises of the Centre, but the applicant later told the court that it had not been successful because the child was allegedly subjected to pressure by her father. 19. At the next meeting, held on 14 October 2005, the child was constantly holding on to her father, crying and avoiding contact with her mother. The psychologist was not present during the meeting, being on sick leave at the time. After leaving the premises of the Niš Social Care Centre, the applicant and respondent and other persons present started to fight. The respondent’s father allegedly physically attacked the applicant. The court informed the Doljevac Social Care Centre about the incident, seeking advice as to how to proceed further. 20. On 2 March 2006 the applicant asked the court to enforce the interim custody order in the presence of the police. 21. The enforcement of the interim order was to be attempted on 20 March 2006 on the premises of the Niš Social Care Centre in the presence of the judge, a psychologist and a teacher from the Centre, the applicant and the respondent’s representative. The respondent and the child did not appear. The child was allegedly ill. 22. On 29 May 2006 the next enforcement attempt was made. The respondent again failed to appear. According to his representative, he had not been properly summoned. At the hearing, two psychologists were present, one from the Niš Social Care Centre and the other from the Doljevac Social Care Centre. Both gave their opinion concerning the forced return of the child to her mother, the psychologist from Niš contending that it was the only option, since the father was not willing to hand over the child voluntarily, and the psychologist from Doljevac arguing against it, on the basis that it could have a negative influence on the child’s further development. 23. The enforcement attempt scheduled for 13 June 2006 was also postponed due to the absence of the respondent and his representative. 24. On 29 June 2006 the respondent appeared without the child, because she was allegedly sick, but he did not submit any evidence in support of this allegation. Throughout the meeting he claimed that he was willing to hand over the child to the mother but that the child was refusing to cooperate. 25. On 27 July 2006 the court again ordered the respondent to pay a fine in the amount of RSD 20,000 and to return the child to her mother. 26. On 25 December 2006 the court asked the Niš Mental Care Institute to prepare an opinion concerning the enforcement of the interim custody order because of the difficulties encountered in the proceedings. 27. The Niš Mental Care Institute issued an experts’ report on 28 June 2007. The report contained the opinions of a psychologist, a sociologist and a neuropsychiatrist, all of whom had conducted interviews with the child and both her parents. The experts found that the child’s intellectual ability was on the low side and that her emotional and social maturity was underdeveloped as a result of the family situation. They also found that both parents were manipulating the child and not doing what was in her best interests. Their ultimate opinion was that the forcible removal of the child from her father and her current social environment without proper psychological preparation could at that stage provoke certain psychological disorders. The experts advised that the child should receive psychological and social counselling to help her overcome her resistance towards her mother, that the father and his family should be helped to change their attitude and stop influencing the child’s opinion towards her mother, and that both parents should receive counselling on how to behave in the best interests of the child. 29. On 12 June 2008 and 28 May 2009 the Niš District Court and the Supreme Court of Serbia upheld the Municipal Court’s judgment at second and third instance, respectively. 30. All of the above-mentioned courts reasoned that, “notwithstanding her earlier forcible removal from ... [the applicant’s custody] ...”, it was in the best interests of A.C. to remain with her father since a separation could prove psychologically detrimental. In support of this conclusion, the courts referred to a separate opinion drafted by the Doljevac Social Care Centre, in addition to an expert’s report, stating that it would indeed be advisable for A.C. to remain in the environment to which she had become accustomed, where she was surrounded by love and care, and where she had made social connections (see paragraph 27 above). 31. In addition, the Supreme Court found that there was no evidence that the respondent had committed acts of violence against the child or the applicant. 33. The applicant never sought enforcement of the judgment of 14 January 2008 as regards the weekly meetings with the child. 34. On 16 March 2010 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Constitutional Court, alleging a breach of her parental and family rights, essentially complaining about the non-enforcement of the Municipal Court’s interim custody order of 25 July 2005. She also argued that the Supreme Court’s ultimate ruling on the issue of A.C.’s custody had failed to take into account the child’s best interests and had instead retroactively endorsed V.C.’s violent and unlawful conduct and had permanently separated her from her child. 35. On 15 March 2012 the Constitutional Court dismissed the complaint regarding the interim custody order of 25 July 2005 for being out of time, having been lodged more than 30 days after the applicant had been served with the District Court’s judgment of 12 June 2008. With respect to the applicant’s complaint regarding the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court rejected it on the merits, accepting the Supreme Court’s reasoning entirely. 36. On 19 October 2007 the Niš Municipal Court found V.C. guilty of unlawfully removing A.C. from the applicant’s custody and sentenced him to six months’ imprisonment, suspended for a period of two years. The respondent was ordered to return the child to the applicant within fifteen days of the date on which the judgment became final. This judgment was upheld by the Niš District Court on 8 April 2008. 37. On 18 August 2008, acting upon the applicant’s initiative, the Niš municipal public prosecutor requested the revocation of the respondent’s probation, but withdrew the request on 16 December 2008 because the respondent had in the meantime been granted custody of A.C. On 25 December 2008 the Municipal Court terminated the proceedings seeking revocation of the probation. 38. Following the applicant’s claim for review of the judgment of 14 January 2008, on 12 October 2012 the Niš Municipal Court granted the applicant custody of A.C. and ordered V.C. to contribute towards her maintenance on a monthly basis. In its reasoning the court explained that A.C. had stated that she now wanted to live with the applicant and that V.C. himself no longer had any objections to this arrangement. This judgment became both final and enforceable on 10 November 2012 and A.C. moved to the applicant’s flat shortly thereafter. 39. In July 2013 the Niš Public Prosecutor’s Office received a criminal complaint that had been lodged against V.C. for failure to make maintenance payments. 40. It would appear that the applicant re-established contact with her daughter on 19 August 2012, that is to say after a period of seven years, and soon afterwards A.C. went to live with the applicant. However, it seems from the documents submitted by the Government that the mother-daughter relationship was not well re-established. A.C. kept returning to her father whenever she had a misunderstanding with her mother. She even gave a statement to the police to the effect that her mother was maltreating her. 41. On 27 August 2015 A.C. moved to her father’s home and it appears that she is still living with him by choice. It would also appear that the respondent filed a claim for review of the judgment of 12 October 2012 on custody of A.C. and that those proceedings are still pending.

5. The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Prague. 6. In the period between 30 December 2005 and 8 June 2006 the applicant was found to have addressed emails to C., his former partner, stating, among other things: “... It is this [C.] that I wish to see; I don’t want to meet the other one again. I gave up the possibility of keeping her at bay by any means (such as pictures of her injecting drugs, pictures of her offering prostitution services or pictures of her masturbating), because I have so much respect for her that I did not want to spend any more hours trying to pull off dirty tricks on her, naively believing that the second time I would be able to open her eyes to the truth. ... You say that you are scared of me. Well, get rid of that fear finally; otherwise we cannot even be very good friends ... I suggest we draw a line under the past, particularly the evil period, and turn over a new leaf. In the same spirit, I suggest not talking about the evil things ever again; otherwise you will not be able to get rid of your fear ... ... Are we really only able to talk to each other when I yell at you or tie you up or abduct you in my car, or do I have to think up a similar dirty trick? Do I have to become evil before you can hear me out and are willing to talk to me? You are not going to believe me, but it hurt me that I had to lower myself to that level. ... It’s a pity that one has to abduct you or tie you up, in other words simply use means of physical restraint in order to make you listen and carefully think about and evaluate what they have told you. I would be happier if you could do so without such actions ... ... promise made in the car ... Because I have not humiliated you either, although I had a good opportunity to do so. I could have taken pictures of you, forced you to make a porn movie and sent it to all those people in England. I could have forced you to sign whatever I wished for, and I know that you would forced yourself to sign whatever I wished and I know that you would have done it at that moment. Do not wonder about the things I am able to think about; wonder about why I have not done so ... I will tell her everything about what I have done to you as well as why I have done it; I will give her your contact details, and maybe she can help us become closer ... I told the psychologist everything about what I have done to you, ... how I was bad to you, including the threats I have recently made in order to make you hear me out. When I told her about how I tied you up, she replied that I must not do that to you ever again and that I should be glad that you have not turned me in ... On Monday, it will be one month since that last time I threatened you and intimidated you ... ... all my threats are really just my defensive response to various feelings of injustice ... When you were at my place, I could have done whatever I wanted with you; but I’m not like that, it is hard to hurt you in any way because I love you ... If you cannot accept it, I will not do anything more than what I have repeated a thousand times when we made that agreement at Christmas ... I will do or pay someone to do something that will harm you. Ranging from pettiness to heavy force that would be in violation of the law ... [C.], I’m slowly starting to realise that my feelings for you are heading towards freezing point and hatred is starting to prevail ...” 7. On 7 June 2006 C. made a statement about the applicant’s threatening telephone calls and emails at the police station in Surrey (the United Kingdom). On the next day, upon police advice, she changed her telephone number and email address. 8. On 23 June 2006 the Prague 1 District Prosecutor’s Office (obvodní státní zástupce) received an anonymous criminal complaint containing allegations of the sexual abuse of children. The female informer indicated that a certain C. had confessed that she had participated in sexual abuse whilst working as an au pair in the United Kingdom. 9. In July 2006 several individuals including the applicant were questioned in connection with the criminal investigation into the criminal complaint. 10. On 13 July 2006 C.’s mother made a statement at the police station in Prague 1 according to which the applicant had tied C. up in his apartment and had shown her a bag in which he intended to carry her away. She stated, in particular, that: “On 6 June 2006, my daughter called me, asking me whether I had time and that maybe I should sit down. She informed me that she had not been dating [L.], as she had claimed the entire time she dated [the applicant], but that instead she had been dating [the applicant], who had allegedly threatened and was currently still threatening her with physical annihilation if she would not resume her relationship with him; he had also demanded that [C.] continue to have sexual relations with him. She decided to tell me about the entire matter only after he had allegedly sent her an email with the words ... ‘and don’t forget that you have a family – mother, brother – back at home’ ... Given her experience of him, [C.] considers it very likely that this threat could be carried out by [the applicant]. Since that time she had changed her email address and phone number; she also informed me that she had changed her place of residence in England because she did not want to have contact with him any more. In addition, my daughter informed me that she had also reported the entire matter in England, where she had been questioned about the matter after suffering a mental breakdown there. This condition of my daughter was caused by the actions of the [applicant], who had continuously been sending her emails and threatening her. My daughter said that she had these emails at her disposal ... In addition, I learned from my daughter that [the applicant], during the period when he was communicating and was able to communicate with her, had told her that she could come back to him, that she was in no danger from him because he had started seeing a psychologist ... in order to reduce or eradicate his violent behaviour, which he was aware of and had been using against her – against [C.] ...” 11. On 19 July 2006 C.’s female friend D.B. stated that, in a letter of 28 January 2006, C. had confided in her about the forcible coercion by the applicant, which had taken place on 29 December 2005. She further stated that, at about the same time, C. had called her from the United Kingdom, telling her that the applicant had been menacing her and her family with threats to their lives. In addition, she said that the applicant had contacted her by SMS, by phone and by email. She submitted the letter to the police. 12. On 7 August 2006 the police asked the Prague 6 District Prosecutor’s Office to apply for an “urgent or non-repeatable measure” (neodkladný nebo neopakovatelný úkon) pursuant to Article 158a of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter “the CCP”), and the following day an interview with C. was conducted. The request included a very detailed justification explaining that the applicant had forcibly coerced C. in the Czech Republic as well as in the United Kingdom, where she had filed a criminal complaint. At the time of making that request, C. had been living and working in the United Kingdom but arrived back in the Czech Republic for the purpose of her interview on 8 August 2006. Her employment and the distance between the place of her employment and Prague, where she was interviewed, made it impossible for her to travel more often to the Czech Republic, where she did not feel safe anyway, given the prior events. 13. On the same day, a prosecutor at the District Prosecutor’s Office asked the Prague 6 District Court (obvodní soud) to secure the presence of a judge during C.’s interview, which was to be carried out as an urgent and non-repeatable measure. 14. On 8 August 2006 the police interviewed C. as a witness in the presence of a judge pursuant to Article 158a of the CCP. At that time, the applicant had not been charged and was therefore not present at the interview. C. stated at the outset that: “... [S]ince September 2005 I have been working as an au pair in the United Kingdom. ... I arrived in the Czech Republic on the basis of an agreement with the police authorities of [the Czech Republic] and upon the advice of my employer, ..., who is a police officer, after the actions of [the applicant] reached such an intensity that I started to be really scared.” She further stated that the applicant had not come to terms with the fact that she had broken off their intimate relationship. She described in detail the acts of intimidation conducted by him in the form of phone calls, SMS messages, emails, letters and verbal threats. She also stated that on 29 December 2005, between 12 noon and 4.30 p.m., she had been present in the applicant’s flat, where he had tied her to the bed, partially undressed the lower part of her body, and threatened to drug her with heroin, to carry her out from the flat in a large bag and to hand her over to unspecified persons to be trafficked to Turkey for 100,000 CZK (EUR 3,622) unless she promised to resume their intimate relationship, which she had broken off on 25 December 2005. According to her, the applicant had threatened to take pornographic pictures of her or to record a porn movie with her, which he would then send to her employer in the United Kingdom and the company which had acted as intermediary in finding her a job in the United Kingdom. Furthermore, on 1 January 2006 they had been in a car together and the applicant had threatened to throw C. into a snowdrift and drive off, or to kill both her and himself in a deliberate car accident. C. also stated that the applicant had searched through her mobile phone contacts to find the number of her female friend D.B., whom he had contacted at a later date. C. wrote an explanatory letter to D.B. She had also phoned her mother and had confided in her about the intimidation by the applicant. C. also stated that the applicant was seeing a psychotherapist. As the intimidation continued, C. filed a criminal complaint at a police station in the United Kingdom on 7 June 2006. She also stated: “Upon the advice of the police in the United Kingdom, on 8 June 2006 I changed my mail address, after 9 June 2006 I also changed the number of my mobile phone and at the advice of my employer, I have also the confidential employment that [the applicant] or his eventual messengers could not contact me. ... ... I was asked to make comment on the email notice which was made anonymously at the Prague 1 District Prosecutor’s Office on 23 June 2006 at 10.48 a.m.. ... I do not know any girl who would meet me in a club in the United Kingdom; I do not know any such girl who would know the information about me, which were written in this denouncement. ... The information indicated in this denouncement corresponded to what [the applicant] knows about me, what I foolishly told him in the past.” At the end of the interview, C. submitted copies of her email exchanges with the applicant and a tape recording of his voice messages, and made available SMS messages on her mobile phone for transcription. 15. On 25 October 2006 a judge at the Prague 6 District Court ordered the compilation of a list of incoming and outgoing telephone calls from the applicant’s mobile phone between 20 December 2005 and 31 July 2006. On 26 October 2006 he ordered the compilation of a list of communications executed from three mail-boxes between 14 February and 30 June 2006 and between 1 January and 30 June 2006, respectively. On 31 October 2006 the judge ordered the compilation of a list of communications carried out from several of the applicant’s other mail-boxes in the period from 25 December 2005 to 30 June 2006, and also the provision of information on the total number of communications logged in these mailboxes between 25 December 2005 and 18 October 2006. On the same day, the judge ordered the compilation of a list of outgoing telephone calls from the applicant’s land line on 9 June 2006 between 11 a.m and 3 p.m. 16. On 5 April 2007 criminal proceedings were initiated against the applicant for unlawful restraint (omezování osobní svobody) in concurrence with coercion (vydírání), defamation (pomluva) and false accusation (křivé obvinění). 17. In April 2007 a search was conducted in both the applicant’s flat and the commercial premises where he ran his business, upon the search orders issued on 16 and 18 April 2007 respectively. The applicant was arrested on 20 April 2007 and was charged with unlawful restrain, coercion, defamation and false accusation, and released afterwards. 18. The police continued to gather evidence during 2007 and 2008. They obtained an expert psychiatric opinion on the applicant’s health, analysed his computer, carried out a search of his flat and questioned a number of witnesses. 19. On 27 April 2007 C.’s mother was interviewed. She stated, in particular, that: “On 6 June 2006 ... my daughter called me at work, started crying on the phone ... She told me that ... she had been dating [the applicant] the entire time. [She] continued crying a lot, which made me realise that this was not all there was to it. It made me feel physically sick. She continued the story, saying that when she was at home for Christmas [the applicant] had abducted her. She had agreed to meet him somewhere in Prague they met normally and agreed to go out for a drink in the evening. But he said that he needed to change clothes so they would first drive to his place and then go out later in the evening. In the apartment, however, he tied her up and menaced her with horrible threats. At that time, she did not tell me any details. ... At the same time, during our phone conversation we came onto the topic of the threatening emails that [the applicant] had been sending her the entire time. She said that she had not paid much attention to them but that lately it had got completely out of hand and ... he had started threatening to kill her and, finally, had sent her an email saying that she should not forget that she had her entire family in Prague, specifically mentioning her mother and brother, and that she should not forget that he knew where we lived. ... I personally contacted the psychologist ... She confirmed that my daughter had phoned her as well. She said that she had advised her ... to immediately cut off all contact with [the applicant] ... I told her about what [the applicant] had done to my daughter at Christmas 2005 and she essentially replied that [the applicant] had also told her about it and that she had strictly forbidden him to ever do such a thing again ... [C.] told me that in December 2005, when she was in his flat, [the applicant] had tied her up, threatened to kill her, to traffic her, to make a movie of her taking drugs or a porn movie; he had also searched through her handbag and taken a piece of paper with her home address or had written it down, had searched through the address book in her mobile phone and had accessed her electronic mail box after forcing her to give him the password ...” 20. The investigation having been concluded in May 2008, the applicant was indicted for coercion under Article 235 §§ 1 and 2 of the Criminal Code on 16 June 2008. This legal classification of his criminal acts was more serious than that indicated in the notice served on him on 20 April 2007, when he had been charged with deprivation of personal liberty under Article 231 §§ 1 and 2 of the Criminal Code in conjunction with coercion under Article 235 § 1 of the Criminal Code. According to the applicant, he had not been informed about it, contrary to Article 176 § 2 of the CCP. 21. According to the Government, on 10 September 2008 C. apologised through her mother for not being able to attend the hearing before the District Court. 22. The trial started on 14 October 2008. As C. apologised for not attending the main hearing, the statement made by her on 8 August 2006 was therefore read out. The applicant claimed that C.’s residence abroad had not been a sufficient reason for carrying out her interview as an urgent measure and that her statement should not be read out at the trial. He argued that the conditions laid down in Article 211 § 2 of CCP had not been met. 23. The District Court tried to summons C. again. In its letter of 12 March 2009, the court sent a summons to the main hearing to C. through her mother. On 13 March 2009 the District Prosecutor’s Office sent to the District Court copies of the documents justifying the urgent need to interview C., namely the request of 7 August 2006 to secure the presence of a judge during an urgent and non-repeatable measure and the police letter of 7 August 2006. 24. In a letter of 24 April 2009, C. informed the presiding judge that, although she had been summonsed, she was unable to attend the main hearing because she had been working abroad for more than four years and intended to stay abroad on a permanent basis. She stated that the circumstances justifying the applicant’s criminal prosecution were very stressful for both her and her mother. It appears that the District Court did not try to summon C. again. 25. In a judgment of 8 December 2009 the District Court found the applicant guilty of coercion and sentenced him to two and a half years’ suspended prison sentence subject to a probationary period of two years. The court explicitly noted that in finding the applicant guilty, it mainly relied on the testimony of C., but also on a statement made by D.K., a schoolfriend of C.’s, who stated that she had received emails concerning C.; the statement by M.V., C.’s psychotherapist, who testified that C. had confided in her about having been taken somewhere by the applicant against her will; the statement by C.’s mother; a testimony by L.B. implying that the applicant and C. had met at Christmas 2005; expert opinions in cybernetics and computer technology and in psychiatry; the emails sent by the applicant to C. between 30 December 2005 and 8 June 2006; and the letter from C. to D.B., in which C. wrote to her female friend about the applicant’s violent behaviour. 26. The court then stated: “Based on such secured evidence, the court came to a clear conclusion, finding the defendant guilty as indicated in the verdict of the judgment. The defendant denies any such behaviour and actions on his part directed against [C.] as described in the judgment; however, he has clearly been proved guilty by the evidence taken. The court relied in particular on the testimony of witness [C.], who described the defendant’s actions in great detail. The testimony is consistent with further evidence taken. This includes email correspondence, which corroborates the victim’s statement and the victim’s mother’s statement to the effect that the victim had confided in her about everything on 6 June 2006. A brief description of the defendant’s behaviour was also included in the letter sent by the victim to her female friend [D.B.] which was available to the court ... In his expert opinion, the expert concluded that it was absolutely possible and posed no problem for the defendant to use previously prepared straps to tie the victim to bed and partially undress the bottom half of her body, and that it was absolutely possible and posed no problem for him to tie her up in the manner she had described ...” 27. On 13 February 2010 the applicant appealed, raising a number of procedural, factual and interpretational complaints. He claimed, inter alia, that C.’s statement remained uncorroborated evidence on which his conviction was based. 28. In his extensive submissions of 26 March 2010, he requested that C. be questioned in order, inter alia, to clarify the contradictions between the statements given by C., her mother, and her psychologist and the applicant’s testimony. He also suggested that an expert opinion be drawn up by a psychiatric expert to assess the reliability of C. and to complete and assess other evidence, including the hearing of three witnesses who had been rejected without adequate reasoning by the first instance court. He also requested that the Prague Municipal Court (městský soud) postpone the public hearing, without giving any reason in this respect. 29. The hearing before the Municipal Court was held on 30 March 2010 in the absence of the applicant, who had apologised in writing on 29 March 2010 indicating that he could not attend the hearing due to serious personal and family reasons, but agreeing that the court carry out merely the procedural acts allowed by Article 263 § 5 of the CCP and asking, at the same time, to postpone the hearing afterwards. At the hearing he was represented by counsel who, contrary to the applicant’s written appeal, did not request that any further evidence be taken. The court, having rejected the applicant’s request to postpone the hearing, examined his appeal, upholding the conviction of the first instance court. 30. The court found that the applicant’s guilt had been securely established in particular by the statement given by C., which was not the only evidence against the applicant, her statements having been corroborated by further indirect evidence, such as the testimony of her mother, in whom C. had confided at the material time. The appellate court also found that, although C. and her mother had not had a close relationship before, C. contacted her out of fear for her and her brother’s life and described the acts of coercion carried out by the applicant. Witness C.’s mother also claimed that the initial anonymous criminal complaint sent by email to the Prague 1 District Prosecutor’s Office had been sent by the applicant, who had thus lodged a false accusation. Her testimony was examined in detail. The indirect evidence also included text messages sent by the applicant on 5 June 2006 and the criminal complaint filed by C. in the United Kingdom on 7 June 2006. The time concurrence was thus a significant factor, too. 31. As regards the reliability of C. and the assessment of evidence, the court stated: “... the assessment of the evidence is reasonable and convincing, as is [the District Court’s] conclusion concerning the reliability of witness [C.]. The District Court was not wrong in believing this witness, who proved the defendant’s guilt of the criminal acts. The testimony of the victim was not the only convincing evidence against the applicant on which the District Court based its conclusion about the defendant’s guilt, since the defendant’s criminal acts are also proved by a chain of indirect evidence corroborating the testimony of the victim and confirming the credibility of her statements. This includes, in particular, the testimony of her mother ... in whom the victim confided during a phone call on 6 June 2006 in which she described the defendant’s actions, including the way he had tied her up in his apartment, threatened her and sent her threatening emails. The testimonies given by [C.] and her mother ... regarding the relevant facts correspond to the content of the criminal complaint filed by the victim at the police station in Surrey, United Kingdom ... on 7 June 2006. The defendant’s complaint that the unreliability of the victim is proved by the fact that she did not confide earlier in her mother or a close female friend about his alleged behaviour is ill-founded: the evidence taken clearly shows that the victim and her mother did not previously have a particularly close relationship since she did not confide in her mother about her relationship with the defendant. This is understandable given that she was allegedly abused by the mother’s partner (as the victim confided in the defendant). Furthermore, the victim was already back in the United Kingdom at the relevant time (as of 3 January 2006) and her contact with the defendant was conducted solely via mobile phone calls and email correspondence. In these circumstances, the behaviour of the victim appears rather logical and understandable, i.e. confiding in her mother and brother concerning the threats to their health and her life in an SMS message. ... The reliability of the victim and the veracity of her testimony is also corroborated by the emails included in the ... These emails, which were submitted to the police by the victim, correspond case file to her testimony as to the timeframe and the contents ... It is hardly possible for the Municipal Court to believe that the victim would systematically and for many months beforehand prepare all the evidence ... in order to be able to file a criminal complaint against the defendant. In addition to the above, the defendant’s contacts with the victim (which he himself did not deny) and her reliability are also clearly shown in the defendant’s affidavit of 2 June 2006 ..., in which the defendant declared he did not have any financial claims against the victim. Finally, one should not disregard the statement of an impartial witness ... namely the victim’s psychotherapist, who confirmed that the victim came to her because of relational problems with the defendant, confided in her about having been held by the defendant against her will and driven off somewhere in his car, and about his emails threatening to harm her if she left him. All this indirect evidence is interrelated and consistent with the victim’s testimony. Consequently, the defendant’s complaint concerning the unreliability of the victim is ill-founded ... As a result, the District Court correctly believed the testimony given by the victim in relation to this matter, considering her testimony in general to be credible ... The defendant’s behaviour and verbal aggression, as documented in the emails and SMS messages sent by him escalated at a later stage, prompting the victim to file a criminal complaint and change her contact details because she was afraid of the defendant’s behaviour after he threatened to harm her mother and brother. ...” 32. In respect of the applicant’s complaint concerning C.’s interview, which was conducted as an urgent and non-repeatable measure under Article 158a of the CCP, the Municipal Court noted that: “The victim was duly interviewed in the presence of a judge ..., with the unrepeatability of the measure being determined by the long-term residence of the witness in the United Kingdom. The justification of such a procedure and the unavailability of the witness were confirmed by the efforts of the District Court to secure her attendance at the main hearing, which the witness repeatedly failed to attend, providing a written statement to the effect that she was residing abroad on a long-term basis and would not be able to attend the main hearing in the foreseeable future. Therefore, the Municipal Court deemed legal the procedure applied by the District Court whereby, after exhausting the possibility of examining the victim in the main hearing for unavailability due to her residence abroad, it read out the statement she had made ... in the pre-trial proceedings in accordance with Article 211 § 2(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Although this was key evidence, it was not the only evidence proving the defendant’s guilt ...” 33. The appellate court admitted that the prosecutor had violated Article 176 § 2 of the CCP in reclassifying the charges without notifying the applicant. It found, however, that this omission did not impact on the legality and correctness of the reviewed judgment to the extent that a duty to reverse it resulted. 34. On 18 July 2010 the applicant filed an appeal on points of law (dovolání) which was rejected as unsubstantiated by the Supreme Court (Nejvyšší soud) on 30 November 2010. The court stated that the appellate court had not proceeded erroneously in having decided the case in the absence of the applicant, who had not sufficiently substantiated his request to have the hearing postponed. It added that the applicant’s counsel had not requested that further evidence be gathered and assessed and that, therefore, there had been no need to postpone the hearing. 35. On 13 March 2011 the applicant filed a constitutional appeal (ústavní stížnost) which was dismissed by the Constitutional Court (Ústavní soud) in a decision of 1 December 2011 which was served on the applicant on 9 December 2011. Having analysed the testimony given by C., the Constitutional Court found that, although it was direct evidence, it was corroborated by a chain of indirect evidence, especially the testimony of her mother. In respect of the remaining complaints, the Constitutional Court agreed with the findings of the lower courts stating, in particular: “The applicant’s complaints regarding the search in his flat and non-residential premises and lands are unsubstantiated. The search in the applicant’s domicile was carried out in compliance with Article 83 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on the basis of the search order issued by the Prague 6 District Court. The applicant had the opportunity, if he was convinced that the search is unlawful, to lodge a constitutional appeal against this order ... In a constitutional appeal against the final judgment of conviction, it is possible, in connection with a search carried out unlawfully, complain in particular the inadmissibility of concrete pieces of evidence which were gathered and on the basis of which [an applicant] was found guilty. However, the applicant did not expressly submit any concrete evidence which would be gathered illegally. ...” 36. On 30 August 2012 the applicant submitted to the Ministry of Justice a claim for compensation for damages caused by delays in the criminal proceedings under the State Liability Act (no. 82/1998). On 24 September 2012 his claim was rejected as having been introduced outside the six-month statutory time-limit. On 24 May 2013 the applicant filed an action for damages against the Ministry, which appears to be still pending before the Prague 2 District Court.

5. The applicants were born in 1974 and 1994 respectively and live in Baku. At the material time the first applicant was a member of one of the main opposition parties in the country, the Popular Front Party of Azerbaijan, and the second applicant was a member of an opposition group, Nida. 6. The applicants participated in an assembly on 6 May 2014. According to the applicants, they were among people who gathered near the Baku Assize Court to support members of Nida (an opposition group), who were being tried on that day. The courtroom was full, and therefore some people gathered outside the court to wait for the outcome of the proceedings. When the court announced its judgment, those who had gathered outside began to protest against the judgment, since they considered it unfair. The protest was brief, spontaneous and peaceful. Immediately after the protesters started chanting slogans, police officers and people in plain clothes began to forcibly disperse the demonstration. 7. The applicants were arrested during the dispersal operation and were taken to a police station, where they were kept overnight. 8. The applicants were questioned at the police station. 9. On the day of the applicants’ arrest, administrative-offence reports on them (inzibati xəta haqqında protokol) were issued, which stated that they had committed an administrative offence under Article 298.2 of the Code of Administrative Offences (“the CAO”): participation in a public assembly organised not in accordance with the law. 10. According to the applicants, they were never served with copies of the administrative-offence reports or other documents from their case files. They were not given access to a lawyer either after their arrest or while they were in police custody. 11. According to a police officer’s decision and an order dated 6 May 2014, a State-funded lawyer (Mr O.A.) was invited to defend the first applicant. Similarly, according to a police officer’s decision and an order dated 6 May 2014, a State-funded lawyer (Mr A.B.) was invited to defend the second applicant. 12. The applicants were brought before the Nasimi District Court on the day following their arrest. 13. According to the applicants, the hearing before the first-instance court was very brief in both cases. Members of the public were not allowed inside the courtroom, even though the court had not taken a formal decision to close the hearing to the public. 14. According to the applicants, they were not given an opportunity to appoint lawyers of their own choosing. 15. A State-funded lawyer was invited to defend the first applicant. It was the same lawyer, Mr O.A., who had been invited to defend her in accordance with the above-mentioned police officer’s decision of 6 May 2014. 16. The second applicant was not represented by a lawyer. According to the transcript of the hearing in his case, he refused the assistance of the State-funded lawyer and decided to defend himself in person. 17. According to the transcript of the hearing concerning the first applicant, the State-funded lawyer did not make any oral or written submissions. 18. The only witnesses questioned during the hearing concerning the first applicant were police officers who, according to official records, had arrested her or issued the administrative-offence report on her. They testified that the applicant had staged an unauthorised protest. With respect to the second applicant, the court did not question any witness. 19. According to the transcript of the hearing concerning the first applicant, she stated that she had participated in the protest of 6 May 2014 and had rightfully used “improper language” in the course of the protest. 20. According to the transcript of the hearing concerning the second applicant, he stated that he had simply protested against an unfair judgment against the Nida members, and had not committed any unlawful action. 21. In both cases the Nasimi District Court found that the applicants had participated in an unauthorised demonstration. The court convicted the applicants under Article 298.2 of the CAO, and sentenced them to a period of administrative detention of thirty and twenty days respectively. 22. On unspecified dates the applicants lodged appeals with the Baku Court of Appeal, arguing that their convictions had been in violation of their rights, because the protest in which they had participated had been spontaneous and peaceful. The applicants also complained that their arrests had been unlawful, and that the hearings before the first-instance court had not been fair. They asked the Baku Court of Appeal to quash the first‑instance court’s decisions in their respective cases. 23. The first applicant was assisted by a lawyer of her own choosing before the Baku Court of Appeal. The second applicant was not represented by a lawyer. 24. On 16 and 22 May 2014 respectively the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the applicants’ appeals and upheld the decisions of the first‑instance court.

4. The applicants were born in 1950 and in 1949, respectively, and live in Matosinhos. 5. On 16 March 2005 A.C. and M.L. instituted civil proceedings against the applicants and other four defendants before the Matosinhos Court seeking the payment of 11,843.48 euros (EUR) due to the alleged sale of a part of the plaintiffs’ property. 6. On 29 March 2005 the applicants were summoned to challenge the action against them; which they did not. In the notification letter they were given notice that the lack of opposition would entail the confession of the facts pursuant to Article 484 § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (see paragraph 11 below). 7. Between 21 April 2005 and 24 May 2013 several procedural steps took place either by action of the plaintiffs, the remaining defendants or the Matosinhos Court. In particular: on 21 April 2005 the remaining defendants contested the action; on 3 November 2005 the plaintiffs submitted observations in reply; on 17 October 2007 the plaintiffs lodged a request seeking the intervention of I.T. in the proceedings, which was admitted by the Matosinhos Court on 29 May 2009; on 15 December 2010 the judge gave directions concerning the matters to be discussed at the hearing (despacho saneador); on 21 March 2012, following I.T.’s death, the Matosinhos Court stayed the proceedings pending the outcome of inheritance proceedings. 8. On 24 May 2013 the applicants submitted a power of attorney and requested that the case-file be uploaded to the legal platform “CITIUS” for consultation. 9. On 10 January 2014 the applicants requested the participation of an expert of their own choosing in the preparation of the expert report which had been sought by the plaintiffs. On an unknown date the other defendants in the proceedings lodged an opposition to the applicants’ request. 10. On 16 October 2015 the Matosinhos Court adopted a judgment in which it ruled in favour of the applicants.

4. The first applicant was born in 1980 and lives in Sharya, the Kostroma Region. 5. The applicant was held in remand prison IZ-44/1 in Kostroma in the following cells: Cell no. Surface, sq. m Dates of stay 29 6. The parties disagreed on the design capacity of the cells and the actual number of inmates. 7. The first applicant, relying on three hand-written statements from his co-detainees, submitted that Cell 49 had contained three two-tier bunk beds with metal sheets welded to beds on the upper and lower levels to create additional sleeping places. Cell 49 was used to accommodate between ten and twenty prisoners. Cell 43 contained two two-tier bunk beds and accommodated four prisoners. 8. The Government submitted that the number of prisoners in the cells had not exceeded the occupancy limit. Cell 29 had three sleeping places, Cell 49 four places and Cell 43 two places. They submitted selected pages from the prison registration log. All of these pages, except one dated 24 July 2009, indicate that Cell 49 was designed for four persons and accommodated as many prisoners. The number “4” appears to be written over a different number that was erased. The entry of 24 July 2009 indicated that Cell 49 was designed for ten persons and accommodated eight prisoners. Similarly, the entries in respect of Cell 29 show traces of erasures and alterations. Its design capacity is listed as two or three places and the actual population is always three prisoners. 9. The second applicant was born in 1958 and has been serving his term of imprisonment in Ivdel, the Sverdlovskiy Region. 10. Between 14 July 2009 and 4 July 2010 the second applicant was held in remand prison IZ-59/1 in the Perm Region. According to him, the facility was overcrowded. In particular, Cell 90 measuring 40 sq. m accommodated up to sixteen inmates. 11. According to the Government, the second applicant was held in cells 80, 90, 92, 98 and 103. The actual number of inmates detained in the cells did not exceed their designed capacity. Each inmate had more than 3 sq. m of personal space. Other conditions were satisfactory. The Government submitted selected pages from registration logs, some of which appears to contain erasures and alterations in the fields showing the number of inmates in Cell 90. On some pages the listed total number of inmates is ten less than the number produced by adding up the population of individual cells.

4. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 5. Nepalese Gurkha soldiers have served the Crown since 1815, initially as soldiers in the (British) Indian Army. Following Indian independence in 1947, six Gurkha regiments were transferred to the Indian Army, while four regiments became an integral part of the British Army. More than 200,000 Gurkha soldiers fought in the two world wars, and in the past fifty years they have served in Hong Kong, Malaysia, Borneo, Cyprus, the Falklands, Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan. They have served in a variety of roles, mainly in the infantry but also as engineers and in signals and logistics units. 6. Today, they form the Brigade of Gurkhas (“the Brigade”), in which only Nepali nationals are eligible for service. The Brigade is not an operational brigade in the conventional sense; rather, it is an administrative entity which ensures that Gurkha units, into which all Gurkha soldiers are recruited and serve, are able to be integrated into – and form part of – other operational brigades in the British Army. 7. The Brigade was originally based in the Far East, in the region formerly known as Malaya. In 1971 the Brigade’s base moved to Hong Kong. On completion of the handover of Hong Kong to China in July 1997, the home base moved to the United Kingdom. Consequently, the majority of Gurkhas are currently stationed in the United Kingdom, although since 1962 a section of the Brigade has been stationed in Brunei. 8. Pursuant to a memorandum of understanding of 9 November 1947 (“the Tripartite Agreement”), the Governments of the United Kingdom, India and Nepal agreed that the salary of Gurkhas serving in the British Army would be set by reference to rates applied by India in respect of Indian soldiers so as to avoid competition between the Indian and British armies for Gurkha recruits. The Brigade’s basic pay was therefore set in accordance with the Indian Pay Code, although cost-of-living allowances were paid for service outside Nepal. These allowances used to be calculated by reference to local living expenses (for example, in Hong Kong or Brunei), but in 1997, when the Brigade’s home base moved to the United Kingdom, a “universal addition” was introduced to ensure that, whenever a Gurkha soldier was serving outside Nepal, his take-home pay would be similar to that of a non-Gurkha soldier in the British Army of comparable rank and experience. However, the “universal addition” was not treated as pensionable pay. 9. Prior to 1 April 2006, Married Accompanied Service entitlement (that is, an entitlement for the soldier to be accompanied by wife and children) was for one married accompanied tour of between two and three years in the first fifteen years of service and for permanent accompanied service for Gurkhas ranked Colour Sergeant and above. However, with effect from 1 April 2006, those who had served for three years or more in the Brigade were entitled to Married Accompanied Service (in other words, they were entitled to be joined in the United Kingdom by their wives and children). 10. Gurkha soldiers are required to retire after fifteen years’ service, subject to the possibility, dependent on rank, of one or more yearly extensions. 11. In comparison, other soldiers in the British Army are entitled to serve for twenty-two years. 12. Historically, Gurkha soldiers were discharged to Nepal and it was presumed that they would remain there during retirement. (a) The 2004 amendments to the Immigration Rules 13. On 25 October 2004 the Immigration Rules (HC 394) were changed to permit Gurkha soldiers with at least four years’ service who retired on or after 1 July 1997 (the date that the Gurkha’s home base relocated to the United Kingdom) to apply for settlement in the United Kingdom. Approximately 90 per cent of the 2,230 eligible Gurkha soldiers have since applied successfully to settle in the United Kingdom with their qualifying dependants. (b) The 2009 amendments to the Immigration Rules 14. On 21 May 2009 the Secretary of State for the Home Department announced a new policy under which all former Gurkhas who had served in the British Army for at least four years would be eligible for settlement in the United Kingdom. Approximately thirty-five per cent of those eligible have since applied for resettlement in the United Kingdom. 15. The Tripartite Agreement provided that the pensions of Gurkhas serving in the British Army would also be set by reference to the rates applied by India to Indian soldiers. (a) The Gurkha Pension Scheme 16. In 1949 the Gurkha Pension Scheme (“GPS”) was established by Royal Warrant and applied the former Indian Army Pensions Code to Gurkhas serving in the Brigade. Pension entitlements under the GPS were index-linked to the cost of living in Nepal as it was presumed that the Gurkhas would retire there. Pensions were immediately payable upon retirement and could not be deferred. A Gurkha who retired without having served fifteen years would be entitled to no pension whatsoever. 17. In 1981 Gurkha pensions were reviewed and the rate payable was set at the highest rate applicable under the Indian Army pension arrangements. 18. In 1999, following a ministerial review, the rates applicable to the pensions of Gurkhas in the Brigade were increased by over 100 per cent, taking them over the scales set by the Indian Army. The rationale for the increase was that a Gurkha who retired from the Brigade to Nepal would not receive the benefit of various schemes which soldiers retiring from the Indian Army could access, such as the provision of certain medical facilities. The increase applied to all Gurkhas regardless of the date of discharge. (b) The Armed Forces Pension Scheme 19. Non-Gurkha soldiers retiring from the British Army are entitled to pensions under either the Armed Forces Pensions Scheme 1975 (“AFPS 75”) or the Armed Forces Pensions Scheme 2005 (“AFPS 05”) depending on when they commenced service. Neither scheme is index‑linked with the cost of living in the soldier’s country of origin. 20. Under the AFPS, soldiers are eligible for deferred pensions, payable at the age of 60, provided that they have rendered at least two years’ service before leaving the British Army. In order to receive an immediate pension officers are required to serve for sixteen years and all other ranks are required to serve for twenty-two years; however, in practice fewer than one fifth of non-Gurkha soldiers in the British Army serve for sufficiently long periods to be eligible for an immediate pension. 21. The annual pension entitlement under the GPS is broadly equivalent – taking into account the adjustments made in 1981 and 1999 – to one-third of that under the AFPS. (c) Review of Gurkhas Terms and Conditions of Service 22. Following the 2004 amendment to the Immigration Rules (see paragraph 13 above), the Secretary of State for Defence announced a review of the Gurkhas’ Terms and Conditions of Service. The review noted that the 2004 amendment to the Immigration Rules and the changes to Married Accompanied Service (see paragraph 9 above) had changed the traditional assumption that British Gurkhas would retire in Nepal, and pointed to a future in which they could be expected increasingly to regard the United Kingdom, rather than Nepal, as their family base. The Review Team therefore concluded that, the affordability issues notwithstanding, the major differences in Gurkha terms and conditions of service could no longer be justified on legal or moral grounds and recommended that they be modernised by bringing them largely into line with those available to the wider Army. 23. With regard to pensions, the review concluded that on balance the GPS was more suitable than the AFPS to support the life-cycle of the great majority of Gurkhas up until July 1997. However, moving the Brigade’s base to the United Kingdom and the subsequent change to the Immigration Rules had altered the previously valid assumption that Gurkhas would retire in Nepal. For a Gurkha retiring to a second career in the United Kingdom, the GPS profile was “clearly wrong, paying sums too small to be useful at a time when he does not need them and an inadequate pension at retirement age. As the life profile of the typical Gurkha approaches that of his UK/Commonwealth counterpart, there can be little to be said in favour of providing them with such different pension benefit profiles.” 24. The report recommended that serving and retired members of the Brigade should be allowed to transfer from the GPS to either AFPS 75 or 05, depending on when they enlisted. Those who were already in the GPS and wished to remain in it could do so, but it would be closed with effect from April 2006. (d) The Gurkha Offer to Transfer 25. In March 2007 the United Kingdom formulated the Gurkha Offer to Transfer (“GOTT”) and this was given effect in the Armed Forces (Gurkha Pension) Order 2007 (“the 2007 Order”). Gurkhas who retired before 1 July 1997 did not qualify for the GOTT. However, the GOTT enabled Gurkha soldiers who retired on or after 1 July 1997 to transfer from the GPS to either AFPS 75 or AFPS 05 depending on when they first enlisted in the British Army. The terms of any transfer were such that the accrued rights to a pension for service after 1 July 1997 would transfer into the AFPS scheme on a year-for-year basis. 26. In respect of service rendered before 1 July 1997 the Explanatory Memorandum to the 2007 Order explained that “although Gurkha service from 1 July 1997 is transferable on a one-for-one basis, Article 2 L4 provides that pre-1997 Gurkha service counts proportionately depending upon the rank of the transferee. This proportion is not arbitrary: it has been arrived at after careful calculation by the Government Actuary’s Department. It represents broadly the value of the pre-1997 benefits accrued in the GPS. A Gurkha transferring to either AFPS will be given fair pension value for his GPS service.” 27. Under the actuarial calculation adopted by the Government, a year’s service before 1 July 1997 translated – in terms of pension entitlement – to the equivalent of between 23 and 36 per cent of the value of a year’s service of a non-Gurkha soldier of equivalent rank. 28. The transition from the GPS to the AFPS for those opting to transfer who were already in receipt of a pension under the GPS did not deprive them of their existing GPS pension, which would continue to be paid. Transfer to the relevant AFPS occurred at 60 or 65, when they received the preserved pension. However, as they had been in receipt of the GPS pension from around the age of thirty-three, the capital value of the pension pot at retirement age would be reduced by the payments received under the GPS up to that date. 29. Nearly all serving Gurkhas elected to transfer to the AFPS (only 0.3 per cent elected to remain in the GPS). Of those who had retired, but remained eligible for transfer, approximately three per cent elected to remain in the GPS. 30. The first applicant is a non-governmental unincorporated association that acts on behalf of 399 former members of the Brigade. 31. The second applicant is a former Gurkha soldier who retired from the Brigade on 8 February 1997 after having accumulated fifteen years’ service. As he completed his service prior to 1 July 1997, he is ineligible to transfer any of his pensionable years to one of the AFPSs. His pension continues to be governed by the GPS and, as such, is valued at approximately fifty per cent of that which a British soldier of equivalent rank would receive for the same period and type of service. 32. The third applicant is a former Gurkha soldier who retired from the Brigade on 31 July 2002 after having accumulated almost thirty-one years’ service. The last five years of service were transferred into the AFPS on a year-for-year basis. The preceding twenty-six years of service were transferred under an actuarial calculation pursuant to the 2007 Order. Under that calculation the pensionable value of each of his years of service was regarded as equivalent to approximately twenty-seven per cent of a pensionable year served by a British soldier of equivalent rank engaged in the same type of service. 33. On 7 March 2008 the applicants issued an application for judicial review in the High Court challenging the legality of both (a) the decision that Gurkhas who retired prior to 1 July 1997 were not entitled to transfer their pension rights under the GPS into the AFPS and (b) the decision that, for those Gurkhas who retired after 1 July 1997, service before that date did not rank on a year-for-year basis. The challenge was advanced on three grounds: under the Race Relations Act 1976 (namely, that there had been a breach of a procedural duty to promote equality of opportunity); on grounds of irrationality; and under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 read together with Article 14. In relation to the third ground, the applicants alleged that they were discriminated against in their entitlement to an army pension on the basis of their age and/or nationality. In particular, they argued that they were treated differently both from younger Gurkha soldiers who had (more) years of service after 1 July 1997 and from regular British Army soldiers. 34. The applicants were granted permission to pursue their judicial review application. A hearing took place in October 2009. At the hearing the parties agreed that the 2009 change to the Immigration Rules (see paragraph 14 above) was irrelevant for the purpose of the proceedings. 35. On 11 January 2010 the High Court dismissed the application on all three grounds. In respect of the age discrimination challenge the High Court relied on its earlier decision in R (Gurung) v. Ministry of Defence [2008] EWHC 1496 (Admin) (summarised at paragraphs 45 – 49 below), in which it held that the difference in treatment did not occur due to the difference in age but due to the dates at which service had been rendered. The judge in the present applicants’ case noted that “when lines are drawn for any purpose by reference to dates the result may well include some indirect age discrimination.” 36. In reaching this conclusion, the court rejected the argument – advanced by the applicants – that age discrimination should be treated as a “suspect” ground. 37. In respect of the discrimination-on-grounds-of-nationality challenge the High Court considered that it was bound by R (Purja and Others) v. Ministry of Defence [2003] EWCA Civ 1345 (summarised at paragraphs 41 – 44 below), in which the Court of Appeal had ruled that Gurkhas with service before 1 July 1997 were in a markedly different position from other soldiers serving in the British Army before that date. The difference in pension arrangements reflected the different historical position of the Gurkhas. Although the High Court accepted that the 2004 change in the Immigration Rules (see paragraph 13 above) undermined some of the assumptions supporting the decision in Purja, it held that the changes did not affect the reasoning of the Court of Appeal as that reasoning applied to the calculation of pension entitlements which accrued before 1 July 1997. For all the reasons advanced by the High Court Judge in Gurung, the High Court considered that the choice of 1 July 1997 to mark the boundary for different treatment of accrued pension was a rational and reasonable one. 38. The applicants were granted permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal. On appeal, their case was put exclusively by reference to Article 14 of the Convention read together with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. 39. On 13 October 2010 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicants’ appeal. In respect of the discrimination-on-grounds-of-nationality claim the Court of Appeal, like the High Court, considered itself bound by the decision in Purja (cited above). In respect of the age-discrimination claim the court, relying on the Strasbourg Court’s judgment in Neill v. the United Kingdom, no. 56721/00, 29 January 2002, held that even if a relevant comparison could be drawn between older and younger Gurkhas, the Ministry of Defence could easily justify the difference in treatment. 40. On 13 December 2010 the Supreme Court refused to grant the applicants permission to appeal.

5. The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Stara Zagora. 6. The applicant worked as head teacher in a secondary school in Stara Zagora. 7. On 19 July 2002 the head of the Regional Education Inspectorate (“the REI”) of the Ministry of Education dismissed the applicant on disciplinary grounds. 8. The applicant brought a claim against the REI, challenging the order for her dismissal and seeking reinstatement and compensation for lost earnings. 9. By a judgment of 2 April 2003 the Stara Zagora District Court (Районен съд) allowed the applicant’s claims. That judgment was upheld by the Stara Zagora Regional Court (Окръжен съд) and the Supreme Court of Cassation on 18 July 2003 and 24 November 2005 respectively. In the course of the proceedings, neither the opposing party nor any of the courts raised any doubts as to whether the REI was the correct defendant in the case. 10. Following the entry into force of the judgment of 24 November 2005, the applicant applied to take up her duties on 6 December 2005. On the same day a new order for her dismissal was issued by the head of the REI. 11. On an unspecified date, at the latest in January 2006, the applicant lodged an appeal against the dismissal order with the Stara Zagora District Court, challenging its lawfulness, and seeking reinstatement to her previous post and compensation for loss of income. It appears from the case file that at the first court hearing, the date of which was not specified, the REI argued that it was not the proper defendant in the case and that the claims had to be addressed to the secondary school in which the applicant had been working prior to her dismissal. The REI submitted that Article 61 § 2 of the Labour Code and section 37(4) of the Education Act provided that the applicant’s employer was the school. 12. During a court hearing on 12 April 2006 the District Court ruled in favour of the objection, and, reasoning that the proper defendant in the case was the school, discontinued the proceedings. 13. The applicant appealed against that decision before the Stara Zagora Regional Court. 14. On 26 May 2006 the Regional Court quashed the decision of the lower court, explicitly stating that the proper defendant in the applicant’s case was the REI. It remitted the case to the first-instance court for examination on the merits. 15. By a judgment of 8 December 2006 the District Court allowed the applicant’s claims. 16. Following an appeal lodged by the REI, on 27 April 2007 the Regional Court upheld the judgment. 17. The REI lodged an appeal on points of law. On 16 April 2008 the Plovdiv Appeal Court (Апелативен съд), sitting as a court of cassation according to a legislative amendment entered into force in July 2007, quashed the judgment of the lower court and dismissed the applicant’s claims. It found that the REI was not the applicant’s employer under the law and was not, therefore, the proper defendant in the case. Thus, the claims brought against it were unfounded. The court ruled that the applicant’s claims had to be brought against the school in which she had been working prior to her dismissal, as that school was her employer.

4. The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Zákopčie. 5. On 28 February 2011 the applicant was sued by his son in proceedings on child maintenance before the Čadca District Court (file no. 10 C 38/2011). 6. During those proceedings he made an incomplete submission on 21 April 2011, which he supplemented the month after alleging that he had been waiting for a response from the Centre for Legal Aid in respect of his request for a legal aid lawyer. He also lodged two complaints with the president of the District Court about the excessive length of proceedings, namely on 9 February 2012 and 29 February 2012, which were unsuccessful. Having been dissatisfied with their outcome, he turned to the appellate court for review of his complaints to no avail. 7. The District Court, on the other hand, took the following steps. It asked several public authorities, such as for example Social Security Authority and the Job Centre, to provide it with information relevant to the case. Between May 2012 and April 2014, it was dealing with an appointment of a guardian to the applicant, who at the material time was undergoing an ambulatory psychiatric treatment. Such an appointment was eventually revoked in September 2014 on the grounds that the Centre for Legal Aid had appointed a lawyer for the applicant in June 2014. The District Court also joined the present case file to another set of proceedings for several months. In January 2014, the District Court judge responsible for hearing the applicant’s case changed. The District Court further scheduled several hearings, which were either adjourned or cancelled. 8. On 13 May 2015 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant’s complaint about a violation of his right to a hearing within a reasonable time in the proceedings held before the District Court as manifestly ill-founded. It concluded that the District Court proceeded with the matter actively and properly, apart from a few minor exceptions, such as the joining of a case file to another set of proceedings, changing of the judge and a procedural error made during one of the hearings. In particular, the Constitutional Court took into account the fact that the applicant had complained of excessive delays with the president of the District Court and challenged them further on appeal on each occasion. 9. Subsequently, the District Court took several steps as follows. It asked for further information from inter alia the applicant’s employer. It also scheduled a hearing for 12 August 2015, which was adjourned to 31 August 2015. It then postponed the latter hearing to an unspecified date, since it had to deal with a procedural request from the plaintiff, which was also challenged on appeal. In the absence of any further information from the parties, it appears that the proceedings are still pending and no judgment on the merits has been delivered by the District Court.

5. The applicant was born in 1966 and is detained in the Suwałki Prison. 6. The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows. 7. On 30 April 2003 the Suwałki Regional Prosecutor’s Office issued an arrest warrant against the applicant on suspicion of his being the leader of an international organised criminal group and six counts of kidnapping for ransom committed by members of that group. On the same day the Suwałki District Court issued a decision ordering the applicant’s detention on remand, relying on the reasonable suspicion that he had committed the offences in question. It attached great weight to the possibility that the applicant might attempt to obstruct the proceedings by bringing pressure to bear on witnesses and other suspects. 8. On 22 April 2003 the applicant was arrested in the Netherlands. 9. The extradition request, arrest warrant and detention order were sent to the Netherlands. The applicant was transferred to Poland on 20 October 2003. 10. On 8 April 2004 the Suwałki Regional Prosecutor indicted the applicant before the Augustów District Court. The case was later transferred to the Lublin Regional Court. 11. The applicant’s appeal against the detention order, his further appeals against subsequent decisions extending his detention, and all his subsequent applications for release and appeals against refusals to release him, were unsuccessful. 12. In the meantime, in another set of criminal proceedings, on 1 April 2005, the Suwałki Regional Court convicted the applicant of armed robbery and sentenced him to four years and six months’ imprisonment (II K 96/04). The judgment was upheld on appeal. He served this sentence from 21 January 2006 until 20 July 2010. 13. The bill of indictment was first lodged with the Augustów District Court, which declared itself not competent to deal with the case on 14 April 2004. The case was then transferred to the Lublin District Court, where the trial commenced on 21 September 2004. The court held many hearings and heard witnesses. On 26 January 2006 the prosecutor submitted a request for the case to be transferred to the Lublin Regional Court. Following various appeals and challenges, on 26 September 2006 the Warsaw Court of Appeal finally decided that the Lublin Regional Court was competent to deal with the applicant’s trial. The trial commenced before the Lublin Regional Court in December 2006. The court held at least sixty-five public hearings lasting up to four hours. 14. At the hearings before the Lublin District Court and Lublin Regional Court the applicant had the services of a Lithuanian interpreter. On a few occasions a Russian interpreter was provided as the applicant agreed that he spoke Russian well enough. On 4 January 2007 the applicant expressed his preference for a Lithuanian interpreter and one was provided until the end of the trial. 15. On numerous occasions the applicant, assisted by an interpreter, examined the file. According to the Government, the file was examined on 14 November and 2 December 2007, 3 January, 7, 17 and 31 March and 5 May 2008 at the very least. At the applicant’s request the trial court provided him with translations of documents. In addition, at four hearings in 2005 the applicant requested copies of the relevant documents in Polish. 16. On 5 October 2007 the applicant asked the trial court to allocate another legal aid lawyer to him. He contended that he had argued with the incumbent lawyer and could not communicate with him. It appears that at the hearing the lawyer endorsed the request made by the applicant, but the court dismissed it. 17. At the hearing of 7 January 2009 the applicant challenged the presiding judge. However his challenge was dismissed. 18. On 27 January 2010 the Lublin Regional Court (IV Ka 338/06) convicted the applicant as charged. In particular he was convicted on six counts of kidnapping for ransom and leading an organised criminal gang. The applicant was sentenced to twelve years’ imprisonment. The period of the applicant’s detention from 22 April 2003 until 20 January 2006 was credited towards the sentence. 19. During the trial before the Lublin District and Regional Courts the applicant was represented by Mr M.C. a lawyer from Białystok, appointed for him by the court. The lawyer prepared an appeal on his behalf. In his appeal he raised, inter alia, a breach of the applicant’s defence rights under Article 6 of the Convention and argued that the applicant had not had access to his lawyer in the presence of an interpreter and full access to the case file in his own language. 20. On 7 December 2010 the Lublin Court of Appeal (II AKa 235/10) upheld the conviction. The court dismissed the allegations regarding the impossibility of communicating with his lawyer, who spoke only Polish, as manifestly ill-founded. The court established that the applicant had had access to a sworn interpreter during the entire trial, including meetings with the lawyer. The appellate court also found that the applicant had not been hindered in his right of access to the case file, which he consulted on many occasions in the presence of his interpreter. The court stated: “During the entire proceedings the accused benefited from free counsel with whom he could communicate in the presence of an interpreter. The regional court even organised recesses during the hearing in order to enable the applicant to contact his lawyer in the presence of a sworn interpreter. Consequently, one cannot share the accused’s allegation of a breach of Article 6 of the Convention or other provisions. Moreover, throughout the proceedings the first-instance court provided him with copies of the requested documents...” 21. A new lawyer allocated to the applicant at this stage of the proceedings, Mr A.D., lodged a cassation appeal against the judgment. He argued that the contact with the lawyer during recesses in the trial had occurred in the presence of police officers and sometimes lay judges or judges’ assistants. That rendered respect for the applicant’s defence rights illusory. The requests for unsupervised meetings with the lawyer in the presence of the interpreter had been dismissed by both the trial court and the court of appeal. In the cassation appeal he further argued that the trial court never actually provided the applicant with copies of the translated documents although it had agreed to do it. Moreover, the court had asked the applicant to pay for them although he did not have any financial means. 22. On 4 April 2012 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s cassation appeal. The translation into Lithuanian of this judgment had been received by the applicant on 7 July 2012. As regards the arguments put forward in the cassation appeal, the court stated that the applicant had been detained on remand and had therefore had to be accompanied by guards during the meetings with the lawyer which had taken place during recesses in the trial court hearing. The court further noted that the requirements of Article 6 of the Convention had been fulfilled as the applicant had had translations of the most important documents necessary for his comprehension of the case, even if not the entire file. 23. On 21 October 2003 the Suwałki Remand Centre requested to classify the applicant as a so-called “dangerous detainee”. In their request the authorities pointed out that the applicant had been charged with having committed several counts of kidnapping for ransom, robberies and attempted murder and of being a leader of an international, armed, criminal group. The applicant was searched by an arrest warrant and apprehended in Amsterdam. The remand centre authorities stated: “his personal situation, character and behaviour pose a serious danger to society or to the security of a remand centre”. They further indicated that the security of all transfers of the applicant be strengthen “given the character and the manner in which the offences had been committed and the fact that [the applicant] had previously practiced box and combat techniques”. The request ends: “He is a person of high degree of depravity”. On the same day the Lublin Remand Centre Penitentiary Commission decided to classify the applicant as a “dangerous detainee”. The commission stated that the main reason for the classification was the suspicion that the applicant had committed offences within an organised criminal group (Article 212a § 3 and §4 (c) of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences). 24. On an unspecified date the applicant lodged a complaint with the Lublin Regional Prison Service Inspectorate concerning the constant monitoring of his cell, repeated body searches and the lack of unsupervised visits. On 15 February 2010 the complaint was declared manifestly ill‑founded. 25. Every three months the Lublin Remand Centre Penitentiary Commission reviewed and reaffirmed its decision to classify the applicant as a “dangerous detainee”. The relevant decisions were limited to short descriptions of the nature of the charges laid against him, and later offences of which he had been convicted which, together with his “personal situation”, justified the maintaining of the previous decisions. In the requests for extension of the regime issued prior to each decision of the commission, the director of the remand centre emphasised the violent nature of the crimes which the applicant had allegedly committed. In the requests of 19 October 2004 and 9 January 2005 the authorities referred to the applicant’s “personal circumstances (ruthless and cruel manner in which the crimes were committed taken together with the knowledge of box and combat techniques)”. In the more recent requests the remand centre authorities pointed out that the applicant had not taken any active part in the “social rehabilitation process” and had been of low moral character. All the commission’s decisions and the requests by the remand centre issued between April 2005 and 2012 had similar wording. 26. The applicant appealed against some of those decisions. In particular, he appealed against the decision of 2 April 2009, but this was dismissed by the Lublin Regional Court on 8 June 2009. The applicant also appealed against the commission’s decision of 29 April 2011 and on 6 September 2011 the Białystok Regional Court upheld it. In addition to that, the applicant submitted that he had appealed against the decision of 4 August 2011 which was dismissed on 11 October 2011. On 26 March 2012 the Białystok Regional Court dismissed his appeal against the decision of the commission issued on 27 January 2012. The domestic courts examined the legality of the impugned decisions and found that they had been given in accordance with the law and after a thorough analysis of the case. In particular due consideration had to be given to the nature of the offences allegedly committed by the applicant and of which he had been later found guilty. The courts also found that the authorities based their decisions on an exhaustive assessment of the applicant’s behaviour. 27. On 25 July 2012 the Białystok Remand Centre Penitentiary Commission decided to lift the measure. The commission considered that the applicant no longer posed a threat to the security of the remand centre. 28. On 11 October 2007 the Lublin Regional Court granted the applicant’s request to be allowed to make phone calls from the detention centre. During his subsequent detention in the Lublin and Suwałki Remand Centres the applicant was authorised to make two telephone calls per week, each lasting ten minutes. For a short period of time in 2010 the use of telephone was limited to once a week but the call duration extended to 15 minutes. 29. In addition to that, the applicant was often granted additional telephone conversations with his family, daughter, lawyer, or diplomatic representatives. In 2010 these took place on eight occasions and in 2011 on seven occasions. At his request, on seven occasions in 2010 the authorities extended the allotted time to fifteen minutes. 30. The visits by the applicant’s family, his common-law wife and daughter, were subject to restrictions, but he had been able to receive them regularly. The first visit from his common law wife took place in August 2004, followed by two other in the same year. From the list of visits submitted by the Government and not contested by the applicant, it appears that between 2004 and 2009 he had had between two and four visits every year at least. In 2010 he had in total eight visits mostly from his wife and daughter. Each visit lasted between thirty minutes and two hours. 31. The applicant was not restricted in receiving correspondence from his family. 32. The Government acknowledged that during the hearings before the Lublin Regional Court the applicant had been held in a metal cage separating him from the judges and the public, and whilst in the cage, his hands had remained handcuffed. 33. The parties failed to provide a detailed description of the cage, in particular its dimensions. It is also not clear whether the guards were positioned inside the cage with the applicant or next to it. 34. The parties disagreed as to the number of hearings during which the applicant remained in the cage. The applicant stated that he was placed in the metal cage, with his hands and legs shackled, during all the hearings before the trial court, approximately 104 of them. The Government submitted that he was placed in the cage, handcuffed, during some hearings before the Lublin Regional Court but not all of them. 35. The Government also submitted that on 7 October 2010 the applicant received disciplinary punishment for having verbally threatened a prison guard.

4. The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Lakha-Varanda, Chechen Republic. 5. On 11 July 2008 P. caused a traffic accident while driving and damaged the applicant’s car. According to P., the applicant threatened him, asking for cash for his car’s repair. 6. On 16 July 2008 P. reported the applicant to the regional police department for combatting organised crime. The police decided to run a special operation to arrest the applicant. They gave P. 2,000 United States dollars (USD) and 90,000 Russian roubles (RUB) in marked notes. At around noon several police officers arrived at a car market where P. worked. At about 5 p.m. the applicant entered P.’s office. P. met the applicant and gave him the money he had received from the police. Immediately thereafter, the policemen arrested the applicant. According to the police officers, the applicant resisted the arrest and they had to handcuff him. The applicant was then taken to the regional police department for combatting organised crime. At 5 p.m. the policemen searched the applicant and found heroin on him. Lay witnesses F. and R. were present during the search. The applicant alleged that it was the police officers who had planted the drug on him. 7. At 8 p.m. on 16 July 2008 police captain A. drew up an administrative arrest record, according to which the applicant had “failed to comply with the policemen’s legitimate request to present his identification document, resisted them and tried to abscond”. No legal assistance was made available to the applicant. 8. On 17 July 2008 at 12.45 p.m. investigator S. from the town police department opened a criminal investigation against the applicant on suspicion of illegal drug possession. At 6.20 p.m. she drew up a criminal arrest record. 9. On 18 July 2008 the Odintsovo Town Court authorised the applicant’s pre-trial detention. The court noted as follows: “As is apparent from the evidential material submitted, [the applicant] is suspected of having committed a serious offence and he has a prior criminal record. If released, he might abscond and interfere with [administration of justice]. ” 10. The applicant appealed, noting that he had been arrested by the police a day before the record of his arrest was prepared and that the Town Court had failed to take his fact into consideration. He also argued that the Town Court had ignored the fact that he had a permanent place of residence in Moscow, that he had been the sole provider for two minor children and his wife, that he was in the fourth year of study by correspondence at a higher educational establishment and that he had employment. Nor had the prosecutor furnished any evidence disclosing the applicant’s intent to abscond or to interfere with the administration of justice. Lastly, he noted that the arrest order did not indicate a time-limit for his detention. 11. On 5 August 2008 the Moscow Regional Court upheld the arrest order of 18 July 2008 on appeal. 12. On 15 September 2008 the Town Court extended the applicant’s detention until 17 November 2008. The court reasoned as follows: “As is apparent from the evidential material submitted, [the applicant] is charged with a serious offence and has a prior criminal record. Accordingly, if released, he might abscond and interfere with [administration of justice].” 13. On 12 November 2008 the Town Court extended the applicant’s detention until 31 December 2008. The court reasoned as follows: “Taking into account the fact that [the applicant] is charged with a serious offence which he committed whilst on parole, that he has a prior criminal record and that he might abscond, continue his criminal activities, and interfere with the administration of justice, it is necessary that [the applicant] remain in custody. ” 14. On 16 December 2008 the Town Court set the trial-date for 23 December 2008. The court also ordered that the applicant remain in custody pending examination of the case and noted as follows: “... According to the material submitted by the prosecutor, [the applicant] had been previously convicted. He is charged with a[n] ... offence classified as particularly serious ... . ... The court considers that, if released, [the applicant] might abscond. Furthermore, [the applicant’s] release might interfere with the comprehensive and objective examination of the evidence. Accordingly, the measure of restraint previously imposed on [the applicant] cannot be lifted.” 15. On 18 December 2008 the Town Court opened the trial. 16. On 22 May 2009 the Town Court extended the applicant’s detention until 8 September 2009 noting as follows: “Having heard the parties’ arguments, the court concludes that, in view of the fact that [the applicant] is charged with a ... grievous offence ... which he committed whilst on parole, the court considers that, if released, he might abscond or continue criminal activities. Furthermore, the [applicant’s] release might interfere with the comprehensive and objective examination of the case. Accordingly, ... the detention imposed on [the applicant] cannot be lifted.” 17. On 25 June 2009 the Town Court returned the case file to the prosecutor’s office for rectification of certain omissions and extended the applicant’s detention until 8 September 2009. The court referred to the gravity of the charges against the applicant and noted that the latter was charged with having committed a serious offence whilst released on parole. 18. On 16 July 2009 the Regional Court upheld the decision of 22 May 2009 on appeal. 19. On 23 July 2009 the Regional Court upheld the decision of 25 June 2009 on appeal. 20. On an unspecified date the prosecutor’s office returned the case file to the Town Court. 21. On 2 November 2009 the Town Court opened the trial. On the same date the applicant studied the material in the case file at the court-house. He tore several pages out of the case file and burnt them. 22. During the subsequent hearings the court heard evidence from a certain P., police officers And., Rom., Ak., Z., Shch., and T. − who had taken part in the applicant’s arrest − the head of the police unit Pl., lay witness R. − who had been present when the applicant was searched on 16 July 2008 − and forensic expert P., who had run a laboratory test on the heroin found on the applicant. 23. On 11 and 12 November and 2, 3, 4 and 8 December 2009 the applicant received repeated reprimands from the presiding judge for making threats and insulting persons present in the courtroom. The judge warned the applicant that he might be removed from the courtroom for continuing with such disruptive behaviour. 24. On 9 December 2009 the director of the company that provided the interpreters for the trial complained to the court that the applicant had threatened the interpreters who had earlier taken part in the proceedings. 25. On 16 December 2009 the applicant refused to leave the remand prison to attend a trial hearing. The hearing was adjourned. 26. On 17 December 2009 the court held the last trial hearing. The presiding judge confirmed the presence of the parties and witnesses. L., a police officer who had been in charge of the operation leading to the applicant’s arrest on 16 July 2008, appeared for questioning. The applicant insulted the witness. The presiding judge reprimanded the applicant and warned him that he would be removed from the courtroom if he persisted with his disruptive behaviour. The applicant started talking in Chechen. The interpreter refused to interpret and asked the court to relieve him of his duties. The presiding judge informed the parties that the interpreters who had earlier taken part in the proceedings had decided to refuse further engagement in view of the insults and threats made by the applicant. The applicant talked back to the judge in Chechen. The interpreter refused to interpret into Russian. The presiding judge again reprimanded the applicant and warned him about his possible removal from the courtroom. The presiding judge presented the report from the remand prison management stating that on 16 December 2009 the applicant had refused to be transported from the remand prison to the court-house for the hearing. The presiding judge asked the prosecution and defence whether it was possible, in the circumstances, to remove the applicant from the courtroom. The prosecutor did not object. The applicant stated that the presiding judge’s conduct clearly demonstrated that he was being pressurised by high-ranking law-enforcement officials to deliver an unlawful judgment in the applicant’s case and that his decision to remove the applicant from the courtroom would be unlawful and in contravention of the Convention. The court ruled as follows: “... the court decides to remove [the applicant] from the courtroom ... for the following reasons. [The applicant] has repeatedly been disruptive in the courtroom in the course of the trial, including the current hearing. In particular, ... while studying the material in the case file, [the applicant] destroyed five pages thereof. He repeatedly refused to appear in the courtroom referring to his needs to pray, eat, wash and go to the bathroom. On several occasions he refused to appear before the court alleging that he was ill. However, the emergency response doctors summoned did not confirm his allegation. He has insulted witnesses and other participants in the proceedings and shown disrespect for the judges participating in the trial by making negative comments about the judicial system in Russia. He claimed to know the home address of [a witness] and one of the judges. He has made statements and comments unrelated to the trial. During this hearing, [the applicant] insulted a witness ... . After [the applicant] said something in the Chechen language, the interpreter asked the court to [relieve him of his duties] ... . The head of the interpreters’ agency reported that [the applicant] spoke Chechen [in the courtroom] with the sole intention of insulting and threatening the interpreters.” 27. The trial continued in the applicant’s absence. The court questioned L., who, at the time, had been in charge of the special operation conducted in response to P.’s complaint about the applicant extorting money from him. The applicant’s lawyer was present and put questions to the witness. The court also established that witness F. had failed to appear and decided that the statement he had made earlier to the investigator should be read out. The court also read out statements made by witnesses Shch. and T. earlier during the trial as those witnesses had also failed to appear. Lastly, the court granted a request from the applicant’s lawyer and read out several earlier statements made by the applicant and several witnesses for the defence who had failed to appear. According to the record of the court hearing, the applicant refused to return to the courtroom to participate in the closing arguments. The judgment was read out in the applicant’s absence. 28. The Town Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to four years’ imprisonment. The court based its findings on statements made by witnesses questioned by the investigator and the court, police reports and other material in the case file, and forensic evidence. The court accepted the prosecution’s version of events, namely that the applicant had been arrested by special police forces in the course of an operation targeting him as a racketeer as alleged by P. and that heroin had been found on him during the search conducted immediately after his arrest. 29. On 13 April 2010 the Moscow Regional Court upheld the applicant’s conviction on appeal. 30. On 11 December 2013 the Presidium of the Moscow Regional Court reviewed the applicant’s conviction and reduced the applicant’s sentence to three years and two months’ imprisonment. 31. On 21 May 2009 the applicant was taken to the Odintsovo police station. According to applicant, at the station he was assaulted by three police officers. They throttled him and pulled his arms behind his back causing him enormous pain. 32. On 21 and 22 May 2009 the applicant was examined by a paramedic. According to the official report, the applicant complained about chronic stomach pain. 33. On 22 May 2009 the applicant’s lawyer complained to the police and the prosecutor’s office about the incident of 21 May 2009. 34. On 25 May 2009 the police completed an internal inquiry into the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment. It was established that five police officers had had to subdue the applicant during a body search. They had pinned him to the ground and handcuffed him. 35. On 10 July 2009 investigator B. refused to institute criminal proceedings against the alleged perpetrators. On 31 August 2009 his superior quashed the said decision and remitted the matter for further inquiry. 36. On 9 September 2009 investigator D. dismissed the applicant’s complaint as unsubstantiated and refused to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers. Relying on the evidential material obtained in the course of the inquiry, he concluded that the police officers had acted in accordance with the law. It appears that the applicant did not appeal against the decision of 9 September 2009. 37. Following communication of the application to the Government, on 4 February 2014 the Acting Head of the Investigative Committee of Odintsovo Town quashed the decision of 9 September 2009 and remitted the matter for further inquiry. The parties did not disclose the outcome of the proceedings. 38. On 25 September 2009, remand prison director M. ordered the applicant’s placement in a disciplinary cell. 39. According to the applicant, on their way to the disciplinary cell M. repeatedly hit the applicant against the wall, administering blows to his head and body. The applicant’s nose and lips began to bleed. Then the guards handcuffed the applicant and continued beating him. 40. According to the Government, the applicant refused to enter the disciplinary cell. Instead, he threw a punch at M.’s face and M. hit his head against the wall. M. tried to subdue the applicant by pulling his right arm behind his back. The applicant resisted and kicked M. Guard N. came to M.’s rescue and pulled the applicant’s arm behind his back. The applicant fell to the floor and his nose bled. The guards handcuffed the applicant and took him to a cell where he calmed down. The guards called an ambulance. 41. On the same date the prison director and the guards reported the use of force against the applicant. According to the reports, M. pulled the applicant’s right arm behind his back using a combat technique and guard K. handcuffed the applicant to put an end to his resistance. 42. On an unspecified date the applicant underwent a medical examination. According to the medical report the applicant had sustained the following injuries: bruises on the right forearm and shoulder, left shoulder, left armpit and left calf; a bruised wound on the lower lip. 43. On 6 October 2009 the applicant complained that he had been beaten up by M. On 15 October 2009 investigator Mar. dismissed the applicant’s allegations as unsubstantiated and refused to institute criminal proceedings against M. 44. On 12 October 2009 a medical forensic expert examined the applicant and his medical case history. The expert concluded that the applicant’s injuries could have resulted from impact by blunt and solid objects and that the applicant might have sustained the injuries on 25 September 2009 as a result of blows or a fall. The expert concluded that the injuries were not serious and had not caused any harm to the applicant’s health. 45. On 22 October 2009 the expert issued an additional forensic report, noting that it was impossible to determine the exact date on which the applicant had sustained the injuries. It could have been on 25 September 2009 or some time before or after that date. 46. On 7 October 2009 the prosecutor’s office opened a criminal investigation into the incident of 25 September 2009. The applicant was charged with the use of force against a State agent. 47. On an unspecified date the Town Court received the file and opened the trial. During the trial, the applicant maintained his innocence. He claimed that the remand prison director and the guards had beaten him up on 25 September 2009 and he had then been prosecuted on trumped-up charges to cover up for the beatings. 48. On 16 December 2010 the Town Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to six years’ imprisonment. The court dismissed the applicant’s version of events as unsubstantiated, relying on the prosecution and defence witnesses’ statements and forensic evidence. On 17 March 2011 the Regional Court upheld the applicant’s conviction on appeal. The court also re-calculated the applicant’s sentence. It took into account that the applicant had two previous convictions and sentenced him cumulatively to seven years’ imprisonment. 49. On 11 December 2013 the Presidium of the Regional Court reclassified the charges against the applicant by way of supervisory review, reduced his sentence to five years’ imprisonment and sentenced him cumulatively to five and a half years’ imprisonment. 50. On 29 October 2010 the applicant was detained in remand prison no. IZ‑77/4 in Moscow. According to the applicant, the prison guards beat him and nine other inmates. According to the Government, the applicant was inciting other inmates to disobey the guards. He also threatened the guards and insulted them. The guards used rubber truncheons and handcuffs to subdue the applicant. 51. On 3 November 2010 the applicant took part in a hearing at the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation by means of video link. The applicant demonstrated to the judges extensive bruising on his stomach, chest and lower back and claimed that he had been beaten up by guards of the remand prison. 52. On 9 November 2010 the Supreme Court informed the Moscow City Prosecutor of the applicant’s injuries and forwarded the applicant’s complaint about the beatings in the remand prison. 53. According to the Government, on 12 January 2014 an investigator completed the inquiry into the incident of 29 October 2010 and refused to institute criminal proceedings against the prison guards. On 27 January 2014 the district prosecutor quashed the decision of 12 January 2014 and remitted the matter for further inquiry. The Government did not disclose the outcome. 54. According to the applicant, on 24 June 2012 he was beaten up whilst in detention in correctional colony no. IK-19 in the Sverdlovsk Region. According to the Government, the applicant had an altercation with inmate Ur. As a result, the applicant sustained bruises and a bone fracture on the right side of the face and concussion. On an unspecified date the authorities instituted criminal proceedings against Ur. The parties did not disclose their outcome. (b) Correctional colony no. IK-2 55. On an unspecified date the applicant was transferred to correctional colony no. IK-2 in Yekaterinburg. 56. According to the applicant, on 29 September 2012 some time after 10 p.m. a group of young and strongly-built men entered his cell and beat him up. They were led by inmate O. 57. According to the applicant, on 1 October 2012 a man wearing the uniform of a major and accompanied by several medical orderlies entered the applicant’s cell. The major started beating the applicant, who was lying on the bed. The major then told the orderlies to pull the applicant off the bed and continued the beatings, administering multiple blows to the applicant’s head and other parts of the body. 58. On 7 October 2012 the applicant was transferred to correctional colony no. IK-19 in the Sverdlovsk Region. Upon arrival, he underwent a medical examination. The medical practitioners recorded a wound on the applicant’s head and a bruise near the hip bone. The applicant explained that he had sustained the injuries as a result of the beatings to which he had been subjected in correctional colony no. IK-2. The management of correctional colony no. IK-19 forwarded the relevant report to the regional investigation committee but it was never received by them. According to the Government, the authorities’ inquiry into the loss of the report is still pending. 59. According to the Government, the inquiries into the incidents of 29 September and 1 October 2012 are still pending. 60. Between 17 July 2009 and 13 April 2011 the applicant was detained in identical conditions in the temporary detention centre in Odintsovo, in remand prison no. IZ‑50/1 in Mozhaysk and in remand prison no. IZ-77/4 in Moscow. The cells were overcrowded, dirty, poorly ventilated and insufficiently lit. The toilet offered no privacy. The use of a shower was limited. 61. From 22 November 2012 to 11 January 2013 the applicant was held in remand prison no. IZ-66/1 in Yekaterinburg. (a) Temporary detention centre in Odintsovo 62. On numerous occasions between 10 November 2008 and 17 December 2009 the applicant was held in the temporary detention centre in Odintsovo. According to the Government, the centre comprised fifteen cells measuring 184 sq. m in total. The centre had an outdoor area where the inmates were able to exercise. The inmates were able to take a shower at least once a week. They were provided with three meals per day and an individual sleeping place, bed linen, toiletries, a bowl, a mug and a spoon. 63. According to the applicant, at all times the cells in the temporary detention centre were overcrowded and the personal space available to the inmates fell short of the statutory minimum standard of 4 sq. m. The cells were dirty and there was no ventilation. The lighting was poor and insufficient for reading. The access to shower facilities was limited. The applicant received one meal a day. On the days of the court hearings, the applicant did not have any meals at all. (b) Remand prisons nos. IZ-50/1 in Mozhaysk and IZ-77/4 in Moscow 64. The applicant did not provide a description of the conditions in which he was detained in remand prisons nos. IZ-50/1 in Mozhaysk and IZ‑77/4 in Moscow, beyond alleging that they were identical to the conditions of his detention in the temporary detention centre in Odintsovo. (c) Remand prison no. IZ-66/1 in Yekaterinburg 65. On 22 November 2012 the applicant was placed in cell no. 423 in remand prison no. IZ-66/1 in Yekaterinburg. The cell measured no more than 15 sq. m and was equipped with four beds. Between seven and nine inmates were held in the cell, together with the applicant. 66. From 29 November to 28 December 2012 the applicant was held in cell no. 240. The cell was constantly overcrowded and housed between eighteen and thirty inmates. 67. From 29 December 2012 to 11 January 2013 the applicant was held in cell no. 2. It measured 6.23 sq. m and housed two inmates. 68. According to the applicant, on the days of the court hearings and on the days when there was a change of the applicant’s place of detention, he was woken up early and placed in an overcrowded holding cell. He was then taken to the place of his destination (a court-house or a detention facility) in a prison van. On each occasion the number of the persons transported with the applicant exceeded the van’s capacity of 24 persons. The vans were dirty and unventilated and had no heating. The trip lasted several hours. The van compartments were stiflingly hot in the summer and very cold in the winter. (b) Description provided by the Government 69. According to the Government, the applicant was transported in GAZ vans which comprised two compartments measuring 6.2 sq. m and 1.2 sq. m respectively, in strict compliance with the vans’ design capacity. The vans were equipped with ventilation and heating. The trips from the temporary detention centre in Odintsovo to the Odintsovo Town Court lasted no more than 5 to 10 minutes. The trips from the same detention centre to the courts in Moscow lasted no more than three hours. 70. According to the applicant, at the court-house he was placed in a holding cell measuring 5 sq. m together with two to four other inmates. He was held in such conditions for several hours awaiting the hearing. He was allowed to use the toilet only once. The cell was not ventilated. All the other detainees smoked and the applicant, a non-smoker, was exposed to the others’ tobacco smoke. 71. On 13 April 2011 the applicant was transported to correctional colony no. IK-19 in the Sverdlovsk Region. The trip lasted from 13 to 27 April 2011. (a) Description provided by the applicant 72. According to the applicant, he was held with twelve to fourteen other inmates in a train compartment of which the capacity was a maximum of six persons. During the stops, the applicant was housed in remand prisons in Moscow, Chelyabinsk and Yekaterinburg. All the cells there were overcrowded. The applicant was not provided with an individual sleeping place. (b) Description provided by the Government 73. According to the Government, the applicant was transported in a train compartment measuring 159 x 214 x 287 cm. At no time did the number of inmates transported in one compartment together with the applicant exceed ten persons, the compartment’s capacity being twelve persons. It was equipped with eight sitting and four sleeping places. The applicant was provided with dry food rations and drinking water.

4. The applicants were prosecuted in Russia for various crimes. They were arrested and detained pending investigation and trial. Their detention was ordered and extended by the courts. The detention orders were essentially based on the gravity of the charges, the primary grounds being the risk of the applicants’ absconding and interfering with the course of justice. The detention and extension orders used stereotyped formulae, without addressing specific facts or considering alternative preventive measures. 5. The first applicant was born in 1973 and lived, prior to his arrest, in Yekaterinburg, Sverdlovsk Region. In 2007 the applicant was arrested in Ukraine. On 24 May 2008 he was extradited to Russia and was placed in pre-trial detention until 27 December 2010 when he was released on bail. On 22 April 2011 the Kirovskiy District Court of Yekaterinburg convicted him of fraud. 6. The second applicant was born in 1978 and lived, prior to his arrest, in Angarsk, Irkutsk Region. On 23 September 2007 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of fraud. On 25 September 2007 the court remanded him in custody. On 24 June 2010 the Irkutsk Regional Court convicted the applicant of fraud. 7. The third applicant was born in 1967 and lived, prior to his arrest, in Yekaterinburg. The applicant was arrested on 16 August 2012. On 17 August 2012 the court held to place him in pre-trial detention. On 10 October 2013 the Sverdlovsk Regional Court convicted the applicant of trespass, battery, robbery and sexual assault.

5. The applicant was born in 1962 and is detained in Baku. 6. On 9 June 2008 the Assize Court (Ağır Cinayətlər Məhkəməsi – hereinafter “the Assize Court”), sitting as a court of first instance for serious offences, convicted the applicant and his wife of fraud. The applicant was sentenced to nine years’ imprisonment with confiscation of property, and his wife to seven years’ imprisonment, suspended for five years on probation. 7. On 23 January 2009 the Baku Court of Appeal (Bakı Apellyasiya Məhkəməsi – hereinafter “the Court of Appeal”) overturned the judgment of 9 June 2008, reducing the applicant’s term of imprisonment to seven years and lifting the confiscation of property sanction. 8. The applicant lodged a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court (Ali Məhkəmə – hereinafter “the Supreme Court”). The prosecutor lodged a cassation protest in respect of the judgment of 23 January 2009 with the Supreme Court, requesting that it be set aside and the case remitted to the Court of Appeal. 9. The Supreme Court scheduled the first hearing for 10 June 2009 but adjourned the proceedings until 24 June 2009 at the request of the applicant’s lawyer who pleaded that he had not enough time to familiarise himself with the case-file and collect further evidence. 10. At the hearing of 24 June 2009 the applicant’s lawyer requested another adjournment referring to health problems and lack of time for familiarisation with the case-file. The Supreme Court scheduled the next hearing for 1 July 2009. According to the minutes of the hearing of 24 June 2009 provided by the Government, the applicant’s lawyer was present when the court declared that his request had been granted and that the proceedings were adjourned until 1 July 2009. 11. On 1 July 2009, having examined the case in the absence of the applicant and his lawyer but in the presence of the prosecutor, the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal and accepted the prosecutor’s application for supervisory review in part. The prosecutor made oral submissions during the hearing, seeking the dismissal of the applicant’s appeal. 12. The Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeal’s judgment as regards the applicant’s conviction, but quashed his wife’s conviction, remitting that part of the case to the Court of Appeal for fresh examination. The Supreme Court found that proof of the applicant’s guilt had been duly established during the trial in the first-instance court and the Court of Appeal and that his actions had been properly classified under criminal law. Citing Article 419.4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Supreme Court’s decision stated that the examination of the case was possible in the absence of the applicant and his lawyer given that the lawyer had failed to appear despite having been duly notified and the applicant, who was serving his prison sentence, had made no request to attend.

5. The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Beograd. 6. On 19 September 1996 certain A.N. (hereinafter “the debtor”) was sentenced for fraud in criminal proceedings and ordered to pay 18, 425 Serbian dinars (RSD) to PP Reprek, a company based in Serbia and owned by the applicant. 7. On 17 December 1998 the said company filed with the District Court in Belgrade a request for enforcement based on the judgment in said criminal proceedings. Following an order to specify a motion for enforcement, the decision on enforcement was adopted on 29 April 1999. 8. On 15 October 1999 the enforcement court ordered the Ministry of Interior to provide the exact address of the debtor. 9. On 7 February 2000 the bailiff noted that the debtor had moved away to an unknown address. 10. On 27 October 2000 the case was adjourned. 11. On 7 May 2005 the applicant requested the continuation of the enforcement proceedings on behalf of his company. 12. On 4 October 2005 the enforcement court again ordered the Ministry of Interior to provide the exact address of the debtor. 13. By letter of 21 October 2005, the Ministry informed the enforcement court of the debtor’s address. 14. On 18 November 2005 the bailiff went to the address provided by the said Ministry and established that the debtor was no longer living there and that he had moved away to an unknown address. 15. On 20 January 2006 the enforcement Court requested the Ministry of Interior to provide the exact address of the debtor and his latest known place of residence. 16. On 24 October 2006 the enforcement court informed the applicant that the Ministry did not establish the exact address of the debtor nor did it initiate misdemeanour proceedings against the debtor in accordance with Article 25 of the Domicile and Temporary Residence Act (see paragraph 22). 17. On 31 May 2007 the insolvency proceedings against the applicant’s company “Reprek” were completed. The said company ceased to exist and all its assets were transferred to the applicant. 18. The enforcement court adjourned the case on 31 March 2010.

5. The applicant was born in 1948 and lives in Belgrade. 6. The applicant was employed by “PIM – bagerovanje i vodni transport”, a socially-owned company based in Belgrade (“the debtor”). 7. On 30 March 2005 the Belgrade Second Municipal Court (Drugi opštinski sud u Beogradu) ordered the debtor to pay the applicant specified sums in respect of salary arrears, social security contributions and procedural costs. This judgment became final on the same date. 8. On 22 June 2005 the Belgrade Fourth Municipal Court (Četvrti opštinski sud u Beogradu) issued an enforcement order with regard to the said judgement. 9. On 29 March 2012, acting upon the applicant’s constitutional appeal, the Constitutional Court held that the applicant had suffered a breach of the “right to a trial within a reasonable time” with regard to the enforcement proceedings. The court ordered the acceleration of the proceedings and declared that the applicant was entitled to compensation for the non-pecuniary damage suffered in the amount of EUR 700, converted into the national currency at the rate applicable at the date of settlement. 10. The enforcement proceedings instituted on the basis of the judgment rendered by the Belgrade Second Municipal Court on 30 March 2005 continued and are still pending.

5. The applicants were born in 1974, 1975 and 2003 respectively and live in Ankara. 6. In 2004 Duru Kurt’s parents took her to the Ankara SSK hospital because they thought that she was displaying symptoms of heart problems. The child was examined and then transferred to the Sami Ulus paediatric hospital, where she was treated for two years, after which the doctors decided that she should undergo heart surgery. 7. Before the operation, which took place on 19 July 2006, the patient’s father signed a form setting out the potential risks facing his daughter in undergoing the surgical operation, consenting to the operation (“the consent form”). 8. During the post-operative check-ups a leak was detected on the periphery of the membrane covering the incision. 9. On 8 February 2007, by decision of the hospital medical board, the patient underwent a second operation carried out by a different medical team. Prior to the operation, the patient’s father signed a consent form identical to the first one. That form did not mention any risk of a serious neurological problem, but specified that the list of possible sequelae was not exhaustive. 10. After that second operation, the patient suffered an oedema, a brain haemorrhage, liver failure and muscle spasticity while in intensive care. 11. On 6 July 2007 the applicants lodged a complaint against the doctors who had carried out the operations. 12. On 11 July 2007 the medical board of the Dışkapı paediatric hospital in Ankara diagnosed the child with a severe irremediable psychomotor disability (caused by hypoxic ischemic encephalopathy), estimating her disability rate at 92%. 13. On 16 July 2007, pursuant to standard procedure, the prosecutor’s office applied to the Governor of Ankara for authorisation to prosecute. 14. The report drawn up following the internal investigation commissioned by the Governor’s Office stated that the patient was suffering from a very serious congenital heart disease, that treating that disease would entail a high-risk surgical operation and that in 52% of cases a leak was noted around the membrane, necessitating a second operation. It concluded that the medical team had not been guilty of negligence during the first operation. 15. According to the aforementioned report, the second operation, which had been carried out to rectify the leak, had also been very risky. The report pointed out that the patient’s neurological complications had been a common occurrence during open-heart surgery and that they occurred when artificial pumps were installed to maintain blood circulation or where the patient was placed in hypothermia. It added that the patient continued to suffer from sequelae despite the treatment administered after the second operation. In conclusion, the investigator recommended not authorising a criminal prosecution. This preliminary investigation report explained that the relevant persons had been questioned by the instigator. It is not known in what capacity the author of the report, who is a doctor, was involved or to which hospital he is attached. 16. On 6 September 2007, as recommended by the preliminary investigation report, the Governor’s Office refused to authorise prosecution. 17. The applicants’ challenge to that administrative decision was dismissed by the Regional Administrative Court on 18 December 2007 on the grounds that the preliminary investigation report and the appendices thereto were not such as to enable the prosecutor’s office to instigate a judicial investigation. 18. Consequently, on 28 September 2008 the prosecutor’s office issued a discontinuance decision. 19. Concurrently with the criminal proceedings, the applicants lodged a complaint with the Ankara Medical Association. 20. The expert appointed by the latter submitted his report on 14 July 2008. This one-page document stated that the patient had displayed a congenital anomalous left coronary artery from the pulmonary artery (ALCAPA), that open-heart surgery had been carried out in order to irrigate the left coronary artery from the aorta, that six months later a leak had been detected on the membrane which had been applied to the incision during that first operation, that a second operation had been carried out which had resolved that problem, but that the patient had suffered a stroke. The expert pointed out that the patient’s anomaly had been extremely serious, that it was liable to be fatal, and that the probability of complications occurring during or after such an operation had been high. The expert took the view that the second operation, geared to treating a foreseeable complication stemming from the first operation, had in fact been even riskier. He considered that open-heart surgery presented risks not only to the organ being operated on but also to other organs. The expert concluded his report as follows: “The stroke [suffered by] the patient Duru Kurt was one of the possible complications occurring during open-heart surgery. No negligence or fault has been noted on the part of the medical teams which carried out the first and second operations. The teams showed great efficiency and a high degree of medical expertise. The complication [which occurred in the present case] was an eventuality which can be observed in cases of anomalies [such as that suffered by the patient] and as a result of open-heart surgery.” 21. On 23 May 2008 the applicants brought an action for damages against the doctors before the Ankara Civil Court of General Jurisdiction (“CCGJ”) alleging that they had not practised their profession properly and had caused the very severe sequelae with which their daughter Duru Kurt was afflicted. In support of their claim they submitted a private expert report dated 13 May 2008 on the amount of the damages. 22. On 26 March 2009 the CCGJ appointed a board of experts comprising two professors and a lecturer in cardiovascular surgery from Ankara University. 23. The board of experts submitted its report on 31 July 2009. 24. According to that report the patient had originally been diagnosed with dilated cardiomyopathy (an illness which significantly diminishes the “pumping” capacity of the heart) at Ankara University Hospital, and following more detailed examinations at the Sami Ulus Hospital, ALCAPA, also known as Bland-White-Garland syndrome, had been diagnosed. 25. The experts explained that the patient had undergone a Takeuchi operation to create an intrapulmonary tunnel and that a leak had been noted on the periphery of the membrane during the check-ups conducted six months later. They stated that that leak had led to a second surgical operation, that the patient had been placed on respiratory support owing to the emergence of a tonic-clonic contraction after the operation and that the neurological sequelae had appeared during that period of intensive care. 26. After those initial findings, the experts stated in their report that the heart disease from which the patient suffered and for which she had undergone surgery was rare, accounting for 0.5% of all congenital heart diseases. Without treatment the mortality rate was between 80% and 90%, and those affected seldom reached adulthood. The board of experts considered that the only treatment for that disease was surgery, and that the most appropriate type of surgery was the Takeuchi operation. The board added that the latter had a mortality rate of up to 23%, that in 50% of all cases a leak could occur around the membrane following such heart surgery and that, taking all types of complications together, the rate of re-operation was up to 30%. 27. The experts added that in 10% to 29% of cases congenital cardiovascular diseases were accompanied by neurological disorders, and that a multi-country study had shown that the rate of neurological damage in the immediate post-operative period stood at 20%. 28. In their conclusions, the experts pointed out that ALCAPA was a very serious heart disorder and that the patient’s parents had signed a consent form before their child’s operation. They considered that the fact of the patient’s dilated cardiomyopathy had further exacerbated the already serious risks posed by the operation. According to the report, the leak which had been observed around the membrane after the first operation had been a complication which occurred in 50 % of cases, and the operation carried out to resolve that issue had been even riskier than the first one. The experts also pointed out that the neurological damage suffered by the patient had been a complication which was often encountered in cases of patients suffering from a congenital heart defect who underwent post-operative intensive care. 29. The report, which quoted twenty or so bibliographical sources, ended with the following words: “In short, this patient’s situation could be seen as one large complication. There can be no question of the doctors having committed a medical or surgical error.” 30. The applicants contested the report, deeming it inadequate. They considered that the document, which cited scientific studies, was more like a magazine article than an expert report. It contained no concrete and objective facts about the case in hand and would not help in determining the dispute. The applicants did not deny that there had been a risk, but considered that neither that risk nor the signing of a consent form released the doctors from their duty to practise their profession properly. They submitted, however, that the report, which lacked any explanations or reasoning on that point, had not mentioned any checks carried out with regard to the risk factors. Consequently, they asked the court to commission a second expert assessment, either from a different medical board or from a specialist section of the Istanbul Institute of Forensic Sciences. 31. By judgment of 3 November 2009 the CCGJ rejected the applicants request for a second expert assessment. With regard to the expert report of 31 July 2009 and the facts set out in the prosecution investigation file, the court held that the doctors had not been responsible for the sequelae affecting the child after her high-risk operations, to which her parents had given their consent. 32. The parents lodged an appeal on points of law against that judgment, reiterating their previous criticism of the expert report, which they considered inadequate. They also emphasised that the report had been based on the medical file and that their daughter had not been examined by the experts. Furthermore, under established case-law, the experts should have begun by explaining the acts and procedures required by medical lege artis and comparing them with the acts which the doctors in question had actually carried out in order to determine whether and how far the said rules had been observed. Furthermore, they submitted that it was not the courts’ usual practice in this type of case to confine themselves to a single expert report. In that connection, the rejection of their request for a second expert report had amounted to a blatant injustice. They alleged, moreover, that one of the doctors who should have been present during the operation had stayed away from the theatre after having been alerted by telephone that the patient’s heart had stopped during the operation, pointing out that the expert report had neither analysed nor even mentioned that fact. 33. Their appeal was dismissed by judgment of 20 April 2010. 34. On 7 October 2010 the Court of Cassation also dismissed the applicants’ application for rectification.

5. The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Iași. 6. On an unspecified date in 2006 the applicant brought proceedings against a third party, seeking the annulment of two sale/purchase agreements concerning an apartment. 7. By a judgment of 25 January 2007 the Iaşi District Court, acting as a court of first instance, allowed the applicant’s action on the merits and declared the two contracts null and void. The third party appealed against the judgment. 8. By a decision of 21 November 2007 the Iaşi County Court, sitting as a bench of two judges, allowed the third party’s appeal on the merits, quashed the judgment of 25 January 2007 and dismissed the applicant’s action. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law (recurs) against that decision. 9. By a final decision of 2 June 2008 the Iaşi Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law as inadmissible, without commenting on the merits of the case. It held that, under Article 2811 of the Romanian Code of Civil Procedure, judgments delivered by first-instance courts in respect of disputes where the subject matter of the litigation had been valued at less than one billion Romanian lei (RON) (approximately EUR 27,000) were not subject to an ordinary appeal. The applicant had estimated the value of the disputed property to be RON 9,000. Therefore, the judgment delivered by the District Court could only be challenged by way of an appeal on points of law. Moreover, the decision of the Iaşi County Court was final, even if the County Court had erred and examined the applicant’s case in a composition of two rather than three judges.

5. On 28 April 1993 the applicant rented a municipally-owned shop in the town of Primorsko. The shop consisted of a metal structure built on a concrete foundation on a municipally-owned plot of land. 6. On 18 September 1995 the applicant asked Tsarevo Municipal Council to be allowed to purchase the shop under the preferential privatisation procedure for tenants of State and municipally-owned property, as provided for in section 35(1) of the Transformation and Privatisation of State and Municipally-Owned Enterprises Act (Закон за преобразуване и приватизация на държавни и общински предприятия – hereinafter “the Privatisation Act”). She also expressed the wish to buy the plot of land on which the shop was built. As the municipal council did not reply, the applicant applied for judicial review of the municipality’s tacit refusal to sell the shop to her. The first-instance court rejected that application on 31 March 2003. 7. In a final judgment of 4 November 2003, rectified for errors in October 2004, the Supreme Administrative Court quashed the lower court’s judgment, finding that it had not dealt with all the evidence submitted by the applicant. The last-instance court then observed that the parties were in agreement that, at the time of her privatisation request, the applicant had had a valid rent contract for the shop with the municipal authorities. It further found, on the basis of the submitted evidence, that the shop constituted a separate property unit measuring 140 square metres and that all statutory conditions for privatising the shop under the preferential privatisation procedure had been present. As to the land on which the shop was built, the court observed that it was not part of the rental contract and thus its inclusion in the privatisation of the shop was a matter of discretion for the municipal authorities. The court referred the case back to Tsarevo Municipal Council with instructions for it to open a privatisation procedure by offering to sell the shop to the applicant. 8. In 2004 the applicant again asked Tsarevo Municipal Council to examine her privatisation proposal. As she did not receive a reply, she applied for judicial review of its tacit refusal to sell the shop to her. 9. In a final judgment of 28 November 2005, the Supreme Administrative Court held that the applicant met the conditions for the privatisation of the shop. The court specified that, following changes to the country’s administrative map, the privatisation decision had to be taken by Primorsko Municipal Council and it referred the case back to it. 10. On 25 November 2005 and later again on 30 October 2006, Primorsko Municipal Council explicitly refused to sell the shop to the applicant. She brought judicial review proceedings in respect of those refusals. 11. In a final judgment of 31 March 2008 the Supreme Administrative Court revoked the refusals as null and void, finding that the municipal council had been obliged to sell the shop to the applicant. The court briefly noted that, whatever the circumstances, no proof had been presented to it by the municipal council in support of its objection that the shop no longer physically existed. 12. In the meantime, in March and April 1996, the municipal company managing the shop informed the applicant that she had no lease contract for 1996 and invited her to vacate the premises. On an unknown date in 1997, that company lodged a rei vindicatio claim against the applicant. In a final judgment of 3 July 2002, the Supreme Court of Cassation dismissed the company’s claim, holding that the applicant’s lease contract could not be terminated pending the privatisation procedure pursued by her. 13. On 16 February 1999 the mayor of Primorsko (hereinafter “the mayor”) ordered the municipal company to demolish the shop. Following a complaint lodged by the applicant with the Governor of the Burgas Region, the latter revoked the mayor’s order on 18 April 2000, finding that the mayor had not been competent to dispose of municipal property without a prior decision of the municipal council to that effect. The Governor further stated that, pending the privatisation procedure, the lease contract with the applicant could not be terminated. 14. On an unknown date in 1999, the municipal company sold the shop to a private company. On 12 May 1999 the buyer, assisted by municipal employees, prevented the applicant from entering the shop. Following a complaint lodged by the applicant with the prosecutor, on 27 May 1999 the latter established that the buyer had acted in an abusive manner and ordered the police to assist the applicant in regaining possession of the shop. According to the applicant, after she had re-entered the property she discovered that the electricity supply had been cut off. It appears that she ran the shop without electricity until an unspecified date in 2001, when the electricity supply was restored. 15. In 2000 the buyer brought a rei vindicatio claim in court against the applicant. In a final judgment of 14 October 2003, the Supreme Court of Cassation dismissed that claim, confirming the reasoning in the lower court’s judgment. The last-instance court found in particular that the buyer had not acquired ownership of the shop and that, in any event, the applicant was protected by the Privatisation Act in that she could not be evicted from the shop pending the examination of her privatisation proposal. 16. Primorsko Municipal Council considered that the shop was dilapidated and unsafe on account of the corrosion of its metal structure and ordered its sale for demolition. At some point in 2005 the municipal council sold the shop to an individual and on 14 February 2006 the mayor ordered the new buyer to demolish the shop. Even though on the following day, 15 February 2006, the mayor revoked his own order, the buyer dismantled the shop on 18 February 2006 with the assistance of the police. The applicant was informed of the demolition by an acquaintance who happened to pass by the shop on the day it was pulled down. She had not known about the sale of the shop before it was demolished. 17. The parties dispute what happened to the applicant’s goods and belongings. According to the Government, they were listed and taken for safekeeping. According to the applicant, they were destroyed together with the shop. 18. In 2006 the applicant requested that criminal proceedings be opened against the mayor and the chairperson of Primorsko Municipal Council for breach of duties and obstruction of the enforcement of a final court judgment. In a decision of February 2007 the prosecutor refused her request. He found that it was impossible to open criminal proceedings as the refusals to privatise the shop had been issued by the municipal council, a collective body, whereas criminal responsibility was personal. 19. On 18 October 2006 and 22 May 2008 respectively the applicant again requested Primorsko Municipal Council to examine her privatisation proposal. In a letter of 10 September 2008 the council informed her that her case was factually and legally complex, and that an ad hoc commission would be formed to propose a solution. On 20 January 2009 the ad hoc commission proposed that an enquiry be made with the Privatisation Agency (the State body in charge of the privatisation of State-owned property). In two letters dated 5 March 2009, sent respectively to the applicant and the municipality, the Privatisation Agency observed that the question about the demolition of the shop had not been raised in the proceedings before the courts. The Agency nonetheless held that the municipality was obliged to comply with court judgments. 20. In February 2011, the applicant lodged a claim with the Burgas Administrative Court for damages against the Primorsko municipal authorities for their failure to implement the final judgments in her favour. The claim was lodged under the State and Municipalities Responsibility for Damage Act 1988 (“the SMRDA”). The court split the claim to be examined into two separate sets of proceedings – the first one against the municipality (община) and the second one against the municipal council (общински съвет). 21. In the first set of proceedings, in which she challenged the mayor’s order of 14 February 2006 that the shop be demolished (see paragraph 16 above), the applicant sought damages for loss of opportunity (пропуснати ползи). The Burgas Administrative Court found that the applicant had no standing to pursue this claim because she had not been the addressee of the mayor’s order. Although the shop had been demolished shortly after the order had been issued, that had been irrelevant in respect of the legal proceedings brought by the applicant, given that she had sought compensation for damage specifically stemming from the mayor’s order. The court dismissed the applicant’s claim and terminated the proceedings. That ruling was upheld by the Supreme Administrative Court in a final decision of 17 October 2011. 22. In the second set of proceedings the applicant sought both pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages stemming from the failure of the municipal council to decide on her privatisation request by implementing the final court judgments ordering it to offer to sell the shop to her. 23. She specified that she sought pecuniary damages in respect of: the rent she had had to pay between January 1998, when her request to privatise the shop should have been granted, and February 2006, when the shop had been demolished; those of her belongings that had been destroyed together with the shop; the loss of income resulting from the impossibility of collecting rent from a company with which she had concluded a contract on 17 January 2006 in respect of part of the shop; and the impossibility of increasing her investment by buying the plot on which the shop stood and by building upon it. 24. In addition, the applicant sought non-pecuniary damages in respect of the intense stress and emotional suffering that had led her to fall into a lasting and severe depression, which had been the result of the shop’s demolition and of the failure of the municipal council to sell it to her, despite the final judgments. She provided medical records in respect of her failing health and the related hospital treatment she had undergone. (a) At first instance 25. Examining the applicant’s claim, the Burgas Administrative Court considered that she was complaining of the municipal council’s tacit refusal to reply to her request of 23 May 2008 to buy the shop. On 3 January 2014 the court found that both claims, for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages, were admissible. 26. As to the merits, the court held that the claim for pecuniary damages was unjustified and also that there was no causal link between the municipal council’s refusal to privatise the shop and the applicant’s claims for loss of financial opportunity as a result of the impossibility of buying the land and building on it. 27. As regards the applicant’s claim for non-pecuniary damages, the court accepted it as justified on the basis of the evidence submitted during the proceedings (see paragraph 24 above). In particular it found that it had been demonstrated that the applicant had suffered significantly as a result of the municipal council’s refusal to open a privatisation procedure vis-à-vis her. The court held that the applicant’s suffering had been caused by the municipal council’s tacit refusal to act upon the final court judgment of 2008. The applicant had succumbed to depression, which had manifested itself in acute feelings of hopelessness and a perception that any future efforts would be futile, as well as in feelings of helplessness, insomnia, a disturbance of memory functions, and attention disorder. Those conditions had further led to a serious deterioration in the applicant’s family environment, given that she had directed all her frustration and negative emotions towards her young daughter. The court awarded the applicant the entirety of her claim, namely about 20,000 euros (EUR), plus interest, as well about EUR 6,500 for costs and expenses. It further declared null and void the municipality’s tacit refusal to act upon her request of 23 May 2008, and returned the case to it for it to take the appropriate action. (b) At last instance 28. After an appeal lodged by the municipal council, the Supreme Administrative Court found that the lower court had wrongly concluded that the municipal council’s silence amounted to a new tacit refusal to privatise the shop. The applicant was seeking damages stemming from the absence of a privatisation procedure launched by the municipality in respect of the shop. The administrative procedure concerning the privatisation of the shop had begun with the applicant’s initial request of 18 September 1995 (see paragraph 6 above) and had not been completed. The applicant’s subsequent requests to the same effect had not created a new obligation on the part of the municipality concerning the privatisation of the same shop. 29. The last-instance court further held that, as regards the first final court decision in the applicant’s favour (that of 4 November 2003) it had not created obligations on the part of Primorsko Municipal Council, given that the respondent party required to act under that decision had been the Tsarevo municipality (see paragraph 7 above). Primorsko Municipal Council had only been expected to act in respect of the second final judgment on that question (see paragraph 9 above). 30. As regards the municipal authorities’ explicit written refusal of 25 November 2005 to open a privatisation procedure (see paragraph 10 above), the court noted that that refusal had been declared null and void in 2008 by another of its benches for being contrary to the first final court decision of 2003 (see paragraph 11 above). 31. The last-instance court conceded that, objectively, the declaration of the municipal council’s refusal as null and void corresponded to one of the statutory prerequisites for the pecuniary liability of the council. However, the remaining conditions for the council being held so liable had not been met. In particular, the court held – without elaborating further – that the applicant had failed to prove both the existence of actual damage and the causal link of any such damage to the municipal council’s refusal to privatise the shop by offering to sell it to her. 32. Furthermore, the applicant’s claim in respect of the council’s refusal of 25 November 2005 had been inadmissible on account of the expiry of the five-year limitation period, as calculated as of the date of that refusal. Moreover, the council tacit refusal to act upon the 31 March 2008 court decision was of no consequence, given that the shop had no longer physically existed at that time. 33. Importantly, the obligation on the municipal authorities to privatise property under the Privatisation Act existed only vis-à-vis individuals who met the conditions stipulated under that Act. The applicant, however, was not among those persons. The reason was that she had not had a valid contract with the municipality at any of the times when she had requested the latter to sell the shop to her, because the contract concluded in 1993 had expired prior to those times. 34. Moreover, as a matter of principle, the liability of a municipality, or of the State for that matter, under the SMRDA did not include loss of opportunity but only already incurred losses. Consequently, the applicant could not claim loss of opportunity in these proceedings. 35. In respect of the applicant’s claim for non-pecuniary damages, the court emphasised that these could only be incurred by an individual and not by an enterprise. It was true that in legal terms the sole trader was a physical, as opposed to a legal, person; however, the damage suffered by the applicant stemmed specifically from the economic activity carried out by her in her capacity as a sole trader. Consequently, the applicant as an individual was not entitled to compensation for damage that could have been sustained in the context of the economic activity of the trader. In view of the above, the lower court had wrongly granted the applicant’s claim for non-pecuniary damages. 36. On the basis of the above, the Supreme Administrative Court quashed the lower court’s judgment and dismissed the applicant’s claims in a final judgment on 3 December 2014. It also held that the applicant had to pay to the municipal council about EUR 4,000 for legal costs and expenses. 37. On 5 January 2015 the applicant asked the Supreme Administrative Court to rectify its judgment of 3 December 2014 in the part in which it had ordered her to pay the legal costs claimed by the other party (the municipal council). She pointed out that the municipal council had not presented proof that it had indeed incurred those expenses and that, in any event, the council should not be allowed to benefit from its unlawful failure to implement the judgments in her favour. The applicant sought, alternatively, a reduction in those costs. 38. The Supreme Administrative Court found her request admissible but rejected it as unjustified (неоснователна) in a final decision of 2 June 2015. On 25 November 2015 the bailiff invited the applicant to voluntarily comply with the final judgment of 3 December 2014, indicating that failure to pay the sum due would result in the forced sale of items of the applicant’s personal movable and immovable property.

5. The applicant was born in 1970 and lives in Stockholm. He is self-employed and runs a business. 6. On 22 April 2004 the Swedish commercial television channel TV3 broadcast an episode of a television show entitled “Insider”, in which it was claimed that “shady transactions and shady characters” were revealed. The show was broadcast live with a few recorded features. In the show, the applicant, who was unknown to the broader public, appeared in pictures and was mentioned by name. He was singled out as the central figure of organised crime within media and advertising and as being guilty of several counts of fraud and other economic offences. The programme was re‑broadcast on 25 April and 17 September 2004. At this time, no criminal investigation had been initiated against the applicant. 7. The television programme was produced in Sweden by the Swedish company Strix Television AB. It was sent by satellite link from Sweden to the London-based company Viasat Broadcasting UK Ltd and from there sent unaltered to a satellite which transmitted the programme to the Swedish audience. The encoded programme was viewable via a satellite receiver or a cable connection in Sweden a fraction of a second after it had been sent by satellite link. Even if it was viewable in the United Kingdom, which is doubtful, it would have been watched there by a small audience. It was presented in the Swedish language for a Swedish-speaking audience, and was sponsored by companies competing in the Swedish market. The anchorman of the show, X, a Swedish national, was a celebrity and a well-known television personality in Sweden; he was also the Chief Executive Officer of Strix Television AB. The show had a long run and was watched by many viewers. 8. In October 2006 the applicant brought a private prosecution against X for gross defamation, claiming damages in the amount of 250,000 Swedish kronor (SEK; approximately 27,000 euros). He maintained that he had been unreservedly pointed out as the central figure of organised crime within media and advertising and as being directly or indirectly responsible for a large number of serious crimes. He further alleged that X was responsible for the content of the programme since he had failed in his duty to appoint a legally responsible editor (ansvarig utgivare) for the programme and because he had been its anchor. 9. The applicant relied on Chapters 5 and 6 of the Constitutional Law on Freedom of Expression (Yttrandefrihetsgrundlagen, 1991:1469; hereafter “the Constitutional Law”), regarding freedom of expression offences and liability rules, and Chapter 5 of the Penal Code (Brottsbalken), dealing with defamation, as well as Articles 6 § 2, 8 and 13 of the Convention. In the latter respect, he argued that his appearance in the show breached his right to privacy as well as his right to be presumed innocent and that a decision to dismiss his claims would constitute a violation of his right to an effective remedy. The applicant submitted a legal opinion stating that it would be impossible, or at least not useful, to bring an action in the United Kingdom in the present case since the damage flowing from the television programme at issue had not occurred in the United Kingdom. 10. X disputed the claim on the grounds, inter alia, that he was not the responsible editor of the show and that he enjoyed the freedom to communicate information as provided for under Chapter 10, section 2 of the Constitutional Law and as clarified by the Supreme Court (Högsta domstolen) in the case NJA 2005 p. 884 (see paragraphs 32 and 33 below). 11. In a preliminary ruling on 20 May 2008 the Stockholm District Court (Stockholms tingsrätt) dismissed the claim in so far as it was based on the Constitutional Law. It referred to the Supreme Court judgment in an almost identical case, NJA 2002 p. 314 (see paragraphs 28-31 below), and held that Chapters 1-9 of the Constitutional Law were not applicable to the television programme since it could not be regarded as emanating from Sweden. This was because the programme had first been sent by satellite link to Viasat Broadcasting UK Ltd, the British company responsible for the programme content, and thereafter uplinked to a satellite, which had in turn transmitted the programme to viewers in Sweden. As Chapters 1-9 of the Constitutional Law were not applicable, X could not be held responsible for the programme content under Chapter 6. The District Court further held that the applicant’s claims under the Penal Code were to be determined following the main hearing in the case. The court finally drew the parties’ attention to the Supreme Court case NJA 2005 p. 884. 12. The applicant appealed, repeating what he had stated in his earlier submissions. He further argued that all companies involved in the case were Swedish, including the receiving company in London, allegedly named Viasat AB, with its seat in Stockholm. Although Viasat AB had acquired the right to transmit the show from the Swedish company TV3 AB, it had had no impact on or responsibility for the programme selection. Having regard to the above, the offence committed against the applicant through the programme could not be examined by United Kingdom courts. The applicant also submitted that Swedish courts were competent to examine the case under the Brussels I Regulation (see further paragraph 35 below). X contested the arguments and submitted that it was the company Viasat Broadcasting UK Ltd, whose seat was in the United Kingdom, which was responsible for the programme service and decided on the final content of the programmes. 13. On 20 March 2009 the Court of Appeal (Svea hovrätt) upheld the District Court’s decision. It held that the issue for it to determine was whether the general provisions in the Constitutional Law were applicable to the programme in question, that is, whether or not the broadcasting of the programme could be considered to have originated from Sweden within the meaning of Chapter 1, section 6(2) of that law. It further stated that the burden of proof concerning the applicability of the Constitutional Law rested on the applicant and that he had not, in response to X’s refutation, established that the decisions concerning the programme content were taken in Sweden. Consequently, Chapters 1-9 of the Constitutional Law were not applicable in the case. The court further held that the material before it indicated that it was possible for the applicant to bring claims before a British court. 14. The applicant appealed and referred to his earlier submissions. In addition, he requested that a question concerning the interpretation of the Brussels I Regulation be referred to the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) for a preliminary ruling. According to the applicant, the regulation entitled a person claiming non-contractual damages to bring actions where the harmful event occurred. In the present case, the harmful event had occurred in Sweden and the applicant thus should have had the right to bring his action before the Swedish courts. Consequently, the position hitherto taken by the Swedish courts ran contrary to Community law. 15. On 21 September 2009 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant’s referral request and refused leave to appeal in the case. It held that, since the District Court had found itself competent to examine the applicant’s claims in so far as they were based on grounds other than the Constitutional Law, there was no reason to request a preliminary ruling from the ECJ. 16. The applicant subsequently withdrew his remaining claims before the District Court since there was no practical prospect of success in a continued procedure. On 17 November 2009 the District Court struck the case out of the list and ordered the applicant to pay X’s legal costs and expenses. 17. Criminal proceedings were taken against the applicant in regard, inter alia, to the matters described in the television programme. He was convicted of aggravated fraud as well as tax and bookkeeping offences and sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. The criminal proceedings were finalised by a Supreme Court decision to refuse leave to appeal on 4 October 2010. These proceedings, in particular their compliance with Articles 6 and 7 of the Convention, are the subject of an application lodged with the Court on 4 April 2011 (no. 32814/11).

5. The first and second applicants were born in 1981 and 1971 respectively and live in Jurbarkas. They are wife and husband. 6. On 15 May 2009 the first applicant, who was nine months pregnant and already past her due date, was admitted to the obstetrics and gynaecology ward of Jurbarkas Hospital. 7. On the morning of 20 May 2009 she was given medication in order to induce labour, but the medication was subsequently discontinued and she was given sedatives. In the late afternoon her waters broke. The doctors noticed that the heartbeat of the foetus was weak and decided to perform a Caesarean section. Following the surgery, the first applicant gave birth to a daughter. The newborn baby was in a serious condition, so she was taken to a hospital in Kaunas for intensive care. 8. On 22 May 2009 the baby died. The applicants decided not to have an autopsy performed on her body – according to them, they were informed by doctors that an autopsy was not necessary. The Government contested this and submitted that the applicants had been informed that an autopsy had been necessary but refused it nonetheless. 9. Following the baby’s death, Jurbarkas Hospital conducted an internal inquiry into the medical services provided to the first applicant. The inquiry report, issued on 16 June 2009, found that some erroneous entries had been made in the first applicant’s medical file, the assessment of her and the baby’s condition had probably been inadequate, and certain actions to resuscitate the baby had been taken too late. 10. At the applicants’ request, the Ministry of Healthcare also conducted an inquiry into the medical services provided to them at Jurbarkas Hospital. A provisional report, issued on 22 June 2009, found that the first applicant’s labour had not been induced in compliance with the relevant rules, the condition of the foetus had not been properly monitored, there had been shortcomings in the resuscitation of the baby, and one of the doctors (R.B.) had not been properly qualified to provide obstetric services. The report issued a series of recommendations to the hospital, and also suggested that the State Inspectorate for Medical Inquiries conduct a more in-depth inspection of the medical services at Jurbarkas Hospital. 11. The State Inspectorate for Medical Inquiries issued its report on 26 August 2009, in which it identified several shortcomings in the work of doctors who had provided care to the first applicant, and concluded that the medical services had been inadequate. 12. Subsequently, doctor R.B. was dismissed from Jurbarkas Hospital, and the hospital stopped providing obstetric services, citing a lack of qualified medical personnel. V.K., a gynaecologist, and three other doctors were officially reprimanded for having provided inadequate medical services to the first applicant and V.K. was later dismissed at her own request. 13. On 22 June 2009 the applicants asked the Jurbarkas district prosecutor (hereinafter “the prosecutor”) to open a pre-trial investigation into the medical negligence at Jurbarkas Hospital which had led to their newborn daughter’s death. The pre-trial investigation was opened on the same day and carried out by the Jurbarkas police. In July and August 2009 the applicants were interviewed and granted victim status in the investigation. 14. On 7 August 2009 a court-appointed doctor delivered a specialist opinion (specialisto išvada) that the applicants’ daughter’s death had resulted from asphyxia during birth and meconium aspiration syndrome. 15. In August and September 2009 the police interviewed the doctors who had provided medical services to the first applicant, and obtained various documents from Jurbarkas Hospital. 16. In September 2009 the applicants asked the prosecutor to exhume their daughter’s body so that an autopsy could be performed and the cause of her death could be more precisely determined. However, the prosecutor denied their request, relying on an opinion from medical experts that performing an autopsy more than three months after the baby’s death would not give any results because of the significant post-mortem changes to the body during that time. 17. In October 2009 the police asked four court-appointed doctors for a specialist opinion on the causes of the baby’s death and the actions of the doctors at Jurbarkas Hospital. The applicants also submitted questions and their questions were forwarded to the specialists. The opinion, delivered on 5 May 2010, stated that no causal link between the doctors’ actions and the death could be established, and that it was not possible to determine whether the death could have been avoided because an autopsy of the body had not been performed. Subsequently, the applicants asked the police to order another opinion from specialists, and they submitted additional questions. On 10 February 2011 three other court-appointed doctors provided answers to the applicants’ questions. Their overall conclusions were the same as those of the previous specialists. 18. On 4 March 2011 the prosecutor discontinued the pre‑trial investigation on the grounds that no causal link between the actions of the doctors at Jurbarkas Hospital and the baby’s death had been established. On 24 March 2011 a senior prosecutor upheld that decision, but on 2 May 2011 the Jurbarkas District Court upheld a complaint submitted by the applicants and reopened the pre-trial investigation. The court found that the two specialist opinions (see paragraph 17 above) had not answered some of the questions submitted because certain medical data had not been made available. It also found that the investigation had not established why an autopsy had not been performed (see paragraph 8 above). Therefore, the court ordered the prosecutor to ask additional questions of some of the witnesses and order a comprehensive forensic examination. 19. On 2 June 2011 the prosecutor asked the court to order a forensic examination of the causes of the baby’s death and the causal link between the doctors’ actions and the death. The applicants submitted a list of additional questions to be forwarded to the forensic expert. On 27 June 2011 the Jurbarkas District Court ordered the examination, but that order included only the prosecutor’s questions and did not provide any reasons as to why the applicants’ questions had not been included. The applicants appealed against it, but on 14 October 2011 the Kaunas Regional Court dismissed their appeal on the grounds that deciding which questions to forward to the expert was the lower court’s prerogative. 20. On 25 October 2011 the applicants again submitted their questions to the prosecutor and asked for an additional forensic examination. On 5 December 2011 the Jurbarkas District Court ordered an additional forensic examination, and that order included the applicants’ questions. However, the court’s order was only forwarded to the forensic expert on 5 February 2013. 21. On 29 January 2013 a court-appointed forensic expert delivered the answers to the prosecutor’s questions (see paragraph 19 above). The expert found that the cause of the baby’s death had been determined correctly, the medical services provided to the first applicant had been adequate, and there was no causal link between the doctors’ actions and the death. 22. On 13 February 2013 the applicants submitted a complaint to the Prosecutor General, stating that the pre-trial investigation was being conducted inefficiently and with undue delays. They complained, in particular, that the court’s decision of 5 December 2011 to order an additional forensic examination (see paragraph 20 above) had not been forwarded to the expert until 5 February 2013, one year and two months after it had been issued. The Prosecutor General’s Office conducted an official inquiry, which on 18 June 2013 concluded that Jurbarkas prosecutors had committed disciplinary violations, and that the pre-trial investigation had not been properly conducted and supervised. The inquiry found that the Jurbarkas district prosecutor’s office had been reorganised in 2012, which was the likely reason for the above-mentioned shortcomings. No individuals were penalised. 23. On 25 June 2013 a court-appointed forensic expert delivered the answers to the applicants’ questions (see paragraph 20 above). Among other things, the expert found that some of the doctors’ actions had not been in line with the relevant requirements, but there was no direct causal link between their actions and the applicants’ daughter’s death. 24. On 5 July 2013 the prosecutor discontinued the investigation on the grounds that no causal link between the actions of the doctors at Jurbarkas Hospital and the applicants’ daughter’s death had been established (see paragraphs 17, 21 and 23 above). The applicants appealed against that decision, and on 4 November 2013 a senior prosecutor reopened the pre‑trial investigation and assigned it to a different police department. The senior prosecutor considered that, following the decision to discontinue the investigation, new relevant circumstances had emerged, although he did not specify what those circumstances were. 25. On 28 February 2014 V.K., the gynaecologist, was served with a notice that, under Article 229 of the Criminal Code, she was suspected of having failed to perform her official duties (see paragraph 37 below). On 8 April 2014 the case was referred to the Jurbarkas District Court for examination on the merits. 26. On 28 April 2014 the Jurbarkas District Court held an oral hearing. V.K. was not present and her lawyer informed the court that she had been admitted to hospital, although no medical certificate was submitted. The court adjourned the case until 12 May 2014. 27. On 12 May 2014 V.K. was again not present, and the court received a medical certificate confirming her hospitalisation until 14 May 2014. The court decided to adjourn the case and proposed three alternative dates: 13 May, 16 May and 19 May 2014. V.K.’s lawyer stated that V.K. would not be well enough by 13 May, and that on the later dates he would be unable to represent her. The court adjourned the case until 25 June 2014. 28. On 23 June 2014 the applicants applied to the court to reclassify the charges against V.K. as negligent homicide in violation of special conduct security rules under Article 132 § 3 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 38 below). The court adjourned the case until 14 July 2014 in order to give the accused enough time to acquaint herself with the case file. 29. On 14 July 2014 the Jurbarkas District Court terminated the case on the basis that it was time-barred. It held that V.K. had been charged with a crime of negligence, and the five-year statutory limitation period had ended on 21 May 2014 (see paragraphs 8 above and 39 below). The court also dismissed the application to reclassify the charges and noted that, in any event, reclassification would not alter the statutory limitation period. 30. The applicants appealed against that judgment. They submitted that, in line with the Criminal Code, the statutory limitation period must have been suspended while the examination of the case had been adjourned owing to V.K.’s illness (see paragraph 40 below). 31. On 6 November 2014 the Kaunas Regional Court dismissed the applicants’ appeal and upheld the judgment of the first-instance court. It firstly held that the legal provision cited by the applicants had been adopted after the alleged offence had been committed, and that at the time the alleged offence had been committed domestic law had not provided for suspension of the statutory limitation period during the adjournment of a case (see paragraphs 39-40 below). The court further held that, in any event, the examination of the case had been adjourned for an important reason ‑ V.K.’s hospitalisation – so there were no grounds for suspending the statutory limitation period. 32. On 24 February 2015 the Supreme Court refused to examine a cassation appeal lodged by the applicants, on the grounds that it did not raise any important legal questions. 33. The Government in their observations informed the Court that on 15 September 2011 the applicants instituted civil proceedings against Jurbarkas Hospital, claiming compensation in respect of pecuniary and non‑pecuniary damage caused by inadequate medical services provided to the first applicant and their newborn daughter. They revised their claim in December 2011 and August 2013. The applicants claimed a total of 600,000 Lithuanian litai (LTL – approximately 173,770 euros (EUR)) in respect of non-pecuniary damage and a total of LTL 16,295 (approximately EUR 4,720) in respect of pecuniary damage, consisting of funeral expenses and the second applicant’s lost earnings during his time off work after their daughter’s death. 34. On 26 November 2014 the Kaunas Regional Court granted the applicants’ claim in part. Relying on the available inquiry reports, as well as the specialist opinions and results of the forensic examinations delivered in the criminal proceedings (see paragraphs 9, 10, 11, 17, 21 and 23 above), the court held that the doctors at Jurbarkas Hospital had breached their duty of care and that their actions “had contributed” (turėjo įtakos) to the death of the applicants’ daughter, so there were grounds for the hospital incurring civil liability. However, the court considered that the doctors’ actions had not been premeditated or grossly negligent, so the applicants’ claim in respect of non-pecuniary damage was granted in part, and they were awarded a total of LTL 80,000 (approximately EUR 23,170) under that head. They were also awarded a total of LTL 6,716 (approximately EUR 1,945) in respect of pecuniary damage, on the basis of the documents in the court’s possession. 35. The applicants and the hospital appealed against that judgment, but on 17 September 2015 the Court of Appeal upheld the lower court’s findings. The hospital transferred the awarded amount to the applicants’ bank accounts in November and December 2015.

5. The first applicant was born in 1983 and lives in Ludbreg. The second applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Slunj. 6. During 1991 and 1992 Serbian paramilitary forces gained control of about a third of the territory of Croatia and proclaimed the “Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina” (Srpska autonomna oblast Krajina, hereinafter “Krajina”). At the beginning of August 1995 the Croatian authorities announced their intention to take military action with the aim of regaining control over Krajina. The operation was codenamed “Storm” (Oluja) and took place from 4 to 7 August 1995. Before the military action, the vast majority of the population of Krajina fled Croatia. Most of them went to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and also to Serbia. Some returned to Croatia after the war. The number of people who fled is estimated at between 100,000 and 150,000. 7. On 5 November 1997 Croatia ratified the Convention. 8. On 8 August 1995 the applicants’ close relatives, G.O. and M.V., were killed in a house in Veljun, a town on the territory of Krajina. The police were alerted to the killings on the same day. On 11 August 1995 the bodies were buried in a cemetery in Slunj. 9. On 25 January 2002 the police interviewed M.M., who said that on 8 August 1995 he had been wounded by the Croatian army in Veljun. That day he had seen G.O. and M.V. alive but did not know what had happened to them after that because he had been taken to a hospital by a member of the Croatian army. 10. On 20 February 2002 the police interviewed D.V. and J.V. D.V. said that on 6 August 1995 she had moved to a house in Veljun, together with the first applicant, G.O. and M.V. On 7 August 1995 the Croatian army had entered Veljun. When G.O. and M.V. had been killed she had not been in the house and had not seen who had killed them. J.V. said that he had lived in Veljun during the war. On 7 August 1995 the Croatian army had entered Veljun. On 9 August 1995 he had heard that G.O. and M.V. had been killed the day before but had not seen who had done it. 11. On 25 February 2002 the police interviewed the second applicant. He said that at the material time he had been serving as a Croatian policeman in Karlovac. He had learned about the killing of his wife G.O. and her mother M.V. on 8 August 1995 when his son, who had lived with his mother and grandmother, had been brought to him. The son said that on the morning of 8 August 1995 some members of the Croatian army had come to their house and asked for the keys of a Golf vehicle parked in the courtyard but that his grandmother had shouted at them. The second applicant assumed that that had angered the soldiers who had then killed his wife and her mother. 12. On 30 March 2006 the Karlovac State Attorney’s Office asked the Slunj police whether the Veljun area had been occupied on 7 August 1995; whether the perpetrator of the killing of G.O. had been identified; and whether G.O. had been a member of the paramilitary forces of Krajina or of the Croatian army. On 6 July 2006 the Karlovac police department replied that Veljun had not been occupied on 7 August 1995 because Serbian paramilitary forces had left the area the previous day as the Croatian forces had advanced from the direction of Slunj. However, owing to the disorganised nature of the withdrawal of the Serbian paramilitary forces, there had still been some armed members of the “Serbian army” in the area. On 7 August 1995 the Croatian forces had started to enter the area and therefore it could be said that from a military point of view that area had been in a war zone. There had been no information about the people who had killed G.O. and she had not been registered as a member of any army. 13. On 25 October 2006 the police interviewed the first applicant, who said that he had lived with his mother and grandmother in Slunj and that his father had been a Croatian policeman. When the war had escalated in 1991 his mother had stayed in Slunj, in occupied territory, since her mother was a disabled person who could not move at all. Some time at the beginning of Operation Storm his uncle had taken them all to a relative’s house in Veljun. On 5 or 6 August 1995 the Croatian army had entered Veljun. They had instructed them to put a white flag on their house to indicate that there were civilians living there and his mother had done so. The following day he had spent some time with Croatian soldiers, about 1,500 metres from the house where he had been staying with his family. Around noon he had heard some gunshots from the direction of the house but had not paid much attention to them. About half an hour later he had returned home and had found his mother and grandmother shot dead in the house. He had informed some of the Croatian soldiers about it. After that they had taken him to his father in Slunj. He could not remember whether there had been any dispute between his mother and grandmother and Croatian soldiers about the Golf parked in their courtyard, which had belonged to his uncle. 14. On 17 January 2007 the police interviewed I.B., a policeman who had carried out an inspection of the crime scene. He described how he had found the bodies of G.O. and M.V. On the same day another police officer, Z.G., made a note stating that on 8 January 2007 he had inspected the premises of the elementary school in Veljun, where he had found the following inscriptions on the walls: “Tigers, I.V. 4 August 1995, K.T., 40th regiment GSOSRH” and “Tigers TNT No 31 – Moles”. 15. On 1 February 2007 the Karlovac police lodged a criminal complaint with the Karlovac County State Attorney’s Office against unknown perpetrators in connection with the killing of G.O. and M.V. 16. On 1 August 2007 the police interviewed Mi.V. who said that she had not been in Veljun during Operation Storm and had no direct knowledge about the killing of G.O. and M.V. 17. On 22 October 2012 a Deputy State Attorney of the Karlovac State Attorney’s Office interviewed the applicants, who repeated their previous statements. The first applicant added that in his opinion the Croatian soldiers who had killed his mother and grandmother had not been those who had been the first to enter Veljun because that group had treated civilians correctly. 18. On 9 November 2012 the Karlovac police asked the Ministry of Defence about the Croatian army units which had been in Veljun between 7 and 12 August 1995, the identity of their commanders and all their members. That request was repeated on 11 December 2012. 19. On 9 January 2013 the first applicant asked the President’s Office, the State Attorney, the Karlovac County State Attorney, the Ministry of Justice and the State Attorney’s Department of War Crimes to identify the perpetrators of the killing of his mother and grandmother. 20. On 21 February 2013 the Karlovac police drew up a note on the investigation. It stated that documents about the Croatian army units present in Veljun in the material period (those documents have not been submitted to the Court by the Government) showed that on 7 August 1995 at 10.30 a.m. Veljun had been liberated by members of the 143rd Domobran Regiment of Ogulin (143. domobranska pukovnija Ogulin), under the command of Captain (satnik) N.N. On 7 August 1995 at about noon the armoured battalion of the “Tigers” First Guards Brigade (oklopna bojna 1. gardijske brigade “Tigrovi”) under the command of Captain Lj.U., as well as the Second Infantry Battalion of the First Guards Brigade (2. pješačka bojna 1. gardijske brigade) under the command of Major A.K., had arrived. On 8 August 1995 the following Croatian army units had been in Veljun: the Second Infantry Battalion of the 143rd Domobran Regiment from Ogulin under the command of Captain M.K. and the IS-2 (izvidnička skupina IS-2) patrol group comprised of the soldiers M.I., M.B., T.N. and Z.Č., under the command of Lance Corporal (razvodnik) P.K. 21. Between 27 February and 28 March 2013 the police interviewed several Croatian soldiers who belonged to the units of the Croatian army that had been in Veljun on 7 and 8 August 1995. N.N., the commander of the Second Battalion of the 143rd Domobran Regiment, said that they had entered Veljun on the morning of 8 August 1995. At the same time the First Guards Brigade under the command of I.K. had been coming to Veljun from the direction of Slunj. He had no knowledge of the killing of two women in Veljun. As regards the officers of the Second Battalion, Z.K. had been in command of the First Company (prva satnija), M.B. of the Second Company (druga satnija) and I.Z. (who had died later on) of the Third Company (treća satnija). The brigade also had a mortar unit (mitnica minobacača) under the command of N.V., a communications squad (desetina za veze) led by D.L., a medical platoon (sanitrani vod) headed by S.P. and an anti-tank platoon (protuoklopni vod) under the command of D.S. B.S., the second-in-command of the First Battalion of the 143rd Domobran Regiment, confirmed that M.K. had been the commander. The regiment had been composed of three companies. The First and Second Companies had been under the command of I.F. and I.P. respectively, but he could not remember the commander of the Third Company. He said that owing to the passage of time he could not remember the places they had been during Operation Storm. He had no knowledge about the killing of civilians in Veljun. Officer J.C. of the Slunj police said that he had heard about the killing of his colleague’s wife and her mother, but had no relevant information. M.K., the commander of the First Battalion of the 143rd Domobran Regiment of Ogulin, said that that formation had comprised three battalions. His First Battalion and the Second Battalion, which had been under the command of N.N, had had about 970 soldiers. The Third Battalion had been under the command of T.L. He then described the units of the First Battalion and named the commanders he could remember. He had no knowledge about the killing of civilians in Veljun. A.B., the commander of a platoon of the 134th Domobran Regiment, said that he and his men had spent about an hour in Veljun during Operation Storm but could not say on which day exactly. None of the soldiers in his platoon had searched for civilians in houses and he had no knowledge about the killing of G.O. and M.V. S.P., the commander of the medical squad of the Second Battalion of the 143rd Domobran Regiment, said that his battalion had entered Veljun at about noon on 7 August 1995 and had stayed there for two days. There had been no military action and he had not given any medical assistance to anyone in Veljun. He knew nothing about the killing of two women there. Officer I.Š. of the Slunj police said that during Operation Storm a Croatian soldier had approached him and told him that a child in Veljun needed transport. I.Š. had gone with his colleague M.V. to Veljun where they had found two dead bodies and a child in a house. They had taken the child to Slunj police station to join his father, Pave Obajdin. M.V. confirmed that statement. S.V. said that he had been a policeman in Slunj during Operation Storm and had been the one who had found the bodies of G.O. and M.V. 22. Between 14 October 2014 and 21 October 2015 the police conducted further interviews with Croatian soldiers A.Ž., Z.P., B.S., B.G., V.J. and P.K., who all said they had no knowledge about the killing of G.O. and M.V. In the same period the police also interviewed the victims’ relatives G.V., D.M. and S.V., who had all heard about the killing of G.O. and M.V. but had no relevant information about possible perpetrators.

4. The applicant was born in 1988 and lives in Istanbul. 5. On 19 September 2007 the applicant left Uzbekistan for fear of being subjected to ill-treatment while under criminal investigation. The applicant submitted that the investigation had been initiated on account of his political activities. 6. On 13 December 2007 the Uzbek prosecuting authorities issued an international warrant for the applicant’s arrest. 7. On an unspecified date the applicant arrived in Turkey. 8. On 9 September 2009 the applicant was arrested in Turkey. According to the arrest and search reports, he was arrested and searched because “he was wanted by Interpol”. 9. On 10 September 2009 the Bakırköy Magistrates’ Court ordered that the applicant be kept in provisional detention for forty-five days. The court based its decision on the Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Civil, Commercial and Criminal Matters between the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Uzbekistan. 10. On 17 September 2009 the applicant appealed against his detention but on 20 October 2009 the magistrates’ court dismissed his objection. 11. On the same day the applicant applied to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (“the UNHCR”) and the Ministry of the Interior for recognition as a refugee. 12. On 15 October 2009 the Turkish authorities received a formal extradition request from the Uzbek authorities. 13. In a judgment dated 23 October 2009 the Bakırköy Assize Court ordered the applicant’s extradition and that he be kept in detention, on the basis of Article 18 § 7 of the Criminal Code. 14. On 16 April 2010 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of 23 October 2009 on procedural grounds. It noted, in particular, that the first-instance court had failed to attach a photograph of the applicant to his case file for identification purposes, to keep a record of the last hearing in the case file, to inform him of his legal rights, in breach of Law no. 5271, and to obtain final defence submissions from the applicant before ruling. The Court of Cassation also noted that the assize court had failed to enquire whether the applicant had been convicted in Uzbekistan or whether there was a case pending against him before ruling on the merits. Lastly, the Court of Cassation noted that the first-instance court had ordered the applicant’s extradition, whereas it should merely have declared the extradition request admissible, given that extradition could only be ordered by the Cabinet of Ministers. 15. The Court of Cassation’s decision was received by the first-instance court on 12 May 2010. 16. On 3 June 2010 the Bakırköy Assize Court asked the opinion of the Bakırköy public prosecutor as to whether the applicant could continue to be detained under Articles 100 and 101 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The public prosecutor replied on the same day that the applicant could be kept in detention under Article 100. 17. On 7 June 2010 the Bakırköy Assize Court re-started its examination. It annulled its previous detention order, given on the basis of Article 18 § 7 of the Criminal Code, and ordered the applicant’s detention under Articles 100 and 101 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It took account the nature of the offences, the state of the evidence, the content of the case file, the existence of a strong suspicion that he had committed the offences in question and the risk that he might abscond. 18. On 1 July 2010 the Bakırköy Assize Court decided to find out whether the applicant had been convicted or whether there was a case pending against him in Uzbekistan. To that end, the president of the court sent a letter to the Uzbek authorities via the Ministry of Justice. 19. On 4 November 2010 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent the documents that had been requested, which had been obtained through the Turkish Embassy in Tashkent, to the Ministry of Justice. On 10 November 2010 the Ministry of Justice sent them to the Bakırköy public prosecutor’s office. 20. On 14 December 2010 the Bakırköy public prosecutor submitted the documents to the Bakırköy Assize Court. They showed that there was neither a criminal conviction nor a case pending against the applicant in Uzbekistan. 21. Between 1 July and 27 December 2010 the assize court adjourned the proceedings six times as it awaited information from the Uzbek authorities. 22. On 27 December 2010, at the eighth hearing, the trial court asked the applicant to submit observations in response to the documents received from the Uzbek authorities and adjourned the hearing. 23. In the meantime, on 23 December 2010 the UNHCR had sent a letter to the Ministry of the Interior. It advised the authorities to grant the applicant subsidiary protection status and to refrain from extraditing or deporting him to Uzbekistan pending proceedings before the UNHCR. The UNHCR also informed the authorities in its letter that it had rejected the applicant’s application for refugee status since he did not qualify for that status but that he should nevertheless not be removed to Uzbekistan in the light of the non-refoulement principle and the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention. On an unspecified date the applicant appealed against the UNHCR’s decision not to grant him refugee status. 24. On 7 January 2011 the Bakırköy Assize Court decided to ask the Ministry of the Interior to submit a certified copy of the UNHCR’s letter to it and adjourned the hearing. 25. The Ministry of the Interior submitted the document requested at a hearing on 4 February 2011. The court also decided to await the outcome of the applicant’s appeal against the UNHCR’s decision not to grant him refugee status. 26. The proceedings were adjourned between 4 February and 30 March 2011 as the assize court waited for a response from the UNHCR but on the latter of those dates it decided to annul its previous decision on the grounds that the UNHCR’s examination of the applicant’s appeal could take a long time. 27. At the thirteenth hearing in the case, held on 27 April 2011, the Bakırköy Assize Court asked the applicant to make his defence submissions. On 23 May 2011 the court once again adjourned the proceedings as one of the applicant’s lawyers failed to attend the hearing and the other lawyers had not submitted their defence submission. 28. On 1 June 2011 the Ministry of the Interior granted the applicant subsidiary protection status and a temporary permit to reside in Sakarya. 29. By a letter dated 2 June 2011, the Ministry of the Interior provided information about the applicant’s new status to the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Istanbul and Sakarya governors’ offices and the police’s Interpol‑Europol department attached to the General Police Headquarters. The Ministry of the Interior asked the Ministry of Justice to take the necessary measures to prevent possible extradition of the applicant to Uzbekistan because he had been granted a permit to reside in Sakarya. On 15 June 2011 the Ministry of the Interior’s letter was submitted to the Bakırköy Assize Court by the Bakırköy public prosecutor’s office. 30. On 20 June 2011 the Bakırköy Assize Court once again admitted the request for the applicant’s extradition. In its judgment the court noted that there was an ongoing investigation into the applicant in Uzbekistan and that the offence with which he had been charged had nothing to do with military or political matters. The court noted that the applicant was under investigation for establishing a criminal organisation and causing bodily harm. 31. On the same day the court ordered that the applicant be kept in detention under Article 18 § 7 of the Criminal Code. 32. On 20 July 2011 the applicant applied to the Bakırköy Assize Court for release. He noted, in particular, that he could not be extradited because he had been granted subsidiary protection status. He asked the court to consider measures other than detention such as a prohibition on leaving the country, release on bail or an obligation to report to a police station. His application was rejected. 33. On 2 August 2011 the applicant appealed against the judgment of 20 June 2011. He once again stressed that he had been granted subsidiary protection status and that therefore he could not be extradited. 34. On 6 December 2011 the public prosecutor at the Court of Cassation asked the high court to quash the judgment of 20 June 2011. He argued that the first-instance court had ruled without having made an examination of the case in the light of Article 3 of the Convention and the relevant provisions of other human rights treaties. 35. On 8 March 2012 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of 20 June 2011. 36. On 4 May 2012 the Ministry of Justice sent a letter to the Bakırköy public prosecutor’s office, stating that the applicant could no longer be extradited as a result of his subsidiary protection status and that therefore his detention should be reviewed by the court. 37. On 9 May 2012, at the request of the Bakırköy public prosecutor, the Bakırköy Assize Court ordered the applicant’s release from prison on the grounds that he had been granted subsidiary protection status. He was then placed in a foreigners’ removal centre, where he was detained for one day. 38. On 10 May 2012 the applicant was released from the removal centre on the basis of his residence permit. 39. On 10 September 2012 the applicant acquired Turkish nationality. 40. Between 7 June 2010 and 23 May 2011 the Bakırköy Assize Court ordered the applicant to be kept in detention owing to the nature of the offences in question, the state of the evidence and the fact that he was not a permanent resident of Turkey. The applicant asked to be released several times. He also appealed against the orders for his continued detention. In particular, in petitions and oral submissions to the trial court starting from June 2011 the applicant argued that he had been granted subsidiary protection status, that he could not be extradited and that therefore he should be released.

6. The applicant was born in 1968 and is currently detained in Vratsa Prison. 7. In 2012 the applicant was detained in Varna Prison, serving a combined sentence of eighteen years’ imprisonment for aggravated murder, lewd acts, aggravated theft and car theft. 8. He suffers from many chronic medical conditions and a personality disorder which manifested itself in, inter alia, several attempts at self-harm and some suicide threats. 9. In 2007 the applicant was treated on the psychiatric ward of Lovech Prison Hospital. 10. Following his placement in an isolation cell in April 2008, he again threatened to harm himself and for eight days was kept almost constantly immobile by having his hands and feet handcuffed to a bed (see Dimcho Dimov v. Bulgaria, no. 57123/08, 16 December 2014, where the Court found violations of the substantive and procedural limbs of Article 3 of the Convention in that regard). 11. In early 2012 the applicant was part of a prisoner group that included Mr K.I. The latter was serving a combined sentence of six and a half years for aggravated racketeering and numerous instances of threats of murder and aggravated hooliganism. According to a later psychological report, Mr K.I. had previously been admitted many times to the psychiatric ward of Lovech Prison Hospital and he suffered from a mixed personality disorder with elements of dissocial behaviour, paranoia and emotional instability. 12. On the morning of 15 February 2012 the applicant went to the wing for prisoners who were being transferred to fetch a mattress he had allegedly lent to another inmate. When he entered the cell, Mr K.I., with whom he had had a conflict since January that year, began arguing with him, telling him that he had no right to come in and remove items. A guard intervened and took the applicant out of the wing, leaving him in the prison barbershop. According to statements made by the applicant later, Mr K.I. followed him, grabbed him by the collar through the bars separating the barbershop from the corridor, and hit him on the head and nose. In a report drawn up several days later, the social worker in charge of the applicant’s group said that there was no evidence of such an incident as no other inmate had confirmed the applicant’s allegations, and the applicant had not requested a medical examination. 13. Alerted by the guard, the social worker came and talked with the applicant, repeating that he could not go back into that wing. According to her report about the incident, her words upset him and he began arguing with her in a loud voice. That in turn irritated Mr K.I., who began to shout at the applicant. The social worker took Mr K.I. and two other inmates to a cell, where she reminded them of their duties and warned them that any violence would be in breach of prison rules and entail disciplinary measures. They agreed that they had overreacted and undertook to make efforts to put relations in the group right. After that, the social worker had a talk with the applicant, who was in a highly emotional state. She told him of Mr K.I.’s undertaking to calm the conflict. The applicant began shouting and insulting Mr K.I., who heard him and shouted back. To calm things down, the social worker had the applicant isolated in a cell. 14. The next day, the social worker received complaints from five other inmates from the group. They protested against the applicant’s return to the group, saying that he had systematically bullied and assaulted them. The applicant also filed a complaint, saying that he could no longer remain in the same group as Mr K.I. 15. As a result, on 21 February 2012 the social worker recommended that the prison governor move the applicant to another group. She was of the view that his remaining in his old group would worsen relations within it because he would take on inmates who had not taken his side in the conflict with Mr K.I., which would also be bad for his emotional well-being and security. In the meantime, the applicant was provisionally held in a cell on another floor. 16. Six days after the first incident, on 21 February 2012, a guard took the applicant back to his old corridor so that he could fetch his belongings from his locker. According to the guard’s report, filed the same day, the applicant swore at and threatened Mr K.I. when passing him by. The latter, upset, punched the applicant on the jaw. The social worker carried out an enquiry over the following days at the request of the prison governor and obtained statements from eight other inmates, confirming the events. She proposed that Mr K.I. be given a disciplinary warning and that the applicant be kept in his new group to avoid further altercations between the two. As a result of the blow he had received the applicant suffered a fractured jaw, but this was not detected immediately (see paragraphs 18, 25 and 28 below). Three weeks after the incident, on 13 March 2012, the prison governor issued Mr K.I. with a disciplinary warning. 17. The applicant expressed no wish to be given a medical examination after the incident which allegedly took place on 15 February 2012. 18. After the incident on 21 February 2012 he was brought to Varna Prison’s medical centre, where he was seen by the feldsher as the prison’s only doctor was on long-term sick leave at the time (see paragraph 40 below). The applicant told the feldsher that he had been punched next to his right ear and had pain in the ear and the lower jaw. The feldsher noted some redness in his ear, but reported nothing more serious. She also noted that the applicant had no signs of other traumatic injuries to his body. She wrote a note to the prison administration, detailing her findings. According to a statement which he made in the course of the ensuing criminal proceedings against Mr K.I. (see paragraph 35 below), the applicant asked the feldsher to send him for an X-ray, but she refused. 19. On 22 February 2012 the applicant went to the medical centre again and was given vitamins, an anti-inflammatory drug, a muscle relaxant and antibiotics. 20. He visited the centre once more on 24 February 2012 and was given a painkiller. 21. According to a statement by the applicant in the criminal proceedings against Mr K.I. (see paragraph 35 below), he repeatedly asked to be sent to an external medical specialist for an examination. 22. His next visit to the centre was on 7 March 2012, when he complained of a loss of hearing in his right ear. The feldsher decided to refer him to an external specialist. The consultation took place seven weeks later, on 26 April 2012 (see paragraph 25 below). The Government said the delay was because the applicant’s symptoms had not suggested that he had a medical condition that required urgent attention and because it took time to organise a medical examination outside the prison. 23. The applicant went to the prison’s medical centre again on 13 March 2012 and threatened to go on a hunger strike. According to a statement which he made in the course of the criminal proceedings against Mr K.I. (see paragraph 35 below), he made that threat to pressure the prison authorities to send him for a medical examination by an outside specialist. 24. His next visit to the centre was on 23 April 2012, when he obtained a painkiller but apparently did not complain further about his health. 25. On 26 April 2012 the applicant was seen by an external otolaryngologist, who noted that he was experiencing pain in his right temporomandibular joint and ears and had poor hearing. He also noted that the applicant had some redness on his eardrums. He prescribed painkillers and antibiotics, and suggested that the applicant be seen by a maxillofacial surgeon. The prison paid for the consultation. 26. On 27 April and 7 and 10 May 2012 the applicant again visited the prison’s medical centre and obtained antibiotics and analgesics. On 12 May 2012 he was taken out of prison for a consultation with a psychiatrist. 27. On 14 May 2012 the prison’s feldsher told the applicant that she would ask the prison administration to pay for a consultation with a maxillofacial surgeon. The Government explained that that had been necessary because such consultations were not covered by Bulgaria’s health insurance scheme and the prison had to make a special payment for such a consultation. 28. On 19 May 2012 the applicant was examined by a maxillofacial surgeon and given a panoramic X-ray. The surgeon noted that the applicant had a fracture of the right condyloid process that had not healed properly and post-traumatic arthritis of the right temporomandibular joint. He recommended that the applicant have physiotherapy for that joint. The consultation and the X-ray were paid for by the prison administration. 29. On 21 May 2012 the prison feldsher offered to send the applicant to Sofia Prison Hospital for physiotherapy. He refused. 30. On 15 June 2012 the applicant agreed to be sent to Sofia Prison Hospital, and was admitted on 18 July 2012. He was examined and given an X-ray of the skull. It was noted that he had a fracture of the jaw that had already healed and could no longer be operated on, and a deviated nasal septum. He was treated with antipsychotic, anticonvulsant and mood‑stabilising drugs, and had physiotherapy for his temporomandibular joints. He was in the hospital until 1 August 2012, when he returned to Varna Prison. 31. Between June and October 2012 the applicant visited the prison medical centre on several occasions. He was generally given pain medication and further on request external medical consultations were discussed. 32. The second consultation with an otolaryngologist took place on 27 December 2012. She noted that the applicant complained of poor hearing and pain in the right ear. She found that he had normal eardrums but poor teeth, which caused luxation of the temporomandibular joint, and also had a dysfunction of that joint. She prescribed painkillers. 33. In a medical report drawn up on 11 February 2013, the Varna Prison doctor noted that the applicant had no money to pay for surgery on his jawbone and that the national health insurance scheme did not cover it. In November 2013 the applicant had surgery for the deviated nasal septum in a hospital in Varna. 34. On an unknown date in 2012 the applicant complained to the Varna district prosecutor’s office about the incidents on 15 and 21 February 2012. In June 2012 the prosecutor’s office refused to open criminal proceedings. It found that no prison staff had committed any offences during the incidents. On appeal by the applicant, the Varna regional prosecutor’s office upheld that decision in August 2012. The applicant appealed further and, on 10 October 2012, the Varna appellate prosecutor’s office quashed the refusal to open criminal proceedings against Mr K.I., but upheld the refusal to open proceedings against prison staff. It noted that the internal inquiry had established that the incident involving the two inmates had been promptly dealt with and that there had been no culpable omissions by prison staff. It referred the case back with instructions to the lower prosecutor’s offices to check whether Mr K.I.’s actions had amounted to causing moderate bodily harm. 35. Following a criminal investigation and delays in the resulting trial due to Mr K.I.’s mental health, in February 2015 the Varna District Court found Mr K.I. guilty of causing moderate bodily harm to the applicant by breaking his jaw. It sentenced him to six years’ imprisonment and ordered him to pay the applicant 2,000 Bulgarian levs (BGN) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage. The court noted that the fracture had impaired the applicant’s chewing and speech functions for at least four months and had caused him considerable pain and suffering (see прис. № 68 от 12.02.2015 г. по н. о. х. д. № 3419/2013 г., РС-Варна). 36. In March 2016, following an appeal by Mr K.I., the Varna Regional Court fully upheld the lower court’s judgment (see реш. № 61 от 07.03.2016 г. по в. н. о. х. д. № 301/2015 г., ОС-Варна). 37. In September 2014 the applicant brought a claim for damages against the Chief Directorate for the Execution of Punishments at the Ministry of Justice. He alleged that over the previous two months the authorities at Varna Prison had failed to provide him with adequate medical care for pain in the right ear, his fractured jaw and numbness in his left arm. 38. The Varna Administrative Court heard the case on 1 December 2014 and 2 February 2015, when the applicant unexpectedly withdrew his claim and the court discontinued the proceedings. II. RELEVANT REPORTS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMITTEE FOR THE PREVENTION OF TORTURE AND INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT 39. A delegation of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“the CPT”) visited Bulgaria between 18 and 29 October 2010. The visit included a visit to Varna Prison. In its ensuing report (CPT/Inf (2012) 9), the CPT noted the following (footnotes omitted): “88. At both Plovdiv and Varna Prisons, inter-prisoner violence was rife. It transpired from the examination of documentation on disciplinary punishments that there was at least one violent altercation between prisoners every week, leading to placements in a disciplinary cell and occasionally to a medical intervention or hospitalisation. ... At Varna Prison in particular, the low staffing level, coupled with severe overcrowding, could easily compromise the safety of staff and prisoners alike. ... 89. ... The Committee considers that an effective strategy to tackle inter-prisoner intimidation/violence should seek to ensure that prison staff are placed in a position to exercise their authority in an appropriate manner. In particular, staff should be encouraged more closely to supervise the activities of prisoners and enter in direct contact with them with a view to developing dynamic security. This implies making available sufficient numbers of staff and providing them with appropriate initial and advanced training. When incidents of inter-prisoner intimidation/violence do occur, staff must be both resolved and properly trained to intervene. ... In addition to implementing an individualised risk and needs assessment, the prison system may also need to develop the capacity to ensure that potentially incompatible categories of prisoners are not accommodated together. ... 121. Despite the goodwill and commitment of health-care staff at the prisons visited, the provision of health care to prisoners remained problematic, due to the serious shortage of staff and resources. The delegation heard a number of complaints from prisoners at both Plovdiv and Varna Prisons concerning delayed or difficult access to a doctor, inadequate quality of care (in particular dental care), problematic access to outside specialists and delays in transfer to outside hospitals. ... At Varna Prison, the health-care staff team comprised a psychiatrist and a feldsher. The impossibility to replace the head doctor who was on prolonged sick leave placed an overwhelming burden on the psychiatrist and the feldsher. As a stop-gap solution, the doctor from the nearly hostel ‘Razdelna’ periodically visited the prison (i.e. four to five times a month). ...” 40. A delegation of the CPT visited Bulgaria again between 4 and 10 May 2012. The visit again included a visit to Varna Prison. In its ensuing report (CPT/Inf (2012) 32), the CPT noted the following (footnotes omitted): “19. The delegation received many allegations of inter-prisoner violence at both Burgas and Varna Prisons (including verbal and physical intimidation), and even witnessed itself such episodes. This was hardly surprising considering the combination of severe overcrowding and extremely low staffing levels at both establishments. Despite long-standing recommendations on this issue, the findings from the 2012 visit suggest that very little progress has been made to tackle inter-prisoner violence. The Committee must stress again that the duty of care which is owed by the prison authorities to prisoners in their charge includes the responsibility to protect them from other prisoners who might wish to cause them harm. In particular, prison staff must be alert to signs of trouble and be both resolved and properly trained to intervene. Such a capacity to intervene will of course depend, inter alia, on an adequate staff/prisoner ratio and on providing all staff members with appropriate initial and advanced training. In addition, the prison system as a whole may need to develop the capacity to ensure that potentially incompatible categories of prisoners are not accommodated together. ... 40. The provision of health-care was very problematic at both prisons due to an extreme shortage of staff and resources. The delegation was submerged by complaints about difficulties in having access to prison medical staff, inadequate quality of care (including dental care), problematic access to outside specialists/hospitals (in particular for insurance reasons) and delays in transfer to outside hospitals. At Varna Prison, the health-care staff consisted of a general practitioner – who had just returned to his duties after a lengthy period of sick leave – and a feldsher, both working full-time. The doctor from the nearby prison hostel ‘Razdelna’ had been ensuring medical cover when the feldsher was absent. The psychiatrist’s post had been vacant since January 2011. A part-time dentist was present for two hours, five days a week. No qualified nurse was present at the establishment. To sum up, since January 2011, the establishment’s needs in terms of health-care had been covered essentially by a single feldsher. The delegation was impressed by her professionalism and commitment, which was also recognised by inmates; nevertheless, the fact that no arrangement was found to compensate the absence of the GP for at least 18 months is unacceptable. ... 41. The above-mentioned staffing situation rendered virtually impossible the provision of health care worthy of the name in the establishments visited. Further, there was an over-reliance on feldshers, causing them to practise beyond the limits of their competence. ... 43. No specific screening for injuries was performed upon arrival or after a violent episode in prison, and very limited medical information could be found at Varna Prison ... in this respect. Further, it appeared that reporting of injuries depended on the prisoner concerned making a specific request, usually to the social worker, on a special form (a copy of the form was not kept in the medical file). There appeared to be no systematic reporting of traumatic injuries to the Main Directorate for the Execution of Sanctions. In the light of the above, the CPT reiterates its recommendation that steps be taken to ensure that prison health-care services perform a thorough screening of newly-arrived prisoners for injuries. In this context, the report completed by the doctor should contain, in addition to a detailed description of injuries observed, any allegations made by the prisoner concerned and the doctor’s conclusions as to the consistency between those allegations and the objective medical findings. ... The same approach should be followed whenever a prisoner is medically examined following a violent episode in prison.”

5. The applicant was born in 1991 and lives in Moscow. 6. On 6 May 2012 the applicant was arrested during the dispersal of a political rally at Bolotnaya Square in Moscow. He was found guilty of failure to obey lawful police orders, an offence under Article 19.3 of the Code of Administrative Offences, and was subsequently charged with participation in mass disorder and with having committed violent acts against police officers, criminal offences provided for by Articles 212 § 2 and 318 § 1 of the Criminal Code. He was detained and tried on these charges and was convicted to a prison term of two years and three months. 7. The background facts relating to the planning, conduct and dispersal of the assembly at Bolotnaya Square are set out in more detail in the judgment Frumkin v. Russia (no. 74568/12, §§ 7-65, 5 January 2016). The parties’ submissions on the circumstances directly relevant to the present case are set out below. 8. On 23 April 2012 five individuals (Mr I. Bakirov, Mr S. Davidis, Ms Y. Lukyanova, Ms N. Mityushkina and Mr S. Udaltsov) submitted notice of a public demonstration to the mayor of Moscow. The aim of the demonstration was “to protest against abuses and falsifications in the course of the elections to the State Duma and of the President of the Russian Federation, and to demand fair elections, respect for human rights, the rule of law and the international obligations of the Russian Federation”. 9. On 3 May 2012 the Moscow Department of Regional Security approved the route from Kaluzhskaya Square, down Bolshaya Yakimanka Street and Bolshaya Polyanka Street, followed by a meeting at Bolotnaya Square, noting that the organisers had provided a detailed plan of the proposed events. The march was to begin at 4 p.m., and the meeting had to finish by 7.30 p.m. The number of participants was indicated as 5,000. 10. On 4 May 2012 the First Deputy Head of the Moscow Department of Regional Security held a working meeting with the organisers of the demonstration at Bolotnaya Square, at which they discussed the security issues. The organisers and the authorities agreed that the assembly layout and the security arrangements would be identical to the previous public event organised by the same group of opposition activists on 4 February 2012. On that occasion, the venue of the meeting had included the park at Bolotnaya Square and the Bolotnaya embankment. 11. On 5 May 2012 the Tsentralnyy District Prosecutor’s Office of Moscow issued a warning to two of the organisers, Mr Davidis and Mr Udaltsov, against exceeding the notified number of participants and against erecting camping tents at the meeting venue, an intention allegedly expressed by the organisers at the working meeting. 12. On the same day the Moscow Department of the Interior published on its website the official information about the forthcoming demonstration on 6 May 2012, including a map. The map indicated the route of the march, the traffic restrictions and an access plan to Bolotnaya Square; it delineated the area allotted to the meeting, which included the park at Bolotnaya Square. Access to the meeting was marked through the park. 13. On the same day the Police Chief of the Moscow Department of the Interior adopted a plan for safeguarding public order in Moscow on 6 May 2012 (the “security plan”). In view of the forthcoming authorised demonstration at Bolotnaya Square and anticipated attempts by other opposition groups to hold unauthorised public gatherings, it provided for security measures in Moscow city centre and set up operational headquarters to implement them. The police units assigned to police the march and the meeting counted 2,400 riot police officers, of which 1,158 were on duty at Bolotnaya Square. They were instructed, in particular, to search the demonstrators to prevent them from taking tents to the site of the meeting and to obstruct access to Bolshoy Kamenyy bridge, diverting the marchers to Bolotnaya embankment, the place of the meeting. The adjacent park at Bolotnaya Square had to be cordoned off. 14. At about 1.30 p.m. on 6 May 2012 the organisers were allowed access to the meeting venue to set up their stage and sound equipment. The police searched the vehicles delivering the equipment and seized three tents found amid the gear. They arrested several people for bringing the tents. 15. At the beginning of the march, the organisers signed an undertaking to ensure public order during the demonstration and gave assurances to the police that the limits on the place and time allocated for the assembly would be respected and that no tents would be placed on Bolotnaya Square. 16. The march began at 4.30 p.m. at Kaluzhskaya Square. It went down Yakimanka Street peacefully and without disruption. The turnout exceeded expectations, but there is no consensus as to the exact numbers. The official estimate was that there were 8,000 participants, whereas the organisers considered that there were about 25,000. The media reported different numbers, some significantly exceeding the above estimates. 17. At about 5 p.m. the march approached Bolotnaya Square. The leaders found that the layout of the meeting and the placement of the police cordon did not correspond to what they had anticipated. Unlike on 4 February 2012, the park at Bolotnaya Square was excluded from the meeting venue, which was limited to Bolotnaya embankment. 18. Faced with the police cordon and unable to access the park, the leaders of the march – Mr S. Udaltsov, Mr A. Navalnyy, Mr B. Nemtsov and Mr I. Yashin – stopped and demanded that the police open access to the park. The cordon officers did not enter into any discussion with the protest leaders and no senior officer was delegated to negotiate. After about fifteen minutes of attempting to engage with the cordon officers, at 5.16 p.m. the four leaders announced that they were going on a “sit-down strike” and sat on the ground. The people behind them stopped, although some people continued to go past them towards the stage. 19. Between 5.20 p.m. and 5.45 p.m. two State Duma deputies tried to negotiate the enlargement of the restricted area by moving the police cordon behind the park along the lines expected by the organisers. At the same time the Ombudsman of the Russian Federation, at the request of police, attempted to persuade the leaders of the sit-in to resume the procession and to head towards the meeting venue at Bolotnaya embankment where the stage had been set up. During that time no senior police officer or municipal official came to the site of the sit-down protest, and there was no direct communication between the authorities and the leaders of the sit-in. 20. At 5.50 p.m. the crowd around the sit-down protest built up, which caused some congestion, and the leaders abandoned the protest and headed towards the stage, followed by the crowd. 21. At 5.55 p.m. the media reported that the police authorities were regarding the strike as a provocation of mass disorder and were considering prosecuting those responsible for it. 22. At the same time a commotion near the police cordon occurred at the place vacated by the sit-down protest, and the police cordon was broken in several places. A crowd of about 100 people spilled over into the empty space beyond the cordon. Within seconds the police restored the cordon, which was reinforced by an additional riot police force. Those who found themselves outside the cordon wandered around, uncertain what to do next. Several people were apprehended, others were pushed back inside the cordon, and some continued to loiter outside or walked towards the park. The police cordon began to push the crowd into the restricted area and advanced by several metres, pressing it inwards. 23. At 6 p.m. Ms Mityushkina, on police instructions, announced from the stage that the meeting was now over, but apparently her message was not heard by most of the demonstrators or the media reporters broadcasting from the spot. The live television footage provided by the parties contained no mention of her announcement. 24. At the same time a Molotov cocktail was launched from the crowd at the corner of Malyy Kamennyy bridge over the restored police cordon. It landed outside the cordon and a passer-by’s trousers caught fire. It was promptly extinguished by the police. 25. At 6.15 p.m. at the same corner of Malyy Kamennyy bridge the riot police began breaking into the demonstration to split up the crowd. Running in tight formations, they pushed the crowd apart, arrested some people, confronted others, and formed new cordons to isolate sections of the crowd. Some protesters held up metal barriers and aligned them so as to resist the police, threw various objects at the police, shouted and chanted “Shame!” and other slogans, and whenever the police apprehended someone from among the protesters they attempted to pull them back. The police applied combat techniques and used truncheons. 26. At 6.20 p.m. Mr Udaltsov climbed onto the stage at the opposite end of the square to address the meeting. At this point, he was arrested. Mr Navalnyy attempted to go up onto the stage, but he was also arrested, and so was Mr Nemtsov, five minutes later. 27. Meanwhile, at the Malyy Kamennyy bridge the police continued dividing the crowd and began pushing some sections away from the venue. Through loudspeakers they asked the participants to leave for the metro station. The dispersal continued for at least another hour until the venue was fully cleared of all protesters. 28. On the same day the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation opened a criminal investigation into the suspected mass disorder and violent acts against the police (Articles 212 § 2 and 318 § 1 of the Criminal Code). 29. On 28 May 2012 an investigation was also launched into the criminal offence of organising mass disorder (Article 212 § 1 of the Criminal Code). The two criminal cases were joined on the same day. 30. On 24 May 2013 the first criminal case against twelve individuals suspected of participation in mass disorder, including the applicant, was transferred to the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow for the determination of criminal charges (the first “Bolotnaya” case). 31. On 21 February 2014 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow pronounced a judgment in the first Bolotnaya case. It found eight individuals, including the applicant, guilty of participation in mass disorder and of violent acts against police officers during the public assembly on 6 May 2012. They received prison sentences of between two and a half and four years; one of them was released on parole. The applicant was sentenced to two years and six months’ imprisonment. Three co-defendants had previously been pardoned under the Amnesty Act and a fourth had his case disjoined from the main proceedings. This judgment was upheld by the Moscow City Court on 20 June 2014. It reduced the applicant’s prison sentence to two years and three months. 32. On 24 July 2014 the Moscow City Court found Mr Udaltsov and Mr Razvozzhayev guilty of organising mass disorder on 6 May 2012 and sentenced them to four and a half years’ imprisonment. On 18 March 2015 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the judgment of 24 July 2014, with amendments. 33. On 18 August 2014 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow examined another “Bolotnaya” case and found four persons guilty of participating in the mass disorder and of committing violent acts against police officers during the demonstration on 6 May 2012. They received prison sentences of between two and a half and three and a half years; one of them was released on parole. This judgment was upheld by the Moscow City Court on 27 November 2014. 34. At the time of arrest the applicant was a student at the political science faculty of the Moscow State University and lived with his wife and their child born in 2011. On 6 May 2012 he arrived at Bolotnaya Square to take part in the demonstration and, according to him, he did not take part in any disorder or clashes with the police, although he was in the area where clashes occurred. At one point during the dispersal of the demonstration he picked up from the ground a small round yellow object and threw it over the heads of the protesters in the direction of the police. He was arrested shortly after that. There is no information as to whether he was detained on that day. 35. On 17 May 2012 the applicant was charged with non-compliance with a lawful order by a police officer on 6 May 2012. He was found guilty of the offence provided by Article 19.3 of the Code of Administrative Offences and was sentenced to 24-hours’ detention. 36. Until 9 June 2012 the applicant continued to study at the university while living with his family at his usual address. On the latter date he was detained on suspicion of having participated in mass disorders on 6 May 2012. 37. On 11 June 2012 the Basmannyy District Court examined and granted the request to detain the applicant pending criminal investigation. It reasoned as follows: “In assessing the circumstances under investigation, [the court takes account of] the submitted materials and the indicated information in their integrity, as well as the personality of [the applicant], who is suspected of having committed criminal offences one of which is characterised as grave and the other of medium gravity, punishable by up to two years of deprivation of liberty, and therefore giving sufficient reasons to believe that the applicant is likely to abscond, to continue his criminal activity, to destroy evidence, or to otherwise obstruct the investigation of the criminal case.” 38. The court dismissed the applicant’s request for an alternative preventive measure, including bail of 500,000 Russian roubles (RUB), and personal guarantees of several state officials and found that his release was not required on health grounds. It ordered the applicant’s detention until 6 July 2012. On 2 July 2012 the Moscow City Court upheld the detention order. 39. On 18 June 2012 charges were brought against the applicant under Articles 212 § 2 (participation in mass disorder) and 318 § 1 (violence against a public official) of the Criminal Code. He was accused, in particular, of shouting slogans and throwing an unidentified small round yellow object that had hit the police officer’s shoulder. 40. On 3 July 2012 the Basmannyy District Court examined the investigator’s request to extend the term of the applicant’s detention by four months. The applicant asked for another preventive measure pending trial. He offered bail of RUB 500,000 or the personal guarantees of a State Duma deputy, two Moscow municipal deputies and one academic. His request for an alternative preventive measure was supported by petitions signed by six Moscow municipal deputies and three personal references from his place of residence and the university. The applicant also made a plea for release on health grounds, having provided medical certificates confirming that he was suffering from a high-degree myopia and asthma. On the same day the court found that the circumstances that had justified the detention order had not changed and, referring to the gravity of the charges and the complexity of the investigation, extended the applicant’s detention until 6 November 2012. This extension order was upheld by the Moscow City Court on 6 August 2012. 41. On 29 October 2012 the Basmannyy District Court granted another extension of the applicant’s detention, until 6 March 2013, essentially on the same grounds and noting that the circumstances that had justified the detention order had not changed. This extension order was upheld by the Moscow City Court on 26 November 2012. 42. On 7 November 2012 the charges against the applicant were updated with a statement that the applicant’s and others’ acts had cumulatively caused the police officer a haematoma on the head, leg and shoulder. The classification of the offences remained unchanged. 43. On 1 March 2013 the Basmannyy District Court granted a new extension of the applicant’s detention, until 9 June 2013, essentially on the same grounds as before and noting that the circumstances that had justified the detention order had not changed. On 10 April 2013 the Moscow City Court upheld this extension order. 44. On 23 April 2013 the Moscow City Court examined a fresh request for the extension of the applicant’s detention and granted it until 6 July 2013. The decision read as follows: “The materials presented [by the investigator] reveal that the grounds for choosing the preventive measure in respect of [the applicant] were not only the gravity of the charges but also the information about the personality of [the applicant] who could abscond from the investigation and trial, threaten witnesses, or otherwise obstruct the proceedings in the case, if released. The aforementioned grounds ... have not changed, have not lost their relevance to date, and the circumstances of the case [and] the nature of the crime committed by [the applicant] lead the court to conclude that the need for the [pre-trial detention] has not, at this stage, ceased to exist ... This term is reasonable, [it] is justified by the objective circumstances, it is not in conflict with the term of the pre-trial investigation, also extended on the same grounds ... In accordance with the Constitutional Court’s [case-law], the proportionality of the preventive measure to the [gravity of the] charges imputed to [the applicant] show that in this case the public interests, in particular those related to the criminal investigation, override the importance of the principle of respect of individual liberty.” 45. On 24 May 2013 the applicant’s criminal case was transferred to the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court for the determination of criminal charges. 46. On 30 May 2013 the Moscow City Court upheld the extension order of 23 April 2013. 47. On 6 June 2013 the latter court granted another extension of the applicant’s detention until 24 November 2013. This decision concerned eleven defendants and read, in so far as relevant, as follows: “... the court concludes that the preventive measure in respect of [all defendants] ... is to remain unchanged because the reasons taken into account when these measures were chosen have not ceased to exist and have not changed ... ... [the defendants] are accused of [grave crimes punishable by prison sentences] ... Regard being had to all the available information about the personality of [the defendants] and the nature of the criminal offences imputed to each of them, the court still has sufficient grounds to believe that the said defendants, if at liberty, may flee the trial or otherwise obstruct the course of justice, [motivated by] the gravity of the charges. ... no other measures of restraint would secure the aims and goals of the judicial proceedings ... The court takes into account the arguments of Mr Akimenkov, Mr Belousov and Mr Barabanov and their counsel concerning the health problems which occurred in custody, but notes that no documentary evidence that these defendants have diseases threatening their life or health and incompatible with the detention in custody have been provided.” 48. On 2 July 2013 the Moscow City Court upheld the extension order of 6 June 2013. 49. On 6 August 2013, during the court hearing the applicant made an application for release which was dismissed by the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court on the same day. 50. On 11 September 2013 the Ombudsman of the Russian Federation applied to the Presidium of the Moscow City Court with a complaint about the extension of the applicant’s pre-trial detention, and requested an alternative preventive measure for him. 51. On 22 October 2013 the applicant applied for release on the grounds of his child’s medical condition, as well as the deterioration of the applicant’s own health. This application was supported by several prominent public personages, including university professors, the dean of the faculty of political science and a State Duma deputy, all of whom provided personal guarantees. On 2 October 2013 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court rejected this application. 52. On 1 November 2013 the Moscow City Court refused the Ombudsman’s request of 11 September 2013. 53. On 19 November 2013 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court granted another extension of detention in respect of nine defendants, including the applicant. It ordered their detention until 24 February 2014 on the grounds of the gravity of the charges. It held, in particular, as follows: “[The defendants] are charged with a criminal offence provided for by Article 212 § 2 of the Criminal Code, which belongs to the category of grave crimes punishable by a prison sentence of over three years. Furthermore, [some defendants] are charged with a criminal offence provided for by Article 318 § 1 of the Criminal Code, also punishable by a prison sentence of over three years. Despite the defendants being registered as having permanent addresses in the Russian Federation, the analysis of the overall information about [the defendants’] personalities, and the nature of the offences imputable to them, give the court sufficient grounds to consider that the defendants, if the preventive measure is changed to another one not involving deprivation of liberty, may flee the trial or otherwise obstruct the course of justice, [motivated by] the gravity of the charges ... the reasons taken into account when these measures were chosen have not ceased to exist and have not changed ...” 54. On 17 December 2013 the Moscow City Court upheld the extension order of 19 November 2013. 55. The applicant has high-degree myopia. According to a 2009 medical certificate, his eyesight in the right eye was minus 10 dioptres, and on the left eye minus 6 dioptres. 56. From 19 June 2012 to 29 June 2013 the applicant was detained in remand prison IZ-77/5, and from 29 June 2013 he was held in IZ-77/2. Upon his arrival at the remand prisons the applicant was subjected to medical checks which did not reveal any health issues. 57. The parties agree that on most days the number of inmates in the cell did not exceed the design capacity. They also agree that the size of the cells and the number of detainees allowed the applicant four square metres of personal space and that the applicant had an individual sleeping place in every cell. 58. The parties provided the following accounts of the conditions in these cells. According to the applicant, the cells were inadequately lit and ventilated, excessively hot in summer and cold in winter, all with a lavatory pan separated from the living space by a chin-high plastic partition providing insufficient privacy. The applicant alleged that he had been constantly exposed to cigarette smoke, and although the window in the cell could be opened it gave onto a courtyard used for incinerating rubbish, letting in fumes. Therefore the cell constantly lacked fresh air, and the forced ventilation could not compensate for it. Outdoor exercise was limited to one hour per day. The applicant also claimed that the window was too high to give sufficient light for reading or working with documents. Finally, he alleged that access to drinking water was conditional on the purchase of an electric kettle. 59. According to the Government, the artificial light in the cells was maintained at 100 watts round the clock except at night, from 10 p.m. to 6 a.m., when it was 75 watts; they provided measurement tables for this detention centre created in August 2013, which stated that the brightness in the cells was between 149 and 454 lux, the temperature in the cells between 26oC and 29oC, and the humidity between 36% and 45%. They indicated that in IZ‑77/5 the detainees had access to a gym upon their written request. 60. On 11 July 2012 the applicant applied in writing to the head of the facility for a medical examination. He alleged that he had been suffering from asthma and high-degree myopia. On 20 September 2012 he made a similar application to the investigator of the criminal case. 61. On 3 October 2012 the investigator granted the applicant’s request for a medical examination. This decision read as follows: “... the performance of a medical examination ... falls outside the competence of the investigating bodies ... However, given that the state of health of the accused Mr Belousov is of importance to the present criminal case, the investigating bodies have sent the relevant request to the administration of [IZ-77/5] stating the need to carry out, in the shortest possible time, the medical examination of the accused Mr Belousov, the results of which are to be submitted to the investigating bodies for inclusion in the criminal case file.” 62. It appears that the medical examination was not carried out. 63. On 28 November 2012 and 11 January 2013 the public commission for the monitoring of detention facilities visited IZ-77/5, and, according to the Government, the applicant made no complaints about the conditions of detention or the lack of medical assistance on either occasion. 64. On 3 September 2013 the applicant had a hypertension crisis during a court hearing. An ambulance was called and provided him with the necessary assistance. 65. Following his complaints of headaches, on 6 September 2013 the applicant was placed in the medical ward of IZ-77/2. Upon admission, the applicant was diagnosed with hypertension. He remained in the medical ward for a period of at least two months for his blood pressure to be monitored. 66. The applicant alleged that the conditions in IZ-77/2 were poor, in particular on account of the lack of outdoor exercise and inadequate sanitary arrangements. He specified that the lavatory pan was separated from the living space by a chest-high partition providing insufficient privacy. According to the applicant’s letter of 30 July 2013, he had not been able to have a shower since his transfer to IZ-77/2. 67. According to the Government, the conditions in the cells of IZ-77/2 were as follows: the toilet was separated by a solid partition from the rest of the cell and ensured the necessary privacy; the state of the sanitary facilities was satisfactory; the cells were treated for disinfection and pest-control once every three months and whenever necessary; the applicant was entitled to one hour’s outdoor exercise per day; the cell was cleaned and the bedding changed once a week; the cells were equipped with forced ventilation and could be aired through a hinged window pane. Artificial light was provided at 100 watts by day and 75 watts by night. The glazed windows let in sufficient daylight. 68. Pursuant to the request of the applicant’s counsel filed on an unidentified date, on 31 January 2014 the applicant was examined by an ophthalmologist and was diagnosed with high-degree myopia (minus 13 dioptres on both eyes). 69. During the hearing of the applicants’ criminal case, which began in July 2013, the applicant and his co-defendants were regularly transferred from the remand prisons to the court-house and back. All the defendants attended the hearings on three or four consecutive days every week. According to the Government, the applicant’s trial involved ninety-one court hearings, and it appears that the applicant was transferred to attend all of them. A typical schedule on a hearing day is represented by the following two-week extract submitted by the applicant: 02/07/2013 03/07/2013 04/07/2013 09/07/2013 10/07/2013 11/07/2013 Wake up 5 a.m. 6 a.m. 7 a.m. 9.30 a.m. Arrival at the court-house 10 a.m. 10 a.m. 10 a.m. 10 a.m. 10 a.m. 10 a.m. End of hearing 5 p.m. adjourned 7 p.m. 5 p.m. 6 p.m. 3 p.m. Board the van 8 p.m. 8 p.m. 8 p.m. 9 p.m. 70. According to the applicant, this schedule left him insufficient time for sleep between the court hearings, gave him no time to prepare for the next day’s hearing, and deprived him of hot meals. 71. He further alleged that the conditions in the prison assembly rooms and in the transfer van («автозак») had been appalling, in particular owing to overcrowding. He claimed that he was cramped together with other detainees and their belongings in a small tin cabin without windows, ventilated only through a roof hatch. The benches were spaced at 30 cm, and the detainees had to get in and out by walking on others. Smoking was allowed, which caused further discomfort, especially to non-smokers. Occasionally, they were transferred in vans divided into tight individual metal cubicles. In both types of vans the cabin overheated in the summer and froze in cold weather. The transfer lasted for two to six hours depending on the number of pick-up points and traffic conditions. There was no opportunity to use a toilet during the transfer, even at other pick-up points where the van could wait for hours. 72. At the Moscow City Court before and after the hearings the applicant and his co-defendants were held in convoy cells. According to the applicant, these were poorly lit and often overcrowded, and access to a toilet was subject to the availability of a convoy officer. Some of the convoy cells on the ground floor of the court-house were as small as two square metres, and each could be shared by two detainees. The applicants’ account was supported by witness statements submitted by his co-defendant Mr Kavkazskiy and those given by his three fellow inmates, unrelated to the present case; their detailed accounts of the prison transfers in the relevant period, as well as of the convoy cells at the Moscow City Court, were consistent with the applicant’s submissions. 73. According to the Government, the morning transfer to the court‑house did not exceed 1.5 hours, and the transfer back lasted for up to three hours because of the evening traffic. Also, the applicant’s schedule allowed for eight hours of uninterrupted sleep. They indicated that the wake-up time at the detention centres was 6 a.m., the pickup would take place at 8 a.m., and the drop-off after the hearing at 9.30 p.m.; assembly before and after the transfer did not exceed 30 minutes. All the detainees were provided with packed meals for the whole day out at the court-house, and they were given hot water at lunchtime. They further indicated that the vans used for the transfer were 2009-2011 models of KAMAZ‑4308‑AZ, KAMAZ‑OTS‑577489‑AZ (both designed for 32 detainees), GAZ‑326041‑AZ (designed for seven detainees), and GAZ‑3309‑AZ (designed for 19 detainees). As regards the convoy cells at the Moscow City Court, they submitted that the applicant and his co-defendants were detained in convoy area of the court-house, which included four cells measuring 12 square metres each and toilets, including a wheelchair-accessible one, which the detainees could use on demand, accompanied by the convoy. They submitted that the cells had adequate light and ventilation, and that they were furnished with tables and benches. During the intervals in the hearing the defendants could use an electric kettle to boil water. 74. On 6 June 2013 the court proceedings began in hearing room no. 338 of the Moscow City Court. The latter court lent its premises to the Zamoskvoretsky District Court so as to accommodate all the participants in the proceedings, the public and the press. In that hearing room ten defendants were held in a glass cabin measuring 3.2 m x 1.7 m x 2.3 m (height). The Government submitted that the glass cabin was a permanent courtroom installation consisting of a steel frame and sheets of bulletproof glass, with a partition inside, a steel mesh ceiling and a secure door; the cabin was equipped with benches. The walls of the cabin had slots allowing documents to be passed between the defendants and their counsel; ventilation outlets were at floor level, and near the dock was an air conditioner. The cabin was equipped with microphones allowing for consultations with counsel and facilitating the defendants’ participation in the proceedings. The Government specified that convoy officer guarded the cabin on both sides, supervised the defendants and intercepted any attempts of “contact with outsiders”, but the defendants could communicate with their counsel with the court’s permission. 75. The applicant submitted that the glass cabin lacked space and ventilation and that it was virtually soundproof, hampering the defendants’ participation in the proceedings and their communication with counsel. The benches had no backrests, and the lack of space made it impossible to have documents; it was impossible to consult counsel or the case file during the hearing. The applicant also submitted that the video evidence examined at the hearing could not be seen by him from the cabin because of the distance between the cabin and the screen and his poor eyesight. 76. In August 2013 the proceedings moved to hearing room no. 635 of the Moscow City Court. This hearing room was equipped with two glass cabins similar to the one in hearing room no. 338, except that there were no slots in them. Each cabin measured 4 m x 1.2 m x 2.3 m (height). From 2 August 2013 one of the defendants was no longer placed in the glass cabin owing to a change in the measure of restraint for him. The nine remaining defendants were divided between the two cabins. 77. From mid-September 2013 to the end of 2013 the hearings continued on the premises of the Nikulinskiy District Court of Moscow (hearing room no. 303), and in January and February 2014 at the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court (hearing room no. 410). These hearing rooms were equipped with metal cages in which the nine defendants (from 19 December 2013 eight), including the applicant, sat during the hearings. According to the photographs submitted by the applicants, the dimensions of the cages were similar to the glass cabins described above and, likewise, they were not equipped with any furniture other than benches. 78. On 6 June 2013 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow began a preliminary hearing of the criminal case against ten participants in the public assembly at Bolotnaya Square charged with participation in mass disorders and violent acts against police officers. On 18 June 2013 the same court began the hearing on the merits. 79. On 13 November 2013 police officer F., the victim of the applicant’s assault, was examined as a witness. He testified that the applicant had thrown an unidentified yellow object which had hit him on the shoulder and caused him pain. The applicant asked for F.’s statements made during the investigation, which contained no mention of the yellow object or the applicant, to be read out in court. The applicant pointed out that no identification parade had been held during the investigation to enable F. to identify the person who had assaulted him; instead, the applicant and F. had been questioned in confrontation, whereby the applicant had been the only person introduced to F. as the likely perpetrator. The court refused the applicant’s request for F.’s statements to be read out. 80. On 21 February 2014 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow pronounced judgment. It found, in particular, as follows: “Between 4 p.m. and 8 p.m. on 6 May 2012 ... at Bolotnaya Square ... unidentified persons ... called those present [at the venue] to move outside the agreed meeting venue, to defy the lawful orders of the police ..., to use violence ... which led to mass disorder accompanied by the use of violence against public officials in connection with the performance of their duties [and] the destruction of property. On the same day at 5 p.m. at the latest [the defendants] acquired the criminal intent to participate in mass disorder and to use violence ... Thus, in furtherance of this criminal intent, at an unidentified time and place Mr Belousov acquired an unidentified solid yellow round object with the intention of using it to cause violence against officials ... ... together with other participants ... Mr Belousov repeatedly chanted anti‑government slogans. Moreover ... the participants in the mass disorder threw chunks of tarmac, stones, sticks and other objects at the police ... which hit them on various body parts, and [the defendants] ... [who] participated in the mass disorder ... implemented their criminal intent to use violence against public officials ... applied physical force not endangering life or health of those [officials] ... Mr Belousov used violence not endangering the life or health of [Mr F.] ... Between 5 p.m. and 8.10 p.m. on 6 May 2012 ... unidentified participants in the mass disorder deliberately administered at least three blows and kicks to [F.’s] head, body and limbs, after which Mr Belousov ... deliberately targeting [F.], threw an unidentified solid yellow round object, which hit [F.] on the upper right side of the chest, causing him physical pain. As a result of Mr Belousov and other unidentified persons’ actions [F.] sustained physical pain and injuries in the form of bruising and abrasion of the soft tissues of the parietal region, bruising of the ... left forearm, abrasion on the ... right shin, [all of] which, assessed individually or cumulatively, constituted injuries not endangering life or health, and not entailing short-term health impairment or minor durable professional incapacitation ... Mr Belousov ... pleaded not guilty and testified that ... he wanted to see why the meeting was not starting [and] went to Malyy Kamennyy Bridge ... [he] saw the riot police cordon ... [and officers] arresting some [participants] ... [he] was looking to leave and went to the middle of Bolotnaya Square and saw a girl who tripped on something and nearly fell. Without looking at it closely he picked it up from the ground; it felt soft and slimy ... and threw it away without aiming it at anyone ... he joined hands with other protesters chanting “One for all and all for one!”, “United, we are invincible!”. At this moment three police officers ran up to him, grabbed him and carried him to the police vehicle ... Police officer [F.] testified that ... after the cordon was restored ... he was heading into the crowd to arrest offenders ... somebody hit him three times on the head ... then he felt a blow from a heavy object on his shoulder. From the corner of his eye he saw [Mr Belousov] take a swing and toss something ... like a billiard ball. ... Mr Belousov was filmed at the moment he threw a yellow object at the police ... The [defendants’] argument that no mass disorder took place is considered by the court unsubstantiated because ... as a result of the premeditated actions of a group of individuals who organised ... obstruction to the demonstrators’ march on their way to the intended meeting venue where the stage was, which caused discontent among the protesters towards ... the police ... those who were leading the march and who were able to make an unhindered approach to the meeting venue changed their tactics and called for ... a sit-in, hoping thus to secure a decision to change the placement of the cordon to their advantage and to extend their area beyond what had been agreed ... As a result ... the protesters forced their way through the police cordon ... public order was disrupted ... because of the larger crowd, uncontrollable and incited by organised groups ... conditioned the applicants’ intent to participate in such actions, accompanied by chunks of tarmac and plastic bottles being thrown and violence towards the police otherwise being used. Conscious of their participation in spontaneously erupted disorder and wishing to take part in it, the defendants joined the mass movement ... ... the court takes into account the nature and the degree of [the applicant’s] involvement in the mass disorder ... and considers it possible to give him a sentence below the minimum punishment provided for by Article 212 § 2.” 81. The applicant was sentenced to two years and six months’ imprisonment, calculated on the basis of a two-year prison term under Article 212 of the Criminal Code partly concurrent with a one-year prison term under Article 318 of the Criminal Code. The applicant’s pre-trial detention counted towards the prison sentence. 82. The applicant appealed. He contested the first-instance court’s finding that mass disorder had taken place, and alleged that there had only been isolated clashes between the protesters and the police, caused by the authorities’ last-minute decision to alter the layout of the meeting venue and aggravated by their excessive crowd-control measures. He denied that the object he threw hit anybody; he alleged a breach of procedure for questioning in confrontation with the victim, police officer F., and complained that the court had refused to have the records of the latter’s interrogation conducted during the investigation read out. He also complained about the conditions in which he was escorted to the courtroom, the intensity of the hearing schedule, and that he had been placed in a glass cabin during the trial, claiming that it hindered his communication with counsel. 83. On 20 June 2014 the Moscow City Court upheld the first-instance judgment, also reducing his prison sentence to two years and three months, comprising a one-year-and-nine-month term under Article 212 of the Criminal Code and a nine-month term under Article 318 of the Criminal Code, to run partly concurrently. 84. On 8 September 2014 the applicant was released after serving his prison term.

5. The applicants, Mr Vladimir Karapetyan (the first applicant), Ms Martha Ayvazyan (the second applicant), Mr Araqel Semirjyan (the third applicant) and Ms Karine Afrikyan (the fourth applicant), are Armenian nationals who were born in 1969, 1967, 1973 and 1954 respectively and live in Yerevan. 6. At the material time, the applicants occupied different posts within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, namely Head of Press and Information Department, Head of NATO Division of Arms Control and International Security Department, Counsel of the European Department and Head of USA and Canada Division of the American Department respectively. 7. On 19 February 2008 a presidential election was held in Armenia. The main contenders were the then Prime Minister, Serzh Sargsyan, and the opposition candidate, Levon Ter-Petrosyan. Immediately after the election, Levon Ter-Petrosyan announced that the election had been rigged. From 20 February 2008 onwards nationwide protests, such as demonstrations and sit-ins, were organised by thousands of Levon Ter-Petrosyan’s supporters. 8. On 23 February 2008 several ambassadors for Armenia in foreign countries made the following statement: “We, the undersigned, remaining faithful to our calling as Armenian diplomats and led by our feeling of responsibility before the Republic of Armenia and the Armenian people, with concern for the situation which has arisen in Armenia, with profound respect for the right of Armenian citizens to free elections, with the conviction that only a president elected as a result of free and fair elections can best tackle the challenges facing our country on the international level and substantially raise the international image of Armenia, express our support to our compatriots who have risen to struggle for freedom, protection of the right to a fair election and establishment of true democracy in Armenia. Considering the preservation of stability in the country important and public accord necessary, we appeal to our compatriots and especially the representatives of all the structures in the country responsible for maintaining public order and peace to avoid the temptation of resolving problems by use of force. We appeal to all television companies in Armenia, and especially to Armenian Public Television, to ensure impartial and comprehensive coverage and to provide live airtime to representatives of all the powers who have a constructive position in overcoming the current inner-political crisis. We appeal to all our colleagues working both in Armenia or abroad to join our statement.” 9. This statement was reported by the mass media on the same day. According to the first applicant, he also received the statement via his electronic mail. According to the Government, the ambassadors who issued this statement were dismissed from their posts the following day and their dismissal was widely reported in the media. 10. On 24 February 2008 the applicants made the following statement: “By joining the statement issued by our colleagues from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs we express our concern with the situation created in Armenia, fraught with internal and external undesirable challenges, and outrage against the fraud of the election process, which shadow the will of our country and society to conduct a civilised, fair and free presidential election. As citizens of Armenia, we demand that urgent steps be undertaken to call into life the recommendations contained in the reports of the international observation mission, as well as other prominent international organisations. Only by acting in conformity with the letter and spirit of the law can we create democracy and tolerance in Armenia and earn the country a good reputation abroad.” 11. The names of the applicants, with the indication of their office, appeared under the statement. It appears that this statement was reported by several mass media outlets, including Radio Liberty, on the same day. 12. On 25 February 2008 the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Armenia adopted decrees dismissing the first, second and third applicants from office. The fourth applicant was dismissed from office by a similar decree on 3 March 2008. As a ground for the dismissals, the decrees referred to sections 40, subsection 1, point (j) and 44, subsection 1, point (c), of the Diplomatic Service Act (ՀՀ օրենքը «Դիվանագիտական ծառայության մասին», containing description which stated, inter alia, that a diplomat had no right to use his official capacity and work facilities for the benefit of parties and non-governmental organisations, or in order to carry out other political or religious activity (see paragraphs 22-24 below). 13. On an unspecified date in March 2008, the applicants instituted administrative proceedings challenging their dismissal and seeking to be reinstated in their work. In particular, they claimed that the decrees on their dismissal contained no reasons regarding the particular instance where they had made use of their official capacity and work facilities for the benefit of parties or non-governmental organisations or for engaging in political or religious activities, as prohibited by the sections of the Diplomatic Service Act. They also claimed that dismissal on the ground of convictions and opinions was prohibited by law. 14. On 10 April 2008 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as a respondent, lodged a response with the Administrative Court (ՀՀ վարչական դատարան), claiming that the applicants, by making their statement of 24 February 2008 which had then been reported by the mass media and announced during the demonstration, had engaged in political activities. Furthermore, the applicants had made use of their official capacity since they indicated their official titles in the statement. 15. On 29 May 2008 the Administrative Court dismissed the applicants’ claim, finding that their dismissal from work was lawful since the applicants, by making the impugned statement, in essence had engaged in political activity. In this respect, the Administrative Court mentioned that the impugned statement concerned political processes as it contained a political assessment of election and post-election events. Furthermore, that statement, as well as that of the ambassadors, had been read aloud during the demonstration organised by a political force and had received a political assessment. The Administrative Court also found that the applicants, by indicating their post titles, had made use of their official capacity. The applicants’ right to freedom of expression, as protected by Article 27 of the Constitution (ՀՀ Սահմանադրություն), was not breached since the applicants, in exercising that right, had made use of their official status and work facilities. Therefore, the restriction on that right was in compliance with Article 43 of the Constitution. Besides, the applicants had not been dismissed on the ground of their political opinion, but because in disseminating that opinion they had made use of their official status, which was prohibited by law. 16. On an unspecified date, the applicants lodged an appeal on points of law against the judgment of the Administrative Court, claiming, inter alia, a violation of their right to freedom of expression, as protected by Article 10 of the Convention. Besides, they claimed that they had been discriminated against on grounds of political opinion, in violation of Article 14, since those diplomats or state officials who had expressed publicly their support for the pro-governmental candidate had never faced any sanctions: the true reason for their dismissal was their critical opinion of government actions in the sphere of human rights and democratisation. They also claimed that their dismissal had been based on an erroneous interpretation of sections 40, subsection 1, point (j) and 44, subsection 1, point (c), of the Diplomatic Service Act since they had not made use of their official capacity or work facilities when making the impugned statement. Furthermore, the statement had not been made for the benefit of any political party and it could not be qualified as political activity as such. 17. On 23 September 2008 the Court of Cassation (ՀՀ վճռաբեկ դատարան) decided to declare the applicants’ appeal on points of law inadmissible for lack of merit.

4. The applicants were born in 1970 and 1935 respectively and live in Sofia and Ruse. 5. D.D., father of the second applicant and grandfather of the first applicant, and his son P.R., father of the first applicant, owned a plot of land and a house in Popovo. 6. By two decisions of the mayor of 9 May 1988 and 27 February 1989 the property was expropriated with a view to constructing a residential building. The decisions, based on section 98(1) of the Territorial and Urban Planning Act of 1973 (Закон за териториалното и селищно устройство – hereinafter “the TUPA”), provided that D.D. was to be compensated with a two-room flat in a building which the municipality planned to construct on the expropriated plot, and P.R. with the right to build a house on municipally owned land. 7. In 1989 the expropriated house was pulled down and in 1994 construction work was started on the site. 8. By a supplementary decision of 19 April 1991, based on section 100 of the TUPA, the mayor specified the exact location and size of the future flat to be offered to D.D. No supplementary decision was issued however with regard to the right to build a house on municipally owned land which was due to P.R. 9. D.D. and P.R. passed away in 1998 and 2002 respectively, and D.D.’s wife passed away in 2011. This left the two applicants as heirs of D.D., and the first applicant as sole heir of P.R. 10. On an unspecified date in 2005 the applicants requested that the mayor of Popovo revoke the expropriation order in respect of their predecessors’ property, under paragraph 9(2) of the transitional provisions of the Territorial Planning Act (Закон за устройство на територията, see paragraph 17 below). The mayor did not respond, which under domestic law was considered a tacit refusal. After the applicants applied for judicial review, the refusal was upheld by the courts, in judgments of the Targovishte Administrative Court (“the Targovishte Court”) and the Supreme Administrative Court of 9 March and 11 July 2006 respectively. 11. Following a fresh request by the applicants for the revocation of the expropriation order, in judgments of 10 November 2006 and 25 April 2007 the Targovishte Court and the Supreme Administrative Court annulled a new tacit refusal on the part of the mayor, acknowledging that the preconditions for such a revocation had indeed not been met, but instructing the mayor to examine the applicants’ request under paragraph 9(1) of the transitional provisions of the Territorial Planning Act, providing for the possibility of monetary compensation (see paragraph 17 below). 12. As the mayor failed once again to take a decision on the applicants’ request, on an unspecified date they challenged his new tacit refusal, which was annulled once again by the Targovishte Court and the Supreme Administrative Court, in judgments of 27 September 2007 and 3 April 2008 respectively. 13. Following that, on two occasions (3 June 2009 and 15 June 2010) the mayor refused expressly to revoke the expropriation order in respect of the applicants’ property. After the applicants challenged these refusals, they were found to be null and void by the courts, the first one in a final judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 21 May 2010, and the second one in a judgment of the Varna Administrative Court of 25 March 2011. The courts, finding that the fresh refusals were in contradiction with the earlier court judgments in cases between the same parties, sent the case back to the mayor, instructing him once again to examine it under paragraph 9(1) of the transitional provisions of the Territorial Planning Act. 14. In April 2011 an expert commission of the municipality assessed the value of the expropriated property and set the amount of compensation to be provided to the applicants at 67,300 Bulgarian levs (BGN). After the applicants challenged that amount, in a judgment of 21 December 2011 the Targovishte Court increased it to BGN 83,500. 15. That sum was paid to the applicants in June 2012.

5. The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Athens, Greece. 6. Because of the difficult economic situation in Moldova, in 1997 the applicant left that State for Greece where she found employment; she was engaged by a family to take care of a disabled child. She used to visit Moldova on holiday every two to three years and she kept an apartment in Causeni. 7. On 15 September 2008, after a visit to Moldova, the applicant was returning to Greece from Chisinau Airport when she was stopped by customs officers because she had on her twenty-nine pieces of non-identical jewellery such as rings, bracelets, necklaces and pendants. The applicant was wearing seven pieces of the jewellery and the rest were in a jewellery box in her handbag. Since the applicant had failed to declare the jewellery, she was taken to the airport police station. There she stated that she had not been attempting to smuggle the jewellery through customs and that she had honestly believed that no declaration was necessary for goods whose value was less than 5,000 euros (EUR). She also submitted that the jewellery in question had been brought to Moldova from Greece. She was informed that she only had the right to take five pieces of non-identical jewellery out of country, no matter their value. She also submitted that she had not been asked to declare anything by the customs officers. The police drew up a report according to which the applicant had in her possession twenty-nine pieces of jewellery made of precious metals and stones with a total value of 55,582 Moldovan lei (MDL – approximately EUR 3,284). All the jewellery, including the pieces allowed by law to be transported over the border, was seized by the police. 8. The applicant missed her flight and spent two weeks in Moldova during which time she went to the police station on several occasions. There she made an official declaration and signed a formal undertaking to appear before the prosecuting authorities and courts when necessary. She informed the authorities about her intention to leave the country and obtained their permission. She also gave her Greek address and telephone number. 9. On 1 October 2008 the applicant returned to Greece because she could no longer be absent from work. She had no difficulties in leaving the country through the same airport. 10. On 7 October 2008 the Chişinău airport police formally initiated criminal proceedings against the applicant for attempted smuggling of jewellery. The offence was considered to be a minor one (infracțiune ușoară) with a maximum penalty of 6,000 Moldovan lei (approximately EUR 430) or 240 hours community service or imprisonment of two years. The applicant was not aware of the initiation of the criminal proceedings against her. 11. Subsequently, the applicant was summoned to appear before the investigating authorities via her Moldovan address. Since she did not appear, the prosecutors contacted her adult son and a relative of hers and asked them about the applicant’s whereabouts. Both of them stated that the applicant was in Greece and that they did not know when she intended to return to Moldova. It does not appear from the material in the case-file that the prosecutors asked the applicant’s relatives for her contact information in Greece or to inform her that she had to appear before them. 12. On 16 June 2009 the prosecutor’s office applied to the Botanica District Court for a detention order in respect of the applicant. The reason relied upon by the prosecutors was that the applicant had absconded from prosecution when she left the country on 1 October 2008, in spite of her having given a written undertaking to appear when summoned. A public defender was appointed to represent the applicant. On 19 June 2009 the Botanica District Court ordered the applicant’s detention for a period of fifteen days. The reason relied upon by the court was that the applicant had failed to appear before the investigating authorities when summoned. The publicly appointed lawyer did not challenge that decision. 13. The applicant learned of the detention order against her in the summer of 2010 and employed a Moldovan lawyer to challenge it. On an unspecified date the applicant’s representative lodged a habeas corpus application with the Botanica District Court in which it was argued, inter alia, that the applicant had not been aware of the criminal proceedings against her, that she had never been summoned to appear before the prosecutor’s office and that she had not been informed that she could not leave the country. She asked the court to revoke the detention order and, in exchange, promised to appear before the court when necessary and to surrender her passport. 14. On 18 September 2010 the Botanica District Court rejected the applicant’s habeas corpus application relying, inter alia, on the fact that the applicant had formally undertaken to appear before the prosecuting authorities and courts and later failed to abide by the undertaking. The applicant’s representative appealed, arguing, inter alia, that according to the law the undertaking had not been valid because no criminal proceedings had been formally instituted at that time. The appeal was dismissed by the Chişinău Court of Appeal on 30 September 2010. 15. In July 2011, after the communication of the present case to the Government, the Moldovan authorities applied to Interpol for an international arrest warrant for the applicant. As a result, the applicant was arrested in Greece and held in detention pending extradition proceedings for a period of twenty-three days. In the documents ordering the applicant’s arrest and detention, the Greek authorities made specific reference to the detention order issued by the Botanica District Court on 19 June 2009 (see paragraph 12 above). The extradition proceedings ended on 21 September 2011 when the Athens Court of Appeal rejected the Moldovan authorities’ extradition request and ordered the applicant’s release from detention. The Athens Court of Appeal found that according to Article 5 of the European Convention on Extradition, persons suspected of offences in connection with taxes, duties and customs could be extradited only if the Contracting Parties have so decided in respect of any such offence or category of offences. In the absence of any such agreement between Moldova and Greece, the extradition request could not be upheld. It appears that the applicant has not returned to Moldova ever since.

5. The applicant was born in 1975 and is detained in Kahramanmaraş. 6. On 19 November 2003 the applicant was taken into police custody on suspicion of membership of an illegal organisation, namely the PKK/KADEK (Workers’ Party of Kurdistan/Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress). It appears that at some point the applicant confessed to committing an armed attack on a prison vehicle in Adana and, as a result, on 21 November 2003 at 3 p.m. was required to participate in a reconstruction of the events (yer gösterme). According to the record drafted by police officers and signed by the applicant, the latter described in detail what steps he had taken before the attack on a prison vehicle in Adana and indicated how he had opened fire on that vehicle. 7. On the same day, he was taken to the Dörtyol police station for questioning. The questioning took place between 8.10 p.m. and 11.50 p.m. the same day and 10 a.m. and 3.45 p.m. the following day. The applicant’s statements to the police were transcribed on pre-printed forms, the relevant part of which was filled in to indicate, inter alia, that the applicant was suspected of membership of an illegal organisation and of carrying out armed activities on behalf of that organisation. On the first page of the forms there was a pre-printed message stating, inter alia, that the person being questioned had the right to remain silent and the right to choose a lawyer. It appears from the form that the applicant had refused legal assistance since the first page of the record includes a pre-printed phrase stating “No lawyer sought” with the applicant’s signature underneath. He was thus questioned in the absence of a lawyer. 8. In his statement, the applicant admitted that he was a member of the PKK/KADEK and that he was active in the organisation. In particular, he gave detailed information about, inter alia, an armed attack on a prison vehicle in Adana. He also stated that his code name was “Hüseyin”. 9. On 23 November 2003 he was brought before the Dörtyol public prosecutor, where he partly confirmed and partly denied the content of his statements to the police made in the absence of a lawyer. Prior to this he had been told his rights, including the right to benefit from the assistance of a lawyer. He further stated that he was a member of the PKK/KADEK and had been involved in some of its activities in northern Iraq but had not taken part in any political or armed activities in Turkey. 10. On the same day, an investigating judge of the Adana State Security Court took statements from the applicant. Prior to the interview, the applicant was informed of his rights under Article 135 of the former Code of Criminal Procedure. He did not ask for a lawyer. During the interview, the applicant stated that his statements made to the police and the public prosecutor had been correct. He maintained, in particular, that his statements made to the police in respect of the armed attack in Adana had been entirely correct. The court ordered the applicant’s pre-trial detention. 11. During the applicant’s period in custody, specifically from 19 to 23 November 2003, he was examined six times by doctors. The medical examinations conducted before and at the end of his custody period revealed no signs of ill-treatment on his body. 12. Prior to the applicant’s arrest, on 27 October 2003, a certain H.K., who was a co-accused, had claimed during questioning that he had organised the armed attack, acting with someone whose code name was “Hüseyin”. Later, at the first court hearing, he retracted his statements to the police, alleging that they had been extracted under duress. 13. On 23 December 2003 the Adana public prosecutor lodged an indictment, charging the applicant with the offence of breaking up the unity of the State and seeking to remove part of the national territory from the State’s control, under Article 125 of the former Criminal Code. 14. On 16 March 2004, at the first hearing in the case, the applicant retracted his statements made to the police, the public prosecutor and the investigating judge, alleging that they had been obtained through coercion and death threats by the police. He admitted that he was a member of the PKK/KADEK while denying involvement in the armed attack in Adana. When asked about the reports of the reconstruction of events, the applicant submitted that he had not accepted the evidence against him. 15. State Security Courts were abolished on 16 June 2004 pursuant to Law no. 5190. The case was therefore transferred to the Adana Assize Court. 16. On 10 February 2005 the applicant’s lawyer applied to the court to have a certain F.Y. summoned as a witness and to hold a confrontation with the applicant, as F.Y. had stated in his witness statements dated 16 October 2003 that he had seen the perpetrators of the attack. He also asked the court to enquire of the banks as to whether there had been any money transferred between the applicant’s father and H.K. The court dismissed the application concerning the attendance of a witness, on the grounds that the witness would not remember the incidents given the long time which had elapsed and that he would not tell the truth owing to the nature of the incident. It further dismissed the other request concerning the transfer of money, considering it not to be essential for the purposes of the case. 17. On 11 December 2005 the applicant sent a letter to the trial court in which he explained the threats and coercion he had been subjected to in detail and asked the court not to take his co-accused’s statements into consideration. 18. On 22 December 2005 the Adana Assize Court convicted the applicant as charged. 19. On 28 December 2005 the applicant’s lawyer appealed against that judgment and alleged, inter alia, that the applicant’s statements had been taken without notifying him of his rights and as a result of coercion and death threats by the police. The applicant’s lawyer gave detailed accounts of such treatment and asked the Court of Cassation not to rely on these statements which had been obtained by impairing the applicant’s will. 20. On 12 October 2006 the Court of Cassation quashed the conviction for procedural shortcomings. 21. At a hearing on 22 June 2007, the applicant’s lawyer once again maintained that the applicant’s confessions had taken by coercion and that the applicant had been forced by the police to sign his statements. He asked the trial court not to rely on those statements. At the same hearing, the first-instance court again convicted the applicant under Article 125 of the Criminal Code then in force, and sentenced him to life imprisonment. It relied, inter alia, on the consistent confessions of the applicant and H.K. made during questioning, which were later repeated before the public prosecutor and the investigating judge, and the record of the reconstruction of events. It also took into account the weapons, bullets and explosives seized by the judicial authorities and the organisational documents as well as the incident report, hotel records, an autopsy and expert reports, photographs, witness statements and investigation reports. The trial court’s reasoned judgment did not contain any pronouncements as regards the admissibility of the applicant’s pre-trial statements. 22. On the same day, the applicant’s lawyer appealed against that judgment and alleged, inter alia, that the applicant’s statements had been taken without notifying him of his rights and as a result of coercion and death threats by the police. The applicant’s lawyer gave detailed accounts of such treatment and asked the Court of Cassation not to rely on these statements which had been obtained by impairing the applicant’s will. 23. On 12 February 2009 the Court of Cassation upheld the conviction. 24. On 18 February 2009 the judgment was pronounced in the absence of the applicant and his lawyer.

4. The applicants were born in 1947 and 1950, respectively. The first applicant, Mr Kryukov, lives in Kolpashevo, the Tomsk Region. The second applicant, Mr Lantsev, died on 28 October 2007. On 10 March 2008 his widow, Ms Raisa Pavlovna Lantseva, stated her wish to pursue the complaint of her late husband before the Court. 5. On 30 June 1997 the applicants were dismissed from work on the grounds of redundancy. 6. On 17 July 1997 the applicants sued their former employer for reinstatement, salary arrears and compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 7. On 10 September 1997 the Kolpashevo Town Court of the Tomsk Region dismissed the applicants’ claims in full. 8. On 17 October 1997 the aforesaid judgment was quashed further to the applicants’ appeal by the Tomsk Regional Court and the case was remitted for fresh examination. 9. On 16, 20 and 22 January 1998 the applicants amended their claims. 10. On 18 March 1998 the hearing was adjourned until 20 April 1998 at the defendant’s request in view of its representative’s health condition. 11. On 23 April 1998 the Town Court allowed the applicants’ claims in part. 12. On 8 September 1998 the Regional Court upheld the judgment in part but remitted the claim for salary arrears for a fresh examination. 13. On 25 November and 8 December 1998 the hearings were adjourned at the applicants’ request. 14. On 15 December 1998 the applicants further amended their claims and asked for a forensic accountant to be appointed. The proceedings were adjourned until 11 February 1999 to allow the accountant to prepare his report. 15. On 11 February 1999 the applicants lodged a new claim. 16. By the judgment of 11 February 1999 the Town Court partly allowed the applicants’ claims. 17. On 23 April 1999 the Regional Court quashed the first-instance judgment and remitted the case for fresh examination. 18. On 26 August and 30 November 1999 the hearings were adjourned. 19. On 13 January 2000 the applicants amended their claims. 20. On 14 January 2000 the applicants’ claims were satisfied in part by the Town Court. 21. On 15 February 2000 the judgment was upheld on appeal by the Regional Court. 22. On 13 March 2002 the Presidium of the Tomsk Regional Court, by way of supervisory review, quashed judgments of 14 January and 15 February 2000 and remitted the case for fresh consideration. 23. The hearings of 10 April, 20 August and 10 October 2002 were adjourned. 24. On 23 May 2002 the hearing was adjourned until 30 July 2002 for collecting additional evidence, on 1 November 2002 - for obtaining a graphologist’s report, and on 26 May 2003 – for taking further evidence from the defendant. 25. On 31 July and 31 October 2002 and 27 May 2003 the applicants lodged new claims. 26. On 4 June 2003 the proceedings were stayed as the defendant company was in the process of reorganisation which lasted until 19 July 2004. 27. By judgment of 1 October 2004, the Town Court granted the applicants’ claims in part. 28. On 14 December 2004 the Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal.

5. The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Novi Pazar. 6. She was employed by DP “Raška Holding Kompanija” AD, a socially-owned company based in Novi Pazar (hereinafter “the debtor”). 7. On 30 June 2004, 25 September 2009 and 21 December 2009 respectively, the Novi Pazar Municipal Court ordered the debtor to pay the applicant certain amounts on account of salary arrears and social insurance contributions, plus the costs of the civil proceedings. These judgments became final on 15 September 2004, 20 October 2009 and 5 October 2010 respectively. 8. On 5 October 2004 and 11 July 2011 respectively, upon the applicant’s request to that effect, the Novi Pazar Municipal Court ordered the enforcement of the said judgments; it further ordered the debtor to pay the applicant the enforcement costs. 9. On 11 September 2013 the Kraljevo Commercial Court opened preliminary insolvency proceedings against the debtor. 10. On 25 October 2013 the same court opened insolvency proceedings against the debtor. 11. The insolvency proceedings are still ongoing.

6. The applicant was born in 1987 and lives in Helsinki, Finland. 7. On 19 February 2007 the Harju County Court in Estonia convicted the applicant of murder. In the criminal proceedings T. was heard as a witness. In its judgment the domestic court dismissed the applicant’s argument that he had shot the victim in self-defence. The applicant was subsequently transferred to Finland to serve his prison sentence. 8. On 11 December 2008 V., the owner of the apartment where the applicant had committed the crime brought a civil action against the applicant before the Harju County Court. He claimed compensation for damage caused as a consequence of the offence (damaged chair which had been hit by the bullet, damaged or lost belongings (mostly various items used to wrap parts of the victim’s cut up body), damaged flooring after the police had cut out a piece of parquet with a bullet mark to serve as evidence, a lock cylinder removed for evidence, cleaning bills, unpaid utility bills) in the amount of 28,259 kroons (EEK) (corresponding to approximately 1,806 euros (EUR)). The plaintiff submitted to the court documentary evidence (material from the criminal case, photos, invoices, inventory list of the apartment attached to the contract between V. and the victim) in support of his claims. 9. On 14 January 2009 the County Court ruled that the action was accepted for proceedings and that the case was to be dealt with in simplified proceedings (lihtsustatud menetlus) under Article 405 § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) (Tsiviilkohtumenetluse seadustik). It also explained to the parties that if they wished to be heard, they would have to notify the court within fifteen days of the date of receiving the decision. The applicant was asked to provide the court with a written reply to the action. 10. On 8 April 2009 the applicant informed the County Court in writing that he did not object to accepting the action for proceedings but he contested the claim, arguing that he had not damaged or destroyed the items in question. He further contended that he had not committed murder but had shot the victim in self-defence; in so far as the alleged damage related to the collection of evidence, it had been caused by the police; the claims were unsubstantiated in part. He requested examination of the case at a court hearing and asked that he and two witnesses (T. and K. – Estonian and Finnish forensic experts) be summoned and questioned in court. He stated that he wished to explain that he had not caused the damage and had acted in self-defence. As to the witnesses, he also wished them to give evidence about his acting in self-defence. 11. On 7 May 2009 plaintiff V. replied in writing to the applicant’s submissions, stating that he did not deem it necessary for the applicant to be present in person at the court hearing. He asked the court to dismiss the applicant’s request for the summoning of witnesses, as these individuals would be unable to give testimony about the items in the apartment or their value, and their statements could not refute the findings of a final court decision. He also submitted additional evidence to the court (a photo of one of the items in question; a bank statement about the payment of utility bills; price lists to prove the cost of another damaged item and the cost of cleaning services). 12. On 8 July 2010 the County Court ruled that the case was to be examined in written proceedings (kirjalik menetlus) under Article 404 of the CCP. The court noted the plaintiff’s agreement to the case being examined in written proceedings and that the applicant wished to be heard. It then went on to explain that under Article 404 of the CCP a written procedure could be applied when the amount of the claim was under 50,000 kroons (EUR 3,196) and a party’s appearance in court was significantly hindered by a long distance or for any other good reason. It gave the parties a thirty‑day time-limit from the date of receipt of the decision for making any written submissions. No appeal lay against this decision. 13. No submissions were made to the court within the thirty-day time limit. 14. By a judgment of 3 December 2010 the County Court adjudicated the case in simplified and written proceedings. The court noted in its judgment that it had also examined the material pertinent to the related criminal case and relied as documentary evidence on the statements made by T. in the criminal proceedings. Relying on the judgment in the criminal case, the County Court considered it established that the applicant had not acted in self-defence when he killed the victim. Based on the material of the criminal case as well as documentary evidence submitted by V., the County Court accepted V.’s claim in part, that is in the amount of EEK 22,337 (EUR 1,428, which amounted to 79% of the initial claim). The court found on the basis of the applicant’s submissions that accepting the claim was not justified in so far as it concerned the lock cylinder, unpaid utility bills and certain allegedly damaged items. It was noted in the judgment that an appeal lay to the Tallinn Court of Appeal and that the appeal could be examined in a written procedure unless examination at a court hearing had been requested in the appeal. 15. On 22 December 2010 the applicant filed an appeal against the County Court’s judgment. He complained that, although he had requested an oral hearing before the County Court, no hearing had been held. He had therefore been deprived of an opportunity to be examined and to explain his position, according to which he had caused no unlawful damage to the plaintiff’s property. He relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and also referred to persons whose examination he had requested. He challenged the County Court’s reliance on the criminal court’s judgment and claimed that in a civil case it should be possible to challenge facts established in a criminal case. 16. On 7 January 2011 the Tallinn Court of Appeal refused to accept the applicant’s appeal. It noted that the County Court had examined the case in simplified proceedings (lihtmenetlus). In such circumstances, the Court of Appeal could only accept an appeal for examination if the County Court in its judgment had granted leave to appeal or a provision of substantive or procedural law had clearly been incorrectly applied or it was clear that the evidence had been wrongly assessed and this could have significantly influenced the court’s ruling. The County Court had not granted leave to appeal. The Court of Appeal did not find that in the case at hand it could be said that the County Court had clearly incorrectly applied a provision of substantive or procedural law or clearly wrongly assessed the evidence or breached the right to be heard (ärakuulamise õigus). The County Court had examined the matter under Article 405 § 1 of the CCP in simplified proceedings. Pursuant to Article 405 § 1 of the CCP, in such proceedings the court had to guarantee that the fundamental rights and freedoms and the essential procedural rights of the parties were observed and that the parties were heard (kohus kuulab menetlusosalise ära) if they so requested. However, for that it was not necessary for a court hearing (kohtuistung) to be conducted. On 8 July 2010 the County Court had ruled that the case was to be examined in written proceedings and had given the parties an opportunity to make written submissions. The applicant had thus been guaranteed an opportunity to present his position to the court. The Court of Appeal further noted that the applicant had not objected under Article 333 §§ 1 and 2 of the CCP to the County Court’s decision of 8 July 2010 whereby the court had ordered that the case be examined in simplified proceedings and requested the applicant to make his submissions in writing. Pursuant to Article 333 § 3 and Article 652 § 6 of the CCP (see paragraphs 19 and 20 below) the Court of Appeal could not therefore consider these arguments in the appellate proceedings. The Court of Appeal concluded that there was no legal basis for it to accept the applicant’s appeal for examination. 17. The applicant lodged an appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision, arguing that by refusing to allow him a hearing the County Court had clearly violated procedural law and Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. 18. On 30 May 2011 the Supreme Court decided not to examine the appeal.

5. The applicant was born in 1945 and lives in Bobadela. 6. In December 1993 the applicant became a patient of the gynaecology department of the Alfredo da Costa Maternity Hospital (since renamed the Central Lisbon Hospital – Centro Hospitalar de Lisboa Central, hereinafter “the CHLC”). 7. On 9 December 1993 the applicant was diagnosed with bartholinitis, a gynaecological disease, on the left side of her vagina (bartholinite à esquerda). She started treatment, which included drainages (drenagens). After each drainage the Bartholin gland would swell, causing the applicant considerable pain. She would thus require a second drainage and painkillers. 8. She was offered surgery for the condition during a consultation at the beginning of 1995. 9. On 21 May 1995 the applicant was admitted to the CHLC for a surgical procedure to remove the left Bartholin gland. On 22 May 1995 the applicant had both glands, on the left and right sides of the vagina, removed. 10. On an unknown date after being discharged, the applicant began to experience intense pain and a loss of sensation in the vagina. She also suffered from urinary incontinence, had difficulty sitting and walking, and could not have sexual relations. 11. On an unknown date the applicant was informed after being examined at a private clinic that the left pudendal nerve (nervo pudenda do lado esquerdo) had been injured during the operation. 12. On 26 April 2000 the applicant brought a civil action in the Lisbon Administrative Court (Tribunal Administrativo do Círculo de Lisboa) against the CHLC under the State Liability Act (ação de responsabilidade civil extracontratual por facto ilícito), seeking damages of 70,579,779 escudos (PTE), equivalent to 325,050,020 euros (EUR), of which PTE 50,000,000 (EUR 249,399) was in respect of non-pecuniary damage owing to the physical disability caused by the operation. 13. On 4 October 2013 the Lisbon Administrative Court ruled partly in favour of the applicant. It established, inter alia, the following facts: (i) that the applicant had suffered since 1995 from a physical deficiency which had given her an overall permanent degree of disability of 73% and that the disability had resulted from the left pudendal nerve being cut; (ii) after being discharged from hospital, the applicant had complained of pain associated with insensitivity in the part of the body which had been operated on and which had become swollen; (iii) the left pudendal nerve had been injured during the operation, which had caused the pain from which the applicant was suffering, the loss of sensitivity and the swelling in the vaginal area; (iv) the applicant had suffered from a decrease in vaginal sensitivity due to the partial lesion to the left pudendal nerve. 14. On the merits, the Lisbon Administrative Court found that the surgeon had acted recklessly by not fulfilling his objective duty of care, in breach of leges artis, and established that there was a causal link between his conduct and the injury to the applicant’s left pudendal nerve. The Lisbon Administrative Court also established that it was that injury which caused her, among other problems, the pain and loss of sensation in the vagina and urinary incontinence. As a consequence, she had difficulty walking, sitting and having sexual relations, which, all together, made her feel diminished as a woman. Consequently, the applicant was also depressed, had suicidal thoughts and avoided contact with members of her family and friends. For those reasons the Lisbon Administrative Court considered that the applicant should be awarded EUR 80,000 in compensation for non-pecuniary damage. In respect of pecuniary damage, the Lisbon Administrative Court awarded her EUR 92,000, of which EUR 16,000 was for the services of a maid the applicant had had to hire to help her with household tasks. 15. On an unknown date the CHLC appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court (Supremo Tribunal Administrativo) against the judgment of the Lisbon Administrative Court. The applicant lodged a counter-appeal (recurso subordinado), arguing that she should have received EUR 249,399 in compensation and that the CHLC’s appeal should be declared inadmissible. An opinion from the Attorney General’s Office attached to the Supreme Administrative Court (Procuradora Geral Adjunta junto do Supremo Tribunal Administrativo) stated that the CHLC’s appeal should be dismissed because it had been established that there had been a violation of leges artis. As a consequence, the various requirements of the obligation to pay compensation had been verified and the first-instance court had decided on compensation in an equitable and proper way. 16. On 9 October 2014 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the first-instance judgment on the merits but reduced, inter alia, the amount that had been awarded for the services of the maid from EUR 16,000 to EUR 6,000 and the compensation for non-pecuniary damage from EUR 80,000 to EUR 50,000. The relevant part of the judgment on those points reads as follows: “... with respect to damages related to the charges for the maid ... [the plaintiff] could not show the amount paid under that head. Also ... we consider that the award of EUR 16,000 under that head is manifestly excessive. Indeed, (1) it has not been established that the plaintiff had lost her capacity to take care of domestic tasks, (2) professional activity outside the home is one thing while domestic work is another, and (3) considering the age of her children, she [the plaintiff] probably only needed to take care of her husband; this leads us to the conclusion that she did not need to hire a full-time maid ... Lastly, as regards non-pecuniary damage, it is important to set an amount which compensates the plaintiff for her pain and loss of sensation and swelling in the vaginal area, and for the difficulty sitting and walking, which causes her distress and prevents her from going about her everyday life, forcing her to use sanitary towels on a daily basis to conceal urinary and faecal incontinence and which has limited her sexual activity, making her feel diminished as a woman. In addition, there is no medical solution to her condition. All this has caused her severe depression, expressing itself in anxiety and somatic symptoms manifested in the difficulty she has sleeping, deep disgust and frustration with the situation in which she finds herself, which has turned her into a very unhappy person and which inhibits her from establishing relationships with others and has caused her to stop visiting family and friends, from going to the beach and theatre and which has given her suicidal thoughts. It should be noted, however, that the plaintiff has been suffering from the gynaecological condition for a long time (at least since 1993) and that she had already undergone various kinds of treatment without any acceptable result and that it was that lack of results and the impossibility of curing the condition otherwise that was the motivation for surgery. She had already had unbearable pain and symptoms of depression before [surgery]. This means that the plaintiff’s complaints are not new and that the surgical procedure only aggravated an already difficult situation, a fact which cannot be ignored when setting the amount of compensation. Additionally, it should not be forgotten that at the time of the operation the plaintiff was already 50 years old and had two children, that is, an age when sex is not as important as in younger years, its significance diminishing with age. Thus, having regard to all those aspects, we believe that the compensation awarded at first instance exceeded what could be considered reasonable and, as such, the plaintiff should be awarded EUR 50,000 in compensation [in respect of non-pecuniary damage].” 17. On 29 October 2014 the Attorney General’s Office attached to the Supreme Administrative Court applied to the Supreme Administrative Court to have the judgment of 9 October 2014 declared null and void (nulidade do acórdão) in the part concerning the amount awarded for non-pecuniary damage. It argued that the reasoning in the judgment and the decision on the amount of compensation were contradictory. It further submitted that the compensation award should not have taken account of the applicant’s symptoms before the medical intervention, as if only a worsening of those symptoms had been at stake. The relevant parts of the application read as follows: “... III – In the instant case, we are dealing with surgical intervention which aimed exclusively at extracting the Bartholin glands. ... During that surgical procedure the left pudendal nerve was partly damaged. The pudendal nerve ... is a different organ from the one which was the object of the surgical intervention. Following the extraction of the glands the plaintiff suffered damage which was considered as being established and which specifically arose from the lesion in question. IV- In view of the factual basis of the judgment and having regard to the fact that ‘in the absence of unlikely and unexpected occurrences doctors would have cured the plaintiff’s illness and she could have returned to her normal life’, the decision setting the amount of compensation for non-pecuniary damage should not have taken account of the plaintiff’s pain and symptoms of depression prior to the surgical intervention as if they had worsened. That is because, according to the judgment, they would have disappeared once the Bartholin glands had been removed and the plaintiff’s condition cured by surgery. V – The reasoning in the judgment leads logically to a different decision. That would be to set compensation for non-pecuniary damage on the basis of the fact that the plaintiff would have been cured if the pudendal nerve had not been injured.” 18. On 4 November 2014 the applicant applied to the Supreme Administrative Court to join the Attorney General’s appeal of 29 October 2014, arguing that the judgment of 9 October 2014 should be declared null and void in the part concerning the amount of non-pecuniary damage she had been awarded. 19. On 29 January 2015 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the appeals by the Attorney General’s Office and the applicant and upheld its judgment of 9 October 2014. It considered that the causal link between the injury to the pudendal nerve and the alleged damage had been established. However, that injury had not been the only cause of damage to the applicant. In the opinion of the judges of the Supreme Administrative Court, the applicant’s health problems prior to the operation, and her gynaecological and psychological symptoms in particular, could not be ignored and had been aggravated by the procedure.

5. The applicant was born in 1987 and lives in Nizhniy Novgorod. 6. The applicant and two minors (Z. and S.) were suspected to be implicated in several car thefts. 7. On 23 August 2007 the Leninskiy District Court of Nizhniy Novgorod (“the District Court”) authorised the applicant’s detention on remand in connection with the car thefts, referring to the gravity of the charges and an unspecified risk that she would put pressure on minors S. and Z. The judge concluded that the applicant could obstruct the proceedings. Z. was also detained on 28 August 2007. 8. On 5 September 2007 the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Court upheld the detention order on appeal. 9. On 13 September 2007 the investigator ordered a psychiatric examination of the applicant to verify whether she was fit to stand trial. On 8 October 2007 the experts found that the applicant suffered from a mental deficiency. The experts concluded that her mental conditions did not exclude a criminal liability and that she did not require any compulsory psychiatric treatment. 10. The District Court, referring to the need to complete the investigation “in the absence of grounds for varying or cancelling the measure of restraint”, issued further detention orders extending the term of the applicant’s pre-trial detention on 18 October and 14 December 2007, and on 15 January 2008. 11. In February 2008 the criminal case against the applicant and her co‑defendants was submitted for trial before the District Court. 12. On 18 February 2008 the District Court, noting that the applicant had been charged with a serious crime and could exercise pressure on the minor co-defendants if at liberty, decided to maintain her in custody until 1 August 2008. 13. On 11 July 2008 the judge ordered the applicant’s and Z.’s release, concluding that there was no longer necessary to maintain them in custody, given that they had made admissions and that the applicant was unlikely to put any pressure on her co-defendants. 14. By judgment of 1 September 2008, the applicant was convicted on several charges and acquitted of the remainder, in particular, of the charges pertaining to involvement of minors in criminal activities. She was sentenced to a suspended prison term. 15. On 23 August 2007 the applicant was placed in remand prison IZ‑52/1 in Nizhniy Novgorod. She was kept in cell no. 7/56 measuring 66 square metres. According to the applicant, the cell accommodated up to forty persons. In the Government’s submission, twenty-seven to thirty-five inmates shared the cell during that period. 16. On 20 December 2007 the applicant was transferred to cell no. 30/349 measuring 12.14 square metres, which she shared with another detainee. 17. In December 2007 the Committee Against Torture retained Ms P., an advocate, who visited the applicant in the remand centre on 27 December 2007 and 21 February 2008. The applicant explained to the advocate that a certain “Olga”, a prison staff member, asked her about her complaint to the Court and told her to make written statements indicating that she “had no claims against the remand centre”. 18. In the meantime, on 8 February 2008 Mr Ryzhov, the applicant’s representative before the Court, sought a permission to see the applicant in the remand centre in order to obtain further details concerning the conditions of her detention. The applicant’s representative showed a simple authority form signed by the applicant and authorising him to represent her before the Court. 19. On 28 February 2008 the administration of the remand centre informed the representative that such permission could be granted by the District Court dealing the criminal case against the applicant. 20. Instead of applying for a court order, the applicant’s representative sought judicial review of the above refusal. By decision of 25 March 2008 the Sovetskiy District Court of Nizhniy Novgorod confirmed the above refusal considering that the applicant’s representative had not been vested with any authority to represent the applicant in the judicial review proceedings because he had not had an “advocate” status, as required by the Civil Code or the Code of Civil Procedure; a copy of the authority form concerning the proceedings before the Court had not been duly attested. 21. On 6 May 2008 the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Court upheld the Sovetskiy District Court’s decision on appeal.

5. The applicant was born in 1949 and lives in Torre del Greco. 6. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, can be summarised as follows. 7. In January 1990, a few years after she had applied to the Interior Ministry for a disability pension, Ms T.G., the applicant’s mother, was granted an entitlement to the monthly payment of the pension together with a special allowance on account of her partial blindness. 8. On 21 October 1994 Ms T.G. filed an application with Torre Annunziata District Court (pretore), sitting as an employment tribunal, to obtain acknowledgment of a re-evaluation of her pension and interest on the arrears. 9. On 27 March 1998, after the hearing had been adjourned three times, the District Court dismissed the application as out of time. On 24 September 1998 Ms T.G. died. 10. On 10 March 1999, the applicant, lodged an appeal against that decision, on her own behalf and in her capacity as heir, in Naples District Court. 11. On 10 December 2002 that court acknowledged the applicant’s right to the recalculated sum and interest for a total of EUR 12,240.26. The decision became final on 25 January 2004. 12. As the decision was not enforced by the relevant authorities, on 14 June 2004 the applicant served a payment order (atto di precetto) on the National Social Security Agency (Istituto Nazionale della Previdenza Sociale – INPS) for EUR 30,364.38, representing the sum claimed, with interest and taking account of the re-evaluation. 13. On 25 January 2005 she obtained a garnishee order (pignoramento presso terzi) from the Naples enforcement judge in respect of her whole claim. 14. On 25 May 2005 the applicant lodged an appeal with the “Pinto” Division of the Rome Court of Appeal, complaining about the excessive length of the proceedings. With regard to the admissibility of her appeal, she argued that, under section 4 of Law no. 89/2001 (the “Pinto Act”), the “final domestic decision” to be taken into account was that of the enforcement judge of 25 January 2005. In consequence, she argued, the six-month deadline for lodging the claim for just satisfaction ought to run from that date. 15. On 18 May 2006 the Court of Appeal declared the appeal inadmissible as out of time, taking the view that the final domestic decision to be taken into consideration was that delivered by the Naples District Court in the proceedings on the merits, a decision which had become final on 25 January 2004. 16. The Court of Cassation upheld that decision on 25 September 2008 and dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law.

8. The applicant is a Moldovan national belonging to the German ethnic minority. He was born in 1978 and lived in Tiraspol until 2010. Since 2011 he has been an asylum-seeker in Switzerland. 9. The Moldovan Government submitted that despite all their efforts they had been unable to verify most of the facts of the present case owing to a lack of cooperation on the part of the authorities of the self-proclaimed “Moldavian Republic of Transdniestria” (the “MRT”). They had therefore proceeded, broadly speaking, on the basis of the facts as submitted by the applicant. 10. The Russian Government did not make any submissions in respect of the facts of the case. 11. The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant and as may be determined from the documents in the case file, are summarised below. 12. The background to the case, including the Transdniestrian armed conflict of 1991-92 and the subsequent events, is set out in Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia ([GC], no. 48787/99, §§ 28-185, ECHR 2004‑VII) and Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia ([GC], nos. 43370/04 and 2 others, §§ 8-42, ECHR 2012). 13. On 24 November 2008 the applicant was detained on suspicion of defrauding the company he worked for and another company belonging to the same group. The companies allegedly claimed initially that the damage had been 40,000 United States dollars (USD) and then increased that amount to USD 85,000. The applicant was asked to confess to the crime, which he claims he did not commit. He signed various confessions, allegedly following threats to him and his relatives. He claimed to have first been detained by his company’s security personnel and subjected to threats if he did not confess to the crime, before being handed over to the investigating authority. 14. On 26 November 2008 the “Tiraspol People’s Court” remanded the applicant in custody for an undetermined period. 15. On 5 December 2008 the “MRT Supreme Court” rejected an appeal by the applicant’s lawyer as unfounded. Neither the applicant nor his lawyer was present at the hearing. 16. On 20 March 2009 the “Tiraspol People’s Court” extended the applicant’s detention for up to five months from the date of his arrest. 17. On 21 May 2009 the “Tiraspol People’s Court” extended the applicant’s detention for up to eight months from the date of his arrest. That decision was upheld by the “MRT Supreme Court” on 29 May 2009. Neither the applicant nor his lawyer was present at the hearing. 18. On 22 July 2009 the “Tiraspol People’s Court” extended the applicant’s detention until 24 September 2009. 19. On 22 September 2009 the “Tiraspol People’s Court” extended the applicant’s detention until 24 November 2009. That decision was upheld by the “MRT Supreme Court” on 2 October 2009. The applicant’s lawyer was present at the hearing. 20. On 4 November 2009 the applicant’s criminal case was submitted to the trial court. 21. On 21 April 2010 the applicant’s detention was extended again until 4 August 2010. 22. On 1 July 2010 the “Tiraspol People’s Court” convicted the applicant under Article 158-1 of the “MRT Criminal Code” of defrauding two companies, and sentenced him to seven years’ imprisonment, suspended for five years. It ordered the confiscation of the money in his and his girlfriend’s bank accounts and of his personal car, which totalled the equivalent of approximately USD 16,000, and additionally ordered him to pay the two companies the equivalent of approximately USD 26,400. It also released him subject to an undertaking not to leave the city. No appeal was lodged against that decision. According to the applicant, in order to pay a part of the damages his parents sold his flat and paid USD 40,000 to the companies. 23. On an unknown date shortly after 1 July 2010 the applicant left for treatment in Chișinău. In 2011 he arrived in Switzerland. 24. On 25 January 2013 the “Tiraspol People’s Court” amended the judgment in the light of certain changes to the “MRT Criminal Code” providing for a more lenient punishment for the crime of which the applicant had been convicted. He was thus sentenced to six years and six months’ imprisonment, suspended for a period of five years. 25. By a final decision of 15 February 2013, the same court replaced the suspended sentence owing to the applicant’s failure to appear before the probation authorities, and ordered that the prison sentence be served in full. 26. Following a request from the applicant’s lawyer of 12 October 2012, on 22 January 2013 the Supreme Court of Justice of the Republic of Moldova quashed the judgment of the “Tiraspol People’s Court” of 1 July 2010. With reference to Articles 114 and 115 of the Constitution and section 1 of the Law on the status of judges (see paragraphs 69-70 below), the court found that the courts established in the “MRT” had not been created in accordance with the Moldovan legislation and could not therefore lawfully convict the applicant. It ordered the materials in the criminal file to be forwarded to the prosecutor’s office with a view to prosecuting the persons responsible for the applicant’s detention and also to determining whether the applicant had breached the rights of other persons. 27. On 31 May 2013 the Prosecutor General’s Office of the Republic of Moldova informed the applicant’s lawyer that it had initiated a criminal investigation into his unlawful detention. Within that investigation, “all possible procedural measures and actions [were] planned and carried out”. No further progress could be achieved owing to the impossibility of carrying out procedural steps on the territory of the self-proclaimed “MRT”. 28. The applicant’s medical condition (bronchial asthma, an illness which he has had since childhood) worsened while in prison, and he suffered several asthma attacks. He was often moved from one temporary detention facility (IVS) to another (such as the IVS at Tiraspol police headquarters and the IVS in Slobozia, as well as colony no. 3 in Tiraspol and the IVS in Hlinaia), all of which allegedly provided inadequate conditions of detention. 29. The applicant described the conditions at Tiraspol police headquarters as follows. There was high humidity, no working ventilation and a lack of access to natural light (since the detention facility was in the basement of the building), while the windows were covered with metal sheets with small holes in them. The cell was overcrowded (he was held in a 15 sq. m cell together with twelve other people). They had to take turns to sleep on the single large wooden platform, which was not covered. The applicant was allowed fifteen minutes of exercise daily, spending the remainder of the time in the cell. Many of the detainees smoked in the cell, which contributed to his asthma attacks. The metal truck he was transported in when being brought before the investigator was suffocating, and he was placed in a cell without a toilet for hours on end (while waiting to be interviewed by the investigator) and suffered numerous asthma attacks. Laundry could only be done in the cells, where wet clothes would also be hung out to dry. The food was scarce and inedible. The cells were full of parasites. There were no hygiene products except for those brought in by detainees’ relatives. For several months the applicant was detained in a cell which became very hot in summer, causing him to suffer more asthma attacks. 30. The applicant described in a similar manner the conditions of his detention in the Slobozia detention facility, where there were no hygiene products at all, he was transported in a crammed and unventilated truck, and was fully reliant on his parents for any sort of medication. 31. As for colony no. 3 in Tiraspol, the applicant again noted the insufficient medical treatment, overcrowding (with one hour’s exercise per day, the remaining time being spent in the cell) and a lack of ventilation coupled with the heavy smoking of his cellmates. The food was inedible, full of worms and made from rotten produce. In the winter the heating was on for only a few hours a day and, as at the Tiraspol police headquarters, the detainees were allowed to shower only once a week (all the detainees in his cell had a combined total of twenty minutes in which to take a shower with cold water). 32. In the IVS in Hlinaia the applicant was again placed in an overcrowded cell and received virtually no medical assistance. 33. During his detention the applicant often complained about his medical condition and asked for medical assistance. His parents requested on many occasions that their son be seen by a lung specialist. On 12 March 2009 he was eventually seen and various tests were carried out. He was diagnosed with unstable bronchial asthma and prescribed treatment. 34. In May 2009 the applicant was transferred to the Medical Assistance and Social Rehabilitation Centre of the “MRT Ministry of Justice” (“the Centre”). Doctors there confirmed his previous diagnosis and the fact that he suffered frequent asthma attacks and had second and third degree respiratory insufficiency, and that his medical condition was continuing to get worse. On 7 May 2009 the Centre informed the applicant’s relatives that it had neither a lung specialist nor the required laboratory equipment to treat the applicant properly. The doctors added that he needed to be transferred to the respiratory medicine department of the Republican Clinical Hospital, but that this would be impossible to arrange because the hospital was short‑staffed and had no one to guard the applicant during his stay. 35. On an unknown date in 2009 the applicant’s mother asked for the applicant to be transferred to a specialist hospital, as bronchial asthma was one of the illnesses listed by the “MRT Ministry of the Interior” as a reason warranting a transfer to hospital. In its reply of 1 June 2009, the “MRT Ministry of the Interior” informed her that only convicted prisoners could be transferred to hospital on those grounds. 36. On 21 September 2009 the Centre informed the applicant’s parents that since May 2009 their son had continued to be treated on an in-patient basis, but that his medical condition was continuing to get worse, with no visible improvement as a result of treatment. 37. On 15 February 2010 a medical panel composed of four senior “MRT” doctors established as follows. “Despite the repeated treatment given, the respiratory dysfunction continues to increase and treatment is having no noticeable effect. A continuing downward trend is observed, with an increase in the frequency of asthma attacks and difficulty in stopping them.” In addition to the initial diagnosis of bronchial asthma and respiratory insufficiency, the panel found that the applicant had second degree post‑traumatic encephalopathy. It concluded that “[t]he [applicant’s] life expectancy/prognosis is not favourable. His continued detention in the conditions of [pre-trial detention centres] appears problematic owing to the absence of laboratory equipment and specially qualified medical staff at [the Centre] for the purposes of carrying out the required treatment and its monitoring.” 38. Despite the panel’s findings, the applicant was transferred on the same day to the IVS in Hlinaia, which, as stated by the applicant and not contradicted by the respondent Governments, was less well equipped than the Centre. On 16 February 2010 the applicant’s mother was allowed to see him. He told her about his poor conditions of detention (lack of ventilation, heavy smoking by detainees, overcrowding) and said that he had already had two asthma attacks that day. The applicant’s mother was told by the prison staff that she had to bring her son the medication he required since there was none available in the prison. 39. On 18 February 2010 the applicant’s mother asked the “MRT President” for the applicant to be transferred as a matter of urgency to a specialist hospital and for his release from detention pending trial in order to obtain the treatment he required. On 20 February 2010 she received a reply saying that her complaint had not disclosed any breach of the law. 40. On an unknown date after 18 February 2010, the applicant was transferred to Prison no. 1 in Tiraspol. On 17 March 2010 he was again admitted to the Centre for in-patient treatment. 41. In a letter to the applicant’s lawyer of 11 June 2010, the Centre’s director stated that, in addition to the applicant’s main diagnosis of asthma, he was also found to have terminal respiratory insufficiency, symptoms of a head injury with localised areas of brain damage, the first signs of hypertonic disease, an allergy in his lungs making treatment and the ability to stop his asthma attacks more difficult, post-traumatic encephalopathy, arterial hypertension, toxoplasmosis, giardiasis (a parasite), chronic gastroduodenitis, pancreatitis and pyelonephritis. His prognosis was worsening. 42. In a number of replies to complaints by the applicant’s parents, the “MRT” authorities informed them that the applicant was seen regularly by various doctors. After his transfer from the Centre to the IVS in Hlinaia on 15 February 2010, his state of health had deteriorated and on 17 March 2010 he had been immediately transferred to the Centre for treatment. 43. According to the applicant, his state of health improved after his release and the treatment he received in Chișinău. However, because he feared re-arrest by “MRT militia”, he fled to Switzerland and applied for asylum there (see paragraph 23 above). 44. From November 2008 until May 2009 the applicant was not allowed to see his parents, despite repeated requests (for instance on 5 March and 13, 16 and 30 April 2009). The first authorised visit took place six months after the applicant’s arrest, on 4 May 2009. On 9 December 2009 a judge of the “Tiraspol People’s Court” refused to allow a further visit because examination of the case was pending. Another request for a visit was refused on 15 February 2010. On 16 February 2010 a visit was authorised, but the applicant and his mother had to talk to each other in the presence of a prison guard. They were not allowed to speak their own language (German) and were made to speak Russian or risk the guard calling off the visit. 45. In June and September 2009 pastor Per Bergene Holm from Norway attempted to visit the applicant at the latter’s request in order to provide him with religious services, including “listening to [the applicant’s] confession and giving him the sacraments”. He was denied access to the applicant, a refusal which he subsequently confirmed in a letter to the Court dated 29 September 2010. On 30 September 2009 an “MRT presidential adviser” acknowledged that there was no reason to refuse the pastor access and that such a refusal was incompatible with the “MRT Constitution and laws”. The pastor was finally allowed to see the applicant on 1 February 2010. As stated by the applicant and not disputed by the Governments, a guard remained in the room throughout the visit. 46. The applicant’s parents made several complaints to the Moldovan authorities and the Russian embassy in Moldova concerning their son’s situation. 47. On 12 October 2009 the Centre for Human Rights of Moldova (the Moldovan Ombudsman) replied that it had no means of monitoring the applicant’s case. 48. On 3 November 2009 the Moldovan Prosecutor General’s Office informed the applicant’s parents that it could not intervene owing to the political situation in the Transdniestrian region since 1992. It also referred to Moldova’s reservations in respect of its ability to ensure observance of the Convention in the eastern regions of Moldova. 49. A complaint made on an unknown date to the Russian embassy in Moldova was forwarded to the “MRT prosecutor’s office”. The latter replied on 1 February 2010, saying that the applicant’s case was pending before the “MRT courts”, which alone were competent to deal with any complaints after the case had been submitted to the trial court. On 10 February 2010 the Russian embassy forwarded that reply to the applicant’s mother. 50. The applicant also complained to the Joint Control Commission, a trilateral peacekeeping force operating in a demilitarised buffer zone on the border between Moldova and Transdniestria known as the “Security Area”. For further details, see Ilaşcu and Others (cited above, § 90). It is unclear whether he obtained any response. 51. After notice of the present application had been given to the respondent Governments, the Moldovan Deputy Prime Minister wrote on 9 March 2010 to the Russian, Ukrainian and US ambassadors to Moldova, as well as to the Council of Europe, the European Union and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), asking them to assist in securing the applicant’s rights. 52. On 16 July 2010 the applicant asked the Moldovan Prosecutor General’s Office to provide witness protection to him and his parents, since the “MRT militia” had been looking for him at his home in Tiraspol while he was in hospital in Chișinău. On the same day the applicant was officially recognised as a victim. However, on 19 July 2010 the Bender prosecutor’s office refused his request to be provided with witness protection, since it had not been established that his life or health were at risk. 53. On 6 August 2010, following a complaint by the applicant, the investigating judge of the Bender District Court in Moldova set aside the decision of 19 July 2010 on the grounds that the applicant had been unlawfully arrested and convicted and had had his property taken away from him. He ordered the Bender prosecutor’s office to provide witness protection to the applicant and his family. The parties did not inform the Court of any further developments in this regard. 54. The applicant submitted reports from various “MRT” media outlets. According to an article dated 13 April 2007 from Regnum, one of the leading Russian online news agencies at the relevant time, the Russian ambassador to Moldova had given a speech in Tiraspol the previous day in which he declared that Russia would continue its support for the “MRT” and would never give up its interests there. The diplomat added that “Russia has been here for more than a century. Our ancestors’ remains are buried here. A major part of our history is situated here”. 55. On 20 April 2007 the same news agency informed the public of a decision by the Russian Ministry of Finance to give the “MRT” USD 50 million in non-reimbursable aid, as well as USD 150 million in loans secured on “MRT” property. 56. In a news report dated 23 November 2006, the Regnum news agency reported a statement by the “MRT President” to the effect that each “MRT Ministry” was working on harmonising the legislation of the “MRT” with that of Russia, and that a group of representatives of “MRT Ministries” was to travel to Moscow within the next few days to discuss the matter. 57. According to the Moldovan Government, “the last and non-significant” withdrawal of armaments from the “MRT” to Russia took place on 25 March 2004. Almost twenty thousand tonnes of ammunition and military equipment are purportedly still stored on the territory controlled by the “MRT”. On 26 January 2011 Russian and Ukrainian officials were able to visit the Colbasna arms depot, while Moldovan officials were neither informed of nor invited to participate in the visit. 58. In February 2011 the Russian ambassador to Moldova declared, inter alia, in public speeches that since 2003, when Moldova had refused to sign a settlement agreement with the “MRT” (the so-called “Kozak Memorandum”), Russia had no longer been able to withdraw arms from the “MRT” owing to the latter’s resistance. 59. According to the Moldovan Government, Tiraspol Airport, which was officially closed down by the Russian authorities on 1 December 2005, continues to serve “MRT” military and civilian helicopters and aircraft. Russian military planes and helicopters are still parked there. Between 2004 and 2009, over eighty flights from that airport which were not authorised by the Moldovan authorities were recorded, some of which appear to have been bound for Russia. 60. According to the Moldovan Government, the “MRT” received a total of USD 20.64 million in Russian aid in 2011, in the form of either the waiving of debts for natural gas consumed or of non-refundable loans. During 2010 the “MRT” consumed natural gas from Russia to a value of USD 505 million. It paid the Russian company Gazprom USD 20 million, about 4% of the price for that gas. At the same time, the local population paid the “MRT” authorities approximately USD 163 million for gas in 2010, a sum which remained largely at the disposal of the “MRT”. II. RELEVANT REPORTS OF INTER-GOVERNMENTAL AND NON‑GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS 61. The relevant parts of the Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Manfred Nowak, concerning his visit to the Republic of Moldova from 4 to 11 July 2008 (UN Human Rights Council, 12 February 2009, UN Doc. A/HRC/10/44/Add.3), read as follows. “Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova ... 29. The Special Rapporteur also received information that in the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova transfers of prisoners are conducted by the police. Prisoners are packed on top of each other in a metal wagon with only one tiny window. In the summer the heat in the wagon becomes unbearable after a few minutes but they have to stay inside for hours. Different categories of prisoners are mixed during these transports (adults, minors, sick, including those with open tuberculosis), which puts the prisoners at risk of contamination with diseases. ... 45. According to several of his interlocutors, including detainees, progress has been made with improving conditions in the penitentiary system, e.g. functioning heating, food quality improved, HIV treatment in prisons commenced in September 2007. However, complaints about the poor quality and sometimes lack of food were common. The Special Rapporteur also received reports that international programmes are often not extended into the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova, which means less out-reach in terms of health care and problems in particular with regard to tuberculosis treatment and a higher percentage of persons sick with tuberculosis and HIV. 46. The Special Rapporteur is concerned that many human rights violations flow from the legislation in force, which, for instance, requires solitary confinement for persons sentenced to capital punishment and to life imprisonment and which prescribes draconic restrictions on contacts with the outside world. 47. Conditions in custody of the militia headquarters in Tiraspol were clearly in violation of minimum international standards. The Special Rapporteur considers that detention in the overcrowded cells with few sleeping facilities, almost no daylight and ventilation, 24 hours artificial light, restricted access to food and very poor sanitary facilities amounts to inhuman treatment.” 62. The relevant parts of the “Report on Human Rights in the Transnistrian Region of the Republic of Moldova” (by UN Senior Expert Thomas Hammarberg, 14 February 2013) read as follows. “... the de facto authorities in Transnistria have ... pledged unilaterally to respect some of the key international treaties, including the two UN Covenants on human rights, the European Convention on Human Rights and the Convention on the Rights of the Child.” (p. 4) “The changes of the role of the Prosecutor and the creation of the Investigation Committee would have an impact on the functioning of the judiciary as well. If correctly implemented, it would be clear that the Prosecutor would not have an oversight or supervisory role in relation to the functioning of the courts.” (p. 17) “The Expert was confronted with many and fairly consistent complaints against the functioning of the justice system. One was that the accusations in a number of cases were ‘fabricated’; that procedures were used to intimidate persons; that the defence lawyers were passive; that people with money or contacts had an upper-hand compared to ordinary people; and that witnesses changed their statements because of threats or bribery – and that such tendencies sabotaged the proceedings. It is very difficult for an outsider to assess the basis for such accusations but some factors made the Expert reluctant to ignore them. They were strikingly frequent and even alluded to by a few high level actors in the system.” (p. 18) “Comments Building a competent, non-corrupt and independent judiciary is a huge challenge in any system. However, it is an indispensable human right to have access to independent and impartial tribunals. The Transnistrian Constitution states that judges cannot be members of political parties or take part in political activities. It is as important that the judiciary avoids close relationships with big business or organized partisan interests. The procedures for the recruitment of judges should be impartial and reward professional skills and high moral standards. Corrupt behaviour and other breaches of trust should be investigated and punished through a credible and competent disciplinary mechanism. A reasonable salary level will also counter temptations of accepting bribes. The judge has a crucial role in protecting the principle of ‘equality of arms’. The Expert heard complaints that the defence in general was disadvantaged in comparison with the prosecution. Such perceptions undermine the credibility of the system and the sense of justice in general. The prestige of judges in society will of course depend largely on their competence, their knowledge of the laws and the case law as well as familiarity with problems in society. Update training is one way of meeting this need. Special training is needed for those judges involved in juvenile justice matters. The United Nations adopted a set of basic principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, which were unanimously endorsed by the General Assembly in [1985]. These principles, representing universally accepted views on this matter by the UN Member States, set out parameters to ensure independence and impartiality of the judges, condition of service and tenure, freedoms of expression and association and modalities for qualification, selection and trainings. [Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights] and the International Bar Association have jointly developed extensive guidance material on human rights in the administration of justice, which might also be used for the training of legal professionals working in the Transnistrian region. The Expert considers that an evaluation ought to be undertaken on the present situation with regard to minors in detention, including, inter alia, their length of stay, their individual background as well as efforts to assist their reintegration in society. Such survey could serve as a background to a review of the whole approach to juvenile crime. The Expert feels that there is an acute need to develop preventive programmes and alternatives to institutional punishment. ... The Expert was informed that there were, as of October 1, 2 858 inmates in these institutions, of whom 2 224 were convicted and 634 held on remand. This means that there are approximately 500 prisoners per every 100 000 persons, one of the highest figures in Europe. The number had gone down during 2012 from an even higher figure as a consequence of releases through reduction of sentences and pardons granted to a considerable number of prisoners. Furthermore, the Code of Criminal Procedure was amended in the autumn in order to reduce the number of persons kept on remand during investigations. Another amendment opened for alternatives to imprisonment, such as fines or controlled, non‑penitentiary community work, for the less serious crimes. Detention on remand When the Expert visited the remand facility in prison no. 3 in Tiraspol, there were 344 detainees kept there. Some were under investigation before trial. Others had been charged and were defendants at court proceedings. Still others had appealed a sentence in the first instance. None of these three categories had an unconditional right to receive visitors. The reason given was that visits might disturb the investigations. However, relatives may on request get permission from the investigator or the judge to pay a visit, though not in private. ... The Expert talked with inmates who had been kept on remand longer than 18 months. One woman who had appealed an original sentence had been detained for four years. Her two small children had been taken to a children’s home and she had not been able to see them for the entire period of her detention. The Expert was told that the total detention period before and during a trial could be as long as seven years. ... Penitentiary facilities in Tiraspol and Glinnoe The Expert visited the colony in Tiraspol (prison no. 2) in May and the one in Glinnoe (prison no. 1) in September. The former had at the time 1 187 inmates, of whom 170 were under strict special regime. The average sentence was 13 years, the Expert was told. Terms of 22-25 years are being served for murder, repeat offences and trafficking crimes. In Glinnoe, the Expert was told that there were 693 convicted prisoners; the number had gone down as a consequence of the recent revision of the Criminal Code. The Expert was told that the average sentence was 5 years though many prisoners had sentences of between 10 and 15 years. ... The possibility of visits by relatives was limited. In Tiraspol no. 2, the basic rule was to allow visits four times a year, two short and two longer. Phone calls were allowed for 15 minutes once a month – with supervision except for discussions with the lawyer. Both visits and phone calls could be reduced as a method of disciplinary sanction. Such measures were taken in cases of infringements such as possessing alcohol or having a mobile telephone. Disciplinary measures could also include solitary confinement of up to 15 days. ... Health situation in prisons Health service in the penitentiary institutions is also under the authority of the Transnistrian Ministry of Justice; doctors and nurses there are seen as part of the prison staff. The resources are limited and the Expert found the health situation, in particular in the Glinnoe prison, to be alarming and the care services substandard. There is limited communication with the civilian health system which results in low coverage with testing and treatment. ... Few human resources and limited capacities of existing medical personnel create barriers to enjoying access to quality medical services in penitentiaries. The standard of health care in the Glinnoe prison appeared to the Expert to be especially bad on all accounts, including on record keeping and preventive measures such as diet control. There, the complaints about the quality of the food were particularly bitter.” (pp. 19‑23) 63. In the report on its visit to Moldova between 21 and 27 July 2010 (CPT/Inf (2011) 8) the CPT stated that, following the refusal of the “MRT” authorities to allow members of the Committee to meet in private with detainees, the CPT had decided to call off its visit because a limitation of this kind ran counter to the fundamental characteristics of the prevention mechanism enshrined in its mandate. 64. The relevant parts of the report of the CPT on its visit to Moldova between 27 and 30 November 2000 (CPT/Inf (2002) 35) read as follows. “40. At the outset of the visit, the authorities of the Transnistrian region provided the delegation with detailed information on the five penitentiary establishments currently in service in the region. In the time available, the delegation was not in a position to make a thorough examination of the whole of the penitentiary system. However, it was able to make an assessment of the treatment of persons deprived of their liberty in Prison No. 1, at Glinoe, Colony No. 2, at Tiraspol, and the SIZO (i.e. pre-trial) section of Colony No. 3, again at Tiraspol. 41. As the authorities are certainly already aware, the situation in the establishments visited by the delegation leaves a great deal to be desired, in particular in Prison No. 1. The CPT will examine various specific areas of concern in subsequent sections of this report. However, at the outset, the Committee wishes to highlight what is perhaps the principal obstacle to progress, namely the high number of persons who are imprisoned and the resultant overcrowding. 42. According to the information provided by the authorities, there are approximately 3,500 prisoners in the region’s penitentiary establishments i.e. an incarceration rate of some 450 persons per 100,000 of the population. The number of inmates in the three establishments visited was within or, in the case of Prison No 1, just slightly over their official capacities. Nevertheless, the delegation found that in fact the establishments were severely overcrowded. The situation was at its most serious in Prison No 1. The cells for pre-trial prisoners offered rarely more – and sometimes less – than 1 m² of living space per prisoner, and the number of prisoners often exceeded the number of beds. These deplorable conditions were frequently made worse by poor ventilation, insufficient access to natural light and inadequate sanitary facilities. Similar, albeit slightly better, conditions were also observed in the Sizo section of Colony No. 3 and in certain parts of Colony No. 2 (for example, Block 10). 43. An incarceration rate of the magnitude which presently prevails in the Transnistrian region cannot be convincingly explained away by a high crime rate; the general outlook of members of the law enforcement agencies, prosecutors and judges must, in part, be responsible for the situation. At the same time, it is unrealistic from an economic standpoint to offer decent conditions of detention to such vast numbers of prisoners; to attempt to solve the problem by building more penitentiary establishments would be a ruinous exercise. The CPT has already stressed the need to review current law and practice relating to custody pending trial ... More generally, the Committee recommends that an overall strategy be developed for combating prison overcrowding and reducing the size of the prison population. In this context, the authorities will find useful guidance in the principles and measures set out in Recommendation No R (99) 22 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, concerning prison overcrowding and prison population inflation ... ... 48. The CPT recognises that in periods of economic difficulties, sacrifices may have to be made, including in penitentiary establishments. However, regardless of the difficulties faced at any given time, the act of depriving a person of his liberty always entails a duty to ensure that that person has access to certain basic necessities. Those basic necessities include appropriate medication. Compliance with this duty by public authorities is all the more imperative when it is a question of medication required to treat a life-threatening disease such as tuberculosis. At the end of the visit, the CPT’s delegation requested the authorities to take steps without delay to ensure that all penitentiary establishments are supplied on a regular basis with medicines of various types and, in particular, with a suitable range of anti‑tuberculosis drugs. The CPT wishes to be informed of the action taken in response to that request. ... 49. Official health-care staffing levels in the penitentiary establishments visited were rather low and, at the time of the visit, this situation was exacerbated by the fact that certain posts were vacant or staff members on long-term leave had not been replaced. This was particularly the case at Prison No 1 and Colony No 2. The CPT recommends that the authorities strive to fill as soon as possible all vacant posts in the health-care services of those two establishments and to replace staff members who are on leave. The health-care services of all three penitentiary establishments visited had very few medicines at their disposal, and their facilities were modestly equipped. The question of the supply of medicines has already been addressed (cf. paragraph 48). As regards the level of equipment, the CPT appreciates that the existing situation is a reflection of the difficulties facing the region; it would be unrealistic to expect significant improvements at the present time. However, it should be possible to maintain all existing equipment in working order. In this context, the delegation noted that all the radiography machines in the establishments visited were out of use. The CPT recommends that this deficiency be remedied. On a more positive note, the CPT was very interested to learn of the authorities’ plans for a new prison hospital, with a region-wide vocation, at Malaieşti. This is a most welcome development. The Committee would like to receive further details concerning the implementation of those plans. ... 51. The CPT has already highlighted the poor material conditions of detention which prevailed in the establishments visited and has made recommendations designed to address the fundamental problem of overcrowding (cf. paragraphs 42 and 43). In addition to overcrowding, the CPT is very concerned by the practice of covering cell windows. This practice appeared to be systematic vis-à-vis remand prisoners, and was also observed in cells accommodating certain categories of sentenced prisoners. The Committee recognises that specific security measures designed to prevent the risk of collusion and/or criminal activities may well be required in respect of certain prisoners. However, the imposition of such security measures should be the exception rather than the rule. Further, even when specific security measures are required, such measures should never involve depriving the prisoners concerned of natural light and fresh air. The latter are basic elements of life which every prisoner is entitled to enjoy; moreover, the absence of these elements generates conditions favourable to the spread of diseases and in particular tuberculosis. It is also inadmissible for cells to accommodate more prisoners than the number of beds available, thereby compelling prisoners to sleep in shifts. Consequently, the CPT recommends that the authorities set the following as short-term objectives: i) all prisoner accommodation to have access to natural light and adequate ventilation; ii) every prisoner, whether sentenced or on remand, to have his/her own bed. Further, as measures to tackle overcrowding begin to take effect, the existing standards concerning living space per prisoner should be revised upwards. The CPT recommends that the authorities set, as a medium-term objective, meeting the standard of 4m² of floor space per prisoner. 52. As the delegation pointed out at the end of its visit, material conditions of detention were particularly bad at Prison No 1 in Glinoe. The CPT appreciates that under the present circumstances, the authorities have no choice but to keep this establishment in service. However, the premises of Prison No 1 belong to a previous age; they should cease to be used for penitentiary purposes at the earliest opportunity.” 65. In its Annual Report for 2005, the OSCE referred to events in Transdniestria as follows. “The Mission concentrated its efforts on restarting the political settlement negotiations, stalled since summer 2004. The mediators from the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and the OSCE held consultations with representatives from Chisinau and Tiraspol in January, May and September. At the May meeting, Ukraine introduced President Victor Yushchenko’s settlement plan, Toward a Settlement through Democratization. This initiative envisages democratization of the Transdniestrian region through internationally conducted elections to the regional legislative body, along with steps to promote demilitarization, transparency and increased confidence. In July, the Moldovan Parliament, citing the Ukrainian Plan, adopted a law On the Basic Principles of a Special Legal Status of Transdniestria. During consultations in September in Odessa, Chisinau and Tiraspol agreed to invite the EU and US to participate as observers in the negotiations. Formal negotiations resumed in an enlarged format in October after a 15-month break and continued in December following the OSCE Ministerial Council in Ljubljana. On 15 December, the Presidents of Ukraine and the Russian Federation, Victor Yushchenko and Vladimir Putin, issued a Joint Statement welcoming the resumption of negotiations on the settlement of the Transdniestrian conflict. In September, Presidents Voronin and Yushchenko jointly requested the OSCE Chairman-in-Office to consider sending an International Assessment Mission (IAM) to analyse democratic conditions in Transdniestria and necessary steps for conducting democratic elections in the region. In parallel, the OSCE Mission conducted technical consultations and analyses on basic requirements for democratic elections in the Transdniestrian region, as proposed in the Yushchenko Plan. At the October negotiating round, the OSCE Chairmanship was asked to continue consultations on the possibility of organizing an IAM to the Transdniestrian region. Together with military experts from the Russian Federation and Ukraine, the OSCE Mission completed development of a package of proposed confidence- and security‑building measures, which were presented by the three mediators in July. The Mission subsequently began consultations on the package with representatives of Chisinau and Tiraspol. The October negotiating round welcomed possible progress on enhancing transparency through a mutual exchange of military data, as envisaged in elements of this package.” On the question of Russian military withdrawal, the OSCE observed: “There were no withdrawals of Russian arms and equipment from the Transdniestrian region during 2005. Roughly 20,000 metric tons of ammunition remain to be removed. The commander of the Operative Group of Russian Forces reported in May that surplus stocks of 40,000 small arms and light weapons stored by Russian forces in the Transdniestrian region have been destroyed. The OSCE has not been allowed to verify these claims.” In its Annual Report for 2006 the OSCE reported as follows: “... The 17 September ‘independence’ referendum and the 10 December ‘presidential’ elections in Transnistria – neither one recognized nor monitored by the OSCE – shaped the political environment of this work ... To spur on the settlement talks, the Mission drafted in early 2006 documents that suggested: a possible delimitation of competencies between central and regional authorities; a mechanism for monitoring factories in the Transnistrian military‑industrial complex; a plan for the exchange of military data; and an assessment mission to evaluate conditions and make recommendations for democratic elections in Transnistria. The Transnistrian side, however, refused to continue negotiations after the March introduction of new customs rules for Transnistrian exports, and thus no progress could be made including on these projects. Attempts to unblock this stalemate through consultations among the mediators (OSCE, Russian Federation and Ukraine) and the observers (European Union and the United States of America) in April, May and November and consultations of the mediators and observers with each of the sides separately in October were to no avail. ... On 13 November, a group of 30 OSCE Heads of Delegations, along with OSCE Mission members, gained access for the first time since March 2004 to the Russian Federation ammunition depot in Colbasna, near the Moldovan-Ukrainian border in northern Transnistria. There were no withdrawals, however, of Russian ammunition or equipment from Transnistria during 2006, and more than 21,000 tons of ammunition remain stored in the region. ...” The Annual Report for 2007 stated: “The mediators in the Transnistrian settlement process, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the OSCE, and the observers, the European Union and the United States, met four times. The mediators and observers met informally with the Moldovan and Transnistrian sides once, in October. All meetings concentrated on finding ways to restart formal settlement negotiations, which have nonetheless failed to resume. ... The Mission witnessed that there were no withdrawals of Russian ammunition or equipment during 2007. The Voluntary Fund retains sufficient resources to complete the withdrawal tasks.” In its Annual Report for 2008 the OSCE observed: “Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin and Transnistrian leader Igor Smirnov met in April for the first time in seven years and followed up with another meeting on 24 December. Mediators from the OSCE, Russian Federation and Ukraine and observers from the European Union and the United States met five times. Informal meetings of the sides with mediators and observers took place five times. These and additional shuttle diplomacy efforts by the Mission notwithstanding, formal negotiations in the ‘5+2’ format were not resumed. ... There were no withdrawals of Russian ammunition or equipment from the Transnistrian region during 2008. The Voluntary Fund retains sufficient resources to complete withdrawal tasks.” In its Annual Report for 2009 the OSCE observed: “Withdrawal of Russian ammunition and equipment. The Mission maintained its readiness to assist the Russian Federation to fulfil its commitment to withdraw ammunition and equipment from Transdniestria. No withdrawals took place in 2009. The Voluntary Fund retains sufficient resources to complete withdrawal tasks.” Subsequent OSCE reports describe the confidence-building measures taken and note the various meetings between those involved in the negotiations concerning the settlement of the Transdniestrian conflict. They do not contain any reference to the withdrawal of troops from the “MRT”. 66. In Catan and Others (cited above, §§ 64-73) the Court summarised the content of various reports by intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations concerning the situation in the Transdniestrian region of Moldova and the Russian military personnel and equipment stationed there during 2003 and 2009. It also summarised the relevant provisions of international law (ibid., §§ 74-76). 67. In paragraph 18 of Resolution 1896 (2012) on the honouring of obligations and commitments by the Russian Federation, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe noted as follows: “The opening of polling stations in Abkhazia (Georgia), South Ossetia (Georgia) and Transnistria (Republic of Moldova) without the explicit consent of the de jure authorities in Tbilisi and Chişinău, as well as the prior ‘passportisation’ of populations in these territories, violated the territorial integrity of these States, as recognised by the international community, including the Parliamentary Assembly.” 68. On 10 May 2010 the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) replied to a letter from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Moldova concerning the applicant’s case, stating that an ICRC delegate and a doctor had seen the applicant on 29 April 2010. During their visit, they had met with the applicant in private and had been told that he had regular contact with his family and could receive parcels from them.

4. The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Donji Kraljevec. 5. On 15 October 2001 the applicant brought a civil action against a private person in the Čakovec Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Čakovcu) seeking that a contract for lifelong maintenance (ugovor o doživotnom uzdržavanju) be declared null and void, that certain entries in the land register be altered, and that certain property be included in his deceased father’s estate. At the first hearing of the trial, the applicant indicated the value of the claim at 101,000 Croatian kunas (HRK). 6. On 4 February 2005 the Čakovec Municipal Court declared the applicant’s action inadmissible. The applicant lodged an appeal against the first-instance decision. On 12 May 2005 the Čakovec County Court (Županijski sud u Čakovcu) dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the first-instance decision. 7. The applicant then lodged an appeal on points of law (revizija) with the Supreme Court. On 19 April 2006 the Supreme Court accepted the applicant’s appeal on points of law, examined it on the merits and quashed the decisions of the lower courts and ordered a fresh consideration of the case. 8. On 17 February 2009, in the fresh proceedings, the first-instance court gave judgment in the applicant’s favour. 9. The defendant, T.B., lodged an appeal and on 10 June 2010 the Čakovec County Court reversed the first-instance judgment. 10. The applicant then lodged an appeal on points of law. On 21 September 2011 the Supreme Court declared the applicant’s appeal on points of law inadmissible ratione valoris because it fell below the threshold of 100,000 Croatian kunas, given that the applicant’s civil action had included three separate claims lodged on different factual and legal bases – therefore, the amount of the claim had to be divided into three. The Supreme Court did not provide any reasoning as to why it had accepted as admissible the applicant’s previous appeal on points of law and decided on the merits. 11. A constitutional complaint subsequently lodged by the applicant was declared inadmissible by the Constitutional Court on 12 January 2012.

5. The applicant was born in 1978 and lives in Osijek. 6. On 27 April 2011 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of trafficking illegal substances. On the same day an investigating judge of the Osijek County Court (Županijski sud u Osijeku) heard his evidence and ordered his pre-trial detention under Article 102 § 1 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (risk of reoffending). The decision also stated that the detention could not exceed forty-eight hours. 7. On 28 April 2011 another investigating judge of the Osijek County Court summoned the applicant, who said that he would be remaining silent because he wanted to be represented by a lawyer, D.O. The judge issued a decision on opening an investigation against him and two other suspects, G.D. and I.D., on charges of trafficking illegal substances. He also ordered his detention for one month, referring to Article 104 § 1 and Article 102 § 1 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The applicant’s detention was ordered because G.D. had said that he had been buying illegal drugs from him. Furthermore, he was unemployed and another set of criminal proceedings on similar charges was pending against him. Following an appeal lodged by the applicant, on 3 May 2011 the decision on his detention was upheld by a three-judge panel of the Osijek County Court. 8. On 24 May 2011 the investigating judge ordered the applicant’s immediate release because G.D. had retracted his previous statement that he had been buying illegal drugs from him. Furthermore, the applicant had submitted documents showing that he had his own candle-making business. The applicant was released that same day. However, following an appeal lodged by the Osijek County State Attorney’s Office (Županijsko državno odvjetništvo u Osijeku), on 26 May 2011 a three-judge panel of the Osijek County Court quashed that investigating judge’s decision and ordered him to re-examine the case. 9. On 31 May 2011 the investigating judge confirmed his previous decision. On 1 June 2011 the Osijek County State Attorney’s Office lodged an appeal, which was not communicated to the applicant or his counsel. It was argued that the risk of the applicant reoffending continued to exist for several reasons. Firstly, G.D. had given a detailed statement describing how he and I.D. had been buying illegal drugs from the applicant, and the evidence showed that the applicant had had frequent telephone contact with G.D. and I.D. Furthermore, G.D.’s retraction of his previous statement had been unconvincing. Secondly, the applicant had already been convicted of a similar offence, and another set of criminal proceedings concerning charges of trafficking illegal substances were pending against him. Thirdly, the evidence indicated that the applicant had been suspected of selling illegal substances over a longer period of time. Fourthly, he was unemployed and had no lawful means of subsistence. 10. On 10 June 2011 a three-judge panel of the Osijek County Court, composed of Judges D.K., A.B. and M.J., held a closed session in the parties’ absence. They reversed the investigating judge’s decision and ordered the applicant’s pre-trial detention under Article 102 § 1 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The decision did not set any time-limit for the detention. 11. On 14 June 2011 the applicant was again placed in pre-trial detention. 12. On 17 June he lodged an appeal with the Supreme Court against the decision of 10 June 2011. Judge M.R., acting as a single judge of the Osijek County Court, declared it inadmissible on 27 June 2011 on the grounds that it was not amenable to further appeal. This decision was upheld on 1 July 2011 by a three-judge panel of the same court, composed of Judges R.Š., A.R. and N.S. 13. On 6 July 2011 the Osijek County State Attorney’s Office indicted the applicant in the Osijek County Court on charges of trafficking illegal substances. 14. On 8 July 2011 a three-judge panel of the court extended the applicant’s detention under Article 102 § 1 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. An appeal lodged by him against that decision was dismissed by the Supreme Court on 20 July 2011. 15. On 12 July 2011 the applicant lodged two constitutional complaints, about the decisions of 10 June and 1 July 2011 respectively (see paragraphs 10 and 12 above). 16. On 15 July 2011 the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) declared the constitutional complaint about the decision of 10 June 2011 inadmissible, on the grounds that on 8 July 2011 a new decision extending the applicant’s detention had been adopted. It also declared his constitutional complaint about the decision of 1 July 2011 inadmissible, endorsing the lower courts’ reasoning (see paragraph 12 above). 17. On 18 October 2012 the Osijek County Court dismissed the indictment against the applicant because the prosecutor had withdrawn the charges against him. On 14 June 2012 the Supreme Court ordered his release. 18. On 15 April 2013 the applicant submitted a request for settlement with the Ministry of Justice in connection with his wrongful detention. A settlement was not reached. 19. On 1 August 2013 the applicant brought a claim in the Osijek Municipal Court against the State under Article 480 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, seeking non-pecuniary and pecuniary damages for his detention, which he claimed had been unfounded (neosnovan). 20. On 18 February 2014 the court allowed the applicant’s claim and awarded him 137,550 Croatian kunas (HRK – about 18,560 euros) in non-pecuniary damages. It held that his detention had been unfounded because a judgment dismissing the charges (presuda kojom se optužba odbija) had been adopted after the State Attorney’s Office had dropped the charges against him. The proceedings are still pending as regards the claim for pecuniary damages. The relevant part of the judgment reads: “The claimant’s claim is well founded in its entirety. The documents in the case file show that the claimant was finally acquitted of the charge [sic] that he had committed the criminal offence against the values protected by international law – abuse of illegal drugs, described and punishable under Article 173 § 2 of the Criminal Code in conjunction with section 41 of the Criminal Code Amendments Act (Official Gazette no. 71/06) by the Osijek County Court’s final judgment no. K-43/2012-86 of 18 October 2012. Further documents show that the claimant was actually detained in connection with the criminal proceedings against him for 393 days. The Osijek County Court’s decision no. Kv-138/2011-3 of 26 May 2011 (pages 16 and 17 of the case file) shows that the claimant had already been finally convicted by the Donji Miholjac Municipal Court of the criminal offence of abuse of illegal drugs under Article 173 § 1 of the Criminal Code, that is to say for an offence of the same type but in its basic form. Against the above background, this court considers that the claimant is to be awarded the amount of HRK 350 for each day he spent in detention, which in total amounts to HRK 137,550 since the claimant was detained without basis for 393 days. When assessing the adequate amount of [just] satisfaction, the Court has taken into account all the circumstances of this case: that the claimant was indicted for the criminal offence of abuse of illegal drugs, described and punishable under Article 173(2) of the Criminal Code in conjunction with section 41 of the Criminal Code Amendments Act; was deprived of his personal liberty for 393 days; [and] that the proceedings ended by the Osijek County Court’s judgment no. K-43/2012-86 of 18 October 2012 because the County State Attorney’s Office had withdrawn the charges. It is true that the claimant was previously convicted of the above-mentioned criminal offence. However, in the opinion of this court the sole fact that the claimant was previously convicted has no effect on the defendant’s obligation to compensate him for his unfounded deprivation of liberty, or his detention. Therefore, since the defendant has not proved that the claimant caused his arrest by some unlawful act such as absconding or concealing evidence, this court considers that there was no contribution on his part to the ordering of his detention.”

5. The applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Białystok. 6. The applicant is deaf and mute. He uses sign language to communicate with other people. 7. The applicant and A.N. married on 20 August 2005. A.N. suffers from a hearing impairment and has had a hearing implant fitted. She communicates both orally and through sign language. 8. The son (S.N.) of the applicant and A.N. was born on 10 December 2006. He also suffers from a hearing impairment. In February 2007 the applicant and his wife separated. On 11 June 2007 A.N. filed a petition for divorce. 9. In the course of the divorce proceedings, on 19 July 2007 the Białystok Regional Court issued an interim decision on the applicant’s contact with his son. Under that decision, the applicant could visit his son every Tuesday and Thursday between 4 p.m. and 6 p.m. and every Sunday between 2 p.m. and 5 p.m. at the child’s place of residence and without the presence of any third parties. 10. The court ordered experts from the Białystok office of the Family Consultation Centre (Rodzinny Ośrodek Diagnostyczno-Konsultacyjny ‑“the RODK”) to prepare an opinion on the suitable form and frequency of the applicant’s contact with his son. In the course of his interview with the experts, the applicant underlined his commitment to maintaining contact with the child, without giving any details. The experts established that the applicant had not been visiting his son as frequently as he was allowed under the interim decision of 19 July 2007. The last contact had occurred on 25 August 2007. 11. In their opinion, dated 15 October 2007, the experts underlined that the emotional ties between the mother and the child were strong and natural. However, the ties between the applicant and his son were weak and superficial. In the view of the experts, taking into account the necessity to ensure the proper development of the child, contact between the applicant and the child should take place four times a month and last two hours on each occasion. 12. On 15 November 2007 the Białystok Regional Court granted a decree of divorce without ascribing blame for the breakdown of the marriage. In its judgment the court also ruled that parental authority should be exercised by both parents and that the child should reside with the mother. It further ruled that the applicant had a right to see his son on the first three Fridays of each month from 4 p.m. until 6 p.m. and on every fourth Sunday of each month from 11 a.m. until 1 p.m. Contact should take place at the mother’s home in her discreet presence but in the absence of third parties. The applicant was further ordered to pay child maintenance. 13. It appears that neither of the parties appealed against the judgment, which consequently became final on 6 December 2007. 14. In August 2011 the applicant filed an application with the Białystok District Court for a change to his contact arrangements. He asked the court to be allowed to have contact with his son on every second and fourth weekend of each month from 3 p.m. on Friday until 6 p.m. on Sunday, away from the mother’s home. He also asked to be allowed to see his son for some time over the Christmas and Easter periods and to spend with him half of the winter holidays and half of the summer school holidays. The applicant argued that the child had already reached the age of five and needed increased contact with his father in order to strengthen their ties. 15. The applicant admitted that after the divorce he had not seen his son for one year on account of his health problems. He submitted that his son was happy to spend time with him and to play with him. The applicant asserted that he had been able to provide appropriate care to his son and that in the event of need he could count on the support of his family. It was the mother of the child who had obstructed his contact with the child and made the atmosphere unfriendly. For example, she refused to pass on oral messages from their son to the applicant. The mother did not inform him about important decisions concerning the child and tried to marginalise him. 16. The mother submitted that the applicant had remained passive during his meeting with S.N. and that she had not obstructed those meetings. In her view, S.N. did not have any emotional ties with his father and did not need contact with him. Further, the applicant would be unable to properly care for S.N. The mother lived together with her parents and her son. 17. On 4 November 2011 a court guardian submitted a report to the court. According to that report, the applicant had not been visiting his son regularly on account of his being treated for depression and other illnesses. He had not seen his son since 12 October 2011. However, the mother of the applicant had been visiting her grandson regularly. 18. On 15 March 2012 the applicant applied for an interim decision and asked for the right to have contact with his son during the second day of the Easter holidays, from 10 a.m. to 5 p.m., and to take him away from his place of residence. On 23 March 2012 the Białystok District Court issued an interim decision allowing the applicant to visit his son during the second day of the Easter holidays from 11 a.m. to 1 p.m. at the child’s place of residence. 19. On 30 April 2012 the RODK issued an opinion commissioned by the District Court. It had been prepared by a psychologist, an education specialist and a psychiatrist who had met the parents and the child and had been assisted by an interpreter of sign language. The experts stated that emotional ties between the mother and the child were strong – indeed, the mother had a tendency to be overprotective. The child’s ties with the father were superficial and weak. The child recognised the applicant as his father but did not consider him a part of his family. The father’s ties with the child were positive, but founded on limited experience and high expectations. These ties were also affected by the communication difficulties between them. The experts further noted that the conflict between the parents impeded their cooperation with regard to the child. They suggested that the parents be counselled by a specialist with a view to their being taught how to accept each other as a parent. 20. The experts opined that an increase in contact, as requested by the applicant, was not advisable, on account of the limited level of communication between him and the child, the child’s age and history, and the strength of the child’s ties with the mother and maternal grandparents. They recommended, however, that contact should also take place outside the mother’s home (at playgrounds, during walks) but in her presence. The mother should cooperate with the father and support him in making his contact with the child more diverse. The experts noted that the ability of the applicant to care independently for his son was considerably limited. In their view, the interests of the child required that the parents cooperate with each other, despite the communication problems. The experts added that the mother should be more proactive in this regard but that the father should not contest the mother’s decisions concerning the child. 21. The applicant contested the experts’ findings and alleged that the opinion should have been prepared with the assistance of a specialist in deaf education and a psychologist specialising in the needs of deaf people. He claimed that their finding that contact could not take place without the presence of the mother on account of his (that is to say the applicant’s) disability amounted to discrimination. The experts had also disregarded the possibility of the paternal grandmother rendering assistance and of ordering the parents to undergo family therapy. 22. The District Court heard evidence from the RODK experts. The psychologist, G.H., admitted that the RODK did not have specialised methods of examining deaf people but stated that such methods were not necessary in respect of determining the advisability of maintaining contact. She noted that the child was well-developed and rehabilitated (zrehabilitowanym). The main obstacle in respect of contact was the conflict between the parents and the lack of cooperation between them. Such circumstances created a particular difficulty in the case of a child with a hearing impairment. The psychologist observed that the applicant’s disability also constituted an objective obstacle. In her opinion, contact should take place two to three times a month. 23. The court dismissed the applicant’s request for a second expert opinion since the earlier opinion was complete and comprehensive. 24. The court also heard the parties and witnesses (family members). It further took into account information submitted by a court guardian after visiting the applicant’s and the mother’s respective homes, together with relevant documentary evidence. 25. On 9 August 2012 the Białystok District Court dismissed the applicant’s application for a change to the contact arrangements. 26. The court established that the parents of S.N. remained in conflict and could not reach an agreement regarding the child’s contact with the father. Since September 2009 the child had attended a nursery school with an integration unit, where he had remained under the supervision of a specialist in deaf education, a speech therapist and a psychologist. He suffered from a hearing impairment and used a hearing aid. The child required specialised medical care and followed a rehabilitation programme. He was certified as having a second-degree disability. 27. Having regard to all the evidence, and in particular the expert opinion, the court found that the requested change to the contact arrangements would not be in the child’s best interests. It was true that the first decision in respect of contact had been given five years previously, when S.N. had been a baby and when the presence of his mother during contact had been justified by the child’s age. However, the age of the child was not the only element to consider. Other relevant elements were the specifics of the child’s development, his state of health, his disability, the need for his permanent medical rehabilitation and his heavy dependence on his mother and maternal grandparents. The court found that these elements still justified the discreet presence of the mother and at her home during the applicant’s contact visits. It noted that the requested change to the contact arrangements would be too far-reaching, since the applicant wanted to see his son more often, outside S.N.’s place of residence and without the mother being present. The court observed that except for the first two months of the child’s life the applicant had not lived with him or cared for him. The applicant admitted that he had not always kept to scheduled visits. Sometimes the reasons for this had been beyond his control (health problems or evening school commitments) and sometimes contact had been obstructed by the mother. However, in consequence, his limited and irregular involvement in the child’s life had adversely influenced the emotional ties between the father and the son. 28. The court underlined that the applicant had not been fully availing himself of his rights to contact his son, as granted by the divorce judgment. Nonetheless, once their ties were strengthened and the applicant made full use of the rights already granted to him, it would be possible to extend contact. 29. The court also found that it could not disregard the communication problems between the applicant and his son. It did not agree with the applicant that this constituted a discriminatory measure against him; rather, it constituted an objective and independent factor that hampered his communication with the child. The applicant, irrespective of his own and his son’s disability, had an incontestable right to contact with his son. However, the communication problem should be taken into account in regulating the contact arrangements so they would remain as favourable as possible to the child. The court noted that the applicant used mostly sign language (and articulated a few single words), while the child communicated only orally, so communication difficulties naturally arose. For this reason, it was still justifiable that the mother, who was able both to use sign language and communicate orally, should be present during the applicant’s visits. The mother’s presence, which provided the child with a sense of security, could also help him to relax during his meetings with the father. The court disagreed with the applicant that the paternal grandmother could ensure proper communication between him and his son. The issue was not only about interpreting between sign language and speech but also about ensuring security and stability, which could only be provided by the mother. The applicant’s son did not know his paternal grandmother well and so her presence would not compensate for the absence of his mother. 30. The court underlined that the applicant’s contact with his son should first and foremost ensure the security and stability of the child. The stress to which he would be exposed in the event of a change to his current environment and in the absence of persons with whom he usually spent his time would certainly jeopardise the child’s well-being and damage his sense of security. The court dismissed the applicant’s argument that the child spent most of his day in a nursery school (that is to say outside his home and without his mother), so he could easily stay at the applicant’s father’s home. It noted that the mother had been preparing her son for nursery school over a long period of time and had at first attended the school with him for short periods of time so he could become familiar with the place. 31. The court observed that the child’s paternal grandmother had not visited her grandson for some time and was therefore not a person with whom the child was familiar or who could assist as an interpreter between the applicant and his son. 32. The fact that the child had been paying short unsupervised visits to a neighbour of the mother’s family did not support the applicant’s argument either. The court noted that the neighbour was a familiar person to the child, since he had been regularly visiting the child’s family. In addition, the unsupervised visits to the neighbour’s flat did not last longer than one hour. 33. Lastly, the court did not consider it necessary to impose an obligation on the parents to undergo family therapy. It noted that the experts had opined that both parents required contact with a specialist who would assist them in mutually accepting each other as a parent. However, the only suitable place for such therapy for persons with impaired hearing was the premises of a foundation (fundacja) attached to the nursery school attended by the child. The mother stated that she already attended a parent support group there and the applicant declared that he could do the same. In these circumstances, the court found that there was no need for its intervention. 34. The applicant lodged an appeal with the Białystok Regional Court. He argued that the District Court had failed to respect the principle of non-discrimination against deaf and mute persons by dismissing his application for unsupervised contact with his son. He invoked Article 4 § 1 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. The applicant further argued that the lower court had erred in holding that the child’s interests did not justify a change to contact arrangements. The expert opinion indicated that the presence of the mother during contact created tensions between the parents and that this was unfavourable to the child. In addition, according to some witnesses, the contact took place in the presence of third parties. 35. The applicant contested the lower court’s finding that the child’s paternal grandmother was a stranger to him; he argued that the child would not be exposed to stress in the event of contact without the mother’s presence and outside her home in view of the fact that the child attended nursery school and was cared by a neighbour a few times a week. Lastly, the applicant contested the refusal to order a supplementary expert opinion. 36. On 23 November 2012 the Białystok Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal. It found that the lower’s court assessment of the evidence had been correct and that the refusal to order a supplementary expert opinion had been justified. 37. The Regional Court noted that the contact arrangements could be amended if the interests of the child so required (Article 1135 of the Family Code). It concurred with the lower court that there was no justification for a change to the existing arrangements since the applicant already had the possibility of regular contact with his son and if used this would enable the parties to strengthen their ties. The findings of the RODK experts clearly supported the conclusion that no change was necessary. The Regional Court also agreed that the existing conflict between the parents would certainly prevent the applicant from benefitting from increased contact. It stressed that the priority of the court in such cases was to take into account the interests of the child, not the interests of either of his or her parents. 38. It further underlined that the presence of the mother during visits was necessary in order to ensure the child’s sense of security since the mother was the primary carer, with strong ties to the child. The paternal grandmother could not provide the same sense of security. In addition, the mother’s presence would solve the problem of communication between the applicant and the child. The Regional Court did not agree with the applicant that the lower court’s taking into account the issue of communication barrier had amounted to discrimination against him. The communication barrier was a real obstacle to the forging of ties between the applicant and his son and it could not be disregarded, given that the interests of the child were of primary consideration, overriding the individual interests of the parents. The Regional Court stressed that this constituted an objective obstacle, not a form of discrimination against the applicant. 39. In July 2011 A.N. brought an action in the Białystok District Court for an order limiting the scope of the applicant’s parental authority over S.N. to those issues that concerned their son’s education. She submitted that the applicant had refused to give his consent to an identity document being issued for the child. 40. In October 2011 the applicant brought a counteraction seeking an order to compel A.N. to undergo family therapy. He argued that A.N. was acting to the child’s detriment by refusing to cooperate with the applicant in matters concerning the child. She also humiliated and insulted the applicant in the child’s presence and undermined his authority. 41. On 2 August 2012 the Białystok District Court restricted the applicant’s parental authority over S.N. to issues concerning his education. It dismissed the applicant’s counteraction. 42. The court relied on the opinion prepared by the experts of the RODK for the purposes of the proceedings. The experts concluded that the joint exercise of parental authority was practically impossible. The reason for this was the permanent conflict between the parents, as well as the communication difficulties. The experts recommended that both parents undergo therapy with a view to developing their parenting skills. They further pointed out that that the possibility of communication between the applicant and his son was significantly restricted because of the different method that each used to communicate. In the view of the experts, the mother of the child properly exercised her parental authority, in particular with respect to the child’s needs, the necessity of treatment, and the development of the child’s social skills. 43. Having regard to the evidence, the court found that it was justifiable to restrict the applicant’s parental authority and limit it only to matters concerning the child’s education. Its decision was motivated by the lack of agreement between the parents in respect of the exercise of parental authority. The applicant was not to be solely blamed for this situation. Furthermore, communication with the applicant was limited on account of his disability; however, the mother had been aware of this fact since the beginning of their relationship. The court further took into account the fact that the child was being raised by the mother, the parents lived apart, and there was a communication barrier between the applicant and the child. This was of importance in respect of matters concerning the child’s health. The court underlined that the fact that communication between the applicant and his son was limited did not mean that the applicant was a bad father. The court found that it was not necessary to give the applicant the possibility to have a say in matters concerning the child’s medical treatment since these were sometimes urgent – therefore, it was the mother, with whom the child lived, who should decide on them. 44. With regard to the applicant’s request for the mother to be obliged to undergo family therapy, the court did not find this justified. It took into account the fact that the mother had already been attending a support group and found no reasons to formally oblige her to undergo therapy. It was established that the mother had independently taken important decisions concerning the child of which she had not informed the applicant and that she was overprotective. Nonetheless, the court found that she properly exercised her parental authority and that the child’s welfare was not endangered. 45. The applicant appealed. 46. On 23 November 2012 the Białystok Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal. It underlined that the court of first instance had comprehensively assessed the evidence in the case. In the view of the Regional Court, the limitation of the applicant’s parental authority was in the interests of the child. It ruled that the communication barrier constituted an objective obstacle to relations between the applicant and his son and that taking it into account could not be considered to constitute a form of discrimination against the applicant.

4. The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Szeged. 5. The applicant had a car accident in 1993, sustained serious injuries and, as a consequence, her loss of capacity to work was assessed to be 67 per cent. 6. An insurance company was obliged to pay a monthly allowance to the applicant. In order to redeem the monthly allowance, the insurance company offered 4,400,000 Hungarian forints (17,600 euros) to the applicant as compensation for all damages she has suffered. The applicant and the insurance company concluded an agreement on the lump sum on 25 February 1999. 7. Subsequently, the applicant realised that the lump sum paid by the insurance company did not cover all her damages, believing that the calculation method applied by the insurance company was mistaken. Consequently, on 7 August 2003 the applicant initiated a civil lawsuit against the insurance company requesting the court to declare the agreement invalid and to oblige the insurance company to pay compensation for damages. 8. The Budapest Regional Court delivered a partial judgment on 18 April 2006 in which dismissed the applicant’s claim on the alleged invalidity of the parties’ agreement. On appeal, the Budapest Court of Appeal upheld the partial judgment on 21 February 2007. The applicant challenged the partial judgment before the Supreme Court which upheld it on 17 October 2007. 9. As to the remainder, the Budapest Regional Court in its judgment delivered on 11 June 2007 partly found for the applicant in respect of the damage claim. On appeal, the Budapest Court of Appeal reversed the judgment and dismissed the applicant’s claim on 23 April 2008. The applicant challenged the judgment before the Supreme Court but to no avail. The Supreme Court upheld the final and binding judgment on 11 February 2009.

5. The applicant was born in 1965 and lives in Ankara. 6. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7. On 13 April 2010 the applicant was dismissed from his post as an officer in the army due to non-compliance with disciplinary rules. 8. On 16 May 2010 the applicant brought an action before the Supreme Military Administrative Court and requested the annulment of his dismissal. On 21 October 2010 the chief public prosecutor submitted his observations to the Supreme Military Administrative Court. These observations were notified to the applicant and he replied to it in his petition of 24 January 2011. 9. On 15 February 2011 the Supreme Military Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s action having regard to the “secret documents” submitted by the Ministry of Defence. These documents were not disclosed to the applicant. 10. On 3 May 2011 the applicant’s request for rectification of the above judgment was rejected by the same court.

5. The applicant was born in 1970 and currently lives in London. 6. On 16 October 2008 the Frankfurt am Main District Court issued a penal order against the applicant. Having regard to the written submissions the applicant had made on the charges to the prosecution, the court found the applicant guilty of withholding and embezzlement of employee salaries and sentenced her to a fine of 100 daily rates of EUR 50. 7. According to the record of service, a form containing several options as to the way in which court mail was served, which was issued by a courier and returned to the District Court, the courier had attempted to hand over the penal order to the applicant at her residence on 7 November 2008 at 2.10 p.m. As this had not been possible, the courier had served the penal order on the applicant by placing it in the mailbox appurtenant to her residence (Article 180 of the Code of Civil Procedure, see paragraph 29 below). 8. On 27 December 2008 the applicant filed an objection against the penal order with the Frankfurt am Main District Court and applied for the reinstatement of the proceedings. She argued that her objection was not time-barred as the penal order had not been served on her on 7 November 2008. She had only learnt about the existence of a penal order issued against her on 20 December 2008 when she had found in her mailbox a bill of the court cashier requesting her to pay the fine imposed in the penal order. On calling the court cashier, she had been informed of the order’s alleged service on 7 November 2008. 9. The applicant claimed that she was sure that no penal order had been served on her on 7 November 2008. She stated that her counsel, Mr N. Dotterweich, and her husband had been at a court hearing at the Hanau District Court on 7 November 2008 and had therefore come to visit her at her house on that day. In the afternoon she had bade farewell to her counsel. When accompanying him to the front gate, she had checked her mailbox for her daily mail in his presence. She had found neither a penal order nor a notice that a penal order had been deposited in another place. 10. On 6 February 2009 the applicant’s counsel supplemented the applicant’s submissions. He claimed that he, the applicant, the applicant’s mother who was living in the same house as the applicant and the applicant’s husband who lived in London had all been at the applicant’s house at the time the penal order had allegedly been served. Counsel and the applicant had returned to the applicant’s residence at around 12.15 p.m. after having attended a hearing at the Hanau District Court. The applicant’s husband had arrived shortly before them and had been waiting for them, together with the applicant’s mother. 11. The applicant’s counsel explained that no one had rung the doorbell to hand over the penal order while they had been at the applicant’s residence. They would have noticed the doorbell ringing, as the applicant had dogs, which were outside and would have barked. At around 3.30 p.m. they had all left the house. At that moment the applicant had taken the mail out of her mailbox. She had immediately checked the contents. There had been no official letter from a court. Such a letter would have stood out and would therefore have been noticed by the persons present, as official court letters came in bright yellow envelopes. The applicant’s husband, counsel and the common daughter of counsel and the applicant had then left. 12. The applicant’s counsel further submitted that the private postal service company J., which had been in charge of the delivery of official court mail for the Frankfurt am Main District Court, was known for its unreliability. In December 2008, hence shortly after the alleged delivery, the company had had to register as insolvent. 13. The applicant’s counsel added to his submissions the affirmations in lieu of an oath of the applicant’s mother, the applicant’s husband and himself confirming his submissions. The applicant’s mother stated, in particular, that she had paid special attention when her daughter took the mail out of the mailbox as, owing to the fact that they lived in the same house, part of her mail was sometimes put into her daughter’s mailbox. The applicant’s husband declared that when the applicant had taken out the mail he had paid special attention because he had formerly also lived at that address and sometimes mail addressed to him was still sent there. 14. On 9 April 2009 the Frankfurt am Main District Court rejected the applicant’s objection against the penal order as inadmissible and dismissed her application for reinstatement of the proceedings. The court considered it proved that the penal order had been served on the applicant on 7 November 2008 at 2.10 p.m. as was certified by the record of service. The applicant had therefore failed to file her objection, which was received by the court on 27 December 2008, within the two-week time-limit and the penal order had hence become final (see paragraph 27 below). 15. The District Court was also of the view that there was no reason to grant the applicant reinstatement of the proceedings, as it was not apparent why the applicant had been prevented, through no fault of her own, from submitting her objection against the penal order within the two-week time‑limit after the delivery of 7 November 2008. 16. The court found that the record of service had probative value for the fact that the penal order had been put into the applicant’s mailbox by the courier on 7 November 2008 (Article 418 of the Code of Civil Procedure, see paragraph 29 below). In accordance with the settled case-law, this could only be disproved if facts were presented that convinced the court that there was no possibility that the facts certified by the record of service were correct. The applicant had not been able to furnish the court with such counter-evidence. 17. In its assessment of evidence, the Frankfurt am Main District Court had regard to the written statement of the courier who had delivered the applicant’s penal order, whom it had had interviewed by the police as a witness. The courier had explained that she had been registered with J. company to help her husband with the delivery of the court mail since October 2008. When asked by the police to describe how she had delivered official court letters she had stated that official court letters had always been in yellow envelopes. She confirmed that she always rang the doorbells of the addressees. If they did not respond she would deposit a “letter of notification” (Benachrichtigungsschreiben) in the mailbox. She confirmed that the signature on the record of service concerning the applicant was hers, the date and the time had been filled in by her husband. She did not specially remember either the service on 7 November 2008 or the applicant’s house. When cautioned that she did not have to respond to questions if there was a risk that she might incriminate herself, she had confirmed that she was sure she had served the mail correctly or left a “notice” (Benachrichtigung). 18. The District Court concluded that the courier had testified that she had always served the official court mail in accordance with the rules. Moreover, when asked by the police, the Frankfurt am Main branch of J. company had confirmed that no irregularities were known to the company with regard to the service of the court mail. The courier had had no incentive to embezzle the applicant’s mail. 19. The court considered, in contrast, that the story described by the applicant to disprove the service of the penal order seemed fabricated. It took into consideration that the declarations in lieu of an oath all came from persons who were close to the applicant and who had a considerable interest in the outcome of the criminal proceedings against her. It further noted that the applicant had not mentioned all the persons who had allegedly been present when she checked her mail in her first submission of 27 December 2008. Moreover, it was not in accordance with general experience in life for someone to check his mail in front of all his family members. As it had been proved by the record of service that the penal order had been put into the applicant’s mailbox, potential shortcomings by the courier’s failure to ring the doorbell first – which according to the applicant would have resulted in her dogs barking, which they allegedly had not done at the relevant time – would, in any event, have been remedied by the actual service. 20. On 22 April 2009 the applicant, represented by her lawyer, appealed against the decision of the Frankfurt am Main District Court. She claimed, in particular, that according to articles in a national newspaper, the unreliability of the postal service company J. had been revealed, inter alia, by the Oldenburg Court of Appeal and the Kiel Regional Court and that an Aachen local newspaper had reported that court mail had been found in a refuse shed. 21. The applicant further pointed out that the courier’s witness statement contradicted the record of service. The courier had described the service of the penal order by way of putting a written notice into the addressee’s mailbox, which constituted a substituted service in accordance with Article 181 of the Code of Civil Procedure (see paragraph 29 below). In contrast, the record of service certified service by way of placing the penal order itself in the applicant’s mailbox, which constituted substituted service in accordance with Article 180 of the Code of Civil Procedure (see paragraph 29 below). 22. On 10 June 2009 the Frankfurt am Main Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the decision of the Frankfurt am Main District Court. The court, essentially endorsing the reasons given by the District Court, confirmed the District Court’s finding that the penal order had effectively been served on the applicant on 7 November when placed in the applicant’s mailbox (Article 37 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, read in conjunction with Article 180 of the Code of Civil Procedure, see paragraphs 28-29 below). 23. The Regional Court considered that the applicant had not furnished the court with sufficient counter-evidence. The court did not have to decide whether J. company had been reliable in all cases. In the case before it, the courier and her husband had had no reason to commit post embezzlement and forgery of documents. The affirmations in lieu of oaths could not prove that the penal order had not been in the mailbox on 7 November 2008. The affirming persons had not testified that they had constantly paid special attention to a possible ringing of the doorbell. Furthermore, it could not be ruled out that the applicant had been inattentive when going through the mail because of the presence of guests. It was likely that the penal order had been hidden among other mail and had probably inadvertently been thrown away or simply ignored. 24. On 14 August 2009 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court in which she claimed that her constitutional right to be heard and her right to a fair trial had been breached in the criminal proceedings against her. 25. On 22 September 2009 the Federal Constitutional Court declined to consider the applicant’s constitutional complaint without giving reasons (file no. 2 BvR 1891/09). The decision was served on the applicant’s counsel on 30 September 2009.

7. The applicant was born in 1955. He is currently being detained in Krasnoyarsk. 8. On 10 December 2010 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of incitement to murder. On the same day the Tsentralniy District Court of Krasnoyarsk authorised his pre-trial detention. 9. Subsequently the applicant’s detention was extended on a number of occasions in the course of the investigation and trial in view of the gravity of the charges against him and the risks of his absconding, seeking to influence witnesses and reoffending. 10. On 5 May 2012 the District Court found the applicant guilty of the charges and sentenced him to five years’ imprisonment in a correctional colony. On 4 September 2012 the Krasnoyarsk Regional Court upheld the conviction, but decreased the sentence by two months. 11. During the admission process at remand prison no. IZ-24/1 in Krasnoyarsk the applicant told the medical staff that he had hypertension. The diagnosis was confirmed by a prison doctor, who prescribed him hypotensive medication and regular monitoring of his blood pressure. 12. In April 2011 the applicant was admitted to Prison Tuberculosis Hospital no. 1 in Krasnoyarsk (“the prison hospital”) for two weeks of inpatient treatment for his hypertension. A chest X-ray showed that he had a mild case of pneumonia and he was also diagnosed with another chronic condition. In the hospital the applicant received the full range of treatments for his conditions. 13. In June 2011 the applicant had a hypertensive crisis. Several weeks later his lawyer complained to the prison authorities of inadequate medical care. 14. A medical examination in August 2012 showed that the applicant had recovered from pneumonia and that there were positive developments with his hypertension. 15. In 2012 and 2013 the applicant was moved between various detention facilities and had routine medical checkups. 16. In April 2013 he was sent to a minimum security settlement colony. The applicant and other inmates performed repairs to a nearby children’s health camp. The applicant complained only of fatigue and headache to medical staff during that period. 17. According to the applicant, in May 2013 he started experiencing pain in the chest, pelvic area and testicles. His ability to walk was hindered by severe pain. He took painkillers sent by his relatives. The detention authorities ignored his complaints and on several occasions confiscated the painkillers. 18. In written submissions, Mr Kh., Ms K. and Ms B., detainees who worked with the applicant in the children’s camp from May 2013, confirmed the above statements. They submitted that the applicant had been seriously ill, had been barely able to walk and had often complained about severe pain. No proper medical examination or treatment had been arranged despite the applicant’s requests for inpatient treatment. Inmates had injected the applicant with painkillers supplied by his relatives. 19. On 2 September 2013 the applicant asked the head of the detention facility to authorise a medical examination and treatment outside the facility owing to a serious spine and leg condition that had worried him since May 2013. He stated that over the previous three months he had received pain relief medication provided by his relatives, but that his condition had not got better. 20. Following the applicant’s complaint, he was sent to a civilian clinic in Krasnoyarsk for a magnetic resonance imaging scan (MRI). An examination carried out on 22 January 2014, two days after his admission, revealed a prostate tumour and affection of the bone. A consultation by an oncologist was prescribed. 21. On the next day the applicant complained about the quality of his treatment to the Federal Service for the Execution of Services in Krasnoyarsk. The complaint was forwarded to the applicant’s ward but was dismissed as ill-founded on 10 February 2014. 22. On 14 February 2014 the applicant was taken to the Regional Cancer Hospital in Krasnoyarsk, where he was diagnosed with prostate cancer with metastasis to the pelvic bone. According to his medical records, he suffered mild to intense pain. 23. Six days later a medical panel certified the applicant as having a second-degree disability. 24. Between 21 March and 3 April 2014 the applicant was examined and treated in the prison hospital. While tests performed in the hospital did not disclose any cancer, hospital officials acted on the diagnosis of 22 January 2014 and prescribed drug treatment for prostate cancer. 25. On 15 May 2014 the applicant was examined by an oncologist, who recorded his cancer treatment and ordered tests. 26. In August 2014 the applicant spent two weeks in the prison hospital. 27. The following month he was seen by doctors and was prescribed further treatment for cancer. The medical staff apparently complied fully with that prescription. 28. On 19 September 2014 a medical panel concluded that the applicant’s state of health warranted his early release on medical grounds. Ten days later the Sosnovborsk Town Court of the Krasnoyarsk Region dismissed an application for early release, finding that the applicant was receiving the required treatment in detention. On 23 December 2014 the Regional Court quashed the decision on procedural grounds and remitted the case for fresh consideration. The parties did not inform the Court of the outcome of those proceedings. However, given the further developments, it appears that the applicant remained in detention. 29. On 9 April 2015 the applicant was certified as having a first-degree disability. 30. In May 2015 he was admitted to the prison hospital for a medical examination and treatment. There are no details regarding his subsequent treatment. 31. The applicant was detained in the remand prison between 10 December 2010 and 25 May 2015, save for short periods in the prison hospital. The applicant complained of the poor conditions of his detention, including overcrowding. The Government disagreed.

5. The applicant was born in 1961 and lives in Kaunas. 6. In 1994 the applicant obtained a loan of 30,100 Lithuanian litai (LTL – approximately 8,718 euros (EUR)) from the State. The purpose of the loan was to build or buy an apartment. In 2000 the applicant became the owner of an apartment built by a public association, and in exchange she took over the association’s loan of LTL 90,036 (EUR 26,076) from the State. The apartment was pledged to the bank as collateral. Both loans were given under preferential conditions – the annual interest rate was lower than the average annual interest rate for loans given by private banks at that time. Both loans were administered by a State bank, the State Commercial Bank of Lithuania (hereinafter “the bank”). In 1998 that bank transferred the claims to some of its loans, including both of the applicant’s loans, to another State bank, the Savings Bank of Lithuania. In 2001 the latter bank was privatised and became the private bank AB Hansabankas. 7. On 13 August 2001 the applicant concluded an agreement with a third party, A.E., under which the applicant paid LTL 30,870 (EUR 8,940) and bought from A.E. the right to restoration of title in respect of 1.47 hectares of land in Kaunas. That land had belonged to A.E.’s grandfather, S.F., who had died in 1949. It had been determined by a ruling of the Kaunas District Court of 23 May 2001 that S.F. had owned a total of 68.26 hectares of land in Kaunas. Following that ruling, A.E. sold the right to restoration of title in respect of different parts of that land to over a hundred individuals, including the applicant. 8. On 23 October 2001 the Kaunas County Administration (hereinafter “the KCA”) restored the applicant’s title in respect of 1.47 hectares of land. At the applicant’s request, her property rights were restored by cancelling her outstanding debt to the State (see paragraphs 31-33 below). The KCA estimated that the value of that plot of land was LTL 70,560 (EUR 20,435.60), and its indexed value was LTL 112,896 (EUR 32,697), an amount equal to the applicant’s outstanding debt under the two loan agreements of 1994 and 2000 (see paragraph 6 above). 9. On 10 November 2001 the KCA forwarded to the Ministry of Finance a list of individuals, including the applicant, whose property rights it had decided to restore by cancelling their debts to the State. 10. On 16 November 2001 the KCA ordered an internal audit into the restoration of property rights in respect of the land which had belonged to S.F. (see paragraph 7 above). The audit report, delivered on 7 December 2001, found that the documents in the possession of the KCA showed that from 1927 to 1940 S.F. had sold parts of his land to numerous individuals, and that, as a result, at the time of his death he had owned no more than 15.58 hectares. Accordingly, the audit report considered that the size of S.F.’s land, as established by the Kaunas District Court (see paragraph 7 above), had been incorrect, and recommended that the KCA suspend the restoration of property rights in respect of any land which had previously been considered as belonging to S.F. 11. Following the internal audit, on 14 December 2001 the KCA suspended the restoration of property rights in respect of S.F.’s land. It informed the Ministry of Finance about the suspension, and asked it to suspend the cancellation of debt for all the individuals on the previously submitted list, including the applicant (see paragraph 9 above). 12. Subsequently the Kaunas Regional Prosecutor (hereinafter “the prosecutor”), at the request of the KCA and relying on the findings of the audit report, asked the domestic courts to reopen the civil proceedings concerning the size of S.F.’s land, and to suspend the enforcement of all the KCA’s decisions concerning the restoration of property rights in respect of that land. On 21 March 2002 the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court suspended the enforcement of the KCA’s decisions. The applicant participated in the court proceedings as a third party and appealed against the suspension, but on 25 April 2002 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed her appeal. On 23 October 2002 the Supreme Court reopened the civil proceedings concerning the size of S.F.’s land, on the grounds that the audit report had revealed relevant information which had not been known at the time of the adoption of the Kaunas District Court’s ruling of 23 May 2001. 13. In the reopened proceedings, on 30 April 2003 the Kaunas District Court determined that S.F. had owned 48.40 hectares of land. On 30 June 2004 the Kaunas Regional Court partly amended that judgment and determined that S.F. had owned 47.91 hectares of land. The latter judgment became final. The KCA and the applicant participated in the reopened proceedings as third parties. 14. On 25 October 2004 the prosecutor asked the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court to revoke the order suspending the enforcement of the KCA’s decisions concerning the restoration of property rights in respect of S.F.’s land. The prosecutor submitted that the total amount of land affected by those decisions was less than 47.91 hectares, so there was no risk of restoring property rights in respect of land which had not belonged to S.F. On 26 October 2004 the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court granted the prosecutor’s application. 15. On 9 November 2004 the KCA asked the Ministry of Finance to resume the cancellation of debt with regard to the applicant and other individuals (see paragraph 9 above). 16. On 6 December 2004 the Ministry of Finance issued a certificate confirming the cancellation of the applicant’s outstanding debt to the State, amounting to LTL 112,896 (EUR 32,697). On that same day the bank received the certificate from the Ministry and cancelled the applicant’s debt. 17. It appears that from 23 October 2001 to 6 December 2004 the applicant did not make any loan repayments to the bank and the bank did not request any such payments. However, until September 2002 she was paying interest and late payment fines under the two loan agreements, and paid a total of LTL 5,222.26 (EUR 1,512.47). 18. On 26 January 2005 the bank informed the applicant that she owed it LTL 13,140.56 (EUR 3,805.77) in interest and late payment fines under the two loan agreements. 19. On 3 February 2005 the bank lodged a civil claim against the applicant concerning the unpaid interest and late payment fines under the loan agreement of 1994, amounting to LTL 2,909.33 (EUR 842.60). It asked the Kaunas District Court to order interim measures – seizing the applicant’s apartment. On the same day the bank unilaterally terminated the loan agreement of 2000 and asked the court to begin the forced recovery of the debt under that agreement, amounting to LTL 10,231.23 (EUR 2,963.17), by seizing the applicant’s apartment, which had been pledged to the bank as collateral. 20. On 7 February 2005 the Kaunas District Court seized the applicant’s apartment and informed her that, following her failure to repay the debt under the loan agreement of 2000 within one month, the apartment would be sold at auction. The following day the court also granted the bank’s application for interim measures concerning the loan agreement of 1994, but having found that the applicant’s apartment had already been seized, the court ordered the seizure of the applicant’s movable property, financial assets and property rights, amounting to the sum of LTL 2,909.33. 21. On 24 February 2005 the applicant submitted a counterclaim against the bank. She stated that on 23 October 2001 the KCA had restored her property rights by cancelling her debt to the State, but due to circumstances beyond the applicant’s control the Ministry of Finance had only informed the bank about the cancellation on 6 December 2004. The applicant submitted that from 23 October 2001 until 6 December 2004 she had repeatedly contacted the bank and asked it to not count the interest and late payment fines. Thus, she considered that the bank had known about the cancellation of her debt, and it was therefore unjust and unfair for it to ask her for any payments for that period, or to unilaterally terminate the loan agreement of 2000. The applicant further asserted that in the period of 2001‑2002 she had paid the bank a total of LTL 5,222.26 (EUR 1,512.47) in interest and late payment fines under the two loan agreements; she claimed that there had been no grounds for the bank to accept those payments, and asked the court to order the bank to return them to her. 22. On 22 March 2005, at the applicant’s request, the Kaunas District Court suspended the forced recovery of the debt by means of seizing the applicant’s apartment, pending the examination of the claim and counterclaim in the civil case. On 18 October 2005 the court lifted the order for seizure of the applicant’s apartment because the bank had not requested its sale at auction within the time-limit prescribed by law. 23. On 22 February 2006 the Kaunas District Court granted the bank’s civil claim in part. The court found that the applicant’s debt had only been cancelled on 6 December 2004, so there were no grounds to find that her obligation to honour the loan agreement with the bank had ended before that date. The court held that the applicant had been using the loan during the period of 2001-2004, and thus she was obliged to pay interest to the bank. Accordingly, it ordered the applicant to pay the bank LTL 2,705.52 (EUR 783.57). However, the Kaunas District Court also noted that the loan had been given to the applicant by the State and not by the bank, so the latter could not claim to have suffered any losses due to late payments. The court found no bad faith on the part of the applicant – it considered that she had had legitimate grounds to expect that the cancellation of her debt, ordered on 23 October 2001, would be implemented promptly. Accordingly, the court decided that the bank had no grounds to claim late payment fines, and ordered it to return to the applicant LTL 72.25 (EUR 20.93) which she had already paid. The applicant’s counterclaim was dismissed. 24. The applicant appealed against that judgment, but on 1 June 2006 the Kaunas Regional Court dismissed her appeal and upheld the first-instance judgment in its entirety. The court considered that the applicant had to assume the risks resulting from her agreement with A.E., which had enabled her to seek the cancellation of her outstanding debt after paying a sum that was several times lower than that debt (see paragraphs 7-8 above), especially as the bank had not been a party to that agreement. The court also noted that the delay in the cancellation of the applicant’s debt had been caused not by the actions of the bank but by those of the KCA and the prosecutor, so the bank had had the right to receive interest payments during the period in question. 25. In those proceedings, the courts did not examine whether the applicant had been under an obligation to pay interest and late payment fines under the loan agreement of 2000, because she had not made such a claim. As submitted by the applicant and not disputed by the Government, on an unspecified date in 2006 the applicant paid LTL 10,231.23 (EUR 2,963.17) in interest and late payment fines requested by the bank under that agreement. 26. On 3 July 2006 the applicant submitted to the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court a civil claim for damages against the KCA, the Prosecutor General’s Office and the Ministry of Finance. She claimed that because of the unnecessary and unjustified delay in the cancellation of her debt from 23 October 2001 until 6 December 2004, caused jointly by those three institutions, she had suffered financial losses of LTL 20,926.73 (EUR 6,060.80), consisting of interest and late payment fines paid under the two loan agreements, as well as legal expenses incurred in the civil proceedings instituted by the bank. She also claimed non-pecuniary damages of LTL 15,000 (EUR 4,344.30) for the stress and frustration caused during that delay. 27. On 13 July 2006 the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court refused to accept the applicant’s claim, on the grounds that complaints against the Prosecutor General’s Office and the Ministry of Finance – and, as a result, the entire claim – had to be examined by the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court (see paragraph 38 below). 28. On 26 April 2007 the applicant submitted to the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court a civil claim for damages against the KCA only. She again claimed pecuniary damages of LTL 20,926.73 and non-pecuniary damages of LTL 15,000 in respect of damage allegedly caused by the unjustified delay in the cancellation of her debt. The applicant argued that the KCA had acted unlawfully by suspending the restoration of her property rights and asking the prosecutor to apply for the reopening of the civil proceedings concerning the size of S.F.’s land. The Prosecutor General’s Office and the Ministry of Finance participated in the proceedings as third parties. 29. On 11 June 2007 the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s claim. It held that the principle of the rule of law obliged the KCA to ensure that the restoration of property rights was conducted in accordance with the applicable laws. The court considered that, in the presence of well-founded doubts about the actual size of the land owned by S.F., the KCA had acted lawfully and diligently by suspending the restoration of the property rights and initiating the reopening of the proceedings. The fact that the courts dealing with the reopened proceedings had found that S.F. had owned less land than initially determined (48.40 hectares and 47.91 hectares, as opposed to the initial estimate of 68.26 hectares) showed that the suspension had had a proper basis. Accordingly, the court concluded that the KCA had acted lawfully and there were no grounds to award damages to the applicant. 30. The applicant appealed against that judgment, but on 12 March 2008 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed her appeal and concluded that the KCA’s actions in initiating the suspension of its decisions concerning the restoration of property rights had been in accordance with domestic law. In addition, the Supreme Administrative Court distinguished between the KCA’s competence and that of the Ministry of Finance: while the KCA was responsible for the restoration of property rights, it was the Ministry of Finance which had the authority to cancel the applicant’s debt and issue the bank with a certificate confirming such cancellation. The KCA’s request of the Ministry of Finance to suspend the cancellation of the applicant’s debt (see paragraph 11 above) had not been legally binding on the Ministry, and had had no legal effect on the cancellation of the debt. The court further held that the suspension of restoration of the applicant’s property rights had been ordered not by the KCA but by the ruling of the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court of 21 March 2002, and the ruling had been revoked by that same court only on 26 October 2004 (see paragraphs 12 and 14 above). Accordingly, the Supreme Administrative Court concluded that the KCA could not be held responsible for the suspension of the restoration of the applicant’s property rights and the cancellation of her debt, and thus there were no grounds to award her damages.

5. The applicant company is a limited liability company registered in 2004 in Ukraine, with its registered office in Kyiv. 6. On 12 April 2005 the applicant company and another company, S., concluded an agreement by which the applicant company undertook to provide information and analytical services to S., and the latter undertook to pay for those services. On 24 November 2005 the parties concluded an additional agreement for supplementary services to be provided to S. by the applicant company. 7. On 27 April 2006 the applicant company lodged a claim against S. with the Kyiv Commercial Court, seeking recovery of an alleged debt under the above agreement, as well as the payment of penalties and legal fees. 8. On 9 June 2006 the Kyiv Commercial Court opened the proceedings in the case. 9. On 11 September 2006, during a hearing in the case, S. submitted a counterclaim, seeking that the agreement be declared void. The court adjourned the hearing until 14 September 2006 without deciding on the admissibility of the counterclaim. 10. On 14 September 2006 the judge hearing the case accepted S.’s counterclaim for joint consideration with the original claim by the applicant company. At the same hearing, the judge granted S.’s counterclaim in part and rejected the original claim of the applicant company in full. According to the record of the hearing, the hearing lasted ten minutes. 11. On 13 October 2006 the applicant company lodged an appeal on points of law against the judgment of 14 September 2006 with the Higher Commercial Court of Ukraine (“the HCCU”). It argued that the proceedings before the first-instance court had not been adversarial, and had not complied with the principle of procedural equality between the parties: the first-instance court had not provided the applicant company with an opportunity to prepare and submit observations as to S.’s counterclaim or collect and provide evidence in defence. The applicant company requested that the impugned judgment be quashed and the case remitted to the first-instance court for fresh consideration. 12. On 9 November 2006 the HCCU returned the applicant company’s appeal on points of law to it without considering the appeal on the merits, because the relevant court fee had not been paid in full. 13. On 21 November 2006 the applicant company resubmitted its appeal on points of law with proof of having paid the full court fee. The appeal on points of law was submitted together with a cover letter. In the cover letter, the applicant company set out the circumstances which had resulted in its missing the deadline for appealing on points of law, and asked the HCCU to extend the relevant time-limit and consider the appeal. Apart from that information, the cover letter contained the date, name and address of the court to which it was addressed, the case reference number, the parties’ contact details, and the disputed amount which was the subject of the case. The letter ended with a list of enclosures, the applicant company’s lawyer’s details, his signature and a stamp. 14. On 19 December 2006 the HCCU found that the applicant company had submitted the second appeal on points of law outside the time-limit provided for by Article 110 of the Code of Commercial Procedure, and had failed to enclose an application for an extension. Relying on sub-paragraph 5 of Article 111-3 § 1, the HCCU declined to consider the applicant company’s appeal on points of law. 15. On 4 January 2007 the applicant company challenged the decision of 19 December 2006 before the Supreme Court, arguing that on 21 November 2006 it had in fact applied for an extension of the time-limit for lodging the appeal on points of law with the HCCU. The application had been included in the text of the cover letter accompanying the appeal on points of law. 16. On 22 February 2007 the Supreme Court upheld the decision of 19 December 2006.

4. The applicants were placed in Menemeni police station in Thessaloniki, either in pre-trial detention or serving prison sentences. Applicants nos. 1 and 6 were detained in cell no. 1, applicants nos. 2 and 4 were detained in cell no. 2 and applicants nos. 3, 5 and 7 were detained in cell no. 3. At the time they submitted their application they had been detained for periods ranging from one to six months. 5. The first six applicants were transferred to Thessaloniki General Detention Facility on the following dates: applicant no. 2 was transferred on 30 November 2013, applicant no. 3 was transferred on 6 December 2013, applicant no. 4 was transferred on 11 February 2014, applicant no. 5 was transferred on 7 February 2014 and applicant no. 6 was transferred on 18 November 2013. The parties disputed the date on which applicant no. 1 was transferred: according to the Government’s submissions, he was transferred on 18 September 2013, whereas the applicant argued that he was transferred on 3 December 2013. According to the material in the Court’s possession, applicant no. 7 was still being detained in Menemeni police station on 24 May 2014. 6. The applicants alleged that Menemeni police station had been entirely inappropriate for long periods of detention, as in their cases. It had consisted of three cells on the first floor and two sanitary facilities situated outside the cells. Cells nos. 1 and 2 had measured 10 square metres and had accommodated four detainees each, while cell no. 3 had measured 6 square metres and had accommodated five detainees. The cells had been equipped with beds but had no blankets. The applicants further stressed that the cells had been filthy and that there had been inadequate access to natural light. Cell no. 1, in particular, had not had a window. 7. Detainees had been confined to their cells and had not been allowed to spend time outside, which had affected their psychological health. They had had to ask permission from the guards to use the restroom. Recreational activities had not been offered and cells had not been equipped with televisions. 8. Healthy detainees had been held together with drug users or sick detainees, resulting in their exposure to contagious diseases. The police station had not had the necessary means to transfer detainees to a hospital in case of emergency. 9. Instead of food, detainees had been offered 5.87 euros per day, which had not sufficed to cover their daily dietary needs, either in terms of quantity or quality. 10. On 19 November 2013 the applicants had lodged a complaint with the public prosecutor, complaining of the conditions of their detention but had not received a reply. 11. The Government submitted that Menemeni police station had been housed in a building constructed in 2008 on the basis of quality specifications necessary to ensure proper conditions of detention. It had consisted of three cells: cell no. 1 had measured 23 square metres and had three built-in beds, cell no. 2 had measured 23.3 square metres with four built-in beds and cell no. 3 had measured 26 square metres with five beds. The capacity of the police station had never been exceeded. 12. The Government affirmed that there had been two sanitary facilities with hot water outside the cells. They submitted two contracts with cleaning companies for the building for the periods in question: one from 10 June 2013 to 10 August 2013 and the other from 11 August 2013 to 11 October 2013. The contracts included cleaning the detention areas and the sanitary facilities every day and disinfecting the detention areas once a week. 13. When the number of detainees had allowed it, drug addicts had been detained separately from the rest of the detainees. In addition, the staff at Menemeni police station had made every possible effort to accommodate detainees’ needs by painting the facilities often, cleaning or replacing the bedding and by resolving any problem in general that might have risen. 14. Regarding recreational activities, the Government stressed that detainees had had unlimited access to telephone cards and that it had been standard practice for them to receive newspapers and magazines. 15. The Government confirmed that the applicants had not been provided with meals but had received 5.87 euros a day to order food from restaurants, given that police stations did not have any cooking facilities. 16. An on-call doctor had been available on a 24-hour basis in Thessaloniki Police Headquarters (Αστυνομικό Μέγαρο Θεσσαλονίκης). In urgent cases, inmates had been transferred to local hospitals. Additionally, police staff had been responsible for administering prescribed medications to detainees, as ordered by a doctor. 17. The Government pointed out that the applicants had not referred to or adduced any evidence that they had needed medical treatment which they had not received. On the contrary, according to the police station’s records, applicants nos. 4, 5 and 7 had been taken to local hospitals on various occasions.

4. The applicant was born in 1967 and lived in Rostov-on-Don prior to his arrest. 5. On 30 March 2006 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of murder. By judgment of 16 May 2006, the Orlovskiy District Court of the Rostov Region found him guilty and sentenced him to seven years’ imprisonment. On 18 July 2006 the Rostov Regional Court upheld the conviction. The applicant and his counsel lodged an application for supervisory review of the conviction. 6. On 12 April 2007 the Presidium of the Regional Court, upon hearing the prosecutor, counsel for the applicant and for the injured party, quashed the conviction for formal defects and ordered a re-trial. The Presidium directed that the applicant should be held in custody, without citing grounds for the custodial measure or setting a time-limit for its application. 7. On 26 June 2007 the District Court held a preliminary hearing and fixed the trial date for 3 July. By the same decision, the court determined that the applicant should remain in custody because he was charged with a particularly serious offence and could pervert the course of justice if released. The applicant and his counsel filed an appeal against the extension order. 8. On 31 July 2007 the Regional Court examined the appeal in the absence of the applicant and his counsel. It annulled the detention order on the ground that the District Court had failed to set a time-limit for the applicant’s detention, in breach of the requirements of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It did not take any decision regarding the applicant’s further detention and referred the issue to the District Court for a new examination. 9. On 7 September 2007 the District Court extended the applicant’s pre‑trial detention for a period of six months starting from 28 April 2007 and lasting until 28 October 2007, referring to the gravity of the charges and the applicant’s new line of defence which, in the District Court’s view, was an indication that he might abscond. On 8 October 2007 the Regional Court rejected in a summary fashion the appeal against the extension order. 10. On 15 October 2007 the District Court extended the applicant’s detention until 28 December 2007, referring to the gravity of the charges and the flight risk. On 11 December 2007 the Regional Court upheld the detention order on appeal. 11. On 13 December 2007 the District Court examined the applicant’s request for release. Noting that the trial was approaching the final stage, that the witnesses had been heard, and that the applicant had family and dependent children, the court held that the applicant could be released on bail. The applicant was released the following day. On 5 February 2008 the Regional Court quashed the bail decision, holding that the District Court had not taken proper account of the gravity of the charges. On 20 February 2008 the District Court reconsidered the matter and held that the applicant should be re-detained for a further three months on account of the gravity of the charges against him. On 26 March 2008 the Regional Court upheld the detention order on appeal. 12. On 3 March 2008 the District Court found the applicant guilty of murder and sentenced him to five years’ imprisonment. On 23 April 2008 the Regional Court upheld the conviction.

6. The applicant was born in 1949 in the Khabarovsk Region. He is serving his prison sentence in a correctional colony in the village of Kochubeyevskoe, Stavropol Region. 7. On 9 March 2006 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of aggravated murder, robbery and firearms possession. He remained in detention throughout the investigation and trial. 8. On 28 July 2006 the Stavropol Regional Court found him guilty as charged and sentenced him to nineteen years’ imprisonment in a correctional colony. 9. On 10 February 2010 the applicant was sent to serve his sentence in correctional colony no. IK-17/1 in the village of Kochubeyevskoe, Stavropol Region (“the correctional colony”). 10. When the applicant arrived at the colony the resident doctor noted that he had a first-degree disability: he was totally blind as a result of mature cataracts in both eyes. His blindness, which had developed during his detention, meant that he was unable to move around alone. In addition, he was suffering from coronary disease, hypertension, gallstones and chronic pancreatitis. He was included on a list of detainees requiring enhanced medical attention. 11. The applicant was assigned to colony unit no. 10 for special-needs detainees, which comprised a separate dormitory. It housed forty-six detainees with various disabilities or serious illnesses. The unit had a dormitory measuring 149.6 square metres, a dining room, a toilet, showers, and several offices for administrative and medical personnel. A large part of the dormitory floor area was taken up by furniture such as bunk beds, bedside tables and chairs. According to a certificate issued by the correctional colony on 13 October 2014, each detainee was afforded 2.82 square metres of living space. As is apparent from the documents and photographs submitted by the Government, the premises were not adapted for visually impaired or blind persons. 12. The authorities assigned another inmate with cardiac problems to assist the applicant with his basic needs. The inmate did not receive any remuneration for the assistance he provided to the applicant. He helped the applicant to move around the dormitory and to take showers, and guided him in the dining room. The applicant had no prison work; he remained in the unit throughout the day. 13. According to the applicant, he faced particular difficulties in orientating himself in the correctional colony. He regularly stumbled over objects, slipped and fell. Such helplessness induced anguish and despair. In 2011 he was diagnosed as having an emotionally unstable personality disorder. 14. On 21 February 2011 and 19 November 2012 a medical commission confirmed the applicant’s disability. They recommended that the authorities provide him with a walking stick, a white cane, a player for audiobooks designed for blind people, a vocal clinical thermometer and a vocal tonometer. The recommendations were never enforced. According to two entries in his medical record, on 30 November 2011 and 23 January 2013 officials asked the applicant whether he wished to receive those items. The applicant allegedly refused, but did not agree to make a written note to that effect in the medical record. 15. In September 2014 the inmate who had been assisting the applicant was released from detention and the applicant was left to fend for himself. According to a certificate issued by the authorities, he refused the assistance of other inmates. 16. On 8 February 2013 the applicant asked for a medical examination to determine whether his state of health warranted his early release. 17. On 5 April 2013 a medical commission held that as blindness was one of the diseases listed in Government Decree no. 54 of 6 February 2004 that may warrant release from a correctional institution, the applicant could be relieved from serving his sentence. 18. Relying on the conclusion of the medical commission, the applicant lodged an application with the Kochubeevskoe District Court, Stavropol Region, for release on health grounds. On 16 April 2013 the District Court dismissed the application. Referring to Ruling no. 21 of the Supreme Court of Russia dated 20 December 2011 (see paragraph 26 below), the court noted that the fact that the applicant’s illness was included in the list provided for by Government Decree no. 54 did not automatically mean that he would be released. The court cited the gravity of the crimes committed by the applicant and the length of the prison term he had yet to serve. Taking those two factors into account, the court concluded that the applicant should remain in the correctional colony. The Stavropol Regional Court upheld that judgment on appeal. 19. On 10 July 2014 the Supreme Court of Russia rejected a cassation appeal lodged by the applicant without examining it on the merits. It found that the applicant had failed to lodge the appeal within the statutory time‑limit.

5. The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Sofia. 6. In 1993 the applicant, acting as a sole trader, concluded a contract with a municipally-owned company under which she undertook to set up a shop in the city shopping centre. This contract was extended numerous times. 7. On 1 July 1996 the applicant asked the Kardzhali Municipal Council (“the municipal council”) to sell to her the first floor of the shopping centre under the preferential privatisation procedure for tenants of State- and municipally-owned property as provided for in section 35 (1) of the Transformation and Privatisation of State and Municipally-Owned Enterprises Act (Закон за преобразуване и приватизация на държавни и общински предприятия) (“the Privatisation Act”). In February 1997 the applicant was informed that the municipal council had refused her request on 29 January 1997. 8. The applicant brought judicial review proceedings challenging the refusal to sell the property to her. On 20 February 2004 the Kardzhali Regional Court quashed the council’s refusal and instructed it to open a privatisation procedure under which it would offer the applicant the option to buy the first floor of the shopping centre under preferential conditions, in accordance with the Privatisation Act. The court ordered several expert reports and determined on the basis of them that the first floor in question constituted a separate property unit, in both technical and legal terms, which could be the subject of a transaction. That finding was upheld by the Supreme Administrative Court in a final decision of 18 February 2005. 9. In the meantime, on 8 May 2001 the mayor of Kardzhali sent a notice to the applicant announcing the termination of the contract concluded in 1993 (see paragraph 6 above). On 4 June 2001 the mayor ordered the applicant’s eviction from the shop. Following an appeal by the applicant, the Burgas District Court suspended the enforcement of the order. This ruling was confirmed by the Burgas Regional Court. 10. On 24 September 2001 the mayor issued another order for the applicant’s eviction. Before it entered into force, representatives of the municipal council broke into the shop and took possession of it. The applicant complained to the district prosecutor of Kardzhali (“the district prosecutor”) about the mayor’s allegedly arbitrary action. On 9 November 2001 the district prosecutor refused to intervene or to open criminal proceedings. Subsequently the regional and appellate prosecutors upheld that refusal. 11. On 11 April 2005 the applicant requested the municipal council to open a privatisation procedure so that she could buy the first floor of the shopping centre, in accordance with the final decision of the Supreme Administrative Court of 18 February 2005 (see paragraph 8 above). The municipal council did not reply to her request, so the applicant complained to the district prosecutor about that failure to respond and asked him to open criminal proceedings. On 3 July 2006 the district prosecutor refused to open criminal proceedings, observing in particular that, given that the decision had been taken by a collective body, no individual criminal responsibility could be attached to any of its members. 12. On 20 April 2006 the municipal council decided to open a privatisation procedure in favour of the applicant in respect of part of the first floor of the shopping centre. In the same decision the council also prohibited any and all transactions aimed at disposing of the property. 13. On 16 June 2006 the mayor ordered that two expert reports be drawn up, in accordance with the relevant procedure: one in respect of the legal status of the property and another one in respect of its value. During the proceedings the relevant authorities considered that the shopping centre had not been divided into separate property units and that such a division would have to be carried out before some of those could be sold to the applicant. 14. On 24 July 2008 the municipal council authorised the mayor to open a privatisation procedure in favour of the applicant in respect of part of the shopping centre’s first floor. On 20 August 2008 the applicant brought judicial review proceedings in respect of the tacit refusal of the municipality to offer to her the whole first floor of the shopping centre and not just a part of it. While those proceedings were pending, on 29 September 2008 the municipal council and the applicant, acting as a sole trader, signed a contract under which the applicant purchased the part of the first floor of the shopping centre offered by the council. The applicant’s challenge to the municipality’s tacit refusal was dismissed as inadmissible by the Kardzhali Administrative Court on 7 October 2009. The court found that the municipality’s failure to sell to her the entirety of the property, as decided in the final judgment of 18 February 2005 in the applicant’s favour (see paragraph 8 above), did not constitute a new refusal to initiate a privatisation procedure; rather, it represented a failure on the part of the authorities in question to comply with the said final judgment ordering the start of that privatisation procedure. This ruling was upheld by the Supreme Administrative Court on 22 January 2010. 15. In the meantime, the applicant lodged a claim for damages against the municipal council under the State and Municipalities Responsibility for Damage Act 1988 (“the SMRDA”). She sought damages in respect of the municipal council’s failure to open a privatisation procedure by means of offering to sell to her the whole first floor of the shopping centre. Her claim concerned the period between the date of the final judgment of 18 February 2005 and the date of her lodging the claim for damages – 18 December 2007. 16. The Sofia Administrative Court rejected her claim on 10 November 2008. The court found in particular that the applicant had not proved her claim in respect of the pecuniary damages she had sought, given that there had been no certainty that, had the municipality made an offer, she would have actually paid the price for the property and thus completed the deal. As regards her claim for non-pecuniary damages, the court found that the applicant’s great emotional suffering was established during the trial. However, the suffering was more intense during the several months immediately following the municipal council’s initial refusal to sell the premises to the applicant. The court further noted during a hearing on 21 April 2008 that the applicant had interrupted her activities as a sole trader at the time, having moved to another city with her family. Given that it had not been demonstrated that the applicant had felt resentment and tension specifically as a result of the failure to enforce the judgment in her favour, no award for non-pecuniary damage was due to her. 17. The applicant appealed before the Supreme Administrative Court which upheld the lower court’s findings in a final decision of 31 May 2010. 18. The applicant continued to pursue the purchase, under the preferential privatisation procedure, of the remaining part of the shopping centre’s first floor. That part was identified as consisting of two separate units, which she claimed were due to her on the basis of the final judgment of 18 February 2005. In response to a request made by the applicant on 21 June 2013 to be offered to buy the remaining part of the shopping centre’s first floor, the municipal council decided in December 2013, on the advice of the municipal council’s counsel, as well as on the basis of various expert reports, to offer her the option to buy the remaining part of the shopping centre’s first floor. 19. On 18 August 2014 the municipal council sold to the applicant the outstanding part of the first floor of the shopping centre. 20. On 12 September 2014, the applicant leased one of her recently acquired property units to a third party, a company. The terms of the lease were for the period of twenty years and for the price of 50,000 euros (EUR).

4. The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Kalinkovichi. 5. On 29 March 2008 the applicant was stopped by a Russian customs officer at the border crossing into Belarus. After having checked the applicant’s documents, the officer informed the applicant that, having failed to declare his Opel car when entering Russia, he had infringed the Russian customs regulations. The officer instituted administrative proceedings against the applicant and impounded his car. 6. On 11 June 2008 Colonel B., Head of the Novozybkov Customs Post of the Bryansk Customs Office, examined the applicant’s case. He found the applicant liable for having failed to declare the car and ordered him to pay a fine in the amount of 35,509.50 Russian roubles (RUB). He further ruled that the applicant’s car, which had been impounded by customs, should be returned to the applicant. The applicant appealed. 7. On an unspecified date the Novozybkov Town Court of the Bryansk Region fixed the hearing for 8 August 2008. 8. On 8 August 2008 the Town Court examined the applicant’s appeal and upheld the decision of 11 June 2008. The court heard the case in the applicant’s absence. In the operative part of the judgment, the court advised the applicant of his right to appeal against the judgment adopted by the Town Court. 9. According to the applicant, the letter from the Town Court notifying him of the date and time of the court hearing reached him on 9 August 2008. 10. On 26 September 2008 the applicant received a copy of the Town Court’s judgment of 8 August 2008 by post. 11. On an unspecified date the applicant lodged an appeal with the Bryansk Regional Court. On 13 November 2008 the Regional Court sent a letter to the applicant informing him that his appeal was dismissed. 12. The subsequent request by the applicant for supervisory review was dismissed by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation on 26 January 2009. 13. On 20 August 2009 the Acting Head of the Novozybkov Customs Post of the Bryansk Customs Office discontinued the enforcement proceedings in respect of the decision of 11 June 2008. He noted that the applicant was a foreign national and had no assets or known place of residence in the Russian Federation and that it was impossible to enforce the decision of 11 June 2008 on account of the expiry of the relevant time-limit. 14. On 24 August 2009 the Bryansk Customs certified that (1) the decision concerning the applicant’s administrative liability had come into force on 15 July 2009; and (2) the applicant had failed to reclaim his car within a month of that date. 15. On an unspecified date the regional agency in charge of the federal property applied to the Town Court seeking to reclaim the applicant’s car as bona vacantia. 16. On 12 November 2009 the Town Court granted the agency’s claims in full. It took into account that, as claimed by the agency, the applicant had been repeatedly summoned to the regional customs office to pick up his car. According to the documents submitted by the Government, the court decided to hear the case in the applicant’s absence given that he had been duly notified of the hearing and chose not to attend. The applicant did not appeal. 17. On 2 June 2010 the judgment of 12 November 2009 was enforced. 18. On 19 March 2012 the leaders of the Strategy-31 movement notified the Mayor of Moscow of their intention to organise a rally (from 6 to 8 p.m.) at Triumfalnaya Square in the centre of Moscow and a march (from 8 to 8.30 p.m.) from Triumfalnaya Square down Tverskaya Street to Manezh Square on 31 March 2012 (Saturday). Approximately 1,500 people were expected to attend. The events were organised to promote the right to peaceful assembly as set forth in Article 31 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation and the freedom of Parliamentary elections in Russia. 19. On 20 March 2012 the Government of Moscow refused to agree on the venues for the rally and the march. According to the authorities, there was archeological and construction work going on in Triumfalnaya Square and the march, according to the indicated route, would “disrupt the normal functioning of the city’s infrastructure and traffic [and] infringe the rights and interests of people who would not take part [in the rally and the march]”. The authorities further suggested two alternative venues for the planned events, also located in the centre of Moscow. 20. On 29 March 2012 the leaders of the Strategy-31 movement informed the Mayor of Moscow that the rally would take place at the venue indicated in their notification of 19 March 2012. 21. On 31 March 2012 the rally was held as planned by its organisers at Triumfalnaya Square. The applicant took part. At 6.30 p.m. he was arrested and brought to the police station. According to the arrest record, the applicant had taken part in an unauthorised gathering and chanted slogans such as “Down with Putin”, “Let us stop the dictatorship” and “Fascism shall not pass”. 22. On 17 April 2012 the Justice of the Peace of Precinct no. 367 of the Tverskoy District of Moscow found that the rally held on 31 March 2012 had been organised in contravention of the existing procedure and that the applicant had taken part in it without having verified whether it had been legitimate. The court found the applicant administratively liable for violation of the established procedure for organising a public assembly and fined him RUB 500. The applicant appealed. 23. On 21 May 2012 the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow upheld the decision of 17 April 2012 on appeal.

5. On 9 June 2004, the applicant, 69 at the time, was walking in the centre of Kharkiv and was hit in the face by a pellet fired from an air gun. 6. The applicant was admitted to hospital the same day and the pellet was removed from her face. It was subsequently seized as evidence by the police. The doctors noted in the applicant’s medical file that she had a gunshot wound on the infraorbital region of her face. 7. Later that day she lodged a criminal complaint with the police. The applicant alleged that the shot had been fired from a particular flat in a building in the centre of Kharkiv. 8. From 10 to 26 June 2004 the applicant underwent outpatient medical treatment for her injury. 9. On 2 July 2004, at the request of the police, she was examined by an expert, who concluded that the applicant’s injury was of a minor degree and might have been caused by a gunshot. On 31 October 2005 the applicant underwent an additional medical examination, which confirmed the previous conclusion. 10. By decisions of 22 March and 8 December 2005 and 9 August 2006, the police refused to open criminal proceedings, stating that it was not possible to identify the offenders and that the applicant’s allegations that the shot had been fired from a particular location were unfounded. They further found that there had been no serious breach of public order in the applicant’s case and noted that the applicant could have lodged a criminal complaint directly with a court in the framework of private prosecution proceedings. Despite her repeated requests, the applicant was not given access to the police investigation file related to the incident of 9 June 2004. 11. On appeal by the applicant, those decisions were annulled by different prosecutors and the courts generally on the grounds that the police enquiry had fallen short of the requirements of a full and objective examination of the circumstances of the case. It was noted that the police had failed to examine the relevant evidence, including the pellet, and that the case contained elements of the crime defined by Article 296 of the Criminal Code (hooliganism). In particular, on 21 August 2007 the Dzerzhynskyy District Court of Kharkiv ruled that the case should be returned to the prosecutors for further investigation. 12. No further investigation was carried out after that date. 13. By a letter of 21 August 2009, the Deputy Prosecutor of the Dzerzhynskyy District of Kharkiv informed the applicant that the investigation case file had gone missing. There is no information as to any further developments in that regard. 14. On 7 November 2009 the applicant died. Her death was unrelated to the incident of 9 June 2004.

4. The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Vienna. He worked as a civil servant for the Ministry of Economics and Labour (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit). 5. On 23 August 2004 the Disciplinary Prosecutor (Disziplinaranwalt) of the Ministry of Economics and Labour reported to the Disciplinary Council (Disziplinarkommission) of the Ministry of Economics and Labour that it suspected the applicant of having committed disciplinary offences. The report indicated that the applicant had been working on a project for the implementation of an electronic administration system for foreign trade since 2001. The Disciplinary Prosecutor accused the applicant of not having conducted an award procedure (Vergabeverfahren). Furthermore, the applicant had allegedly placed orders without consulting the Ministry and asking for permission beforehand. He had thereby caused damage amounting to around 200,000 euros (EUR). Furthermore, he had disobeyed orders from the Ministry and subsequently tampered with the files. He had therefore breached his official duties (Verletzung der Dienstpflicht). 6. In his submissions of 7 September 2004, the applicant contested these accusations. 7. On 1 October 2004 the Disciplinary Council of the Ministry of Economics and Labour decided not to institute disciplinary proceedings against the applicant as it considered that prosecution of the reported offences had become time-barred. 8. On 30 December 2004 the Appeals Commission at the Federal Chancellery (Berufungskommission beim Bundeskanzleramt) allowed the appeal of the Disciplinary Prosecutor and quashed the decision by the Disciplinary Council. It held that the authority had only learned about the applicant’s offences on 1 July 2004 and therefore prosecution had not become time-barred. 9. On 25 January 2005 the Disciplinary Council decided to institute disciplinary proceedings against the applicant. 10. On 7 April 2005 the Appeals Commission dismissed the applicant’s appeal against this decision. 11. On 11 October 2005, the Vienna Public Prosecutor informed the applicant that criminal investigations against him on the grounds of suspected embezzlement had been discontinued. 12. On 15 March 2006 the Constitutional Court (Verfassungsgerichtshof) dismissed the applicant’s complaint against the Appeals Commission’s decision of 7 April 2005 (see paragraph 10 above). 13. Meanwhile, on 20 December 2005, the Disciplinary Council had decided to summon the applicant to an oral hearing and specified the offences of which he was accused, namely the breach of official duties. 14. On 28 February 2006 the Appeals Commission dismissed the applicant’s appeal against this decision. 15. On 6 December 2006 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint against the decision of the Appeals Commission of 28 February 2006. 16. Meanwhile, on 1, 24 and 27 March 2006 the applicant had lodged three requests for the re-opening of the disciplinary proceedings on issues which had already been decided by the authorities at previous stages. He had further requested that the proceedings before the Disciplinary Council be stayed and that no oral hearings be held as long as the proceedings concerning his complaints before the Constitutional Court were pending (see paragraphs 12 and 15 above). 17. On 7 April 2006 the Ministry of Economics and Labour ex officio placed the applicant in retirement as from 1 May 2006. It held that the applicant was suffering from a personality disorder, was not able to exercise his official duties and was therefore unfit for service. 18. In spite of the applicant’s request to stay the disciplinary proceedings (see paragraph 16 above), the Disciplinary Council held oral hearings on 27, 28 and 31 March, 5 April, 2, 3, 22, 23 and 24 May and 28 June 2006. 19. On 28 June 2006 the Disciplinary Council convicted the applicant of breach of official duties and imposed the disciplinary penalty of loss of all his rights and entitlements from his public employment. The applicant appealed. 20. On 20 July 2006 the Appeals Commission rejected the applicant’s request for re-opening of 24 March 2006 (see paragraph 16 above). 21. On 5 September 2006 the Disciplinary Council rejected the applicant’s requests for re-opening of 1 and 27 March 2006 (see paragraph 16 above). On the same day, the applicant lodged an application for transfer of jurisdiction to the superior authority (Devolutionsantrag) with the Appeals Commission. 22. On 14 December 2006 the Appeals Commission quashed the Disciplinary Council’s decision of 28 June 2006 (see paragraph 19 above) and remitted the case to the Disciplinary Council on the grounds that the Disciplinary Council had not sufficiently assessed the evidence before it. It found several procedural errors and ordered the Disciplinary Council to appoint a psychiatric expert to establish whether the applicant could be held accountable for his actions. 23. On 9 January 2007 the Appeals Commission rejected the application for transfer of jurisdiction to the superior authority and on 15 March 2007 it dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the Disciplinary Council’s decision of 5 September 2006 (see paragraph 21 above). 24. Between 21 September 2007 and 16 June 2008 the Disciplinary Council held several hearings, in the course of which it appointed a psychiatric expert to submit a report on whether the applicant could be held responsible for his actions. Since, despite several previous summonses, the applicant failed to appear before the expert, on 4 April 2008 the Disciplinary Council requested the expert to deliver his opinion on the basis of the medical certificates and expertises obtained so far in parallel proceedings. 25. Meanwhile, on 23 October 2007, the Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the decision of the Ministry of Economics and Labour of 7 April 2006, and the applicant’s compulsory retirement became final (see paragraph 17 above). 26. On 20 June 2008 the Disciplinary Council again convicted the applicant of breach of official duties and imposed as punishment the loss of all his rights. 27. On 2 December 2008 the Appeals Commission quashed the decision again and remitted the case to the Disciplinary Council on similar grounds to those set out in its decision of 14 December 2006 (see paragraph 22 above). 28. Thereupon the Disciplinary Council held oral hearings on 27 April, 5 and 18 May, 3, 4 and 10 June and 1 July 2009. 29. On 1 July 2009 the Disciplinary Council decided that the applicant was not guilty of having committed a breach of his official duties. In its reasoning the Disciplinary Council noted that there were doubts as to whether the applicant could be held responsible for his actions at the relevant time. The Disciplinary Prosecutor appealed against this decision. 30. By decision of 28 October 2009, the Appeals Commission upheld in essence the reasoning of the Disciplinary Council and dismissed the Disciplinary Prosecutor’s appeal. Subsequently, the Disciplinary Prosecutor filed a complaint with the Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgerichtshof). 31. On 2 July 2010, after the Disciplinary Prosecutor had withdrawn her complaint, the Administrative Court discontinued the proceedings and ordered the Disciplinary Prosecutor to reimburse the applicant’s expenses in the amount of EUR 1,106.40. This decision was served on the applicant’s counsel on 3 August 2010. 32. By judgment of the Vienna Court of Appeal of 25 May 2011 concerning the official liability proceedings instituted by the applicant, he was awarded EUR 4,608, corresponding to the costs of his appeals against the Disciplinary Council’s decisions of 28 June 2006 and 20 June 2008 (see paragraphs 19 and 26 above), which were both quashed by the Appeals Commission due to procedural errors and lack of reasoning (see paragraphs 22 and 27 above).

5. The first applicant, born in 1953, is the sister of the second applicant, born in 1946, the aunt of the third applicant, born in 1984, and the daughter of the fourth applicant, born in 1920. The first, second and third applicants live in Lviv. The fourth applicant having died in January 2013, the first applicant expressed the wish to pursue the proceedings in her stead. 6. On 27 July 2002 the Air Force of Ukraine organised a military aviation show in the “Sknyliv” airdrome in Lviv (“the Sknyliv air show”) to commemorate the sixtieth anniversary of the 14th Air Force Corps. The agenda for the event included a static display of military aircraft and other equipment and a live aerobatics show by military pilots. 7. The event was attended by several thousand individuals, including the third applicant; Mrs Natalya Mykhayliv, the first applicant’s daughter; her spouse Mr Andriy Mykhayliv and their two daughters Natalya and Andriana, born in 1994 and 1998 respectively. 8. During the aerobatics performance, an SU-27 military aircraft piloted by Colonels V.T. and Y.Y. crashed into the static aircraft display site where there were numerous spectators, where it exploded. Both pilots had successfully ejected before the explosion. As a result of the crash, seventy-seven people died and nearly three hundred sustained injuries. 9. Four members of the Mykhayliv family died on the spot. The third applicant suffered a post-traumatic stress reaction. 10. According to the applicants, following the accident, the military authorities immediately started cleaning up the site, shovelling the bodies into a pile, washing off the blood and small organic remains, and burying body fragments under the sand to conceal the evidence of the disaster. They also attempted to prevent people from photographing and filming. Senior Air Force staff and civilian authorities occupying the VIP lounge fled in panic, causing a traffic jam and obstructing access to the site for police and medical professionals. 11. The Government contested this account. They noted, in particular, that the law-enforcement authorities had arrived promptly at the scene and had not recorded any instances of inappropriate conduct by the military personnel present there. According to them, the bodies of the victims were inspected by the police at the scene and then carefully transported to mortuaries for forensic examination and identification. 12. Following the accident, the first and third applicants went to the mortuary in search of their relatives’ remains. According to them, they were obliged to wait long hours in the heat before being allowed to enter the premises. Once inside, they had to search through numerous bodies and body fragments piled up on the floor to identify those of their relatives. Unrefrigerated remains, which were decomposing in the heat, emitted a terrible odour. 13. On 5 August 2002 a panel of forensic experts examined the bodies of Mr and Mrs Mykhayliv and their daughters, and concluded that they had sustained fatal cerebral trauma and numerous other injuries. In particular, Mr Mykhayliv had sustained a severe concussion; the head of Mrs Mykhayliv had been completely destroyed; the heads of the children had been partly destroyed, with fragments missing. The documents on file indicate that the experts’ conclusions were based on external examination of the bodies. 14. The applicants submitted that the bodies had been autopsied in spite of the first applicant’s objections. 15. On an unspecified date the applicants collected the bodies of Mr and Mrs Mykhayliv and their daughters and buried them in the Yanivske cemetery in Lviv. According to the applicants, one of the girls had a gold earring missing. They further submitted that the head of Mrs Mykhayliv had been extracted from the crashed aircraft engine and, in spite of their pleas, had not been returned to them along with some other unspecified body fragments. 16. The Government submitted that unidentified body fragments of the Sknyliv accident victims had been buried in a common grave in the Goloskivske cemetery in Lviv after all reasonably available possibilities of identifying them had been exhausted. They also provided several documents produced by the General Prosecutor’s Office in August and September 2002, apparently in response to the first applicant’s requests for further measures to be taken with a view to identifying body fragments, including a distorted female head, as possibly belonging to her deceased relatives. It appears from these documents that the chief investigator ordered some of the measures requested by the first applicant but rejected other requests as unfounded. It was also noted in the documents that, while the authorities had had a distorted female head in their possession, it could not have belonged to Mrs Mykhayliv, because, according to the expert findings, her head had been completely destroyed. 17. On various dates several concurrent investigations were opened to establish the circumstances of the accident, including investigation by a special Government Commission set up for this purpose, the Ministry of Defence, the Lviv City Council, the Prosecutor’s Office, and Sknyliv Tragedy, a non-governmental organisation founded by survivors of the accident and those who had lost relatives at the air show. 18. On 27 July 2002 the President of Ukraine set up a special Commission (the Government Commission for the investigation of the causes of the catastrophe of the military aircraft of the Air Force of Ukraine; “the Special Commission”) with a specific mandate to investigate the circumstances of the accident and coordinate assistance to its victims. The Commission was chaired by the President of the National Security and Defence Council. Other members of the Commission included senior officials from the Ministries of Emergencies, Transport, Finances, Health, Interior and Social Protection, officers of the Security Service of Ukraine, the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces, the State Aviation Transport Department, and the Lviv Regional State Administration. The Commission also engaged several experts from the “Sukhoy” construction bureau (the SU-27 aircraft manufacturer, Russia) and two test pilots from the Russian Federation as aviation experts. 19. Following the investigation, which included inspecting the accident site, interviewing individuals involved in the organisation of the air show and examining the relevant documents, as well as deciphering data from the flight data recorders, on an unspecified date in 2002 the Special Commission reported on the facts as follows. 20. In June 2002 Colonel-General V.S. (the Air Force Commander-in-Chief) authorised the aerobatics show at the request of Lieutenant-General S.O. (the 14th Corps Commander). The Air Force Headquarters appointed a mixed team of officers from different units, including Colonel V.T., from Kirovske, Crimea as the first pilot; Colonel Y.Y., of the Air Force Headquarters, stationed in Vinnytsia, as the second pilot; and Lieutenant-Colonel Y.Ya., stationed in Mirgorod, as the aerobatic performance director. Lieutenant-General A.T. and Major-General A.L., both stationed locally in Lviv with the 14th Corps Command, were also designated to join the mission, one as “air show flights director” and the other as “chief safety officer”. 21. On 24 July 2002 V.T., Y.Y. and Y.Ya. carried out their only training flight as a team. On the orders of the Air Force Headquarters, the flight took place at a military aerodrome in Ozerne, near Zhitomir. According to the Special Commission, that flight could not qualify as a rehearsal for the performance at the air show, as it included a different sequence of manoeuvres; its purpose was rather to improve and practise piloting techniques. The Commission also established that V.T. had requested an additional training flight in Ozerne and that his request had been turned down by the command, citing a shortage of fuel. Although the air show preparation programme included an on-site rehearsal flight on 26 July 2002, the 14th Corps Commander decided to cancel it for the same reason. The pilots were not formally apprised of the boundaries of the aerobatics zone or the placement of spectators. 22. Before the show, the pilots were provided with a different aircraft from the one in which they had carried out their training flight. There was a certain asynchronism in the performance of the right and left engines of this aircraft. Overall, however, it was in an acceptable technical condition and remained fully operational until it crashed. The aircraft had been supplied with extra fuel in order to enable the pilots to return to Ozerne without landing at the site of the air show. The fact that the pilots had trained in a different aircraft and with less fuel had a negative impact on their readiness for performing aerobatic displays. For unspecified reasons, the pilots decided to take off without the mandatory anti-gravitation suits (“g-suits”). On arrival at the Sknyliv aerodrome, the pilots immediately started the performance, without taking any time to familiarise themselves with the site, which was new to them. During the performance, the aircraft exited the designated aerobatics zone, the boundary of which was some 150 metres from the spectators’ area. Neither A.T. nor Y.Ya., directing the flight from the ground, warned them of that fact or directed them to return to the designated zone. Still outside of the zone, V.T. decided to perform a certain aerobatic display (called “the trunk”), which he had never practised before and which was not included in his mission order. He made a technical mistake in its performance and, as the second pilot did not intervene when appropriate, the pilots lost control of the aircraft and it started falling. Subsequent efforts by the crew to regain altitude were futile. Accordingly, the Special Commission concluded that the principal cause of the accident was a technical mistake on the part of the first pilot in performing a manoeuvre which he had not been commissioned to perform. It also noted that the prompt and appropriate intervention of the second pilot could have saved the situation and that loss of life and damage to health could have been avoided had the ground crew properly guided the pilots to stay within the aerobatics zone. 23. The Special Commission also noted serious shortcomings in the organisation of the air show, including poor coordination between various officers and authorities involved in its preparation; unsatisfactory crew training, and lack of appropriate emergency and spectator-safety planning, which contributed to the disaster. The Commission noted, in particular, as follows: “The serious consequences of the aviation catastrophe ... were the result of irresponsibility, negligence, lack of discipline, official neglect and breach of applicable regulations ... on the part of many leading officers of the Armed Forces, in particular, the generals and officers of the Air Force Headquarters. The tragedy was also the result of the absence of a system of effective supervision of the execution of orders ... by the respective air force officials – from its Commander-in-Chief to the members of the crew of the SU-27. As a result, the generals and officers involved in the preparation and staging of [the air show] were not apprised of the real state of affairs concerning the necessary measures to be carried out, while the immediate participants in the aerobatic performance proved to be ill-prepared for it.” 24. The Special Commission criticised, in particular, V.S. (the Air Force Commander-in-Chief) and his colleagues from the Air Force Headquarters responsible for the military training – Lieutenant-General O.V. and Major-General V.A. – for not having developed appropriate specific normative guidelines for the aerobatic performances. In the Commission’s view, these were much needed given the lack of general regulations on the relevant matters. The Special Commission also criticised V.S. and his colleagues for not having ensured a proper distribution of tasks between their subordinates engaged in the show and their direct supervision on behalf of the Air Force Headquarters. In the Special Commission’s opinion, such supervision was particularly important in view of the involvement in the show of officers from different military units that were not subordinate to each other and not accustomed to performing any tasks together. It also noted that Lieutenant-General S.O. (the 14th Corps Commander) and his subordinates, in particular Major-General A.T. and Colonel A.L. (the 14th Corps chief flight safety officer), had failed to put in place any meaningful land-and-air safety precautions plan. In addition, the Special Commission regretted S.O.’s decision to cancel the on-site rehearsal flight and concluded that the officers designated to direct the flight as ground crew (A.T. and Y.Ya.) had had no relevant experience or clearance for such a mission. 25. The Special Commission also reported on numerous procedural breaches on the part of the local administration and municipal authorities in authorising the air show. In particular, K., deputy mayor of Lviv with responsibility for humanitarian issues, had exceeded his authority in authorising it instead of the mayor himself. The mayor, having learned of the military authorities’ initiative to organise the air show, took little action to coordinate the relevant preparatory activities. The show was authorised without the involvement of the competent officers and services legally responsible for carrying out assessments of the relevant safety risks and for taking the necessary prevention and response measures. The local authorities also failed to set up a necessary air show coordination committee and to organise a safety inspection of the aerodrome site before the show. 26. In September 2002 the Ministry of Defence produced a Report on the internal investigation, largely reiterating the findings of the Special Commission. In particular, it concurred that the immediate cause of the accident was the first pilot’s unforeseen misconduct, whose grave consequences could have been avoided or mitigated, were it not for the second pilot’s and the ground crew’s failure to intervene in good time. It also recognised that the organisation of the air show had been marked by significant shortcomings, including an unsatisfactory land and air safety precautions plan; refusal to arrange at least one training flight for the crew over the Sknyliv aerodrome; and poor supervision by the Air Force Headquarters and the 14th Corps Command of the preparatory activities. In addition, it was noted that the necessary regulatory framework was missing, and the organisers had drawn guidelines from the regulations on ordinary military training, which were not adapted for staging air shows for civilian spectators. 27. Referring to the conclusions of the investigation, on 6 September 2002 the Minister of Defence issued order no. 305 (On the unsatisfactory organisation of the demonstration flight and the SU-27 aircraft disaster at the Sknyliv aerodrome), whereby a number of officers engaged in the organisation of the show were subjected to disciplinary sanctions. In particular, Lieutenant-General S.O. (the 14th Corps Commander) was demoted; Lieutenant-General O.V., (Deputy Air Force Commander-in-Chief on military training) was dismissed from the military “for unsatisfactory performance of service duties in respect of the preparation for and supervision of the air show at the Sknyliv aerodrome, and for personal irresponsibility”; Major-General V.A. was dismissed from the military “for a negligent attitude to the performance of service duties and low personal executive discipline”; and four other high-ranking Air Force officers received warnings and were subjected to other sanctions. In addition, Colonel‑General V.S., the Air Force Commander-in-Chief, was also dismissed from the military service on disciplinary grounds, and the new Air Force Commander-in-Chief was instructed to impose disciplinary sanctions on “other officers guilty of breaches of duty during the preparation and staging of the air show”. The issue of disciplinary responsibility for the pilots of the crashed aircraft and the ground crew which had operated their flight, was reserved pending a criminal investigation of the accident. 28. On 22 October 2002 the Lviv City Council Special Temporary Investigation Commission delivered its report. It stated that numerous authorities shared, to various extents, common responsibility for the poor organisation of the show. It noted, in particular, that: “2.2. ... in the course of the preparation and staging of the demonstration flights ... the military establishments, the specialised central State aviation facilities and departments, the municipal authorities and their particular officers failed to comply with a number of provisions of the current law, governing the procedure of preparation and staging the events of such a scale, which failures, to various extents, resulted in the catastrophe and such a major loss of human life ...” 29. The Commission concluded that the local authorities had played an ancillary role in the organisation of the air show. However, they had acted negligently in authorising it in breach of formal procedures and without soliciting all relevant information from the military authorities. They had also failed to develop an appropriate emergency prevention and response plan for the air show. According to the Commission, the municipal authority had been completely disengaged from any safety-related decision-making and its overall performance had been marked by “...a certain confusion and lack of clear understanding by the higher officers of the scope of their responsibilities.” In view of this, the Commission recommended that the City Council evaluate the performance of the Mayor and other municipal officers and clarify its policy concerning the distribution of functions between them. It also invited the Mayor to impose disciplinary sanctions on his staff members who were at fault for breach of duty. 30. The Commission next concluded that the negligence of the city authority had not been a direct cause of the accident, and attributed the primary responsibility for it to the military authorities, having provided the following overall political assessment of the accident: “[the accident is] ... a consequence of the generally irresponsible policy of the National Government, which has neglected reformation of the Army and the Navy, leading to a loss unprecedented for a civilised country... of military efficiency and patriotic spirit, criminally negligent performance of their official duties by the military command at all levels, loss of pride in the military service and marginalisation of the material and technical procurement of the armed forces and military servicemen ... “... [the accident] ... demonstrated the inadequacy of the current legal framework, the inadequacy of the State control system in respect of flight safety; irresponsible and negligent performance by officers at all levels of their duties under the law in force; the need to establish civilian control over the activities of the army; and the need to modernise and effectively reform the armed forces of Ukraine ...” 31. On 1 October 2003 the Sknyliv Tragedy Lviv-based NGO founded by the relatives of the accident victims and its survivors published its own investigation report based on interviews and other information collected from public and private sources. In addition, the report featured an assessment of V.T.’s piloting techniques by S., a civil aviation pilot, who had lost family members at the Sknyliv air show. 32. Similarly to the reports produced by the governmental authorities, the authors of this report concluded that the immediate cause of the crash was error by the first pilot in performing a manoeuvre, which had been neither envisaged by his mission order nor practised by him before the show, while the second pilot and ground crew did not take the opportunity to intervene in respect of the first pilot’s conduct. In addition to that, in the opinion of the authors of the report, the Air Force Commander-in-Chief and the 14th Corps Commander, who had been watching the performance from the VIP lounge, had also failed to act to prevent the accident, as they had had direct radio connection with the ground crew and could have intervened at any moment. 33. Notwithstanding the aforementioned findings, in the opinion of the authours of the report, the accident had largely resulted from a structural problem. The responsibility for it had to be borne by numerous entities, including the Ministry of Defence, the Air Force Headquarters, the authorities of the 14th Air Force Corps, the Lviv city and regional authorities, and the civil aviation authorities (the Ukraviatrans State Aviation Transport Department and the Ukraerorukh State Company), which had given permission for the aerobatic performance without checking its terms of reference. 34. In particular, the authors of the report considered that the pilots’ mission had been poorly developed and had not been properly communicated to all parties involved. The mission order approved on 12 July 2002 by Lieutenant-General O.V. of the Air Force Headquarters was at variance with the aircraft specifications. A subsequent explanatory document to the mission order approved by Colonel O.K., the first pilot’s direct supervisor, was inconsistent with these specifications and with the aforementioned mission order. None of these documents specified such important parameters of the mission as engine performance mode, attack angles and acceleration coefficient to be observed during particular manoeuvres. Marginal flight parameters, such as minimum speed and height and maximal attack angle, which had been developed by the 14th Air Force Corps officers, were unsuitable for the performance of most of the manoeuvres which formed part of the event programme. 35. The authors of the report also criticised the 14th Corps Command for designating too small an aerobatics zone, (2,500x1,600 metres, when 3,514 x2,000 metres would have been required). They noted that it was technically impossible for the pilots to perform their programme within the boundaries of this zone and not to find themselves above the spectators’ heads. 36. Finally, the report also attributed part of the responsibility for the accident to the local municipal and regional authorities, which had disengaged themselves from any safety-related and emergency-prevention planning as well as to the civil aviation authorities (the Ukraviatrans and Ukraviarukh State agencies) for giving authorisations for the air space to be used in breach of the relevant procedural rules. 37. On 27 July 2002 the Western Region Military Prosecutor’s Office instituted criminal proceedings to investigate the circumstances of the accident. 38. On 28 July 2002 the case was transferred for investigation to the General Prosecutor’s Office and assigned to the Deputy Chairman of the Investigation Division of the Chief Department for Military Prosecutors’ Offices. The team of some twenty investigators and other officers from the military prosecutor’s office dedicated to the case was supplemented by nineteen civilian investigative officers from the Lviv Regional Prosecutor’s Office, department of the interior and the State Security Service. The composition of the team was modified on several occasions, each time consisting of both military and civilian officers. 39. On 4 February 2003 the prosecution commissioned an aviation expert assessment, which was carried out by a group of four Air Force officers in active service, a retired Air Force flight safety specialist and a civilian aviation expert. 40. On 15 April 2003 the group produced its report, in which it concurred with the earlier findings made by the Special Commission and other entities concerning the principal causes of the accident. As regards the quality of the organisation of the show, the experts found that the pilots’ mission as such had not been incompatible with the SU-27 specifications, and that the size and location of the aerobatics zone had been acceptable. At the same time, in the experts’ view, the organisational flaws had included, among others, a failure on the part of the superior officers to draw up comprehensive documents and guidelines in order for the crew to understand the scope of their mission, and to supervise more closely the execution of orders. 41. On 30 May 2003 the civilian expert engaged in the above assessment issued a separate opinion in which he stated, inter alia, that in his view the aerobatics zone had been too small; its location had been inherently dangerous and the pilots’ mission order had been incompatible with the SU‑27 specifications. 42. On 2 June 2003 the prosecutor’s office solicited an opinion from two other experts, both retired USSR Air Force officers, who at the material time had been on the staff of the Air Force scientific centre for combat application, to clarify the matters in dispute and other questions. 43. On 11 June 2003 the investigation obtained a conclusion by these two experts, in which they reported of numerous shortcomings in the air show organisation. In addition to the shortcomings pointed in the earlier Special Commission’s report, they concluded that the aerobatics zone was too small; the boundaries of the zone were not clearly marked on site so as to be visible from the aircraft, which factor impaired the pilots’ ability to orient themselves; the location of the aerobatics zone was potentially dangerous in case of any unforeseen situation; the airfield’s preparation for the show was carried out without any account being taken of the possibility of pilot error or any other emergency; the crew did not receive a single mission order defining its mission according to all applicable standards; various documents defining its flight parameters were not comprehensive and not fully consistent with each other; the officers of the flight safety service failed to reveal the above shortcomings; the pilots were allowed to take off without g-suits and their preparedness being checked by any competent authority; the position of “air show flights director” assigned to Major-General A.T., which did not feature in any military training documents, appeared to be redundant; it paralleled that of the ordinary aerodrome flights director, with a lack of clarity as to the distribution of authority between the two officers; neither Major-General A.T. nor Colonel Y.Ya., who directed the flight, had the proper clearance, experience, and qualifications; and there was no assessment of the quality of the first pilot’s piloting technique during the training flight in Ozerne on 24 July 2002. In practice, the pilots’ training was coordinated and supervised only by Colonel O.D., stationed at the Ozerne aerodrome, who had neither the authority nor the qualifications to assess their preparedness. The experts also noted that, regard being had to the army hierarchy, it was for the Air Force Commander-in-Chief to issue an appropriate formal order clearly designating the officers responsible for the mission and determining their personal responsibilities, as well as to bear responsibility for their proper training, since the programme envisaged the involvement of crew members and the use of equipment from various military units. 44. According to the experts, these and other shortcomings constituted breaches of numerous provisions contained in the relevant regulatory framework, including special military aviation guidelines, in particular: Guidelines for execution of flights for the Ukrainian Air Force, enacted by order no. 249 of the Deputy Minister of Defence on 25 December 1998 (Настанова по виконанню польотів в авіації Збройних Сил України, НВП-99); Air Force Navigation Service Guidelines of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, enacted by order no. 54 of the Air Force Commander of Ukraine on 9 November 1992 (Настанова по штурманській службі авіації Збройних Сил України, НШС-93); General Rules on Flights in Ukrainian Air Space, enacted by order no. 62 of the Air Force Commander of Ukraine on 10 December 1992 (Основні правила польотів у повітряному просторі України, ОПП-93); Regulation on Prevention of Aviation Incidents in the Ukrainian Air Force, enacted by order no. 210 of the Air Force Commander on 29 October 1999 (Положення про запобігання авіаційних подій у Військово-Повітряних Силах України, ПЗАП-2000), and several others. Similarly to the findings contained in other reports, the experts concluded, in particular, as follows: “... One of the reasons for the emergence of the ... incident ... was the existence of significant shortcomings in the ... preparation and staging of the ... air show and lack of clear distribution of duties between the officers ... which, in turn, led to lack of coordination between ... the persons engaged in the preparation, as well as to the absence of effective control over their activity.” If the foregoing normative acts had been unconditionally complied with, the breaches in the organisation of the demonstration flight could have been detected and remedied, and the grave consequences avoided ...” 45. The investigation ended on 10 August 2004. Ten officers, including both pilots and their ground support crew; the Air Force Commander-in-Chief (O.S.); O.V. and V.A. of the Air Force Headquarters; the Commander of the 14th Corps (S.O.); the 14th corps chief safety officer (A.L.) and the commander of the Air Force unit based in Ozerne (O.D.) were committed for trial. 46. On an unspecified date in 2004 S.O., previously demoted from his post as 14th Corps Commander, was appointed first deputy Air Force Commander-in-Chief. 47. On 27 August 2004 the Deputy Prosecutor General disjoined the criminal proceedings against V.S., O.V., V.A. and S.O. and referred their case (hereafter referred to as “the organisers’ case”) for additional investigation. He found, in particular, that it was necessary to clarify whether there was a causal link between the omissions imputed to those officers and the aircraft crash. 48. For that purpose, on 24 September 2004 two civilian experts were commissioned to carry out an additional assessment. The four defendants challenged that appointment, alleging that the experts concerned were not competent to evaluate their performance. S.O. proposed six other candidates in their stead. The prosecutor’s office dismissed the challenge to the civilian experts, but agreed to include three of the candidates proposed by S.O. in the group, having found that they were sufficiently independent. It rejected the other three candidates, citing possible conflict of interest in view of their current or former employment with the Air Force Headquarters. Subsequently, two more retired military officers were included in the group, which finally consisted of two civilian experts and five retired military officers. Four of the military officers (including the three candidates proposed by S.O.) were serving at the material time in the faculty of the National Military Academy and the fifth expert was deputy director for flight safety at a military aircraft repair company belonging to the Ministry of Defence. 49. On 8 February 2005 the five military experts produced a report in which they concluded that all four defendants had duly fulfilled their responsibilities in respect of the organisation of the air show and that none of them had breached any service duty or other applicable provisions. The group also concluded that the applicable legal framework governing the staging of military air shows and the organisation of aerobatic performances had been adequate and sufficient and that there had been no need for the defendants to develop any additional rules or guidelines before the air show. In the group’s view, the misconduct by the first pilot was the sole cause of the accident. Their conclusion, insofar as relevant, read as follows: “The only reason for the crash of the SU-27 aircraft was the execution by the pilot of an unplanned piloting manoeuvre, in the course of which he committed grave errors in piloting technique, which caused the falling of the aircraft and the catastrophic consequences.” 50. On 11 May 2005 the two civilian experts also produced a report, which largely replicated the findings and the language of the report issued by their military counterparts. 51. In the meantime, on an unspecified date, the case in respect of the pilots, the ground crew and two other officers of the lower rank (hereafter the “performers’ case”) was transferred to the court for trial. 52. During the trial, the defendants pleaded innocent of any wrongdoing. In particular, Major-General A.T. noted that there had been no normative document defining the responsibilities of an “air show flights director”. Having been appointed to this position created by order of the 14th Corps Commander, he had developed his own reference document listing his duties for the Commander’s approval and had done his best in performing them. In his opinion, the appointment could not have made him responsible for direct supervision of the pilots’ training at a different airfield and ensuring their readiness, as neither of them had belonged to the 14th Corps or been placed under his command. He considered that regard being had to their position in the military hierarchy, the pilots had to report directly to the Air Force Commander-in-Chief. 53. Colonel A.L. of the 14th Corps flight safety service likewise asserted that he had properly performed his service duties and had prepared sufficient documentation concerning flight safety during the air show. He had submitted the relevant documents for review by 14th Corps Command as well as by the relevant sectors in the Air Force Headquarters, and had not received any negative feedback. Colonel A.L. further admitted that he had never personally instructed the pilots on the safety measures and had never checked on their readiness for the flight. In his view, such responsibilities fell outside his authority and had to be carried out by the pilots’ direct superiors, who did not belong to the 14th Corps. 54. Lieutenant-Colonel Y.Ya., the aerobatic performance director, asserted that, having been informed of the size and boundaries of the aerobatics zone on 24 July 2002, he had warned Major-General A.T. and the pilots of his doubts concerning its safety. However, having been told that the relevant parameters had been approved by the higher command and it was too late to change anything, he had executed the orders of his superiors and directed the flight as best he could. 55. Colonel V.T. (the first pilot) alleged, in particular, that during the flight the aircraft had become uncontrollable due to forces beyond his control. He denied an accusation that he had deviated from his mission order, and submitted that in his view the way to perform the disputed manoeuvre was a matter for the pilot’s discretion, particularly as his mission order had no specific instructions to this end. Moreover, prior to the flight, he had discussed the disputed manoeuvre with Colonel Y.Y. (the second pilot), who he had considered to be the crew captain, as he was higher in the military hierarchy, and the latter had no objections to his choice. Colonel V.T. also noted that the documents defining his mission had not defined the boundaries of the aerobatics zone. He had been taken by surprise when he saw on arrival on site that the spectators were to the left of the runway, as according to his orders, his manoeuvres were also to be carried out to the left. In any event, he considered himself obliged to carry out his orders without arguing. 56. Colonel Y.Y. (the second pilot) submitted that he had considered the first pilot to be the crew captain and that he himself was obliged to refrain from interfering with his actions. He concurred with the first pilot that the way to execute the disputed manoeuvre, which was not specified in the mission order, was a matter for the pilot’s discretion. 57. On 23 June 2005 the Central Region Military Court of Appeal, sitting in a panel consisting of three military judges and acting as a first-instance court, found both pilots, the air show flights director and the aerobatic performance director guilty of breaches of flight regulations within the meaning of Article 416 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (“the CCU”) and sentenced them to fourteen, eight, six and five years’ imprisonment respectively. It further found the chief of the 14th Corps flight safety service guilty of having a negligent attitude towards military service within the meaning of Article 425 paragraph 2 of the CCU, and sentenced him to four years’ imprisonment, suspended, with probation. By way of reasoning, the court referred extensively to the relevant findings of the Special Commission and the aviation experts’ assessment of 11 June 2003 (see paragraphs 20-22 and 43-44 above) in so far as they related to the actions of the above officers, as well as described the overall shortcomings in organising the show. 58. The sixth defendant, Colonel O.D., who had coordinated V.T.’s and Y.Y.’s training programme in Ozerne and supplied the aircraft for the show, was found to have performed his duties in good faith and acquitted. 59. On 2 March 2006 the Military Panel of the Supreme Court of Ukraine upheld this judgment on appeal and it became final. 60. In the meantime, on an unspecified date the General Prosecutor’s Office decided to continue with the “organisers’ case”, having disagreed with the expert conclusions of 8 February and 11 May 2005, and on 25 January 2006 suspended S.O.’s authority as the Deputy Air Force Commander. 61. On 11 January 2008 the defendants in this case were committed for trial on charges of having a negligent attitude towards military service within the meaning of Article 425 paragraph 2 of the CCU. O.V. and V.A. were additionally charged with breaches of flight regulations within the meaning of Article 416 of the CCU. Finally, V.S. and S.O. were additionally charged with exceeding their authority within the meaning of Article 424 paragraph 3 of the CCU by inappropriately using State funds for a celebration of a bogus memorial date and staging aerobatic performances in the absence of an appropriate regulatory framework. 62. On 11 June 2008 the Central Region Military Court of Appeal, sitting in a panel of three military judges and acting as a first-instance court, acquitted all four defendants of the above charges, largely relying on the expert conclusions of 8 February and 11 May 2005. It found that the provisions of Article 416 of the CCU did not apply to O.V. and V.A., as they had not operated the flight and had not been directly involved in its preparation. Other charges were dismissed as unsubstantiated. In particular, all the defendants were found to have carried out their service duties properly. The court noted that they had taken numerous measures to ensure proper organisation of the show and had produced a large volume of documents correctly delegating tasks to different officers. They had also reasonably trusted the pilots, the supporting crew and other officers to carry out the tasks assigned to them. No legal act could be interpreted as conferring on the defendants a different range of duties or imposing an obligation to act in a different manner. The relevant allegations of the prosecution, as well as the conclusions of the Special Commission and the expert findings dated 11 June 2003 in respect of the defendants were incorrect, being based partly on an overly broad interpretation of the applicable legal provisions and partly on references to provisions that were wrongly applied in the context. The court did not refer to the internal investigation of the Ministry of Defence in its judgment. The relevant excerpts of the court judgment read as follows: “... the members of the [Special Commission] concluded that the immediate cause of the catastrophe ... derived from mistakes in the piloting technique ... outside the designated aerobatics zone ... The same conclusion was adopted by the court, which examined the criminal case concerning [V.T.] and others. All other circumstances connected to the organisation of the show in the court’s view did not in any way affect the wrongdoings by [the first pilot] and, moreover, they could not have been foreseen or taken into account by the organisers of the show ... ... As far as the size of the aerobatics zone was concerned, which, according to the experts, was insufficient for the performance of the mission ... this breach was not the cause of the catastrophic situation, since the SU-27 aircraft was practically never within its boundaries ... Reports on the crew’s readiness for the flight were produced properly, and it was following their receipt that [V.S.] as well as [S.O.] gave permission for the flight to go ahead; The decision to hold the show was taken by the 14th Air Force Corps Commander [S.O.]: this decision was coordinated by him with the Air Force Commander-in-Chief [V.S.], and they acted within the scope of their authority. With a view to preparation of the festivities and organisation of the flight by SU-27, the 14th Corps Command jointly with the Air Force Headquarters took a number of relevant measures: orders were issued; show plans were drafted; agendas were put in place; and air and static display schemes were developed ... The 14th Corps Commander performed his duties with respect to the preparation of the show in accordance with the applicable law, having properly distributed duties among his subordinates ... Issues concerning preparation of the show and supervision over the performance of the delegated tasks were discussed at meetings organised by [S.O.] ... The court’s conclusions ... are also not affected by the cancellation of the [on-site] ... rehearsal flight ... In the court’s view, this fact did not affect the cause of the disaster, which was deviation by [V.T.] from his mission ...” 63. The Prosecutor’s Office and numerous injured parties appealed against this verdict before the Military Panel of the Supreme Court. In its appeal, the prosecution asserted, in particular, that the preparation for the show was based exclusively on the military training documents, which took no account of the specifics of an aerobatic performance involving civilian spectators. Lacking a body of relevant legislation and regulations, the Air Force Command had been obliged to develop specific documents adapting the military training rules for this purpose before planning the show. As an aerobatics performance could not be equated to an ordinary military training flight, a special training programme had to be set up, and the crew had to have special clearance. However, the reports by the Special Commission, the Ministry of Defence and the aviation experts indicated that not only did the defendants fail to act in developing relevant rules and regulations, but they also failed to supervise compliance with the existing general rules. The court’s findings were at odds with the findings by these authorities, and no justification was provided for them. Moreover, they were inconsistent with the court’s own position adopted in the judgment of 23 June 2005, where it heavily relied on the conclusions of the Special Commission and the aviation expert assessment in examining various aspects of the case and had referred to the relevant findings concerning poor organisation of the show in its reasoning. 64. On 22 October 2008 the Military Panel of the Supreme Court of Ukraine rejected the appeals and upheld the acquittals. 65. On 25 April 2003 the applicants lodged civil actions within the aforementioned criminal proceedings against the military officers, claiming damages for the deaths of the Mykhayliv family from the Ministry of Defence. The first applicant claimed 36,000,000 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH) in compensation for non-pecuniary damage for the deaths of her daughter, granddaughters and son-in-law; the second applicant claimed UAH 2,000 in compensation for pecuniary damage and UAH 6,000,000 for non-pecuniary damage for the deaths of her niece and her family; the third applicant claimed UAH 1,000 for pecuniary damage and UAH 3,000,000 for non‑pecuniary damage for the deaths of her cousin and her family; and the fourth applicant claimed UAH 6,000,000 in compensation for non‑pecuniary damage for the deaths of her granddaughter and her family. 66. On 23 June 2005, when pronouncing the verdict in the “performers’ case”, the court ruled on the applicants’ civil claims and awarded the pecuniary damages claimed by the second and third applicants in full. It further awarded UAH 220,000[1] in non-pecuniary damages to the first applicant and UAH 60,000[2] under this head to each of the other applicants. 67. On 2 March 2006 the Military Panel of the Supreme Court rejected the applicants’ appeals, in which they claimed higher compensation. 68. On 21 and 31 August, 18 October and 29 November 2006 the first, fourth, third and second applicants, respectively, obtained the judgment awards due to them. 69. On various dates the applicants also brought further civil actions against the Ministry of Defence in the “organisers’ case”. 70. On 22 October 2008 the Supreme Court left these claims unexamined, regard being had to the acquittals of the defendants. 71. On 27 July 2002 the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine allocated 10,000,000[3] Ukrainian hryvnias from the State reserve fund to the Lviv Regional State Administration towards liquidating the consequences of the accident (Decree no. 1085). 72. On 29 July 2002 the Regional Administration created a commission to deal with distribution of the above funds, and determined the categories of expenses to be covered (Decree no. 718). According to the Administration’s decision, UAH 5,485,000 was to be distributed to the families of the deceased. The sums were to be disbursed to spouses, children, parents and dependents of the deceased victims, in amounts ranging from UAH 20,000 to UAH 40,000 depending on the family circumstances. The decree further allocated a total of UAH 2,075,000 to the surviving victims; UAH 500,000 to help the families with arranging funerals and providing gravestones; UAH 180,000 towards medical and rehabilitation costs; UAH 553,000 towards prosthetic care and relevant rehabilitation expenses, and the remaining funds to other categories of expenses. According to the Government, the relevant funds were disbursed to the addressees before the end of 2002. 73. On 3 September 2002 the Parliament of Ukraine decided to transfer one day’s salary of each Member of Parliament, with their consent, to the benefit of the Sknyliv accident victims. 74. On 27 November 2002 the Lviv City Council’s Executive Committee decided how to distribute the UAH 849,475 received by the municipality in charitable donations (Decree no. 522). According to this decision, UAH 202,475 of these funds were to be distributed to the families of the deceased; UAH 405,000 to those with serious irreversible health damage; UAH 121,492 to those with serious injuries and who were receiving in-patient treatment; UAH 80,520 to those with injuries of medium seriousness and who were receiving in-patient treatment, and UAH 39,970 to those receiving outpatient treatment. 75. On various other occasions the authorities took additional decisions allocating financial and other assistance to various categories of the victims (such as decrees no. 730 of 15 August 2003, no. 1078 of 5 December 2003, and no. 221 of 5 March 2004 by Lviv City Council, Decree no. 328 of 19 July 2012 by the Lviv Mayor, and others). Pursuant to these decisions, further funds were allocated for medical check-ups and rehabilitation procedures, to cover the costs of holidays in recreational facilities for children, and for lump-sum payments to victims of the accident. 76. The first applicant received UAH 47,690[4] in various payments from the State under the above programmes. The first, second and fourth applicants also received UAH 40,270[5], UAH 6,000[6] and UAH 4,000[7] respectively from State-managed private charitable donations raised in aid to the victims. 77. The parents of Mr Mykhayliv were paid UAH 68,000[8] in State aid in connection with the deaths of their son and granddaughters. They received a further amount of UAH 60,000[9] from State-managed charitable donations. It appears from the evidence available that Mrs Mykhayliv’s in-laws did not lodge any civil claims within the criminal proceedings.

5. The applicant was born in 1926 and lives in Novi Sad. His son, Mr Vojislav Mučibabić, was born in 1951 and died on 23 June 1995. The present case concerns the investigation into the death of the applicant’s son. 6. On 23 June 1995 a powerful explosion occurred at the facilities of Grmeč, a company with headquarters in Belgrade. 7. It transpires from the judicial decisions and the case file that the explosion was caused by the covert production of composite solid rocket fuel under the auspices of the State Intelligence Service. 8. The general information the Court has been able to procure as to the production of rocket fuel and the risk of an explosion at production sites may be summarised as follows. 9. Composite fuel, also known as composite propellant, is a broad class of solid chemical fuels that are used as propellants in rockets. The rocket-fuel sheets resemble PVC folia but are less stable and require a specialised location with a high level of preventive measures and safety precautions. They are composed of fuel and oxidiser. An example of a fuel is phenol formaldehyde and of an oxidiser, ammonium perchlorate (“AP”). AP is a powerful oxidiser, which explains why it is used mainly in solid propellant rocket boosters, including space shuttles and military missiles. 10. AP is a white, granular, crystalline solid or powder. Its explosive characteristics depend on particle size and granulometric composition. It is a class 4 oxidiser (it can cause an explosive reaction) when particles measure over 15 micrometres. It is classified as an explosive when particles measure less than 15 micrometres. It has been apparently involved in a number of accidents. AP is stable when properly stored, transported and handled at temperatures below 150 degrees Celsius (oC). The amount put in any pile must be limited and storage sites must be designed with blast walls. The risks of explosion and fire associated with AP arise mainly when there is a large proportion of AP in a premix or when it is exposed to intensive heat or an organic compound. When heated to 300oC, AP degrades organic adhesive, breaking cemented joints. Complete reactions leave no residue. 11. At a series of meetings, an Intelligence Service executive had apparently agreed to the production of rocket fuel with a private company, JPL Systems (hereinafter “JPL”). The latter’s experts were supposed to provide the formula and certain components, including oxidisers. Certain Grmeč managers had allegedly been requested to make available a mill with two counter-rotating rollers in its facilities for the production of polyvinyl chloride sheets, as well as other substances and its experts. 12. On 23 June 1995, most of the components were blended together in a batch mixer in another company, transported in aluminium bins to Grmeč in a private car by JPL experts and stored next to the mill. When the mixture was put on the mill and extraction of the sheets of rocket fuel started, an explosion occurred in the presence of more than twenty workers from the two commissioned companies. As a consequence, the applicant’s son and ten other people died, while ten others were seriously injured. 13. It appears from the Serbian Business Register and the expert reports that neither Grmeč nor JPL was licensed and adequately equipped for the production of rocket fuel at the material time. 14. At about 9 p.m. on 23 June 1995 the investigating judge on duty, M.A., arrived at Grmeč to inspect the scene of the incident. V.V., the Deputy District Public Prosecutor Office (hereinafter “the prosecutor”), Z.L., a crime inspector, and V.M., a crime-scene technician, were also present. 15. According to the investigating judge’s two-page report of his inspection of the incident scene (zapisnik o uviđaju), at about 6.30 p.m. on 23 June 1995 a massive explosion occurred during the production of a new product – polyvinyl chloride sheets. The explosion greatly damaged the production room and killed a number of people who had been involved in the production process. When the investigating judge arrived at the scene, unspecified members of the factory’s security staff and the Belgrade police prevented him and the prosecutor from entering the production room. They were requested to examine the scene two to three steps away from the entrance door for security reasons, given that the damaged roof could have collapsed. The judge noticed that it had been a powerful explosion, and that the production room had been covered in dust and pieces of the roof, which also prevented a good overview of the room. As the judge could not inspect the incident scene, in order to gather evidence he talked to the director, R.U. He had to wait thirty minutes for the director to be found and to finish his telephone call with the Belgrade mayor, N.Č. The director stated that the explosion had occurred when the factory’s experts with a team of additional experts (part of the statement is illegible) had apparently tested a new product-manufacturing process with which he was not familiar. However, he clarified that the manufacturing process required special security measures and teams, and named all of the factory’s experts involved, including the applicant’s son as a chief engineer. The technical director, S.K., stated that his team of between seventeen and twenty employees had been testing a new product and that experts from other companies and faculties “might have been involved” in the manufacturing process that afternoon. Presuming that ten people had died, he anticipated that the cause of the explosion may have been “an unwanted, unexpected and unknown chemical reaction which had ‘broken out’ during the process”. The investigating judge instructed (a) the Belgrade police’s expert team and the factory experts to continue looking for those involved who had died or survived; (b) the crime-scene technician to collect and register all traces, objects and details which might help to elucidate the account of the events and to make an appropriate file in that respect; (c) the removal of all the corpses to the Institute for Forensic Medicine for post-mortem examinations to determine the cause of death; and (d) the transfer of all the survivors to the appropriate medical centres. All those activities and the relevant documentation were to form an integral part of the incident report. 16. In his two-page report on the forensic inspection of the incident scene (izveštaj o kriminalističko-tehničkom pregledu lica mesta), the crime inspector, Z.L., noted that there had been traces of the destruction caused by a massive explosion which had occurred at about 6 p.m. on 23 June 1995 at the Vinfleks factory (production room) where bituminous materials were produced. He reported that nine corpses had been found and gave the names of several injured people who had been transported to hospital (one of them had died there) as well as a short statement by one of the workers who had been nearby. The inspector reported that the police firemen had already started extinguishing the fire, that the crime-scene technicians, M.P. and M.Š, had taken photographs, and that the criminal police (Kriminalistička služba (UZSK)) had taken on the case. The identification of the casualties and the cause of the explosion should have been determined the following day by specialised teams of criminal police. No other documents, photographs, scheme of the scene or results of any chemical or toxicological analysis, if any, have been submitted to the Court with the case file; nor apparently were they made available to the applicant. 17. On 24 June 1995 an additional forensic report was drawn up after the fingerprinting and photographing of the bodies. The bodies were transferred for post-mortem examination, together with additional body parts which had been found in the meantime, while the clothing was sent to the prosecutor’s office. 18. The post-mortem examination of victims’ bodies was carried out between 24 and 26 June 1995 by the Institute for Forensic Medicine of the Faculty of Medicine in Belgrade. The autopsy reports stated that the victims’ deaths had been violent and caused by the destruction of or damage to some vital organs and/or third and fourth-degree burns from the explosion, or complications thereafter. 19. On 24 June 1995 the Belgrade police ex officio set up a commission to examine the cause of the explosion. The commission was comprised of several officers from the Security Institute (Institut bezbednosti MUP-a Srbije)[1], as well as two professors from the Mechanical Engineering Faculty in Belgrade, B.J. and Ð.B., who were also the co-owners of JPL (see paragraph 11 above). 20. Following site inspections between 23 and 26 June 1995 and computer simulations of the explosions, two experts from the Security Institute, B.G. and P.P., submitted their report to the DDPO on 9 August 1995. As regards the cause and origin of the accident, the experts stated (a) that the explosion appeared to have been initially caused by the heat generated by the mill’s rollers during the production of composite fuel; (b) that static electricity could not have ignited the composite fuel, premix or fuel sheet; (c) that the primary blast of the premix or the composite fuel sheet on the mill’s two counter-rotating rollers had most probably been caused by the presence of a mechanical object in the premix, which had ended up between the rollers; and (d) that the initial blast had led to two secondary explosions of the premix, which was stored in two aluminum bins next to the mill. 21. On 30 August 1995 the Labour Ministry inspectorate lodged a criminal complaint against the Director of Grmeč, R.U., for breaching health-and-safety regulations (see paragraphs 76-77 below). Previously, on 3 July 1995 the Ministry had informed the prosecutor that on 24 and 26 June 1995 they had been refused access to the factory and to documentation for inspection, and that Grmeč had not informed them to that date about the fatal incident, as required by the relevant law. 22. It would appear that the prosecutor lodged a request for a formal preliminary judicial investigation against unknown persons from Grmeč in respect of the explosion (zahtev za sprovođenje pojedinih istražnih radnji). On 13 September 1995 the applicant sought to be granted victim status. 23. On 8 March 1996 the applicant and two other victims’ relatives lodged a criminal complaint against a number of senior executives of Grmeč and JPL (R.U., D.M., S.K., D.Z., Lj.R., Z.O., B.I. and V.B.), on the grounds that there was a reasonable suspicion that they had committed grave breaches of public safety regulations (see paragraph 76 below, Article 194 § 2 in conjunction with Article 187 § 4 of the Criminal Code). 24. The experts’ report of 9 August 1995 was served on the applicant on 15 April 1996. Two weeks later, the applicant submitted numerous objections and posed questions. He questioned, inter alia, the expert commission’s authorisation to investigate the case, the fact that it had focussed on the cause of the explosion without establishing whether the appropriate safety precautions had been taken, and the experts’ conclusions, which were pure presumption. 25. On 5 June 1996 the prosecutor lodged a request with the Belgrade District Court that the police experts be heard. 26. At a hearing scheduled for 4 December 1996, however, the investigating judge did not take statements from the experts. The applicant again objected to the experts’ report. The investigating judge endorsed the experts’ request to be provided with all questions in writing and to be given another month to answer. In their reply of 15 April 1997, the experts clarified that (a) on 23 June 1995 at the scene of the incident, where they had gone ex officio, the investigating judge had instructed them orally to establish the cause of the explosion; (b) they had not made any plan or programme for the expert report; (c) they had not had sufficient information (for example, on the original premix or the final product) to examine and determine the cause of the blast, but they had found traces of AP at the accident scene and had been provided with the formulae of the premix by JPL; (d) they could not say whether the fire had started on the rollers, the fuel or the rocket-fuel sheet; (e) they had not found any documentation about the planning or technology programme of the production of rocket fuel which had led to the blast; and that (f) their task had been to establish the cause of, and not the responsibility for, the explosion. 27. On 14 May 1997 the applicant amended his criminal complaint, relying on Article 194 § 2 in conjunction with Article 187 § 4 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 76 below). 28. Following the prosecutor’s proposal of 10 June 1997, a month later the court appointed the Military Institute to determine and submit a report on whether the cause of the explosion had been of a technical nature or a human mistake. On 18 July 1997 the Institute informed the investigating judge that it did not have the capacity to do so. 29. On 28 November 1997 the Belgrade Chemistry Faculty was appointed to determine the cause of the explosion, whether it could have been avoided and the possible liability in that respect. 30. Following two unsuccessful attempts to receive additional relevant data, on 12 May 1998 the Professor of the Belgrade Chemistry Faculty, I.J., submitted his report. He claimed that it was based on reliable data collected by the Security Institute, given that, owing to the lapse of time, it was impossible to analyse any samples found on the site. He clarified further that he had not used most of the Institute’s documentation, as it concerned computer-generated and simulated experiments of assumed events which could only indirectly hint at the possible answers. The expert stated that the collected data were incomplete and did not contain quantitative figures of the samples examined to allow any deeper analysis of the collected evidence or its compliance with the account of the events that had allegedly led to the explosion. While not excluding the possibility that the cause of the explosion might have been the one suggested by the police experts, the expert observed that the possible exposure of AP to humidity could have made it sensitive to an organic compound and the explosion could have been caused by a piece of paper, wood or engine oil, especially in the presence of unwanted metal or soot particles. 31. The expert also noted the following issues as relevant: (a) although explosive, carcinogenic and other dangerous substances were used during the production process, no technical-technological documentation and certificates for them had been found; (b) the purity of the components, especially of AP, was questionable (it was described as light pink powder, whereas it was a white, crystalline substance); (c) the samples revealed, unusually, included the presence of phosphates, which were not components of composite fuel, or equipment for the maintenance of the mill or the building itself; (d) the production process and technology did not seem to have been accurately specified and followed, as certain components had been added and mixed on the mill in the course of the production process; and (e) an unacceptably high number of individuals present had indicated that they did not know what had been produced and that other safety measures had probably not been taken. 32. Following the prosecutor’s proposal of 13 June 1998, the investigating judge heard evidence from a number of witnesses to and surviving victims of the accident (eighteen out of the nineteen were from Belgrade) on ten occasions between 10 November 1998 and 15 October 1999[2]. They were asked who had allowed V.B. to bring the premix to Grmeč, and whether they had known what it contained and what safety measures had been taken. On 27 July 1999 and 18 February 2000 respectively the investigating judge also interviewed Mr Radosav Lukić and Mr Jovica Stanišić, Deputy Head and Head of the State Intelligence Service. 33. On 1 March 2000 the investigating judge returned the case file with the collected evidence to the prosecutor. 34. On 9 June 2000 the investigating judge, on the prosecutor’s initiative, withdrew the case file and sealed the statements of the State Intelligence Service executives, classifying them as State secret. 35. On 12 June 2000 the public prosecutor decided not to prosecute, relying on secret evidence and information. He stated that a detailed analysis of the facts had been provided in an official note of 15 March 2000, which had been classified as confidential. He summarily dismissed the applicant’s criminal complaint on the grounds that there were no elements of crimes prosecuted ex officio (da se prijavljeno delo ne goni ex officio), invoking Articles 184 to 187 of the Criminal Code. By a letter of the same date, the applicant was informed about the prosecutor’s decision and notified that he could pursue a subsidiary criminal prosecution within eight days of the date the letter had been served on him by lodging a request for an investigation (zahtev za sprovođenje istrage). 36. The applicant alleged that despite his request, he had not had access to the case file until 10 June 2000. In the meantime, he commissioned an expert report by the court’s permanent specialist on explosives and blasts, M.A.L. In her report of 11 May 2000, the specialist stated that most of the police experts’ work had been incomplete or irrelevant, and gave the reasons for her assertions. She found that neither Grmeč nor JLP had been registered and properly equipped for working with explosive materials, and that their employees had lacked the necessary skills and competences. She confirmed in principle, and further elaborated on, the findings of the Chemistry Faculty’s expert and itemised the numerous failures of the two companies to comply with the relevant provisions of the Explosive Substances, Flammable Liquids and Gases Act concerning transporting and working with explosive materials (see paragraphs 84-86 below). 37. On 20 June 2000 the applicant instituted subsidiary prosecution against R.U., S.K., R.Č., V.B., J.T. and R.L. by lodging a request with the Belgrade District Court that a criminal investigation be opened into breaches of safety regulations, referring to Articles 194 § 2 and 187 §§ 1 and 3 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 76 below). 38. On 27 September 2000 the investigating judge of the Belgrade District Court refused to open the investigation sought by the applicant (izrazio neslaganje sa zahtevom), and referred the case to a three-judge criminal panel (see paragraph 81 below). 39. On 3 October 2000 the three-judge panel of the District Court upheld the investigating judge’s decision, having established that rocket fuel had been produced on the orders of the then Serbian President, Mr Milošević, and Mr Stanišić (see paragraphs 7 and 32 above). The applicant appealed on 21 October 2000. 40. On 28 December 2000 the Supreme Court of Serbia quashed that decision. On 25 January 2001 it referred the case back to the Belgrade District Court for additional investigation, holding that the prosecuting authorities had failed to assess the evidence properly. 41. A month after the prosecutor’s request of 19 March 2001, the investigating judge commissioned the Military Technical Academy (Vojno-tehnička akademija-Katedra za raketna goriva) to draw up a fresh expert report in respect of the explosion. The Academy refused, claiming that it did not have the power to do so. 42. On 10 May 2001 the investigating judge appointed the Security Institute to draw up the report, but that institute also refused, referring to its report of 9 August 1995 (see paragraph 28 above). 43. On 12 June 2001 the investigating judge informed the applicant that there was no other available institution to carry out a fresh expert report and that, instead, he could file an indictment directly if he so wished. 44. In June and August 2001 the applicant filed an indictment and requested further investigative measures. 45. On 25 March 2002 the criminal chamber of the District Court sent the case file back to the investigating judge, referring to the Supreme Court’s decision of 28 December 2000 (see paragraph 40 above). The chamber instructed the investigating judge to open an investigation and interview the suspects. It stated that the three-judge panel of the District Court would again decide on his refusal to open an investigation once the suspects had been heard. It explained that it would be inappropriate to proceed with a subsidiary indictment without first carrying out an investigation, even with the investigating judge’s permission to file a direct indictment, if the suspects had never been questioned. 46. On the same date, the investigating judge opened an investigation. Between 16 September and 10 October 2002 he questioned all five suspects and gave individual decisions on investigation in respect of each of them. 47. On 29 October 2002 the investigating judge again appointed the Military Technical Academy to draw up a report establishing in a clear and conclusive manner the cause of the explosion and which irregularities in the production process had led to the blast. In a short report drawn up in December 2002, the Academy stated this time that their task was apparently to examine the cause of the explosion, not the possible failure of any of the suspects to protect those involved from the risk of explosion. 48. On 8 April 2003 the investigating judge closed the investigation. The applicant was informed and instructed that he could file an indictment as a subsidiary prosecutor within fifteen days if he so wished. 49. On 22 April 2003 the applicant and two others filed an indictment, laying blame on four former senior executives of Grmeč and JPL, R.U., S.K., R.Č. and V.B., as well as on Mr R.L., former Deputy Head of the Intelligence Service, for failing to take measures that had been required of them to prevent the lives of the applicant’s son and others from being avoidably put at risk or to mitigate casualties. By 3 July 2003, the District Court rejected all of the objections raised by the defence that the indictment was defective, and upheld the indictment. 50. The beginning of the trial was scheduled for 12 December 2003 and then for 22 March 2004, but was adjourned on both occasions by the court because it had been unable to secure the proper composition of its bench and/or some of the defendants had not been properly summoned. 51. The trial before the Belgrade District Court eventually started on 14 May 2004, when the court heard two defendants and adjourned the hearing because the scheduled time had lapsed. The three scheduled hearings (14 June 2004, 16-17 September 2004 and 18 January 2005) were adjourned because of the presiding judge’s other commitments and/or because one or more of the defendants had failed to appear in court. 52. At a hearing held on 15-16 March 2005, the court heard four defendants (S.K., R.U., V.B. and R.Č.) and adjourned to decide on further objections to the indictment. Between 23 March 2005 and 7 December 2005, the competent courts dismissed the indictment in respect of R.L. and R.Č., because the applicant had failed to name them as suspects in his earlier criminal complaint for the crimes at issue (see paragraph 23 above), which were, in principle, supposed to be prosecuted firstly ex officio. The hearing scheduled for 24 October 2005 was adjourned to allow the court to decide on R.Č.’s objection, and the next hearing scheduled for eleven months later, on 13 September 2006, was cancelled as the case file had been at the Supreme Court to decide on appeals on points of law lodged by other suspects (R.U, S.K. and V.B.) against the courts’ decisions on their objections. 53. On 25 September 2006 the indictment was slightly amended with regard to the facts. 54. On 20 November 2006, the trial recommenced before a new chamber, and also owing to the lapse of time since the previous hearing. The court heard the defendants and two witnesses. 55. On 6 February 2007 the applicant requested the District Court to re-examine whether the classification of the testimonies of two Intelligence Service executives as State secret had been in accordance with the law, and to add them to the case file if appropriate. No decision in respect of his request has been submitted to the Court. 56. The trial recommenced once again before a new trial chamber on 12 February 2007, when the court heard two defendants and three witnesses. On 14 and 15 May 2007, the court heard four new witnesses, as well as R.L. and R.Č. The three hearings set for 13 February, 5 September and 12 November 2007 were adjourned or cancelled owing to a strike by court clerks (zapisničara) and/or as the witnesses had not been summoned properly or had failed to appear. The court imposed fines on four witnesses for failure to appear in court. 57. The trial recommenced before yet another trial chamber on 11 February 2008, as well as again because of the lapse of time. The court heard one witness and adjourned the hearing because it had been unable to maintain the proper composition of its bench. Two further scheduled hearings (15 April and 8 September 2008) were cancelled at the request of the defendants or their lawyers for private or professional reasons and/or because of the inadequate summoning of witnesses. 58. On 17 July 2008 the applicant lodged a new bill of indictment against R.L. and R.Č. 59. The trial started anew because of the lapse of time on 24 November 2008, when the court again heard defendants and four witnesses. On 28 November 2008 the present proceedings were joined with the criminal proceedings against R.L. and R.Č. The two hearings scheduled for 25‑26 February and 23 April 2009 were cancelled due to the failure of the defendants’ lawyers to appear in court and/or the difficulties of successfully tracing certain experts after so many years. 60. On 24 June 2009 the trial re-started again because of the lapse of time, but could not proceed as the competent experts failed to appear in court. The judge fined one of the experts. On 16 September 2009 the court heard one police expert (B.G.). The hearing scheduled for 15 December 2009 was adjourned because of the absence of two forensic experts (P.P. and I.J.) and the defendants’ attorneys. 61. Following judicial reforms, on 1 January 2010 the case was assigned to another judge of the newly competent Belgrade High Court and the proceedings had to begin anew. The hearing fixed for 21 May 2010 was cancelled because the court had been informed that R.L. had been found dead on 19 February 2010, as well as because one of the defendants’ lawyers had not been properly summoned. 62. On 6 July 2010, the court discontinued the proceedings against R.L. In order to speed up the trial, the applicant amended the indictment, accusing the defendants of being co-accomplices in serious breaches of safety regulations (see paragraph 77 below, Article 288.2 in conjunction with Article 278.3 of the Criminal Code). The hearing was adjourned until 19 October 2010 to allow the defendants to readjust their defence to the slightly amended indictment. The latter hearing was also not held due to a judiciary strike. 63. By September 2011, the District Court had held one hearing and adjourned another four hearings. Specifically, during a very short hearing on 11 February 2011 one defendant and a number of witnesses had been re-heard, whilst the hearings of 8 December 2010 and 24 March 2011 had been adjourned because the defendants’ lawyers had not appeared. The hearing scheduled for September 2011 was cancelled by the court itself because it had, apparently, been unable to secure the proper composition of its bench. When one of the parties to the proceedings complained about the delay, the Belgrade High Court informed him that the case had been classified as “backlog” and would be dealt with shortly. 64. On 24 April 2013 the court rendered the first-instance decision. It acquitted the defendants, finding that there was insufficient evidence to declare them guilty of the offences with which they had been charged. The judgment was served on the applicant on 8 September 2013. 65. According to the information made available by the parties, the case is still pending before the Belgrade Court of Appeal. 66. On 10 September 2010 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud), complaining about the length of the criminal proceedings described above. He complained, in particular, of obstacles and obstructions within the criminal proceedings, of not being involved in the investigative activities and of having had no access to the case file. 67. On 14 July 2011 the Constitutional Court held that the applicant had suffered a breach of his “right to a trial within a reasonable time” in respect of the ineffective, inadequate and lengthy criminal proceedings before the first-instance court, and ordered the latter to bring the impugned proceedings to a conclusion as soon as possible. In order to establish its jurisdiction ratione materiae, the court held that the criminal proceedings concerned the right to life, which was a civil right. The Constitutional Court also declared that the applicant was entitled to non-pecuniary damages, in accordance with Article 90 of the Constitutional Court Act. The applicant does not seem to have been served with that decision until October 2011. 68. On 31 October 2011 the applicant’s lawyer lodged a request with the Commission for Compensation. In so doing, he relied on the Constitutional Court’s decision, and sought 10,000,000 dinars (RSD) in compensation on account of the pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage suffered. 69. On 27 December 2011 the Commission for Compensation offered to pay the applicant the sum of RSD 100,000 (at the time approximately 840 euros (EUR)) for the non-pecuniary damage referred to in the Constitutional Court’s decision. According to the information contained in the case file, the applicant refused to accept that amount, deeming it insufficient. 70. Instead, on 17 July 2012 the applicant lodged a claim with the Belgrade Court of First Instance (Osnovni sud), noting that he had not received an appropriate offer from the Commission for Compensation, which was why he was entitled to bring a separate civil suit in this respect (Article 90 of the Constitutional Court Act, see paragraph 63 above). The applicant sought RSD 10,000,000 (at the time approximately EUR 85,000) for the non-pecuniary damage sustained. 71. On 12 December 2013 the Belgrade Court of First Instance accepted the applicant’s claim in part and awarded him RSD 500,000 (approximately EUR 4,330). The applicant was exempted from paying court stamp duty on account of his age and indigence. 72. On 14 May 2014 the Belgrade Court of Appeal (Apelacioni sud), decreased the award to RSD 300,000 (approximately EUR 2,580). The court stated that the payment of the original award would be contrary to the purpose of compensation and that the State could not be responsible for the omissions of third parties. According to information made available by the parties, the awarded amount has not yet been paid. 73. It would appear that on an unspecified date the applicant lodged another constitutional appeal with the Constitutional Court in respect of the compensation. The Court has not been informed by the parties about the outcome of the proceedings before the Constitutional Court. 74. Despite the Court’s request to the Government to provide it with the information indicating the ownership structure of Grmeč and JPL as of June 1995, the documents provided by the Government concerned only the legal status of Grmeč as of 1997, when it was incorporated as a limited liability company (društvo sa ograničenom odgovornošću). Nevertheless, documents in the Court’s possession show that in 1995 it was a well-established “socially-owned” holding company (društveno preduzeće/poslovni sistem)[3] licenced for the production of homogeneous flooring and other products made of PVC masses. Its Vinfleks factory was apparently registered for the production of bituminous materials. 75. JPL was registered as a privately-owned company in 1995 for other services than the production of rocket fuel. It would appear that soon after the explosion the company was re-registered as Brunner, and that some of its co-founders, including R.Č. and B.J., further re-registered the company or established new companies called Infinity and/or EdePRO. According to media reports, a new explosion occurred on the EdePRO premises in November 2008. One person died and three were injured.

5. The applicants were born in 1943 and 1942 respectively and live in Odessa. 6. On 30 April 2002 the applicants’ daughter was struck by a car driven by P. as she was crossing the street. She died in hospital following the accident. 7. Between April 2002 and October 2010 the prosecution authorities delivered at least ten decisions refusing to institute or discontinuing criminal proceedings in respect of P. owing to a lack of corpus delicti in his actions. All those decisions were quashed by the supervising authorities as unsubstantiated and further investigations were ordered. 8. On 9 July 2009 the first applicant lodged a civil claim against P. within the criminal proceedings. On 15 July 2009 he was attributed the status of an aggrieved party in those proceedings. 9. On 26 October 2010 the Odessa Suvorivskyy District Court discontinued the criminal proceedings against P. as time-barred. On 21 December 2010 and 20 November 2012 the Odessa Regional Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”) and the Higher Specialised Court for Civil and Criminal Matters (“the Higher Specialised Court”), respectively, upheld that decision. 10. On 20 November 2012 the Higher Specialised Court also issued a separate ruling, by which it brought to the attention of the Court of Appeal and the Odessa regional prosecutor’s office a number of shortcomings in the proceedings. It stated, in particular, that the pre-trial investigation had been perfunctory and lengthy. Since 2002, there had been hardly any investigative measures. The numerous refusals by the investigating authorities to institute criminal proceedings in respect of the accident had been unfounded and had eventually been quashed. Guidelines as regards remedying shortcomings in the investigation had been ignored. The overall duration of the investigation, over ten years, had been unjustified. In summary, the Higher Specialised Court held that the criminal investigation in question had not complied with domestic legislation or the Convention. It therefore instructed the aforementioned authorities to take measures to prevent similar violations in the future.

5. The applicant, Mr Volodymyr Oleksandrovych Kryvenkyy, is a Ukrainian national who was born in 1934 and lives in Velyki Gadomtsi. 6. On 25 March 1997 the applicant obtained a certificate (cертифікат на право на земельну частку (пай)) attesting his entitlement to a nominal 3.61-ha share of the land belonging to the V.G. collective farm. At the same time, according to him, he was allocated a specific plot measuring 3.61 ha, which, he had farmed and paid land tax on since that time. It appears that the allocated land consisted of at least two different parcels, one of them measuring 0.6021 ha. 7. In September 1998 V.G. merged with Kh., a neighbouring collective farming company, which was designated as its successor. Following the merger, Kh. did not register itself as the new owner of the land formerly allocated to V.G. Subsequently the two farms separated again. 8. On 18 March 1999 the Parliament of Ukraine ordered the expropriation of 150 ha of Kh.’s land and its transfer to U.C.C. closed joint stock company for the exploitation of kaolin deposits. By the same decision, U.C.C. was obliged, in particular, to compensate the local council for the damage suffered by the agricultural producers in connection with the expropriation of the land. 9. On 10 June 1999 the Berdychiv district land authority drew up a draft land-ownership certificate designating the boundaries of the plot to be allocated to U.C.C. This plot was de facto located on the land which had been registered as belonging to V.G.. The draft certificate mentioned, in particular, that U.C.C. had to obtain and register a relevant State land-use certificate. 10. According to the applicant, until 2004 U.C.C. took no action to register its land-use rights and the plot designated for expropriation by Parliament’s decision of 18 March 1999 remained in the hands of the members of the V.G. collective farm. The 0.6021-ha parcel of the land farmed by the applicant was affected by the Parliament’s decision. 11. Meanwhile, on 17 January 2003 the Berdychiv district administration approved a draft certificate determining the boundaries of the plots of land to be designated to individual farmers from the lands allocated to V.G. and ordered production of the respective individual land-ownership certificates. 12. On the basis of this decision, on 4 June 2003 the applicant was issued with the land-ownership certificate for the aforementioned 0.6021-ha plot. No information concerning registration of ownership in respect of any other land parcels farmed by the applicant has been provided to the Court. 13. On 7 July 2005 the Berdychiv district prosecutor addressed the Berdychiv district administration objecting to its decision of 17 January 2003. The prosecutor maintained, in particular, that 150 ha of land designated for exploitation of kaolin deposits had been allocated to individual farmers in breach of U.C.C.’s rights. 14. On 22 July 2005 the Berdychiv district administration accepted the prosecutor’s objection and annulled its decision of 17 January 2003 in so far as it related to the 150 ha of land claimed by U.C.C. 15. On 31 August 2005 U.C.C. lodged a civil action claiming the 0.6021-ha plot of land allocated to the applicant and seeking annulment of the land-ownership certificate issued to him on 4 June 2003. It noted, in particular, that the Berdychiv district administration had already annulled its own decision of 17 January 2003, which had served as the basis for the issuance of the land-ownership certificate to the applicant. The issuance had therefore been devoid of legal basis. 16. On 17 August 2006 the Berdychiv Court allowed the aforementioned claim. It noted that the disputed plot had been allocated to the applicant mistakenly on the basis of the decision of 17 January 2003, without due regard to the fact that in 1999 this very plot had already been expropriated and transferred to U.C.C. 17. Following this decision, U.C.C. blocked the road leading to the plot disputed by the U.C.C. and it became impossible for the applicant to access it or use it for farming. 18. On 12 December 2006 the Zhytomyr Regional Court of Appeal upheld the above judgment. 19. The applicant appealed in cassation before the Supreme Court of Ukraine. He noted, in particular, that he had obtained the disputed land lawfully and in good faith. He could therefore not be deprived of it unless fair compensation was paid. 20. In February 2007 the applicant added to his cassation appeal, informing the Supreme Court of Ukraine that on 12 February 2007 the Regional Court had annulled the decision of 22 July 2005 and revalidated the decision of 17 January 2003, on the basis of which he had obtained his land-ownership certificate (see paragraph 23 below). 21. On 4 April 2007 the Supreme Court of Ukraine rejected the applicant’s request for leave to appeal in cassation. 22. On an unspecified date several individuals, excluding the applicant, apparently the land owners whose land was also being claimed by U.C.C., instituted administrative proceedings against the Berdychiv district administration. They sought, in particular, to annul its decision of 22 July 2005 and to declare lawful the decision of 17 January 2003, on the basis of which their land-use certificates had been issued. 23. On 12 February 2007 the Zhytomyr Regional Court of Appeal allowed their claim. It noted, in particular, that Parliament had ordered the expropriation of Kh.’s land, while the land, whose boundaries had been in dispute, had belonged to V.G., which had been a separate legal entity on the date of the decision at issue. 24. On 23 July 2008 the Higher Administrative Court of Ukraine quashed the above decision and remitted the case for retrial. 25. After several rounds of proceedings, on 14 September 2011 the Berdychiv Court found that the decision of 22 July 2005 had been unlawful in so far as it had related to the plots of land of the individuals who had instituted the proceedings. On 6 December 2011 and 27 August 2013 the judgment of 14 September 2011 was upheld by the Zhytomyr Regional Administrative Court and the Supreme Court of Ukraine respectively.

5. The applicant was born in 1961 and lives in Mississauga, Canada. 6. In 2009 the applicant got married in Canada to E.N., a Polish national. They continued living in Canada and their son was born there in September 2010. The child obtained Canadian nationality at birth. It is unknown to the Court whether he also holds Polish nationality. The family lived in the applicant’s apartment. The applicant worked full time and was the sole financial provider for the family. In February 2011 he took thirty-three weeks’ parental leave. 7. In April 2011 the family went to Poland on holiday. They agreed to return to Canada in July 2011 and aeroplane tickets were purchased to this end. The couple split up in May 2011 and E.N. refused to return to Canada with the child. Soon afterwards the applicant went back to Canada alone. He briefly returned to Poland in July 2011 when his son underwent emergency surgery. 8. On 31 October 2011 the applicant lodged an application to have his child returned under the Hague Convention. This application was registered with the Kielce District Court on 23 January 2012. 9. On 27 November 2012 the Kielce District Court decided to obtain an expert report from the Family Consultation Centre (Rodzinny Ośrodek Diagnostyczno-Konsultacyjny “the RODK”). The experts were ordered to assess whether there was a grave risk that the boy’s return abroad would expose him to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place him in an intolerable situation. A copy of this decision has not been submitted to the Court. 10. The applicant and E.N. were invited to appear at an interview at the RODK which was scheduled for 30 November 2012. It appears that the domestic court’s decision to order the RODK report contained an instruction that the examination should go ahead whether or not the applicant was present. The applicant did not come to the appointment at the RODK. As a result, the report was based only on the statements of the child and his mother and on four volumes of the domestic court’s case file. It was prepared by two experts in psychology and was issued on 7 December 2012. 11. In their report, the RODK experts took notice of the fact that for the past year and a half the child (who was two years old at the time of the psychological examination) had lived away from and almost without any contact with his father. They also observed that the child had a strong emotional bond with his mother; he was developing well and spoke Polish; and that E.N. had ensured the child’s security, well-being and development. 12. The experts concluded that “the child’s separation from his mother would disturb his sense of security, belonging and stability, and [that] it would be adverse to his development – in particular, psychological [development] – [and] it would be against his best interests. In view of the above, moving the child to his father’s care [posed] a grave risk to his emotional [and] social development, [and] could cause a situation [which] for a two-year-old child [would be] difficult to bear.” 13. Apart from the RODK report, the domestic court obtained the following evidence: testimony from the applicant, E.N. and the members of both families and medical reports. 14. On 2 January 2013 the Kielce District Court, with Judge I.G. presiding, dismissed the applicant’s Hague Convention application (IIRNsm 87/12). 15. The first-instance court held that the child had been wrongfully retained in Poland by his mother within the meaning of the Hague Convention. It also considered that, in line with Article 17 of the Hague Convention, the interim orders concerning the issues of custody over the child and his residence which had been granted by the Canadian and Polish family courts (see paragraphs 33, 34 and 36 below) were viewed as irrelevant to the case at hand. 16. The district court also considered that the RODK report was thorough, clear and of a high evidentiary value. Relying on the report and the remaining evidence, the family court established that since his birth the child had been under the constant good care of his mother (who had not worked in Canada). The child had a strong emotional bond with the mother, did not remember the applicant and did not perceive him as a parent. The applicant did not show any interest in the child. Since July 2011, he had seen his son only once, in March 2012, despite the fact that he had been in Poland for a month. He had also stopped paying child support and had not shown any interest in him. The domestic court also made an additional observation that the applicant had sold his apartment in Canada and it was unknown if his new living conditions were adequate for his two-year-old child to move into. 17. In view of the above it was ultimately held that separating the two-year-old boy from the mother and returning him to his father in Canada would be traumatic and hard to bear for the child. This, in turn, would pose a threat to the child’s emotional and social development and would perturb his sense of security and stability. 18. The applicant appealed, arguing that the first-instance court had erred in that, inter alia, it had given a broad and not restrictive interpretation of Article 13 (b) of the Hague Convention and had dismissed his application even though it had not been established that the child was at a grave risk of physical or psychological harm if returned to Canada. The applicant also challenged the RODK experts’ report, arguing that it was unconvincing and inconsistent with the evidence obtained. 19. On 9 July 2013 the Kielce Regional Court (II Ca 551/13) dismissed the appeal in the relevant part. 20. The appellate court observed that international and domestic practice required that Article 13 (b) be given a restrictive reading to the effect that, in principle, any unfavourable consequences of the child’s separation stemming from the order to surrender the child by the abducting parent did not give rise to a grave risk of physical or psychological harm within the meaning of that provision. It also noted that the aim of the Hague Convention would be achieved if the abducting parent returned with the child. If no objective obstacles to the abducting parent’s return were present, it could be inferred that the parent was refusing to return and was acting in his or her own interest and not the interest of the child. 21. The appellate court reasoned that the application of the above‑mentioned principles was more complex in cases concerning very young children. The Hague Convention stipulated only a maximum age requirement for children whose return could be sought under its provisions (the age of 16). It also protected (under Article 12) very young children from possible harmful effects of the return if it was shown that the parent seeking the return had not taken care of the child before the abduction or that the child had already adapted to the new environment. Following this approach, separating an abducted child from the parent who had a dominant role in the child’s life would not fall within the Article 13 (b) exceptions unless objective obstacles to the parent’s return could be shown to be present. This approach however, was difficult to accept in cases concerning abductions of infants by mothers because of the special relationship between them. This was true even in the absence of any objective obstacles to the mother’s own return because any separation of an infant from his or her mother would inevitably be contrary to the child’s best interests. 22. The appellate court held that the utmost importance had to be attached to the child’s contact with his mother and his separation from her would place the boy in an intolerable situation. The domestic court relied on the following elements of the case: the applicant’s son had arrived in Poland with both parents at the age of six and a half months, in April 2011; since then the child had been taken care of solely by his mother; the most important element in his life was his contact with the mother; he did not have any memories of his life in Canada; and the applicant had not considered the child’s remaining in Poland illegal prior to October 2011. The appellate court also observed that by not appearing at the RODK interview, the applicant had waived his right to demonstrate that he could establish adequate contact with his young child and that the applicant had only seen his child once since the latter’s departure from Canada. 23. Since July 2011, the applicant has visited his son once, in March 2012 during a month-long stay in Poland. 24. In the applicant’s submission, he had made countless attempts to see his son. In particular, he had applied to the courts to have a meeting with his child away from E.N.’s house on 23 November 2011 and on an unspecified date in February 2012. Copies of these applications have not been submitted to the Court. In the Government’s submission, the applicant had not enquired about or sought contact with the child. 25. On 23 February 2012 the applicant lodged an application with the competent domestic court for arrangements to be made to secure the effective exercise of his right of contact during the Hague Convention proceedings. He wished to meet with his son away from E.N.’s house one day before and on the day of the court hearing. He submitted that he had not seen his child since August 2011 and that the child’s mother and grandparents had been very hostile towards the applicant when he had tried to visit his son at home. The applicant submitted that the application had been made under Article 21 of the Hague Convention. A copy of this application has not been submitted to the Court. 26. On 2 March 2012 the Kielce District Court, with I.G. as the presiding judge, decided to return the application for an interim order on the right of contact as unsubstantiated. It was considered that the applicant had not demonstrated that the child’s mother, apart from her allegedly hostile attitude, had obstructed his contact with the child. The domestic court relied on the applicable provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and did not make any reference to Article 21 of the Hague Convention. 27. The applicant stated without submitting a copy of the relevant document that on 1 July 2013 the domestic court had decided to grant him a right to a supervised visit with his son for two hours daily in E.N.’s house. The applicant had been in Canada at that time and thus had not exercised his right. 28. The applicant also submitted that on 9 July 2013 the appellate court had dismissed his request, presumably for a different schedule of his visits. A copy of this decision is not in the case file. 29. On an unspecified date, the Polish family court granted the applicant a right to contact with his child. The details of this decision are unknown to the Court. 30. On 3 June 2014 the Kielce Regional Court issued a decision, presumably concerning the applicant’s right of contact with his son (IC 2240/11). A copy of this decision has not been submitted by the Court. 31. The applicant lodged an interlocutory appeal against this decision. On 10 September 2014 the applicant’s lawyer completed this appeal by submitting that E.N. had been hindering the father’s right of contact which he had tried to enforce in line with the court’s order. The outcome of these proceedings is unknown. 32. On 1 September 2011 E.N. petitioned for divorce in Poland. Divorce proceedings are currently pending before the Kielce Regional Court. 33. On 22 November 2011 the Kielce Regional Court gave an interim order, establishing the child’s residence as being with the mother. It appears that the applicant participated in the court hearing via a live video link. He refused to answer any questions. 34. On 27 October 2011 the Ontario Superior Court of Justice in Canada held that the child’s retention in Poland was wrongful and issued an interim order granting full custody of the child to the applicant, authorising him and the law-enforcement authorities to apprehend the child and ordering E.N. to surrender the child without delay. To this effect, a wanted notice for E.N. was issued by Interpol for the offence of kidnapping. 35. On 21 August 2012 the Ontario Superior Court of Justice found E.N. to be in contempt of court for, inter alia, failing to comply with the interim order described above. No sentence was pronounced on that occasion. 36. On 11 September 2012 the Ontario Superior Court of Justice confirmed the interim decision of 27 October 2011, granting a final order of the applicant’s exclusive custody of the child. The Canadian court also requested the assistance of the Polish courts in securing the immediate apprehension and return of the child pursuant to the Hague Convention. 37. On 22 May 2013 the Ontario Superior Court of Justice allowed the divorce between the applicant and E.N. 38. The relevant international and domestic law is set out in the Court’s judgment of K.J. v. Poland, no. 30813/14, §§ 33-38 and 41-41, 1 March 2016.

5. The applicants were born in 1980 and 1964, respectively, and live in Hajdukovo. 6. On 12 February 2007 the applicants and their friend S.K. were indicted for allegedly having stolen a wine press (presu za grožđe). 7. On 25 January 2008 the Subotica Municipal Court acquitted all three defendants of these charges. In so doing, it explained that while there was evidence that they had been in possession of a press, there was nothing to suggest that they had obtained it through any criminal activity. The applicants themselves maintained that they had found the press abandoned, while S.K. denied the charge and thereafter exercised his right to remain silent. No material evidence was introduced during the trial and, apart from the statement by the alleged victim ‒ who maintained that the press worked and had been kept in a locked yard ‒ the statements of two witnesses supported the applicants’ defence. 8. On 8 April 2008 the prosecution lodged an appeal against this judgment, emphasising, in particular, that the first-instance court had failed to take into account a statement given to the police by S.K. on 26 January 2006 (albeit in the absence of the applicants and their counsel, who had not been invited to attend). 9. On 12 May 2008 the Subotica District Court quashed the impugned judgment and ordered a retrial. The court explained that the statement referred to by the prosecution was particularly important because on this occasion S.K. had confessed ‒ in the presence of his counsel ‒ that he had stolen the press together with the applicants. S.K. had subsequently revoked this confession claiming that it had been given under the influence of alcohol and then refused to answer any further questions, and all of these circumstances needed to be reconsidered by the Municipal Court, even though the prosecution itself had initially failed to request that S.K.’s statement of 26 January 2006 be admitted as evidence. The court found this failure by the Municipal Court to be “unclear and inexplicable”. 10. On 12 October 2008 S.K. died and on 29 December 2008 the Municipal Court discontinued the proceedings against him. 11. On 19 February 2009 the Municipal Court, having held a hearing and read out S.K.’s statement of 26 January 2006 before the parties, found the applicants guilty. The first applicant was sentenced to an effective prison term of six months while the second applicant was sentenced to six months’ imprisonment, suspended for a period of two years. In its reasoning the court primarily relied on S.K.’s statement of 26 January 2006. No evidence different from that admitted during the first trial was introduced during the retrial. 12. On 29 July 2009 the District Court upheld this judgment on appeal, and on 7 October 2010 the Supreme Court rejected the applicants’ further appeal on points of law (zahtev za ispitivanje zakonitosti pravosnažne presude). 13. In the meantime, on 11 September 2009, the applicants lodged a constitutional appeal with the Constitutional Court, alleging that their conviction had been based on the testimony of a person whom they had never had a chance to cross-examine and who had, in any event, revoked it subsequently. 14. On 14 October 2010 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicants’ appeal as manifestly ill-founded, adding that ‒ as a consequence of the death of S.K. ‒ the lower courts had had no choice but to accept his prior statement given to the police and, clearly, could no longer accommodate the applicants’ objection regarding his cross-examination.

6. The applicant had a restitution claim concerning movable property located in Opočno Castle. The castle itself belonged to another person, of whom the applicant is not an heir. The movable property was initially confiscated from a predecessor of the applicant during the German occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1942 on the orders of the German Secret State Police, which considered him to be an enemy of the German Reich. After the end of the Second World War, the property was once again confiscated, in 1945, by the Czechoslovak State under the Beneš decrees as he was considered to be of German nationality. That expropriation was quashed on appeal by the National Council in Prague (zemský národní výbor) on 21 January 1947 after it had been established that the applicant’s predecessor was of Czechoslovak nationality and had been loyal to the Czechoslovak State. What happened to the property afterwards is disputed and was discussed in the domestic decisions. 7. On 31 March 1992, the applicant’s father, together with his cousin, Ms. Kristina Colloredo-Mansfeld, claimed the restitution of movable property which had been in Opočno Castle. The applicant entered the proceedings as the heir and legal successor to his father, who died in 1998. 8. Due to a large number of items in question, the first-instance court decided the case by way of three separate judgments. 9. In 1999 the Pardubice District Court (okresní soud) returned a collection of 68 paintings to the applicant and his co-plaintiff. That judgment was upheld on appeal by the Hradec Králové Regional Court (krajský soud) on 1 June 2000 and the defendant’s appeal on points of law was dismissed. Those proceedings are not part of the present applications. 10. On 27 October 2006 the District Court ordered the National Heritage Institute to return to the applicant and his co-plaintiff certain movable property located in Opočno Castle. It found that the applicant’s predecessor had been the owner of the property on the critical date, that is 25 February 1948 (see Gratzinger and Gratzingerova v. the Czech Republic (dec.), no. 39794/98, § 24, ECHR 2002‑VII), and that the statutory conditions for its restitution had been fulfilled. 11. On 18 October 2007 the Regional Court quashed the judgment and dismissed the action. It held that the property in question had been taken away from the applicant’s predecessor before 25 February 1948 and that therefore the legislation on restitution did not apply. During a hearing on 8 October 2007, the court did not raise with the parties any questions or elements of evidence but was merely listening to the comments of the parties on the decision of the first-instance court, after which the case was adjourned for delivery of a judgment. 12. The Regional Court based its decision on two pieces of evidence. Firstly, there was a letter of 24 June 1947 from the national administrator of Opočno Castle to his superiors, informing them about a visit by the applicant’s predecessor to the castle. The second piece of evidence was a decision by the Ministry of Agriculture of 30 April 1947 by which Opočno Castle had been declared State cultural property (hereinafter “the 1947 decision”). The 1947 decision had not been raised with the parties in the course of the hearing and the parties had not received an opportunity to comment on it. In its reasoning the Regional Court noted that it was aware of the existence of the document through the exercise of its functions. 13. On 11 February 2009 the Supreme Court (Nejvyšší soud) dismissed an appeal on points of law (dovolání) lodged by the applicant. It noted that the appellate court had reached its conclusion, inter alia, on the basis of the 1947 decision. It did not address the applicant’s argument that he had not seen that decision and had not been able to comment on it. 14. On 11 August 2010 the Constitutional Court (Ústavní soud) dismissed a constitutional appeal by the applicant as manifestly ill-founded. It noted the importance of the 1947 decision, but stated that the requirements of Article 121 of the Code of Civil Procedure had been met and that it was not necessary to prove facts which were generally known, or known to a court through the exercise of its functions. 15. On 22 April 2009 the District Court dismissed the rest of the applicant’s restitution claim. In its reasoning it referred to the judgment of the Regional Court of 18 October 2007 and that of the Supreme Court of 11 February 2009. 16. On 27 January 2011 the Regional Court upheld the first-instance judgment. The court relied as evidence on a letter by the Ministry of Agriculture of 27 May 1957 referring to the 1947 decision. Despite the applicant’s repeated requests, the 1947 decision was not produced for the parties. 17. On 28 November 2011 the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal by the applicant on points of law. 18. On 19 April 2012 the Constitutional Court dismissed a constitutional appeal by the applicant, claiming a violation of his right to a fair trial and to his property, as manifestly ill-founded.

5. The applicants were born in 1938 and 1939 respectively and live in the city of Kherson, Ukraine. 6. On 14 January 2000 a police training exercise was conducted in accordance with an operational plan entitled “Sirena” (оперативний план «Сирена») (hereinafter “Operation Sirena”). During the exercise the applicants’ son, a police officer at the material time, played the role of a criminal for the purposes of the exercise and was accidentally shot dead by another police officer. 7. Operation Sirena for the Kherson Region was approved in 1999 by the police, civil and military authorities of that region on the basis of order No. 230 (classified) of 24 April 1998 of the Ministry of the Interior (see paragraph 66 below). The plan set out the steps to be taken and the procedure to be followed in the event of a search for and the arrest of armed or other dangerous criminals, including those who had escaped from detention. 8. A senior traffic police inspector, L., following instruction no. 20/10-33 of 9 January 2000 issued by the Kherson Regional Department of the Ministry of the Interior (Управління Міністерства внутрішніх справ в Херсонській області) (“the Kherson Regional Department”) and pursuant to an order from a senior traffic police officer, Kos., drafted a training exercise for traffic police officers in the city of Kherson and the village of Antonivka in the context of Operation Sirena. 9. The one-page training scenario stipulated that the training was to take place on 14 January 2000 between 10 a.m. and 5 p.m. At 10 a.m. a police office on duty was to circulate information that armed criminals had hijacked a car and that Operation Sirena had been launched. The scenario stipulated that, in addition to the police officer who would drive the car, there should also be in the car a second police officer, O., who would observe the actions of police patrol officers. The hijacked car would be followed by a second car containing a police officer, Ts., who would film the exercise. The scenario was approved on 13 January 2000 by a deputy head of the Kherson Regional Department, S. 10. Senior traffic police officer Kos., who on 14 January 2000 was the acting head of the Traffic Police Department, later stated in the course of the criminal investigation that traffic police officers had been given prior notice of the training exercise on the day that it was held. 11. At 10.30 a.m. on 14 January 2000 a senior traffic police officer, So., briefed traffic police officers O., Ts., Ku., Sh. and the applicants’ son about the training. At 10.50 a.m. L. instructed a traffic police officer on duty to give the police unit on duty («чергова частина») prior notice of the training exercise and to issue a “lookout alert”. 12. At 10.56 a.m. a police officer on duty, P., was informed by a traffic police unit that two unknown armed criminals had hijacked a car and were moving in the direction of Tavriyskyy, a Kherson residential neighbourhood. He communicated this information to the patrol cars, to the city’s district police stations and to the head of the Kherson Regional Department. Two or three minutes later P. received additional information that the above-mentioned alert was part of a training exercise being conducted under Operation Sirena. According to the findings of the subsequent internal police investigation (see paragraph 19 below), P. forwarded that additional information to the head of the Kherson Regional Department, who instructed P. to pass it on to the city’s district police stations. It was established by the police internal investigation that P. failed to do so. 13. Having been informed of the alleged hijacking, Os., the First Deputy of the Dniprovskyy district police office, issued appropriate instructions to four police officers and placed them at various posts. In particular, police officer K. was placed, together with a traffic police officer, Ko., in the vicinity of the Antonovskyy Bridge over the River Dnipro. 14. The car containing the “criminals” (played by the applicants’ son and police officer Ku.) passed the aforementioned post without being stopped. According to Ko., his radio transmitter had not been working properly and he had left his post in order to inform the traffic police office in charge that the hijacked car had passed their post. Later Ko. testified that he had given K. prior notice of the training exercise. After Ko. had left, police officer Ts., who was in the second car and was filming the exercise, switched off his camera (see paragraph 26 below). 15. Traffic police officer O., who was an observer in the “hijacked” car, instructed the applicants’ son, who was driving, to drive by the post again. This time, police officer K. stopped the car, released his gun’s safety catch, and ordered the applicants’ son and police officer Ku. to get out of the car. While searching the applicants’ son, K. pulled the trigger since the applicants’ son had allegedly made a sudden movement. The applicants’ son was fatally wounded and died on the way to hospital. 16. The applicants submitted a copy of the video recording of the training exercise. However, the part containing the shooting incident involving the applicants’ son was missing. The original video recording has been lost (see paragraph 46 below). 17. On 15 January 2000 the Kherson Regional Board of the Ministry of the Interior adopted a decision by which it was concluded that the “extraordinary event” («надзвичайна подія») of 14 January 2000 had taken place because of low professional standards on the part of the police; K.’s failure to assess properly the “extraordinary circumstances” («екстремальні умови»), ignorance of the steps to be taken when arresting a suspect and failure to properly handle his weapon; and the irresponsible attitude of senior police officers towards the organisation of the training exercise. It was decided, inter alia, to dismiss K., O., P., Os. and A. 18. On 16 January 2000 the head of the Kherson Regional Department, I., approved the findings of an internal investigation conducted following the death of the applicants’ son. 19. The conclusion of that investigation provides, in so far as relevant, as follows: “The inspection established that: In accordance with instruction no. 20/10-33 of 9 January 2000 issued by the Kherson Regional Department of the Ministry of Interior ..., L. ... drafted a training scenario for traffic police personnel ... When doing so he did not take into consideration the provisions of Operation Sirena ... [It] is pointless and not efficient to conduct training only for the traffic police officers of Kherson and Antonivka. The procedure for the conduct of the training was not comprehensively set out; [failures included]: - the failure to stipulate an itinerary for the car containing the “criminals”; - the failure to provide for the necessary number of observers ... In their turn, the senior officers of the Kherson Regional Traffic Police ... acted in a perfunctory and irresponsible manner ..., did not properly study the scenario and did not correct its shortcomings... Moreover, no training instructor was appointed and the heads of services and subdivisions involved in the training were not informed of the details of the scenario. The deputy head of the Department ..., S. – approved the above-mentioned scenario on 13 January 2000 without correcting its shortcomings... So., a lieutenant-colonel, ... briefed those police officers who were due to participate in the training but failed to notify the head of the Department of the time of the training and did not personally supervise the progress of the training ... 20. As a result, it was concluded that police officers K., O., P., Os. and A. should be dismissed and that the dismissal of police officer S. should be initiated before the Ministry of the Interior. It was further proposed to discipline a number of the other police officers involved. The investigation concluded that the senior police officers involved had failed to properly train their personnel to act in emergency circumstances. 21. On 17 January 2000 the Ministry of the Interior issued an order which noted that even though safety and the prevention of death and injury in respect of police officers were priorities in police activities, there had been a number of serious shortcomings in the organisation and conduct of the training exercise, which had led to the incident in question. It was noted, inter alia, that since the beginning of his service with the Dniprovskyy District Police Office in November 1999 K. had not attended the relevant theoretical instruction classes. The Ministry also concluded that the police officers involved had failed to properly organise the training. 22. It was further noted that by order No. 17 of 16 January 2000, issued by I., the head of the Kherson Regional Department, Os., A., P., O., and K. had been dismissed and other police officers disciplined. For the most part, that decision was approved by the Ministry of the Interior. However, it was decided not to dismiss but rather to demote Os. and A. and to reprimand I. 23. On 14 January 2000 the Dniprovskyy District Prosecutor’s Office of Kherson (“the District Prosecutor’s Office”) instituted criminal proceedings in respect of the incident. On the same day it was decided to assign the case to three investigating officers and to conduct a forensic medical examination of the body of the applicants’ son. In particular, the expert was asked to determine what injuries were on the corpse. 24. On 15 January 2000 a forensic medical expert concluded that the applicants’ son had a gunshot wound to the chest and scratches on the left side of the face, possibly sustained when he fell down. 25. In the course of the investigation K. pleaded guilty. His testimonies regarding the events of 14 January 2000 coincided with the facts as described in paragraphs 13-15 above. 26. The testimony of different police officers involved in the organisation and conduct of the training exercise included, inter alia, the following: - P. testified that the “orders in force” had not required that information about the training be circulated; - the head of the police unit on duty at the Kherson Regional Department (начальник чергової частини штабу Управління МВС), G., testified that he had instructed P. to “comply with the Sirena plan, in accordance with the existing instructions”. G. also submitted that the police unit on duty had only received the training scenario on 15 January 2000 that is the day after the training exercise. It had been impossible to involve only the traffic police in the training since Operation Sirena had required joint action, involving both the police and the traffic police; - S., a deputy head of the Kherson Regional Department, testified that there had been no legal instruments governing the conduct of police training under Operation Sirena. S. stated that the police officer who had ordered the implementation of the training had been supposed to instruct police officers on duty as to what information should be given to the district police stations. S. stated that the training scenario had been discussed with Kos., who had told S. that the scenario had been approved by the head of the Kherson Regional Department; - police officer O. testified that the district police stations must have been aware of the training exercise. This information should have been circulated, together with a “lookout alert”; - police officer A. testified that nobody in the Dniprovskyy District Police Office had been aware of the training exercise; - police officer Ku. testified that he and the applicants’ son had been “aware that the police officers [would] have guns with live rounds”; - traffic police officer Ko. testified that he had told K. about the training; - police officer Ts. testified that he had stopped filming after traffic police officer Ko. had left (see paragraph 14 above), since he had “not known that the car would make a second attempt to pass this post”. 27. During a confrontation held between K. and traffic police office Ko., the latter insisted that he had informed K. about the training. 28. In the course of the investigation a number of other investigating measures were conducted, including a forensic ballistics examination and a reconstruction of events. 29. On 13 July 2000 the Dniprovskyy District Court (“the Dniprovskyy Court”), in the absence of the applicants, terminated the criminal proceedings against K. under the Amnesty Act, since he was the father of a minor and should thus not be liable to serve a punishment. It was noted that this decision was not subject to appeal. 30. On 3 April 2009 the Dniprovskyy Court rejected as unsubstantiated an application lodged by the second applicant on March 2009 for the renewal of the time-limit in respect of an appeal against the decision of 13 July 2000. On 19 May 2009 the Kherson Regional Court of Appeal upheld this decision. The court noted that although the second applicant had been absent from the court hearing on 13 July 2000, she had been aware of that decision since at least 2004 and had received a copy of it on 23 January 2008 at the latest. 31. In June 2000 the District Prosecutor’s Office refused to institute criminal proceedings against other police officers involved in the organisation and conduct of the training exercise. In particular, on 7 and 8 June 2000 the District Prosecutor’s Office refused to institute criminal proceedings against L., O., Kos., So., S., A., Ost. and G. in the absence of any evidence of a crime, given that there had been no causal link between their actions and the death of the applicants’ son. 32. On 27 and 28 June 2000, citing the same reasons, the District Prosecutor’s Office refused to institute criminal proceedings against P. and O. On 18 August 2000 those decisions were quashed by the Kherson Regional Prosecutor’s Office and the case was remitted for additional investigation. 33. On 1 September 2000 the District Prosecutor’s Office instituted criminal proceedings in respect of the alleged negligence on the part of the Kherson Regional Department police officers involved in the organisation and conduct of the training exercise. 34. On 30 October 2000 the District Prosecutor’s Office terminated the proceedings. It noted that, according to a Kherson Regional Department senior police officer, the legal instruments of the Ministry of the Interior had not stipulated that police officers should have been informed about the training. Such training was to be conducted under realistic conditions. It was further noted that no obligation to inform colleagues about the training exercise had been part of the duties of any police officer on duty. 35. On 28 November 2000 the Kherson Regional Prosecutor’s Office quashed that decision and remitted the case for additional investigation. It noted that the investigation had not been thorough and that the decision taken had been unsubstantiated. In particular, it had not been established whether there had been a causal link between the shortcomings on the part of the police officers and the death of the applicants’ son. It had also not been established which legal instruments regulated police training exercises. 36. By a letter of 29 December 2000 the Kherson Regional Department informed the District Prosecutor’s Office that, under (classified) order No. 230 of the Ministry of the Interior (see paragraph 66 below), the relevant skills were “to be mastered during training [conducted] under realistic conditions”. At the same time the relevant legal instruments did not specify any procedure for the conduct of training exercises. 37. On the same day the District Prosecutor’s Office terminated the criminal proceedings. 38. On 12 February 2001 the Kherson Regional Prosecutor’s Office quashed that decision, citing the failure to fully comply with the decision of 28 November 2000. The recommenced proceedings were again terminated on 29 March 2001. It was noted in the latter decision that the constituent elements of a crime (“negligence”) under Article 167 of the Criminal Code included failure to perform properly or at all certain duties. However, in the absence of any regulations governing procedure for the conduct of training exercises under Operation Sirena, the duties of the police officers involved in such training had not been defined. Moreover, there had been no causal link between the actions of the Kherson Regional Department police officers and the death of the applicants’ son, since the latter had died following K.’s mishandling of firearms. It was concluded that there was no indication of any crime in the actions of the police officers. 39. On 1 April 2004 the General Prosecutor’s Office quashed the decision of 29 March 2001. It was noted that the decision to terminate the criminal proceedings had been “premature and unlawful”. In particular, during the investigation it had not been clarified whether there had been a possibility to equip the police officers with blank cartridges and why O. had not intervened to prevent K. firing his gun after seeing that its safety catch had been released. 40. On 25 April 2004 the District Prosecutor’s Office again terminated the proceedings. When questioned again, O. stated that he had not known that K.’s gun had been loaded. Moreover, K. should have been aware that a training exercise was in progress. The tragic incident had happened within seconds, so O. had not had the possibility of preventing it. P. testified that, “under the Department’s instructions regarding the ‘Sirena’ training plan”, it had not been his responsibility to circulate the information that the announcement about the car hijacking was part of a training exercise. As to whether blank cartridges could have been used for the training exercise, the head of the Kherson Regional Department staff, D., testified that the regional police senior officers had decided to use live rounds for the training. The investigation concluded that the applicants’ son had died as a result of the mishandling of firearms on the part of K. 41. On 21 September 2004 the Kherson Regional Prosecutor’s Office quashed this decision and remitted the case for additional investigation. It was noted that a number of investigative actions had yet to be undertaken and a number of issues had yet to be clarified. In particular, the plans for the training exercise and Operation Sirena had to be seized and it had to be clarified who had briefed K. and why K. had been alone at his post. It was also noted that order No. 230 was not classified and should therefore be added to the case materials. 42. In January 2005 the applicants’ relatives testified that at the funeral of the applicants’ son they had noted that make-up had been applied to the applicants’ son’s face to cover a hole in his head. An ambulance doctor testified that he had not examined the body in detail since it had been evident that the applicants’ son had died after being shot. 43. On 20 January 2005 the investigating authorities decided to exhume the body. 44. On 24 March 2005 a forensic medical examination of the body of the applicants’ son was ordered because the applicants insisted that their son had not been accidentally shot but rather killed by either being hit on the head with a gun or shot in the head because he had possessed information regarding unlawful activity on the part of other police officers. They stated that the body had had a large haematoma on the head and there had been a crack in the skull. 45. After the forensic medical examination of the body of the applicants’ son, a forensic expert concluded that the crack in the skull of the applicants’ son had appeared during the initial forensic medical examination. 46. On 25 January 2006 the Deputy Prosecutor of the Kherson Regional Prosecutor’s Office upheld the conclusions of an internal investigation into the loss of the original video recording of the training exercise. It was proposed to discipline the investigating officer, I., who, between April 2004 and April 2005, had lost the video. 47. On 10 February 2006 it was again decided to terminate the criminal proceedings in the absence of any evidence of a crime. A deputy head of the Kherson Regional Department, T., submitted that the police officers had not been informed about the training exercise since, under (classified) order No. 230 of the Ministry of the Interior, police training should be conducted under conditions as realistic as possible. There were no legal instruments of the Ministry of the Interior stipulating the procedure for the conduct of training exercises and there was no obligation to inform police officers when any such training was being conducted. Consequently, the scope of duties of those involved in the training conducted under Operation Sirena had not been defined. 48. On 8 September 2006 the Suvorovskyy District Court (“the Suvorovskyy Court”) quashed this decision and remitted the case for additional investigation, since the prosecutor’s office had failed to take into account the fact that some police officers had been disciplined. The court also observed that “all necessary and possible investigative actions had not been undertaken”. 49. On 14 November 2006 the Kherson Regional Court of Appeal quashed the decision of 8 September 2006 and upheld the decision of 10 February 2006. The court concluded that the circumstances of the case had been investigated comprehensively and that the Suvorovskyy District Court had, in particular, failed to specify which facts had not been examined by an investigating officer. 50. The second applicant appealed against the decision of 14 November 2006 in cassation. She stated that the court of appeal had failed to examine the factual circumstances of the case and that many aspects of the case remained unclear (whether there had been an obligation to inform the police officers about the training, what did the “near-reality” conditions mean etc.), therefore, the first instance court decision had been well-grounded and should not had been quashed. On 31 January 2008 the Supreme Court of Ukraine dismissed the second applicant’s appeal. It found that the applicant’s arguments about unlawfulness and lack of reasoning of the second instance court decision had been unsubstantiated. In particular, the court of appeal correctly concluded that the investigation had been comprehensive while the first instance court had failed to give reasons for the need for additional investigation. 51. On 16 October 2000 a lump-sum insurance payment in the amount of 18,270 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH) (at the material time around 3,894.68 euros (EUR)) was paid jointly to the applicants and to their son’s widow and daughter pursuant to section 23 of the Police Act (see Lovygina v. Ukraine (dec.), no. 16074/03, 22 September 2009). 52. According to the Government, between 2002 and 2013 a total of UAH 21,320 (around EUR 2,558) was paid to the applicants in financial aid and the first applicant was furnished with a washing machine, construction materials for a house renovation and a table for a computer. 53. The applicants instituted proceedings against the Kherson Regional Department claiming compensation for damage inflicted by their son’s death. On 13 October 2000 the Suvorovskyy District Court awarded them UAH 23,600 (around EUR 5,000) as compensation for non-pecuniary damage. This decision was quashed and the case remitted for fresh consideration. 54. On 26 September 2001 the same court awarded the applicants UAH 20,000 (around EUR 4,000). On 15 January 2002 the Kherson Regional Court of Appeal upheld that decision. However, on 21 October 2002 the Supreme Court of Ukraine quashed it and dismissed the applicants’ claim, finding that, after having accepted a full insurance payment, the applicants no longer had a valid compensation claim. The parties did not submit copies of the applicants’ claim and the domestic courts’ decisions. 55. In March 2006 the applicants instituted proceedings against the prosecutor’s offices at various levels. The applicants complained that the investigation into their son’s death had been ineffective and claimed compensation for non-pecuniary damage. 56. On 8 September 2006 the Suvorovskyy District Court, examining the case under administrative procedure, found for the applicants. The court found that the investigation had lasted for six years and that on four occasions the Kherson Regional Prosecutor’s Office had quashed the decisions of the District Prosecutor’s Office terminating those proceedings. The court concluded that the case had been investigated improperly, with numerous breaches of the law, and awarded the applicants compensation. 57. On 23 January 2007 the Kherson Regional Court of Appeal quashed that decision and remitted the case for fresh consideration by the first-instance court. 58. After declining several times to consider the applicants’ case because of their failure to comply with procedural requirements, on 6 February 2008 the Komsomolskyy District Court (“the Komsomolskyy Court”) decided to terminate the proceedings, ruling that the applicants’ claim for damages should have been lodged under a civil procedure. On 24 December 2008 the Odessa Administrative Court of Appeal upheld this decision. The applicants appealed in cassation. 59. On 10 March 2011 the Higher Administrative Court upheld the above decisions and held that the applicants should have complained to a higher prosecutor about the allegedly unlawful actions of the lower prosecutor. 60. In April 2009 the applicants lodged a claim under civil procedure with the Komsomolskyy Court against the Kherson Prosecutor’s Office, claiming compensation for damage resulting from an ineffective investigation. On 22 April 2009 the court dismissed that claim on the ground that the applicants should have lodged their claim under administrative procedure. On 20 July 2009 the Kherson Regional Court of Appeal upheld that ruling. The applicants did not appeal against those rulings. 61. In February 2009 the second applicant instituted administrative proceedings in the Kherson Regional Administrative Court against the Ministry of the Interior and the Kherson Regional Department, complaining that their conduct relating to the organisation of the police training of 14 January 2000 had been unlawful. It is not clear whether she claimed any compensation in this respect. 62. On 26 June 2009 the Kherson Regional Administrative Court found against the second applicant. The court noted that the death of the second applicant’s son had been investigated several times; K. had been found guilty but amnestied, criminal proceedings against other police officers had been terminated in the absence of evidence of any crime, and police officers S. and I. had been disciplined. Moreover, the second applicant’s son had died in 2000, but the second applicant had only lodged her claim against the Ministry and the Kherson Regional Department in 2009. 63. On 4 January 2010 the Odessa Administrative Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal lodged by the second applicant, ruling that it had been lodged out of time. On 16 November 2010 the Higher Administrative Court of Ukraine upheld that ruling. 64. On 1 April 2003 the applicants lodged an application before this Court complaining that termination of the proceedings against K. had been in breach of the State’s positive obligation under Article 2 of the Convention to conduct an effective independent investigation into their son’s death. They also invoked Article 6 § 1 of the Convention complaining about the outcome of the proceedings in respect of their claim for compensation (see paragraph 54 above). 65. On 18 October 2005 the Court by a Committee decision declared their complaints inadmissible (application no. 15439/03).

6. The applicants were born in 1966 and 2007 respectively and live in St Petersburg. The first applicant is the second applicant’s father. 7. The first applicant has a mild mental disability. Between 1983 and January 2012 he lived in St Petersburg Neuropsychological Care Home no. 1 (“the care home”). 8. In 2007 the first applicant married Ms N.S., a resident of the same care home, who had been deprived of her legal capacity on account of her mental disability. 9. On 30 May 2007 Ms N.S. gave birth to the second applicant. At the time, the first applicant was not recognised as the child’s father. One week later the second applicant was admitted to hospital because of an infection she had contracted during the delivery. 10. On 12 July 2007 the second applicant was placed in St Petersburg Children’s Home no. 3 (“the children’s home”) as a child without parental care. 11. On 7 August 2007 the first applicant obtained a new birth certificate for the second applicant and was registered as her father. He subsequently gave his consent for her to stay at the children’s home until it became possible for him to take care of her. Throughout the second applicant’s stay there, the first applicant maintained regular contact with her. He would visit her regularly, spend time with her, take her for walks and buy her books, toys and clothes. 12. By a judgment of 31 March 2008 the Dzerzhinskiy District Court of St Petersburg refused to restore Ms N.S.’s legal capacity, relying in particular on a psychiatric examination report. It stated that, inter alia, there were conflicting, aggressive and emotionally inadequate tendencies in her behaviour. 13. On 24 September 2008 the marriage between the first applicant and Ms N.S. was declared void at the request of a public prosecutor because of Ms N.S.’s legal incapacity. 14. Following a claim by the first applicant acting on his own behalf and on behalf of the second applicant, on 6 June 2011 the Smolninskiy District Court of St Petersburg ordered the St Petersburg City Council to provide the applicants with housing under a social tenancy agreement. In November 2011 they were provided with a flat in St Petersburg. 15. In February 2012, on the basis of a medical assessment, the first applicant was discharged from the care home and moved into his flat. He has been living there ever since. 16. In November 2011 the first applicant informed the children’s home of his intention to take the second applicant into his care once he was discharged from the care home and had moved into his flat. 17. On an unspecified date the children’s home applied to the Frunzenskiy District Court of St Petersburg (“the District Court”) to have the first applicant’s parental authority over the second applicant restricted. The children’s home indicated that “the first applicant [had] never yet taken the girl from the children’s home to raise her in his family but was planning to raise the girl by himself”. In the children’s home’s view, it was not advisable to let the girl be placed in her parents’ care as her mother was legally incapacitated and thus posed a danger to the girl’s life and health, while her father could not fully exercise his parental responsibilities owing to his mental disability. In addition, the children’s home submitted, referring to information provided by its staff (see paragraph 18 below), that at the time it would be very stressful for the second applicant to be transferred to her parents’ family. (a) Written evidence 18. In the proceedings before the District Court, the children’s home produced undated reports by its staff. They stated that the second applicant had difficulties in communicating with her parents and that she felt fear, anxiety and emotional stress in their presence. 19. The first applicant relied on the following pieces of written evidence. 20. In a certificate dated 24 December 2009 the children’s home stated that the second applicant was in their care and that the first applicant and Ms N.S. regularly visited her. 21. In a certificate dated 26 May 2011 a municipal custody and guardianship agency confirmed that the second applicant was living temporarily at the children’s home at the first applicant’s request pending the allocation of social housing to him, and that he visited her there. 22. A report dated 10 October 2011 by a panel of experts contained the results of a medical psychiatric examination of the first applicant that had been carried out with a view to determining whether he could be discharged from the care home and bring up his child. The report described him as a fully focused, sociable person with reduced intelligence. According to the report, the first applicant was well presented, readily engaged himself in conversation and could read, write and do arithmetic. He was able to cook and kept his room in the care home clean and orderly. The report also mentioned that he talked about his daughter with tenderness and love, proudly demonstrated her “achievements”, showed clothes and toys bought for her, and regularly visited her. He was planning to take her home as soon as he was provided with social housing. The report also stated that throughout his stay at the care home the first applicant had worked there and saved money over several years; he would therefore be able to support his daughter financially. The report concluded that he could be discharged from the care home and that his state of health enabled him to fully exercise his parental authority. 23. A report dated 8 February 2012 by the custody and guardianship authority described the living conditions in the first applicant’s flat as appropriate for his daughter. It stated, in particular, that the flat had recently been renovated, was clean and light, had all the necessary furniture and home appliances, and that there was a sleeping place for the child with clean bed linen. There were toys and books suitable for her age, and clothes appropriate for the season. There was also a separate desk equipped for the child. 24. A letter dated 14 February 2012 issued by the care home to the District Court again confirmed that the first applicant regularly visited the second applicant at the children’s home, that he bought clothes for her and that he discussed with the management of the care home the steps he could take on his own to ensure the girl received a good upbringing, financial support, health care and an education. When concluding the social tenancy agreement for the flat allocated to him, the first applicant had himself found out which documents he would need to register the girl at kindergarten, had collected those documents and had put her on a waiting list for a place. The letter also stated that the first applicant’s medical examination had not revealed any contradictions to his upbringing of the second applicant; he was a well-organised and reliable person who had realistic life plans and a responsible attitude towards his work and obligations. His psychiatric state was stable; he did not show any signs of aggression towards others or emotional instability and did not need any medical treatment. (b) Oral submissions and witness statements 25. At the hearing before the District Court, the first applicant’s representative contested the children’s home’s application as groundless and discriminatory as being based on the fact that the first applicant had an intellectual disability. He argued, with reference to the adduced evidence (see paragraphs 20-24 above), that the first applicant was fully able to exercise his parental authority and take care of his daughter. He pointed out that the first applicant had recently been discharged from the care home and lived in a separate flat, where the conditions were adequate and suitable for the second applicant to live in. The first applicant’s lawyer thus insisted that the second applicant should be transferred into his care. He argued that the transfer could be performed gradually, to enable the girl to get used to the changes in her life, while the competent social care agencies could assist the first applicant in exercising his parental authority and monitor the family and, in particular, the second applicant’s life and upbringing. 26. Representatives of the children’s home (its director and the doctor in charge of the second applicant’s treatment) maintained the claim, arguing that it was premature to transfer the girl into the first applicant’s care. They stated, in particular, that the first applicant had a mental disability and had lived for all his life in a closed specialist institution; he would therefore be unable to ensure proper hygienic care of the girl or her adequate development, while it was impossible to entrust any such care to the second applicant’s mother as she was legally incapacitated. The representatives of the children’s home also stated that the first applicant’s attempts to communicate with the second applicant clearly showed that there was no contact between them. They added that when the second applicant had been told for the first time that she might be transferred into her father’s care, she had been stressed, scared and afraid of approaching him; later, when she had realised that she would be staying at the children’s home, her fears had disappeared. They also stated that at the time the second applicant’s fear of her parents had passed, and that she ceased fearing living with her family. 27. A representative of the municipal custody and guardianship authority and a public prosecutor both maintained the children’s home’s application, arguing that in view of the first applicant’s diagnosis, and the fact that his partner Ms N.S. had no legal capacity, it was not safe to transfer the second applicant into their care, and that two parents with mental disabilities would be unable to ensure the girl’s harmonious development. 28. The District Court also heard evidence from Ms O., a care home employee, who stated that whilst at the home the first applicant had lived independently in a separate room, which he had kept in order. He had bought food and cooked for himself and had been able to take prescribed medicines unsupervised if given clear instructions. He had worked part-time at the home, helping to take care of its patients, and had always been able to establish good contact with the patients and their relatives. He had been allowed to leave the care home freely and had also worked part-time outside, and at some point he and Ms N.S. had lived together at her relatives’ place for a while, and had then returned to the care home. Ms O. expressed her certainty that the first applicant would be fully able to fulfil his parental obligations and take good care of the second applicant. (c) Judgment of 20 March 2012 29. On 20 March 2012 the District Court examined the children’s home’s claim. It observed, in particular, that the first applicant and Ms N.S. regularly visited the second applicant at the children’s home and attempted to communicate with her in the presence of the social workers, and that the first applicant had obtained a compulsory medical insurance certificate for her. The court also referred to the report of 8 February 2012 regarding the first applicant’s living conditions and noted, more specifically, that the first applicant had carried out repairs at the flat allocated to him, had equipped a room for a child, and had registered the second applicant at the address. 30. The District Court went on to note that if the children’s home’s application to restrict the first applicant’s parental authority were to be dismissed, the first applicant would be entitled to take his daughter into his care. However, the court considered that at the time it would be “undesirable” as it would not be in the child’s best interests. It noted, with reference to the reports by staff members of the children’s home (see paragraph 18 above) and similar statements by the representatives of the children’s home made at the hearing (see paragraph 26 above) that at present the girl felt anxious in the presence of her parents and had difficulties in communicating with them. The court therefore considered that “it would be stressful for the child to be placed with the family of her parents, who she had never lived with and had so far had no chance to get used to”. 31. The District Court further observed that since childhood, the first applicant had lived in specialist State institutions for people with mental disabilities and had no skills and experience in rearing children and taking care of them. In view of the fact that he had only left an institution and started living on his own in 2012, it considered that his intention to raise his daughter by himself was premature. 32. The court also observed that the girl’s biological mother had free access to the first applicant’s flat and noted that at present she had no legal capacity. It then noted that it “[had] no sufficient and reliable evidence that it would be safe for the child to remain with her parents, including her legally incapacitated mother”. 33. The District Court also referred to the first applicant’s mental disability and noted that “at present there was no reliable evidence showing that it would be safe for the girl to live with him”. In this connection, it noted that his medical diagnosis and category of disability would make him ineligible for applying to adopt a child. 34. Lastly, the District Court observed that the first applicant’s monthly income was 15,000 Russian roubles (RUB), while the monthly living wage was RUB 6,910.90 for an adult and RUB 5,461.39 for a child. As the first applicant would have to pay utility bills and, from time to time, medicine, some of which could be costly, the court considered that at the time he would be unable to provide adequate financial support for his daughter. 35. The District Court then referred to Article 73 of the Family Code and allowed the children’s home’s claim. It restricted, for the time being, the first applicant’s parental authority over the second applicant. The court added that by virtue of Article 76 of the same Code the first applicant would be able to apply to court to have the restriction of his parental authority lifted, if the reasons for the restriction being imposed ceased to exist. 36. The first applicant appealed against the judgment of 20 March 2012 to the St Petersburg City Court (“the City Court”). 37. With regard to the District Court’s first argument (see paragraph 30 above), the first applicant submitted that it would in any case be stressful for the child, who had spent four years at the children’s home, to start living anywhere else, for instance with an adoptive family. As for the children’s home’s reference to the girl’s anxiety in her parents’ presence, the first applicant argued that the reports to that end by its staff (see paragraph 18 above) were out of date and could not serve as a basis for the court’s finding, as at the hearing before the first-instance court the children’s home representatives had confirmed that the second applicant was no longer afraid of her parents or of being placed in the first applicant’s care (see paragraph 26 above). 38. The first applicant also argued that, in so far as the District Court had relied on the fact that he had lived at the care home for a prolonged period, a parent’s past or present residence in a specialist institution, there was no such ground for restricting parental authority in the Russian Family Code. Moreover, the law did not require biological parents to prove their ability to raise children or their housekeeping skills as a prerequisite for exercising their parental authority. 39. The first applicant further insisted, with reference to the District Court’s argument to that end, that the fact the girl’s mother was legally incapacitated was of no relevance to his case. Legal incapacity was a formal status and did not mean that the person was dangerous to others. In any case, the mental health of the child’s mother could not serve as a basis for restricting his own parental authority over his daughter. The first applicant also claimed that during the second applicant’s stay at the children’s home, her mother had been allowed to visit her. 40. The first applicant went on to argue that there had been no evidence at the District Court’s disposal proving that he posed any danger to his daughter. On the contrary, the relevant medical report by the experts of the care home, who had observed the first applicant for many years, revealed that his mental condition had not impaired his ability to fulfil his parental responsibilities (see paragraph 22 above). 41. Lastly, the first applicant alleged that the District Court had erred in establishing his income, which in fact exceeded the living wage in St Petersburg. Referring to the Court’s judgment in the case of Saviny v. Ukraine (no. 39948/06, 18 December 2008) and the relevant provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, he also submitted that his income could not be a decisive element in the decision to restrict his parental authority. 42. In his oral submissions before the City Court, the first applicant argued that if the children’s home’s claim was rejected, the transfer of the second applicant into his care could be gradual to enable her to adapt psychologically to her new life in the family. 43. On 17 July 2012 the City Court upheld the judgment of 20 March 2012 on appeal. It repeated the reasoning and conclusions of the District Court, stating that they were correct and accurately reflected the factual circumstances of the case. The appellate court considered that the first applicant “had not adduced convincing evidence proving the absence of a real risk to the second applicant’s life, health and adequate upbringing” if she was transferred into her father’s care. It also noted that the first applicant was not precluded from seeking an annulment of the restriction of his parental authority in the future, should the relevant circumstances change. 44. On 31 January 2013 a St Petersburg City Court judge returned without examination a cassation appeal by the first applicant against the court decisions of 20 March and 17 July 2012, as he had failed to enclose a duly certified copy of the judgment of 20 March 2012. He did not attempt to pursue the cassation proceedings any further. 45. After the present application was communicated to the respondent Government, they submitted information on factual developments in the case. 46. In particular, by a judgment of 20 September 2012, the Zelenogorskiy District Court of St Petersburg restored, with reference to a psychiatric report, Ms N.S.’s legal capacity. The judgment entered into force on 25 October 2012. 47. On 15 November 2012 the first applicant remarried Ms N.S. 48. By an order of 9 January 2013 the children’s home established rules concerning the admission of visitors. According to the Government, on the basis of that order the first applicant regularly and without any limitations visited the second applicant there. 49. On an unspecified date the first applicant brought civil proceedings against the children’s home in the District Court of St Petersburg, seeking to have the restriction of his parental authority over the second applicant lifted. He argued, in particular, that one of the grounds for imposing that restriction had been the second applicant’s anxiety and fear she had felt in his presence and her unwillingness to live with him. He pointed out that at present the second applicant had no fear of her parents, that she had developed an affective attitude towards him, considered him as her father and was ready to live with him. He also pointed out that since February 2012 he had been living on his own and maintaining a household and that he was employed and had a stable income. He also submitted that the legal capacity of the second applicant’s mother, Ms N.S., had recently been restored. In the first applicant’s view, therefore, there was no reason to continue to restrict his parental authority over the second applicant which prevented him from taking her from the children’s home. 50. A representative of the children’s home confirmed in court that the first applicant regularly visited the second applicant, that close emotional ties had formed between them and that the girl missed her father when he left. He was therefore of the opinion that it would be in the second applicant’s interests to lift the restriction on the first applicant’s parental authority and transfer her into his care. Representatives of two district custody and guardianship agencies and a public prosecutor supported the first applicant’s application. 51. On 8 April 2013 the District Court gave its judgment. It took into account the parties’ arguments and observed, as had been submitted by a representative of the children’s home, that the first and second applicants had developed close emotional ties, that at present the girl felt comfortable and calm in her father’s presence and that she missed him whenever he left the children’s home. It also observed that from February 2012 onwards the first applicant had been living independently in a separate flat, where the second applicant was also registered. The court noted that the conditions were good and suitable for the second applicant to live in. It also had regard to the fact that the first applicant was employed and had received positive references from his place of work and place of residence. 52. The District Court further noted that the first applicant had a stable monthly income of approximately RUB 19,000. The living wage being RUB 7,352 for a working adult and RUB 5,802.50 for a child, the court considered that he was fully able to ensure the second applicant had adequate financial support. The court went on to note that the legal capacity of Ms N.S., who freely visited the first applicant’s flat, had by that time been restored and that the first applicant had himself submitted a medical report dated 5 March 2013 which confirmed that he was fully able to take care of his child. 53. The District Court therefore concluded that the restriction of the first applicant’s parental authority was no longer justified, as the reasons it had relied on in its previous judgment of 12 March 2012 were no longer valid. With reference to Article 76 of the Russian Family Code, the court thus allowed the first applicant’s application and ordered that the restriction of his parental authority over the second applicant be lifted and that she be transferred into his care. The judgment was not appealed against and entered into force on 17 May 2013. 54. On 20 May 2013 the first applicant took the second applicant from the children’s home to his home address, where she has been living ever since.

4. The applicant was born in 1982 and lives in Baku. At the material time he was a member of an opposition party, Musavat. 5. The applicant attempted to participate in a demonstration organised by the opposition on 20 October 2012. Prior to that assembly, on 15 October 2012, the organisers gave notice to the relevant authority, the Baku City Executive Authority (“the BCEA”). The BCEA refused to authorise the holding of the demonstration at the place indicated by the organisers and proposed a different location on the outskirts of Baku. Nevertheless, the organisers decided to hold the demonstration as planned. 6. According to the applicant, the demonstration was intended to be peaceful and was conducted in a peaceful manner. The participants were demanding democratic reforms in the country. 7. The applicant had intended to attend the demonstration. He and a few others attempted to march from the headquarters of the Musavat party to the place where the assembly was being held. However, shortly after that attempt he was arrested and taken to a police station. According to the applicant, he was arrested by people in plain clothes. 8. On 6 May 2014 the applicant also participated in another assembly, which took place near the Baku Court of Serious Crimes in support of members of an opposition group, Nida, who were being tried on that day. The courtroom was full, so some people were waiting outside the court for the outcome of the proceedings. When the court announced its judgment, those who had gathered outside began to protest against the judgment, which they considered unfair. The protest was brief, spontaneous and peaceful. As soon as the protesters started chanting slogans, police officers and people in plain clothes began to forcibly disperse the assembly. The applicant was arrested during the dispersal operation and taken to a police station, where he was kept overnight. 9. In both cases on the day of the applicant’s arrest, an “administrative‑offence report” (inzibati xəta haqqında protokol) was issued in respect of him. In the first case the report stated that by deliberately failing to comply with a lawful order of the police, the applicant had committed an administrative offence under Article 310.1 of the Code of Administrative Offences (“the CAO”). In the second case the applicant was charged with an administrative offence under Article 298.2 (participation in a public assembly that had not been organised in accordance with the law) of the CAO. 10. According to the applicant, he was never served with copies of the administrative-offence reports or with other documents in his case files. In both cases he was not given access to a lawyer after the arrest or while in police custody. 11. In the second case, according to a document drawn up by a police officer and an order dated 6 May 2014, a State-funded lawyer (Mr S.A.) was instructed to assist the applicant. 12. In the first case the applicant was brought before the Binagadi District Court on 20 October 2012, the day of his arrest. In the second case he was brought before the Nasimi District Court on 7 May 2014, the day following his arrest. 13. According to the applicant, the hearing before the court in both cases was very brief. Members of the public, including human rights defenders and journalists, were not allowed to attend, even though the court had not taken a formal decision to close the hearing to the public. 14. According to the applicant, in neither case was he given an opportunity to hire a lawyer of his own choice. 15. In both cases State-funded lawyers were appointed to assist the applicant. In the second case it was the same lawyer, Mr S.A., who had been instructed to assist the applicant in accordance with the above-mentioned document of 6 May 2014 drawn up by a police officer. 16. According to the records of the court hearings in both cases, in their oral submissions the State-funded lawyers briefly stated that the applicant was not guilty and asked the respective court to discontinue the case. 17. In both cases the only witnesses questioned during the court hearing were police officers who, according to the official records, had arrested the applicant or prepared an administrative-offence report on him. They testified that the applicant had staged an unauthorised protest. 18. In both cases the first-instance court found that the applicant had failed to stop participating in an unauthorised protest. 19. By a decision of 20 October 2012 the first-instance court in the first case convicted the applicant under Article 310.1 of the CAO and sentenced him to ten days’ “administrative” detention. By a decision of 7 May 2014 the court in the second case convicted the applicant under Article 298.2 of the CAO and sentenced him to fifteen days’ administrative detention. 20. On unspecified dates the applicant lodged appeals before the Baku Court of Appeal, arguing that his convictions were in violation of his rights because the assemblies in which he had participated or attempted to participate had been peaceful (in addition, in the second case the applicant argued that the assembly had been spontaneous). The applicant also complained that his arrests had been unlawful and that the hearings before the respective first-instance courts had not been fair. 21. In both cases the applicant was assisted before the Baku Court of Appeal by a lawyer of his own choice. 22. In both cases, on 29 October 2012 and 16 May 2014 respectively, the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the decision of the first-instance court.

5. The applicants were born in 1966 and 1957 respectively. They live in the village of Komsomolskoye in the Chechen Republic. The first applicant is the wife of Mr Shamkhan Abubakarov, who was born in 1963. The second applicant is the wife of Mr Badrudi Abubakarov, who was born in 1949. 6. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7. At about 4.30 p.m. on 30 September 2002 brothers Shamkhan Abubakarov and Badrudi Abubakarov and their nephew Mr A.El. were travelling in a GAZ-3110 (“Volga”) vehicle on the road leading from the Staraya Sunzha settlement to the village of Berkat-Yurt in Chechnya. 8. At about 5 p.m. a convoy of three IFVs (БМП-2) was passing along the road. The applicants’ relatives drove to the side to let the IFVs pass. The Volga and a number of other cars were at the side of the road when one of the IVFs suddenly turned and drove over the Volga, and then drove off in the direction of Staraya Sunzha. All three passengers died on the spot. A number of residents of Berkat-Yurt witnessed the incident. 9. On the same day Sh., an operational search officer from the Grozny department of the interior (Районный отдел внутренних дел (РОВД)) (hereinafter “the ROVD”), reported the incident to the head of the police station, stating that a Volga had been driven over by an IFV carrying military servicemen. 10. The police questioned Mr Sh.A. He stated that his brothers Shamkhan Abubakarov and Badrudi Abubakarov and nephew Mr A.El. had been driving home from a funeral when their vehicle had been driven over by an IFV carrying military servicemen, who had fled the scene and gone to the military base in Khankala. 11. The police also questioned Mr I.A., who stated that he had been driving to Staraya Sunzha when he had seen a convoy of IFVs on the road and a Volga on the kerb letting it pass by. One of the IFVs had suddenly turned in the direction of the Volga, driving over it and killing all three passengers. It had then gone through the checkpoint in Staraya Sunzha. The witness and others present during the incident had immediately driven to the police station to report it. 12. The police examined the Volga, which had been left at the crime scene. Traces of blood and brain matter were found inside the damaged vehicle. No evidence was collected. 13. On 1 October 2002 the Grozny district prosecutor’s office instituted an investigation into the accident under Article 264 § 3 of the Criminal Code (breach of traffic regulations, causing death by negligence). The case file was given the number 56155. 14. It also ordered a post-mortem examination of Shamkhan Abubakarov, Badrudi Abubakarov and Mr A.El. On 8 October 2002 the experts concluded that their deaths had occurred as a result of the accident. 15. On 1 October 2002 the investigators questioned Mr B.S. and Mr I.S., both of whom stated that on 30 September 2002 they had been driving a GAZ-53 vehicle when they had seen three IFVs, one of which had had the serial number 171, violating traffic rules. It had driven over a Volga car and then left in the direction of Staraya Sunzha. They had immediately gone to the damaged vehicle and found three people dead inside. 16. On 8 October 2002 the investigators sent a request to military unit no. 20102 to be provided information on the provenance of IFV no. 171. No reply was given to that or any subsequent requests sent by the investigators. 17. On 24 November 2002 the supervising prosecutor ordered the investigators to take a number of steps, including questioning numerous eyewitnesses to the incident such as local residents and the law-enforcement officers who had been manning the checkpoints through which the IFVs had passed to flee the scene. 18. On 11 November or December 2002 the investigators questioned the head of the local administration, Mr Kh.D. who stated, amongst other things, that he had learnt of the incident shortly after it had happened. He had immediately gone to each of the checkpoints on the road between Staraya Sunzha and Berkat-Yurt. At the checkpoint manned by police officers from the Grozny district police station he had been told that, two minutes prior to his arrival, three IFVs had passed through and driven in the direction of Khankala, where the main military base of the federal forces was situated. He had gone to the military prosecutor’s office in Khankala, where he had been told that an investigator had already gone to the scene and established that two of the IFVs had had the serial numbers 171 and 153; that after the IFV had driven over the Volga, a serviceman had got out of one of the IFVs and checked that the car’s passengers were dead. The IFVs had then driven off. The witness also stated that on 2 or 3 October 2002 Mr A.E., who had worked as a driver at the Khankala military base, had told him that at about 5 p.m. on 30 September 2002 he had seen three IFVs of the 78th regiment driving at high speed into the base. 19. On 1 December 2002 the investigation was suspended on the grounds that the perpetrators had not been identified. The applicants were not informed. 20. On 28 May 2003 the ROVD replied to the applicants’ request for information, stating that the investigation had established that that at about 4.30 p.m. on 30 September 2002 an unidentified person driving an IFV had had a collision with a Volga being driven by Shamkhan Abubakarov and in which Badrudi Abubakarov had been a passenger. As a result of the accident, the driver and two passengers had died on the spot. The driver of the IFV had fled the scene. The document also stated that the material concerning the accident had been sent to the Khankala military prosecutor’s office. 21. On an unspecified date prior to 5 June 2006 the investigation was resumed. The applicants were not informed. 22. On an unspecified date between June and October 2006 the investigation was suspended again. The applicants were not informed. 23. On 25 October 2006 the deputy district prosecutor overruled the decision to suspend the proceedings as unlawful and ordered that the investigation be resumed and the investigators take a number of steps, including identifying the owners of IFV nos. 171 and 153 and carrying out the orders of 1 October 2002 (see paragraph 14 above). 24. On 30 October 2006 the applicants were granted victim status in the criminal proceedings. 25. On various dates in October and November 2006 the investigators questioned a number of residents of Berkat-Yurt, all of whom stated that they had arrived at the scene shortly after the incident and that, according to eyewitnesses, the Volga had been driven over by a military IFV. 26. On 16 November 2006 the investigators questioned Mr A.D., who stated that at about 4 p.m. on 30 September 2002 he had seen a military convoy on the road between Staraya Sunzha and Berkat-Yurt and a Volga at the side of the road letting the convoy pass by. One of the IFVs had suddenly driven off the road and over the Volga. The IFV had then left in the direction of Khankala. 27. On 25 November 2006 the investigation was suspended again. 28. On 4 July 2007 the Grozny District Court of the Chechen Republic allowed the applicants’ complaint against the decision to suspend the investigation. The court stated that between the opening of the investigation on 1 October 2002 and its suspension on 1 December 2002 the investigators had failed to take the necessary steps to identify the perpetrators, limiting themselves to sending two unspecified requests for information to the military authorities, even though it was clear from the case material that after causing the accident the IFVs had entered the Khankala military base. Despite the supervising prosecutor’s instructions given on 25 October 2006, the investigators had only resent two requests for information to the military authorities and had again suspended the investigation on 25 November 2006, as they had received no reply. The court overruled that decision and instructed that the proceedings be resumed. 29. On 14 July 2007 the supervising prosecutor resumed the investigation, deciding that it had been suspended unlawfully. The investigators were ordered to take a number of steps, including sending new requests to the military authorities concerning the possible provenance of IFV nos. 171 and 153. 30. On unspecified dates in July 2007 the investigators questioned two residents of Berkat-Yurt, both of whom stated that they had learnt of the incident from their fellow villagers. 31. On 15 August 2007 the investigation was suspended again. On an unspecified date prior to May 2011 the case was transferred to the Chechnya Investigations Committee. The proceedings are still pending. 32. The Government did not dispute the facts as presented by the applicants. 33. At the Court’s request, the Government furnished copies of the entire investigation file in criminal case no. 56155, running to ninety-six pages.

5. The applicant was born in 1972 and lives in Burgas. 6. At about 6 a.m. on 11 July 2007 several police officers visited the applicant’s home with a summons for him to report to the police station in the neighbouring town of Pomorie “as a witness” in relation to an investigation. The applicant alleged that he was not at home at the time and that he was alerted by phone by his wife. On the summons, on the other hand, it is noted that he refused to accept receipt. 7. At about 7 a.m. the applicant arrived at the Pomorie police station. He was notified that he was being detained under section 63(1)(1) of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Act (“the MIAA”, see paragraph 15 below). The detention order stated that he was being detained on the basis of section 63(1)(1) “in connection with an offence under Article 195 of the Criminal Code”, which refers to theft. 8. During his detention, the applicant was transported to a police station in Burgas and then back to the police station in Pomorie, where his fingerprints were taken. He was not interviewed, and no further investigative steps involving his participation were taken. 9. At about 12 a.m. the applicant was allowed to meet with a lawyer retained by his wife, who insisted that the police release him. The applicant was released shortly after that, at 1.30 p.m. on 11 July 2007. 10. Immediately after his release the applicant applied for judicial review of the detention order. In the framework of the ensuing proceedings the police presented an order dated 10 July 2007 and signed by a police investigator in Pomorie. They stated that the case file concerning the applicant contained no further documents. The order stated that a theft had been committed by an unknown person in a hotel in Pomorie and instructed the police to take the appropriate measures to search for the perpetrator. 11. The Burgas Administrative Court heard the case on 28 November 2007. It accepted the order mentioned in the preceding paragraph as evidence. 12. In a judgment of 21 December 2007 it upheld the detention order, holding that the applicant’s detention had been in accordance with the law. It found, in particular, that for the lawful application of section 63(1)(1) of the MIAA it was not necessary that the police should hold evidence showing “in an unqualified manner” that the detainee had committed an offence; data “justifying a suspicion that there was a probability that the person had committed an offence” was sufficient. The domestic court noted further that the police had operational freedom as to the application of section 63(1)(1) of the MIAA. 13. On appeal by the applicant, on 17 November 2008 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the judgment of the Burgas Administrative Court, reiterating its reasoning.

4. The applicants are all Romanian nationals of Roma origin and heirs of I.B., who instituted the domestic proceedings. Those proceedings were still pending when I.B. died on 1 April 2010. 5. I.B.’s heirs pursued the case before the domestic courts and lodged a complaint before the Court both on his own and their behalf. 6. On the night of 15 August 2008, L.N. moved in with her boyfriend, the fifth applicant, at his father’s (I.B.’s) home. She was sixteen at the time. 7. The next morning, accompanied by the second and third applicants, L.N. went to Clejani Police and made a written statement before the chief police expressing her wish to live in her boyfriend’s home. She chose to make this statement because she came from an affluent non-Roma family. The same evening V.M., the applicants’ neighbour, gave a statement to the police, confirming that L.N. had arrived and was staying voluntarily in I.B.’s home. 8. On 21 August 2008 L.N. and her boyfriend were invited to the Clejani Mayor’s Office, where they met with the deputy mayor, a representative of the Department for Social Assistance from the mayor’s office, the chief police from the Clejani Police Office, and two police officers from the neighbouring commune of Bulbucata and the town Mihăileşti. L.N. reiterated that she was living with the Boacă family voluntarily and asked the police to hand over her jewellery and her mobile phone to her mother. 9. On 27 August 2008, around noon, the Clejani chief of police, together with members of the Giurgiu Rapid Intervention Squad (“the R.I.S.”, Detaşamentul Poliţiei pentru Intervenţie Rapidă) and two plain-clothes policemen travelled by car to I.B.’s house. One of the plain-clothes policemen got out of the vehicle and asked I.B. if he was keeping a girl in his home against her will. He reiterated that L.N. was staying with them voluntarily, as she herself had declared in front of the authorities. He called for L.N. to come out of the house. He asked the policemen if they had a search warrant, to which one of them reacted by hitting him in the face and telling him that his warrant consisted of “a fist and a gun”. They told him that the warrant was at the mayor’s office. 10. Meanwhile L.N. came out of the house and reiterated that she was living there of her own free will. At the sight of L.N., the man who had hit I.B. signalled to the masked R.I.S. officers to enter the yard. 11. I.B. took refuge in the yard. Several other people were also present in the house at that time: I.B.’s sons, the fifth and the sixth applicants; I.B.’s partner, the seventh applicant; and C.I., I.B.’s daughter-in-law, along with her minor children I.A.B. (three years and eight months) and G.M.B. (one year and eight months; see paragraphs 37 and 64 (b) below). 12. The police broke a gate and five windows. They dragged L.N. off the premises. In the course of the assault, the police fired rubber bullets. I.B. witnessed that the sixth applicant, who had become scared and started running towards the back yard, was hit in the buttocks by a bullet fired by one of the policemen. He fell to the ground and was helped up by two neighbours. The masked police continued to fire in the air and threw tear gas. The children I.A.B. and G.M.B. lost consciousness. 13. The sixth applicant was taken to hospital in Bolintin Deal. The medical report indicated the existence of a superficial wound and gave a detailed description of the ecchymosis (bruising). It concluded that the wound could have been caused by the impact of a hard object, but excluded firearms as there were no traces of gunpowder or an ecchymosed perilesional ring. The sixth applicant was 15 years old at the time. 14. I.B., the applicants, and some of their neighbours left for the mayor’s office to ask about the search warrant. Shortly afterwards, police officers entered the office, but the mayor asked them to leave again as the situation was calm. It was found that the police did not have a warrant to enter I.B.’s home that day. 15. Relying on the findings of the domestic courts, the Government made the following submissions as to the incident in question. 16. On 27 August 2008 L.N.’s father reported to the police that his daughter had disappeared and had apparently gone to her boyfriend’s home. He believed that his daughter was being kept against her will and thought that she might have been drugged. 17. The police decided to investigate the whereabouts of the girl. As the boyfriend had a criminal record of violent crime and as the Boacă family members were known to the police for being violent, the local police team was reinforced by a team of five members of the R.I.S. 18. Upon arrival at I.B.’s home, the police showed their badges and inquired about the girl. I.B. and the fifth applicant invited them in. Four police officers entered the house and talked to L.N. The Boacă family members tried to influence L.N., but eventually she decided to go with the police back to her parents’ home. 19. At that point, the Boacă family became violent: the seventh applicant shouted “nobody leaves alive” and the men picked up bats and knives, threatening L.N.’s and the police officers’ physical integrity. In order to protect L.N. and themselves, the police issued a warning and then, as it had no effect, used tear gas against the assailants. The attack continued as the Boacă family threw stones, bricks and glass at the police car where L.N. had been put for safety. As a fresh warning was also ignored, the police fired vertical warning shots in the air. 20. According to the police statements, nobody was injured during the operation. 21. On 12 and 17 September and 24 November 2008 I.B. and his counsel filed criminal complaints against the policemen involved in the incident of 27 August 2008, alleging brutality. They described in detail the police operation and the harm sustained by the Boacă family members, including the destruction of their property. I.B. also complained that this was not the first instance of police brutality against his family and believed that the police discriminated against them and treated them badly because of their Roma origin. He informed the prosecutor that he wished to produce documents and to bring eyewitnesses to support his allegations. 22. The investigation was carried out by the prosecutor’s office attached to Giurgiu County Court. The prosecutor in charge took statements from the eight police officers who had participated in the events: the chief of police, the two local policemen and the five members of the rapid intervention squad. They all described the events as in paragraphs 16 to 20 above. L.N. and her parents also gave statements to the police. 23. Nobody from the Boacă family was interviewed by the police. The court officer in charge of the service procedure recorded that I.B. and the fifth applicant had refused to accept the summonses, which had therefore been posted on their door. I.B. and the fifth applicant had informed the court officer that Romano CRISS had taken on their defence case and that they would go to the prosecutor’s office if summonsed. 24. According to the police’s mission statement and the report of the operation, the police officers had been equipped with firearms and tear gas and had used them in self-defence. 25. The investigators concluded in their report that the use of force had been proportionate and had lasted only as long as the Boacă family continued to be violent. They ruled out any racial motive for the operation. They also recorded that the damage to the police van was being examined by a panel which would make a proposal regarding appropriate compensation. 26. Based on the investigators’ report, on 7 May 2009 the prosecutor’s office decided not to prosecute. It found that the police officers had had no intention of harming the Boacă family members. The prosecutor considered the force used to have been only defensive and employed in order to allow the policemen to leave the premises safely with L.N. after the police had come under attack by the Boacă family. The prosecutor also concluded that the injury sustained by the sixth applicant was not consistent with a gunshot wound and was thus irrelevant for the purposes of the investigation. Lastly, the prosecutor noted that I.B. and the fifth applicant had refused to accept the summons to give statements in the case. 27. I.B. contested the decision, arguing that the investigators had failed to hear evidence from the eyewitnesses. On 12 June 2009 the prosecutor in chief of the Giurgiu County Prosecutor’s Office upheld the decision of 7 May 2009 (see paragraph 26 above). 28. I.B. lodged a complaint against the prosecutors’ decisions with the Giurgiu County Court. He pointed out that the prosecutors had failed to question the eyewitnesses and had only taken statements from the policemen involved. He provided the names of the eyewitnesses. He also maintained that he had not received any summons to appear before the prosecutor. 29. The County Court gave its ruling on 11 November 2009. Based on the evidence in the file, it dismissed the complaint. It found that the police officers had acted within the lawful limits of their authority. Their purpose had not been to harm the Boacă family members, but rather to protect themselves and L.N. from imminent attack. It also dismissed as unfounded I.B.’s allegation that he had not been invited to testify before the prosecutor. 30. I.B. appealed against that decision but died while the appeal proceedings were still pending. On 12 October 2010, based on a certificate issued on 15 September 2010 by the local administration, the applicants (except for the seventh applicant, Mrs Nina Niculae) were recognised as heirs. The seventh applicant, who had also expressed her wish to participate in the proceedings after I.B.’s death, did not object to the interlocutory judgment of 12 October 2010. She did not participate in the ensuing proceedings. 31. On 14 December 2010, based on the evidence in the file, the Bucharest Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. The County Court decision thus became final.

6. The applicant was born in 1966 and has been in the Netherlands since 2003. 7. On 25 July 2003 the applicant entered the Netherlands where on 19 August 2003 he applied for asylum, fearing persecution within the meaning of the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“the Refugee Convention”) and/or treatment in breach of Article 3 of the Convention. On 20 August 2003, he was interviewed about his identity, nationality and travel itinerary (eerste gehoor). He stated, inter alia, that he was an Afghan national of Hazara origin, that he came from Kabul and that he had travelled to the Netherlands via Pakistan, Iran and Germany. 8. On 21 August 2003 the applicant was interviewed about his reasons for seeking asylum (nader gehoor). He stated that he feared persecution and ill-treatment on account of his communist past as a former member of the communist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (“the PDPA”) and for having served as a volunteer in the Revolutionary Guard (Sepah Enghelab). He further claimed that he risked ill-treatment at the hands of mujahideen party Jamiat-e Islami for having been involved between 1992 and 1994 with the rival Hazara-dominated, Hezb-e Wahdat party and, additionally, at the hands of a Mr S., whom he had captured and ill-treated during an interrogation conducted in the context of his work for Hezb-e Wahdat. He also feared problems from the side of Hezb-e Wahdat for having stopped working for them. 9. The applicant stated that he had joined the youth branch of the PDPA in 1978 and that in 1981 he had served as a volunteer for twenty days in the Revolutionary Guard. He had been discharged after he had stepped on a mine during combat. He further stated that in 1984 he had started to work for the Ministry of Trade in Kabul, at the department for government stores, and that in 1989 he had given a television interview in which he had criticised the then Minister of Trade. This interview had not been broadcast in 1989 but only in mid-May 1992, after the mujahideen had seized power in Afghanistan. The day after it had been broadcast, the applicant had been arrested by the mujahideen faction Ittehad-al-Islami (Islamic Union) then led by Abdul Rasul Sayyaf. In his opinion they had been under the impression, given that he had dared to criticise the Minister of Trade, that he was an important member of the Communist Party. He had been released after ten days in a prisoner exchange operation mediated, at the request of the applicant’s parents, by Mr M., an influential person of Hazara origin. 10. In return, the applicant had had to work for Hezb-e Wahdat. He had worked as a representative of the (military) Division 95 of Hezb-e Wahdat at the West Kabul peace commission in which Jamiat-e Islami, Ittehad‑al-Islami and Harakat-e-Islami had also been represented. His tasks had included trading prisoners and seized goods, and mediating between parties. He had also been responsible for preventing members of Hezb-e Wahdat’s Central Committee from defecting and for preventing members of other factions from infiltrating Hezb-e Wahdat. In the course of carrying out these duties and if circumstances so warranted, he had been under orders to take people secretly into custody. One of the persons taken in custody, Mr S., had been interrogated by the applicant himself, who had ill-treated Mr S. during interrogation. After Burhanuddin Rabbani and Ahmad Shah Massoud had taken over control of the Afshar district in West Kabul, the applicant had been arrested and detained again by Ittehad‑al-Islami in December 1992/January 1993. He had been released in a prisoner exchange organised by Hezb-e Wahdat. 11. The applicant had continued his work for the peace committee of Hezb-e Wahdat until December 1994, when this party had been defeated and retreated to Bamyan. The applicant had stayed behind in Kabul and had not been persecuted by “Khalili” (see paragraph 39 below). However, fearing Jamiat-e Islami and the Taliban, the applicant had then gone into hiding – moving around between Kabul and the villages of Siah Khak and Sar Shesmeh in the province of Wardak – until December 2001, when American troops had arrived. He had been arrested on 20 or 21 March 2002 by Jamiat-e Islami, then under the leadership of General Fahim. The applicant had been tortured several times during his incarceration. Mr S. had been present on one of those occasions. The applicant had been told by interrogators that he had been detained because he was a communist or a convert. He also thought that his arrest had something to do with Mr S. The applicant had managed to escape from prison after 45 days with the help of a guard – who like the applicant was a former communist – to whom the applicant had paid three thousand United States dollars. This guard had set up a mock execution outside the prison, which had enabled the applicant to escape. This guard had told the applicant that he should leave Afghanistan forever. After his escape, the applicant had first hidden in his house in Kabul for about 15 days and had subsequently stayed with a distant relative until he had left Afghanistan for Pakistan in May 2002. 12. On 18 September 2003, the Minister for Immigration and Integration (Minister voor Vreemdelingenzaken en Integratie) informed the applicant that his case had been transmitted to the 1F Unit (see A.A.Q. v. the Netherlands (dec.), no. 42331/05, §§ 47-49, 30 June 2015) in order for it to examine whether Article 1F of the 1951 Refugee Convention should be applied to the applicant’s asylum request. 13. On 5 February 2004 the 1F Unit conducted a supplementary interview (aanvullend gehoor) with the applicant. During this interview, he declared, inter alia, that in 1981, as a member of the Revolutionary Guard, he had participated in a purge action – ordered by the PDPA Central Committee and the Ministry of Defence – aimed against persons active on behalf of Hezb-e Islami and Jamiat in a specific area and that prisoners of war had been handed over to the former Afghan communist security service, KhAD/WAD (Khadimat-e Atal’at-e Dowlati/Wezarat-e Amniyat-e Dowlati). He had become disabled when the tank on which he had been standing had hit a mine. The applicant also stated that, during the wars, Hezb-e Wahdat had plundered houses, seized privately owned cars and physically tortured persons. It was correct that Hezb-e Wahdat had committed many crimes and had shed much blood. He further related how he had interrogated and hit Mr S. at the Hezb-e Wahdat headquarters in Kabul. He also stated that, at present, he had no proof that he was being searched for but that it was clear to him, having been released upon payment of a bribe, that he could not show himself in Afghanistan. 14. On 21 April 2005 the Minister for Immigration and Integration issued notice of her intention (voornemen) to reject the first applicant’s asylum application and to apply Article 1F of the 1951 Refugee Convention. The Minister found it established, given his consistent and detailed statements, that the applicant had worked for the Revolutionary Guard and Hezb-e Wahdat but also found that, in his account to the Netherlands authorities, he had in part misrepresented the facts, had sought to trivialise his activities for Hezb-e Wahdat and had withheld important information. 15. The nature of the applicant’s work, and the contents of an official report (ambtsbericht), drawn up on 29 February 2000 by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, entitled “Security Services in Communist Afghanistan (1978-1992), AGSA, KAM, KhAD and WAD” (“Veiligheidsdiensten in communistisch Afghanistan (1978-1992), AGSA, KAM, KhAD en WAD”; DPC/AM 663896) and an official report, drawn up on 23 June 2000 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on Hezb-e Wahdat (DPC/AM-681499), had given cause to consider whether Article 1F of the 1951 Convention was applicable to the applicant’s asylum claim. 16. In her notice of intention, the Minister analysed, on the basis of elaborate argumentation based on various international materials and on the prescribed and so-called “knowing and personal participation” test, the nature of the acts imputed to the applicant in the framework of Article 1F of the 1951 Refugee Convention, as well as his individual responsibility under that Convention. The Minister noted, inter alia, that the applicant had worked for a part of the PDPA Government, the Revolutionary Guard, which had collaborated with the KhAD and found that it was justified to conclude that the applicant had known or should have known about the criminal character of the KhAD and that its crimes had formed part of a widespread or targeted attack aimed against the civilian population. Having regard to the official report of 29 February 2000 (see paragraph 15 above), the Minister further found that the cruel character of the KhAD had been commonly known. The Minister further did not believe that the applicant had been ignorant of the criminal character of Hezb-e Wahdat when he had started to work for it as this had been widely known at the material time. Relying on the official report of 23 June 2000 (see paragraph 15 above), the Minister underlined that Hezb-e Wahdat had been considered during the Afghan civil war to be one of the most violent groups, not only because of its militia’s actions on the battle field and merciless liquidation of its political opponents, but in particular because of its militia’s crimes against the civil population of Afghanistan and for having instilled a true climate of terror in the country. The Minister lastly found it established that the applicant himself had committed acts of torture on the person of Mr S. 17. As regards Article 3 of the Convention, the Minister did not find it established that the applicant, if returned to Afghanistan, would be exposed to a real risk of being subjected to treatment prohibited by this provision. In reaching this finding, the Minister took into account, inter alia, that the applicant had stayed for about three months in Pakistan and about eight months in Iran without having sought assistance in these countries from, for instance, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”), that he had not applied for asylum when he had been apprehended by the police in Germany, and that he had not reported immediately to the immigration authorities after his arrival in the Netherlands. 18. On 17 June 2005 the applicant submitted written comments (zienswijze) on the Minister’s intended decision. On 19 October 2005 the Minister rejected the applicant’s asylum application, confirming the reasoning set out in her notice of intention of 21 April 2005 and rebutting the applicant’s written comments. 19. The applicant’s appeal against this decision was rejected on 25 January 2007 by the Regional Court (rechtbank) of The Hague, sitting in Roermond. It held in respect of the applicant’s activities as a fifteen-year‑old adolescent volunteer for the Revolutionary Guard that, according to the applicable policy in respect of child soldiers, the Minister had not adequately reasoned her decision finding “knowing participation” in respect of this part of the applicant’s account. However, on the basis of the other elements of the account, it accepted the decision of the Minister to deny the applicant asylum by applying Article 1F of the Refugee Convention against him. It further held that it had not been established that the applicant – if expelled to Afghanistan – would be exposed to a risk of being subjected to treatment proscribed by Article 3 of the Convention from the side of Jamiat-e Islami on the basis of the general security situation in Afghanistan, or on the basis of his Hazara ethnic origin. 20. The applicant, who from his first interview was assisted by a lawyer in these asylum proceedings, could have filed a further appeal with the Administrative Jurisdiction Division (Afdeling Bestuursrechtspraak) of the Council of State (Raad van State), but did not do so. Consequently, the ruling of 25 January 2007 became final when the four week time-limit for filing an appeal with the Administrative Jurisdiction Division expired. 21. On 25 May 2007 the applicant was informed by the Deputy Minister of Justice (Staatssecretaris van Justitie) of the intention (voornemen) to declare him an undesirable alien entailing the imposition of an exclusion order (ongewenstverklaring) in accordance with section 67 § 1 (e) of the Aliens Act 2000 (Vreemdelingenwet 2000), following the decision to hold Article 1F of the Refugee Convention against him in the asylum procedure. 22. The actual decision to impose this exclusion order on the applicant was taken on 24 September 2007 by the Deputy Minister of Justice. As regards Article 3, the Deputy Minister did not find it established that the applicant would be at risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to this provision in Afghanistan or that there were any obstacles of a medical nature to his removal to Afghanistan. Further noting that the applicant did not have any relatives or other persons in the Netherlands with whom he had a family life within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention, the Deputy Minister further found that the exclusion order did not constitute an interference with the rights guaranteed by this provision. 23. The applicant challenged this decision in administrative law proceedings. The last (for the applicant negative) decision in these proceedings was taken on 10 February 2009 by the Regional Court of The Hague, sitting in Maastricht. It noted that, in its ruling of 25 January 2007, which had obtained the force of res iudicata, the Regional Court of The Hague, sitting in Roermond, had concluded that there existed serious reasons for assuming that the applicant had been involved in acts referred to in Article 1F of the Refugee Convention. As the Deputy Minister had enjoyed a discretionary power in deciding whether or not to impose an exclusion order, it had to be assessed whether in deciding to impose that order, the competing interests involved had been carefully balanced. In view of the reasons given in the impugned decision and the applicant’s submissions, the Regional Court of The Hague, sitting in Maastricht, accepted the Deputy Minister’s decision that the applicant’s personal interests were outweighed by the general public’s interests pursued by the exclusion order. 24. In so far as the applicant had invoked Article 3 of the Convention, the Regional Court noted that in its ruling of 25 January 2007 it had already found that the applicant had not demonstrated that his expulsion to Afghanistan would expose him to a risk of a violation of his rights under that provision. It found that also in the proceedings at hand the applicant had not submitted facts or referred to circumstances on the grounds of which it should be accepted as plausible that he would risk a violation of his rights under Article 3 of the Convention if he were to be expelled to Afghanistan. As regards Article 8, the Regional Court noted that it appeared from the applicant’s notice of appeal (beroepschrift) that it was not in dispute between the parties that the applicant could not claim a right of residence on the basis of Article 8 of the Convention and that it was thus not necessary to consider this point any further. 25. The applicant, who was represented by a lawyer throughout these proceedings, could have filed a further appeal with the Administrative Jurisdiction Division, but he did not do so. Consequently, the ruling of 10 February 2009 became final after the expiry of the four-week time-limit for filing an appeal with the Administrative Jurisdiction Division.

5. The applicant was born in 1982 in Achinsk, Krasnoyarsk Region. He lives in Krasnoyarsk. 6. On 21 January 2005 the Achinsk Town Court of the Krasnoyarsk Region convicted the applicant of aggravated robbery and sentenced him to nine years’ imprisonment. He was sent to Krasnoyarsk Region correctional colony no. IK- 235/26-22 to serve his sentence. 7. On 22 August 2007, owing to repeated violations of prison rules, the applicant was placed in the single-cell wing (единое помещения камерного типа, hereinafter “the EPKT”), a stricter regime of the correctional colony, for eleven months. He was allegedly beaten up by EPKT guards on two occasions. 8. The applicant submitted that on 5 March 2008 a new detainee “of a lower social status” was placed in his cell, which was shared with other detainees. Soon a heated quarrel broke out between the applicant and the newcomer. Prison guards entered the cell, took the applicant out, kicked his legs, twisted his hands, threw him to the floor and then dragged him to a search room. There they delivered blows to his head and body, handcuffed him to the ceiling of a metal cage and left him alone for an hour. Upon their return the guards put him in a spread-eagled position and started beating him, until he fell to the floor. They continued beating him for another two to three hours. 9. Two days later the applicant was sentenced to fifteen days’ detention in a disciplinary cell. 10. According to the applicant, on 9 April 2008 he was again beaten up by prison guards under the pretext of a minor disciplinary offence. The beating continued for two or three hours. The applicant insisted that the beating had been so severe that he had lost ability to walk unassisted. Thereafter he was dragged back to his cell where he was locked up alone. 11. The applicant further submitted that on the morning of 10 April 2009 he was taken to the office of the head of the unit where he slumped into a chair, half lying on it as he was unable to sit up straight due to a pain in his back and leg. A prison guard hit the applicant on the head and ordered him not to fake injuries. 12. The applicant was allegedly forced to write a statement to the head of the prison service of the Krasnoyarsk Region, stating that no force had ever been used against him or any other detainees in the correctional colony and that his health problems had resulted from an accident in childhood. 13. During his detention the applicant suffered from chronic gastritis, urethritis and ischialgia. His health-related complaints were addressed by a prison doctor, who provided him with treatment when necessary. 14. In the EPKT the applicant was subjected to routine daily check-ups for bodily injuries. No injuries were recorded during the entire period of his detention. 15. On 10 March 2008, five days after the first incident of alleged ill‑treatment, the applicant complained to a prison doctor about pain in the small of his back. The doctor diagnosed lumbalgia, prescribed drugs and ointment, and noted in his file that the applicant’s skin was “peculiarity‑free”. 16. On three occasions in the same month the applicant complained of constricting chest pain, frequent urination, a headache and pain in the small of the back. The doctor diagnosed lumbalgia, “neurocirculatory dystonia of the hypertensive type” and cystitis. Medication was prescribed. 17. In the end of March 2008 the applicant again visited the prison doctor to complain about a sprained ankle. The doctor discovered an oedema on his ankle with a scar measuring 1cm. The applicant explained that it was the result of a childhood trauma. In addition, he also made a written statement that his back pain and leg problems were chronic and that he had not been ill-treated in the correctional colony. Having recorded the absence of any injuries on the applicant’s body, the doctor prescribed analgesics. 18. On 18 April 2008, nine days after the alleged second episode of ill‑treatment, the applicant complained of pain while urinating. The doctor recorded acute cystitis and amended the drug regimen. In the last days of that month he complained, for the first time, of pain on his left shin. The doctor noted that the left leg was swollen and the applicant was unable to stand on it. He diagnosed a blood circulation disorder and prescribed medication. 19. The applicant’s medical condition did not improve and on 13 May 2008 he was placed in the old wing of the prison hospital. He informed the hospital doctors that he had started experiencing the pain in his leg after a fall in the cell in the first days of March 2008. His diagnosis of acute deep-vein thrombosis of the left leg, lymphedema, and degenerative disc disease were addressed by conservative treatment, leading to the amelioration of his condition. 20. The applicant was discharged from the hospital on 22 May 2008 with instructions to continue treatment and use a walking stick. 21. In the summer of 2008 the applicant started using crutches. In July 2008 a doctor recorded significant swelling of his left leg accompanied by bluish coloration of the area. The diagnosis of relapsed lymphedema led to the amendment of his drug regimen. At the same time, the applicant made a statement stating that he had not been subject to any ill-treatment. 22. By mid-October 2008 the leg oedema abated. 23. In November 2008 the applicant was again placed in the old wing of the prison hospital. He was diagnosed with post-thrombotic disease and nephroptosis. The treatment was effective and on 21 November 2008 he was discharged. The doctor prescribed a drug regimen and recommended that the applicant not use crutches. 24. In the beginning of 2009 the applicant’s leg swelled again. On 28 March 2009 he was admitted to the new wing of the prison hospital where the conditions were, according to the applicant, satisfactory. His treatment in the hospital continued until 27 April 2009 and resulted in the decrease of the oedema and associated inflammation. Compression stockings, drugs and limiting of physical activity were prescribed. 25. In the beginning of 2010 the applicant underwent symptomatic treatment for degenerative disc disease. In September 2010 his medical condition was declared stable with his chronic illness having been taken under control. 26. In 2011-12 the applicant had allergic dermatitis, rhinopharyngitis, lumbodynia and vegetative-vascular dystonia, without any condition being considered serious or problematic. The illnesses were addressed with drug therapy. 27. In August 2008, during a meeting with his mother, the applicant complained of having been beaten by the guards. On 10 September 2008 his mother asked for a thorough inquiry into the alleged ill-treatment. 28. On 24 October 2008 the Boguchanskiy district prosecutor visited the applicant, who submitted his account of the events and asked for a criminal case to be opened. 29. The investigating authorities collected extracts from the applicant’s medical records and written explanations from a guard who had been allegedly involved in the beatings. The colony officers denied using force against the applicant, supporting their arguments with the applicant’s written statements of 17 July 2008 and written statements by his fellow inmates. The inmates insisted that the applicant had suffered for a long time from chronic back pain and swollen leg syndrome, which had become particularly acute every spring and autumn. Tired of the difficulties of prison life, the applicant had allegedly told the inmates that he had intended to use his chronic ailments to obtain a transfer to a hospital, where he “could rest”. 30. On 15 November 2008 a senior investigator of the prosecutor’s office dismissed the complaint, having found no evidence of criminal conduct. 31. The above decision, as well as another three similar decisions of 27 June, 8 August and 5 September 2011, was overturned by a higher‑ranking prosecutor, who criticised the lack of thoroughness of the investigation. 32. On 12 September 2011 an expert from the Krasnoyarsk Bureau of Forensic Medical Examination was asked to look into the possible cause of the applicant’s leg condition, including the possibility of it having a trauma‑related cause related to the alleged beatings in March and April 2008. The expert found that the condition could not have resulted from the beatings. 33. On 16 January 2012 the investigating authorities again refused to open a criminal case. The refusal was overturned by a high-ranking prosecutor who ordered further investigation steps. 34. In the new round of the investigation the investigator questioned Mr V., the only inmate who had not previously been interviewed. Unlike all the other witnesses, who had denied the beatings, he said that on 5 March 2008 the prison officers had taken the applicant out of his cell, after a conflict with a “low caste” cellmate, to a search room. He had then heard guards shouting and the applicant moaning. However, he had not seen any injuries on the applicant, but had seen the latter limping several days after the incident. The applicant had insisted that he had been beaten by the guards. 35. On 28 September 2012 a new medical expert report was prepared, with the expert asked to see whether any of the applicant’s illnesses could have resulted from having been beaten. After having examined the applicant and his medical file, the expert found no evidence of ill-treatment and insisted that the applicant’s medical condition could not have been caused by or linked to the beatings. The main finding was that the applicant’s illnesses were no more than “independent pathological processes without any traumatic influence”. 36. On 12 October 2012 the investigating authorities dismissed the applicant’s complaints of ill-treatment. 37. From 22 August 2007 to 13 May 2008, and from 22 May to 17 July 2008 the applicant was detained in the EPKT. On several occasions he was also detained in various disciplinary cells, with the most recent periods of this detention being between 7 and 22 March 2008 and between 19 and 24 August 2009. During the latter period he was detained in cell no. 12, which measured 15.2 square metres. The cell was equipped with two double plank beds. 38. The applicant provided a very general and summary-like description of his detention in all the disciplinary cells, complaining of poor ventilation and lighting and inadequate sanitary conditions. 39. According to the Government, the number of cellmates in disciplinary cell no. 12 did not exceed four. The applicant was afforded a daily hour-long walk in the prison yard. The cell was ventilated by means of a window casement. The window itself, measuring 90 by 60 centimetres, allowed sufficient daylight. The cell was also lit by a 150-watt lamp from 5 a.m. to 9 p.m. and a 40-watt security light at night. The toilet in the cell was separated from the main area by a one-metre high partition, ensuring privacy. The cell was clean and disinfected. The applicant was given uniform, underwear and slippers. Once a week he could take a shower. 40. In June 2008 the applicant lodged a claim seeking compensation for non-pecuniary damage allegedly caused by the poor conditions of his detention in the prison hospital and ineffective medical care. He also sought leave to appear. The presiding judge informed the applicant that there was no procedural obligation to transport a convicted inmate to a civil case in which he or she was a party. 41. On 30 December 2008 the court ordered an expert report to assess the quality of the medical treatment afforded to the applicant in detention. In a report on 29 June 2009 experts stated that the applicant had received inpatient treatment in full compliance with the generally recognised medical standards. The deterioration of his health in November 2008 could have been caused either by the natural course of his illness or by his failure to adhere to doctors’ recommendations. The experts noted that the applicant had suffered from chronic conditions, including vascular illness, degenerative disc disease of the thoracic and lumbar spine with Schmorl’s nodes and first-stage nephroptosis of the right kidney. He had received adequate medical treatment. 42. On 23 November 2009 the Zheleznodorozhniy District Court dismissed the claim, having considered that the medical treatment received in the prison hospital had been adequate and successful, given the significant improvement of his health. The applicant was not brought to the hearing, while the representatives of the prison hospital appeared. The District Court again cited the lacuna in the Russian law pertaining to the participation of convicts in their civil cases. 43. That judgment was upheld on appeal by the Krasnoyarsk Regional Court on 17 March 2010. The parties to the proceedings did not appear. No comments were made by the Regional Court on account of their absence. 44. In 2010 the applicant lodged a claim for non-pecuniary damages against the correctional colony, arguing that the conditions of his detention in the EPKT had been appalling and that he had not had adequate medical care in the colony. 45. On 1 April 2010 the Achinsk Town Court ordered an expert examination, asking for an assessment of the quality of the treatment afforded to the applicant between 5 March and 17 July 2008. 46. On 29 July 2010 the commission presented its report. It concluded that the applicant was provided, timeously and in full compliance with the existing legal requirements, with the necessary treatment which any person was entitled to receive in a general, non-specialised, medical facility. The experts also stressed that there were no scientifically available means to properly diagnose the applicant’s deep-vein thrombosis before the illness had manifested itself through acute symptoms, such as pain. The deterioration in his health could have been either the natural development of the illness, or could have resulted from his failure to follow medical recommendations. The experts noted no episodes of belated medical treatment or evidence of a failure to provide him with conservative treatment. 47. In the meantime the applicant asked the Town Court to ensure his presence at the hearing. The application for leave to appear was dismissed with reference to the lack of a legal provision regulating inmates’ transport to civil courts. 48. On 28 April 2011 the Town Court, having examined the case in the applicant’s absence, dismissed the claim. It found that his vascular condition could not have been diagnosed earlier and that it had been developing in a stealthy fashion throughout the detention. As soon as the symptoms had appeared, the applicant had started receiving timely and adequate medical care. 49. On 7 September 2011 the Regional Court examined the case in the absence of the parties. It noted that the applicant’s presence was not required given the specific nature of his claim and the limited usefulness of oral submissions.

4. The applicant was born in 1966 and is currently detained in Giurgiu Prison. 5. On 24 June 1999 the Călăraşi County Court convicted the applicant of burglary, rape and murder and sentenced him to twenty five years’ imprisonment. In application of Article 71 of the Criminal Code, his right to vote and to be elected was withdrawn during detention. 6. The decision became final on 25 February 2000 when the Supreme Court of Justice dismissed the appeal on points of law lodged by the applicant. 7. The applicant is currently serving his prison sentence in Giurgiu Prison where he has been held since 21 January 2009. 8. The applicant described the conditions of his detention as follows: - there was no water during summer days; - he was placed with smokers (in the court-room and for few days during detention) although he did not smoke; - the windows were covered with bars and thick galvanised wire which rendered the ventilation of the cell impossible; - he was transported to court hearings in small dirty vans, with no ventilation or natural light; - from 2009 until the date of the last information received (22 July 2014) he had been held with five other inmates in a 17.65 sq. m cell infested with bugs. 9. Based on the documents presented by the Prison Administration, the Government explained that during his stay in Giurgiu Prison the applicant had occupied the following cells, all non-smoking: - cells nos. A305, A306, A328, B232, C109, C116, C126, C127, C215, C216, C225, E1.22, E3.7, E3.12, E3.24, E3.26, E3.32, E4.5, E4.14, E4.25, E4.27, E5.32, E10.8, E10.11 which each measured 17,65 sq. m and which he shared with a maximum of five other detainees, between 26 January 2009 and 5 August 2010, between 12 August and 6 September 2010, between 7 March and 28 April 2011, between 20 May and 22 August 2011, between 29 August 2011 and 3 February 2012, between 9 February and 2 April 2012, between 7 May and 23 July 2012, between 2 August and 13 September 2012, between 4 October 2012 and 4 March 2013, between 11 March and 11 April 2013, between 18 and 29 April 2013, between 7 May 2013 and 7 February 2014 and between 21 February and 22 July 2014. - cells nos. C317, C333, C336 and E3.19 which each measured 9.66 sq. m and which he shared with another person, between 21 and 26 January 2009, between 6 September and 10 October 2010, between 12 and 20 May 2011 and between 7 and 21 February 2014. 10. The sanitary annexe measured 2.7 sq. m and was provided with a sink, a shower cabin, shelves, mirror and a toilet. All rooms had windows and ventilation. The detainees collected the trash and cleaned the cells twice every day. 11. The inmates received the hygiene products from the prison administration and had access to warm water twice every week. Access to drinking water was unlimited. 12. The information submitted by the Prison Administration concerned conditions of detention only until 22 July 2014. 13. According to the Government, from 21 February 2014 onwards the applicant had been sharing the cells with a maximum of four other persons, in compliance with the decision adopted on 31 January 2014 by the Giurgiu District Court (see paragraph 15 below). 14. The applicant complained repeatedly to the post-sentencing judge (Law no. 275/2006 on the execution of sentences; hereinafter “Law no. 275/2006”) about the conditions of his detention. 15. By two decisions of 29 August and 21 November 2013 the post-sentencing judge for Giurgiu Prison noted that the applicant was no longer held with smokers. The judge also considered that because of the large number of inmates held in that Prison, it was impossible to ensure more personal space for the applicant. He also concluded that in so far as the inmates were responsible for cleaning their cells, the presence of bugs was not the authorities’ fault, but that of the prisoners. The applicant appealed against these two decisions. On 31 January 2014 the Giurgiu District Court ordered the Giurgiu Prison administration to ensure the applicant 4 sq. m of personal space, as provided by law. 16. The applicant also complained before the post-sentencing judge for Slobozia Prison, that while he was held in there, from March to May 2013, he was again placed in cells with smokers. On 7 October 2013 the post‑sentencing judge dismissed the request as having been lodged after the expiry of the ten-day time-limit provided for by Law no. 275/2006. The decision was upheld by the Slobozia District Court on 10 March 2014. 17. Ruling on a similar complaint lodged by the applicant about his stay in a cell with smokers from 8 to 11 March 2013 in Rahova Prison, the post‑sentencing judge for this prison decided, on 19 March 2013, that no measure could be imposed on Rahova Prison as the applicant was no longer there. He also noted that the applicant could bring a separate claim for compensation before the civil courts.

7. The US nationals (“the US applicants”) started proceedings for the adoption of children from Russia between 2010 and 2012. They had complied with the requirements set by the United States authorities, having obtained favourable appraisals of their living and financial conditions and their suitability to adopt a child. Some of the applicants had had to comply with additional requirements laid down in the Agreement between the United States of America and the Russian Federation Regarding Cooperation in Adoption of Children (“Bilateral Agreement on Adoption”) upon its entry into force on 1 November 2012. They then applied to the competent Russian authorities who, except in those cases where the adoption proceedings had focussed on a particular child from the outset, provided them with information concerning the children who were available for adoption. 8. In most cases the US applicants received a positive decision from the Russian authorities regarding both the impossibility of placing the child in a Russian family and their suitability to become adoptive parents. As part of the adoption procedure, they obtained a referral to visit the child concerned, which enabled them to spend several days with him or her at the respective orphanage. They visited the children and reaffirmed their formal agreement to adopt them. In some cases, according to the US applicants, they had formed a bond with the child even before initiating the adoption procedure, and one case concerned the adoption of the brother of a previously adopted girl (cases nos. 23890/13, 37173/13 and 42340/13 respectively; see the specific circumstances below). In such cases the adoption procedure referred to a particular child from the outset. Many of the prospective adoptive children suffer from serious health issues and require specialist medical care. 9. By the end of 2012 most of the US applicants had completed all the requisite steps of the adoption procedure prior to submitting the adoption application to a court. However, on 21 December 2012 the Russian State Duma adopted the Federal Law no. 272-FZ on Measures in respect of Persons Involved in a Breach of Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms, Rights and Freedoms of Nationals of the Russian Federation (“Law no. 272‑FZ”), which, inter alia, banned the adoption of Russian children by nationals of the United States. The law entered into force on 1 January 2013. 10. Adoption proceedings were halted in respect of those US applicants who had not submitted an adoption application to a court before the entry into force of Law no. 272-FZ. 11. In respect of those US applicants who had submitted an adoption application to a court but had not attended a hearing before the entry into force of Law no. 272-FZ, the courts discontinued the adoption proceedings, relying on Law no. 272-FZ. Some of the applicants appealed. Their appeals were dismissed. 12. Applications for adoption submitted by US nationals after 1 January 2013 were rejected on procedural grounds, with similar reference to Law no. 272-FZ. Where an application had been submitted on behalf of the US applicants by an adoption agency, it was rejected on the grounds that the agency could not submit an application to the court because the activities of such agencies had been banned. Where the application had been submitted by some other kind of representative, it was rejected because it should have been submitted by such an adoption agency only. 13. The US applicants were subsequently removed from the State databank containing information on prospective adoptive parents, meaning that they could no longer be considered as such. 14. After spring 2013 some of the prospective adoptive children were transferred for adoption by different families or placed in foster families. (b) Circumstances surrounding the entry into force of the Bilateral Agreement on Adoption and Law no. 272-FZ 15. On 13 July 2011 the United States and the Russian Federation signed the Bilateral Agreement on Adoption setting out the procedure for intercountry adoption between the two States. It entered into force on 1 November 2012. 16. On 21 December 2012 the Russian State Duma adopted Law no. 272-FZ ‒ which was signed by the President on 28 December 2012 ‒ also known as the “Anti-Magnitsky Law” or the “Dima Yakovlev Law” due to the circumstances underlying its adoption. The law has been described as a response to the Russia and Moldova Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012 passed by the United States Congress in November/December 2012 and signed by the US President on 14 December 2012 (the “Magnitsky Act”). The Magnitsky Act imposed sanctions on the Russian officials who were thought to be responsible for the death of Sergei Magnitsky, a lawyer who had exposed alleged large-scale tax fraud involving State officials and subsequently died in custody. The Magnitsky Act prohibited the Russian officials from entering the United States and using the United States’ banking system. The list of the eighteen individuals concerned was made public by the Administration of the President of the United States. 17. The Russian authorities’ response involved the passing of a similar act in respect of United States nationals responsible for gross human rights violations, prohibiting their entry into Russia and freezing their assets within Russia. However, Section 4 § 1 of Law no. 272‑FZ also introduced a ban on the adoption of Russian children by United States nationals. The introduction of that provision was prompted by the death in 2008 of Dima Yakovlev, a Russian toddler adopted by United States nationals. He was left alone for nine hours strapped in his adoptive father’s car after the latter forgot to take him to his day-care centre. The father was eventually acquitted of involuntary manslaughter. This news created a stir in the Russian media and resulted in the highlighting of a number of abuse cases involving Russian children adopted by United States nationals, leading to calls from certain Russian authorities to restrict or end adoptions by US nationals. 18. On 28 December 2012 the United States Department of State released a statement concerning the adoption of Law no. 272-FZ which read, insofar as relevant: “We deeply regret Russia’s passage of a law ending inter-country adoptions between the United States and Russia and restricting Russian civil society organizations that work with American partners. American families have adopted over 60,000 Russian children over the past 20 years, and the vast majority of these children are now thriving thanks to their parents’ loving support. The Russian government’s politically motivated decision will reduce adoption possibilities for children who are now under institutional care. We regret that the Russian government has taken this step rather than seek to implement the bilateral adoption agreement that entered into force in November. We are further concerned about statements that adoptions already underway may be stopped and hope that the Russian government would allow those children who have already met and bonded with their future parents to finish the necessary legal procedures so that they can join their families.” 19. On 1 January 2013 Law no. 272-FZ entered into force. On the same date the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the US Embassy in Moscow that, pursuant to Section 4 § 2 of Law no. 272-FZ, Russia was terminating the Bilateral Agreement on Adoption. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Bilateral Agreement on Adoption, it should have remained in force until one year from the date on which one of the States Parties informed the other Party of its intention to terminate the Agreement, and this move therefore caused confusion regarding the validity of the agreement and the outcome of the pending adoption cases involving prospective adoptive parents from the United States. 20. During a briefing on 8 January 2013, a United States Department of State spokesperson announced that Russia had informed the United States of its intention to suspend the Bilateral Adoption Agreement. 21. On 10 January 2013 news agencies including the BBC and RIA Novosti reported that the Russian President’s Press Secretary had stated that the Bilateral Agreement on Adoption was still in force on that date and that it would remain valid until early January 2014. On the afternoon of the same day the Russian Ministry of External Affairs posted a comment on its website stating that Russia had not merely suspended the Bilateral Agreement on Adoption but had terminated it, and that a communication to this effect had been handed over to the United States Embassy in Moscow on 1 January 2013. 22. On 13 January 2013 about twenty thousand people gathered on the streets of Moscow to take part in an action called March Against Scoundrels to protest against Law no. 272-FZ. 23. The law was also criticised by human rights organisations including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch and received numerous negative reactions from the media, including Time, The Economist and The Guardian. Most of the critical commentators argued that the law was politically motivated and detrimental to the children’s interests. 24. On 15 January 2013 forty-eight members of the United States Congress sent a letter to the President of Russia, Vladimir Putin, on behalf of the United States families affected by Law no. 272-FZ. The letter requested exemption for families who were in the final stages of the adoption procedure and invited Russia to re-join the Bilateral Agreement on Adoption. 25. On 22 January 2013 the Russian Supreme Court issued a letter instructing the lower courts to allow the transfer of adopted Russian children into families of United States nationals where the adoption decision had been taken prior to 1 January 2013, even if it had entered into force after that date. 26. Proceedings in all cases involving prospective adoptive parents from the United States in which a decision on adoption had not been delivered before 1 January 2013 were halted, irrespective of the status of the proceedings. 27. On 2 July 2013 the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) adopted a Resolution on Intercountry Adoption in which it called on member States “to recognize the foundational bond between prospective adoptive parents and the child and to honor and protect these nascent families” and urged them “to resolve differences, disputes, and controversies related to intercountry adoptions in a positive and humanitarian spirit” so as “to avoid any general, indiscriminate disruption of intercountry adoptions already in progress that could jeopardize the best interests of the child, harm the nascent family, or deter prospective adoptive parents from pursuing an intercountry adoption” see paragraph 301 below). Although Russia was not specifically referred to in the Resolution, it was introduced by US Senator Roger Wicker in direct response to the ban on adoptions by United States nationals. 28. According to a news report by RIA Novosti of 5 July 2013, the Russian Ministry of External Affairs dismissed as futile any attempts by the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly to make Russia annul the previously adopted decisions concerning intercountry adoption, the latter being in full compliance with international law. 29. Application no. 6033/13 was lodged on 22 January 2013 by three groups of applicants. (i) First group of applicants 30. A.J.H., born on 16 May 1976, and J.A.H., born on 26 June 1977, who live in Vaughn, Montana, United States (the US applicants), and D.M., who was born on 17 August 2009 and lives in Lobnya, the Moscow Region. 31. D.M. suffers, in particular, from Down syndrome, delayed psychological and speech development, congenital heart disease and insufficient blood flow. He was born prematurely. 32. Having completed the necessary steps for intercountry adoption within the United States, the US applicants were registered in the Russian State databank as prospective adoptive parents on 6 August 2012. They were assisted by the authorised adoption agency “Hand in Hand”. 33. On 24 September 2012 the US applicants obtained a referral to visit D.M. from the Ministry of Education and Science. They visited him every day between 24 and 28 September 2012 and again between 10 and either 13 or 14 January 2013[2]. Each visit lasted between an hour and an hour and a half. 35. On 15 November 2012 the adoption application was submitted to the Moscow Regional Court. The hearing initially scheduled for 21 December 2012 was rescheduled for 15 January 2013 at the applicants’ request. 36. On 10 January 2013 the US applicants arrived in Russia and visited D.M. every day between 10 and either 13 or 14 January 2013[3]. 37. On 15 January 2013 the US applicants appeared before the court. However, the hearing was adjourned at the request of the Ministry of Education of the Moscow Region, which cited a lack of guidance from the Supreme Court of Russia on the application of Law no. 272-FZ. A new hearing was scheduled for 21 January 2013. 38. On 21 January 2013 the US applicants appeared before the court. However, the Moscow Regional Court postponed the hearing until 11 February 2013 in response to a similar request from the Ministry of Education of the Moscow Region. 39. On 22 January 2013 the US applicants left for the United States. They booked a flight for 9 February 2013 in order to be present at the next hearing. 40. On 23 January 2013 the US applicants’ representative, Ms Zakharina[4], was informed that the hearing had been rescheduled for an earlier date, namely 30 January 2013. This left the US applicants insufficient time to reschedule their trip to Russia, and they were unable to be present at the hearing. 41. On 30 January 2013 the Moscow Regional Court discontinued the adoption procedure on the grounds that under Law no. 272-FZ the US applicants had no right to adopt D.M. The US applicants appealed. 42. On 14 May 2013 the Moscow Regional Court upheld the decision of 30 January 2013. The US applicants lodged cassation appeal. 43. On 26 August 2013 the Moscow Regional Court refused leave to have the cassation appeal examined by the Presidium. 44. According to the Government, D.M. has been placed with a foster family. (ii) Second group of applicants 45. G.D.C., born on 14 August 1980 and who lives in Salt Lake City, Utah, United States (“the US applicant”), and E.G., who was born on 28 May 2010 and lives in St. Petersburg. 47. The US applicant initiated the adoption procedure in December 2011. Having completed the necessary steps for intercountry adoption within the United States, the US applicant was registered in the Russian State databank as a prospective adoptive parent on 8 November 2012. She was assisted by the authorised adoption agency “Hand in Hand”. 48. On 28 November 2012 the US applicant obtained a referral to visit E.G. from the Ministry of Education and Science. She visited her every day between 28 November and 1 December 2012. Each visit lasted approximately two hours. 51. On 13 February 2013 the St. Petersburg City Court rejected the application on the grounds that G.D.C. could not be represented by her representative, E.F., because an application of this kind could only be submitted by an authorised agency. The US applicant appealed. 53. On 12 March 2013 the US applicant resubmitted the application through another representative, O.T. 54. On 21 March 2013 the second application was rejected for the same reasons. The US applicant appealed. 55. On 2 and 12 April 2013 the St. Petersburg City Court dismissed the appeals against its decisions of 13 February and 21 March 2013 respectively. 56. On 31 May 2013 the US applicant was informed that she had been removed from the State databank as a prospective adoptive parent. 57. According to the Government, E.G. has been placed with a foster family. (iii) Third group of applicants 58. J.M., born on 1 June 1981, and A.M., born on 14 April 1982, who live in Gainesville, Georgia, United States (the US applicants), and V.T., who was born on 30 September 2008 and lives in Mytischy, the Moscow Region. 59. V.T. is developmentally delayed, he suffers from Down syndrome, hearing loss, heterotropy, intrauterine hypoxia, congenital heart disease (he underwent heart surgery in 2009 where an electric cardiostimulator was implanted), and a number of other illnesses. 60. The US applicants, who have two biological children and one adopted child, initiated the procedure to adopt another child in March 2012. Having completed the necessary steps for intercountry adoption within the United States, they were registered in the Russian State databank as prospective adoptive parents on 17 August 2012. They were assisted by the authorised adoption agency “Hand in Hand”. 61. On 1 October 2012 the US applicants obtained a referral to visit V.T. from the Ministry of Education and Science. They visited him every day between 1 and 5 October 2012 and again between 17 and 21 January 2013. Each visit lasted four hours. 63. On 30 November 2012 the adoption application was submitted to the Moscow Regional Court. The hearing initially scheduled for 22 January 2013 was rescheduled for 12 February 2013 at the request of the Ministry of Education. However, on the same date the prosecutor requested that the proceedings be speeded up due to the uncertainty over the child’s fate. Eventually the hearing was rescheduled for 31 January 2013. 64. On 31 January 2013 the Moscow Regional Court discontinued the adoption procedure on the grounds that under Law no. 272-FZ the US applicants had no right to adopt V.T. The US applicants appealed. 65. On 14 May 2013 the Moscow Regional Court upheld the decision of 31 January 2013 on appeal. The US applicants lodged cassation appeal. 66. On 10 December 2013 the Moscow Regional Court refused leave to have the cassation appeal examined by the Presidium. 67. On 22 April 2013 the US applicants were removed from the State databank as prospective adoptive parents, an action of which they were not informed until 26 April 2013. 68. According to the Government, V.T. is still available for adoption, and the competent authorities provide prospective adoptive parents looking for a child with information about him. (b) Application no. 8927/13 69. Application no. 8927/13 was lodged on 4 February 2013 by J.J., born on 12 December 1983, and Jn.J., born on 25 January 1984, who live in Dover, New Jersey, United States (the US applicants), and A.M., who was born on 27 January 2007 and lives in Moscow. 71. The US applicants initiated the adoption procedure in March 2012. Having completed the necessary steps for intercountry adoption within the United States, they were registered in the Russian State databank as prospective adoptive parents on 16 November 2012. They were assisted by the authorised adoption agency “Hand in Hand”. 72. On 26 November 2012 the US applicants obtained a referral to visit A.M. from the Ministry of Education and Science. They visited her every day between 27 and 30 November 2012. Each visit lasted two to three hours. 73. On 28 December 2012 the adoption application was submitted to the Moscow Regional Court. The hearing was first scheduled for 8 February 2013, but then rescheduled for 31 January 2013. As it left the US applicants insufficient time to reschedule their trip to Russia, they asked the court to postpone the hearing. 74. On 31 January 2013 the Moscow Regional Court rejected the request to postpone the hearing and discontinued the adoption procedure on the grounds that under Law no. 272-FZ the US applicants had no right to adopt V.T. The US applicants appealed. 76. On 22 April 2013 the US applicants were removed from the State databank as prospective adoptive parents. 77. According to the Government, A.M. has been placed with a foster family. (c) Application no. 10549/13 78. Application no. 10549/13 was lodged on 11 February 2013 by J.E.L., born on 1 June 1962 and A.M.L., born on 4 February 1972, who live in Williamsport, Pennsylvania, United States (the US applicants), and S.T., who was born on 29 November 2011 and lives in Volgograd. 80. The US applicants initiated the adoption procedure in December 2011. Having completed the necessary steps for intercountry adoption within the United States, they were registered in the Russian State databank as prospective adoptive parents on 13 June 2012. They were assisted by the authorised adoption agency “Christian World Adoptions, Inc.”. 81. On 23 October 2012 the US applicants obtained a referral to visit S.T. from the Ministry of Education and Science. They visited her twice a day between 24 and 29 October 2012. Each visit lasted two hours. 83. On 1 February 2013 the adoption procedure was discontinued on the grounds that under Law no. 272-FZ the US applicants had no right to adopt S.T. 84. On 15 February 2013 the US applicants appealed. On 20 February 2013 the Volgograd Regional Court stayed the appeal proceedings and instructed the US applicants to correct certain deficiencies by 20 March 2013. On 3 April 2013 the appeal statement was returned to the US applicants. On 25 April 2013 they resubmitted the appeal. On 7 May 2013 the Volgograd Regional Court extended the time-limit for appeal. 86. On 14 February 2013 the US applicants were informed that they had been removed from the State databank as prospective adoptive parents. 88. Application no. 12275/13 was lodged on 18 February 2013 by nine groups of applicants. (i) First group of applicants 89. M.S.P., born on 15 May 1974, and A.N.P., born on 6 March 1980, who live in Papillon, Nebraska, United States (the US applicants), and A.A., who was born on 21 June 2005 and lives in St. Petersburg. 90. A.A. suffers from Down syndrome, moderate mental deficiency, delay in physical development, strabismus, planovalgus deformity, and hyperbilirubinemia. 91. The US applicants initiated the adoption procedure in August 2011. Having completed the necessary steps for intercountry adoption within the United States, they were registered in the Russian State databank as prospective adoptive parents on 6 September 2012. They were assisted by the authorised adoption agency “Hand in Hand”. 92. On 8 October 2012 the US applicants obtained a referral to visit A.A. from the Committee on Social Policy of the St. Petersburg Administration. They visited her on three days in October 2012. Each visit lasted between one and a half and two hours. 94. On 24 December 2012 the application was returned to the US applicants’ representative, E.F. In the court’s ruling, it was stated that it had been returned at E.F.’s request. According to the US applicants, they did not ask E.F. to withdraw the application, and she did not apply to the court to have it withdrawn. Rather, the court asked her to take it back. The US applicants were not informed of this ruling, but having learned about it, they filed a complaint against it, arguing that they had never requested their representative to withdraw the application and that the power of attorney did not empower her to do that. On 4 June 2013 the St. Petersburg City Court set aside the ruling of 24 December 2012. It appears that no further decisions were taken in the case. 95. On 31 May 2013 the US applicants were informed that they had been removed from the State databank as prospective adoptive parents. 96. According to the Government, A.A. is still available for adoption, and the competent authorities provide prospective adoptive parents looking for a child with information about her. (ii) Second group of applicants 97. D.S.G., born on 29 May 1974 and who lives in New York, New York, United States (the US applicant), and O.N., who was born on 24 June 2011 and lives in St. Petersburg. 98. O.N. suffers from a mixed developmental disorder, atopic dermatitis, food allergies and hypermetria of both eyes with astigmatism. 99. The US applicant initiated the adoption procedure in December 2011. Having completed the necessary steps for intercountry adoption within the United States, she was registered in the Russian State databank as a prospective adoptive parent on 9 October 2012. She was assisted by the authorised adoption agency “International Assistance Group, Inc.”. 100. On 24 December 2012 the US applicant obtained a referral to visit O.N. from the Committee on Social Policy of the St Petersburg Administration. She visited her twice a day between 24 and 28 December 2012. Each visit lasted two hours. 102. On 11 February 2013 the adoption application was submitted to the St. Petersburg City Court by the adoption agency. 103. On 13 February 2013 the St. Petersburg City Court rejected the application on the grounds that as of 1 January 2013 the agency’s activity had been banned in Russia pursuant to Law no. 272-FZ. On 4 March 2013 the US applicant appealed. 104. On 25 March 2013 the appeal statement was returned to the US applicant without examination on the grounds that it had been lodged outside the applicable time-limit. 105. On 31 May 2013 the US applicant was informed that she had been removed from the State databank as a prospective adoptive parent. 106. According to the Government, O.N. has been adopted by a different adoptive family. (iii) Third group of applicants 107. B.C., born on 13 June 1965, and J.W.S., born on 4 January 1955, who live in Sag Harbor, New York, United States (the US applicants), and A.R., who was born on 24 March 2010 and lives in St. Petersburg. 108. A.R. was abandoned by her parents, who suffered from substance addictions, at the age of eleven months. She is hepatitis C positive and suffers from a mixed developmental disorder and planovalgus deformity. 109. The US applicants had two children, a son and a daughter. After their daughter died of paediatric cancer at the age of twelve, they decided to adopt a child, since their son did not wish to be an only child. The US applicants initiated the adoption procedure in February 2011. Having completed the necessary steps for intercountry adoption within the United States, they were registered in the Russian State databank as prospective adoptive parents on 18 October 2012. They were assisted by the authorised adoption agency “International Assistance Group, Inc.”. 110. On 28 November 2012 the US applicants obtained a referral to visit A.R. from the Committee on Social Policy of the St Petersburg Administration. They visited her twice a day between 27 and 30 November 2012. Each visit lasted two hours. 112. On 10 February 2013 the adoption application was submitted to the St. Petersburg City Court by the adoption agency. 113. On 13 February 2013 the St. Petersburg City Court rejected the application on the grounds that, as of 1 January 2013, the agency’s activity had been banned in Russia pursuant to Law no. 272-FZ. 114. On 31 May 2013 the US applicants were informed that they had been removed from the State databank as prospective adoptive parents. 115. According to the Government, A.R. has been adopted by a different adoptive family. (iv) Fourth group of applicants 116. T.L.B.-S., born on 21 June 1968 and who lives in Oldtown, Maryland, United States (the US applicant), and V.O., who was born on 7 August 2005 and lives in St. Petersburg. 117. V.O. suffers from Down syndrome, mental deficiency, umbilical hernia, planovalgus deformity, atopic dermatitis and hypermetria of a light degree. 118. The US applicant has two biological children and a son adopted from Russia. She decided to adopt another child and, having completed the necessary steps for intercountry adoption within the United States, she was registered in the Russian State databank as a prospective adoptive parent on 1 November 2012. The US applicant was assisted by the authorised adoption agency “Small World Adoption Foundation of Missouri Inc.”. 119. On 12 November 2012 the US applicant obtained a referral to visit V.O. from the Committee on Social Policy of the St Petersburg Administration. She visited her daily on several days in November 2012. Each visit lasted between one and a half and two hours. 121. According to the US applicant, she did not have sufficient time to prepare all the necessary documents in order to be able to submit the adoption application to a court before the entry into force of Law no. 272‑FZ. After its entry into force she realised that this would be futile, although she remained willing to adopt V.O. 122. On 31 May 2013 the US applicant was informed that she had been removed from the State databank as a prospective adoptive parent. 123. According to the Government, V.O. is still available for adoption, and the competent authorities provide prospective adoptive parents looking for a child with information about her. (v) Fifth group of applicants 124. S.M., born on 12 May 1966, and K.M., born on 30 April 1968, who live in Lake Elsinore, California, United States (the US applicants), and V.G., who was born on 19 December 2005 and lives in St. Petersburg. 126. Having completed the necessary steps for intercountry adoption within the United States, the US applicants were registered in the Russian State databank as prospective adoptive parents on 9 February 2012. They were assisted by the authorised adoption agency “Hand in Hand”. 127. On 18 July 2012 the US applicants obtained a referral to visit V.G. They visited her every day between 18 and 20 July 2012. Each visit lasted three hours. 129. On 26 November 2012 the adoption application was submitted to a court by the US applicants’ representative E.F. from the adoption agency. 130. According to the Government, on 30 November 2012[5] the St. Petersburg City Court stayed the proceedings and instructed the US applicants to rectify certain shortcomings by 30 December 2012[6]. In particular, they were asked to corroborate the powers of their representative to act as such in matters concerning adoption in view of the fact that the power of attorney had been issued to E.F. as a private person, whereas pursuant to Article 4 § 4 of the Bilateral Agreement on Adoption only authorised agencies could act as representatives. On 9 January 2013 the application was returned to E.F. on the grounds that the shortcomings had not been rectified. 131. According to the US applicants, they were never informed of any alleged shortcomings in their adoption application. Furthermore, several days before 1 January 2013 a judge had called E.F. and had asked her to withdraw the application, even though E.F.’s power of attorney did not authorise her to do so. Several days later E.F. found out that the application had been “lost” and the only record of submission was a note in the court’s register. 132. The US applicants also allege that on 11 January 2012 the head of a branch of adoption agency “Hand in Hand” had asked the Chairman of the St. Petersburg Committee on Social Policy for permission to continue its activity as an adoption agency in St. Petersburg through its legal representatives E.F. and I.Z. The permission was granted, and on 11 January 2012 the adoption agency “Hand in Hand” issued E.F. with a power of attorney valid for three years to represent the interests of adoptive parents before the courts of St. Petersburg. 133. According to the Government, the St. Petersburg Committee on Social Policy did not have the competence to authorise the activity of an adoption agency. The matter fell within the exclusive competence of the Ministry of Education. E.F. and I.Z. were registered at the Ministry of Education as employees of the adoption agency “Hand in Hand” during the period 2009-11. 134. According to the US applicants, on 12 and 28 March and 3 April 2013 their representative O.T. requested a copy of the St. Petersburg City Court’s ruling on their application. However, the file was not in the registry and she was not presented with a copy. On 11 April 2013 O.T. resubmitted her request to Judge G. and the President of the St. Petersburg City Court. In a letter of 16 April 2013 Judge G. refused to provide her with a copy of the ruling. On 22 April 2013 O.T. filed a complaint against the refusal. It is not clear whether the complaint has been examined. 135. According to the Government, O.T.’s request was refused as there were no procedural means whereby to provide persons acting as intermediaries in adoption proceedings with copies of documents. 136. On 31 May 2013 the US applicants were informed that they had been removed from the State databank as prospective adoptive parents. 137. According to the Government, V.G. is still available for adoption, and the competent authorities provide prospective adoptive parents looking for a child with information about her. (vi) Sixth group of applicants 138. Q.S., born on 8 April 1979, and W.S., born on 6 May 1980, who live in Salt Lake City, Utah, United States (the US applicants), and D.K., who was born on 26 May 2011 and lives in Perm. 139. D.K. suffers from Down syndrome, psychomotor development delay, anomaly in heart development, partial atrophy of optic discs, astigmatism and cytomegalovirus infection. 140. The US applicants initiated the adoption procedure in July 2012. Having completed the necessary steps for intercountry adoption within the United States, the US applicants were registered in the Russian State databank as prospective adoptive parents on 11 December 2012. They were assisted by the authorised adoption agency “Global Adoption Services Inc.”. 141. On 19 December 2012 the US applicants obtained a referral to visit D.K. They visited her twice a day between 19 and 21 December 2012. Each visit lasted approximately two hours. 143. The adoption application was not submitted to the court. According to the US applicants, it would have been submitted if it had not been for the entry into force of Law no. 272-FZ. 144. According to the Government, on 24 April 2013 the US applicants were informed that they had been removed from the State databank as prospective adoptive parents. According to the US applicants, they were never informed of this fact. 145. According to the Government, D.K. has been placed with a foster family. (vii) Seventh group of applicants 146. S.A.K., born on 9 May 1960 and who lives in Chicago, Illinois, United States (the US applicant), and K.R., who was born on 31 May 2009 and lives in St. Petersburg. 147. K.R. suffers from a mixed developmental disorder, planovalgus deformity, adenoids, hypertrophy of palatine tonsils, hepatosplenomegaly and physiological phimosis. 148. The US applicant has already adopted a girl from Russia. She decided to adopt another child and initiated the adoption procedure in May 2012. Having completed the necessary steps for intercountry adoption within the United States, the US applicant was registered in the Russian State databank as a prospective adoptive parent on 9 October 2012. The US applicant was assisted by the authorised adoption agency “International Assistance Group Inc.”. 149. On 21 November 2012 the US applicant obtained a referral to visit K.R. from the Committee on Social Policy of the St Petersburg Administration. She visited her every day between 21 and 23 November 2012. Each visit lasted two hours. 151. On 11 February 2013 the adoption application was submitted to the St. Petersburg City Court by T. from the adoption agency. 152. On 13 February 2013 the court returned the application on the grounds that the activity of the adoption agency had been banned pursuant to Law no. 272-FZ. The US applicant appealed. 153. On 27 March 2013 the appeal statement was returned on the grounds that it had been submitted in breach of procedural rules. In particular, it failed to state whether the US applicant had been provided with a translation of the ruling and her signature had not been certified by a notary. The US applicant filed a complaint against this ruling. 155. On 31 May 2013 the US applicant was informed that she had been removed from the State databank as a prospective adoptive parent. 156. According to the Government, K.R. has been adopted by a different adoptive family. (viii) Eighth group of applicants 157. C.B., born on 1 December 1967, and T.B., born on 23 October 1966, who live in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, United States (the US applicants), and A.E.A., who was born on 22 August 2011 and lives in Perm. 158. A.E.A. suffers from delay of psychomotor and speech development delay, anomaly in heart development, umbilical hernia and had prenatal contact with HIV. 159. The US applicants initiated the adoption procedure in May 2011. Having completed the necessary steps for intercountry adoption within the United States, they were registered in the Russian State databank as prospective adoptive parents on 6 February 2012. They were assisted by the authorised adoption agency “Adopt a Child”. 160. On 19 November 2012 the US applicants obtained a referral to visit A.E.A. They visited her twice a day between 19 and 23 November 2012. Each visit lasted between one and a half and two hours. 161. The adoption application was not submitted to a court. According to the US applicants, after their visit to Russia in November 2012 they had to amend a number of documents in their adoption file so as to make it conform with the Bilateral Agreement on Adoption. However, Law no. 272‑FZ left them no time to submit the adoption application to a court before its entry into force. 162. On 24 April 2013 the US applicants were informed that they had been removed from the State databank as prospective adoptive parents. 163. According to the Government, A.E.A. has been placed with a foster family. (ix) Ninth group of applicants 164. J.R.V., born on 3 January 1973, and M.L.V., born on 27 May 1973, who live in Aurora, Colorado, United States (the US applicants), and Dz.L., who was born on 13 July 2010 and lives in St. Petersburg. 165. On 4 April 2014 the US applicants’ representative informed the Court that they wished to withdraw the application. (e) Application no. 23890/13 166. Application no. 23890/13 was lodged on 5 April 2013 by M.W., born on 2 February 1961, and D.W., born on 17 March 1964, who live in Woodstock, Virginia, United States (the US applicants), and M.K., who was born on 21 March 1998 and lives in Chelyabinsk. 167. M.K. was born prematurely. He suffers, in particular, from Russell‑Silver syndrome, light cognitive disorder, delay of neurological and behavioural development and chronic gastritis. 168. Between 2001 and 2012 the US applicants were involved in charity work in the Chelyabinsk Region. In particular, they helped with the renovation of an orphanage, where in 2008 they met M.K. 169. According to the US applicants, having developed a close relationship with M.K., in the winter of 2011-2012 they decided to adopt him and initiated the adoption procedure. They contacted about forty adoption agencies asking for assistance with the procedure. However, their attempts were unsuccessful as no adoption agency worked with the Chelyabinsk Region. For this reason they decided to proceed on their own, although the adoption agency Beacon House Adoption Services agreed to provide them with advice on the procedure. 170. In March 2012, during a consultation at the Ministry of Social Relations of the Chelyabinsk Region, the US applicants expressed their wish to adopt M.K. According to the US applicants, the ministry confirmed that there were no authorised adoption agencies operating in the Chelyabinsk Region and stated that the US applicants could proceed on their own. At the same time their adoption file was rejected on the grounds that the apostille on certain documents was incorrect and some additional documents were required. 171. In March 2012 the US applicants twice visited M.K. at the orphanage, with each meeting lasting three hours. 172. On 30 July 2012 the US applicants submitted to the Ministry of Social Relations of the Chelyabinsk Region a corrected set of documents for the adoption of M.K. 173. However, on 8 August 2012 the Minister of Social Relations of the Chelyabinsk Region informed the US applicants that, since the Bilateral Agreement on Adoption had been ratified, with effect from 10 August 2012 individual applications for adoption could not be accepted. For this reason he returned their application for non-compliance with the requirements set by Government Decree no. 654 of 4 November 2006 (see paragraph 318 below). 174. On 17 August 2012 the US applicants contacted the Head of the State databank, who wrongly informed them that the Bilateral Agreement on Adoption had not been ratified and that they could proceed with the adoption procedure on their own. 175. In a telephone conversation on 20 August 2012 the US applicants told the Ministry of Social Relations of the Chelyabinsk Region about the information received from the Head of the State databank. According to the ministry, it was awaiting official clarifications from the Head of the State databank to this effect. 176. On 22 August 2012 the US applicants again contacted the Ministry of Social Relations of the Chelyabinsk Region by telephone and were told that they could proceed with the adoption on their own. 177. On 22 August 2012 according to the US applicants and on 4 September 2012 according to the Government, the adoption file was resubmitted to the Ministry of Social Relations of the Chelyabinsk Region. 178. On 19 September 2012 the adoption file was returned and the US applicants were requested to amend certain documents and to enclose some additional documents. 179. On 3 December 2012, having amended the adoption file, the US applicants again resubmitted the application. By that time the Bilateral Agreement on Adoption ‒ including a provision stating that an adoption application might only be submitted through an authorised agency ‒ had entered into force. 180. On 11 December 2012 the Ministry of Social Relations of the Chelyabinsk Region rejected the application on the grounds that it had been submitted by the US applicants directly and not by an authorised adoption agency. It was recommended that the US applicants re-apply via an agency. 181. According to the applicants, the adoption procedure was eventually halted by the entry into force of Law no. 272-FZ. 183. According to the Government, since 1 September 2014 M.K. has been attending the South Urals Vocational School (Южно-Уральский многопрофильный колледж) and lives in the school dormitory. (f) Application no. 26309/13 184. Application no. 26309/13 was lodged on 18 April 2013 by C.Z., born on 29 October 1974, and S.Z., born on 2 October 1976, who live in Simpsonville, South Carolina, United States (the US applicants), and A.K., who was born on 8 November 2008 and lives in Zelenogradsk. 185. A.K. suffers from psychological developmental disorder, speech development delay, enuresis and dysarthria. A.K. was taken from his home by social workers in August 2011 as he had been neglected and possibly abused by his parents. 186. The US applicants have previously adopted a boy from Russia. They initiated the procedure for adoption of another child in April 2012. Having completed the necessary steps for intercountry adoption within the United States, they were registered in the Russian State databank as prospective adoptive parents. They were assisted by the authorised adoption agency “Adoption Associates Inc.”. 187. On 15 October 2012 the US applicants obtained a referral to visit A.K. from the Ministry of Education of the Kaliningrad Region. They visited him twice a day between 15 and 19 October 2012. They spent four to five hours per day with A.K. 189. According to the Government, the US applicants never made an application to a court for A.K.’s adoption. 190. According to the US applicants, they submitted the adoption application to the Kaliningrad Town Court, and the hearing was scheduled for 17 January 2013. On 28 December 2012 they were informed that the hearing had been cancelled due to the adoption of Law no. 272-FZ. 191. On 30 April 2013 the US applicants were informed that they had been removed from the State databank as prospective adoptive parents. 192. According to the Government, A.K. has been adopted by a different adoptive family. (g) Application no. 27161/13 193. Application no. 27161/13 was lodged on 11 April 2013 by S.S., born on 13 March 1978, and G.S. born on 30 January 1982, who live in Shirley, New York[7], United States (the US applicants), and E.O., who was born on 14 September 2009 and lives in Perm. 194. E.O. is HIV positive. She suffers from speech development delay, slight anomaly in heart development, atopic dermatitis, vegetative dysfunction of the Keith-Flack node and planovalgus deformity. 195. The US applicants initiated the adoption procedure in March 2012. Having completed the necessary steps for intercountry adoption within the United States, they were registered in the Russian State databank as prospective adoptive parents on 6 September 2012. 196. On 6 September 2012 the US applicants obtained a referral to visit E.O. from the Ministry of Education of the Perm Region. They visited her twice a day between 6 and 12 September 2012. Each visit lasted approximately two hours. 197. On 10 September 2012 the US applicants formally agreed to adopt E.O. They were not assisted by any adoption agencies. 199. According to the US applicants, the adoption application had been finalised by 28 December 2012. However, the procedure was halted by the entry into force of Law no. 272-FZ. 200. On 24 April 2013 the US applicants were informed that they had been removed from the State databank as prospective adoptive parents. 201. According to the Government, E.O. has been adopted by a different adoptive family. According to the US applicants, her adoptive parents are not Russian nationals either, and in 2013 E.O. was taken to Ireland. (h) Application no. 29197/13 202. Application no. 29197/13 was lodged on 29 April 2013 by C.M.S., born on 27 February 1967 and who lives in New York, NY, United States (the US applicant), and A.N., who was born on 9 December 2011 and lives in St. Petersburg. 203. At birth A.N.’s umbilical cord was wrapped around his neck, which led to a number of complications. He suffers from congenital heart disease, open foramen oval; congenital renal disease, pyelectasis; mixed psychological development disorder and motor and speech development delay. 204. The US applicant initiated the adoption procedure in early 2012. Having completed the necessary steps for intercountry adoption within the United States, the US applicant was registered in the Russian State databank as a prospective adoptive parent on 15 November 2012. The US applicant was assisted by the authorised adoption agency “Adopt a Child Inc.”. 205. On 19 December 2012 the US applicant obtained a referral to visit A.N. from the Committee on Social Policy of the St Petersburg Administration. She visited him twice a day between 19 and 21 December 2012. Each visit lasted between an hour and an hour and a half. 207. On 18 February 2013 an adoption application dated 9 January 2012 was submitted to the St. Petersburg City Court by D. acting on the basis of a power of attorney. 208. On 19 February 2013 the St. Petersburg City Court returned the application without examination on the grounds that the power of attorney had been issued to D. as a private person whereas, pursuant to Article 4 § 4 of the Bilateral Agreement on Adoption, only authorised agencies were permitted to act as representatives. No appeal was lodged against the ruling. 209. On 31 May 2013 the US applicant was informed that she had been removed from the State databank as a prospective adoptive parent. 210. According to the Government, A.N. has been adopted by a different adoptive family. (i) Application no. 32224/13 211. Application no. 32224/13 was lodged on 13 May 2013 by R.K.B., born on 21 December 1969, and T.B., born on 7 December 1973, who live in Wetumpka, Alabama, United States (the US applicants), and V.B., who was born on 3 March 2012 and lives in Volgograd. 212. V.B. suffers from a motor dysfunction, psychological development disorder, heart defects such as open oval window and lesion of the mitral valve, and had prenatal contact with hepatitis C. 213. The US applicants have previously adopted a girl from Kazakhstan. In September 2011 they initiated the procedure to adopt another child from Russia. Having completed the necessary steps for intercountry adoption within the United States, they were registered in the Russian State databank as prospective adoptive parents on 27 June 2012. They were assisted by the authorised adoption agency “Christian World Adoption Inc.”. 214. On 13 December 2012 the US applicants obtained a referral to visit V.B. from the Ministry of Education of the Volgograd Region. They visited her twice daily between 14 and 20 December 2012. Each visit lasted approximately two hours. 216. The adoption application was never submitted to a court. According to the US applicants, the adoption procedure was halted by the entry into force of Law no. 272-FZ. 217. On 30 January 2013 the US applicants were informed that they had been removed from the State databank as prospective adoptive parents. 218. According to the Government, V.B. has been adopted by a different adoptive family. (j) Application no. 32331/13 219. Application no. 32331/13 was lodged on 16 May 2013 by D.M.L., born on 25 February 1972, and De.M.L., born on 7 November 1968, who live in Omaha, Nebraska, United States (the US applicants), and R.P., who was born on 19 February 2012 and lives in Vladivostok. 220. R.P. was born prematurely. He suffers from prenatal encephalopathy of anoxic-ischemic genesis, a light anomaly in heart development in the form of an additional chord of the left heart ventricle, and narrowing of palpebral fissure. 221. The US applicants initiated the adoption procedure in January 2012. Having completed the necessary steps for intercountry adoption within the United States, they were registered in the Russian State databank as prospective adoptive parents on 20 November 2012. They were assisted by the authorised adoption agency “Beacon House Adoption Services, Inc.”. 222. On 17 December 2012 the US applicants obtained a referral to visit R.P. They visited him daily between 17 and 21 December 2012. Each visit lasted between an hour and an hour and a half. 223. The US applicants formally agreed to adopt R.P. However, according to the Government, they had not signed the statement confirming that they had studied his medical file. Therefore, the subsequent steps set out in Government Decree no. 217 of 4 April 2002 prior to submission of an adoption application to a court were not taken. In particular, no confirmation was received from the State databank that the child was available for adoption. 225. On 31 July 2013 the US applicants were removed from the State databank as prospective adoptive parents. 226. On 31 October 2013 the US applicants filed a complaint against the Directorate of Education and Science of the Primorye Region and the Administration of the Primorye Region to the Leninskiy District Court of Vladivostok. They claimed that the defendants had prevented them from finalising the adoption procedure. 227. On 5 November 2013 the complaint was returned without examination on the grounds of lack of territorial jurisdiction. 228. On 18 November 2013 the US applicants’ representative D. resubmitted the complaint to the Frunzenskiy District Court of Vladivostok. 229. On 19 December 2013 the Frunzenskiy District Court of Vladivostok dismissed the complaint, having found that the US applicants’ removal from the State databank as prospective adoptive parents was compliant with Law no. 272-FZ. The US applicants appealed. 231. According to the Government, R.P. has been adopted by a different adoptive family. (k) Application no. 32351/13 232. Application no. 32351/13 was lodged on 16 May 2013 by J.F.B., born on 24 October 1966 and who lives in Boston, Massachusetts, United States (the US applicant), and M.I. who was born on 18 April 2011 and lives in Vsevolzhsk, the Leningrad Region. 233. M.I. was born prematurely and suffers from speech and psychomotor development delay, internal hydrocephalus, and a congenital heart defect. 234. The US applicant initiated the adoption procedure in July 2011. Having completed the necessary steps for intercountry adoption within the United States, she was registered in the Russian State databank as a prospective adoptive parent on 19 September 2012. The US applicant was assisted by the authorised adoption agency “Adopt a Child Inc.”. 235. On 8 October 2012 the US applicant obtained a referral to visit M.I. She visited her every day between 8 and 12 October 2012. Each visit lasted between an hour and a half and two hours. 236. On 9 October 2012 according to the US applicant and on 11 October 2012 according to the Government, the US applicant formally agreed to adopt M.I. 237. On 19 December 2012 the US applicant submitted the adoption application to the Leningrad Regional Court. 238. On 25 December 2012 the Leningrad Regional Court stayed the proceedings due to certain shortcomings in the documents submitted. In particular, on the certificate confirming that the US applicant had undergone the requisite training for prospective adoptive parents, her middle name was not indicated, causing the court to express doubts as to whether the certificate had actually been issued to her. In addition, the validity of the certificate confirming her living conditions had expired on 7 November 2012 and she therefore needed to renew it. Moreover, the application did not contain any information about M.I.’s father and siblings, if any; the medical certificate detailing M.I.’s state of health failed to include the opinions of certain doctors; information about the US applicant’s income was not accurate; and a document corroborating the US applicant’s housing rights was not attached. The court instructed the US applicant to rectify the shortcomings by 28 February 2013. According to the Government, the above decision was not appealed against and became final on 2 February 2013. 239. On 17 January 2013 the Leningrad Regional Court discontinued the adoption proceedings and returned the application without examination on the grounds that, pursuant to Law no. 272-FZ, the US applicant did not have a right to adopt M.I. According to the US applicant, she appealed. It is not clear whether the appeal was examined. 240. On 15 February 2013 the US applicant was removed from the State databank as a prospective adoptive parent. According to the Government, she was informed of this on 30 May 2013. According to the US applicant, she never received any information to this effect. 241. According to the Government, M.I. has been adopted by a different adoptive family. According to the US applicant, M.I.’s adoptive parents are not Russian nationals either. (l) Application no. 32368/13 242. Application no. 32368/13 was lodged on 16 May 2013 by L.A.P., born on 3 March 1966, and J.N.T., born on 5 August 1971, who live in Long Beach, NY, United States (the US applicants), and K.K., who was born on 24 August 2010 and lives in St. Petersburg. 243. K.K. was abandoned at birth by her mother, who was a drug addict. She suffers from mixed psychological disorders and hypotrophy of the first degree. 244. The US applicants initiated the adoption procedure in 2011. Having completed the necessary steps for intercountry adoption within the United States, they were registered in the Russian State databank as prospective adoptive parents on 16 August 2012. They were assisted by the authorised adoption agency “New Hope Christian Services”. 245. On 20 February 2012 the US applicants obtained a referral to visit K.K. from the Committee on Social Policy of the St Petersburg Administration. They visited her every day between 21 and 23 February 2012. Each visit lasted approximately two hours. 248. On 12 November 2012 the St. Petersburg City Court stayed the proceedings on the grounds that certain documents were not enclosed and instructed the US applicants to submit them by 11 December 2012. At the US applicants’ request, the deadline was subsequently extended to 15 January 2013. According to the US applicants, after the entry into force of the Bilateral Agreement on Adoption, they had to comply with additional requirements introduced by the Agreement. Later they also had to provide proof that their house had not been affected by Hurricane Sandy, which hit the north-eastern United States in October 2012. 249. On 15 January 2013 the St. Petersburg City Court returned the application without examination on the grounds that the additional documents submitted by the applicants were not complete. In particular, the section of the report on the US applicants’ living conditions containing the date and signature had not been translated. A photograph of the child’s room was not informative. Moreover, there were no photographs of the US applicants with K.K., and a document confirming that the US applicants had undergone the requisite training for prospective adoptive parents had not been enclosed. No appeal was lodged against this ruling. 251. On 23 May 2013 St. Petersburg City Court returned the application without examination on the grounds that it had been submitted by a private person acting on the US applicants’ behalf, whereas pursuant to virtue of Article 4 § 4 of the Bilateral Agreement on Adoption it could only be submitted by an authorised agency. The US applicants appealed. 252. On 20 June 2013 St. Petersburg City Court returned the appeal statement without examination, making reference to Law no. 272-FZ. 253. On 31 May 2013 the US applicants were informed that they had been removed from the State databank as prospective adoptive parents. 254. According to the Government, K.K. has been adopted by a different adoptive family. (m) Application no. 37173/13 255. Application no. 37173/13 was lodged on 7 June 2013 by J.W.H., born on 29 July 1981, A.M.H., born on 18 March 1969 (the US applicants) and G.N.Y.H., born on 3 December 2008, who live in Smartsville, California, United States, and V.B., who was born on 14 November 2001 and lives in Prokopyevsk. 256. V.B. suffers from light mental development delay, light speech development delay and a mixed form of dysgraphia and dyslexia. 257. On 5 July 2010 the US applicants adopted the third applicant, G.N.Y.H. As a result of what appears to be a clerical mistake, the information about her siblings had not been included in the State databank. 258. According to the Government, the information regarding G.N.Y.H.’s brother, V.B., had been included in G.N.Y.H.’s file, however, and the US applicants had studied this in March 2010. 259. In the decision of the Kemerovo Region Court of 5 July 2010 on G.N.Y.H.’s adoption it was stated that although G.N.Y.H. had an elder brother, V.B., the court considered it possible for G.N.Y.H. to be adopted alone because the children were being placed in different institutions, their family relations had been interrupted, and the adoption was in the interests of G.N.Y.H. 260. According to the US applicants, having learned that G.N.Y.H. had a brother, they started corresponding with V.B. and sent him letters, photos and parcels. They also started making enquiries with a view to adopting V.B. as well. In a letter of 29 April 2011 the prosecutor’s office of the Kemerovo Region advised the US applicants that, as they had been registered as the prospective adoptive parents in respect of one particular child, they would have to reapply to the competent authorities and resubmit documents amended accordingly should they wish to adopt another child. In a letter of 15 June 2011 the same prosecutor’s office acknowledged that the information on G.N.Y.H.’s siblings had not been included in the State databank as a result of a clerical mistake. It noted, however, that the information about V.B. had been included in G.N.Y.H.’s personal file, which the US applicants had studied on 24 March 2010. The prosecutor’s office also confirmed that V.B. was available for adoption and that it was open to the US applicants to apply to the competent authorities for his adoption. The US applicants then initiated the adoption procedure. 261. On 12 May 2012 “Hand in Hand”, an authorised adoption agency acting on behalf of the US applicants, filed an application for V.B.’s adoption with the Directorate of Education and Science of the Kemerovo Region. On the same date the US applicants were registered in the State databank as prospective adoptive parents. 262. According to the Government, the US applicants had initially intended to visit V.B. in June 2012, but they asked if they might change the dates of their visit to October 2012. However, they did not reapply for a later visit. Accordingly, they were never issued with a referral to visit V.B. and never met him. 263. According to the US applicants, at the relevant time they had also applied to adopt another child from Russia, X., and they had accepted a referral to visit her in June 2012. They then also received a referral to visit V.B. in June 2012. Although they were willing to meet both children, they were advised that it was necessary to finalise the adoption of X. first. Accordingly, they asked for permission to visit V.B. in October 2012. However, they were subsequently advised that in July 2012 the regional authorities had banned the adoption of children by US nationals following an incident of ill-treatment of a child from the Kemerovo Region by his adoptive parents from the United States. 264. In December 2012, when the US applicants went to Russia to finalise the adoption of X., they learned that the regional ban on adoption of children by US nationals had been lifted. However, the US applicants were unable to proceed with the adoption of V.B. due to the entry into force of the Law no. 272-FZ. 266. Application no. 38490/13 was lodged on 12 June 2013 by A.B., born on 24 July 1964 and who lives in Bellevue, Nebraska[8], United States (the US applicant), and Ye.L., who was born on 23 July 2009 and lives in Novosibirsk. 267. Ye.L. was born prematurely. He suffers from hearing loss, speech development delay and respiratory ailments. 268. The US applicant initiated the adoption procedure in 2008. As the adoption agency’s licence was later revoked, she had to restart the procedure in 2011. Having completed the necessary steps for intercountry adoption within the United States, the US applicant was registered in the Russian State databank as a prospective adoptive parent on 25 June 2012. 269. On 19 July 2012 the US applicant obtained a referral to visit Ye.L. She visited him on four consecutive days in July 2012. 271. According to the US applicant, preparation of an adoption file took more time after the entry into force of the Bilateral Agreement on Adoption, which stipulated a number of additional requirements. The adoption application was ultimately not submitted to a court due to the entry into force of Law no. 272-FZ. 272. On 10 June 2013 the US applicant was informed that she had been removed from the State databank as a prospective adoptive parent. 273. According to the Government, Ye.L. has been placed with a foster family. (o) Application no. 42340/13 274. Application no. 42340/13 was lodged on 30 June 2013 by M.B., born on 28 December 1966, and D.B., born on 9 November 1968, who live in Alabaster, Alabama, United States (the US applicants), and K.S., who was born on 29 November 2005 and lives in St. Petersburg. 275. K.S. suffers from psychological development delay, atopic dermatitis, planovalgus deformity and a phonematic disorder. 276. Between 13 December 2010 and 17 January 2011 K.S. stayed at the US applicants’ home as a part of the orphan-hosting programme “New Horizons for Children”. 277. As soon as K.S. had left, the US applicants started making enquiries about adoption. In March 2011 they started the adoption procedure. 278. On 20 February 2012 the US applicants were registered in the State databank as prospective adoptive parents. 279. After 2011, the US applicants met with K.S. on three occasions. Each time they came to St. Petersburg for a week and visited K.S. daily. Each visit lasted from two to three hours. 280. According to the Government, on 13 December 2011 the US applicants submitted the application for K.S.’s adoption to the St. Petersburg City Court. As certain documents were not enclosed, the proceedings were stayed and the US applicants were instructed to submit the documents requested by 10 January 2012. The term was then extended to 9 February 2012. As the US applicants failed to submit the documents, on the latter date the adoption application was returned to them without examination. No appeal was lodged against this ruling. 281. According to the US applicants, in November-December 2011 and February-March 2012 they had travelled to Russia as they wished to adopt K.S. and her younger brother. It transpired that they were unable to go ahead with the adoption because, although K.S.’s mother’s parental rights had been revoked, the revocation of her father’s parental rights was pending but not yet finalised. This issue was resolved in March 2012. However, in April 2012 the US applicants were informed that K.S.’s biological mother had had a baby girl, and that K.S. thus had two siblings. In May 2012 they amended the adoption file so as to apply for adoption of three children: K.S. and both her brother and sister. In September 2012 they were obliged to comply with additional requirements introduced by the Bilateral Agreement on Adoption, which included additional training courses. The adoption procedure was ultimately halted by the entry into force of Law no. 272-FZ. 282. According to the Government, K.S. is still available for adoption, and the competent authorities provide prospective adoptive parents looking for a child with information about her. (p) Application no. 42403/13 283. Application no. 42403/13 was lodged on 30 June 2013 by M.M., born on 20 September 1974, and J.M., born on 9 August 1976, who live in Westminster, MD, United States (the US applicants), A.M., who was born on 11 June 2002 and lives in Furmanov, the Ivanovo Region, and D.T., who was born on 22 October 2002 and lives in Kineshma, the Ivanovo Region. 284. A.M. and D.T. are not related. Their parents have been stripped of parental rights. D.T. suffers from mitral heart prolapse, residual encephalopathy, mixed disorder of psychological development and gallbladder anomaly. A.M. had been adopted at the age of five years old but was then returned to the orphanage. She suffers from a mixed disorder of psychological development and light myopia. 285. The US applicants initiated the adoption procedure in 2011. Having completed the necessary steps for intercountry adoption within the United States, they were registered in the Russian State databank as prospective adoptive parents on 11 April 2012. They were assisted by the authorised adoption agency “Hand in Hand”. 286. On 13 September 2012 the US applicants obtained a referral to visit both A.M. and D.T. from the Department of Social Security of the Ivanovo Region so as to choose between the two girls. They visited D.T. twice and A.M. three times in September 2012 and eventually decided to adopt both girls. 287. On 27 September 2012 the US applicants formally agreed to adopt A.M. and D.T. According to the US applicants, A.M. and D.T. met and bonded. 289. On 6 November 2012 the Ivanovo Regional Court stayed the proceedings on the grounds that certain documents, such as confirmation of the US applicants’ registration in the State databank and the girls’ entry permits for the United States, were not enclosed. It instructed the US applicants to submit the documents requested by 27 November 2012. 291. On 4 December 2012 the Ivanovo Regional Court returned the adoption application without examination on the grounds that the US applicants had failed to provide the documents requested. 293. On 18 December 2012 the Ivanovo Regional Court stayed the proceedings on the grounds that some of the enclosed documents did not satisfy the procedural requirements. In particular, (i) although the US applicants had submitted a property certificate concerning a plot of land, it did not provide sufficient information about their dwelling; (ii) the attestation of the US applicants’ suitability to become adoptive parents had been issued more than a year previously and was therefore outdated; and (iii) medical opinion concerning the US applicants’ state of health did not satisfy the Ministry of Health requirements. The US applicants were instructed to rectify these shortcomings by 10 January 2013. 294. On 9 January 2013 the Ivanovo Regional Court rejected the application on the grounds that, pursuant to Law no. 272-FZ, the US applicants did not have a right to adopt A.M. and D.T. The US applicants appealed. 295. On 4 February 2013 the Ivanovo Regional Court upheld the ruling of 9 January 2013 on appeal. The US applicants lodged an appeal on points of law. 296. On 17 April 2013 the Presidium of the Ivanovo Regional Court rejected the appeal on points of law. 297. On 25 April 2013 the US applicants were informed that they had been removed from the State databank as prospective adoptive parents. 298. According to the Government, A.M. is still available for adoption, and the competent authorities provide prospective adoptive parents looking for a child with information about them. D.T. has been placed with a foster family.

6. On 11 December 2002 the applicant instituted proceedings for restitution of a hotel in Skopje which had been confiscated from his predecessor in 1948. On 7 June 2004 a commission responsible for such matters within the Ministry of Finance dismissed the applicant’s claim. On 27 July 2004 he appealed. On 16 November 2004 a second-instance commission set up within the Government dismissed his appeal. Subsequently, the case went back and forth several times between the administrative bodies and courts at two levels of jurisdiction. The proceedings are currently pending before the Higher Administrative Court, awaiting a decision on an appeal by the applicant of 26 January 2016 against a judgment of the Administrative Court. 7. On 3 July 2014 the applicant applied to the Supreme Court for a ruling that the length of the restitution proceedings had been excessive, to award him compensation and set a three-month time-limit for the court dealing with his case to decide on his restitution claim. 8. By letters dispatched between 8 July 2014 (received on 3 September 2014) and 20 January 2015, the Supreme Court requested the case file from the Administrative Court. The case file, which was with the administrative bodies, was forwarded to the Supreme Court on 13 February 2015. 9. On 28 April 2015 the first-instance panel of the Supreme Court found that the relevant period to be taken into consideration had started to run on 16 November 2004 (see paragraph 6 above). It further established that the case had not been complex and that there had been no delays attributable to the applicant. It concluded that there had been a violation of the applicant’s right to a hearing within a reasonable time and awarded him the equivalent of 810 euros (EUR) in compensation. 10. By a letter of 3 June 2015 (received on 10 August 2015), the Supreme Court asked the Ministry of Justice to provide assistance in delivering its decision because the applicant lived in Serbia. Between 25 August and 21 December 2015, the Ministry of Justice of the respondent State asked, on three occasions, that the relevant Ministry in Serbia serve the Supreme Court’s decision on the applicant. By a letter of 28 December 2015 (received on 10 March 2016), the Ministry of Justice of Serbia informed the relevant Ministry of the respondent State about the date of service of the Supreme Court’s decision to the applicant. 11. In an appeal against the Supreme Court’s decision of 28 April 2015, the applicant complained that it had taken too long for that court to decide on his application. He referred to section 36(4) of the Courts Act, which required the Supreme Court to decide on a length of proceedings remedy within six months (see paragraph 14 below). He also complained that the amount of compensation awarded to him had been too low. 12. On 21 March 2016 the second-instance panel of the Supreme Court ruled partly in favour of the applicant. It endorsed the findings of the first-instance panel regarding the complexity of the case and that no delays were attributable to the applicant, found that the proceedings had lasted for ten years, five months and twelve days and set compensation at the equivalent of EUR 1,050.

5. The applicant was born in 1966 and is currently serving a prison sentence. 6. In August and September 2001 a number of separate criminal proceedings were instituted in connection with stealing grain, farm animals and other items from different farms. These proceedings were eventually joined into a single criminal case (“the theft proceedings”). 7. On 15 August 2001 the applicant – together with several other individuals including V.Z. – was arrested as a suspect in these proceedings. 8. On 17 August 2001 the Magdalynivsky District Court (hereafter “the District Court”) remanded the applicant in custody pending pre-trial investigation of the above charges. 9. On 23 August 2001 criminal proceedings were instituted in connection with the premeditated murder of a man whose body had allegedly been found by a villager in the forest near the applicant’s village (“the murder proceedings”). 10. On the same day, whilst being interrogated in the theft proceedings, V.Z. allegedly told the police that on 1 August 2001 the applicant had fatally injured a woman, L.G., in a traffic accident and had killed her husband, A.G., in V.Z.’s presence in order to cover this crime. He also stated that they had hidden the bodies in the forest. According to the Government, criminal proceedings in connection with L.G.’s death in a traffic accident were also launched that day. 11. Later the same day, the applicant and V.Z., unaccompanied by lawyers, were taken to the centre of the village where they lived and were asked by the police to give video-recorded testimonies about the circumstances of the deaths of L.G. and A.G. V.Z. repeated the statement he had made earlier that day. According to the record of the crime reconstruction, which referred to the applicant as the “suspect”, the latter –having been informed of his rights to defence and his right not to incriminate himself – agreed to give testimony and acknowledged that he had fatally hit L.G. with his car and had helped V.Z. to cover the victims’ bodies, but stated that it was V.Z. who had killed A.G. 12. On the same day, in the absence of the applicant’s lawyer, a site inspection and a road examination were carried out. The investigation team and forensic experts also examined the applicant’s car in his absence. 13. On 24 August 2001 criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant in connection with the traffic accident which had resulted in L.G.’s death. The applicant’s wife was questioned by the police. 14. On 31 August 2001 the applicant was informed in writing of his right to defence and was questioned, in the presence of his defense counsel, as a suspect in the premeditated murder of A.G. He repeated the statement he had made on 23 August 2001. 15. On 26 September 2001 the applicant was charged with ten counts of theft and with causing a traffic accident which resulted in L.G.’s death. 16. On 10 October 2001 the investigation into the premeditated murder of A.G. was suspended because it had been impossible to establish the offender. It was resumed on 10 February 2002. 17. On an unspecified date the applicant was committed for trial on the charges of theft and causing a fatal traffic accident. 18. On 11 February 2002 the District Court found the applicant guilty on several counts of theft and sentenced him to ten years’ imprisonment. No verdict was reached on the other charge (see paragraph 21 below). By the same judgment, eleven other individuals, including V.Z., were convicted on various counts of theft in collaboration with the applicant and were sentenced to various penalties. 19. On the same day, the applicant was charged with the premeditated murder of A.G. He was questioned in the presence of his defence counsel but made no statement. 20. On 12 February 2002 the murder proceedings were stayed owing to the applicant’s unspecified illness. According to the applicant, his “illness” was invented by the authorities in order to protract the proceedings. 21. On 25 July 2002 the Dnipropetrovsk Regional Court of Appeal (hereafter “the Court of Appeal”) upheld the conviction of 11 February 2002 with respect to the applicant’s co-defendants, quashed the conviction with respect to the applicant and remitted his case to the District Court for retrial. The Court of Appeal noted, in particular, that the District Court, having admitted the case for trial on both the charges of theft and causing a fatal traffic accident, had reached a verdict only on the theft charge. 22. On 13 February 2003 the District Court disjoined the charge concerning the traffic incident and remitted it to the investigating authorities for further investigation together with the murder charge. 23. On 19 February 2003 the District Court found the applicant guilty on several counts of theft and sentenced him to ten years’ imprisonment. 24. On 24 February 2003 the murder proceedings were resumed and joined to the criminal proceedings concerning the traffic accident. 25. On 6 June 2003 the Court of Appeal quashed the judgment of 19 February 2003 and remitted the case for retrial. It noted, in particular, that the investigation was littered with deficiencies and procedural violations. 26. On 7 July 2003, following a request by the applicant and his lawyer, the District Court remitted the theft case to the Magdalynivsky District Prosecutors’ Office, instructing it to join the proceedings to those concerning the traffic accident and the murder. 27. On 24 September 2003 the investigator reclassified the applicant’s charges from premeditated to aggravated murder. On the same date, these proceedings were joined to the criminal proceedings concerning the theft and the traffic accident. 28. On 25 September 2003 the investigator from the Magdalynivsky District Prosecutors’ Office ordered the applicant’s release from custody pending trial in connection with the theft charges. On the same date, without being released, the applicant was re-arrested on suspicion of the premeditated murder of A.G. 29. On 26 September 2003 the prosecutor’s office asked the District Court to remand the applicant in custody in connection with the murder proceedings. 30. On 27 September 2003, in the presence of his defense counsel, the applicant was questioned as a suspect in the murder proceedings. He maintained his innocence. 31. On 29 September 2003 the District Court refused the prosecutor’s request to remand the applicant in custody in the murder proceedings, having found that the prosecutor’s decision to cancel the applicant’s detention on remand of 25 September 2003 had been unlawful. It noted, in particular, that the investigation of the murder case had featured artificial suspensions and other delays and that by joining and disjoining the various charges against the applicant, the investigation had been sidestepping the proper procedure for extending the term for the pre-trial investigation. Moreover, this tactic had allowed them to conduct various investigative activities in the absence of the applicant’s defence counsel. The court further found that the applicant should be considered as having been in detention since 15 August 2001 for the theft charges. 32. On 7 October 2003, in the presence of his defense counsel, the applicant was charged with theft, causing a traffic accident and premeditated murder and was questioned as an accused. He admitted that he had fatally hit L.G. but denied killing A.G. 33. On 8 October 2003 the Court of Appeal quashed the decision of 29 September 2003 and remitted the matter to the District Court for fresh consideration. 34. On 10 October 2003 the applicant was charged with the aggravated murder of A.G. and causing a traffic accident. 35. On 13 October 2003 the applicant had a face-to-face confrontation with V.Z. 36. On 14 October 2003 the District Court granted the prosecution’s request to remand the applicant in custody in the context of the murder proceedings. 37. On 20 November 2003 the applicant was charged, within the criminal proceedings as joined on 24 September 2003, with aggravated murder, theft and causing a traffic accident. 38. On 2 December 2003 the applicant and his defense counsel were granted access to the case-file. 39. On 9 December 2003 a bill of indictment was drafted by the investigator. 40. On 14 January 2004 the criminal case was sent to the Court of Appeal, acting as the first-instance court, for trial. 41. On 30 January 2004, upon requests from the prosecutor and the applicant, the court remitted the case for additional investigation as it had been littered with procedural violations which could not be rectified during the trial. The court noted, in particular, that after 23 August 2001 a number of investigative actions had been carried out in respect of the applicant without his procedural rights having been explained to him. It further noted that all the investigative actions taken after 23 October 2001 had violated the applicant’s procedural rights because the term for the pre-trial investigation of the murder had expired. 42. On 9 March 2004 the theft charges were disjoined into separate proceedings. The murder charges of 11 February 2002 were dropped. 43. On 16 March 2004 the applicant was charged with aggravated murder and was questioned in the presence of his defence counsel. He maintained his innocence and confirmed the statements made earlier in this respect. 44. On 19 April 2004 the applicant was committed for trial before the Court of Appeal, acting as a first-instance court, on charges of having caused the traffic accident which resulted in L.G.’s death and of the aggravated murder of A.G. 45. During the trial the applicant acknowledged that he had fatally hit L.G. with his car but denied killing A.G., who, according to him, had been murdered by V.Z. 46. On 27 April 2004 the criminal proceedings concerning the theft charges were suspended. 47. On 21 May 2004 the Court of Appeal found the applicant guilty of causing the traffic accident which resulted in L.G.’s death and of the aggravated murder of A.G. The conviction for murder was based on the testimony of V.Z., which the trial court found to be corroborated by the statements made by the applicant’s wife, the results of the crime-scene inspection and the forensic expert’s examination of the victim’s body. The Court of Appeal found reasonable V.Z’s argument that he had no reason to murder A.G. as it was not him who had killed A.G.’s wife. The applicant’s testimony with respect to V.Z. was found by the court to be inconsistent in its details and therefore not truthful. 48. The applicant was sentenced to life imprisonment in combination with a three-year driving ban. The Court of Appeal stated that the term of imprisonment was to be calculated from 10 October 2003. 49. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, having noted, inter alia, that he had not been provided with legal advice during the questioning of 23 August 2001. 50. On 5 October 2004 the Supreme Court upheld the conviction but reduced the sentence to fifteen years’ imprisonment. It found that the applicant’s guilt was proved by V.Z.’s testimony which was consistent and corroborated by other evidence and concluded that the lower court had correctly found the applicant’s accusation against V.Z. inconsistent in its details. Without particularly mentioning the applicant’s argument regarding the lack of legal assistance, the Supreme Court found no procedural violations serious enough to necessitate quashing the judgment. 51. On numerous occasions the applicant complained to the Court of Appeal and other State authorities that his term of imprisonment had been calculated incorrectly in the judgment of 21 May 2004, and that the starting point should have been the date of his first arrest in connection with the theft charges, i.e. 15 August 2001, rather than 10 October 2003. In reply, the applicant was informed that the term of imprisonment had been properly calculated, because prior to October 2003 the applicant had been detained in relation to charges that were not linked to the murder charge for which he was convicted. 52. On 4 April 2005 the criminal proceedings concerning the theft charge were renewed and on an unspecified date the case was referred for trial. 53. On 10 June 2005 the District Court remitted the case for further investigation. 54. On 17 June 2011 the criminal case was referred to the trial court for examination. 55. On 24 May 2012 the District Court found the applicant guilty on several counts of theft and sentenced him to eight years’ imprisonment combined with the confiscation of all his property. Given the applicant’s conviction under the judgment of 21 May 2004, the trial court applied the rule of absorption of sentences, as provided by domestic legislation, and defined the final sentence for all his crimes as fifteen years’ imprisonment combined with the confiscation of his property and the three-year driving ban. The District Court included the length of the applicant’s pre-trial detention in the overall term of imprisonment and ruled that the latter had started running on 15 August 2001, when the applicant had been detained for the first time in the context of the theft proceedings. The parties did not appeal against this decision and it became final on 8 June 2012.

6. The applicants were born in 1985 and live in Vanadzor and Gyumri, Armenia. 7. In May 2003 the applicants were drafted into the Armenian army and assigned to the third infantry battalion of military unit no. 33651, situated near the village of Mataghis in the Martakert Region of the unrecognised Nagorno Karabakh Republic (hereafter, Nagorno Karabakh) (see Chiragov and Others v. Armenia [GC], no. 13216/05, § 28, 16 June 2015). 8. On 9 January 2004 the Martakert Garrison Prosecutor’s Office instituted criminal proceedings no. 90800104 on account of the murder of two servicemen of the same military unit, R.Y. and H.M., who had been found dead in a nearby canal on 9 and 10 January 2004. They had been murdered on 24 December 2003. 9. An investigating team was created by order of the Military Prosecutor of Armenia, which was headed by investigator A.H. of the Military Prosecutor’s Office of Armenia. The investigating team also included the investigator of the Gugark Garrison Military Prosecutor’s Office of Armenia, S.T., the investigator of the Martakert Garrison Military Prosecutor’s Office of Nagorno Karabakh, A.K., the Deputy Chief of the Yerevan Military Police Department, V.K., and the Chief of the Stepanakert Military Police Department of Nagorno Karabakh, A.B. 10. On 16 January 2004 a number of servicemen were arrested and subsequently charged and detained in connection with the murders. It appears that these charges were later dropped for lack of evidence. 11. By letter of 6 March 2004 the Military Police Chief of Armenia informed the Military Prosecutor of Armenia that three servicemen had testified and implicated three other servicemen, V.H., S.P. and G.Y., in the crime but later retracted their testimony, alleging that they had made those statements under moral and psychological pressure from one of the officers of the Stepanakert Military Police Department and two officers of their military unit. 12. On 16 April 2004 the first and second applicants were assigned to keep watch at a military outpost. 13. On 19 April 2004 the investigative team received from one of the officers of military unit no. 33651 an empty envelope allegedly found at the crime scene on 25 December 2003, on which some names were written. 14. On 20 April 2004 a former serviceman of the same military unit, K.A., was questioned in this connection in the second applicant’s home town of Gyumri. It appears that it was disclosed during this interview that the envelope in question was linked to the second applicant and had been included in a parcel sent to him by his parents at the end of December 2003. It further appears that this fact was confirmed during the questioning of the second applicant’s younger brother, which took place on 21 April 2004 from 11 a.m. to 1.10 p.m. 15. The applicants alleged that on 19 April 2004 they were taken, in turns, to the office of their military unit’s commander, M.A., for questioning in connection with the murders. The questioning was carried out by investigators A.H. and S.T. and military police officers V.K. and A.B. Chiefs of the Third and Fourth Battalions, E.M. and I.V. respectively, were also present during part of the questioning. The law enforcement officers started beating, threatening and verbally abusing the applicants, forcing them to confess to the murders. On the same day, following their questioning, they were transported by these law enforcement officers to the Martakert Garrison Military Prosecutor’s Office in Nagorno Karabakh by order of the Military Prosecutor of Armenia, where they continued to be ill‑treated and were kept until their transfer to the Stepanakert Military Police Department for further questioning. 16. The Government contested these allegations and claimed that on 19 and 20 April 2004 the first and second applicants were on watch at a military outpost. It was only on 21 April 2004 that the second applicant was taken to the office of the commander of the military unit, M.A., for questioning as a witness in connection with the murders. Soon thereafter the commander of the military unit ordered the Chief of the Third Battalion, E.M., to bring also the first applicant from the military outpost for questioning as a witness. The third applicant was also taken for questioning. The questioning was carried out in the office of the commander of the military unit by employees of the military prosecutor’s office and the military police. During questioning it was revealed that on 24 December 2003 the applicants had abandoned their military unit without authorisation and had gone to Mataghis village. This was found to be a grave disciplinary offence and the commander of the military unit decided to impose on them a disciplinary penalty of ten days in isolation. On the same day, namely 21 April 2004, the applicants were taken first to the Martakert Garrison Military Prosecutor’s Office and later to the Stepanakert Military Police Department where they were placed in a disciplinary isolation cell in order to serve their disciplinary penalty. 17. It appears from the materials of the case that the applicants’ first questioning took place at their military unit, in the office of commander M.A., where they were taken in turns. The questioning was carried out by investigators A.H. and S.T. and military police officers V.K. and A.B. It appears that the Chief of the Fourth Battalion, I.V., was also present for part of the questioning. The applicants were asked questions about a parcel that the second applicant had received from his parents on 24 December 2003, which included food, letters and other items, whether they had eaten the food together after fetching the parcel from Mataghis and, if so, where and when. No record was made of this interview. 18. It further follows from the materials of the case that on 21 April 2004 the commander of the military unit, M.A., issued Order no. 112, according to which the applicants were considered to be isolated by the Stepanakert Military Police Department and were deprived of their daily allowance as of 22 April 2004. This Order was based on three Isolation Notices dated 21 April 2004 and signed by the commander, which stated that the applicants were to be isolated for a period of ten days on the grounds of a “VMR” (violation of military rules) and were to be kept in a common cell. In the section of the Isolation Notices entitled “Doctor’s conclusion” the note “practically healthy” appeared, followed by the signature of doctor S. The sections of the Isolation Notices which were to include the signature of the chief of the disciplinary isolation cell and his notes regarding the time and date of the applicants’ admission to and release from the disciplinary isolation cell were left blank. 19. On 21 April 2004 the applicants were questioned as witnesses at the Martakert Garrison Military Prosecutor’s Office. According to the relevant records, the first applicant was questioned by investigator S.T. from 2.50 p.m. to 7.25 p.m., the second applicant was questioned by investigator A.K. from 2.35 p.m. to 7.40 p.m., and the third applicant was questioned by investigator A.H. from 2.05 p.m. to 7.20 p.m. The second applicant admitted during questioning that he and the other two applicants had eaten the food contained in the parcel received from his parents outside the military unit next to the canal on 24 December 2003. The first applicant was asked during questioning to provide an account of what he had done on 24 December 2003. He was then asked whether he was familiar with servicemen R.Y. and H.M. and whether the nearby shop had still been open when he and the other two applicants had eaten the food, as well as two questions regarding the envelope of the letter which had arrived with the parcel. 20. Later that day at an unspecified hour the applicants were taken to the Stepanakert Military Police Department of Nagorno Karabakh where from 10.35 p.m. to 00.10 a.m. the second applicant was questioned as a witness by investigator A.H. The interview was videotaped by the cameraman of the Media Department of the Nagorno Karabakh Defence Army, A.G. 21. The applicants were kept at the Stepanakert Military Police Department until 23 April 2004. On that date the Military Prosecutor of Armenia issued a letter addressed to the Defence Minister of Nagorno Karabakh, with a copy to the Chief of Military Police of Armenia, the Chief of the Stepanakert Military Police Department and the commander of military unit no. 33651, having the following content: “For the purposes of criminal case no. 90800104 examined by the investigative unit of the Military Prosecutor’s Office of Armenia, on 21 April 2004 [the applicants], who were performing their military service at military unit no. 33651, were taken to the Martakert Garrison Military Prosecutor’s Office, whereupon they were taken to the Stepanakert Military Police Department. It is necessary to transfer the three above-mentioned servicemen to military unit no. 10724 in Yerevan in order to carry out a number of investigative measures with their participation.” 22. On the same date the applicants were transferred to Yerevan, the second applicant separately from the first and third applicants. At 10.45 p.m. the officer on duty of the Military Police Department of Armenia drew up a record entitled “Receipt” in which it was stated that he had received the first and third applicants from the employees of the Stepanakert Military Police Department. 23. The applicants alleged that, during the entire period prior to their transfer to Yerevan, they were questioned on numerous occasions as witnesses, in spite of already being suspected of the crime. They were continually subjected to beatings, threats and verbal abuse by investigators A.H. and S.T., military police officers V.K. and A.B. and another officer of the Stepanakert Military Police Department nicknamed M., with the aim of extorting a confession. They were kept in various rooms and cells at different law enforcement agencies and were neither fed nor allowed to sleep. They were transferred from one law enforcement agency to another, blindfolded and handcuffed. The second applicant also alleged that the officers threatened to rape him with a club and to arrest his mother and younger brother, if he refused to confess. 24. The applicants further alleged that upon their arrival in Yerevan they remained in custody and at an unspecified point were placed in an arrest facility situated at military unit no. 10724 which was administered by the military police (hereafter, the military police arrest facility – ՀՀ Պաշտպանության նախարարության Ռազմական ոստիկանության վարչության քննչական մեկուսարան) upon the instructions of the investigator. 25. The Government admitted that the applicants had been transferred to Yerevan upon the request of the Military Prosecutor on 23 April 2004, but claimed that this was done as a protective measure under Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP). They further claimed that the applicants were placed in the military police arrest facility only after their arrest on 24 April 2004. 26. On 24 April 2004 from 10.45 a.m. to 3.10 p.m. the second applicant was questioned as a witness by investigator A.H. at the Military Prosecutor’s Office of Armenia. This interview was videotaped. During the questioning, the second applicant confessed that it was he and the other two applicants who had committed the murders. According to his statement, on 24 December 2003 he and the other two applicants had left their military unit in order to eat in private the food sent by his parents, near the canal. There they had come across the two fellow servicemen. A quarrel had erupted which led to a fight and resulted in fatal injuries. Having realised that the two fellow servicemen were dead, he and the other two applicants had decided to throw their bodies into the canal. 27. On the same date the applicants were formally arrested and recognised as suspects. The first applicant’s arrest record was drawn up at 6.35 p.m. at the Military Police Department in Yerevan. The record indicated that he was suspected of complicity in the murder of the two servicemen. 28. It appears that investigator A.H. invited lawyers M.A. and V.Y. to represent the applicants. M.A. was assigned to represent the second applicant, while V.Y. was assigned to the first and third applicants. The first applicant agreed in writing that his interests be represented by lawyer V.Y. 29. Later that day the applicants were questioned separately as suspects in the presence of their lawyers. Furthermore, two separate confrontations were held between the second applicant and the first and third applicants respectively, both in the presence of the lawyers. During his questioning and the above confrontations, the second applicant confirmed his earlier confession, while the other two applicants denied their guilt and his account of events. 30. The applicants alleged that the above-mentioned lawyers had been invited to join the case by the investigators of the Military Prosecutor’s Office and their involvement in the case was merely a formality and amounted to the signing of records and other documents in order to create an appearance of lawfulness. The first applicant also alleged that he had never met with his lawyer in private, while the second applicant alleged that his lawyer, M.A., had not been chosen by him and neither he nor his family had given their consent to the lawyer’s participation in the case. 31. On the same day at an unspecified hour the officer on duty of the military police arrest facility drew up a record of examination of a person’s body (արձանագրություն անձին մարմնի զննության ենթարկելու մասին) in respect of each applicant, which noted that he, together with two deputy officers, two attesting witnesses, V.V. and K.A. (male and female respectively), and the medical assistant on duty (հերթապահ բուժակ), K.G., examined the applicants’ bodies and that “nothing was detected on [them]”. The time of the examinations was indicated as “9.55 p.m.”, “10.05 p.m.” and “10.10 p.m.” for the second, third and first applicants respectively. The respective records were signed by the applicants and everybody else involved. The Government alleged that these examinations had been carried out upon the applicants’ admission to the military police arrest facility. 32. On 26 April 2004 the applicants were formally charged with murder under Article 104 of the Criminal Code. The applicants were questioned as accused in the presence of lawyers V.Y. and M.A. It appears that later that day the first and third applicants dispensed with the services of lawyer V.Y. 33. On the same date the third applicant was visited by his father and his cousin’s husband, H.M. It appears that this visit took place in investigator A.H.’s office and lasted a few minutes. 34. On the same date investigator A.H. took a decision prohibiting the applicants from meeting with their relatives on the ground that it “might obstruct the interests of the criminal investigation”. 35. On 27 April 2004 at an unspecified hour the Arabkir and Kanaker‑Zeytun District Court of Yerevan examined and granted the investigator’s motions seeking to have the applicants detained on remand. It appears that the motions were presented at the hearings by the investigators dealing with the case, in the first applicant’s case this being investigator A.H. The applicants were present at their respective hearings. It appears that the second applicant, who was represented by lawyer M.A., admitted at the hearing that he and the others had beaten the two fellow servicemen, but had no intention of killing them. It further appears that the first applicant was not represented at his hearing. The record of the hearing stated that lawyer V.Y. had been duly notified but had failed to appear. The applicants’ detention was to be calculated from 24 April 2004 and was valid for a period of two months. 36. On 29 April 2004 the second applicant was taken to the crime scene in Mataghis for a reconstruction of the crime, which was videotaped. 37. On 11 May 2004 the second applicant addressed a letter to the Military Prosecutor of Armenia in which he retracted his confession, claiming that he and the other two applicants had nothing to do with the murder. He submitted that he had made his confession because the investigator A.H. had informed him that his mother and younger brother had been arrested and were also held at the Military Prosecutor’s Office of Armenia and had threatened that they would “come to harm”. The investigator further threatened that his younger brother would be assigned to perform his military service at the same military unit and would “come to harm”. The second applicant requested that he be questioned again. 38. On 14 May 2004 a lawyer, Z.P., was hired by the first applicant’s family to represent his interests. 39. On 18 May 2004 the second applicant was questioned by investigators A.H. and S.T. in the presence of lawyer M.A. He was asked questions about his letter of 11 May 2004, including whether it had been his idea to write that letter, why he had not written it earlier, whether it had been dictated to him, whether he stood by his allegations and why he had not retracted his confession earlier when he had other chances to do so. The second applicant again denied their involvement in the murder and repeated his allegation that he had made his confession since he had been told that his mother and younger brother had been arrested. In reply to the investigator’s question about whether anyone had forced or coerced him into making the confession, the second applicant replied that no one had forced him. In reply to the investigator’s question about why he had made a false confession, he replied that when he had told the truth the investigators refused to believe him. 40. By letter of 19 May 2004 investigator A.H. informed the chief of the military police arrest facility that the first applicant’s interests were represented by lawyer Z.P. 41. On 21 May 2004 the applicants were examined by a board of psychiatrists in order to evaluate whether they were competent to stand trial. They were found not to suffer from any mental health issues either at the time of the offence or at present. 42. On 25 May 2004 the chief of the military police arrest facility instructed the staff of the facility that lawyer Z.P. had been authorised to represent the first applicant. It appears that the lawyer was allowed to visit the first applicant at the facility. The first applicant alleged that, prior to his first meeting with lawyer Z.P., he had been deprived of any contact with the outside world and of any legal assistance. 43. On the same date the first applicant addressed a complaint to various authorities, including the General Prosecutor, the Military Prosecutor and the Ombudsman, indicating the number of his criminal case and informing them of the following: “I, Arayik Zalyan, and my two conscript friends, Razmik Sargsyan and Musa Serobyan, are kept at a military police arrest facility and are falsely accused of a grave crime[, namely] the murder of [servicemen H.M. and R.Y.]. On 19 April 2004 I and Razmik Sargsyan were at a military outpost when Razmik received a call from the military unit and was told to come down because his parents had arrived. About an hour later I also received a call and was told that my parents had also arrived and was summoned to the military unit. I went down and was taken to the commander’s office. In the corridor I saw Musa Serobyan who was standing hunched in the corner. There were four unfamiliar persons in the office, two of whom – as I later found out – were investigators [A.H. and S.T.] of the Military Prosecutor’s Office of Armenia. Chief of the Third Battalion [E.M.] and Chief of the Fourth Battalion [I.], whose last name I do not remember, were also present. The two investigators, [A.H. and S.T.], assaulted me, calling me a “murderer”, demanding that I tell with whom I had eaten on 24 December, beating me and demanding that I explain how we murdered servicemen [H.M. and R.Y.]. I was beaten so hard that my nose bled profusely. The Chief of the Fourth Battalion [I.] then helped me and took me to clean my nose. Thereafter I, Musa Serobyan and Razmik Sargsyan were forced to put our T-shirts over our heads, placed in a car and taken away. We arrived in some place, which – as I later found out – was Martakert. I was taken to a room where I stayed with my T-shirt pulled over my head for about an hour and from where I could hear Razmik’s and Musa’s terrified voices and how they were beaten continuously for about an hour. Then it was my turn. [Investigator S.T.] came to my room, started questioning me, saying that my friends had confessed that we had committed the murder, told me to write the same thing and intimidated me, saying that I would not last long and that I would get a life sentence. At that moment some Major entered the room and said that the deceased were his friend’s children and if we did not write the truth – that we had killed them – he would take me out, kill me, throw me in a pit and say that it was the [Azeris] who had killed me. Thereafter, again with our T-shirts over our heads, we were taken away ... and arrived in some place where I was taken to what appeared to be a police station where I was questioned from 6.00 p.m. to 3.00 a.m. I was questioned, sworn at, beaten, threatened, persuaded and told to write that it was us who had killed [H.M. and R.Y.]. They beat and threatened us for a whole day, not even giving us water to drink. That night at around 3.30 a.m. I was taken down to the Stepanakert Military Police Department’s detention facility, where there were three other persons... I, Musa and Razmik were kept in that facility until the morning of 23 April. Musa and I were taken to Yerevan together by a senior lieutenant of the military police department. I realised that Musa had been severely beaten since his face was covered with red and blue marks of blows. We spent the night of 23 April 2004 in Yerevan on the premises of the military police in а room of some supervised unit where we stayed for one night. Musa and Razmik were also there and were kept in separate rooms. The next day I was questioned in the same building and then taken to a confrontation with Razmik. When I saw Razmik, I could hardly recognise him since his entire face was swollen. I realised that he had been beaten and was extremely frightened of the investigators, which is why he gave false testimony. I ask you to carry out an investigation and to find the real perpetrators ...” 44. On 8 June 2004 lawyer Z.P. addressed another complaint to the same authorities, submitting that the applicants had been unlawfully arrested between 19 and 24 April 2004 without an arrest warrant and questioned on numerous occasions on suspicion of having committed a murder. The lawyer further complained in detail about the ill-treatment inflicted on the applicants during that period. She also complained that from 23 April 2004 to the present the applicants, in violation of the law, had been kept at a military police arrest facility, despite their pre-trial detention having been ordered by the court decision of 27 April 2004. Thus, they were deprived of the protection offered by the justice system and were kept under the authority of the military police who were, moreover, working in close cooperation with the Military Prosecutor’s Office. She alleged, inter alia, a violation of Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention. 45. By a letter of 10 June 2004 the Military Prosecutor informed the first applicant and his lawyer, in reply to their complaints, that: “The first investigative measures involving [the applicants] were carried out on 21 April 2004 at the Martakert Garrison Military Prosecutor’s Office where they were questioned as witnesses. Before the questioning they had been informed about the right not to testify against themselves ... guaranteed by Article 42 of the Constitution. In order to clarify a number of discrepancies in their statements, on 21 April 2004 [the applicants] were taken to the Stepanakert Military Police Department of the Ministry of Defence of Armenia for the purpose of conducting confrontations and further questioning. On 22 April [the second applicant], upon my instruction, was transferred to Yerevan as a witness in a criminal case, since I found it inexpedient for him to continue his military service at his military unit. In Yerevan he stayed in the barracks together with the servicemen entrusted with guarding the building of the Military Prosecutor’s Office of Armenia. [The first and third applicants] were transferred to Yerevan from Stepanakert on the night of 23-24 April and stayed, without being isolated, in the room envisaged for servicemen on duty of military unit no. 10724... On 24 April [the second applicant] was questioned again as a witness and he was again informed about the requirements of Article 42 of the Constitution, which is confirmed by his signature under the record of the interview. [The applicants] were arrested on 24 April 2004 and were immediately provided with lawyers. From the moment of their arrest all the investigative measures in respect of [the applicants], such as questioning, confrontations, the arraignment, etc., were carried out in the presence of their lawyers. In compliance with [the CCP] the accused took part in the hearings concerning the imposition of detention, during which they did not make any statements about the ‘ill‑treatment inflicted’ on them... The accused are kept in the military police arrest facility in accordance with Annex 14 to the Regulations for the Garrison and Sentry Services. A medical examination can be conducted in respect of [the first applicant] and the others if a relevant request is made.” 46. On 10 June 2004 the second applicant’s lawyer M.A. filed a motion with the Military Prosecutor, challenging the impartiality of investigator A.H. and requesting that he be removed from the case. It appears that attached to this motion was a complaint by the second applicant, in which he alleged that the investigator and others had bullied and beaten him in Martakert and Stepanakert, as a result of which he had made a false confession. The lawyer requested that the persons mentioned in the second applicant’s complaint be questioned. 47. On 12 June 2004 the Military Prosecutor decided to reject the motion as unsubstantiated, finding that all the investigative measures involving the second applicant had been carried out in compliance with the rules of criminal procedure. From the moment of his arrest his lawyer had participated in all the investigative measures, except the reconstruction of 29 April 2004 in which case the lawyer’s absence had been voluntary. Most of the second applicant’s interviews had been videotaped, which further proved that no ill-treatment had been inflicted on him. Moreover, at the detention hearing of 27 April 2004 he had stated that his statements made at those interviews had been true. Following his complaint of 11 May 2004 he had been additionally questioned upon his request and stated that he had not been forced to make any statements. 48. On 14 June 2004 the first applicant’s lawyer Z.P. filed a similar motion with the Military Prosecutor, challenging the impartiality of investigators A.H. and S.T. and requesting that they be removed from the case on the ground that they had, inter alia, ill-treated the applicants. 49. On 16 June 2004 the third applicant’s new lawyer, A.A., filed a similar motion with the Military Prosecutor, challenging the impartiality of investigator A.H. and requesting that he be removed from the case on the ground that the investigator had, inter alia, ill-treated the third applicant in Stepanakert, including by administering blows to his head with the handle of his pistol. 50. On 17 June 2004 the Arabkir and Kanaker-Zeytun District Court of Yerevan examined and granted the investigator’s motions seeking to extend until 24 August 2004 the period of the applicants’ detention, which was to expire on 24 June 2004. The first applicant submitted at the court hearing that his and the second applicant’s testimony had been given under duress. 51. On 18 June 2004 the Military Prosecutor decided to reject the motion of 14 June 2004 as unsubstantiated, finding that the first applicant had been questioned on 21 April 2004 in compliance with all the rules of criminal procedure, including being informed about the right not to testify against himself guaranteed by Article 42 of the Constitution. No investigative measures involving the first applicant had been carried out on 19 and 20 April 2004. He was arrested on 24 April 2004 and was immediately provided with a lawyer. Neither he nor the third applicant had complained about ill-treatment prior to a similar complaint made by the second applicant. The foregoing indicated that the allegations of ill‑treatment made by the accused and their lawyers were unsubstantiated, concocted and were aimed at justifying the accused, who were employing coordinated common tactics. 52. On the same date the Military Prosecutor rejected the third applicant’s motion of 16 June 2004 on similar grounds. 53. On 25 June 2004 the first applicant lodged an appeal against the decision of 17 June 2004. In his appeal he complained in detail, inter alia, that he and the other applicants had been subjected to ill-treatment by investigator A.H. and other law enforcement officers. The first applicant also complained that he and the other applicants were unlawfully kept at a military police arrest facility. 54. On 29 and 30 June 2004 the second applicant was questioned again. At the outset he was asked questions in connection with the allegations of ill‑treatment raised in his complaint of 10 June 2004, namely whether he had suffered any injuries and whether he still had any injuries. The second applicant stated that he had suffered only a swollen jaw, which healed in about three to four days, still being visible at the time of his arrest on 24 April 2004 but not when he had appeared before a judge on 27 April 2004. Currently he had no injuries. The injury to his jaw had been inflicted at the office of the commander of the military unit in Mataghis on 21 April 2004 by S.T., A.H., police officer V.K. and one tall police officer from the Stepanakert Police Department. The same persons had continued to ill‑treat him at the Military Prosecutor’s Office in Martakert and the Military Police Department in Stepanakert, which made his kidneys hurt and lasted a few days. He had had no other injuries and nobody had ill-treated him following his transfer to Yerevan. When ill-treated, he was being ordered to tell the truth. He had made up the confession himself, without any outside interference. The second applicant was then asked a number of questions in connection with his allegations, including why he had made his confession in Yerevan if no ill-treatment had been inflicted on him there and why he had not raised his allegations of ill-treatment earlier. Lastly, a number of questions were posed about the events of December 2003 and the murder. 55. On 5 July 2004 the investigation into the applicants’ criminal case was over. 56. On 6 July 2004 the Criminal and Military Court of Appeal dismissed the first applicant’s appeal of 25 June 2004. 57. On the same date the Military Prosecutor addressed a letter to the chief of the military police arrest facility, stating that it was no longer necessary to keep the applicants at the arrest facility and requesting that they be transferred to Nubarashen pre-trial detention facility. 58. On the same date the applicants were transferred from the military police arrest facility to Nubarashen pre-trial detention facility. 59. On 7 July 2004 the first applicant was subjected to a medical examination at Nubarashen pre-trial detention facility, with the following conclusion: “No fresh bodily injuries or traces of beatings have been disclosed. Skin and mucous membranes are of a normal colour. Vesicular respiration present in the lungs. Heart sounds [(illegible)] ... The abdomen is soft and pain free. There are no external symptoms of venereal disease.” 60. Medical file no. 607 was opened. On the front page of the medical file “19 April 2004” was noted as the starting date of the first applicant’s detention. 61. It appears that the second and third applicants were also subjected to medical examinations and no injuries were recorded. 62. On 16 July 2004 the General Prosecutor decided to reject another motion filed by the first applicant challenging the impartiality of both the Military Prosecutor and investigators A.H. and S.T., on the ground that, inter alia, the allegations of ill-treatment had not been confirmed. No such allegations had been made by the applicants at the court hearings concerning their detention and they had jointly started raising such complaints only at the end of May 2004. 63. On 22 July 2004 the Deputy Ombudsman informed the General Prosecutor about the second applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment. The Deputy Ombudsman further stated that the second applicant had been kept from 26 April to 6 July 2004 at a military police arrest facility in violation of the Law on Conditions for Holding Arrestees and Detainees and the Regulations for the Garrison and Sentry Services. The Deputy Ombudsman argued that, according to these legal acts, the second applicant should not have been kept at that facility for more than 72 hours after the court issued its decision to detain. 64. On 26 July 2004 the Deputy Ombudsman was informed by the General Prosecutor’s Office that the accused had been kept at the military police arrest facility on the basis of Annex 14 to the Regulations for the Garrison and Sentry Services and had been transferred to Nubarashen pre‑trial detention facility following the entry into force of the amendments to those Regulations adopted by the Parliament on 28 April 2004 and ratified by the President on 22 May 2004. 65. On 24 September 2004 the Deputy Ombudsman addressed a letter to the General Prosecutor in connection with the first applicant’s complaint of ill‑treatment. The Deputy Ombudsman pointed out that the above complaint had been transmitted to the Military Prosecutor’s Office, the authority whose actions were the subject of the complaint, and the criminal case continued to be dealt with by the same investigator who was alleged to have inflicted ill-treatment on the accused. 66. On 3 August 2004 the first applicant made a written statement, declaring that he was going on a hunger strike in protest against the unlawful actions of the law enforcement authorities. He alleged that the charges against him and the others were trumped up and based on a coerced confession. Since all his complaints in this respect had remained unanswered, he wished to continue his protest with a hunger strike. 67. The following record was made in the first applicant’s medical file: “Since 11 August 2004 the patient has been on hunger strike and under constant medical observation ...” 68. On 5 August 2004 the first applicant and his lawyer were granted access to the case file. 69. By a letter of the same date the investigator informed the chief of Nubarashen pre-trial detention facility about this and added that the first applicant’s detention period was suspended pursuant to Article 138 § 3 of the CCP. 70. On 24 August 2004 the first applicant’s detention period, as extended by the decision of 17 June 2004 of the Arabkir and Kanaker‑Zeytun District Court of Yerevan, expired. 71. On 9 September 2004 the first applicant and his lawyer finished familiarising themselves with the materials of the case. 72. On the same date the first applicant filed a motion with the investigator, arguing that from 24 August 2004 there was no court decision authorising his detention and requesting that he be released. 73. On 10 September 2004 the investigator decided to dismiss that motion, stating that, pursuant to Article 138 § 3 of the CCP, the detention period had been suspended on the date when the first applicant was granted access to the case file, namely 4 August 2004. 74. On 16 September 2004 the first applicant’s mother asked to be allowed to visit him in detention. She was worried about his health, as he was on hunger strike, but she was not allowed to see him. 75. On 22 September 2004 the case file was transmitted by the Prosecutor to the Syunik Regional Court, which sat in Stepanakert, Nagorno Karabakh. 76. On an unspecified date Judge M. of the Syunik Regional Court decided to take over the case. 77. By a letter of 15 October 2004 the chief of Nubarashen pre-trial detention facility informed the first applicant that his detention period had been suspended in accordance with, inter alia, Article 138 of the CCP by the letter of the Military Prosecutor’s Office of 5 August 2004. The chief of the detention facility further stated that, according to the Military Prosecutor’s letter of 22 September 2004, as of that date the detention period had been accounted for by the Syunik Regional Court. 78. On 19 October 2004 the first applicant was transferred to the Hospital for Prisoners due to his general emaciation as a result of the hunger strike. 79. On the same date the first applicant’s lawyer addressed a letter to various public authorities, including the prosecutor in charge of the detention facilities and the Chief of the Hospital for Prisoners, complaining that the first applicant was unlawfully detained without a relevant court decision. She further submitted that the first applicant’s state of health was critical and that no requisite medical assistance had been provided for him by the administration of Nubarashen pre-trial detention facility during the entire hunger strike. The lawyer requested that the first applicant be released immediately. 80. By a letter of 21 October 2004 the Deputy Chief of the Hospital for Prisoners informed the lawyer that no visceral illnesses had been disclosed following the first applicant’s objective inpatient examination, clinical and biochemical analyses of his blood and urine, and a number of instrumental examinations. There was therefore no need to administer medicine. The first applicant was under constant medical supervision due to his hunger strike and the resulting general emaciation of a minor degree. 81. On 25 October 2004 the lawyer lodged similar requests with the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan and the Syunik Regional Court. 82. By a letter of 26 October 2004 the General Prosecutor’s Office informed the first applicant’s lawyer that he had not been released from detention by virtue of Article 138 § 3 of the CCP. 83. On 27 October and 1 November 2004 the lawyer again requested the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan to release the first applicant. She also submitted that she had visited him on 25 October 2004 at the Hospital for Prisoners. He had been lying in bed motionless and looked frail. She further alleged that the psychologist had told her that, if the first applicant continued to remain isolated on hunger strike, his life could be in serious danger. She lastly complained that he had been ill‑treated when questioned as a witness. 84. By a letter of 27 October 2004 the District Court informed the first applicant’s lawyer that, in order to have the circumstances of the alleged unlawful methods of investigation examined, she had to apply to the authority dealing with the merits of the case. The District Court was not, however, dealing with the merits of the first applicant’s case. 85. On 1 November 2004 the lawyer requested the administration of the Hospital for Prisoners to provide details of the treatment provided for the first applicant. 86. By a letter of 2 November 2004 the Deputy Chief of the Hospital for Prisoners informed her that the first applicant had undergone an examination and no visceral illnesses had been found. Due to his general emaciation, since 22 October 2004 the first applicant had been receiving intravenous injections of 5% glucose and vitamins in order to sustain water and vitamin balance. In his current state of health the first applicant was fit to be transferred to a detention facility. 87. On 2 November 2004 the first applicant was discharged from the Hospital for Prisoners and transported to Stepanakert, Nagorno Karabakh, to participate in the trial. According to the discharge summary: “[The first applicant] was taken to the Hospital for Prisoners on 19 October 2004 in order to undergo an inpatient examination. The detainee underwent a clinical and laboratory instrumental examination, as a result of which no symptoms of visceral illnesses were found. He was examined by a psychiatrist who concluded that he had no psychological disorders. Taking into account his refusal to eat over a long period of time and the general emaciation of his organism, the detainee was injected with glucose and vitamins through a drip. Since inpatient treatment is no longer necessary, the detainee is being discharged to remain under further medical supervision by the medical staff of the detention facility.” 88. On 4 November 2004 Judge M. of the Syunik Regional Court decided to set the case down for trial and to fix the date of the first court hearing, which was to take place on an unspecified day in November 2004. The judge stated in his decision that the first applicant’s detention was to remain unchanged. 89. On 5 November 2004 the first applicant ended his hunger strike. 90. On 26 November 2004 the first applicant’s lawyer applied to the Chief of the Nagorno Karabakh Remand Centre, claiming that the first applicant’s state of health was unsatisfactory following his hunger strike and requesting that he be examined by a doctor. It is not clear whether there was any follow-up to this request. 91. In November 2004 the court hearings in the applicants’ criminal case commenced at the Syunik Regional Court. 92. The second applicant submitted before the Regional Court that on 19 April 2004 he had been taken to the office of the military unit commander M.A. The Chief of the Fourth Battalion I.V. had also been present. The commander had started asking him questions about a parcel that he had received from his parents on 24 December 2003, including where and with whom he had eaten the food contained in that parcel. He had answered that he had eaten the food with the other two applicants at the military unit, but the commander did not believe him. Thereafter investigators S.T. and A.H. and military police officers V.K. and A.B. had entered the office and started beating him and forcing him to admit that it was he and the other two applicants who had killed the two servicemen. Then the other two applicants had been brought and subjected to beatings. The ill-treatment had continued at the Martakert Garrison Military Prosecutor’s Office and the Stepanakert Military Police Department. Not being able to stand the ill-treatment, he had had to come up with a false story, admitting his and the others’ guilt. Later on he had realised his mistake and asked to be questioned again, during which he retracted his earlier confession. 93. The first and third applicants submitted that they had been ill‑treated in similar circumstances. 94. The Regional Court called and examined investigators A.H., S.T. and A.K. and military police officers V.K. and A.B. 95. Investigator A.H. submitted that he and the other members of the investigating team had arrived at the military unit near Mataghis on 21 April 2004. Upon his instructions the second applicant had been brought from the military outpost to the military unit, since it was necessary to find out where and with whom he had eaten the food contained in the parcel received from his parents. The first and third applicants were also later brought in for questioning. In order to verify the versions of events presented by the applicants, the latter had been transferred to Martakert and then to Stepanakert where further interviews were conducted. Thereafter the applicants had been transferred to Yerevan where the second applicant confessed to the crime. 96. Investigator S.T. and military police officers V.K. and A.B. made similar submissions. 97. Investigator A.K. submitted that he had questioned the second applicant at the Martakert Garrison Prosecutor’s Office but did not know about the outcome of that interview since investigator A.H. and military police officer V.K. had taken over and he had left. 98. The applicants submitted in reply that investigators A.H. and S.T. and military police officers V.K. and A.B. had ill-treated, beaten and threatened them. 99. The Regional Court also called and examined Chiefs of the Third and Fourth Battalions E.M. and I.V., cameraman A.G. and an officer of military unit no. 33651, M.A., who had been present at the reconstruction of the crime on 29 April 2004. 100. I.V. submitted that he had been present on and off during the applicants’ questioning on 21 April 2004 but nobody had ill-treated them in his presence. 101. E.M. submitted that he had personally delivered the first applicant to the office of the military unit commander on 21 April 2004. The second applicant was already there. Thereafter the law enforcement officers had arrived and he had to leave. Nobody had ill-treated the applicants in his presence. 102. A.G. submitted that he had been present during the second applicant’s questioning at the Stepanakert Military Police Department and no beatings or violence had been inflicted on the second applicant by investigators A.H. and S.T. or military police officer A.B. Nor did he notice any injuries on the second applicant or bloodstains on the floor. 103. M.A. submitted that he had been present during the reconstruction of the crime by the second applicant in April 2004. The reconstruction had been filmed by investigator A.H. The second applicant had been calm and no ill‑treatment or violence had been inflicted on him. 104. On 18 May 2005 the Syunik Regional Court found the applicants guilty of murder and sentenced them to 15 years’ imprisonment. This judgment was based, inter alia, on the second applicant’s confession statement. As regards the applicants’ allegations of ill-treatment, the Regional Court found them to be unsubstantiated on the following grounds. First, the applicants had not raised any such complaints during their questioning as witnesses on 21 April 2004, during their questioning as suspects and as accused and the two confrontations which were held on 24 and 26 April 2004 in the presence of their lawyers, or during the reconstruction of the crime on 29 April 2004. Second, the second applicant had not raised such allegations even during his additional questioning on 18 May 2004 and did so only in his motion of 10 June 2004, which was followed by similar motions filed by the first and third applicants on 16 June 2004, all of which were dismissed by the Military Prosecutor as unsubstantiated. Third, the fact that no ill-treatment had been inflicted on the applicants was confirmed by the submissions of law enforcement officers A.H., S.T., V.K. A.B. and A.K., Chiefs of the Third and Fourth Battalions E.M. and I.V. and officer M.A. The Regional Court concluded that the motions filed by the applicants and their lawyers, challenging investigator A.H.’s impartiality, and their allegations of ill-treatment, threats and psychological pressure were aimed at helping the applicants to avoid criminal responsibility. 105. On 1 June 2005 the applicants lodged an appeal against the judgment of the Syunik Regional Court. In their appeal they complained in detail that they had been unlawfully deprived of their liberty from 21 to 24 April 2004 and subjected to ill-treatment during that entire period. They further complained that the authorities had failed to investigate their allegations of ill-treatment in violation of Article 3 of the Convention. Moreover, instead of ordering the institution of criminal proceedings, the Regional Court decided to call and examine the alleged perpetrators as witnesses and to rely on their statements in justifying the conviction. 106. On an unspecified date, the proceedings commenced in the Criminal and Military Court of Appeal. The applicants repeated in detail their allegations of ill-treatment before the Court of Appeal. They also added that at the time of their admission to the military police arrest facility in Yerevan they had various bodily injuries, including an injured jaw, a bruised eye and a bruised back. They were stripped and examined, but the member of the medical staff who had drawn up the relevant records did not note those injuries. They had signed the records drawn up as a result of these examinations without reading them. 107. In this connection the Court of Appeal called and questioned medical assistant K.G. who had participated in the examination of the applicants’ bodies at the military police arrest facility. K.G. submitted that the applicants had been admitted to the arrest facility when he was on duty. They had been examined in the presence of witnesses and no bodily injuries had been found. Appropriate records had been drawn up, which were signed also by the applicants. K.G. further submitted that it was impossible for him to fail to record any injuries found, since he would be held personally responsible for such an omission. Nor was it possible for the second applicant to have had an injured jaw, since that was a serious injury which he could not have overlooked. 108. On 12 December 2005, while their case was still being examined by the Court of Appeal, the applicants lodged another complaint with the General Prosecutor, alleging in detail that they had been deprived of their liberty from 19 to 24 April 2004 and subjected to ill-treatment for the purpose of coercing a confession. They indicated investigators A.H. and S.T. and military police officers V.K., A.B. and M. as the perpetrators and requested that criminal proceedings be instituted against them. The applicants alleged, in particular, that as a result of ill-treatment the second applicant had an injured jaw, the first applicant had a bleeding nose and the third applicant was beaten up and had dirty clothes, having been thrown to the floor and repeatedly kicked. Furthermore, the second applicant was stripped, leaned against the wall and threatened that, if he refused to confess, he would be raped with a club. Thereafter, he was forced to hang on a rod placed on chairs and was threatened with clubs and weapons. When being beaten during his questioning in the office of the chief of Stepanakert Military Police Department A.B., a large amount of blood dripped from the second applicant’s nose onto the floor and he was ordered to lick it off. The applicants finally alleged that they had been kept unlawfully at the military police arrest facility until 6 July 2004 in order to be subjected to further threats and abuse. 109. By a letter of 26 December 2005 the General Prosecutor’s Office informed the applicants that, during the court examination of the criminal case against them, the Syunik Regional Court, guided by Article 17 § 4 of the CCP, had taken the necessary measures to verify the statements alleging that they had been subjected by the investigators to coercion during the investigation, and found them to be unsubstantiated in its judgment of 18 May 2005. 110. On 8 January 2006 the applicants lodged a complaint with the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan under Article 290 of the CCP, complaining that the Prosecutor’s Office, by relying on the examination carried out by the Syunik Regional Court, was refusing to institute criminal proceedings. However, the Syunik Regional Court was not competent to carry out examinations outside the scope of the criminal case before it. The alleged perpetrators were not involved as accused and appeared before the Regional Court only as witnesses. In order to carry out an effective investigation of the allegations of ill-treatment, it was necessary to institute criminal proceedings under Article 181 of the CCP. They requested the District Court to oblige the General Prosecutor to institute such proceedings. 111. On 1 February 2006 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan dismissed the complaint, finding that the General Prosecutor’s reply was in conformity with the law and did not violate the applicants’ rights. The District Court stated, in particular, that complaints alleging a violation of lawfulness in the course of criminal proceedings, pursuant to Article 17 § 4 of the CCP, were to be thoroughly examined by the authority dealing with the merits of the case, while statements about a crime made during a court hearing, pursuant to Article 177 of the CCP, were to be entered into the record of the court hearing. 112. On 14 February 2006 the applicants lodged an appeal, raising similar arguments to those in their complaint of 8 January 2006. 113. On 14 March 2006 the Criminal and Military Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the District Court, finding that the applicants’ allegations of ill-treatment had been examined during the proceedings before the Syunik Regional Court and the evidence obtained was evaluated in the ensuing judgment. The case was currently being examined on the merits by the Criminal and Military Court of Appeal, which was not constrained by the appeal and was competent to examine the full scope of the case, including any new evidence. The applicants’ argument that the Regional Court and the Court of Appeal were not competent to conduct proceedings in respect of persons who had not been involved as accused was incorrect, since the courts, in adopting their judgments, were obliged under the criminal procedure law to verify and assess whether the evidence obtained was admissible and relevant and whether or not it had been obtained through violence, threats and other unlawful actions of the police officers as alleged in the applicants’ appeal. Pursuant to Articles 41 § 2 (4) and 184 § 1 of the CCP, the courts, based on the materials of a case examined by them, were entitled to request that the prosecutor adopt a decision instituting criminal proceedings against third persons. Since the case was currently pending before the Court of Appeal, the applicants’ appeal was to be dismissed. 114. On 28 March 2006 the applicants lodged an appeal on points of law, raising similar arguments. They also claimed that their procedural rights had been violated since the authorities refused to comply with the requirements of Articles 180 and 181 of the CCP. 115. On 30 May 2006 the Criminal and Military Court of Appeal issued its judgment on the merits of the applicants’ criminal case. It found the applicants guilty and increased their sentences to life imprisonment. The Court of Appeal relied, inter alia, on the second applicant’s confession statement. As regards the applicants’ allegations of ill-treatment, the Court of Appeal found them to be unsubstantiated. In doing so, the Court of Appeal first of all referred to the submissions made before the Regional Court by law enforcement officers A.H., S.T., V.K. A.B. and A.K., Chiefs of the Third and Fourth Battalions E.M. and I.V., officer M.A. and cameraman A.G. The Court of Appeal further referred to the video recording of the reconstruction of the crime, which did not reveal any bodily injuries on the second applicant, who moved and talked freely, and the records of examination of a person’s body drawn up at the military police arrest facility on 24 April 2004. 116. On 1 June 2006 the Court of Cassation decided to leave the appeal of 28 March 2006 unexamined. It found, in particular, that the applicants had brought a complaint under Article 290 of the CCP against the prosecutor’s actions related to the pre-trial proceedings. However, since the Court of Cassation was the supreme judicial instance and was called upon, pursuant to Article 92 of the Constitution, to ensure the uniform application of the law, its constitutional status prevented it from examining appeals against decisions and actions of the prosecutor related to the pre-trial proceedings. Such appeals might be examined by the Court of Cassation in exceptional circumstances, if they raised an issue of high importance for judicial practice. In such circumstances, the appeal was to be left unexamined since it was brought against a decision which was not subject to appeal in cassation. 117. On 9 June 2006 the applicants lodged an appeal on points of law against the judgment of the Criminal and Military Court of Appeal of 30 May 2006. 118. On an unspecified date, the father of one of the murdered servicemen, in his capacity of victim, also lodged an appeal on points of law against that judgment. In his appeal he complained that the criminal case had been conducted with procedural violations, as a result of which three innocent servicemen had been found guilty, while the real perpetrators were never brought to justice. 119. On 7 August 2006 the Court of Cassation returned the applicants’ appeal, requesting them to correct a shortcoming and to re-submit the appeal in accordance with the newly-adopted amendments to the CCP. 120. On 11 September 2006 the first and second applicants re‑submitted their appeals, seeking to have their conviction quashed and to be acquitted. It appears that on an unspecified date the third applicant also followed suit. The applicants complained in detail that they had been unlawfully deprived of their liberty from 19 to 24 April 2004 and subjected to ill‑treatment during that period. They further complained that the authorities had failed to investigate their allegations of ill-treatment. 121. On 9 October 2006 the Court of Cassation decided to admit the applicants’ appeals for examination. On an unspecified date the victim’s appeal was also admitted for examination. 122. On 22 December 2006 the Court of Cassation decided to dismiss the applicants’ appeals, but to grant that of the victim, quashing the judgments of 18 May 2005 and 30 May 2006 and remitting the case for further investigation. The Court of Cassation found that the investigating authority had failed to take all the necessary measures for an objective evaluation of the circumstances of the case and had failed to verify duly the statements of the defence concerning the applicants’ innocence and the existence of exonerating evidence, as well as their allegations of a violation of lawfulness in the course of the proceedings. In such circumstances, the applicants’ appeals seeking an acquittal could not be granted, since it was necessary to carry out a further investigation into the case. 123. As regards, in particular, the second applicant’s confession statement, the Court of Cassation found that this statement was not supported by other objective evidence in the case. Furthermore, the second applicant had retracted his statement, alleging that he had given it as a result of fear, violence and torture. It was therefore necessary to verify the credibility of the second applicant’s confession statement. 124. As regards the question of the applicants’ deprivation of liberty and their allegations of ill-treatment, the Court of Cassation stated: “It follows from the materials of the case that [the applicants] were detained on 24 April 2004. It was indicated in the appeals on points of law that for five days in a row [the applicants], having the status of a witness, had been subjected to violence, torture and inhuman treatment, as a result of which a confession statement was extorted from [the second applicant]. Pursuant to Paragraph 5 of Order no. 112 of 21 April 2004 of the commander of military unit no. 33651, [the third applicant] was ‘considered to be isolated’ by the Stepanakert Military Police Department and was deprived of his daily allowance on the basis of Isolation Notice N-99. Pursuant to Paragraph 6 of the same Order, [the second and first applicants], who were on military watch, were considered to be ‘isolated by the Stepanakert Military Police Department’ and were deprived of their daily allowances on the basis of Isolation Notices N-100 and N-101. In the course of the further investigation it is necessary to clarify what it means ‘to consider’ the said soldiers ‘to be isolated by the Stepanakert Military Police Department’ on the basis of isolation notices and what is the substance of such isolation. Has it not led to unlawful restrictions and deprivation of liberty not inherent in measures normally applied in the armed forces? It is also necessary to verify in detail the arguments raised in the appeals lodged by the defence concerning the infliction of violence on [the applicants] and subjecting them to torture during those days.” 125. The Court of Cassation also decided to annul the preventive measure and to release the applicants from detention. 126. On 6 February 2007 the investigation into the applicants’ criminal case was assigned to another investigator of the Military Prosecutor’s Office, V.S. An investigator of the Gugark Garrison Military Prosecutor’s Office of Armenia, S.G., was appointed as his assistant. 127. On 19 February 2007 the applicants appeared for questioning in their capacity of accused but refused to testify, stating that they considered themselves to be victims rather than accused. They stated that they would be willing to testify in connection with their allegations of torture if a separate criminal case was instituted and they were recognised as victims. 128. On the same date lawyer Z.P., who at that point was representing all three applicants, challenged the impartiality of employees of the Military Prosecutor’s Office, alleging that they were incapable of carrying out an objective investigation, which was evidenced by all the unlawfulness demonstrated earlier in the case, and requesting that they be removed from the investigation. This challenge was dismissed by the Acting Prosecutor General as unfounded. 129. On 27 February 2007 lawyer Z.P. filed a motion with the General Prosecutor’s Office requesting that a separate criminal case be instituted. She argued that the criminal case in question had been instituted on account of murder and the applicants were involved as accused. It was not possible to carry out an investigation into allegations of torture within the scope of that criminal case. The applicants had consistently complained for three years about the torture that they had undergone, and indicated the names of the perpetrators, but the authorities refused to make a proper assessment of their allegations. 130. On 28 February 2007 investigator V.S. rejected the motion, finding that not every report of a crime was sufficient in itself to institute criminal proceedings. Sufficient materials had not yet been obtained to adopt such a decision. 131. In March and April 2007 the investigators questioned a number of persons, including investigators A.H. and S.T. and military police officers V.K., A.B. and M., the commander of the applicants’ military unit, M.A., three military police officers of the Stepanakert Military Police Department and one officer of the Nagorno Karabakh Defence Army who had transported the applicants from Stepanakert to Yerevan, lawyers M.A. and V.Y., and the third applicant’s cousin’s husband, H.M., who had visited him in detention together with his father on 26 April 2004. 132. Investigators A.H. and S.T. provided their account of the events and denied having ill-treated the applicants. The transcripts of their interviews, including the questions and answers, contained texts which were word-for-word duplicates. Military police officers V.K. and A.B. similarly denied having ill-treated the applicants. Military police officer M. stated that he had been absent from the Stepanakert Military Police Department during the period when the applicants were taken there and he had never encountered them. Commander of the military unit M.A. stated that on 21 April 2004 he had imposed disciplinary detention on the applicants because of their unauthorised absence from the unit and ordered that they serve it at the Stepanakert Military Police Department. He did not know what questions had been posed to the applicants by the investigators in his office because this had been done in private. No violence had been inflicted in his presence. The officers who had transported the applicants stated that the applicants had not been handcuffed and no violence had been inflicted on them during their transfer. They had not noticed any bodily injuries and the applicants had not complained about their health. 133. Lawyers M.A. and V.Y. stated that on 24 April 2004 they had received telephone calls from investigator A.H. who had invited them to the Military Prosecutor’s Office to take up the applicants’ defence, since a lawyer’s participation was mandatory in cases involving servicemen. They were presented to the second applicant, who was asked to choose between them, so he chose lawyer M.A. Lawyer M.A. stated that, from that moment, he participated in all the interviews and confrontations involving the second applicant. On 27 April 2004 he met with his parents and signed a contract. Lawyer V.Y. stated that he had represented the first and third applicants until 26 April 2004. On that day he met with the first and third applicants’ parents, who did not wish him to continue representing them. Both lawyers stated that they had not noticed any injuries on the applicants, no ill‑treatment had been inflicted on the applicants in their presence, no complaints of ill-treatment had been made by the applicants nor any pressure exerted on them by the investigator. Lawyer M.A. added that the second applicant did not raise his allegations of ill-treatment until 15 days later when they met in private at the military police arrest facility. He then advised the second applicant to lodge a complaint with the Military Prosecutor. 134. H.M. stated that on 24 April 2004 the third applicant’s father had told him that his son had been taken to the Military Prosecutor’s Office. Since he was acquainted with investigator A.H., who lived in his neighbourhood, he promised to find out the reasons for the third applicant’s arrest. On the next day he had bumped into A.H. in the yard and introduced him to the third applicant’s father. They inquired about the reasons for his arrest, to which A.H. had replied that he was investigating a murder case and the third applicant had been arrested in that connection. They had further asked A.H. to give them a possibility to visit the third applicant for a few minutes, to which A.H. replied that on the following day he was going to carry out some investigative measures involving the third applicant at the Military Prosecutor’s Office and he could allow them to see him for a few minutes. On the following day they had gone to the Military Prosecutor’s Office and met with the third applicant for a few minutes in A.H.’s office. In reply to the investigator’s question as to whether he had seen any injuries on the third applicant or received from him any complaints of ill-treatment, H.M. stated that he had not noticed any injuries or received such complaints. Furthermore, since the investigator had left them alone for a few minutes, the third applicant, in his opinion, would at least have told his father about any ill-treatment. 135. On 2 April 2007 the investigator decided to order a forensic medical examination in respect of the applicants. The experts were requested to answer the following questions: (a) whether there had been or were any injuries on the applicants’ bodies and, if so, what was their origin; (b) if so, whether they could have originated during the period from 19 to 24 April 2004 and not be visible three days later, namely on 27 April 2004; and (c) whether the applicants suffered from any illness and, if so, whether it had been caused by the alleged ill-treatment. 136. On 10 September 2007 the forensic medical experts produced their conclusions. They found that, according to the applicants’ medical files, they did not have any injuries or suffer from any illnesses at the material time. It was not possible to determine whether the applicants had any injuries or illnesses at present since they had failed to appear for the examination. The experts added that skin, bone and joint injuries, such as wounds, bruises, scratches, fractures and dislocated joints, were usually visible after three days. 137. On 1 October 2007 the Acting General Prosecutor decided not to institute criminal proceedings against the alleged perpetrators of ill‑treatment for lack of a criminal act. This decision referred at the outset to the instructions of the Court of Cassation to investigate the circumstances of the applicants’ alleged deprivation of liberty prior to 24 April 2004 and their ill-treatment. As regards the deprivation of liberty, it was found to have been a lawful disciplinary measure imposed by the commander of the military unit within the scope of authority vested in him. It was further found that the investigating team had the right to interview the applicants as witnesses and they had been transferred for that purpose. At the Stepanakert Police Department they were placed in a disciplinary isolation cell and continued to be questioned, but later it was necessary to transfer them to Yerevan for the purposes of the investigation. There the second applicant had made his confession, after which the applicants were arrested. Lawyers were assigned to them and they were detained by a court decision of 27 April 2004. In such circumstances, the applicants’ allegations of unlawful deprivation of liberty and ill-treatment had been rebutted by the evidence collected in the case. 138. On 25 October 2007 the applicants lodged an appeal against this decision. They complained in detail that they had been unlawfully deprived of their liberty from 19 to 24 April 2004 in the guise of witnesses, while already being suspected of the crime. This had been done in order to deprive them of the safeguards enjoyed by a suspect under the law, such as the right to have a lawyer and the right not to testify, and to coerce them into making a confession. They had never been summoned to appear as witnesses as required by law but instead were forcibly taken from their military unit and transported miles away from one law enforcement agency to another where they were kept in various rooms and cells and subjected to repeated ill‑treatment. There had been no reasonable suspicion to justify depriving them of their liberty and they had been arrested only once the confession had been secured through coercion. They had then been placed in the military police arrest facility where the investigators continued exerting pressure, and in order to hide any traces of ill-treatment. They had not been informed about the reasons for their deprivation of liberty and were brought before a judge with a delay of eight days. The decision of the Acting General Prosecutor had been unlawful and unfounded. He was obliged by law to institute a separate set of criminal proceedings on account of ill‑treatment, to recognise them as victims and, after carrying out an investigation, to give a proper assessment to the questions raised by the Court of Cassation in its decision of 22 December 2006. For more than four years they had consistently raised their allegations of ill-treatment and indicated the names of the perpetrators but no effective investigation had ever been carried out. The applicants relied, inter alia, on Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention. 139. On 23 November 2007 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan decided to dismiss the appeal. The decision reads as follows: “Having studied the appeal and the materials of the criminal case, the court finds that the contested actions were taken in compliance with the law and there has been no violation of a person’s rights or freedoms.” 140. No appeal was lodged against this decision. 141. On 18 January 2008 the Military Prosecutor decided to institute criminal proceedings to investigate whether the fact that the starting date of the first applicant’s detention was indicated in his medical file as “19 April 2004” amounted to falsification of an official document. A number of persons were questioned and it was revealed that the note in question had been made by mistake by the head of the medical service based on the first applicant’s oral statement. For this reason it was decided to terminate the criminal proceedings for lack of a criminal act. 142. On an unspecified date the applicants’ trial resumed in the Shirak Regional Court. According to the applicants, a number of former servicemen of their military unit and also a few civilians testified during the trial that they had been locked up during various periods at the beginning of 2004 at the Martakert Garrison Military Prosecutor’s Office and the Stepanakert Military Police Department and questioned in connection with the murders. Many of them stated that they had been humiliated and brutally ill‑treated during those periods in order to confess to the crime. 143. On 18 December 2012 the Shirak Regional Court, having heard numerous witnesses and examined the available evidence, found that the applicants’ guilt had not been substantiated and decided to acquit them. It appears that no appeals were lodged against this judgment.

5. The applicant lives in Čaglin. 6. The applicant was a member of a hunting association, V., based in Čaglin (hereafter “the association”). 7. On 17 June 2012 the association’s executive board initiated internal proceedings against the applicant before its disciplinary commission. The executive board sought the applicant’s suspension until the next session of the association’s general meeting (skupština) for reporting a member of the association to the police, falsely accusing him of the criminal offence of intimidation. The executive board argued that by doing so the applicant had committed a serious breach of his duties as a member, a disciplinary offence stipulated in the association’s internal regulations. 8. By a decision of 25 August 2012 the disciplinary commission dismissed the disciplinary action against the applicant. No appeals were lodged against that decision. 9. The executive board nevertheless referred the matter to the general meeting for re-examination, convening an extraordinary session. 10. On 2 September 2012 the general meeting adopted, by twenty votes to seven, a resolution expelling the applicant from the association. He was informed that he could appeal against that decision and that any appeal would be examined at the general meeting’s (regular) annual session. 11. The applicant appealed, but the general meeting’s resolution was upheld by twenty-one votes to three following the adoption of another resolution at the annual session held on 20 February 2013. 12. The general meeting did not give any reasons for expelling the applicant in either of its resolutions. 13. On 11 January 2014 the applicant brought a civil action against the hunting association in the Požega County Court (Županijski sud u Požegi), whereby he asked the court to declare unlawful the general meeting’s resolution of 20 February 2013 and to reinstate him as a member. He relied on section 26(1) of the Associations Act (see paragraph 22 below) and argued that the decision to expel him had been adopted in breach of the procedure provided for in the association’s statute and its internal regulations on disciplinary proceedings. In particular, he submitted that, in the absence of appeals against the disciplinary commission’s decision of 25 August 2012 (see paragraph 8 above), the general meeting could not have overridden that decision because under the association’s statute that commission was the only body authorised to decide on the expulsion of a member. 14. By a decision of 4 March 2014 the County Court declared the applicant’s action inadmissible, on the grounds that the matter was outside the jurisdiction of the courts. The relevant part of that decision reads as follows: “Section 26(1) of the Associations Act suggests that legal protection by way of civil action in the county court could be sought only if the General Meeting or the other relevant body of the association had failed to examine a member’s report regarding irregularities in the implementation of the statute [of the association], or had failed to correct such irregularities. Such a civil action would therefore be aimed at securing the implementation of the statute of the association, and thus would not provide for legal protection in the sense that a specific decision ... of the association could be declared unlawful. Under section 50 of the defendant association’s Statute [Statut] the disciplinary tribunal imposes disciplinary measures against members who have breached their duties stipulated in the statute. According to section 7(2) of the defendant association’s Rules on Disciplinary Proceedings and Disciplinary Liability of Members, a request for review may be lodged with the General Meeting [to contest] the Disciplinary Tribunal’s decision to expel [a member]. The time-limit for the General Meeting to adopt a resolution on the request is not stipulated. The General Meeting’s resolution is final. ... since the plaintiff in his action does not seek [legal] protection envisaged in section 26(1) of the Associations Act, but asks [the court] to declare unlawful the defendant’s resolution to expel him, on which [issue] it is for the General Meeting to make a final decision ... this case does not fall within the jurisdiction of the courts ...” 15. The applicant then appealed against that decision to the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske). 16. By a decision of 2 April 2014 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the first-instance decision, reasoning as follows: “The first-instance court was correct in declaring the action inadmissible, because the case does not fall within the jurisdiction of the courts ... In particular, pursuant to section 26(1) of the Associations Act ... the conduct of associations is supervised by their members, and if a member finds irregularities in the implementation of the statute he or she is entitled to report it to the relevant body of the association designated in the statute or to the General Meeting if there is no relevant body designated in the statute. Furthermore, if the written report is not examined at the General Meeting or by the relevant body of the association designated in the statute within thirty days of its submission, or if irregularities are not corrected, the member may bring a civil action in the county court within whose area of jurisdiction the registered office of the association is situated, with a view to protecting his or her rights as stipulated in the statute. The said provision ... governs jurisdiction of the courts regarding the right of the members of an association to supervise its conduct. That right does not entail the power to contest the lawfulness of a decision adopted in disciplinary proceedings against the plaintiff as a member, as correctly explained in the impugned [first-instance] decision. In this connection it should be taken into account that the case concerns membership of a ... voluntary organisation [where] members may under the internal rules regulate the protection of [their] membership rights. Therefore, the decision to expel a member does not fall within the jurisdiction of the courts under section 26(1) of the Associations Act. The defendant association is not an entity vested with public authority, and the decisions it adopts are not administrative acts, which means that the plaintiff’s action could not even be examined by the Administrative Court under the [relevant provisions] of the Administrative Disputes Act. That is also the opinion of the Constitutional Court, as expressed in the case U-III-140/2006. It follows that the county court was correct in deciding that courts have no jurisdiction to decide on the plaintiff’s action ...” 17. On 12 June 2014 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint against the Supreme Court’s decision. He alleged violations of his right to a fair procedure guaranteed by Article 29 paragraph 1 of the Croatian Constitution (see paragraph 19 below), and also explicitly relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. 18. By a decision of 18 December 2014 the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) declared the applicant’s constitutional complaint inadmissible and served its decision on his representative on 30 January 2015. It found that the case did not raise any constitutional issues.

5. The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Zagreb. 6. He is an advocate. In that capacity, he represented the plaintiff in civil proceedings instituted on 5 February 2009 before the Vukovar Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Vukovaru), in which his client sought payment of a certain amount of money from the defendant. 7. On 16 November 2009 the Municipal Court held a hearing, which the applicant attended. At the end of the hearing, the court scheduled the next one for 17 December 2009. 8. The applicant did not attend the hearing of 17 December 2009, at which the court made a decision to suspend the proceedings (mirovanje postupka) in accordance with section 216(1) of the Civil Procedure Act (see paragraph 18 below). 9. On 31 December 2009 the applicant, on behalf of the plaintiff, lodged an appeal against that decision. 10. He explained that he had been unable to attend the hearing owing to a vehicle malfunction, and that he had tried to contact the court and the defendant’s representative, with a view to informing them of the reason for his absence. He further stated that, after the hearing, he had spoken by telephone with the defendant’s representative, who had told him that, despite his (the representative’s) suggestion to proceed and hear the defendant’s testimony, the court had decided to adjourn the hearing and suspend the proceedings. The applicant argued that, if that was true, the court’s decision to suspend the proceedings had had no legal basis. He explained that suspending proceedings was an instrument for maintaining procedural discipline, the effect of which was to delay proceedings and thereby penalise the parties for their inaction. Yet, in his case, he and his client had been penalised by a delay even though it was through no fault of his own that he had failed to attend the hearing. He then stated: “With a view to highlighting the unacceptable conduct of the judge, the following circumstances have to be mentioned. The parties’ representatives and the defendant attended the hearing held on 16 November 2009. The plaintiff did not attend because no testimonies from the parties were scheduled, he is of low income, and he resides in Pula. The hearing in question was characterised by the fact that the party present at court did not give evidence and the judge attempted to adjourn the hearing without scheduling another one. The judge [eventually] adjourned the hearing, and only at the insistence of the plaintiff’s representative scheduled another one for 17 December 2009. Such conduct from the judge is absolutely unacceptable. In behaving in this way, he seeks to give the impression that he is proceeding with the case [i.e. that the case is being dealt with], whereas, essentially, hearings are being held which are devoid of substance.[1] Since the plaintiff’s representative has no reason to doubt the defendant’s representative’s statement that he had suggested hearing the defendant’s testimony at the hearing in question [the hearing of 17 December 2009], that statement indicates that the court could not have issued the contested decision. ... The contested decision should therefore be quashed.” 11. By a decision of 13 January 2010, Judge M.R. – who was the first-instance single judge in the above case – fined the applicant 1,500 Croatian kunas (HRK)[2] for contempt of court. The relevant part of that decision reads: “... the advocate in the appeal ... first admitted not having attended the hearing scheduled for 17 December 2009 ... owing to a vehicle malfunction ... Instead of asking for the proceedings to be restored to the status quo ante [restitutio in integrum ob terminem elapsum, povrat u prijašnje stanje] as a result of objective reasons and force majeure, the advocate in question, for no reason whatsoever, states on the second page of the appeal, ‘Such conduct from the judge is absolutely unacceptable. In behaving in this way, he seeks to give the impression that he is proceeding with the case [i.e. that the case is being dealt with], whereas, essentially, hearings are being held which are devoid of substance.’ [T]hat statement is certainly offensive to the court and the judge [concerned], and as such constitutes unacceptable communication between the court and the advocate representing one of the parties. By making that offensive statement, the advocate in question implies that the judge hearing the case proceeds pointlessly, and most likely proceeds pointlessly with all other cases, which represents a serious insult to both the court and the judge. For that insult, the court fined the advocate HRK 1,500. Such a fine will most likely [discourage] the advocate from insulting the court and judge hearing the case in future, in his appeals and [other] submissions, and encourage him to pay them due respect in all circumstances.” 12. The applicant appealed against that decision, arguing that his statement had not been offensive or demeaning. Rather, by making that statement, he had criticised the first-instance court’s inefficiency in conducting the proceedings. In particular, in his appeal, the applicant wrote, inter alia, the following: “The operative provisions [of the contested decision] indicate that the fine was imposed for offending the court in the appeal of 31 December 2009 by stating, ‘Such conduct from the judge is absolutely unacceptable. In behaving in this way, he seeks to give the impression that he is proceeding with the case [i.e. that the case is being dealt with], whereas, essentially, hearings are being held which are devoid of substance’. I consider the contested decision to be without basis. The quoted statement does not represent an insult. [Rather,] it is an assessment of how usefully the proceedings in the present case were conducted. The statements quoted in the contested decision ... cannot in themselves, and especially having regard to the behaviour of the judge hearing the case, [be regarded as] disrespectful, which would justify the need to issue a decision on the fine. ... In addition to the plaintiff’s representative, the defendant and [her] representative attended the hearing scheduled for 16 November 2009. The record [of that hearing] states that [the plaintiff] reaffirmed his action and the submissions of 30 March 2009, and that the defendant maintained the arguments expressed in [her] response ... of 11 March 2009. Beside this, nothing else happened at that hearing. ... Apart from acknowledging the facts as stated above, the judge hearing the case did not carry out any action intended to bring the proceedings to an end, except for scheduling the next hearing. At that hearing, he did not even oblige the defendant to provide evidence for the claims expressed in [her] response. At that hearing, not even a decision to hear testimonies from the parties was adopted. Only at the request of the plaintiff’s representative did the judge decide to schedule the next hearing. ... In the circumstances, it is evident that the hearing scheduled for 17 December 2009 would have been identical ... to the previous hearing. The plaintiff’s representative considers such conduct to be at odds with the purpose of law. ... Given that the purpose of a hearing is concentrated deliberation, that purpose is frustrated when such concentrated deliberation is lacking. One should also bear in mind that such conduct increases the costs of proceedings ... [without] rational justification. ... No intention to offend was expressed in the submissions in question [that is, the appeal of 31 December 2009]. The quoted statement represents a view assessing how usefully the proceedings were being conducted. In the reasoning [of the contested decision], it is stated that the representative implies that the judge hearing the case ‘most likely proceeds pointlessly with all other cases’. That view is not supported by any argument and has no basis [in what was written in the appeal].” 13. By a decision of 7 July 2010 the Vukovar County Court (Županijski sud u Vukovaru) dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the first-instance decision. The relevant part of that decision, which was served on the applicant on 16 July 2010, reads: “When deciding to fine the representative for contempt of court ... the first-instance court correctly held – and gave valid reasons for its view – that such statements constituted unacceptable communication between the court and an advocate ..., the assessment of which is within the discretion of the court before which the proceedings are pending. Those statements ... go beyond the limits of an advocate’s role in the proceedings ... and may be legally characterised as abuse of process on account of inappropriate communication.” 14. On 17 August 2010 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint against the decisions of the ordinary courts. In so doing, he complained that those decisions were in breach of his freedom of expression. He explicitly relied on Article 38 of the Croatian Constitution (see paragraph 16 below) and Article 10 of the Convention. 15. By a decision of 27 January 2011 the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) declared the applicant’s constitutional complaint inadmissible on the grounds that the contested decision was not open to constitutional review. That decision was served on the applicant on 11 February 2011.

4. The applicant was born in 1972 and lives in Kharkiv. 5. According to the applicant, at 2 p.m. on 3 May 2005 he was arrested at his home, without any reason being given, and taken to the Ordzhonikidzevskyy district police station (Орджонікідзевський районний відділ Харківського міського управління Міністерства внутрішніх справ України в Харківській області), where he was handcuffed to a radiator. At around 10 p.m. he was brought before an investigator. There he was put on the floor with his hands handcuffed behind his back and was beaten by five or six police officers in his stomach and his liver. The officers then put on a gas mask on him with the air passage blocked and cigarette smoke was blown into it. The officers demanded that he confess “to crimes he had committed”. This treatment continued for one hour and the applicant was then placed in a cell. The next morning, the applicant experienced severe abdominal pain and requested medical assistance (see paragraph 8 below). 6. The Government denied all allegations of ill-treatment. However, they could not provide any factual information as to whether the applicant had been present at the police station on the date in question as the time-limit for keeping the relevant documents had expired and the admissions register of the police station had been destroyed. 7. On 4 May 2005 criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant and two other persons for a robbery which had taken place on 12 April 2005. 8. On the same date the applicant complained to the duty officer that he was experiencing acute abdominal pain. At 10 p.m. an ambulance was called and he was transferred to Kharkiv City Hospital no. 17 (“hospital no. 17”). Upon admission, the applicant stated that he had fallen onto a concrete floor on 3 May 2005. His state of health had been classified as being of medium gravity. His initial medical examination revealed no visible bodily injuries. The applicant had an abdominal distention, felt moderate pain in the left part of his midabdomen and kidney region (“positive” Pasternatsky symptom) and had “negative” peritoneal signs. He was transferred to the surgical ward in order to verify if he had an abdominal trauma and retroperitoneal hematoma (тупа травма живота та позачеревна гематома). The applicant underwent ultrasound and X‑ray examinations as well as urine and blood tests. No pathology had been revealed apart from intestinal pneumatosis which, according to the medical report, could have been an indirect indication of a possible retroperitoneal trauma. The relevant treatment was prescribed to the applicant. 9. On 5 May 2005, according to the medical records, the applicant had no longer experienced pain and his health ameliorated. He was discharged from hospital in a satisfactory condition, after being given the relevant recommendations as to further medical treatment. The applicant alleged that the police forced the hospital officials to discharge him despite his poor state of health. 10. On the same date the applicant, having waived his right to legal assistance, confessed to the crime in question and was arrested. The relevant parts of the arrest reports read as follows: “Investigator ... K., on 5.05.2005 at 18:00 in accordance with Article 115 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine detained, on suspicion of the commission of a crime: Dolganin Valeriy Nikolayevich ... Brought before the investigator ... or actually arrested: on 5.05.2005 ...” 11. He was taken for a forensic medical examination, which was conducted in the presence of a police officer. The relevant report suggests that no bodily injuries were noted by the forensic expert and no complaint was raised by the applicant. According to the applicant, the examination was only superficial and he was forced by the police to keep silent about his ill‑treatment. 12. Later on the same day the applicant was questioned as a suspect and confirmed his earlier statements, having again waived his right to legal assistance. 13. On 6 May 2005 the applicant was charged with robbery and questioned in the absence of a lawyer. He confirmed the statements he had given earlier. 14. On the same date, the applicant complained about nausea, abdominal pain, bloating, fatigue and a dry throat and was transferred to Kharkiv City Hospital no. 2 (“hospital no. 2”), where he underwent a full-scale medical examination. During the examination, the applicant again stated that on 3 May 2005 he had fallen onto a concrete floor. He was diagnosed with a twisted sigmoid colon and acute intestinal obstruction requiring surgery. On 7 May 2005 the surgery was performed and on 13 May 2005 the applicant was discharged from hospital in a satisfactory condition. 15. On 13 June 2005, in the presence of witnesses, the applicant refused to participate in a reconstruction of the crime for health reasons, referring to testimony he had given earlier. 16. On 13 April 2007 the Ordzhonikidzevskyy District Court sentenced the applicant to seven years’ imprisonment on one count of robbery. The operative part of the judgment provided that the term of the applicant’s imprisonment should be calculated from 3 May 2005, the day of his actual arrest. 17. On 12 February 2009 the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal upheld this decision. 18. On 9 June and 29 July 2009 the Supreme Court of Ukraine rejected the applicant’s request for leave to lodge an appeal on points of law. 19. From 16 May 2005 to 19 June 2009 the applicant was detained in the Kharkiv SIZO. On 19 June 2009 he was transferred to another pre-trial detention facility and, later on, to a prison. The applicant’s complaint about inadequate medical treatment raised before the Court concerns the Kharkiv SIZO only. 20. According to the applicant, the medical care provided to him during his detention in the Kharkiv SIZO was inadequate and resulted in a deterioration of his health. 21. The Government’s submitted that the applicant’s intestinal problems had a long history and were of a chronic nature. The applicant’s medical file suggests that in 2003, while serving a prison sentence for another conviction, the applicant was recognised as falling into the second category of disability because of his intestinal problems and the need for appropriate surgery was stressed by physicians. 22. On 16 May 2005 upon his arrival at the Kharkiv SIZO the applicant underwent a medical examination and was prescribed post-surgical medical treatment. His name was put on the list for regular medical check-ups. 23. On 3 June 2005 the SIZO generalist doctor advised that the previously prescribed treatment should be continued. 24. On 6 June 2005 the applicant underwent an X-ray examination and was diagnosed with post-tuberculosis residual effect. The applicant was prescribed anti-relapse medical treatment, a special diet and regular medical check-ups. 25. On 23 August 2005 the generalist doctor diagnosed the applicant as having peritoneal adhesions and prescribed him the relevant treatment. 26. On 28 November 2005 the applicant’s chest was X-rayed and found to be healthy. 27. On 18 May 2006 the applicant was examined by a surgeon and diagnosed with a post-laparotomy condition. 28. On 17 August 2006 a generalist confirmed that the applicant was suffering from peritoneal adhesions and prescribed him the relevant treatment. 29. On 17 October 2006 the applicant complained to the medical unit about stomach problems. The relevant treatment was prescribed to him. 30. On 8 December 2006, following further complaints about his health, the applicant was diagnosed with angioneurosis and prescribed the respective treatment. 31. On 26 February 2007 the applicant was diagnosed with bronchitis. The appropriate treatment was prescribed and the applicant was further recommended to consult a tuberculotherapist, which he did on 28 February 2007. No signs of active tuberculosis were found. 32. On 1 and 7 March 2007 follow-up examinations were conducted. The applicant’s health was found to be improving. Thereafter and until his transfer to another detention facility on 19 June 2009, the applicant did not again consult the medical unit of the Kharkiv SIZO. 33. On 23 June 2009 and 12 October 2010 because of his intestinal problems, the applicant was recognised as falling into the second category of disability for a one-year period and the third category of disability for the remaining imprisonment term, respectively. 34. On 5 January 2012 the applicant was granted early release. 35. On 20 February 2006 the applicant complained to a prosecutor about his ill-treatment by the police on 3 May 2005. He provided a detailed account of events and asked for the admissions register of the police station to be produced as evidence. 36. On 2 March 2006 the Ordzhonikidzevskyy district prosecutor’s office (“the district prosecutor’s office”) refused to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers for the lack of corpus delicti. In doing so, the prosecutor relied on the results of the forensic medical examination of 5 May 2005, the diagnosis made at hospitals nos. 2 and 17, and the fact that the investigator in charge of the applicant’s criminal case denied all allegations of ill-treatment. 37. On 8 August 2006 and 5 September 2006 the applicant’s mother and the applicant, respectively, again complained to the district prosecutor’s office about the applicant’s ill-treatment by the police on 3 May 2005. In letters dated 18 September 2006 the prosecutor informed the applicant and his mother that a similar complaint from the applicant had already been examined and declared ill-founded on 2 March 2006. 38. On 14 September 2006 the Kharkiv regional prosecutor’s office (“the regional prosecutor’s office”) set aside the aforementioned decision of 2 March 2006 on the grounds that the inquiry had been incomplete and ordered an additional investigation. 39. On 11 and 28 September 2006 and on 20 October 2006 the district prosecutor’s office again refused to institute criminal proceedings, giving similar reasoning to that given in respect of its decision of 2 March 2006. 40. On 28 April 2007 the regional prosecutor’s office overruled the decision of 20 October 2006 on the grounds that the inquiry had been incomplete. The prosecutor expressly indicated the measures to be taken in the course of the additional inquiry. It was noted that the applicant and the police officers needed to be questioned in detail about the circumstances in which the alleged ill-treatment had taken place, including the exact place and time of the ill-treatment, the persons involved and their individual role in the alleged incident. Moreover, possible witnesses who could confirm or disprove the fact of the ill-treatment needed to be identified, and medical specialists who had examined the applicant had to be questioned and the relevant medical documents demanded and obtained. 41. On 24 May 2007 the prosecutor again refused to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers. 42. On 25 May 2007 the above decision was dismissed as premature by the regional prosecutor’s office and the relevant instruction to conduct a further inquiry was given once again. 43. On 1 June 2007 the prosecutor’s office again refused to institute criminal proceedings in response to the applicant’s complaint as there was no medical or other evidence to support the applicant’s allegations. 44. On an unspecified date the above decision was again overruled by a higher prosecutor and an additional investigation ordered. The parties did not inform the Court as to the outcome of that additional investigation. 45. During the trial in his criminal case the applicant complained that his confession had been obtained from him by the police under duress. In the judgment of 13 April 2007, by which the applicant was convicted, his ill‑treatment complaint was dismissed as unsubstantiated mainly on the basis of the forensic medical report of 5 May 2005 and the results of the inquiries conducted by prosecutors in respect of the applicant’s complaints. The court also observed that during the whole pre-trial investigation the applicant had acknowledged his guilt and had never complained about any ill-treatment, and that he had not retracted his statements until the trial (which the court considered that he did simply as part of his defence strategy). In the appeals against his conviction before the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, the applicant referred to a medical certificate issued by hospital no. 17 in which it was noted that he had sustained an abdominal injury. He stated, in particular, that this evidence of his ill-treatment had been completely disregarded by the trial court. In their judgments, the higher courts dismissed the applicant’s allegation of ill‑treatment on the same grounds as the first-instance court.

5. The applicant was born in 1983 and lives in Portoheli. 6. On 12 September 2007 the applicant was convicted of forming a criminal organisation, of – together with others − kidnapping an adult, of robbery committed together with others, and of the theft and illegal possession of a gun, and was sentenced to twenty-two years’ imprisonment by the Nafplio three-member Court of Appeal for felonies (Τριμελές Εφετείο Κακουργημάτων) acting as a first-instance court (decision no. 317/2007). The applicant, who had been in pre-trial detention since 7 April 2006, was represented by a lawyer in the proceedings. 7. Following the delivery of the judgment, the applicant expressed his wish to lodge an appeal against the decision of the first-instance court and was escorted, handcuffed, by policemen to the registry of the court in order to do so. In the registry there were pre-printed forms for lodging an appeal, which included the following wording: “In Nafplio, in the Nafplio Court of Appeal today on ... day... and time ... came to me, the Registrar of Nafplio Court of Appeal .... (name), the ... (name) of ... (father’s name) and of ... (mother’s name) who was born on ... in ..., whose profession is ... and resides in ..., street ... no. ... and has the no. ... identity card issued on ... by.... And REQUESTED that this report be drafted declaring that: (he) APPEALS before the Nafplio five-member Appeal Court against decision no. .... of the Nafplio three‑member Court of Appeal by which he was convicted of ... to a total sentence of ... requesting that the decision under appeal be set aside and that he be acquitted from the charge for the reasons he will cite before the Appeal Court.” 8. Under the above paragraph there was an empty space and then followed the phrases: “He appoints as his representative the lawyer practising in Nafplio ...(name). This report was read and confirmed and is signed by the person lodging the appeal and the registrar”. 9. The registrar completed the pre-printed form with the applicant’s personal data, the number of the decision against which he wished to lodge the appeal, the sentence that was imposed to him and the name of the applicant’s representative. He then signed the report and the applicant was momentarily released from handcuffs in order to sign it as well. 10. On 7 May 2009 the applicant’s appeal was heard by the Nafplio five‑member Court of Appeal (“the Appeal Court”). The Appeal Court by a majority dismissed the legal remedy as inadmissible on the grounds that no reasons had been included in the report, as required by law (decision no. 113/2009). The President of the Appeal Court did not agree with the majority of the panel, expressing the view that from the phrase “...for the reasons he will cite before the appeal court”, one could easily infer that the applicant was complaining about erroneous assessment of the evidence by the court of first instance. 11. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law against the decision of the Appeal Court, arguing that his appeal should not have been dismissed as inadmissible. The applicant submitted that it was standard practice in all Appeal Courts for the defendants to be given a pre-printed form which included the phrase: “because the court of first instance did not assess correctly the facts of the case and declared the defendant guilty of an act he did not commit and for the reasons he will cite before the Appeal Court”. In the instant case, the Nafplio Court of Appeal had printed a form in which the first part of the phrase was omitted and the applicant was not to blame for this omission. He was only given the form to sign and was handcuffed at the time, making it even more difficult for him to read the report thoroughly. 12. The Court of Cassation dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law as unfounded on the grounds that the content of the appeal was the applicant’s responsibility, as distinct from the formalities which were the responsibility of the registrar (decision no. 848/2010). The decision was finalised on 28 April 2010. 13. The applicant served his sentence in Patras prison until 23 July 2015 when he was given a conditional release.

6. The applicant was born in 1940 and lives in Donetsk. 7. In the end of November 2001 the applicant was visited by two unfamiliar men, V.S. and A.N., who offered to buy half of the flat she lived in for 700 United States dollars (USD). It was a one-bedroom flat, measuring 43.3 square meters, recently privatised and acquired in equal shares by the applicant and her adult son, Y. The applicant refused to sell her half of the flat. According to her, the price offered was extraordinarily below the market value. In any event, she had no reason to sell the flat, which had been her long-established home for several decades. In response, V.S. and A.N. warned the applicant that she would regret her decision, because Y., (who was married and lived elsewhere), had offered the other half of the flat as a gift to V.S. If the applicant refused to sell her half for the price, which was offered to her, or to exchange it for a smaller flat on the outskirts of the city, V.S. would move into the flat and create intolerable living conditions for her. 8. Subsequently the applicant learned that on 18 December 2001 Y. had signed a notarised gift deed in which he transferred his title to half of the flat (which was not as divided into allocated parts of the whole) to V.S. 9. From November 2002 A.N., V.S. and their acquaintances started regularly visiting the applicant’s flat, demanding that she sell. According to the applicant, on numerous occasions they broke the locks, insulted and harassed her and caused damage to her property. Subsequently a part and then the entire of V.S.’s share in the flat was formally acquired by A.N. as a gift, whose value amounted to 5,602 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH) according to the gift certificates. However, irrespective of this transfer, A.N. and V.S. continued to act in concordance in demanding the applicant move out and sell her share. 10. For instance, on 23 November 2002 A.N. and V.S. broke the locks on the entrance door when the applicant was away, entered the flat and, upon the applicant’s arrival, reiterated their demands that she sell her share. As the applicant protested against their presence in the flat and their overall conduct, a conflict emerged, in the course of which A.N. hit the applicant in the chest inflicting a bruise and causing soft tissue swelling. 11. On 26 November 2002 A.N., V.S. and several strangers broke into the applicant’s flat again. As they were irritated by the barking of the applicant’s dog, V.S. started kicking her and chased her out. Subsequently the applicant found her dog’s dead body in a garbage container. 12. Also on an unspecified date in November 2002 V.S. arrived in the flat after 11 p.m. (when the applicant was already asleep) and opened the balcony door, holding it open for some four hours notwithstanding the freezing temperature outside. In response to the applicant’s subsequent reprimands, he explained that he wished for her to catch a cold as she had been disagreeable. 13. On 15 December 2002, when the applicant’s daughter was visiting the applicant, V.S. arrived in the flat again. A conflict emerged, in the course of which V.S. hit the applicant on the head and stomach, inflicting concussion and blunt trauma of the abdominal wall. He also hit the applicant’s daughter on the head and other parts of the body, inflicting cerebral concussion and bruising of legs and arms. As a result of the conflict, the applicant and her daughter had to seek medical assistance for their injuries and the applicant received inpatient hospital treatment. 14. Subsequently V.S. and A.N. started installing in the flat from two to six strangers without the applicant’s consent. These tenants, mostly young males, behaved in a discourteous way. In particular, they organised loud parties; frivolously used, damaged and stole the applicant’s belongings; created insanitary conditions; carelessly used electricity, gas and appliances, frequently left the entrance door open, and ignored requests to contribute towards the maintenance charges on the flat. 15. On numerous occasions the applicant attempted to drive the tenants away or to call them to order. Her efforts resulted in conflicts, in the course of which she was harassed and intimidated. Her attempts to replace the locks on the entrance doors to prevent unauthorised entry into the flat resulted in them being broken and in the tenants, who frequently changed, moving in again, in spite of her discontent. As she was unable to withstand such living conditions and was afraid for her life and limb, the applicant effectively moved out, contending herself with odd living arrangements. However, she paid short visits to the flat regularly, to supervise the situation. 16. In the beginning of June 2003 V.S. drove his car onto the footpath, where the applicant was standing waiting for a bus, scaring and nearly hitting her. 17. On 11 July 2003 at about 9.20 a.m. V.S. again arrived in the flat, when the applicant was in it, and demanded that she surrender her share. A conflict emerged, in the course of which V.S. punched the applicant in the stomach, causing her physical pain. 18. On three further occasions (30 July 2004, 5 August and 1 December 2005) the applicant was severely beaten by V.S., twice accompanied by his acquaintance A.L. The applicant suffered physical pain and bruising. On 30 July 2005, in addition to that, she also sustained a second concussion, which necessitated inpatient treatment. 19. On various dates the applicant learned that A.N. and V.S. had also acquired ownership of shares in numerous other flats in Donetsk and that they had behaved similarly with the co-owners of these flats, inducing them to sell their shares on unfavourable terms. 20. On 16 October 2003 the Voroshylivsky district prosecutor instituted civil proceedings on the applicant’s behalf, seeking rescission of the gift deed between Y. and V.S. and the eviction of the latter on the grounds that the gift deed had been executed without the applicant’s consent. 21. On 12 November 2003 the Voroshylivsky District Court of Donetsk (hereafter “the Voroshylivsky Court”) allowed this claim, having found, in particular, that Article 113 of the Civil Code of Ukraine of 1963 did not authorise the transfer of title to a part of shared property, which had not been divided into allocated parts and that it also obliged co-owners of a shared property to seek the consent of their counterparts before carrying out transactions in it. 22. On 5 February 2004 the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeal (hereinafter “the Regional Court”) quashed this judgment following an appeal by the applicants’ opponent and dismissed the prosecutor’s claim, having found that, unlike in the case of selling part of a shared property, giving it as a gift to a third party did not require the co-owners’ consent. 23. On 10 August 2004 the Supreme Court of Ukraine dismissed the applicant’s and the prosecutor’s requests for leave to appeal in cassation against the Regional Court’s judgment. The judgment became final. 24. On 5 October 2004 the applicant instituted civil proceedings seeking the dispossession of V.S. (joined by A.N., when he acquired part of V.S.’s share and replaced by him, when he acquired the entire share), of his share in the flat, regard being had to his unlawful conduct towards her, the impossibility of joint use of the flat, and his refusal to pay his share of the maintenance costs. She further sought a judicial rescission of their right to occupy the flat and compensation for the costs she had borne on the flat with their shares. The defendants lodged a counterclaim, alleging, in particular, that the applicant had been interfering with their personal life and belongings, provoking conflicts, harassing them and creating intolerable living conditions, which made it impossible for them to fulfil their desire to settle in the flat. They sought damages from the applicant for this conduct and demanded that the flat be divided into allocated parts. 25. On 21 June 2005 the District Court allowed the applicant’s claim in part and dismissed her opponents’ counterclaim. In particular, referring to Article 365 of the new Civil Code of Ukraine of 2003, it ordered the dispossession of A.N. (by then the owner of half the flat) of his share against payment by the applicant of compensation in the amount of UAH 5,602. The court noted, in particular, that there was extensive evidence that the defendants had allowed numerous strangers to live in the flat; that the applicant had been harassed; and that the flat’s appliances and the applicant’s belongings had been misused and damaged. It further concluded that, regard being had to the flat’s size and layout, it was not possible for the co-owners to use it jointly in a harmonious manner or to have it reasonably divided into two independent halves for each of them to use separately. At the same time, A.N.’s dispossession in return for fair compensation would not put him at a substantial disadvantage, since he had another registered residence and predominantly used the disputed flat for subletting to other persons. The court next found that, since A.N. had received the flat as a gift, fair compensation would be the payment of the indicative price (UAH 5,602) declared by the parties as that share’s value in the latest gift deeds. Finally, the court found that A.N. and V.S. had no longer any right to occupy the flat and ordered partial reimbursement of the maintenance costs incurred by the applicant on the flat. 26. On 20 October 2005 the Regional Court, having reviewed the case on appeal by the applicant’s opponents, upheld the judgment with respect to the reimbursement of the costs borne on the flat by the applicant and the revocation of V.S.’s right to occupy it, as he no longer owned any share in the flat. It then quashed the ruling to dispossess A.N., having noted that, according to the expert assessment, the market value of the disputed flat had been appraised at UAH 147,756, which meant that value of half the flat had been UAH 73,878. The court further stated that the applicant’s claim for dispossession of A.N. and revocation of his right of occupancy had not been based on any legal provision. The relevant part of the judgment read as follows: “Neither the provisions of the Housing Code of Ukraine nor those of the Civil Code of Ukraine of 2003, which the applicant cites as the basis for her claims, nor the Property Law of Ukraine, envisage dispossession of the owner of his or her property and his or her eviction from a flat owned by him or her on the grounds cited by the applicant.” 27. The applicant appealed in cassation. She noted, in particular, that A.N. and V.S. had acquired shares in a number of Donetsk flats and had deliberately created intolerable living conditions for their co-owners in order to obtain the flats in their entirety on terms grossly unfavourable to the other co-owners. She further alleged that, having no other residence and being a victim of constant harassment, she had abandoned the flat and had been requesting refuge from various acquaintances. 28. On 2 December 2005 the district prosecutor also lodged a cassation appeal on the applicant’s behalf, in which he corroborated her submissions that the defendants had been harassing her, had been using the flat in bad faith and had forced the applicant, a senior lady, to leave the dwelling she had occupied for many years. He also alleged that the sum proposed by the applicant in compensation for the defendants’ share in the flat had been fair, as it had been equal to the flat’s value indicated in the gift deeds on the basis of which A.N. had received the disputed share. 29. On 11 January 2006 the Supreme Court of Ukraine rejected the applicant’s request for leave to appeal. 30. On 22 January 2006 it likewise rejected the prosecutor’s request for leave to appeal and the Regional Court’s judgment became final. 31. On numerous occasions between 2002 and 2007 the applicant complained to the Voroshylivsky district police in Donetsk (“the district police”) about various instances of verbal and physical harassment, damage to and taking of her property and attempts by V.S. and A.N. to extort her share in the flat. 32. On various dates police officers arrived in the applicant’s flat in response to her calls for help. They examined the situation, questioned the applicant and her opponents, and subsequently refused to institute criminal proceedings (in particular, 22 January, 7 February and 24 December 2002; 22 and 24 January, 22 February, 5 and 22 March, 15 July, 30 August, 18 September, 12, 16 and 24 October, 4, 15 and 19 November and 5 December 2003; 1 June, 3 and 9 August and 15 November 2004, 20 January, 23 July, 6 August, 19 November, 13 and 28 December 2005; and 4 and 31 March and 16 and 27 July 2006). In their refusals, the police noted that the prosecution of A.N., V.S. and their acquaintances was unwarranted since the relevant facts disclosed the existence of a chronic domestic conflict between lawful occupants of a flat, who attempted to engage the police in resolving their private disagreements. The hostilities took place inside the household and did not breach the public peace. Both parties had accused each other of provoking conflict and it was not evident, which party had in fact assaulted the other and which had acted out of self‑defence. In any event, during these conflicts the applicant had sustained no serious damage to her health and had not presented any evidence that her belongings had in fact been taken or damaged by the accused individuals. It was not possible to exclude that she had falsified the disappearance of her belongings in order to compromise the unwanted tenants. The police further recommended that the applicant resolve the dispute concerning the use of the flat in civil proceedings and assured her that “pre-emptive conversations” had been had with the purported offenders to foster respectful conduct on their part. On several occasions the police had issued official warnings to them, advising them of the impermissibility of antisocial behaviour. 33. On 30 January 2003 the prosecutor’s office quashed a decision not to institute criminal proceedings in connection with the injuries caused to the applicant on 15 December 2002. On several occasions the applicant enquired about the status of these proceedings and received no reply. In 2006 the applicant was informed that the investigation had been suspended. 34. On 19 October 2005 the head of the district police instructed his officers to place the applicant’s flat on the police register for frequent visits with a view to preventing any offences and infringements of applicable law. He noted, in particular, that the investigations had confirmed the applicant’s allegations concerning A.N.’s and V.S.’s disruptive conduct. In particular, it had been established that they had been allowing numerous tenants to live in the co-owned flat, who had brought it into a decrepit and insanitary state. The persons who had been occupying the flat had also taken the applicant’s personal belongings without her authorisation and had used her furniture, equipment and appliances in a careless manner, as a result of which these objects were deteriorating. Moreover, these persons had interfered with the applicant’s ability to access the flat by changing the locks and thus effectively precluding her from living there. He also acknowledged that numerous pre-emptive conversations and warnings given by the police had not brought about any improvements. 35. On several other occasions (in particular, 28 February 2006, 4 September 2006, 19 February 2007 and 6 March 2007) the Ministry of the Interior in Donetsk acknowledged, in response to the applicant’s further complaints, that her allegations concerning A.N.’s and his associates’ interference with her home had some basis. They further assured the applicant that her address had been placed on the police register for frequent visits. 36. On 18 July 2006 the applicant lodged a private criminal complaint against V.S., A.N. and A.L. with the Voroshylivsky Court. Relying on Articles 125 and 126 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, she alleged that the defendants had systematically beaten and verbally harassed her. In this respect the applicant referred to the incidents of 23 November and 15 December 2002, 30 July 2004 and 5 August 2005 (see paragraphs 10, 13 and 18 above). She also submitted that, in her view, these incidents had to be approached not as isolated instances of ill-treatment, but as episodes of systematic and premeditated criminal conduct by an organised criminal association functioning with a view to extorting flats from Donetsk residents. She submitted that the same individuals had engaged in similar conduct vis‑à-vis a number of other co-owners of properties in the city. Accordingly, she requested the District Court’s assistance in transmitting her complaints to the public law-enforcement authorities with a view to instituting criminal proceedings concerning extortion and coercion. 37. On various dates five other residents of Donetsk joined the proceedings, alleging that the same defendants had acquired shares in their flats and had been pressurising and terrorising them with a view to extorting the remaining shares. 38. On 19 December 2006 Judge M. of the Voroshylivsky Court decided that the applicant’s and other complainants’ allegations disclosed an appearance that serious crimes, warranting institution of public criminal proceedings, had been committed. Accordingly, the judge instituted criminal proceedings on suspicion of fraud, extortion, coercion, circumvention of the law and several other crimes, and transferred the case to the Donetsk regional prosecutor for investigation. 39. On 24 January 2007 the prosecutor’s office appealed against this decision, alleging that applicable law did not authorise judges to institute public criminal proceedings in the above circumstances. 40. On 27 March 2007 the Regional Court upheld the prosecutor’s office’s appeal and returned the case to the Voroshylivsky Court to be examined by another judge with respect to the complaints which could be addressed in private prosecution proceedings. 41. Subsequently (23 August 2007) Judge P. of the Voroshylivsky Court returned the applicant’s and other complainants’ submissions without examination. She found that the injured parties had failed to comply with the rules on territorial jurisdiction and with other unspecified procedural requirements. 42. On 26 July 2007 the regional police instituted criminal proceedings in respect of a complaint about extortion lodged by a certain A.C., who had allegedly been forced to abandon her flat on account of the intolerable living conditions created by the co-owners of her flat. 43. On 15 August 2007 the police joined the applicant’s complaints concerning extortion to the aforementioned criminal proceedings. 44. On the same date A.N., V.S. and A.L. were arrested and placed in custody. 45. On various further dates complaints by eleven other individuals relating to the same persons’ misconduct were joined to the proceedings. 46. On 29 December 2007 deputy head of the regional prosecutor’s office signed the bill of indictment in respect of A.N., V.S. and A.L. charging them, in particular, under Article 189 § 4 of the Criminal Code, with extorting property in an organised group and transferring the case to the Kyivskiy District Court of Donetsk (hereafter “the Kyivskiy Court”) for trial. 47. On various dates in 2008 the defendants were released from custody pending trial. 48. On 24 May 2011 the Kyivskiy Court acquitted all the defendants of the charges under Article 189 of the Criminal Code. It noted, in particular, as follows: “... The court comes to a conclusion that the basis of the present criminal proceedings is the existence of a private-law dispute between the defendants and the injured parties concerning the use of shared property, which the injured parties demand to resolve by way of criminal proceedings in view of their extremely antagonistic relationship with the defendants.” 49. On 27 February 2012 the Regional Court quashed this verdict on appeal by the prosecution and the injured parties and remitted the case for retrial. 50. On 17 April 2012 the defendants were rearrested and placed in custody. 51. On 12 October 2012 the Kyivskiy Court found that all the defendants were guilty of extortion under Article 189 § 4 and sentenced them to eleven, ten and eight years’ imprisonment respectively. It also ordered the confiscation of all their personal property. The court found, in particular, that the case-file contained sufficient evidence that the episodes of the applicant’s harassment (listed in paragraphs 10, 12-13 and 16‑18 above) had indeed taken place. It also awarded the applicant UAH 35,273.47 in pecuniary and UAH 30,000 in non-pecuniary damage to be paid jointly and separately by the defendants. 52. On 6 March 2013, following an appeal by the defendants, the Regional Court upheld this verdict on appeal concerning all points, except one episode unrelated to the applicant’s case. 53. On 18 September 2014 the Higher Specialised Civil and Criminal Court rejected the cassation appeals lodged by A.N. and V.S.

5. The applicant was born in 1941 and lives in Staryy Oskol, Belgorod Region. 6. On 6 May 2005 the applicant concluded a preliminary sale agreement with Mr N. regarding a plot of land with a small house under construction situated in the Belgorod Region. After the signature of this agreement, the applicant started using the plot of land, she finalised the construction of the house and beautified the plot of land. 7. On 3 July 2006 Mr N. died. 8. On 10 October 2008 the son of the deceased, Mr N. junior, sold the plot of land to another person, who registered her property right. 9. Later, the applicant sought to register her property right over the plot of land and found that it already had another registered owner. She then sued Mr N. junior before courts. 10. On 9 April 2009 the Starooskolskiy Town Court of the Belgorod Region declared the sale contract of 10 October 2008 null and void. Mr N. junior was declared the owner of the plot of land and of the house. 11. On 17 June 2009 the Town Court granted the applicant’s claims against Mr N. junior and awarded her 613,280 Russian roubles (RUB) for unjust enrichment and damages corresponding to different sums invested by the applicant in the plot of land and the house as well as the reimbursement of cost and expenses. 12. On 4 August 2009 the Belgorod Regional Court partly modified this judgment. It decreased the amount of damages to RUB 246,569, notably quashing the part relating to unjust enrichment. 13. On unspecified date the applicant lodged a supervisory review application. 14. On 17 December 2009 the Presidium of the Belgorod Regional Court partly quashed the judgment of 4 August 2009 and sent the case for consideration anew before the second instance court. The Presidium considered that the Belgorod Regional Court misapplied the provisions of the Civil Code on unjust enrichment and miscalculated the amount of damages to which the applicant was entitled to. It concluded that these were significant violations of substantive or procedural law which influenced the outcome of the proceedings and must be corrected in order to restore and protect the applicant’s right to a fair trial as guaranteed by Article 46 § 1 of the Constitution, Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. 15. On 19 January 2010 the Belgorod Regional Court restored the judgment of 17 June 2009. 16. On 11 May 2010 Mr N.’s son lodged a supervisory review application. 17. On 8 July 2010 the Presidium of the Belgorod Regional Court rejected the supervisory review application lodged by Mr N.’s son, considering that the arguments it contained were limited to a different assessment of evidence. It however quashed the judgment of 19 January 2010 and restored the judgment of 4 August 2009 on its own motion, considering that: “In the interest of lawfulness and taking into account the principle of legal certainty recognised by the Russian Federation the Presidium considers it possible and necessary to go beyond the arguments developed in the supervisory review application. As repeatedly indicated the European Court (Ryabykh v. Russia, no. 52854/99, §§ 51‑53, ECHR 2003‑IX, Khotuleva v. Russia, no. 27114/04, 30 July 2009) in order to preserve the aforementioned principle final judgments shall remain unchanged. The mere existence of two points of view on the same matter does not justify the reopening of the case. Legal certainty presupposes that it is not permissible to have a second examination of the once decided case in the absence of fundamental errors. Taking into account the aforementioned principle, the final decision in the present case should be the judgment of the Belgorod Regional Court of 4 August 2009 which granted certain damages to the claimant and rejected her claims for the rest, including as regards unjust enrichment. In the course of the new examination by the cassation court the principles above have not been taken into account, this omission resulted in a violation of the principle of legal certainty provided by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and undermined the stability of a binding judicial act. The claimant’s argument that the judgment of 19 January 2010 was lawful is not deemed to be sufficient by the Presidium to disregard the aforementioned principles. The fact that the Presidium of the Regional Court disagreed with the aforementioned judicial decision does not constitute in itself a ground for quashing of a final and binding judgment and for reopening of the proceedings. In view of the above, the judgment of 19 January 2010 subject to the present application shall be quashed and the judgment of 4 August 2009 restored.” 18. On 3 November 2010 a single judge at the Supreme Court refused the applicant’s supervisory review application.

6. From 20 January 2006 onwards the Tax Agency (Skatteverket) conducted audits of value-added tax, employers’ social security contributions (arbetsgivaravgifter) and income tax at the three Swedish companies Ergonia Sweden AB, SNS-LAN Trading AB (“SNS”) and Mouse Trapper Nordic AB. The audit covered the period June 2001 – June 2005. On 4 March 2008 the Tax Agency applied to the County Administrative Court (länsrätten) in Stockholm for permission to take coercive measures in respect of SNS under section 8 of the Act on Special Coercive Measures in Taxation Procedures (Lagen om särskilda tvångsåtgärder i beskattningsförfarandet, 1994:466 – hereafter “the Coercive Measures Act”), in particular the search and seizure of certain documents and other material. 7. The Tax Agency’s application contained detailed information on what it had been able to establish in regard to the above-mentioned companies during the audits. The Agency stated that it suspected that significant amounts of money had been withheld from Swedish taxation through irregular transactions between SNS and a Swiss company. According to the Agency, the latter company had been established solely in order to evade taxes on some of the business profits in the above-mentioned Swedish companies. While it was considered highly likely that the persons owning or having a decisive influence in the Swedish companies, including a Mr Toivo Jurik, were also running the Swiss company, it had proved impossible to obtain information on ownership and control of the latter company from the persons involved, who claimed that they had no knowledge of these matters. After Mr Jurik had been shown an extract of the Swiss company register, where he was listed as an executive, he had admitted that he and another person involved in the Swedish companies had been present at the establishment of the Swiss company but that he was listed as an executive only for formal reasons. The other person mentioned had since stated that he would not assist the Tax Agency any further in the audit. The Agency therefore considered that it could not continue to investigate the ownership issue and the accuracy of certain business costs unless it obtained access to documents that showed the Swiss company’s relationship to the Swedish companies and their owners and leaders as well as the Swiss company’s role in the business activities. In the Agency’s view, there were no alternative means of review. 8. Not considering it appropriate to order SNS to provide the required documents, the Tax Agency further requested that the application for coercive measures should not be communicated to the company and that it should not be notified of the court’s decision before the measures had been undertaken, as there was a risk that the documents to be searched and seized could be withheld or destroyed. 9. As SNS had recently been liquidated and had not had its own business premises, the requested search should be made at two addresses connected to Mr Jurik, who had been responsible for the bookkeeping in all three audited companies and was also representing SNS in its contacts with the Tax Agency, and therefore could be expected to be in possession of the required documentation. Thus, the search should start at the registered premises of the parent company, Draupner Universal AB (“Draupner”), at the address P.O. Hallmans gata 15, Stockholm. This was a flat which, in addition to being owned by Draupner and serving as its registered address, was rented by Mr Jurik and used as a pied-à-terre. Draupner was owned by Mr Jurik’s children but was represented and run by Mr Jurik himself. If the necessary documents were not found at the first address, the search should continue at the office of Mr Jurik at the applicant law firm (whose name at the time was Hagenfeldt Advokatbyrå AB), at the address Döbelnsgatan 15, Stockholm. 10. By a judgment of 10 March 2008 the County Administrative Court granted the Tax Agency’s application and ordered that the judgment was immediately enforceable. Agreeing with the Tax Agency, the court considered that there was a substantial risk that documents could be withheld, corrupted or destroyed and that, having regard to Mr Jurik’s connection with SNS and the two addresses in question, there was good reason to assume that the documents relevant to the audit of SNS were to be found at those addresses. While a search and seizure undertaken at a location different from the audited party’s business premises involved a particular encroachment on rights of integrity, the court found that, in the case at hand, the importance of the measures outweighed the intrusion caused. 11. The search of the two designated premises took place on 14 March 2008 and was conducted by officials of the Enforcement Authority (kronofogdemyndigheten) in Stockholm and several auditors of the Tax Agency. The flat was searched first. Present were Mr Carl Lindstrand, a lawyer of the applicant law firm, representing Mr Jurik (who was at the time in Switzerland), and – towards the end of the search – Mr Roland Möller, who, as an associate of the law firm, had been the liquidator of SNS and who was also the designated person to be served writs on behalf of Draupner in Sweden. According to the minutes of the proceedings, drawn up by one of the officers of the Enforcement Authority, the persons present were reminded of the possibility to request exemption of documents. 12. During the search of the flat, material of interest that belonged to Draupner was found. Since Draupner had been involved in transactions connected with the activities of SNS, a decision to audit the company was taken on site by the audit manager of the Tax Agency. She also took an interim decision to use coercive measures against Draupner, in accordance with section 15 of the Coercive Measures Act. It was decided to search for and seize material relating to the audit of Draupner both at the flat and at the applicant law firm. In the latter respect, the decision referred to the fact that not only Mr Jurik but also Mr Möller had offices there. 13. The need for an immediate decision and enforcement was explained by the substantial risk of corruption of material. The decision referred to sections 7-9 of the Coercive Measures Act and to the County Administrative Court’s judgment of 10 March 2008. 14. At the flat 19 files with accounting material, an external hard disk drive and a torn document were seized and the hard disk drive of a computer as well as a USB memory stick were copied (mirrored). This was specified in a report drawn up and submitted to the parties concerned the same day by the Enforcement Authority. 15. The premises of the applicant law firm – that is, the offices of Mr Jurik and Mr Möller – were searched thereafter, again in the presence of Mr Lindstrand and Mr Möller. Attending was also a legal representative whom the applicant had appointed. The issue of possible exemption of documents was discussed and the representative was given a list of the officers attending. Cupboards, shelves and computers in the two offices were searched and a safe was opened by Mr Möller, all monitored by the applicant’s representative. However, no material of relevance was found on the premises. At the end of the proceedings, the applicant’s representative requested that the external hard disk drive and the USB memory stick – seized and copied, respectively, at the flat – be exempted from the audit. 16. The applicant and SNS appealed against the County Administrative Court’s judgment of 10 March 2008. On 7 April 2008 the Administrative Court of Appeal (kammarrätten) in Stockholm dismissed the applicant’s appeal and struck out the case in so far as it concerned SNS. In regard to the applicant, it stated that, while the appealed judgment did indeed allow the use of coercive measures on the premises of the applicant law firm, the reason for this was not that the law firm was the subject of the measures but that it could be assumed that documents relevant to the audit of SNS would be found there. In these circumstances, the appellate court concluded that the applicant was not affected by the appealed judgment in such a way that it was entitled to appeal against it. With respect to SNS, the court considered that, as the coercive measures had already been enforced, it did not have a justified interest in having them examined by a second judicial instance. 17. By a decision of 19 June 2008 the Supreme Administrative Court (Regeringsrätten) refused the applicant and SNS leave to appeal. On 3 July 2008 the court dismissed an appeal in the same matter lodged by Mr Jurik, noting that he had not previously been a party to the case and could not therefore join the proceedings at the level of the Supreme Administrative Court. 18. The Tax Agency’s interim decision of 14 March 2008 to use coercive measures against Draupner was referred to the County Administrative Court, which received it on 17 March 2008, the following Monday. The Agency stated as reasons for its decision that Draupner had had transactions connected to SNS, its subsidiary company, that there had been special reasons to search for material at the applicant law firm as two of Draupner’s representatives, Mr Jurik and Mr Möller, had offices there and that the risk of corruption of material was acute in view of the fact that, during the ongoing enforcement, it had become apparent to persons involved which transactions and connected documents were to be examined. Draupner requested that the decision be quashed, referring, inter alia, to attorney-client privilege pertaining to its representatives. By a judgment of 26 March 2008 the interim decision was confirmed by the court, which found that the seizure of the documents at issue had been justified. The court further considered that there was a substantial risk that the documents would be withheld, corrupted or destroyed if they were returned. 19. Draupner and Mr Jurik appealed to the Administrative Court of Appeal. On 22 August 2008 the court struck out Draupner’s appeal and dismissed that of Mr Jurik. As in the similar case concerning SNS (see paragraph 16 above), the court took into account that the coercive measures had already been enforced and considered therefore that Draupner did not have a justified interest in having them examined by a second judicial instance. In regard to Mr Jurik, it was noted that he had not been a party to the case at the lower court. 20. On 28 January 2009 the Supreme Administrative Court refused Draupner leave to appeal. 21. Draupner also appealed against the Tax Agency’s decision of 14 March 2008 to conduct an audit. On 18 June 2008 the Tax Agency dismissed the appeal because, in accordance with Chapter 6, section 2 of the Tax Assessment Act (Taxeringslagen; 1990:324), no appeal lay against such a decision. This determination was upheld by the County Administrative Court on 11 July 2008. 22. On 19 September 2008 the Administrative Court of Appeal quashed the Tax Agency’s decision to dismiss the appeal and the County Administrative Court’s judgment and referred the case back to the County Administrative Court. The appellate court found that the Tax Agency had lacked a legal basis for its decision; instead of dismissing Draupner’s appeal, it should have submitted it to the County Administrative Court for determination. 23. After a new examination of the case, the County Administrative Court dismissed the appeal in a decision of 3 October 2008, finding that no appeal lay against a decision to conduct a tax audit and that the European Convention was not applicable to such a decision. In addition, it noted that, while the audit decision itself did not involve any harm to Draupner, possible detriment caused by the audit procedure could be removed or mitigated through a request for the exemption of documents from the audit. Such a request was at the time already under examination by the court (see paragraphs 35-43 below). 24. On 15 January 2009 the Administrative Court of Appeal rejected Draupner’s further appeal, agreeing with the lower court’s assessment. 25. By a letter dated 14 March 2008, the day of the search of the flat and the law office, and received by the County Administrative Court on 17 March 2008, the applicant requested that those parts of the material seized and copied at the flat that could concern the law firm be exempted from the audit. It mentioned, in particular, the external hard disk drive and the USB memory stick. Noting that both SNS and Draupner were clients of the law firm, the applicant argued that the material it sought to have exempted was protected by attorney-client privilege. 26. By a decision of 26 March 2008 the County Administrative Court dismissed the request, finding that the applicant lacked legal standing in the matter. It noted that the material had been seized from Draupner and was therefore not under the applicant’s right of disposition. 27. The applicant appealed to the Administrative Court of Appeal, demanding that all seized and copied material except for the files with accounting material be exempted. It also requested that an oral hearing be held on the question of its legal standing in the matter. Mr Jurik joined the applicant’s appeal. 28. On 18 April 2008 the Administrative Court of Appeal refused the request for an oral hearing, finding it unnecessary. 29. By a judgment of 22 August 2008 the Administrative Court of Appeal rejected the applicant’s appeal and agreed with the lower court that the applicant did not have legal standing concerning the requested exemption of documents, as the coercive measures had not been directed against the law firm. Mr Jurik’s appeal was dismissed, as he had not been a party to the case at the lower court. 30. The applicant made a further appeal, stating, among other things, that the Tax Agency’s original interim decision of 14 March 2008 concerning Draupner and the County Administrative Court’s judgment of 26 March 2008 confirming that decision had been directed against the law firm because they allowed a search in the firm’s offices. Moreover, the coercive measures employed had led to the seizure of material which allegedly belonged to the applicant and could contain information covered by attorney-client privilege. In the latter respect, the applicant claimed that the external hard disk drive and the USB memory stick had been used by its associate lawyer Mr Jurik in his work for the firm. 31. On 28 January 2009 the Supreme Administrative Court refused the applicant leave to appeal. 32. In the decision of the Administrative Court of Appeal of 18 April 2008 not to hold an oral hearing (see paragraph 28 above) three judges participated, one of whom was a co-opted member (adjungerad ledamot). She was also a civil servant at the Tax Agency, albeit formally on leave of absence while temporarily serving with the court. The Tax Agency being the opposing party, the applicant challenged her impartiality and called for her disqualification from the case. 33. On 14 May 2008 the Administrative Court of Appeal, sitting in a different formation, rejected the objection, noting that the co-opted member was on leave from her post at the Tax Agency. 34. By a judgment of 5 March 2009 the Supreme Administrative Court, which had regard to Strasbourg case-law, rejected the applicant’s appeal, declaring that the objection had not been justified. It considered that the issue of objective impartiality had to be examined in light of the individual character of the case at hand. In this respect, it noted that the co-opted member’s tasks at the Tax Agency had concerned activities of a different type than those relevant in the case and had been performed in a different part of the country. Furthermore, she was only one of three judges participating in the decision in question, which had concerned a request for an oral hearing. She had not participated in the judgment on the merits of the case. 35. Draupner, represented by Mr Lindstrand, requested that all material seized or copied during the audit be exempted, in particular because it contained information protected by attorney-client privilege pertaining to the applicant law firm and its clients. 36. On 16 October 2008 the County Administrative Court rejected the request. It stated that Draupner was the subject of a tax audit and that all electronic or paper documents linked to the company’s business found on its premises should be considered as belonging to it and being eligible for examination in the audit. The court noted that the company register listed Mr Jurik as a board member and signatory of Draupner. Furthermore, the available evidence in the case showed that he was the representative of the company and that the flat where the search and seizure had taken place constituted the company’s business premises. As the documents at issue had been found at that flat, they should be considered to belong to Draupner, concern its business and, as a rule, be included in the audit. While the coercive measures used could not therefore be considered to have contravened the Coercive Measures Act or the Convention, the question remained whether there were reasons to exempt some or all of the material. Noting that the burden of proof rested with the audited party, the court considered that the company had not demonstrated that the documents were covered by any of the exemptions under the Act. 37. Upon Draupner’s appeal, the Administrative Court of Appeal, on 5 March 2009, decided to quash the County Administrative Court’s judgment and refer the case back to that court. The appellate court found that the lower court had not examined the contents of all the documents, which was a requirement for the assessment of the question of exemption. 38. The County Administrative Court then directed Draupner to specify its request in greater detail, which the company did. By a judgment of 14 September 2009 the court rejected the company’s requests for an oral hearing and an inspection of the flat but granted that a few seized documents be exempted from examination by the Tax Agency, as they were considered to be Mr Jurik’s private documents. It further considered that deleted files, which were readable only after reconstruction, could not be the object of a seizure under the Coercive Measures Act and could therefore neither be exempted nor used by the Tax Agency. 39. Draupner and the Tax Agency appealed. Draupner agreed that 17 of the 19 files seized on 14 March 2008 could be handed over to the Tax Agency for examination, following which the request for exemption concerned the remaining material seized and copied on that day. The Tax Agency requested that it be allowed to examine deleted and reconstructed data files. 40. On 14 September 2010 the Administrative Court of Appeal rejected Draupner’s appeal, but granted that of the Tax Agency. Draupner’s procedural requests for an oral hearing and an inspection were rejected, but the court held a preparatory meeting with the parties to determine the continued proceedings in the case, notably the method for examining the disputed material. The court found that, due to the extremely extensive data material – more than 300,000 files and entries –, it was impossible to examine each and every data file, and the Tax Agency was therefore instructed to list the documents and files it considered as part of its examination after which Draupner would have an opportunity to lodge a new request for exemption. The appellate court agreed with the County Administrative Court’s assessments that the material, including the hard disk drive and the USB memory stick, had been seized on Draupner’s business premises, that there was, accordingly, a presumption that it was included in the audit and eligible for the Tax Agency’s examination and that the burden of proof for exemptions rested with the company, even though a modest level of evidence was sufficient. With regard to Draupner’s assertion that certain documents came under attorney-client privilege, the court noted that the Tax Agency had not ordered a law firm to provide information in the case and that the documents had not been seized at a law firm. It also considered that the particular circumstances of the case did not show that certain documents were protected by such privilege. 41. On 15 November 2010 the Supreme Administrative Court refused Draupner leave to appeal. 42. After the Tax Agency had listed the documents and files it wished to examine, Draupner made a new application for exemption of documents which was partially approved by the County Administrative Court on 24 November 2011 in regard to some documents which were considered to be of a private nature. However, none of the documents for which exemption had been requested were found to have such content that attorney-client privilege applied. 43. On 21 February 2012 the Administrative Court of Appeal upheld the lower court’s judgment. On 8 May 2012 the Supreme Administrative Court (now Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen) refused Draupner leave to appeal. 44. The applicant and Mr Jurik made a complaint to the Parliamentary Ombudsman (Justitieombudsmannen) against the handling of the case by the Tax Agency, the County Administrative Court and the Administrative Court of Appeal and assessments made by these instances. On 11 December 2008 the Ombudsman found no reason to take action. 45. The applicant also petitioned for a re-opening of the Supreme Administrative Court’s decision of 28 January 2009 not to grant leave to appeal in the case concerning the applicant’s request for exemption of documents. This petition was rejected by the Supreme Administrative Court on 20 September 2010. 46. The audits concerning SNS and Draupner were eventually discontinued and no taxation decisions were taken on the basis of the audits. All documents were returned to Draupner. Like SNS, Draupner has since been liquidated.

4. The applicants were owners of flats in Moscow and Yekaterinburg. The municipal authorities reclaimed the flats, and the applicants’ title to the real property in question was annulled. 5. Ye. resided in the flat at 7-1-50 Ulitsa Burakova, Moscow, under a social housing agreement. On 12 December 2003 Ye. died. 6. On 22 December 2003 an unidentified person using the documents in the name of A. (hereinafter referred to as “A.”) had the flat registered as her place of residence and moved into the flat. As it was later established by the police, A. submitted to the registration authorities a written consent for her registration in the flat allegedly signed by Ye. on 11 December 2003. 7. On 28 August 2007 the Housing Department transferred the ownership of the flat to A. under the privatisation scheme. A.’s title to the flat was verified and registered by state authorities. 8. On 10 October 2007 A. sold the flat to the applicant. The transaction and the applicant’s title to the flat were verified and registered by state authorities. 9. According to the Government, the applicant did not move into the flat. She rented it to a third party. 10. On 15 February 2010 the police opened a criminal investigation into the fraudulent acquisition of the flat by A. The Government did not inform of its outcome. 11. On 16 May 2012 the Housing Department brought a civil claim seeking invalidation of all the transactions with the flat, transfer of the title to the flat to the City of Moscow, and the applicant’s eviction. 12. On 19 December 2012 the Izmailovskiy District Court of Moscow granted the Housing Department’s claims in full. The court considered the housing and privatisation agreements to the benefit of A. to be null and void and reinstated the City’s title to the flat. The court also dismissed the applicant’s argument that she had bought a flat in good faith noting that the purchase price she had paid for the flat had been below the market value. Nor had she demostrated due care or diligence when buying the flat. She “had not shown any interest in the flat or persons who had it registered as their place of residence”. Lastly, the court ordered the applicant’s eviction. The applicant appealed. 13. On 30 May 2013 the City Court upheld the judgment of 19 December 2012 on appeal. 14. On 11 October 2013 the City Court rejected the applicant’s cassation appeal. 15. The flat at 10-94 Ulitsa Shchorsa, Yekaterinburg, was owned by the City of Yekaterinburg. T. resided there as a tenant under the social housing agreement with the city from 1966 until her death on 16 April 2009. On 5 May 2009 the municipal authorities were informed of her death and annulled her registration in the flat. 16. On 7 May 2009 the city administration asked the police to carry out an inquiry as regards the persons residing in the flat. The police sealed off the flat. The Government did not inform of the outcome of the inquiry. 17. On an unspecified date Tikh. applied to the state registration authorities for the registration of the sale of the flat by T. to her. According to the documents submitted with the application, on 5 June 1992 the title to the flat was transferred from the City of Yekaterinburg to T. under the privatisation scheme and on 16 January 1997 T. sold the flat to Tikh. The sale was verified and registered by the state authorities and the title to the flat was transferred to Tikh. on 5 February 2010. 18. On 11 August 2010 Tikh. sold the flat to the applicant. The transaction was verified and registered by state authorities. 19. On 26 November 2012 the city administration brought an action seeking the invalidation of all the transactions with the flat. 20. On 19 December 2013 the Leninskiy District Court of Yekaterinburg invalidated the privatisation agreement and transferred the title to the City of Yekaterinburg. The court established that T. had not applied for the privatisation of the flat. Nor had she sold it to Tikh. 21. On 19 March 2014 the Sverdlovsk Regional Court upheld the judgment of 19 December 2013 on appeal.

5. The applicant was born in 1986 and lives in Sumy. 6. The applicant had relations with V., a female student born in 1989. On 24 March 2008 V. gave birth to their daughter. On 29 August 2008 the applicant and V. registered their marriage. 7. From the time of the birth of the child the couple and their daughter lived in the applicant’s flat in Sumy. The applicant’s parents lived in the same flat and assisted the parents in bringing up the child. 8. In 2009 the applicant and V. were absent from home for six months, as they were working abroad. During their absence the applicant’s parents took care of the child. 9. In October 2010 the child was admitted to a child-minding centre in Sumy. 10. Between 2010 and 2011 V. worked abroad for six months. During that time the child was taken care of by the applicant and his parents. While working abroad, V. transferred funds to the applicant to support the family. 11. Relations between the applicant and V. grew worse and on 20 September 2011, after a quarrel with the applicant, V. took the child and moved from the flat without the agreement or knowledge of the applicant. The applicant was not informed of the place to where V. and the child moved to live. 12. On 28 September 2011 the applicant asked the police to establish the whereabouts of the child. He and his parents also conducted their own enquiries. 13. As was further established in the course of the domestic proceedings, V. moved to the village of Bezdryk, near Sumy, where she apparently cohabited with her uncle, F. (born in 1967). The applicant’s child was admitted to the child-minding centre located in the same village. 14. On 1 December 2011 the applicant found the child at the Bezdryk child-minding centre. According to the applicant, the child’s body bore bruises. He took the child back to his flat in Sumy and the following day submitted her for medical examination. 15. On 2 December 2011 a forensic medical expert examined the child and reported a red spot on the chin, measuring 1.5 cm by 0.8 , which – in the expert’s opinion – was “a sign of an earlier abrasion”. The expert also documented two abrasions on the nose, measuring 0.4 cm by 0.3 cm and 0.3 cm by 0.2 cm; a bruise on the back, measuring 2 cm by 1 cm; two bruises on the right shin, measuring 1.8 cm by 1 cm and 1.5 cm by 1 cm; and a red, itchy spot in the abdominal area. The expert stated that the injuries could have been caused by blunt objects three or four days before the examination. 16. The applicant asked the police to carry out a criminal investigation in connection with the injuries sustained by his daughter, who had allegedly explained that the injuries had been inflicted by V. 17. After her return to Sumy, the child continued to live with the applicant and his parents. V. was given access to the child only in the presence of the applicant or other persons that he trusted. 18. On 9 December 2011 the Zarichnyy district police of Sumy refused to open a criminal investigation in respect of the alleged abduction of the child, stating that the facts of the case did not indicate that the crime of child abduction had been committed. It was noted that the couple had not divorced and it had yet to be determined by the court with whom the child should reside. 19. On 13 December 2011 the Trostyanetskyy district police of the Sumy Region refused to open a criminal investigation in connection with the child’s injuries, as determined on 1 December 2011, for lack of corpus delicti. According to the police decision, the seriousness of the injuries had not been established; however, if the injuries had been minor, the applicant was free to institute a private prosecution against the person concerned. 20. On 28 March and 9 April 2012 the applicant’s mother requested the law-enforcement authorities to institute criminal proceedings against V. and F. under Article 156 § 2 of the Criminal Code. She considered that the child could have been a victim of sexual abuse in the period during which the latter had been living together with V. and F. in the village of Bezdryk. The applicant’s mother submitted that the child had told her personal stories which suggested that V. and F. might have engaged in sexual activities in view of the child and that F. had shown his genitals to the child. 21. On 9 April 2012, in the course of a pre-investigation inquiry, the applicant’s daughter was interviewed in the presence of the applicant’s mother. The child explained that during her stay with the mother in the village of Bezdryk she had regularly observed V. and F. naked, embracing and kissing each other and engaging in some “backwards and forwards movements” which she had not been able to understand; F. had taught the child how to kiss in an adult fashion, uncovered his genitals in front of her and asked her to touch his genitals. 22. On 14 April, 16 May and 31 October 2012 the Sumy district police, having conducted the pre-investigation inquiries, refused to open criminal proceedings for lack of corpus delicti. Those decisions were quashed as unsubstantiated by the supervising prosecutors, who ordered further measures, such as establishing the whereabouts of F. (who had not been interviewed), identifying and interviewing possible witnesses, inspecting the premises and the yard where the alleged crime could have been committed, and undertaking medical and psychological examinations of the child. 23. On 8 November 2012 the Sumy district police once again refused to open criminal proceedings against V. and F. on the grounds that there had been no corpus delicti. In their decision the police referred to the interviews with the applicant’s child, V., and other people. V. denied the allegations. F. could not be interviewed as he had moved abroad. In sum, the Sumy district police concluded that the available material had been insufficient to suggest that any crime had been committed. 24. On 8 May 2013 the applicant, relying on the new Code of Criminal Procedure of 2012, requested that an investigation be opened against V. and F. in respect of the alleged child sexual abuse. On the same day the Sumy district police opened a criminal investigation under Article 156 § 2 of the Criminal Code. The applicant was admitted to the proceedings as the representative of his daughter. 25. The investigator ordered that measures be undertaken to establish the whereabouts of F. During the investigation V. denied the allegations and submitted that she had been a victim of domestic violence, that she had been threatened and beaten by the applicant, and that this had prompted her to run away with the child on 20 September 2011; she also submitted that she had moved to the village of Bezdryk, where her grandfather lived, and that she had had no sexual relations with F., her uncle. When questioned, the applicant and his mother insisted on the truth of their previous statements. They underwent polygraph examinations which suggested that they had told the truth in their submissions. 26. On 3 October 2013 the applicant’s daughter was questioned in the presence of a psychologist and her grandmother (the applicant’s mother). The applicant’s daughter submitted in particular that F. had taken her hand and placed it on his genitals; that F. had taught her to kiss in an adult fashion; and that F. and V. had engaged in certain activities which she had not been able to understand and which she had earlier described to the applicant and the grandmother. 27. On 21 November 2013 a panel of experts carried out a forensic psychiatric examination of the applicant’s daughter. In the course of the examination, the child stated that F. had been touching her genitals and she, in compliance with his commands, had had to touch F.’s genitals. F. taught her to kiss in an adult fashion. The child stated that she had seen V. and F. naked and kissing each other; she then described the movements that she had observed V. and F. engaging in while in bed. 28. The experts found that the child had not been suffering from any mental illness at the time of the events or at the time of the examination; that she had not shown any tendency to fantasise; and that she was able to remember the circumstances of the events at issue and to give truthful statements in that regard. However, she could not understand the meaning of the actions that she had observed or in which she had participated. The experts concluded that the child could take part in the investigative measures. 29. On 9 April 2014 the deputy head of the investigation division of the Sumy regional police department ordered the investigator in charge of the case to immediately speed up the investigation, which, in his opinion, was being conducted too slowly. He requested the investigator to undertake a number of investigative measures. 30. On 28 April and 29 September 2014 the Sumy district police closed the criminal proceedings for lack of corpus delicti in the actions of V. and F. Having assessed the available material, the investigator found that there had been insufficient evidence submitted to enable the bringing of charges of sexual abuse. In the last decision the investigator also referred to the statements by F. who was questioned on 20 September 2014 and who denied all the allegations, arguing that they were totally false. 31. These two decisions were reversed as unsubstantiated by the supervising prosecutors, who ordered further investigation. 32. On 27 December 2014 the Sumy district police decided once again to close the criminal proceedings. In examining the statements of the applicant’s daughter, the investigator considered that these statements could not convincingly prove the alleged events since the child had made those statements belatedly; furthermore, the child had only been three years old at the time of the events in question. The investigator furthermore noted that these statements did not suggest anything in respect of mens rea, in particular whether there was any sexual intent in V.’s and F.’s alleged actions in relation to the child, or whether they had been aware of the fact that the child had been observing them during the alleged instances of sexual intercourse. 33. The investigator then referred to the statements of the applicant and his mother, as well as of the mothers of two girls with whom the child had used to play. The latter two women stated in particular that the applicant’s daughter had told them stories which had suggested that she had been subjected to sexual abuse while she had been living with V. and F. The investigator noted that those individuals had not directly observed the alleged instances of sexual abuse and that they had simply repeated statements made by the child. The investigator then stated that V. and F. denied the allegations of child sexual abuse. Other people, such as the child’s teacher at the child-minding centre and village inhabitants, had not provided any more precise information. Overall, the investigator concluded that the available material had been insufficient for him to conclude that V. and F. had committed the alleged crime. 34. On 6 March 2015 the Sumy district prosecutor’s office reversed the decision of 27 December 2014 as unsubstantiated. The supervising prosecutor found that the previous instructions given by the prosecutor’s office had not been followed and that it was necessary to take further investigative measures. 35. As of 20 January 2016, the investigation was ongoing. 36. On 20 June 2012 the Zarichnyy District Court of Sumy dissolved the marriage between the applicant and V. and ruled that the child should live with V. The court ordered the applicant to hand over the child to V. and to pay her a monthly amount for the support of their daughter. 37. In determining the place of the child’s residence, the court first established that until 20 September 2011 the child had lived with both parents and her paternal grandparents in the applicant’s flat and that all of them had participated in the upbringing of the child; the paternal grandparents had taken care of the child when both parents had been abroad for six months in 2009; when V. had been abroad for six months over 2010 and 2011 she had transferred money earned by her to the applicant to cover the needs of the family. On 25 October 2010 the child had been admitted to the child-minding centre in Sumy; the child had been accompanied to and from the centre by the applicant. 38. The court also established that on 20 September 2011 V. had taken the child and moved from the flat because of conflict between her and the applicant. On 25 October 2011 the child had been admitted to the child‑minding centre in the village of Bezdryk. The child had been accompanied to and from the centre by her mother. On 1 December 2011 the child had been taken from the centre by her father. Since that time the child had been living again in the applicant’s flat in Sumy. 39. In comparing the applicant’s flat and the flat where V. was then living, the court found that both flats were located in Sumy and offered appropriate conditions for the residence of the child. In that regard the court referred to the report of the local guardianship office, which stated that both parents provided adequate residential conditions for the child. As to the income of the parents, the father was employed and received a salary; the mother was a student but worked unofficially and had been abroad to earn money. Both parents had positive reference letters and the child had an equal attitude towards both of them. 40. The court dismissed as unsubstantiated the applicant’s allegation that the mother was negligent with the child and that she might have exercised physical violence against the child: in contrast to the results of the medical examination of 2 December 2011 documenting the injuries on the child’s body (see paragraph 15 above), the staff of the Bezdryk child-minding centre had signed a certificate stating that on 1 December 2011 the child had had no injuries; furthermore, the police had refused to institute criminal investigation in respect of the child’s injuries (see paragraph 19 above). The court concluded that there was no link between V.’s attitude towards the child and the latter’s injuries. 41. Relying on the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of the Child of 1959 the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and Article 161 of the Family Code, the court found that the facts did not disclose any exceptional circumstances which could justify the separation of the child from her mother. Consequently, it determined that the child should reside with her mother. 42. The applicant appealed against that decision, arguing that the first‑instance court had breached substantive and procedural provisions of domestic legislation and international law. He submitted that in determining the place of the child’s residence the court should have been guided by the principle of the best interests of the child. The applicant insisted that on 20 September 2011 V. had secretly moved with the child from the flat and destroyed the stability of the child’s everyday life. The court had failed to properly examine the allegations that V. had behaved violently towards the child and the possibility that the child had been the target of sexual abuse during the period when she had lived apart from her father with her mother. The applicant emphasised that on 1 December 2011 he had lawfully taken the child back to his flat since the child had previously been permanently living in his flat and he had never given any consent for V. to change the child’s place of residence. In his opinion, the court had paid no attention to the fact that the child had been attached to the paternal grandparents and that her separation from them would be detrimental to her interests. Furthermore, the respective financial capacity of the applicant and V., as well as the residential conditions, had not been properly assessed. Important pieces of evidence had not been included in the case file and part of the evidence had been assessed wrongly – namely, the certificate issued by the Bezdryk child-minding centre regarding the child’s good state of health was a fabricated document that had been discredited by the forensic medical expert report of 2 December 2011. 43. On 9 August 2012 the Sumy Regional Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the decision of the first-instance court. The Court of Appeal found that the allegations of child abduction, sexual abuse and physical violence had been groundless. As to the child’s attachment to the paternal grandparents, the Court of Appeal considered that the parents played a more important role in the upbringing of the child. Overall, the findings of the first-instance court had been lawful and reasonable. 44. On 14 September 2012 the Higher Specialised Court for Civil and Criminal Matters dismissed a cassation appeal lodged by the applicant as unfounded.

5. The applicant was born in 1981 and lives in Veshenskaya, a village in the Rostov Region. 6. According to the applicant, on an unspecified date at the end of June 2002 he was sitting in a cafe. He saw P. there, a police officer and former schoolmate who was drunk and making indecent suggestions to a girl. The applicant, in his words, reprimanded P. for his behaviour, to which he replied with a vague threat. 7. Between about 10.30 and 11 p.m. on 9 July 2002 the applicant was hit by a car while on the pavement. The driver was P., who was accompanied by a passenger, Ms S.K. The accident took place in a recreational area in the centre of the village. As a result, the applicant suffered severe head and spinal injuries. P.’s car was also damaged. With the help of a passer‑by, G., P. loaded the semi‑conscious applicant into his car and drove him away from the scene of the accident. 8. At about 11 p.m. P. arrived with the applicant at a local hospital. The applicant was able to walk but was suffering from memory loss, was disoriented and did not understand what had just happened. His condition started to worsen; at about midnight he was transferred to the hospital’s intensive care unit. 9. According to the applicant, having seen what he had done, P. called his father, the chief of the local tax police and former chief of the local traffic police. P.’s father called his acquaintances, A., a traffic police officer, and M., the head of the laboratory of the local hospital. He explained to them what had happened and asked if they would help protect his son. The Government did not comment on this allegation. 10. Shortly after the applicant’s admission to the hospital A. arrived and spoke to the applicant. At 12.15 a.m. on 10 July 2002 he drew up a report stating that the applicant had fallen down the stairs of a nearby cafe and had injured himself. He made the applicant sign the report. No mention of the car accident was made. The report contained a handwritten entry, apparently in the applicant’s own handwriting, which read: “Recorded from my words, I have read it”. The report was then submitted to Sholokhovskiy police station, where the accident was logged in the daily accident record as “no. 2”. 11. At 12.20 a.m. on 10 July 2002, M. arrived at the hospital in P.’s father’s car and took samples of the applicant’s blood. After testing them she concluded that his blood contained a high level of alcohol (1.9 per mille), which meant he had been drunk at the time of the accident. The applicant was unconscious when M. took the samples. She also took blood from P. The tests showed the presence of 0.4 per mille of alcohol in his blood (the then acceptable legal limit for driving a car). The applicant alleged that the results of the tests had been falsified by M. He referred to the testimony of two staff members of the hospital, who later testified that he had not been drunk. The applicant also pointed to inconsistencies in the report by A. and the results of subsequent tests of the samples of his blood, which had revealed different levels of alcohol. 12. At about 1.15 a.m. the applicant’s parents arrived at the hospital. According to the applicant, they did not smell any alcohol on him. Furthermore, the entries made by the hospital personnel about his condition and the nature of his injuries were incomplete. No mention of his spinal injury had thus been made, since the existence of such an injury would have gone against the story that he had fallen down the stairs. Furthermore, the hospital authorities had washed his t-shirt, which contained traces of his blood and could have confirmed his version of events. 13. In the meantime P. left the hospital and returned to the scene of the accident. According to the official examination report, the police examined the scene between 1 and 2 a.m. on 10 July 2002. P. took part in the examination, together with police officers from Sholokhovskiy police station. He signed the report, as did the attesting witnesses present. The applicant claimed that the examination had taken place much later in the day, during the afternoon. 14. According to the applicant, later that day P. drove his car to a garage, where it was quickly repaired and the broken windscreen replaced. 15. At 1.45 a.m. on 10 July 2002 the applicant’s father arrived at Sholokhovskiy police station and tried to formally report the car accident. However, the officer on duty refused to accept it, referring to the earlier report by A. stating that the applicant had fallen down the stairs. 16. Between 2 and 3 a.m. doctors at the hospital made an encephalogram of the applicant’s head and took samples of his spinal fluid. 17. At 10 a.m. a second test of the applicant’s blood was carried out, which showed the presence of 0.2 per mille of alcohol. A further test of the same sample showed the presence of 0.1 per mille of alcohol. 18. The applicant’s first operation took place at about 1.30 p.m. on 10 July 2002 and was carried out by Dr Zh, a surgeon from the hospital. His condition, however, remained very unstable and continued to worsen. His relatives suspected that when they had left the hospital, someone had tried to strangle him to death, because upon their return they had discovered marks on his neck. They also blamed the hospital authorities for their inaction in dealing with the applicant’s case. 19. That day the police examined P.’s car. It appears from the report of the examination that the car had dents on the right side of the bonnet and on the front right windscreen support. The police did not mention the windscreen in their report. It is unclear whether the car was examined before or after it had been repaired. 20. At 9 a.m. on 13 July 2002 the local hospital requested the help of the Rostov City Hospital at the insistence of the applicant’s relatives. A neurosurgeon arrived at about 3.30 p.m. and performed further surgery, which was more successful. The applicant started to recover. A few days later he was transferred to the Rostov City Hospital for further treatment. In the years that followed he had to undergo a further two neurosurgical operations, but he never recovered completely; he lost the ability to work and started to suffer from repeated epileptic fits. He was registered as Category 2 disabled (where Category 1 corresponds to a severe disability preventing a person from working, and Category 3 corresponds to a less severe disability). 21. According to the applicant, on 12 July 2002 the Sholokhovskiy district police informed the District Prosecutor about the incident on 9 July 2002. The Government did not comment. 22. On 16 July 2002 the Sholokhovskiy District Prosecutor’s Office opened a criminal investigation into the accident (registered as case no. 2707168). The applicant alleged that the investigator in charge of the case, M., had been a schoolmate and close friend of P. He also alleged that the date the decision was taken to open an investigation was incorrect, as the case had in fact been opened on 18 July 2002. 23. On 17 July 2002 the investigator started questioning witnesses. G., who had been with the applicant on the night of 9 July and helped take him to the hospital, testified that the applicant had not been drinking that evening. He also testified that the applicant had been walking parallel to the road when the car had hit him. His account was confirmed by the testimony of several other witnesses. In contrast, some other witnesses testified that the applicant had suddenly moved in the direction of the car a second before the collision. Several witnesses had also noticed that the windscreen of the car of P. had been broken after the incident. It appears that the investigator identified and questioned more than twelve witnesses who had seen the accident or observed the events immediately afterwards. The investigator also questioned paramedics from the local hospital, some of whom testified that P. had probably been drunk. Others had not noticed anything of that kind. 24. On 19 July 2002 the investigator examined the car again. His report suggests that the car did not have any visible dents, but evidence of repair work was discovered on the front right windscreen support. 25. On 23 July 2002 the investigator questioned P. again. It appears that he was questioned as a witness. He claimed that the applicant had made a dangerous unexpected move in the direction of the car. He also denied that the car had sustained any damage to the windscreen or the front right windscreen support. 26. On 29 July 2002 the investigator examined the scene of the accident. It was established, amongst other things, that it had taken place in an area marked as a pedestrian zone. There was a road sign prohibiting cars from access, although it was unclear whether it had been there on the night of the accident and had been visible. 27. On 29 July 2002 a forensic expert tested a sample of P.’s blood, obtained from him on 10 July 2002. The expert did not find any traces of alcohol. A similar test of a sample of the applicant’s blood revealed the presence of 2.9 per mille of alcohol. 28. On 31 July 2002 the investigator conducted a reconstruction of the accident, in the presence of P. Neither the applicant nor his parents were notified or participated. 29. On 1 August 2002 a forensic expert drew up a report examining the nature of the applicant’s injuries and making conclusions as to the speed and direction P.’s car had been travelling, the position of the applicant’s body at the time of the accident, and other relevant factors. 30. On 2 August 2002 the investigator questioned P.’s father who explained, among other things, that the dent on the bonnet of the car was not related to the accident involving the applicant. P. testified that he had arranged for the car to be repaired a few days before the accident. 31. On 6 August 2002 the applicant’s father complained to the Regional Prosecutor that the investigator M. had been leaking information about the investigation to P.’s father. He asked that the case be transferred to another investigator from a neighbouring district. 32. On 12 August 2002 the applicant’s father submitted to the investigator in charge of the case a list of over a dozen witnesses who had seen the accident. He asked the investigator to summon and question them. 33. On 5 September 2002 the applicant was granted victim status in the investigation. On 6 and 25 September 2002 the investigator questioned him. The applicant testified, among other things, that he had not been drinking on the day of the accident. He also claimed that he had been walking straight when the car had hit him from behind. 34. On 9 September 2002 the investigator organised a reconstruction of the accident in the presence of the applicant, P. and G. 35. On 17 September 2002 the investigator questioned M. She denied falsifying the results of the blood test. The difference between the original and second blood tests could, in her words, be explained by a different testing method and the acceptable margin of error. 36. On an unspecified date experts examined the applicant’s clothes in order to establish the mechanics of the injuries. 37. On 25 September 2002 P. was questioned again, this time as a suspect in the criminal case. He refused to give evidence. 38. On 27 September 2002 the investigator questioned an expert, who explained the difference between the results of the two tests of the blood samples taken from the applicant and P. 39. On 2 October 2002 the investigator questioned the applicant’s father. 40. On 4 December 2002 a team of experts produced a report analysing the applicant’s injuries and the mechanics of the accident. They answered twenty‑two questions which had been formulated by the investigator. 41. On 10 January 2003 the applicant lodged a civil claim against P. in connection with the health problems he had suffered as a result of the accident. 42. On 19 January 2003 P. was ordered by the investigator not to leave the village without his consent. 43. On 14 February 2003 P. was formally charged under Article 264 § 1 of the Criminal Code for causing serious bodily harm by negligently breaching traffic regulations. He was questioned but denied his guilt. 44. On 24 March 2003 the investigator questioned the deputy head of Sholokhovskiy police station, Ch., who had been an eyewitness to the accident. 45. On 26 April 2003 a further reconstruction of the accident was carried out. 46. On 14 May 2003 the applicant obtained an expert report from the Volgograd Forensics Bureau, in which the events of 9 July 2002 were reconstructed on the basis of the material of the case file. 47. On 20 March 2003 the applicant was examined by medical experts. 48. On 15 April 2003 doctors examined X-ray images of the applicant’s neck and drew up a report. 49. On 27 August 2003 P. started working at Sholokhovskiy police station as a district police officer. On 7 July 2003 two witnesses to the accident, S. and B., complained to the district prosecutor that pressure had been put on them by P. in connection with his criminal case. 50. On 22 November 2003 the investigator obtained another expert examination of the applicant’s injuries and the mechanics of the accident. 51. On 24 December 2003 the prosecutor approved the indictment against P. By the end of the investigation, the case file was nine volumes and over three thousand pages long. The applicant was given access to the case material. 52. On 26 December 2003 the applicant brought proceedings to challenge the investigator’s decision, as he was dissatisfied with the accident being classified as an Article 264 § 1 offence. He applied for an injunction requiring the investigator to instead charge P. under Article 111 § 2 (intent to cause serious bodily harm). On 29 January 2004 the Sholokhovskiy District Court dismissed his complaint; it held that the courts had no jurisdiction to review the decisions of the investigator in so far as they concerned the legal classification of a criminal charge, since such a decision did not interfere with the applicant’s constitutional rights and freedoms. 53. On an unspecified date in early 2004 the investigation was completed, and the parties were given access to the case material. The investigator’s decision of 27 April 2004 stated that the applicant’s father had studied it. According to him, he only had five-and-a-half hours to study the material, which consisted of four files, each three hundred pages long. During that time he was only able to read part of the material and copy one hundred and thirty pages. The last volume of the case file was incomplete and did not contain an index of documents. As a result, the applicant had to request additional time to examine the case file during the court proceedings. A handwritten inscription he had written indicating that he had not read all the material allegedly disappeared from the case file. 54. On 5 January 2004 the criminal case and indictment were forwarded to the Sholokhovskiy District Court for examination on the merits. 55. On 12 February 2004 the Sholokhovskiy District Court ruled that the first hearing in the case would be held on 26 February 2004, and that there was no need to hold a preliminary hearing. The applicant objected, claiming that one was necessary. 56. The hearings in the case were held on 26 February, 11 June and 5 July 2004. 57. On 13 September 2004 the Sholokhovskiy District Court found P. guilty under Article 264 § 1 of the Criminal Code and sentenced him to eighteen months’ imprisonment, although he was not required to serve his sentence owing to the expiry of the statutory limitation period for crimes of that category. As to the civil claim lodged by the applicant within the criminal proceedings, the court awarded him 50,000 Russian roubles (RUB) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. It also acknowledged that he had a right to compensation in respect of pecuniary damage but decided to transfer the matter to a civil court for examination because it was impossible to make a precise calculation within the criminal proceedings. 58. On 26 November 2004 P. was dismissed from service in the police at his own request. 59. On 28 December 2004 the Rostov Regional Court quashed the judgment of 13 September 2004 and remitted the case for fresh examination. In particular, it ordered the lower court to clarify whether the road sign could have been visible to P. on the night of the accident. 60. In the course of the second round of the trial the court examined documentary evidence in the case file and heard over twenty witnesses, including the applicant, P., M., the applicant’s parents, several people who had seen the accident, police officers who had been involved in the initial inquiry, two expert witnesses, attesting witnesses and a number of hearsay witnesses. 61. On 8 April 2005 the Sholokhovskiy District Court found P. guilty under Article 264 § 1 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Its findings of fact can be summarised as follows. The court found that P.’s car had been moving at 30 to 40 km/h. The car had entered the pedestrian zone, which had been marked by a road sign, and had hit the applicant from behind. He had been walking straight and had not contributed in any manner to the accident. P. had been able to avoid collision by manoeuvring or stopping his car, but for whatever reason he had not done so. He had applied the brakes a while after the collision. As a result of the collision, the applicant had received life‑threatening injuries. No mention was made of P. or the applicant being drunk during the accident. The court was also unable to make any conclusive findings as to when the dents on P.’s car had been repaired, or whether or not the windscreen had been broken. It concluded that the injuries had been caused to the applicant by P.’s carelessness, but not deliberately. The court sentenced P. to eighteen months’ imprisonment, although again he was not required to serve his sentence owing to the expiry of the statutory limitation period for crimes of a less serious nature. The court awarded the applicant RUB 50,000 in respect of non‑pecuniary damage. As to compensation for pecuniary damage, the court referred the case to a civil court. The Sholokhovskiy District Court specified that although the applicant had produced contracts, receipts and other documents to support his claim for pecuniary damages, he had failed to explain the amounts claimed and the court was therefore unable to make a precise calculation. 62. Both parties appealed. 63. On 31 May 2005 the Rostov Regional Court amended the decision of the first-instance court. Confirming its conclusions as to the facts of the case and their legal classification, the court decided that P. could not be held guilty, owing to the expiry of the statutory limitation period. As a result, the judgment of the first-instance court was quashed in its entirety and the proceedings discontinued. The Rostov Regional Court’s judgment did not make reference to the civil award made by the first-instance court. 64. On an unspecified date the applicant brought civil proceedings against P. claiming compensation for health damage, moral suffering, loss of earning capacity and the inability to live a normal life. The applicant’s relatives also lodged separate claims within the same proceedings. The applicant claimed compensation of RUB 1,118,307 for past medical expenses, 6,000 United States dollars (USD) for a year’s loss of earnings, 100,000 euros (EUR) for future surgery and medical expenses, and EUR 2,000 a month for health damage. In addition, he claimed USD 100,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 65. On 8 August 2005 the Sholokhovskiy District Court, at the applicant’s request, ordered that the car belonging to P. be temporarily seized. 66. On 10 August 2005 the Sholokhovskiy District Court allowed the applicant’s claims in part. 67. On 10 October 2005 the Rostov Regional Court quashed that decision and remitted the case for fresh examination. 68. Since all the judges working in the Sholokhovskiy District Court had participated in the earlier proceedings, the case was transferred to a court in an adjacent district, the Verkhnedonskoy District Court, situated 50 kilometres from the applicant’s village. The applicant, who was a wheelchair user at the time, objected without success. 69. In those proceedings the plaintiffs (the applicant and his relatives) amended their claims. In particular, they claimed that damages should be paid by the State, because P. had been a police officer at the time of the events. 70. The applicant formulated his claims in respect of pecuniary damage as follows. The accident and resulting injuries had deprived him of the ability to work. Although the applicant, who was a qualified naval operator mechanic, had had no actual work at the time, he had been promised an offer of employment overseas on a cargo ship, and had been on a waiting list for a job. If he had accepted that job, his salary would have amounted to USD 2,500 per month. Consequently, he asked to be compensated the three years’ salary he would have earned but for the accident (USD 82,500)[1]. Further, he asked for reimbursement of various medical expenses, including several operations and consultations in Rostov and Moscow, and legal costs related to his participation in the proceedings against P. (RUB 1,031,120). He also claimed reimbursement of his expenses related to a special diet he had to follow, and the personal assistance he had required during his periods of complete disability. Lastly, the applicant claimed that he still needed further surgery, which could only be done at a clinic in Germany because he had developed several brain cysts as a result of the previous operations (EUR 200,000). Lastly, he claimed compensation for his expenses for having to retrain in another field, which would enable him to work again (RUB 970,000). 71. As to non-pecuniary damages, the applicant claimed RUB 4,320,000 under this head, referring mostly to the same facts and the suffering caused by the accident, the subsequent surgery, his participation in the proceedings, and lost opportunities related to his disability. 72. The representative of the State claimed that the State could not be held responsible for the accident. In their words, liability would arise when two conditions were met: if the damage was caused in the course of realisation of the State’s public functions, and if the State’s acts were unlawful. Where damage was caused in the context of an economic activity, it should be compensated in the ordinary way, by the immediate wrongdoer. P. had injured the applicant while driving his own car, and had not been on duty at the time. He had therefore had to be the defendant in the civil proceedings, not the State. 73. On an unspecified date the court obtained (through the applicant or otherwise) a letter from an employment assistance agency, Panigo, dated 28 March 2003. It said that the agency had an opening for the applicant on an overseas voyage on a six-month contract basis, with a salary of USD 2,500. A letter from another shipping company, Valmars Ltd, which had the applicant’s name on a waiting list for an offer of employment at the time of the accident, said that he could have earned USD 550 working as an operator mechanic on a ship in 2003. It also indicated that on overseas voyages on foreign ships, the pay of operator mechanics varied between USD 700 and 2,300. 74. On 5 June 2006 the Verkhnedonskoy District Court gave judgment in the civil case. The court’s findings of fact were almost identical to the findings of the criminal court. It concluded that P. had been fully responsible for the injuries caused to the applicant. As to the amount of pecuniary damages, the court noted that the applicant had only been on a waiting list for future employment and had not received an actual job offer. At the time of the accident he had been unemployed. Moreover, it could be seen from the material in the case file that he could not have obtained a job as a naval operator mechanic on overseas voyages in 2002 owing to a lack of previous work experience and his poor English. Furthermore, the applicant had a chronic kidney problem, which would have prevented him from going overseas. As a result, the court calculated the applicant’s loss of earnings as five times the minimum wage and took into consideration the “minimum subsistence level” which existed at the relevant time in the area where the applicant lived. The resulting amount for loss of earnings for the period under consideration was RUB 117,645 (approximately EUR 3,415). The court also ordered that the defendant pay him RUB 2,690 (approximately EUR 80) every month until the next expert examination of his health. The court also partially satisfied the applicant’s claims concerning the reimbursement of his medical expenses (RUB 5,321) and his and his father’s travel expenses connected to consultations in Moscow clinics (RUB 4,070) and the cost of those consultations (RUB 23,265). The part of the applicant’s claim related to his special diet, treatments, legal and postal expenses and so forth were dismissed by the court as unnecessary, unsubstantiated, or not actually incurred. In particular, the court held that further treatment in Germany had not been proven necessary by the plaintiff. 75. The court ordered P. to pay non-pecuniary damages, dismissing the claims against the State. The court fixed the amount of compensation referring to, inter alia, the defendant’s financial situation, at RUB 50,000 (approximately EUR 1,460). The overall amount to be recovered from P. was RUB 200,301 (approximately EUR 5,850). The court dismissed the claims of the applicant’s relatives as unsubstantiated. 76. The applicant lodged an appeal, but it appears to have been dismissed by the Rostov Regional Court on 12[2] July 2006. 77. The amount of compensation awarded by the Verkhnedonskoy District Court was paid in full by 2008. 78. According to the applicant, during the trial P. made repeated death threats towards him and other members of his family. As a result of that stressful situation, the health of some his relatives worsened and they have since died. The applicant asked the prosecutor to initiate criminal proceedings against P. in respect of the death threats but his request was refused for lack of evidence. The applicant tried to challenge the refusals in the courts but to no avail. 79. The applicant also sought to initiate a criminal investigation into the alleged falsification of the results of the blood tests by M. However, the prosecutor decided not to open a case, a decision which was upheld by the courts. 80. The applicant tried to initiate a criminal investigation into the actions of the surgeon Dr Zh., but the investigator did not find any grounds on which to prosecute him.

4. The applicant was born in 1952 and lives in Tirana. 5. On 18 June 2009 the applicant, who worked as General Deputy Director of State Social Service (Zëvendës Drejtor i Përgjithshëm i Shërbimit Social Shtetëror) at the Ministry of Work, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities (Ministria e Punës, Çështjeve Sociale dhe Shanseve të Barabarta) (“the Ministry”) was dismissed. 6. On 27 January 2010 the Tirana District Court accepted in part the applicant’s action against his dismissal. It ordered the applicant’s reinstatement and the payment of damages corresponding to five months’ salaries. By final judgment of 23 November 2010 the Tirana Court of Appeal upheld the Tirana District Court’s judgment. 7. On 6 May 2011 an enforcement writ was issued. 8. From 2011 to 2014 the bailiff office unsuccessfully attempted the enforcement of the final judgment. 9. On 9 December 2014 the authorities finally paid the damages to the applicant. 10. On 8 April 2016 the State Social Service requested the Ministry to examine the applicant’s reinstatement. On the same day the State Social Service addressed a letter to the Department of the Public Administration, stating that the position of the Deputy Director was available.

5. The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Kostrena. 6. Between 1 October 2003 and 1 October 2007 the applicant was the director of a municipal utility company, KD Kostrena (hereinafter “the company”), whose sole shareholder is the Municipality of Kostrena (Općina Kostrena). The company primarily provides public utility services such as parking, waste disposal, funeral services, maintaining green spaces, cemeteries and so forth. 7. In an article published in the daily Novi list of 19 September 2007, Mr M.U., who was the mayor of Kostrena Municipality and chairman of the company’s General Meeting (skupština) at the time, criticised the way the applicant performed her job. The relevant part of the article reads as follows: “ ... M.U. does not hide his dissatisfaction with the work of Mirela Marunić as head of KD Kostrena. ‘I cannot speak for the others, but after everything that has happened, I can say that Mirela Marunić has betrayed the trust of the members of the General Meeting because she disclosed information which should only have been discussed at the General Meeting. Likewise, in the 2005 [annual] report she spoke in positive terms of building a sports hall, and I do not know what happened to make her change her mind.’ In his words, dissatisfaction with the functioning of KD Kostrena goes beyond the current political crisis in Kostrena and the public statements of Mirela Marunić. ‘The fact is that we had even earlier objected to Mirela Marunić’s work because [the company] has been stagnating for some time now and functioning as a means of transferring municipal funds. Our municipal utility company does not carry out the type of business for which it was established. For example, Žurkovo Bay was leased as a parking lot and a dry [dock] marina, and the same applies to the parking lot near Kostrenka. My question is, how does it benefit the concessionaires to have it and in addition pay rent for it? Had it stayed in our hands we would, apart from making a profit, also have had the chance to employ someone’. M.U. does not hide his dissatisfaction. In a lengthy list of criticisms of the current director of KD Kostrena, M.U. states that he does not like the fact that she has been referred to as a member of his [political] party. He claims that he was the one who had advised her when she was appointed to the position as head of Kostrena’s municipal utility company not to make public statements as a member of [their political party] because someone could misinterpret [the nature of] her work and the way she came to get that position.” 8. In an article published in Novi list eight days later, on 27 September 2009, the applicant replied to the above criticisms. The relevant part of that article reads as follows: “The mayor of Kostrena, M.U., has publicly criticised the current director of KD Kostrena for having disclosed information which should only have been discussed at the General Meeting and for the company’s poor performance, saying it does not engage in the type of business for which it was established. ‘They betrayed my trust by not believing me. I first informed my [political] party but there was no reaction. In particular, at a meeting held before the September session of the General Meeting [of the company] last year, I warned them of all the irregularities, the financial losses and the ruining of KD Kostrena’s business reputation. Then they asked me not to talk about it in the presence of D.G. [who was the only member of the company’s General Meeting from the ruling political party at the State level],’ says Mirela Marunić, repeating that there are written documents in respect of all the issues she had warned the General Meeting about. As regards M.U.’s remark that the company has been stagnating under her leadership, she says that Kostrena Municipality, which does not have a development strategy, has itself been stagnating ... The main precondition for that ... would be, in her opinion, the resolution of property issues which remain outstanding in the case of most of the parking lots administered by Kostrena’s municipal utility company. Marunić illustrates this by referring to the Viktor Lenac parking lot where the municipal utility company has been charging for parking on land which was not even owned by Kostrena Municipality. ‘The legal department of Kostrena Municipality still requires [the company] to charge for parking even though [the company] Lenac refused to do so because of unresolved property issues. That case has now gone to court,’ warns Marunić, ‘and a similar situation exists with the parking lot in Žurkovo and [the one] near Kostrenka, which have been leased out.’ ‘Given that my work has been called into question I demand an audit of KD Kostrena, and the involvement of the Office for the Prevention of Corruption and Organised Crime and the State Attorney’s Office. I sincerely hope that the State institutions will do their job in this case, as that will save Kostrena. Kostrena needs professionals, but they are being removed, the proof of which is the proposal to remove T.S. as a member of the General Meeting. I hope that a young and ambitious person will replace me and continue the work the municipal utility company has been doing so far.’” 9. By a decision of the company’s General Meeting of 11 October 2007 the applicant was summarily dismissed because of the statements she had made in the media, which were regarded as being damaging to the company’s business reputation. The relevant part of that decision reads as follows: “On 27 September 2007 the Novi list daily published an article ... stating that the director of KD Kostrena, Mirela Marunić, had given a statement to [a] journalist of Novi list saying that KD Kostrena was acting unlawfully, that it was charging for parking where it was not allowed, that she demanded an audit of KD Kostrena, and the involvement of the Office for the Prevention of Corruption and Organised Crime and the State Attorney’s Office with a view to looking into KD Kostrena’s operations. The director Mirela Marunić was at the time of the publication of the article ... employed as [chief executive officer] of KD Kostrena, that is, the officer who heads the company and is responsible for the consequences of her own work. Making such allegations in a daily newspaper, if those allegations are true, testifies to unlawful conduct in her job precisely because it is her duty as the officer in charge [of the company] to monitor and make sure that the utility company operates in accordance with the law. If, on the other hand, those allegations are not true but were nevertheless made in the publication that has the largest circulation in the area [of the country] then those allegations gravely harm the [business] reputation of the company because they suggest that KD Kosterna operates unlawfully. That kind of conduct, by an employee who was at the time of the publication of the statement in the daily newspaper the director of the utility company, which she headed, who makes such allegations in the media or engages in unlawful conduct, constitutes, in the opinion of the company’s General Meeting, totally inappropriate behaviour which tarnishes the company’s [business] reputation in the eyes of the public. .. Such conduct ... depicting the utility company in a negative light [constitutes] a particularly serious breach of employment-related duties, and is a particularly important fact which, taking into account all the circumstances and the interests of both contracting parties, makes the continuation of the employment relationship impossible [under section 107 of the Labour Act].” 10. On 22 October 2007 the applicant launched an internal challenge to her dismissal by lodging a request for the protection of her rights (zahtjev za zaštitu prava), a remedy which is guaranteed for every employee by the Labour Act and which employees had to use before bringing a civil action against their employer. The applicant argued, inter alia, as follows: “I contest entirely the argument that by making statements in the media I acted inappropriately and allegedly attacked the [business] reputation of the company ... The utility company is a public company which belongs to the [local] community ... It was my duty, as a member of the [company’s] Management, to contact the media and inform the public because it is a public company and not someone’s private property. I particularly emphasise that I have always given accurate information to the public. It is a well-known fact that the media show a great interest in Kostrena Municipality because of political turbulence among those heading the Municipality. However, my observations were always a defence against the media attacks directed against me by the chairman of the General Meeting. .. it is totally unclear what unlawful conduct I engaged in??? It is true that I warned about unlawful acts [by the company] but [I did so] directly to the General Meeting and the Supervisory Board. My statements were not directed against the utility company but made solely and exclusively with a view to removing any potential liability from myself. Therefore, the arguments in the dismissal decision are a twisted interpretation of the events.” 11. It appears that the applicant received no reply to her request. On 21 November 2007 she therefore brought a civil action for wrongful dismissal against the company in the Rijeka Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Rijeci). She challenged the decision to dismiss her and sought reinstatement. The relevant part of her statement of claim read as follows: “The defendant obviously did not properly read the [impugned] article because the plaintiff merely states some facts in it and, as an example, refers to a particular case of unresolved property issues, which is already the subject of judicial proceedings, and calls for an audit and the involvement of [the prosecuting authorities] with a view to protecting her integrity by expressly stating: ‘Given that my work has been called into question I demand an audit of KD Kostrena, and the involvement of the Office for the Prevention of Corruption and Organised Crime and the State Attorney’s Office.’” 12. By a judgment of 12 June 2008 the Municipal Court ruled in favour of the applicant. The court accepted that her statements in the media had been damaging to the company’s business reputation and as such had constituted a serious breach of employment-related duties within the meaning of section 107 of the Labour Act (see paragraph 23 below), making her summary dismissal justified. However, it ruled in the applicant’s favour because it found that pursuant to her employment contract, her job as director of the company had ended on 1 October 2007, when the company had been required to transfer her to another job. That meant that she could not have been dismissed from her job as director, let alone dismissed with retroactive effect, as the decision to remove her had indicated. Furthermore, since the decision to dismiss her had specifically related only to her job as director, it could not be assumed that it had also entailed the termination of her entire employment relationship with the company, including the job to which she was supposed to have been transferred after 1 October 2007. The court thus found that the dismissal had been wrongful and that the applicant’s employment relationship had not been terminated. It accordingly ordered that she be reinstated and assigned to another job within the company. 13. By a judgment of 14 January 2009 the Rijeka County Court (Županijski sud u Rijeci) dismissed an appeal by the company and upheld the judgment of the first‑instance court. Its reasons, however, were different. 14. It first noted that, contrary to the opinion of the first-instance court, the decision to dismiss the applicant had been aimed at terminating the applicant’s entire employment relationship with the company, and not only her job as director, and had been capable of having that effect. However, the County Court also disagreed with the view of the Municipal Court that the applicant’s behaviour, namely her statements in the media, had constituted a serious breach of employment-related duties such as to justify summary dismissal. In that respect the County Court held as follows: “... the defendant company’s [internal regulations] state that the business activities of the company are public [and] that the company informs the public by notifying the media of its organisation, the way and the conditions under which it operates, [and] the manner in which it provides services and runs its business. It follows that neither the [internal regulations] nor the [applicant’s employment] contract prohibit public statements or criticism of the defendant company’s business activities, which are public. Article 38 of the Croatian Constitution guarantees freedom of thought and [freedom of] expression, particularly emphasising freedom of speech and [the freedom] to speak publicly. As established ... by the first-instance court, the plaintiff’s public statements had been made in reaction to the statements of M.U. published a few days earlier in Novi list on 19 September 2007, where he had criticised the plaintiff’s work and stated that she had betrayed the trust of the members of the General Meeting by disclosing information that should only have been discussed at the General Meeting, [had said] that the [company] was stagnating, that it did not operate the type of business for which it had been established [and so on] ... ... Therefore, in this court’s view, the plaintiff’s actions should be interpreted as [the exercise of] her right to speak publicly and the right to freedom of thought, which are rights guaranteed by the Croatian Constitution. Therefore, in the view of this court, the plaintiff’s conduct does not constitute a serious breach of employment-related duties as envisaged in section [107] of the Labour Act as grounds for summary dismissal. Specifically, in the opinion of this court, the plaintiff’s statements are to be seen as [a way of] informing the public of irregularities in the activities of the defendant company as a public institution; [the statements] were given in the public interest and in good faith and constitute a value judgment rather than a serious breach of employment-related duties. The first-instance court therefore correctly applied the substantive law when finding the dismissal wrongful.” 15. The company then lodged an appeal on points of law (revizija) against the judgment of the County Court. 16. By a judgment of 6 October 2009 the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske) reversed the County Court judgment and dismissed the applicant’s action. The relevant part of that judgment reads as follows: “The findings of the lower courts cannot be accepted. In this particular case, the aforementioned statements by the plaintiff clearly damaged the reputation of the defendant company, since an employer whose leadership structures tolerate and encourage criminal activities certainly cannot have a good reputation or be trusted in the business world. Therefore, the behaviour of the plaintiff, in stating on 27 September 2007 in the Novi list daily ... that the defendant company, which she heads, had acted illegally, namely by charging for parking when it was not allowed [to do so], asking that the [company] be audited, and also seeking the intervention of [the prosecuting authorities] with a view to verifying the activities of the defendant company, has significant repercussions on the employment relationship between the parties and gives the employer a justified reason for terminating the employment contract, within the meaning of section [107] of the Labour Act. Having regard to the given circumstances, it is precisely this which is a particularly important fact making the continuation of employment impossible ... In this particular case, the depiction by the employee of the employer’s business activities in an extremely negative light in the media is a particularly important fact of the kind which gives the employer a justified reason to terminate the employment contract. The plaintiff’s reliance on her duty to speak publicly is unfounded. In this regard it is to be noted that the plaintiff could only have pursued her intention to prevent abuses and protect the property of the defendant company by turning to the relevant State authorities and lodging a complaint with them, which would have resulted in that information being available to the press and other media, and which could not have served as a reason for her dismissal.” 17. The applicant then lodged a constitutional complaint, alleging, inter alia, a violation of her freedom of expression. In so doing she explicitly relied on Article 38 of the Croatian Constitution and Article 10 of the Convention. 18. On 17 February 2011 the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) dismissed the applicant’s constitutional complaint and served its decision on her representative on 14 March 2011. The relevant part of that decision reads as follows: “The Constitutional Court observes that the complainant justifies her conduct towards the employer (namely, her media statements), on account of which the employer summarily dismissed her, by arguing that she had merely been calling for the supervision of her actions in the company by the relevant authorities. That argument is incorrect [having regard to her statements in] the article published in Novi list of 27 September 2009 ... The Constitutional Court notes that the right ‘of a citizen’ to publicly express his or her personal opinions cannot justify a breach of employment-related rights and obligations stemming from an employment contract and the relevant legislation.” 19. Meanwhile, on 21 June 2002 KD Kostrena had brought a civil action in the Rijeka Municipal Court against the water and sewage utility company (Komunalno društvo Vodovod i kanalizacija d.o.o.) of Rijeka seeking to be declared the owner of the Viktor Lenac parking lot in Kostrena. By a judgment of 3 March 2008 the court dismissed KD Kostrena’s action. The final outcome of those proceedings is unknown. However, an extract from the land register concerning the two plots of land that were the subject of the proceedings suggests that the water and sewage company transferred ownership of the plots to shipbuilding company Viktor Lenac on 13 February 2014. 20. On 12 February 2007 the water and sewage company brought a civil action against KD Kostrena in the same court seeking repayment of the parking fees the defendant company had collected from the Viktor Lenac parking lot. The plaintiff company claimed that KD Kostrena had been charging for parking on land owned by the plaintiff. The final outcome of those proceedings is unknown. 21. In June 2013 the applicant won municipal elections and was elected mayor of Kostrena, replacing M.U. She still holds that position at the time of the Court’s judgment.

5. The applicants’ seventeen close relatives were members of an outlawed organisation in Turkey, namely the Maoist Communist Party (hereinafter “the MKP”). On various dates since the 1970s criminal proceedings had been brought against the relatives for membership of a number of outlawed organisations and for carrying out activities on behalf of those organisations. They had spent various periods of time in prisons, and after their release some of them had left Turkey and settled in different countries in Europe. 6. In early June 2005 the seventeen relatives began arriving in a rural area within the administrative jurisdiction of the town of Ovacık, near the city of Tunceli, in order to hold a meeting of their organisation. They were all killed in that area by members of the security forces on 17 and 18 June 2005. 7. The names of the seventeen relatives and the applicants’ relationship to them are as follows: i. Cafer Cangöz was the first applicant Mr Mustafa Cangöz’s son; ii. Aydın Hanbayat was the second applicant Ms Fatma Hanbayat’s son; iii. Okan Ünsal was the third applicant Ms Bahriye Ünsal’s son; iv. Berna Saygılı-Ünsal was the fourth applicant Mr Tevfik Fikret Saygılı’s daughter; v. Ali Rıza Sabur was the fifth applicant Mr Hıdır Sabur’s brother; vi. Alattin Ataş was the sixth applicant Ms Nari Ataş’s son; vii. Cemal Çakmak was the seventh applicant Ms Zekiye Çakmak’s son; viii. Ökkeş Karaoğlu was the eighth applicant Ms Hatice Karaoğlu’s son; ix. Taylan Yıldız was the ninth applicant Ms İmiş Yıldız’s son; x. Dursun Turgut was the tenth applicant Mr İbrahim Turgut’s son; xi. Binali Güler was the eleventh applicant Ms Elif Güler’s husband; xii. İbrahim Akdeniz was the twelfth applicant Mr Mehmet Akdeniz’s son; xiii. Ahmet Perktaş was the thirteenth applicant Ms Gülsüm Perktaş’s son; xiv. Çağdaş Can was the fourteenth applicant Ms Şükran Can’s son; xv. Gülnaz Yıldız was the fifteenth applicant Mr Teslim Yıldız’s daughter; xvi. Ersin Kantar was the sixteenth applicant Mr Erdal Kantar’s brother; and, xvii. Kenan Çakıcı was the seventeenth applicant Ms Dilek Çakıcı’s husband. 8. The events which took place on 17 and 18 June 2005 are disputed between the parties. Thus, the parties’ submissions will be set out separately. The facts as presented by the applicants are set out in Section B below (paragraphs 9-13). The Government’s submissions concerning the facts are summarised in Section C below (paragraphs 14-20). The documentary evidence submitted by the parties is summarised in Section D below (paragraphs 21-76). 9. At around 9 p.m. on 17 June 2005 some of the applicants heard on the television news that nine MKP members had been killed by soldiers in Ovacık and that armed clashes were continuing. 10. The following day a number of family members, suspecting that their relatives might be among those who had been killed, went to the Ovacık District Gendarmerie Command to seek more information. When they failed to obtain any information there a lawyer representing one of the families went to see the local prosecutor. The prosecutor told the lawyer that seventeen people had been killed. 11. The families were then taken to a nearby military base to identify the seventeen bodies, which had been placed in the car park of the military base. The families noted that most of the bodies were naked. As the faces and bodies of the deceased had been destroyed beyond recognition, it was not possible to complete the identification process that day. 12. When all the bodies had been identified and autopsies carried out on them they were handed over to the families for burial. 13. The photographs and video footage taken by the families while the bodies were being prepared for burial were submitted to the Court. Very extensive injuries on the bodies of the seventeen can be seen in the footage. 14. In their observations the Government summarised a number of the steps taken by the national authorities (which are also summarised below between paragraphs 21-76), and added the following. 15. The applicants’ relatives were members of the MKP terrorist organisation and some of them had entered Turkey illegally in order to participate in a meeting of that organisation in Tunceli. After receiving intelligence reports, a patrolling helicopter found the terrorist group in an area near Tunceli on 17 June 2005. The terrorist group opened fire on the helicopter. After determining the location of the group the security forces arrived in the area to arrest them. At 5 p.m. the security forces encountered the group. Despite warnings to surrender issued by the security forces, the terrorists opened fire and injured a soldier. 16. At 9 a.m. on 18 June 2005 the armed clash between the security forces and the terrorists ended. Alongside the bodies of the terrorists the security forces found, amongst other things, a number of automatic rifles and ammunition. Three terrorists were apprehended alive and arrested. 17. On the same day, just after the armed clash ended, the prosecutor arrived at the incident area, conducted an on-site inspection, prepared an incident report, and opened an investigation concerning the deaths of the seventeen terrorists. The prosecutor then ordered the destruction of the material which had no evidential or economic value. 18. On 18 June 2005 between 9.30 a.m. and 2.30 p.m. the bodies and everything else found were photographed. 19. On 29 June 2005, at the request of the relatives of the deceased, the prosecutor asked the Forensic Medicine Institute to examine the clothes and bodies of the deceased with a view to establishing whether the security forces had opened fire from a distance without issuing any warning to surrender. 20. On 1 July 2005 the Forensic Laboratories of the Police in Diyarbakır released the ballistic report, which stated that sixteen of the seventeen terrorists had actively fired at the security forces during the armed clashes. 21. The following information appears from the documents submitted by the parties. 22. According to a report prepared by three non-commissioned officers from the Ovacık District Gendarmerie Command on 18 June 2005 (hereafter “the Ovacık report”), intelligence obtained by the security forces suggested that members of the MKP were planning to have a meeting in mid-June in an area in the vicinity of the Mercan Mountains, near the border between Tunceli and Erzincan provinces. Security forces from Erzincan and Tunceli subsequently started a military operation in the area on 15 June 2005. The operation was also supported from the air. At around 5 p.m. on 17 June 2005 the security forces conducting the operation came across a group of “armed members of the organisation” and asked them to surrender. However, “the members of the organisation” responded with fire and an armed clash ensued. During the first fire opened by “the terrorists” a soldier was injured on the upper leg and airlifted to hospital by helicopter. As the area was mountainous with many caves and in some places covered with snow, and as the “members of the illegal organisation” refused to surrender and opened intense fire, the clashes continued until the following day. At around 10 a.m. the following day the fire directed at the security forces stopped and then a search was conducted by members of the security forces. The bodies of fifteen male and two female “terrorists” were recovered. “As instructed by the public prosecutor”, the bodies and weapons recovered in the area were then taken by helicopter to the Ovacık District Gendarmerie Command. 23. According to the above-mentioned report, 13 automatic rifles (one M16, four G3s, seven Kalashnikov AK47s and one PKM), 23 spent cartridges discharged from G3 rifles, and 45 spent cartridges discharged from Kalashnikov rifles, 44 bullets for PKM-type rifles, 19 bullets for G3‑type rifles, 76 bullets for M16-type rifles and 77 bullets for Kalashnikov-type rifles, 11 Kalashnikov magazines, 7 M16 magazines and 12 G3 magazines were recovered together with the bodies. “Items which did not have evidential value”, including four rucksacks, fifteen items of male and two pieces of female clothing and shoes were destroyed in accordance with “the instructions given by the prosecutor”. 24. The report summarised in the preceding paragraphs, together with the weapons and ammunition mentioned therein, were handed over to the Ovacık prosecutor’s office on 20 June 2005 together with a number of other documents. According to one of those documents which, in effect, is a list of the documents forwarded to the prosecutor by the military, two of the documents handed over to the prosecutor were a twelve-page military order, drawn up on 15 June 2005, for the carrying out of the operation and a sketch of the operation area. Those two documents were not made available to the Court. 25. Another military report was drawn up on 18 June 2005 by the officer in charge of the District Gendarmerie Command of the neighbouring town of Kemah, and eleven gendarmes who had taken an active part in the operation (hereafter the “Kemah report”). The report states that “outlawed terrorist organisations had set up camp” in the area and that its members had been travelling between Erzincan city centre and Sarıyazı village. There was evidence and information showing that members of the terrorist organisation were in contact with three men from Sarıyazı village who were providing them with assistance. At 8 a.m. on 17 June 2005 two of the three men in question were apprehended and questioned by the soldiers. When they denied the allegations against them, the soldiers told them that the mobile telephone belonging to Ali Rıza Sabur – one of the applicants’ deceased relatives – was being intercepted and that the security forces were therefore aware that they had been in contact with members of the illegal organisation who had arrived in the area recently. One of the two men then told the soldiers that he had seen a number of armed men in the area and that he had subsequently helped them by supplying them with food and transport and by providing guidance about the local area. The man informed the gendarmes that the last time he had seen the armed men had been that very morning and that, given that three of the armed men were “limping” and thus walking slowly, they were probably at a location at approximately one hour’s walking distance away. 26. According to the above-mentioned Kemah report, the soldiers then asked for a military helicopter and went to that area with the man to look for the applicants’ relatives. The armed men were spotted in a river bed from armed Cobra-type military helicopters at 11 a.m. When one of the armed men noticed the helicopter, he opened fire and an armed clash ensued during which nine of the armed men were killed. At 4.30 p.m. the same day a number of soldiers taking security measures in the area came under intense fire as a result of which another armed clash ensued and continued until 9 a.m. the following morning, that is 18 June 2005. After the operations ended the bodies of eight more people – two of whom were female – were recovered together with their weapons. One of the three men, who had been apprehended the previous morning and had assisted the soldiers in locating the applicants’ relatives, was with the soldiers at that time and identified the bodies as the persons whom he and his two friends had helped after their arrival in the area. The report further states that the incident took place on the border between the Ovacık and Kemah districts. The Ovacık prosecutor was then informed about the operation and instructed the soldiers to take the bodies of the seventeen and their belongings to the town of Ovacık. 27. On 18 June 2005 a press release was issued by the Gendarmerie Headquarters in Ankara, stating that “seventeen terrorists were recovered dead and three terrorists were apprehended alive” during the operations. 28. Also on 18 June 2005, the applicants’ legal representative Ms Meral Hanbayat submitted a petition to the prosecutor’s office in Malatya and asked the prosecutor to order the carrying out of necessary forensic examinations on the body and clothes of the second applicant’s son, Aydın Hanbayat, with a view to establishing the distance from which he had been shot. The legal representative also asked the prosecutor to examine Aydın Hanbayat’s hands for gunpowder residue in order to establish whether or not he had opened fire. 29. According to a report drawn up by the Ovacık prosecutor on 18 June 2005, the area where the applicants’ relatives had been killed was not safe and therefore it was not possible for the prosecutor to go there to examine the bodies. Thus, a decision was taken to bring the bodies to the town of Ovacık in a military helicopter. When they were brought to the Ovacık District Gendarmerie Command the bodies were placed in the car park reserved for military vehicles. As their identities had not yet been established, each body was given a number. 30. The Ovacık prosecutor, assisted by two doctors, arrived at the car park and examined the bodies. The prosecutor noted that all seventeen were clothed and instructed that the clothes be removed for the examinations to be carried out. The bodies were also photographed, both with their clothes on and after they were taken off. The prosecutor and the doctors noted in their report the extensive injuries they observed on the bodies. A search was carried out of the clothes, in which sixteen identity documents were found. The prosecutor decided to keep the number tags on the bodies in place as he suspected that some of the identity papers might be forged. It was later established that ten of the identity papers belonged to the deceased and the remaining six identity documents were in the names of other people. 31. The two doctors concluded that all seventeen had died as a result of injuries caused by bullets and shrapnel, but considered it necessary to have detailed autopsies carried out. The bodies were then handed over to a gendarme non-commissioned officer, who took them to the Forensic Medicine Institute’s nearest branch in the city of Malatya at around 8 p.m. the same day. No mention is made in the document whether the clothes removed from the bodies of the seventeen were also handed over to that non-commissioned officer. 32. The same evening three people who claimed to know some of the deceased arrived at the Forensic Medicine Institute’s Malatya Branch and identified the bodies of Cafer Cangöz, Aydın Hanbayat, Ökkeş Karaoğlu, Okan Ünsal, İbrahim Akdeniz and Gülnaz Yıldız. 33. The same evening forensic pathologists started carrying out the autopsies; they completed their examinations at 6.30 the following morning. A detailed verbatim report of the actions taken during the autopsies was prepared in the presence of the Malatya prosecutor. Blood and urine samples taken from the bodies were sent for further analysis to verify whether the deceased had consumed alcohol or used drugs. Swabs were taken from their hands and sent for ballistic examinations with a view to establishing whether they had any gunpowder residue on their hands. Bullets and shrapnel found in the bodies were also sent for further analysis. Fingerprints were taken for identification purposes. 34. According to the findings of the forensic pathologists which are set out in the autopsy report, eight of the deceased had been killed by explosives, three of them by bullets, and the remaining six by both explosives and bullets. The forensic pathologists considered that to establish the distances from which the seventeen persons had been shot, further examinations had to be conducted on their clothes. They noted, however, that with one exception all the deceased had been stripped of their clothes and that the clothes belonging to thirteen of the remaining sixteen had not been provided. 35. After the autopsies were concluded the Malatya prosecutor ordered the return of the bodies and the clothes to the Ovacık prosecutor’s office. 36. On 21 June 2005 the Ovacık prosecutor wrote to his opposite number in Kemah and requested a copy of the investigation documents relating to the arrest of the three men (see paragraphs 25-26 above). According to the documents submitted to the Court, the Kemah prosecutor complied with that request and forwarded a copy of his investigation file to the Ovacık prosecutor. 37. It appears from the Kemah prosecutor’s file that on 9 June 2005 the security forces had obtained authorisation from a judge to intercept the applicants’ relatives’ mobile telephones, and telephone conversations some of the applicants’ relatives had had with a number of local people, including the men who were subsequently arrested for providing them with logistical support, were intercepted by the authorities between 9 and 17 June 2005. According to the transcripts of the intercepted telephone conversations drawn up on 11 June 2005, the applicants’ relatives had discussed over the telephone issues such as renting vehicles and facilitating their movements in the area. 38. On 21 June 2005 the Ovacık prosecutor also asked the Ovacık District Gendarmerie Command to send the weapons and the ammunition recovered together with the bodies of the applicants’ relatives to the Regional Forensic Laboratories with a view to establishing whether the rifles had been used in any other previous incident and whether the 23 G3 spent cartridges and the 45 Kalashnikov spent cartridges had been discharged from the G3 and the Kalashnikov rifles found together with the bodies and whether they had thus been used in the armed clash. 39. On 19 and 20 June 2005 most of the bodies were formally identified by their family members and burial certificates were issued. 40. On 22 June 2005 three of the deceased, namely Cafer Cangöz, Berna Saygılı-Ünsal and Ökkeş Karaoğlu, were formally identified after an examination of their fingerprints was conducted at the Malatya Police Headquarters. 41. The same day the Ovacık prosecutor was provided with the report pertaining to the medical examination of the soldier who had been injured during the operation and airlifted to hospital (see paragraph 22 above). According to the report, the soldier in question had been kept in a military hospital in Elazığ between 18 and 30 June 2005 for the “injury to the skin of and a foreign object on the left femur, which is not life-threatening and which can be treated with a simple medical intervention”. 42. On 27 June 2005 three of the applicants, namely Ms Fatma Hanbayat, Mr Mustafa Cangöz and Ms İmiş Yıldız, assisted by their legal representatives, submitted an official complaint to the Ovacık prosecutor’s office. The three applicants alleged in their complaint that the bodies of their three deceased relatives had been stripped of their clothes and displayed at the military base in Ovacık before they were taken to Malatya for autopsies. The three applicants added that they had not seen the clothes since the autopsies. They submitted that the way in which their relatives had been killed must be established before the investigation could proceed. They maintained that a forensic examination on the clothes was crucial and requested the prosecutor to ensure that it was done. 43. In their complaint the three applicants also informed the prosecutor that there were “strong indications” that their relatives had been killed by being bombed from a distance, without any prior warning and without any attempts being made to ask for their surrender. They asked the prosecutor to promptly carry out an impartial investigation and visit the area where the operation had been conducted. They also requested the prosecutor to carry out the necessary investigation into the removal of their relatives’ clothes and the exhibiting of their bodies, which, they argued, constituted an offence. Finally, the three applicants asked the prosecutor to give them a copy of the documents from the investigation file. 44. When the Ovacık prosecutor received the applicants’ complaint he wrote to the Ovacık Magistrates’ Court the same day and informed that court of his opinion that “when taken into account that [the three applicants] are related to the deceased members of the terrorist organisation, handing over to them documents from the investigation file would endanger the investigation”. The prosecutor asked the Magistrates’ Court to issue a decision classifying the investigation file as confidential so that neither the three applicants, their legal representatives, or anyone else would be able to examine the investigation file or obtain any documents from it, with the exception of the autopsy reports. 45. The prosecutor’s request was granted on the same day by the Ovacık Magistrates’ Court. The same day the prosecutor forwarded the Magistrates’ Court’s decision to the three applicants and informed them that in the light of the Magistrates’ Court’s decision it was not possible to accede to their request and that he was therefore unable to give them any of the documents from the file, with the exception of the autopsy reports. The three applicants’ legal representatives were handed a copy of the autopsy reports the same day. 46. On 29 June 2005 the Ovacık prosecutor wrote to the Forensic Medicine Institute’s headquarters in Istanbul, stating that although autopsies had been carried out on the bodies of the seventeen at the Malatya Branch of the Forensic Institute, clothes belonging to some of the deceased had been returned to his office without examination, because there was no expert in Malatya able to carry out that task. The prosecutor also informed the Institute about the allegation made by the three applicants that their relatives might have been killed without a warning and added that the applicants had requested that their relatives’ clothes be forensically examined. With his letter the prosecutor sent the clothes removed from the bodies of Cemal Çakmak, Cağdaş Can, Okan Ünsal and İbrahim Akdeniz, and asked the Institute to carry out the necessary examinations on them. 47. On 1 July 2005 the three applicants mentioned above (see paragraph 42) lodged an objection to the Ovacık Magistrates’ Court’s decision to restrict their access to the investigation file and asked for that decision to be set aside. In their submission the three applicants added that they had spoken to the prosecutor and had repeated their request to have their deceased relatives’ clothes forensically examined. However, the prosecutor had told them that the clothes had been “destroyed after the operation because [the authorities] had deemed it necessary to do so”. The three applicants also stated in their submission that all they needed were the documents recording the actions taken during the investigation, and not any of the documents pertaining to the organisation of the military operation. They argued that they needed those documents to exercise their statutory right to effectively participate in the investigation. Furthermore, when the facts were known by the perpetrators and by the prosecutors, hiding those same facts from the complainants was not compatible with the principle of equality of arms. It was thus evident that an investigation conducted solely on the basis of the documents prepared by the perpetrators, the contents of which were not known to them and could thus not be challenged, would not lead to a fair conclusion. 48. The applicants also challenged the logic behind the decision to restrict their access to the investigation file, and questioned how their involvement in the investigation, the aim of which was to establish the facts, would endanger it. They submitted that some of the evidence, such as the clothes worn by their relatives, had already been destroyed on the orders of the prosecutor. The applicants considered it telling that the clothes of those killed by explosives had been sent for forensic examinations whereas the clothes worn by those killed by bullets had been destroyed. They argued that those destroyed clothes could have been instrumental in establishing the distance from which the deceased had been shot. They complained, moreover, that the prosecutor had still not visited the place where the operation had been conducted; thus, there were serious questions about the way the evidence from that place had been collected. Lastly, the applicants referred to Articles 2 and 13 of the Convention and Paragraph 16 of the Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions (adopted by Economic and Social Council Resolution 1989/65 on 24 May 1989) and argued that their exclusion from the investigation was in breach of those provisions. 49. The objection was rejected by the Tunceli Criminal Court of First Instance on 20 July 2005. 50. Also on 1 July 2005, the Forensic Laboratories of the Police in Diyarbakır published their reports on the swabs taken from the hands of the seventeen deceased. According to the report, there was gunpowder residue on the palms and the backs of the hands of the sixteen of the seventeen relatives. It was stated in the report that the presence of gunpowder residue on the backs of the hands meant that the person had either fired a weapon or been in close proximity to a weapon when it was fired. The presence of gunpowder residue on the palm of the hand meant that the person had either been holding a weapon or had had contact with objects on which there was gunpowder residue, or that he or she had been standing close to a weapon when it was fired. It was stated in the same report that gunpowder residue could be found on the hand of a person who had not fired a weapon but whose hand had been in contact with objects such as a weapon, a bullet entry wound, or the hands of another person who had fired a weapon. 51. On 6 July 2005 sixteen relatives, including fourteen of the applicants, submitted a complaint to the Ovacık prosecutor with the assistance of their legal representatives. 52. The relatives began by stating that the arguments they were making in their complaint were inevitably based only on the autopsy reports and the things they had heard or witnessed personally; as they had been denied access to the investigation they had not had the opportunity to see any of the evidence or the information in the prosecutor’s file. In their submission they complained about the killings of their relatives and about the public displaying of the bodies by the security forces. The relatives also submitted that the fact that the bodies of some of their relatives had been destroyed beyond recognition by bombs had led them to form the opinion that there had not been an armed clash as alleged and that their relatives had been killed by unlawful fire from military helicopters. In any event, on account of their ages and the various physical disabilities of five of them, their relatives had not been in a position to actively participate in an armed clash with soldiers in a mountainous area. Furthermore, although it had been alleged that firearms had been found next to the bodies of their relatives, those firearms would not have been effective against military helicopters. Thus, it was obvious that they had been killed as a result of the use of disproportionate force. 53. The relatives also repeated the criticism, which had already been voiced by three of them on a number of previous occasions (see paragraphs 42-43 and 47-48 above), of the fact that they had been denied access to the investigation file and the investigating authorities’ failures to take certain steps in the investigation. In that connection they highlighted, in particular, the destruction of their relatives’ clothes by the authorities. They also complained that crucial evidence had been collected without any judicial supervision and by members of the security forces who themselves had been implicated in the killings and were therefore under investigation. 54. The relatives argued that the killing of their relatives had been unlawful and in breach of Turkey’s obligations under various international treaties, including the Convention. Contrary to the requirements of those international obligations, no attempts had been made to apprehend their relatives in a non-life-threatening fashion. Moreover, members of the security forces had committed another offence by publicly exhibiting their relatives’ naked bodies. They invited the prosecutor to carry out an independent and effective investigation that was proportionate to the seriousness of the killings. 55. The applicant Tevfik Fikret Saygılı, together with his wife Necla Saygılı, submitted another complaint to the Ovacık prosecutor in addition to the one he had already submitted on 6 July 2005 together with the other applicants. In their complaint the couple complained about the killing of their daughter, Berna Saygılı-Ünsal, and alleged, in particular, that their daughter and her sixteen friends had been unarmed at the time and there had therefore not been an armed clash between them and the soldiers. They further complained that necessary precautions in the area where their daughter was killed had not been taken by the prosecutor, and the evidence in the area had thus been allowed to disappear. They also complained that their daughter’s body had been exhibited by the soldiers. 56. On various dates the Ovacık prosecutor asked his colleagues in various towns and cities to take statements from the applicants living within their jurisdictions. According to the documents submitted by the parties, the prosecutors complied with that request and took statements from twelve of the applicants and four other close relatives of the seventeen deceased. In their statements the relatives repeated their allegations and maintained their complaints. The relatives also stated that, although they had not personally seen the bodies of their deceased relatives being exhibited, they had heard about it from others. 57. On 19 August 2005 the Regional Forensic Laboratories of the Gendarmerie concluded their examinations in respect of the weapons and the spent cartridges found in the operation area (see paragraphs 23 and 38 above). It was stated in the report that 43 of the 45 spent Kalashnikov cartridges had been discharged from the seven Kalashnikov rifles found in the area. The remaining two had been discharged from two other Kalashnikov rifles, which were not among those recovered in the area. It was also established that 22 of the 23 spent G3 cartridges had been discharged from the four G3 rifles found in the area. As the remaining G3 spent cartridge had no markings on it, no examination could be carried out on it. 58. On 23 September 2005 the Forensic Medicine Institute prepared its report in response to the Ovacık prosecutor’s request of 29 June 2005 for the clothes worn by four of the deceased at the time they were killed to be examined. It was noted in the report that the holes observed on three of the four sets of clothes were not bullet holes. The holes observed on the fourth set of clothes which belonged to Cemal Çakmak did not have any gunpowder residue and it was not therefore possible to establish the distance from which he had been shot. 59. On 23 November 2005 the applicants asked the Ovacık prosecutor to give them a copy of the autopsy report and a copy of the document pertaining to the examination of the clothes removed from the bodies of their relatives. The prosecutor complied with that request on 8 December 2005. 60. Between September 2005 and June 2006 a number of ballistic examinations were conducted; the Ovacık prosecutor was informed at the end of those examinations that the rifles and the spent cartridges found next to the bodies had not been used in any other incident. 61. On 20 June 2006 the Ovacık prosecutor closed the investigation. After summarising some of the documents which are also set out in the preceding paragraphs, the prosecutor stated the following in his decision: “Sections 86 and 87 of the Code of Criminal Procedure set out how post mortem examinations should be conducted. As stated in the autopsy reports, there was no one to identify the members of the terrorist organisation MKP/HKO who had been recovered dead. That was why they could not be formally identified in Ovacık. Moreover, their clothes were removed on the instruction of the prosecutor so that their bodies could be examined. Thus, the bodies were not stripped of their clothes by members of the security forces so that they could be publicly displayed. Removing the clothes was a necessity and did not constitute an offence. As for the complaint concerning the killings, the terrorist organisation MKP/HKO issued press releases on 19 and 23 June 2005 in which it was made clear that the deceased had indeed been members of that terrorist organisation and in which the Turkish Republic was expressly referred to as the enemy. It was stated in the press releases, for example, ‘during the armed clashes that took place between the fascist Turkish State and the forces from the People’s Liberation Army (HKO) [acting] under the leadership of our Maoist-Communist Party, seventeen of our communist warrior comrades became martyrs’. Thus, those press releases not only confirm that the deceased were members of the terrorist organisation, but also that they died in armed clashes with the security forces. The aim and strategy of the terrorist organisation MKP/HKO is to destroy the constitutional order of the Turkish Republic through armed struggle and to replace it with a different regime. The deceased were members of the MKP/HKO and were carrying out armed and unlawful activities on behalf of that organisation in order to change the constitutional order by force. The investigation documents, the nature of the weapons recovered, the other documents and information [in the file] and the fact that the deceased did not obey the security forces’ warning to surrender show conclusively that they were members of the MKP/HKO and were acting in accordance with that organisation’s aims to change the constitutional order through armed struggle. In addition, it was openly stated in the press release issued by the terrorist organisation MKP/HKO that all the deceased were members of the MKP/HKO terrorist organisation. As explained above, the deceased were members of the illegal MKP/HKO terrorist organisation, which carries out activities aimed at changing the constitutional order by force of arms; they were carrying out armed and unlawful activities on behalf of that organisation. A report showing that they were members of the unlawful MKP/HKO terrorist organisation and that they had carried out armed activities on behalf of that organisation and thus had committed the offence of attempting to change the Turkish republic’s constitutional order, was prepared [by me] and sent to the Malatya prosecutor. The [deceased] had been wandering and hanging around as a group. Their aim was to inflict casualties on members of the security forces. It was the terrorists who fired first, despite an order to surrender issued by members of the security forces. When they first opened fire they injured a member of the security forces. Then, despite a warning to surrender, the terrorist group continued to open fire. Faced with an all-out armed attack, the security forces had no alternative but to open fire. Thus, the ‘absolute necessity’ and ‘reasonableness’ criteria were satisfied, which renders the killings lawful. In order to realise their so-called ideals, terrorists make plans and act in accordance with those plans. Even when they are dying they think of killing. They prepare traps with explosives and hand grenades and set them to explode when members of the security forces approach them when they are seriously injured or after their death to lift their bodies. The response of the security forces to prevent the terrorists’ so-called last mission (the traps) which caused severe damage to the terrorists’ bodies must be regarded as a lawful action carried out within the ambit of ‘self-defence’ and ‘necessity’, because they acted with the aim of protecting their own physical integrity and lives. According to the decision of the Grand Chamber of the Court of Cassation for Criminal Law Matters (10 October 1995, decision no. 1213/271), the existence of an attack must be interpreted widely; if it is definite that an attack is going to begin, it can be regarded as an attack already begun; if it has already come to an end but there is a fear that it might begin again, then it must be regarded as not yet ended. In the present incident, it is established that members of the security forces had persistently warned the deceased, who were members of the MKP/HKO terrorist organisation, and asked them to stop and surrender. The deceased, who were members of the MKP/HKO terrorist organisation and who opened fire and injured a gendarme soldier, were then recovered dead together with their weapons. In the course of anti-terrorism measures, members of the security forces have the power to use weapons pursuant to s. 1-3 of Law No. 1481 and s. 39-40 of the Regulations on the Establishment and Powers of the Gendarmerie: the latter was drafted in accordance with s. 24 of Law No. 280, and additional section 6 § 2 of Law No. 2559. According to Article 2 § 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights, members of the security forces can use weapons if it has become absolutely necessary to do so. In recovering dead the members of the MKP/HKO terrorist organisation, members of the security forces used their weapons in accordance with s. 24-25 of the Turkish Criminal Code, Article 2 § 2 of the ECHR and s. 17 § 4 of the Turkish Constitution, and they did so within the limits of their powers and duties. It is clearly established that their actions were lawful within the context of self-defence. Thus, no offence was committed by the members of the security forces who killed the deceased or by members of the security forces and the administrative officials who planned the operation and ordered it ... The decision is hereby taken not to continue with the investigation...” 62. The applicants lodged objections to the prosecutor’s decision on 14 and 22 July 2006. In their submissions the applicants also referred to the Kemah report and drew attention to the discrepancies between that report and the Ovacık report. They argued, in particular, that in the Kemah report there was no mention of any warnings having been issued to their seventeen relatives to surrender. In the Ovacık report it was stated, however, that their relatives had been given warnings to surrender. The applicants pointed out in this connection that, instead of trying to assess which version had represented the truth, when closing the investigation the prosecutor had completely ignored the Kemah report, in which no mention was made of surrender warnings, and relied solely on the Ovacık report. 63. The applicants further argued that no investigation had been conducted into the roles played by and the actions of members of the security forces during the operation. In fact, they had not even been named or questioned. Furthermore, no attempts had been made to find out what types of weapons had been used by the security forces in the operation. 64. The applicants also referred to the documents in the Kemah prosecutor’s investigation file concerning the actions of the three men who had been arrested on suspicion of helping their relatives. They submitted that those documents showed that members of the security forces had not simply “come across” their relatives on 17 June 2005 as alleged in the Ovacık report (see paragraph 22 above). Instead, those documents showed that the operation had in fact started on 2 June 2005 and had been meticulously carried out. For example, twelve of their relatives had been under close observation by the security forces from the time of their arrival in Erzincan on 2 June 2005, and their telephone conversations with the three men who were under investigation for helping them had been intercepted and their meetings photographed. According to the applicants, this background information showed that, instead of arresting their relatives at a much earlier stage, members of the security forces had chosen to wait until their relatives went to the countryside where the conditions were suitable for an operation to kill them. Nevertheless, despite their importance and relevance, none of the above factors had been taken into account by the prosecutor in the investigation. 65. The applicants argued that if the prosecutor had taken notice of the contents of the Kemah report he would have seen that no warnings had been issued by the soldiers before they opened fire on their relatives. Indeed, given that the first contact had been with their relative who had been on lookout duty and the members of the security forces who had been in the helicopter, it was improbable that such a warning had been issued first. Thus, the prosecutor’s reliance on the alleged warnings to surrender when concluding that the killings had been in self-defence was without basis. 66. The applicants also criticised the justification proffered by the prosecutor for the use of heavy weaponry by alleging that their relatives could have set up booby-traps. They argued that there was no evidence in the file to support the prosecutor’s conclusion. In particular, it was impossible to reach such a conclusion without first questioning the soldiers who, in any event, had not made any allegations that there were booby traps. The applicants argued that by doing so the prosecutor had replaced the lack of any evidence with his subjective assumptions and that the conclusion reached by him could not, therefore, have any legal significance and could not prove that the force used had not been excessive. 67. The applicants alleged that the prosecutor had failed to establish with any clarity the way in which their relatives had been killed. They submitted that, according to the news coverage of the incident in the media on 17 June 2005, initially nine of their relatives had been killed by bombs, and that those media reports were compatible with the Kemah military report. The remaining eight relatives had been killed mostly by bullets, because after the initial heavy bombing the soldiers on the ground had formed a circle around the eight relatives and shot them. 68. The applicants also criticised the fact that the swabs taken from the hands of their relatives were examined at the Forensic Laboratories of the Police in Diyarbakır rather than at the independent Forensic Medicine Institute. Moreover, when taking into account that their relatives had been killed in the course of a military operation during which heavy weapons had been used and that their bodies had been carried by soldiers who had taken part in the operation, the prosecutor’s conclusion, which was based on the forensic reports showing that they had gunpowder residue on their hands, that their relatives had taken part in the armed clash was not compatible with the other information in the file. 69. Furthermore, no fingerprint analysis had been conducted on the rifles with a view to establishing whether they had their relatives’ fingerprints on them. Similarly, although the fact that only spent cartridges belonging to Kalashnikov and G3 rifles had been found after the operation could lead to the assumption that only G3 and Kalashnikov rifles had been used in the operation, the failure to specify exactly where those spent cartridges had been found and the added failure to collect the spent cartridges discharged from the rifles used by the soldiers discredited that assumption. 70. In addition to the above, in their complaint the applicants also criticised the prosecutor’s failure to identify the names of the soldiers who had killed their relatives, to establish the exact locations and movements of both their relatives and the soldiers, to visit the scene, to identify the weapons used by members of the security forces, and to safeguard the clothes removed from the bodies of their relatives. 71. The applicants argued that, in the light of the serious failures it could not be said that an effective investigation had been conducted. Indeed, when looking at the investigation as a whole, one could see that both the security forces who had prepared the military reports after the operation, and subsequently the prosecutor, had been convinced that their relatives had deserved to die and that that had been the real reason behind their failure to take even the most basic investigative steps. In that connection they also criticised the fact that evidence had been collected by the soldiers who were supposed to be under investigation. 72. The applicants concluded their complaint by arguing that, in the light of the shortcomings in the investigation, the prosecutor had not been in a position to decide whether or not the use of force was justified under the national legislation set out in his decision. 73. The objection lodged by the applicants against the prosecutor’s decision was rejected by the Erzincan Assize Court on 24 August 2006. The Assize Court’s decision is as follows: “The complainants submitted through their legal representatives that, although their relatives who were killed on 17 May 2005 (sic) could have been apprehended alive, members of the security forces had acted with the intention to kill and that they had stripped the clothes off their relatives and displayed their bodies publicly. Their complaint was therefore against the military and administrative authorities who had ordered the operation, planned it, and carried it out. At the end of the investigation carried out by the Ovacık prosecutor a decision was taken not to bring criminal proceedings against the military or administrative authorities who had ordered the operation, who had overseen it and who had executed it, for the killings of the deceased persons and for displaying their bodies. It was considered that no offence had been committed. Having examined the file, a decision is hereby given to reject the objection lodged by the complainants because the Ovacık prosecutor’s decision is in accordance with the procedure and the legislation”. 74. In the meantime, on the same date as he closed the investigation ‑ that is on 20 June 2006 – the Ovacık prosecutor also prepared a report and sent it to the Malatya prosecutor’s office. In his report the Ovacık prosecutor asked his colleague in Malatya to take the necessary action against the applicants’ deceased relatives who, according to the evidence in his possession, had committed the offences of membership of a terrorist organisation and had attempted to destroy the constitutional order through armed struggle, and had injured a soldier. 75. On 18 August 2006 the Malatya prosecutor decided not to bring criminal proceedings against the applicants’ relatives, because they were dead. 76. According to a document which was made available to the Court by the respondent Government and which was prepared by the Ministry of Justice on 12 May 2009 and sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs apparently in order to advise the latter when preparing its observations to be submitted to the Court, the applicants’ relatives’ clothes and a number of other items found on their persons were destroyed on the orders of the Ovacık prosecutor, on the ground that they had no evidential value.

4. The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Diyarbakır. 5. At the time of the events in question the applicant was the vice‑president of HAK-PAR (Hak ve Özgürlükler Partisi – the Rights and Freedoms Party). 6. On 4 January 2004 the party held its first ordinary congress at a restaurant in Ankara, where the applicant was elected by the delegates to act as the meeting’s chairman. 7. On 28 February 2005 a public prosecutor at the Ankara public prosecutor’s office filed an indictment with the Ankara Criminal Court of First Instance against thirteen members of HAK-PAR, including the applicant, for acting in violation of section 81 (c) of Law no. 2820 during the congress on the grounds, inter alia, that there had been banners in Kurdish and that most of the speeches given by the delegates had been in Kurdish. 8. The applicant acknowledged before the first-instance court that he had not intervened as the chairman when certain delegates had spoken in Kurdish. In this connection, he submitted that, as a founder member of HAK‑PAR, he believed that Kurdish should be used in all areas of life; that those who spoke Kurdish were speaking in their mother tongue; and that he believed that it was neither legal nor ethical for him to intervene to force people to speak in a language other than their mother tongue. He maintained that such speeches could not have constituted an offence, when taking into account laws that had been enacted in compliance with the conditions for membership of the European Union, and the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights. In this connection, the applicant also submitted that the relevant provisions of Law no. 2820 were contrary to the Constitution. 9. On 7 December 2005 the first-instance court dismissed an application from the defendants to suspend the proceedings and transfer the case to the Constitutional Court for examination of the compatibility of the relevant provisions with the Constitution. 10. On 14 February 2007 the Ankara Criminal Court of First Instance convicted the applicant of the charges. In particular, the court considered that the applicant had, despite warnings from a government superintendent present at the congress, continued to allow certain delegates to give their speeches in Kurdish, in breach of section 81 (c) of Law no. 2820. The applicant was sentenced to one year’s imprisonment. 11. On 23 March 2011 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of the first-instance court on the ground that the latter had failed to give any consideration to whether the conditions for suspending the delivery of the judgment against the defendants, pursuant to Article 231 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, had been met. 12. On 6 December 2011 the Ankara Criminal Court of First Instance ordered that the criminal proceedings against the applicant and the other defendants be terminated, on the ground that the statutory time-limit prescribed under domestic law had expired.

5. In 1961 the applicants’ predecessors were deprived of certain land in favour of the State. 6. On 26 January 2006 the Niš Municipal Court ordered PIK Niš (the debtor), a company predominantly comprised of socially-owned capital, as the end user of that land, to pay the applicants specified amounts on account of the compensation for the land in question. 7. On 25 October 2006 and 1 February 2007 respectively, upon the applicants’ request to that effect, the Niš Municipal Court ordered the enforcement of the said judgment and further ordered the debtor to pay the applicants the enforcement costs. This judgment became both, final and enforceable by 16 August 2006. 8. Only one applicant, Mr Tomislav Đorđević, never lodged an enforcement request. 9. On 3 June 2009 the Niš Commercial Court opened insolvency proceedings in respect of the debtor (St. 10/09). 10. Only one applicant, Ms Milica Nikolić Jajčević, duly submitted her claims therein. 11. These insolvency proceedings are still ongoing. 12. On 2 March 2009, 31 August 2009 and 9 June 2010 respectively, all applicants lodged their constitutional appeals. 13. On 17 March 2011, 4 April 2012 and 23 May 2012, respectively, the Constitutional Court found a violation of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time in respect of all applicants, except Mr Tomislav Đorđević. However, the court did not award the applicants any damages, merely stating that the applicants “had not claimed non-pecuniary damages”. 14. The Constitutional Court dismissed the appeal in respect of one applicant, Mr Tomislav Đorđević, since he had failed to request enforcement of the judgment in question.