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4. The applicant was born in 1988 and is detained in Saransk. 5. On 3 August 2009 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of the rape of a girl, who was also a minor. 6. On 5 August 2009 the Staroshaygovskiy District Court of the Mordovia Republic remanded him in custody. He remained in pre-trial detention pending investigation and trial on the grounds that he was accused of a serious crime, might reoffend, abscond, destroy evidence, threaten witnesses, or interfere with the investigation. 7. On 24 December 2010 the Supreme Court of the Mordovia Republic found him guilty as charged. 8. On 4 October 2010 the applicant, acting for himself, submitted his first letter to the Court. 9. On 4 August and 4 October 2010 he provided two powers of attorney authorising Mr Frimu, one of his cellmates, to represent him before the Court.

5. The first and second applicants were born in 1940 and 1942 respectively and live in Kaunas. The third applicant was born in 1977 and lives in France. The first and second applicants are husband and wife, and the third applicant is their daughter. 6. On 25 January 2001 the Vilnius County Administration (hereinafter “the VCA”) acknowledged G.O.’s right to restoration of title in respect of 0.728 hectares of land in the Antaviliai estate in the Vilnius Region. That land had belonged to G.O.’s father and had been nationalised by the Soviet regime. 7. The following day G.O. sold his right to restoration of title in respect of that plot of land in equal parts to four buyers: the three applicants and V.M. (the first and second applicants’ son, and the third applicant’s brother). The sale agreement was signed by V.M., acting as the applicants’ representative. The four buyers paid, in equal parts, a total of 15,000 Lithuanian litai (LTL; approximately 4,344 euros (EUR)) to G.O. 8. On 25 June 2001 the VCA issued documents confirming the applicants’ and V.M.’s right to receive 0.182 hectares of land each from the State for free. As the second applicant had been a deportee of the Soviet regime, in line with the domestic law she and her family had priority rights to have their property rights restored. The applicants and V.M. were provided with four plots of land (one plot each) in the city of Vilnius the following month. 9. In August and September 2001 the applicants, represented by V.M., sold their plots to third parties for the price of LTL 25,000 (EUR 7,241) for each plot. The sale agreements indicated that the indexed value of each plot, estimated by the Vilnius Branch of the State Enterprise Registry of Land and Other Immovable Property (Žemės ir kito nekilnojamojo turto kadastro ir registro valstybės įmonės Vilniaus filialas), was LTL 25,650 (EUR 7,429). 10. In October 2001 the Vilnius City Police Department opened a pre‑trial investigation concerning allegations of fraud in connection with the restoration of property rights in the Vilnius Region. It was suspected that an organised criminal group was forging documents showing deportee status in order to obtain priority rights in the property restoration process. It was also suspected that some officials of regional authorities had unlawfully restored property rights to individuals who did not have such rights. 11. On 26 November 2001 V.M. was interviewed as a witness in the investigation and asked to explain how he and his family (the applicants) had obtained land in Vilnius. V.M. stated that in 1994 he had befriended E.K. who was his wife’s stepbrother. V.M. knew that E.K.’s job was related to land measurement. Sometime in 2000 V.M. mentioned to E.K. that his mother (the second applicant) had been a deportee. Then E.K. told him that it was possible to acquire restoration rights from other persons and get certain privileges available to former deportees. After about six months E.K. informed V.M. that he had found a person who was willing to sell his restoration rights. E.K. advised V.M. that it was better if the contract with that person (G.O.) was signed by four family members and not just one, because that way they could obtain four separate plots of land. E.K. dealt with all the related paperwork and contacted public officials, while V.M. only signed the sale agreements with G.O. After V.M. and his family had received plots of land, E.K. suggested selling them, and found buyers for all the four plots. V.M. submitted that he had not known the buyers previously and had only met them when signing the agreements. He received LTL 25,000 from each buyer. In all their dealings related to the land V.M. and his family trusted E.K. and assumed that he knew all the relevant legal acts, as his work was related to land. Neither V.M. nor the applicants paid any money to E.K. at any point. 12. On 10 January 2002 V.M. was again interviewed as a witness in the investigation. He retracted his previous statement in part and stated that he had not received payment for the four plots of land (LTL 25,000 for each plot) and did not know if the buyers had paid that money to E.K. or to anyone else, or if they had paid anything at all. V.M. also stated that in the autumn of 2001 E.K. had informed him about the pending pre-trial investigation and advised him to tell the authorities, if questioned, that he (V.M.) had received the payment. E.K. had assured V.M. that everything had been done lawfully, but now V.M. considered that he had been misled and deceived by E.K. 13. It appears that none of the applicants were interviewed or had any procedural status in the investigation. 14. On 15 June 2007 the Vilnius City District Prosecutor ruled that “the facts of the case confirmed that suspects A.Ž., G.S. and S.Ž. had acted unlawfully” and that “during the investigation it was indisputably established (neginčytinai nustatyta) that suspect A.Ž. had unlawfully included relatives of friends or acquaintances of hers on the list of those who had priority right to have their property rights restored”. That same ruling discontinued the investigation as time-barred. 15. In January 2002 the prosecutor of the Vilnius Region (hereinafter “the prosecutor”) lodged a claim before the Vilnius City First District Court, asking for the administrative decisions which had acknowledged G.O.’s right to restoration of title, the sale of G.O.’s restoration rights to the applicants (and V.M.), and all the administrative decisions which had allocated land to them, to be overturned. That claim was amended in June and September 2002 and June 2005. The prosecutor submitted that the Law on Restitution, in force at the material time, entitled G.O. to receive one plot of up to 0.2 ha, with the remainder of his land being compensated for in other ways (see “Relevant domestic law” below), so the applicants were not entitled to be allocated a plot of land of that size each. The prosecutor also submitted that the VCA had unlawfully restored the applicants’ rights to property in the order of priority: even though the second applicant had been a deportee, G.O. had not, and thus he did not have the right to transfer to the applicants priority rights which he himself did not have. 16. On 20 February 2006 the Vilnius City First District Court allowed the prosecutor’s claim in part. The court found that the authorities had lawfully decided to restore G.O.’s property rights and that the latter had lawfully sold those rights to the applicants. However, the court upheld the prosecutor’s argument that G.O. did not have the right to sell more rights than he had himself, and that the applicants’ property rights could only have been restored under the same conditions as would have been applied had they been restored to G.O. The court observed that although such a rule had not been explicitly stipulated in the Law on Restoration at the time when G.O. sold his rights to the applicants, that rule stemmed from a systemic and logical interpretation of that Law, as well as from legal acts of lower rank (see paragraphs 32 and 34 below). Accordingly, the court held that the applicants had the right to receive one plot of land of up to 0.2 ha, but not three separate plots of that size, and they were not entitled to restoration in the order of priority. It overturned the administrative decisions which had allocated the land to the applicants. 17. As a result, the Vilnius City First District Court ordered the applicants to return to the State the plots of land which they had received from it for free. Since they had sold the land to third parties and restitution in integrum was not possible, the court decided that they had to pay the State the market value of that land. In line with Article 6.147 § 2 of the Civil Code (see paragraph 38 below), when property subject to restitution is transferred and the person who transferred it has acted in good faith, he or she has to compensate in the amount of the market value of the property at the time when it was received or transferred, or at the time of restitution, whichever is lowest. The court noted that the prosecutor had not alleged that the unlawful transaction had occurred because of the applicants’ fault or that they had acted in bad faith; nor had it been determined, at the time of the proceedings, that any crime had been committed. Accordingly, the court ordered the applicants to return to the State an amount corresponding to the market value of the land at the time they sold it, as that value was the lowest. On the basis of an estimate by the State Enterprise Centre of Registers, each applicant was ordered to pay LTL 216,000 (EUR 62,560). 18. The applicants appealed against that judgment; on 6 June 2006 the Vilnius Regional Court dismissed their appeal. The court considered that obliging the applicants to pay compensation in the amount of the market value of the land was not disproportionate, because they still retained the right to have property rights restored and to obtain new plots. 19. On 5 June 2007 the Supreme Court dismissed a cassation appeal by the applicants. It held that ignorance of the law could not absolve anyone of responsibility, and thus the applicants should have known that property rights had been restored to them in breach of peremptory legal norms, especially as there was information that they had been advised by E.K., who worked in a municipal land reform department (see paragraphs 11-12 above). 20. On 29 June 2007 the applicants submitted a claim against the State for pecuniary damages before the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court. They contended that each of them had received LTL 25,000 for selling the land but had been ordered to pay LTL 216,000 to the State each, and thus had suffered pecuniary losses of LTL 191,000 (EUR 55,317) each. They also asked for pecuniary damages of LTL 5,230 (EUR 1,514) for the court fees each of them had had to pay in the previous proceedings (see paragraphs 15-19 above). 21. After submitting their claim, the applicants applied for suspension of the execution of the Vilnius City First District Court’s judgment of 20 February 2006 (see paragraph 16 above), submitting that they did not have sufficient funds to comply with it. On 7 December 2007 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court rejected their application on the grounds that the execution of the judgment had not been started yet, and that, in any event, if the applicants did not have sufficient funds nothing would be seized from them. 22. On 13 March 2008 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court dismissed the applicants’ claim for damages. The court acknowledged that the VCA had acted unlawfully when allocating land to the applicants; however, it considered that the applicants had not proven that they had suffered any pecuniary damage. The court noted that the applicants still had the right to restoration of title to G.O.’s land, because their agreement had not been cancelled, and that they were on the list of candidates to be given new plots of land. Accordingly, until such plots were given to them it was not possible to assess whether the applicants had suffered pecuniary damage or not. 23. The Vilnius Regional Administrative Court also noted that there had been a criminal investigation concerning the VCA’s unlawful decisions restoring property rights. Although the investigation was eventually discontinued, it had nonetheless “indisputably established” that certain employees of the VCA had unlawfully issued documents recognising restoration rights (see paragraph 14 above). The court noted that one of those employees was E.K., whom the applicants had consulted. Accordingly, the court held that the applicants should have known that they had received the land unlawfully and that they had themselves contributed to the pecuniary damage “by acting carelessly and negligently” (veikdami nerūpestingai ir neatsargiai). 24. The applicants appealed against that judgment. They submitted, inter alia, that even if they had contributed to the pecuniary damage, the main agent who had caused those damages had been the VCA. Therefore, they argued that, in line with the provisions of the Civil Code (see paragraphs 39-40 below), the liability should have been distributed proportionately between the VCA and the applicants and not placed solely on them. The applicants also submitted that the fact that V.M. had consulted E.K. did not prove that the applicants had conspired with E.K. or other unlawfully acting officials, or that the applicants had pressured any officials to act unlawfully to their benefit. The applicants contended that after their restoration rights had been cancelled the original state of affairs should have been restored, and they should not have been obliged to pay more than they had received. 25. On 2 March 2009 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the applicants’ appeal and upheld the judgment of the lower court. It underlined that the applicants had received the land from the State for free, and that they had immediately sold it to third parties who had to be considered bona fide acquirers. The court held that by selling their plots for a price that was significantly lower than their market value the applicants had acted at their own risk, and thus the difference between what they had received (LTL 25,000 each) and what they were obliged to pay to the State (LTL 216,000 each) could not be regarded as pecuniary damage. The Supreme Administrative Court further held that even if the applicants had suffered pecuniary damage, they could not be awarded damages because they themselves had acted unlawfully. Relying on the Supreme Court’s judgment of 5 June 2007 (see paragraph 19 above), the Supreme Administrative Court considered that the applicants had abused their rights by attempting to get from the State more land than G.O. had been entitled to receive. Accordingly, having concluded that both the applicants and the VCA had acted unlawfully, the court relied on Article 6.282 § 1 of the Civil Code (see paragraph 40 below) and held that there were no grounds to award them pecuniary damages. 26. Subsequently the applicants applied for reopening of the proceedings, but on 31 December 2009 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed their application. 27. In March 2013 a bailiff began executing the Vilnius City First District Court’s judgment of 20 February 2006 (see paragraph 16 above). According to the documents in the Court’s possession, from that date until June 2015 the first and second applicants each paid LTL 2,445 (EUR 708) in monthly payments ranging from LTL 69 (EUR 20) to LTL 200 (EUR 58). The third applicant paid LTL 3,249 (EUR 941) in monthly payments ranging from LTL 69 (EUR 20) to LTL 300 (EUR 87). At the time of the parties’ observations to the Court, the execution was ongoing. The Government submitted that in the future, when the applicants were provided with new plots of land (see paragraphs 28-30 below), the remaining amount could be recovered from those plots. 28. On 19 July 2007 the VCA included the applicants (and V.M.) on the list of individuals who had the right to have title to property restored in the area around Vilnius. Their number in the list was 1417 B. 29. On 14 March 2016 the applicants (and V.M.) were informed by the National Land Service that they were number 185 in the above-mentioned list. They were invited to a meeting of candidates during which they would be able to choose one plot of land of up to 0.12 hectares in joint ownership. 30. As submitted by the Government, that meeting took place on 5 April 2016 and the first and second applicants, as well as V.M., were present but the third applicant was not. Since the four of them were entitled to receive one plot of land in joint ownership, the first and second applicants (and V.M.) were not allowed to choose a plot in the absence of the third applicant. The Government further submitted that there was still land available in the area around Vilnius and that the applicants would be invited to another meeting, planned to take place in the autumn of 2016. At the time of the parties’ observations to the Court, the applicants’ property rights had not yet been restored.

5. The applicant was born in 1972. He was detained at the Gaziantep Foreigners’ Removal Centre (“the Gaziantep Removal Centre”) at the time of the events giving rise to this application. His current address is unknown. 6. In 2000 the applicant fled to Turkey because he was being searched for by the Russian authorities. It appears that shortly before his escape, he had lost his right leg in a bomb attack that struck a mosque in Chechnya. 7. Subsequent to his departure from Russia, criminal proceedings were brought against the applicant by the Russian authorities before the Cerkessk City Court on the following charges: (i) participation in an armed insurrection and membership of an armed organisation with the purpose of overthrowing the constitutional order and violating the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation and (ii) possessing firearms and ammunition. It appears that the Cerkessk City Court issued a detention order in respect of the applicant in his absence. 8. On 24 January 2008 the applicant was taken into police custody in Istanbul in the context of an operation against al-Qaeda. He was subsequently taken to Gaziantep, where he was placed in pre-trial detention at the Gaziantep H-Type Prison upon the order of the Gaziantep Magistrate’s Court. 9. On an unspecified date criminal proceedings were commenced against the applicant before the Adana Assize Court. 10. On 28 January 2009 the Adana Assize Court ordered the applicant’s release from the Gaziantep H-Type Prison. There is no further information in the case file as regards the outcome of the criminal proceedings. 11. Following his release from prison on 28 January 2009, the applicant was placed in detention at the Gaziantep Removal Centre, which is attached to the Gaziantep Security Directorate. 12. On an unspecified date the Russian authorities requested the extradition of the applicant. On 3 April 2009 the Gaziantep Assize Court refused that request, holding that the offences in question were of a political nature and that under international and national laws, alleged perpetrators of such offences could not be extradited. 13. On 23 October 2009 the applicant applied to the Gaziantep governor’s office with a request for asylum. On 26 April 2010 the applicant was notified that his request had been rejected. 14. In the meantime, on 8 April 2010 the applicant submitted a petition to the Ministry of the Interior (“the Ministry”), where he requested to be released and to be granted a residence permit. The applicant’s requests were dismissed by the Ministry. The applicant’s objection to that decision was further dismissed by the Ministry on 10 June 2010. 15. On 24 July 2010 the applicant was released from the Gaziantep Removal Centre, on the condition that he leave Turkey within fifteen days. It appears that the applicant left Turkey shortly after his release. 16. According to the information in the case file, the applicant met with his lawyer a total of nine times between 3 March 2009 and 27 July 2010 during his detention at the Gaziantep Removal Centre.

4. The applicant was born in 1982 and lives in Kharkiv. 5. According to the applicant, on 31 January 2009 she was arrested by a group of police officers in a café, K., and detained without record at a police station until 2 February 2009. She further alleged that during her detention, she was beaten and threatened by the police officers, notably A.A., who tried to obtain false confessions from her concerning her and other persons’ involvement in drug dealing. According to the applicant, she did not seek any medical assistance upon her release because she intended to file an ill‑treatment complaint and expected to be instructed by the prosecutor’s office on how to document the injuries properly. 6. According to the Government, on 31 January 2009 the police officers seized some heroin from the applicant, which was the basis for the institution of criminal proceedings against her and her eventual committal for trial. However, the applicant was neither arrested, nor detained by the police at that time. 7. On 10 February 2009 the applicant complained about the incident to the prosecutor’s office. 8. On 17 April 2009 this complaint was rejected as unsubstantiated. 9. On 31 March 2010 Kyivskyy District Court in Kharkiv, which examined the criminal case against the applicant, ordered the prosecutor’s office to inquire into her ill-treatment complaint lodged again during the trial. 10. On 23 April 2010 the Kyivskyy District Prosecutor’s Office in Kharkiv decided not to institute criminal proceedings in relation to the applicant’s ill-treatment allegations. As appears from that document, the applicant had stated to the prosecutorial authority that she and V.J. (her partner) had been arrested on 29 January 2009 and that she had been ill‑treated by police officers and detained without record until 31 January 2009. V.J., questioned by the prosecutor’s office in connection with the inquiry into the applicant’s complaints, had likewise alleged that both of them had been arrested on 29 January 2009 and that the applicant had been subsequently detained until 31 January 2009. 11. The applicant appealed against this decision to the General Prosecutor’s Office, which forwarded the case-file materials back to the local prosecutor’s office with a view for them to be joined to the criminal investigation of the applicant’s complaint concerning the second ill‑treatment episode (see below). 12. According to the applicant, on 18 June 2010 the Kyivskyy District Court in Kharkiv, to which the criminal case against her had been referred for examination, returned it for additional investigation. 13. There is no further information concerning the final outcome or present status of the aforementioned case against the applicant. 14. At 9.42 p.m. on 25 June 2009 the applicant sought medical aid at Kharkiv City Clinical Hospital no. 4. 15. At 10 p.m. on the same date she was examined by a medical professional in that hospital and diagnosed as suffering from concussion and chest, stomach, and knee-joint contusions. She refused to be admitted as an inpatient for treatment, which was recommended to her, and left the hospital. 16. On 26 June 2009 a new set of criminal proceedings was instituted against the applicant on suspicion of selling opium to three men on 24 June 2009 and of storing a jar of opium in her house (“the second set of criminal proceedings”). 17. On the same date the applicant complained to the Kharkiv Regional Department of the Interior that she had been ill-treated by the police. She submitted, in particular, that on 24 June 2009 four police officers had forced their way into her house without a court order, searching for drugs. Officer A.A. had hit the applicant on the head with the grip of his gun and had struck her several times in the face with his hand in the presence of the applicant’s two-year-old son, her partner, brother, and two guests. The police officers had then taken the applicant to the police station, where she had been held from about 2 p.m. on 24 June until 5.30 p.m. on 25 June 2009 without a formal arrest record being drawn up. During that period, officer A.A. had demanded that she confess to dealing drugs under the protection of another police officer, Y.B. As the applicant had protested, he had threatened and punched her on various parts of her body. She had been released at about 5.30 p.m. on 25 June 2009 after confessing to drug-related offences and signing various documents at the demand of A.A. 18. According to the applicant, during her visit to the Department of the Interior, she had felt so unwell that an ambulance had been called and she had been admitted as an urgent case to Hospital no. 4. 19. According to the Government, it could be seen from the hospital records that no ambulance had been called for the applicant and she had arrived at the hospital on her own. They submitted hospital records, according to which the applicant had come to the hospital on her own from her home and was registered by the reception desk at 9.27 p.m. It can also be seen from those records that between 26 June and 20 July 2009 the applicant received inpatient treatment for a moderately serious case of concussion, accompanied by a traumatic subarachnoid haemorrhage, epileptic syndrome and several other neurological conditions. 20. On 15 July 2009 a medical expert, having examined the applicant, reported that she had bruises on her right leg and left hip, which could be classified as minor injuries and which could have been sustained between seven and fifteen days prior to the assessment. He further concluded that he was not competent to decide on the cerebral trauma, in particular, as he had not been provided with a comprehensive medical record. 21. On 27 July 2009 another medical expert, after examining the applicant and various medical records, concluded that the applicant’s cerebral trauma could be classified as a moderately serious injury. He further reported that the trauma could have been sustained in the circumstances described by the applicant. 22. In July 2009 the Kharkiv Regional Department of the Interior carried out an internal investigation into the applicant’s ill-treatment complaints. 23. On 10 August 2009 a report summarising the results of the investigation was transferred to the Kharkiv city prosecutor’s office for review and follow-up. According to the findings contained in the report there were, in particular, irregularities in the visitors’ log and other police records, making it difficult to determine the exact time of the applicant’s presence in the police station on 24 and 25 June 2009. 24. On an unspecified date the prosecutor’s office began a preliminary investigation into the applicant’s complaints, in the course of which a number of people were questioned as potential witnesses, including the police officers implicated by the applicant in her ill-treatment, the lay witnesses, who had signed the police report concerning seizure of opium from the applicant on 24 June 2009, the three men implicated in buying opium from the applicant, the applicant’s partner, brother, guests, and the applicant herself. 25. During the questionings, the four police officers implicated by the applicant in the forced entry to her house and ill-treating her, denied this accusation. They maintained that the applicant had willingly allowed them to inspect her house after they had caught her selling opium to three men at the entrance. In the presence of two lay witnesses, syringes full of opium had been seized from the men on the spot and a jar filled with opium had been seized from the applicant’s garage following a search of her house. In connection with those seizures, the applicant had subsequently been taken in for questioning and had been at the police station on 24 and 25 June 2009, however, she had neither been arrested, nor held there overnight. The officers also submitted that it was known to them that the applicant sold drugs under the protection of police officer Y.B. 26. Two men identified as the lay witnesses gave statements largely consistent with the police officers’ submissions. 27. The three men identified by the police officers as the drug buyers denied buying any opium from the applicant and submitted that they had visited her that day to borrow some money. Later on, they had been arbitrarily caught by the police and made to write false confessions, admitting that they had bought opium from the applicant, on pain of criminal sanctions. 28. The applicant herself, V.J. (her partner), A.B. (her brother), and two persons identified by the applicant as the guests present during the purported forced entry, gave statements similar to the ones the applicant had provided to the Department of the Interior on 26 June 2009. The applicant also submitted that there had been no lay witnesses present during the forced entry and search and that the jar and syringes with opium had been brought by the police officers and planted on her. 29. On 18 September 2009 the Kharkiv city prosecutor’s office instituted criminal proceedings against “a group of unidentified police officers” suspected of abuse of authority accompanied by violence and the use of arms against the applicant on 24 June 2009. 30. On 22 September 2009 the applicant joined those proceedings as an aggrieved party. 31. On 1 March 2010, responding to a request from the applicant to be updated on the proceedings and to consult the case file, the Kharkiv city prosecutor’s office informed her that the investigation was in progress and that she would be able to consult the file after it had been completed. 32. On 9 March 2010 a further medical report on the applicant was obtained, which stated that it was not possible to determine the gravity of her cerebral trauma, in particular because of the unavailability of her previous complete medical history. It also concluded that it was unlikely that the applicant’s injuries had been self-inflicted. 33. On 8 December 2010 A.A. was indicted within the framework of the criminal proceedings concerning the applicant’s alleged ill-treatment. The three other police officers implicated by the applicant in assisting him on 24 June 2009 were referenced in the bill of indictment by name. 34. On 9 December 2010 the investigator S. discontinued the second set of criminal proceedings against the applicant for want of any evidence that she had stored opium in her house or had sold it to anyone on 24 June 2009. In his decision, the investigator referred to various procedural irregularities in the collection of evidence by the police officers and discrepancies in the statements of the various persons questioned as witnesses, which he deemed irreconcilable. He further decided to transfer the file of the case against the applicant to the Kharkiv prosecutor’s office in order for it to be joined to the case concerning the applicant’s alleged ill-treatment. 35. On 21 January 2011 a further medical report was obtained. It stated that it was not possible to determine the severity of the applicant’s cerebral injury because the medical history that had been provided to the expert writing the report had been incomplete, and because the applicant herself had not reported for an examination in person. It was also noted that, as regards the bruises which had been documented in July 2009, they could have been inflicted on the dates and in the manner reported by the applicant. 36. On 11 August 2011 a further medical report, this time by a panel of three experts, was obtained, wherein the applicant’s cerebral trauma was classified as a minor injury, which could possibly have been sustained on 24 June 2009 and was unlikely to have been self-inflicted. It was further reported that the data concerning the other injuries (bruises and contusions) were inconclusive, but that based on the available information it was not improbable that the injuries had been self-inflicted. 37. On 29 August 2011 the Kharkiv prosecutor withdrew the bill of indictment against officer A.A., noting that the three men earlier identified as the drug buyers and one of the two people identified as the applicant’s guests who had been present during the purported forced entry had retracted their testimony incriminating A.A. and his colleagues in the assault. 38. On an unspecified date officer M.O., one of the four officers implicated by the applicant in the forced entry, appealed to the Kyivskyy District Court in Kharkiv, seeking the annulment of the decision to institute criminal proceedings. 39. On 12 September 2011 the Kyivskyy District Court of Kharkiv allowed the appeal, referring the case for further preliminary inquiry. The court noted, in particular, that as the applicant’s complaint had been lodged against four named police officers, it had been wrong to institute proceedings into alleged abuse of office by a group of “unidentified officers”. Furthermore, while officer M.O. had de facto been implicated in the bill of indictment against officer A.A. as his accomplice, he had been given witness status only, which had restricted his procedural rights, including the right to defence. 40. On various dates in September 2011 formal confrontations were organised between the applicant, two of the three men identified by the police as the “drug buyers”, and a woman identified by the applicant as one of her guests on 24 June 2009. During those confrontations, the applicant confirmed her previous testimony, while the other people maintained that because they had been regular clients of the applicant’s for drugs in 2009, they had earlier given statements in her favour for fear of reprisals from her and officer Y.B., who had protected her. In fact, the two men confirmed that they had bought opium from the applicant on 24 June 2009, while the woman maintained that she had not visited the applicant on that date and had not witnessed any forced entry by the police. 41. V.J. (the applicant’s former partner) and A.B. (her brother), also questioned again in September 2011, confirmed their previous statements that they had witnessed a forced entry and assault on the applicant. Based on the case file, the second guest (the fourth person, who had earlier contended that he had witnessed the forced entry), was not questioned. 42. On 26 November 2011 the Kharkiv prosecutor’s office refused to reopen the criminal investigation into the applicant’s ill-treatment complaints for want of any evidence that the police officers had committed a crime. They referred, in particular, to the retraction of several witness statements and to the re-classification of the applicant’s injuries as minor in the latest medical report. They further pointed out that, according to the experts’ findings, all of the applicant’s external injuries could technically have been self-inflicted. Accordingly, she could have lied to the police about her ill‑treatment to avoid charges of drug dealing. 43. It appears that the applicant was not informed of the above decision in due time, as in 2012 the applicant’s lawyers unsuccessfully contacted the law-enforcement authorities to obtain information on whether there had been any progress in the proceedings.

5. The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Kaunas. 6. In March 2008 the applicant’s mother passed away. At the time of her death, her estate consisted of an apartment, a car, and cash savings of 6,360 Lithuanian litai (LTL, approximately 1,842 euros (EUR)). In her will she left half of the apartment to the applicant’s niece and the remaining property to the applicant and his sister in equal parts. On 27 May 2008 the applicant renounced his part of the inheritance (see paragraph 20 below). 7. In September 2008 V.L. brought a claim against the applicant before the Kaunas District Court. V.L. submitted that the applicant owed her LTL 14,488 (approximately EUR 4,196) in maintenance payments for their son which he had not paid because he had been insolvent. V.L. argued that by renouncing his part of the inheritance the applicant had violated her rights as a creditor because the inherited property could have been used to cover the applicant’s debt. V.L. therefore invoked Article 6.66 of the Civil Code (see paragraph 23 below) and asked the court to annul the renouncement as being contrary to the interests of the applicant’s creditors. She also asked the court to recognise that the applicant had de facto accepted the inheritance because he had been using his mother’s estate since her death (see paragraph 21 below). 8. In October 2008 a similar claim under Article 6.66 of the Civil Code was brought by D.L. She submitted that the applicant had been under an obligation to pay her maintenance and that he owed her LTL 8,734 (approximately EUR 2,530). D.L. asked the court to annul the applicant’s renouncement of the inheritance and to recognise that he had de facto accepted it. In March 2009 the Kaunas District Court decided to examine V.L.’s and D.L.’s claims together. 9. The Kaunas District Court held an oral hearing on 11 November 2009 in which the applicant and both claimants were present. The applicant argued that he had renounced his part of the inheritance for the benefit of his sister who had paid all the expenses of their mother’s funeral. The applicant also submitted that his sister and niece had accepted the entire inheritance and that he had not used any of the property belonging to his late mother’s estate. 10. On 25 November 2009 the Kaunas District Court partly upheld V.L.’s and D.L.’s claims. It held that the applicant had acted in bad faith by renouncing the inheritance while being insolvent and owing money to the claimants. Accordingly, the court annulled the renouncement on the grounds that it violated the interests of the applicant’s creditors (see paragraph 23 below). However, the court held that there was insufficient evidence to find that the applicant had de facto accepted the inheritance and dismissed that part of the claim. 11. The applicant appealed against that judgment. D.L. also appealed but the Kaunas District Court refused to accept her appeal for examination because of formal deficiencies – D.L. had asked to be completely exempted from paying court fees on the grounds that she was disabled and had a low income, but domestic law allowed only for partial exemptions (see paragraph 24 below). D.L. was given ten days to correct the deficiencies in her appeal. On 28 January 2010 the Kaunas District Court held that D.L. had not submitted a corrected appeal within that time-limit so it considered that she had not appealed (see paragraph 25 below). However, on 1 February 2010 the Kaunas District Court referred both the applicant’s and D.L.’s appeals to the Kaunas Regional Court. 12. On 3 February 2010 the applicant received notice from the Kaunas District Court that the civil case and both his and D.L.’s appeals had been referred to the Kaunas Regional Court, and he was asked to submit a reply to D.L.’s appeal within twenty days. However, a copy of D.L.’s appeal was not enclosed. The applicant sent a letter to the Kaunas Regional Court requesting a copy of the appeal. He received it on 10 April 2010 and submitted a reply on 16 April 2010. 13. Subsequently the applicant asked the Kaunas Regional Court to proceed with the examination of the case in his absence – the applicant stated that he had presented all his arguments in his appeal and in his reply to D.L.’s appeal and had nothing else to add. On 15 September 2010 the Kaunas Regional Court held an oral hearing from which the applicant and D.L. were absent but where D.L.’s lawyer was present. 14. By a judgment of 29 September 2010 the Kaunas Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld D.L.’s appeal. The court upheld the findings of the first-instance judgment that the applicant had acted in bad faith by renouncing the inheritance while being insolvent and owing money to his creditors (see paragraph 10 above). The Kaunas Regional Court also found that since his mother’s death the applicant had been using the car previously owned by her and on that basis the court concluded that the applicant had de facto accepted the inheritance (see paragraph 21 below). 15. The applicant submitted an appeal on points of law but on 27 December 2010 the Supreme Court refused to examine it as raising no important legal questions. 16. In March 2011 D.L. brought a new claim against the applicant and his sister. D.L. submitted that although the court in previous proceedings had acknowledged that the applicant had de facto accepted the inheritance (see paragraph 14 above), the applicant had not formally completed that acceptance and his sister had remained the official heir to their mother’s estate. D.L. asked the court to annul the applicant’s sister’s rights to one half of the inheritance and to recognise the applicant’s rights to that property. 17. On 5 March 2012 the Kaunas District Court dismissed D.L.’s claim. The court found that the total value of the applicant’s mother’s estate (the car and the savings) had been LTL 6,860 (approximately EUR 1,987), and that the applicant’s sister had spent LTL 7,817 (approximately EUR 2,264) on their mother’s funeral. In line with domestic law, an heir had the right to cover funeral expenses from a deceased person’s estate before formally accepting the inheritance (see paragraph 22 below). On that basis, the Kaunas District Court held that the applicant’s sister had not inherited any property which could have been used to cover the applicant’s debt to D.L., and thus there were no legal grounds to satisfy D.L.’s claim. That judgment was not appealed against and became final. 18. In March 2011 the applicant submitted a complaint to the Commission on Judicial Ethics and Discipline concerning the judge of the Kaunas District Court who had examined the civil case (see paragraph 10 above). He complained that the judge had acted in abuse of office by referring D.L.’s appeal to the Kaunas Regional Court because that appeal had not been submitted in accordance with procedural rules (see paragraph 11 above). On 8 June 2011 the Commission dismissed the applicant’s complaint. It held that although the judge had been “insufficiently attentive” and had referred D.L.’s appeal to the Kaunas Regional Court by mistake, that mistake had not been so grave as to constitute abuse of office. 19. In August 2011 the applicant petitioned the Prosecutor General to investigate the actions of the judges of the Kaunas District Court and the Kaunas Regional Court. On 30 September 2011 the prosecutor’s office denied the applicant’s request on the grounds that no crime appeared to have been committed. The prosecutor’s decision was subsequently upheld by the courts.

5. The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Stari Bar, Montenegro. At the relevant time he was a professional basketball player. 6. On 9 July 1997 the applicant brought a claim against the basketball club for which he had been playing, Vojvodina BFC (Košarkaski klub Vojvodina BFC), based in Novi Sad. The club had the status of a citizens’ association. 7. On 17 February 1998 the Novi Sad Municipal Court (hereinafter “the Municipal Court”) ruled in favour of the applicant, ordering Vojvodina BFC (hereinafter “the debtor”) to pay him, within fifteen days, the sum of 110,550 dinars (RSD – approximately 10,000 euros (EUR) at the time) and RSD 8,500 (approximately EUR 730) in costs, together with statutory interest. The judgment became final on an unspecified date in 1998. 8. Following a request by the applicant on 15 October 1998 for enforcement, on 19 October 1998 the Municipal Court issued an enforcement order. 9. On 25 December 1998 the applicant informed the court that the debtor did not have sufficient funds in its bank account and proposed that the judgment be enforced by the sale of the debtor’s immovable assets situated on the premises of the Vojvodina Sports and Business Centre. On 17 March 1999 an enforcement order to that effect was issued. 10. In the meantime, a new basketball club, NIS-Vojvodina, was formed. 11. On 25 December 2002 the Central Bank in Novi Sad informed the court that the debtor’s bank account had been frozen. 12. On 14 March 2003 the applicant informed the court of another bank account in the debtor’s name. On 9 May 2003 he asked the court not to carry out the enforcement by sale of the debtor’s immovable assets as he had asked previously, because it appeared that assets did not belong to the debtor, but to the basketball club NIS-Vojvodina. 13. On 12 May 2003 the Municipal Court ordered enforcement in accordance with the applicant’s request of 14 March 2003. 14. On 25 June 2003 the Central Bank in Novi Sad informed the court that the account details the applicant had provided did not concern the debtor but the basketball club NIS-Vojvodina, and that the debtor’s account was still frozen. 15. On 14 July 2003 NIS-Vojvodina appealed against the enforcement order of 12 May 2003. It claimed not to be the debtor’s legal successor. 16. On 1 April 2004 a three judge panel of the Municipal Court (hereinafter “the panel”) refused to hear the appeal until the enforcement judge determined the debtor’s liabilities. 17. On 24 June 2004 NIS-Vojvodina filed a submission, denying any connection with the applicant’s debtor. 18. On 19 October 2004 the Municipal Court asked the applicant to comment on NIS-Vojvodina’s submission and propose another method of enforcement. 19. As the applicant failed to do so, on 11 January 2005 the Municipal Court suspended (obustavio) the enforcement against NIS-Vojvodina. The applicant appealed. 20. On 14 February 2005 the panel instructed the enforcement judge to establish if there was any relationship between the debtor and NIS‑Vojvodina before transferring the file back to it again. 21. On 30 May 2005 the Ministry of Education and Sport informed the Municipal Court that the applicant’s debtor had appeared on their register of sports organisations since 3 August 1999, while NIS-Vojvodina had never been registered. 22. In the proceedings that followed, the enforcement judge, relying on the Ministry’s information note of 30 May 2005, found that NIS-Vojvodina was not the debtor’s legal successor and transferred the case file to the panel on 1 September 2005. 23. On 16 March 2006 the panel upheld the decision of 11 January 2005, finding that there were no grounds to continue enforcement against NIS-Vojvodina. 24. On 1 September 2011 the Novi Sad Commercial Court opened insolvency proceedings in respect of the debtor and adopted the restructuring plan it had devised. According to the plan, the debtor would pay the applicant RSD 1,229,332.42 (approximately EUR 10,000) over five years, paying him one fifth of the total amount each year. 25. . On 17 September 2012 the debtor paid the applicant one fifth of the above-mentioned sum, that is to say RSD 245,866.48 (approximately EUR 2,000). 26. There is no information in the case file as to whether the applicant received any payments thereafter.

5. The applicant was born in 1978 and until his arrest lived in Sarapul, the Republic of Udmurtiya. 6. He was arrested on 18 October 2006. On 28 May 2007 the Sarapul Town Court convicted him of several criminal offences, including aggravated robbery committed by a criminal group, and sentenced him to six years and ten months’ imprisonment. 7. After the arrest on 18 October 2006 the applicant was taken to a police station in Sarapul and shortly thereafter to remand prison no. IZ-18/1 in Izhevsk. Twenty days later he was admitted to prison hospital no. 4 (“the prison hospital”). 8. The parties provided conflicting descriptions of the conditions of the applicant’s detention in the prison hospital between March and October 2007. 9. From March to May 2007 he was detained with nine other sick inmates in cell no. 4, which measured 36 sq. m. Accordingly, each detainee was afforded around 3.6 sq. m of personal space. The living space was further diminished by six bunk beds and a table. The cell had a window measuring 150 by 150 cm and two lamps, only one of which was functional. Inmates were allowed to smoke in the cell. The ventilation system, which was switched on in the mornings and evenings, and a small ventilation window measuring 25 by 30 cm, was unable to ensure sufficient inflow of fresh air. The cell had a squat toilet separated by a metal screen from the sink, but not from the table or the door. 10. In May 2007 the applicant was transferred to cell no. 1 which was not different in any aspect from cell no. 4, save for the facts that the cell had two windows and was located in the semi-basement and was therefore excessively humid. 11. In late June 2007 the applicant was placed in cell no. 20. The conditions of detention there were satisfactory. It was designed for ten detainees but only accommodated five. 12. Shortly after the applicant was returned to cell no. 4. He did not describe his further transfers between the cells, only claiming that the conditions of his detention had been deplorable. 13. As to the general conditions of detention, the applicant argued that daily outdoor exercises were dispiriting, as the prison yard, secured by high walls, was gloomy and small, and the outdoor activities did not last longer than an hour, or were sometimes even shorter. 14. The applicant used communal shower facilities which were in an appalling unsanitary condition. The floor was covered by a mixture of mud and detergent. Each detainee was afforded fifteen minutes to take a shower. 15. The quality of food served in the prison hospital was poor and scarce. Dishes largely comprised of cabbage, potatoes and barley grit. Meat or fish was only served on public holidays. 16. The applicant supported his claims with photos of the prison hospital and a dish served there. 17. Relying on certificates issued by the prison hospital administration on 22, 23 and 24 April 2013, extracts from records of inmates’ transfers on 7 and 28 February, 27 March, 5 and 23 April, 7 August, 7 and 11 September, 1 October 2007, and a detailed plan of the prison hospital, the Government claimed that the facility had not been overcrowded. Their submissions may be summarised as follows: Period of detention Cell no. Cell surface area (sq. m) Number of detainees 28 February to 21 March 2007 4 37 7 21 to 27 March 2007 6 18. Relying on photos of the prison hospital, written statements about the conditions of detention in 2007 made by three inmates in 2013, and on certificates issued by the prison hospital administration on 22 and 24 April 2013, the Government argued that the cell windows had allowed sufficient daylight so that inmates had been able to read and write. The cells had been equipped with four 40‑watt fluorescent tubes which had been lit from 6 a.m. to 10 p.m. At night the cells had been lit by security lights. 19. A ventilation system had been installed in every cell. The natural ventilation had also been ensured through the windows. The heating system had properly functioned. 20. Toilets in the cells had been separated from the main area by a partition for privacy. Due to the security considerations involved, punishment cells designed for solitary confinement had no such partition, but were equipped with a curtain. The applicant had been able take a shower once a week for at least fifteen minutes. 21. The premises of the prison hospital had been in good sanitary condition, as it had been checked daily by staff members. The cells had been cleaned and disinfected every day. 22. In addition to a daily hour-long walk in the prison hospital’s yard, the applicant had been able to walk freely during the daytime within sanitary block. 23. The applicant had been provided with three hot meals per day and an extra allowance for ill inmates comprising bread, vegetables, meat, milk, cheese and fruit juice. 24. Despite the Court’s request to produce the applicant’s complete medical record, the Government only submitted several illegible pages apparently belonging to his medical file. They further produced extracts from his medical history. The extracts contained fragments of information concerning the drugs prescribed. The following information on the applicant’s treatment may be deduced from the submitted documents. 25. The applicant did not suffer from tuberculosis prior to his arrest. 26. On the day of his arrest, 18 October 2006, the applicant was seen by a prison paramedic, who performed a general check-up, noting, inter alia, that the applicant’s lungs were clear. The next day a prison doctor confirmed that he was in good health. In late October a periodic chest X-ray showed traces of tuberculosis. The prison doctor studied the X-ray record and recommended the applicant’s transfer to the prison hospital. 27. Five days later the applicant was admitted to the prison hospital. A sputum smear test performed on admission led to his being diagnosed with infiltrative tuberculosis at the stage of lung tissue destruction, with inactive Mycobacterium tuberculosis (“MBT”). Two days later a new X-ray test confirmed the diagnosis. 28. Between 16 November 2006 and 11 January 2007 the applicant underwent inpatient anti-tuberculosis treatment in the prison hospital. There is no information describing the nature of the treatment. For unknown reasons it was unsuccessful. 29. According to the medical records, in the following year the applicant “received standard anti-tuberculosis treatment”. However, he stated that between March 2007 and March 2008 he had only been given basic febrifuges and painkillers. During that period he was seen by the prison doctor on three occasions. No significant changes were registered. The size of the lung cavities remained the same. 30. In the beginning of 2008, when a chest X-ray and tomography examinations registered a new focal point of infiltration in the right lung, the applicant’s doctor confirmed the extent of the deterioration of the applicant’s health. 31. In early March 2008 the applicant was examined by a commission of doctors and certified as having a second-degree disability. A three-month drug regimen based on pyrazinamide, ethambutol, capreomycin and other medication was prescribed. According to the applicant, one of the drugs was out of stock. 32. On 18 March and 1 April 2008 the applicant failed to see the attending doctor. 33. In May 2008 the treatment regimen was amended with capreomycin removed and new drugs (rifampicin, cycloserine and others) added into the applicant’s daily drug intake. 34. In the following two months the applicant interrupted his treatment for a period of two or three weeks, having refused to take some drugs and having gone on hunger strike. In the late June 2008 his tuberculosis transformed into MBT-positive form. 35. Between July 2008 and March 2009 the applicant received inpatient treatment which had no effect on his medical condition. The deterioration of his health continued in the summer and autumn of 2009. 36. An X-ray and a tomography examination performed in September 2009 indicated that the applicant’s lungs were filled with caseation. The applicant was taken for a month-long inpatient treatment in the hospital with his condition had been brought under control. By September 2010 his health had improved and the lung cavities had disappeared. 37. According to his medical records, in December 2010 the applicant refused to take a few of the anti-tuberculosis drugs. In April, September and November 2011 he did not consult the attending doctor. 38. In September 2011 tuberculomas replaced the lung cavities. In 2012‑13 calcifications and pulmonary fibrosis scars were only registered in the applicant’s lungs. The most recent sputum smear test in February 2013 did not indicate whether the applicant remained MBT‑positive. 39. The parties did not submit information on the applicant’s further treatment. 40. In the end of 2006 the applicant complained about the poor quality of medical care to the Ministry of Health of the Republic of Udmurtiya. By a letter of 17 January 2007 his claim was rejected. 41. In the early 2007 he lodged a similar claim with the Service for the Execution of Sentences in the Republic of Udmurtiya. It was dismissed on 23 April 2007. 42. In 2008 the applicant unsuccessfully complained to the Federal Ombudsman about his alleged lack of access to information about his health and diagnoses. His claim was not examined on the merits. 43. He further complained of the lack of medical assistance to the prosecutor’s office of the Republic of Udmurtiya. On 21 August 2008 his complaint was dismissed. 44. In 2010 the applicant lodged two claims with the Industrialnyy District Court of the Republic of Udmurtiya arguing that he had not benefitted from adequate medical care in detention. The claims were dismissed. According to the Government, the applicant did not appeal. The parties did not submit copies of the judgments.

5. The applicants were born in 1970 and 1956 respectively and live in Daugavpils. 6. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7. In October 2011 the Bureau for the Prevention and Combating of Corruption (Korupcijas novēršanas un apkarošanas birojs – “the KNAB”) conducted an inquiry into suspected bribery. It obtained information giving rise to a suspicion that the bribery involved the trade of contraband tobacco and alcohol. The goods were stored on the premises of company M., which was owned by V.K. In November 2011 the KNAB transmitted this information to the State Revenue Service (Valsts ieņēmumu dienests – “the VID”). 8. On 16 November 2011 the VID dispatched officers to company M. in order to verify the information received with an inspection (apskate), under Article 2561 of the Code of Administrative Violations (Administratīvo pārkāpumu kodekss). According to the Government, V.K. was not present at the site himself, but was informed by telephone when the officers arrived. 9. At 3.40 p.m. they commenced the inspection of the commercial site used by company M. It covered an area of 7,000 square metres, which was surrounded by a concrete fence and consisted of seven large buildings and numerous containers. It was interrupted as the employees present refused to open a suspicious container, acting on orders given by V.K. over the telephone. The officers then obtained a prosecutor’s authorisation and resumed the inspection. 10. According to the second applicant, who was an accountant at company M., the officers arrived at about 4 p.m. on 16 November 2011. Although she was informed that she was not under arrest, officer J.L. asked her not to leave the site. The second applicant stayed, but subsequently contacted the company’s lawyer, V.G., who advised her that she had a right to leave. She did so at about 7.30 p.m. At about 10 p.m. V.G. telephoned the second applicant, asking her to return to the site to find his power of attorney to act on behalf of company M. She arrived at about 10.30 p.m. 11. According to the Government, at 1.16 a.m. on 17 November 2011 V.K. telephoned the first applicant, a guard at company M., to find out how the inspection was progressing. V.K. telephoned him again at 2.37 a.m., this time asking him to follow his instructions. The first applicant was to go to the outbuilding of a furnace facility and open and press certain taps, valves, and buttons. The KNAB intercepted this conversation and informed the VID officers. 12. At 2.50 a.m. an investigator opened criminal proceedings and decided to conduct an inspection (apskate) of the crime scene. By the same decision, the administrative proceedings were discontinued. According to the Government, shortly thereafter officers arrived at the outbuilding, which smelled of spirits and was filled with large plastic tanks. They discovered the first applicant inside operating various taps and valves and asked him to stop what he was doing. As he refused, the officers handcuffed and removed him from the outbuilding. They placed him in the office building and seized his telephone, given his regular telephone contact with V.K. 13. According to the first applicant, however, at about 2.30 a.m. on 17 November 2011 he went to the outbuilding to switch on the heating. There was no smell of spirits or large plastic tanks. Shortly thereafter he was handcuffed by officers and his mobile telephone was taken off him. From that moment on, he was under the constant watch of the officers and was not permitted to use the telephone. No reasons were given for their actions. 14. According to the Government, officers found approximately ten tons of illegal alcohol in the furnace facility. They also discovered a secret passage leading to a nearby forest. In order to preserve the crime scene, they asked the employees present, including the first and second applicants, not to leave. As the second applicant had been observing their activities and contacting someone on a mobile telephone, the officers seized it from her. The first applicant was kept handcuffed until the furnace facility was sealed off and the commercial site secured. The first applicant submitted that he had remained handcuffed until about 8 a.m. 15. According to the second applicant, because it was so late, she was resting at the site. At about 3 a.m. on 17 November 2011 she was approached by an investigator, I.R. From that moment onwards, she was kept under guard by the officers and forbidden from using the telephone. She was prevented from leaving and ordered to participate in the inspection. 16. At 10 and 11 a.m. the first and second applicants were both questioned as witnesses. 17. At 12.10 p.m. the second applicant made a written request to I.R., stating that she was not feeling well and wanted permission to rest. At 12.23 p.m. I.R. allowed her to rest in the office premises. 18. At 7 p.m., according to the Government, the first applicant left the site. He stated that he had been given permission to leave. 19. According to the Government, at 7.15 p.m. the officers resumed the inspection. As the second applicant was present, the officers invited her to attend it with V.G. She did not refuse this invitation, nor made any remarks or complaints about it in the relevant record. 20. According to the Government, at 4.30 a.m. on 18 November 2011 the officers completed the second part of the inspection. It was then, according to the second applicant, that she was allowed to leave the site. 21. Subsequently, on 18 November 2011 the first applicant was arrested at his home and questioned as a suspect. He was released the same day. 22. By a decision dated 19 November 2011 the first applicant was declared a suspect. He was subsequently charged with failing to report a serious crime and attempting to conceal evidence of a crime. On 16 January 2013 the criminal proceedings against him were terminated for lack of corpus delicti in his actions. He had followed V.K.’s instructions, without being aware of the consequences of his actions. 23. On 26 July 2013 the VID completed the investigation and transferred the case to the prosecution service. 24. At the time the parties exchanged their observations, the criminal proceedings were still pending. 25. On 14 and 29 December 2011 the applicants lodged complaints with the prosecution service regarding the events of 16 to 18 November 2011. They alleged that the officers had breached Article 5 of the Convention and had also restricted their freedom of movement. 26. The first applicant stated that at about 2.30 a.m. on 17 November 2011 he had gone to the outbuilding to switch on the heating. The officers had entered shortly afterwards. They had handcuffed him and taken his mobile telephone. From that moment on, he had been under their constant watch and had not been permitted to use the telephone. At about 3 a.m. he had been ordered to participate in the inspection. He had remained handcuffed until about 8 a.m. At about 10 a.m. an investigator, V.V., had invited him to one of the offices for questioning. The first applicant had asked whether lawyer, V.G., could be present, to which he had received a negative reply. The first applicant had been allowed to leave the site at about 7 p.m. on 17 November 2011. As regards his handcuffing, the first applicant submitted that when the officers had handcuffed him a criminal investigation had not yet been opened. Therefore, the VID officers could not have exercised their powers under sections 16(3) and 161 of the Law on the State Revenue Service (likums “Par Valsts ieņēmumu dienestu”). Furthermore, there had been no grounds under section 161(1) of the Law for his handcuffing and at no point had he actually been formally detained. 27. The second applicant stated that the VID officers had arrived at about 4 p.m. on 16 November 2011. Although she had been informed that she had not been placed under arrest, officer J.L. had asked her not to leave the site. The second applicant had stayed, but about 7.30 p.m. she had contacted V.G., who had advised her that unless she had been detained she had a right to leave. The second applicant had left, despite the officers’ threats. Another employee, T.K., had also left. At about 10 p.m. V.G. telephoned the second applicant, asking her to return to the site to find his power of attorney to act on behalf of company M. She had arrived at about 10.30 p.m. Later, the second applicant had gone to a lounge area to rest. At about 3 a.m. she had been approached by the VID officers, who had told her that V.G. had left and that the first applicant had been handcuffed. I.R. had seized her telephone and had ordered her to participate in the inspection, without informing her that she had a right not to participate. The second applicant had asked I.R. several times to allow her to stay on the office premises as she had been tired. I.R. had refused several times and had eventually told her that if she continued to make such requests I.R. would detain her for forty-eight hours and place her in isolation cell. She had therefore been compelled to participate in the inspection. Furthermore, she had been under the constant watch of the officers. At about 11 a.m. she had been questioned by V.V., who had not given her an opportunity to contact a lawyer. Although the second applicant had not been under arrest, she had not been allowed to leave the site and her brother had been prevented from seeing her. He had meanwhile contacted a lawyer, I.B., who had arrived at the site at about 9.30 p.m. The second applicant had been allowed to leave the site at about 4.30 a.m. the following morning, when the inspection had been completed. (b) Decisions 28. On 30 December 2011 and 9 January 2012 prosecutor O.R. dismissed the applicants’ complaints. 29. He reasoned that between 2.50 and 9 a.m. on 17 November 2011 a VID investigator, I.R., had conducted an inspection, which had been resumed at 7.15 p.m. and completed at 4.23 a.m. the following morning. According to the inspection record the applicants and V.G., acting as a representative of company M., had all been present. They had signed the record, but none of them had noted in it that they had been compelled to participate or that they had not been informed of their rights. 30. There was therefore no reason to consider that the applicants’ presence at the inspection had been unlawful. 31. In so far as the applicants alleged that the VID officers had restricted their rights, their complaints were transmitted to the VID for disciplinary proceedings (see paragraphs 44-48 below). (c) Appeals 32. On 12 and 18 January 2012 the applicants lodged appeals against the aforementioned decisions, arguing that they had not been informed of their right not to participate in the inspection. Furthermore, they had not been assisted by V.G. From about 9.30 p.m. on 17 November 2011 the second applicant had been assisted by I.B. 33. The fact that the first applicant had not made any remarks in the inspection record did not prove that there had been no violations. The second applicant had noted in the record that she had not known what her role in the inspection had been. (d) Decisions on appeals 34. On 1 and 3 February 2012 prosecutor V.Š. dismissed the applicants’ appeals. 35. She reasoned that the inspection had been conducted in accordance with section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Law (Kriminālprocesa likums). 36. The applicants had been present at the site at the start of the inspection at 2.50 a.m. on 17 November 2011. I.R. had invited them to participate in it. There was no evidence suggesting that they had refused. As the applicants had not been involved in the criminal proceedings, there had been no obligation to inform them of their rights. 37. Furthermore, once the inspection had resumed at 7.15 p.m., the second applicant had had an opportunity to invite her lawyer, I.B. Neither I.B. nor the second applicant had noted in the inspection record that she had participated against her will. (e) Further appeals 38. On 14 and 17 February 2012 the applicants appealed against the aforementioned decisions. 39. They maintained that I.R. had ordered them to participate in the inspection. The fact that they had not made notes in the record was irrelevant. They had had no information about their status in the proceedings until they had been questioned as witnesses. 40. In addition, the second applicant had had no opportunity to seek legal assistance, as her mobile telephone had been taken off her. Her relatives had invited I.B., who had arrived at about 9.30 p.m. on 17 November 2011, eighteen hours after the start of the inspection, when it had been nearing its end. The second applicant had been unaware that her rights had been violated and had not known what information to provide to I.B. (f) Final decision 41. On 13 and 14 March 2012 chief prosecutor A.S. dismissed the applicants’ appeals and upheld the lower prosecutors’ decisions. 42. Between 2.50 and 9 a.m. on 17 November 2011 I.R. had conducted an inspection. The first and second applicants and V.G. had attended. The applicants had familiarised themselves with the inspection record and had signed it. While the first and second applicants had made some remarks in the record, they had not noted that they had participated against their will. The second applicant had also attended the second part of the inspection between 7.15 p.m. on 17 November 2011 and 4.23 a.m. on 18 November 2011. From 8.45 p.m. on 17 November 2011 she had been assisted by I.B. Neither I.B. nor she had noted in the inspection record that she had participated against her will or that she had not known her rights in the criminal proceedings. 43. There was no reason to conclude that the applicants had not known their rights, including the right to be present at the inspection, to familiarise themselves with and write remarks in the inspection record and to make complaints. 44. On 16 and 17 January 2012 the VID concluded that there were no grounds for opening disciplinary proceedings against its officers. 45. Between 17 and 18 November 2011 I.R. had conducted an inspection in accordance with sections 139(1), 159, 160 and 162 of the Criminal Procedure Law. Under section 9(1) of that legislation everyone had a duty to comply with the requests of an official authorised to conduct criminal proceedings and with the procedure provided by law. 46. During the inspection on 17 November 2011 the first applicant had opened taps so that spirits could start flowing into the pipes. There had been a suspicion that he had tried to conceal evidence of a crime and therefore had attempted to commit a criminal offence. He had been handcuffed to protect the crime scene and to prevent him from committing further criminal acts, namely, to stop him failing to comply with lawful requests. Immediately after completion of the inspection, the applicant’s handcuffs had been removed. Their use had therefore been lawful. 47. Referring to section 12 of the Criminal Procedure Law, the VID stated that the restrictions on the first and second applicants’ freedom of movement between 17 and 18 November 2011 had been proportionate to the public interest in crime prevention. 48. Furthermore, during the inspection the first and second applicants had been assisted by two lawyers. None of them had noted down in the relevant record any objections as regards the course of the inspection, thereby confirming its lawfulness. 49. On 13 March 2013 the Ombudsperson issued conclusions on the first applicant’s complaint. 50. At 3.40 p.m. on 16 November 2011 VID officers had commenced a “control” (pārbaude) in administrative proceedings. 51. At quarter past midnight on 17 November 2011 they had commenced an “inspection of an area inaccessible to the public” (publiski nepieejamas teritorijas apskate) under Article 2561 of the Code of Administrative Violations, based on a prosecutor’s authorisation. 52. At about 2.30 a.m. the first applicant had gone to the furnace facility. The officers had asked him to stop what he was doing and handcuffed him. 53. At about 2.50 a.m. a decision had been made to open criminal proceedings and conduct an inspection under sections 162 and 163 of the Criminal Procedure Law. 54. Between 9.57 and 10.56 a.m. the first applicant had been informed of his rights and questioned as a witness. 55. At 10.10 a.m. on 18 November 2011 he had been detained and later the same day questioned as a suspect. 56. There was no dispute that under the Law on the State Revenue Service, officers could use restraint measures in the circumstances provided for by law. In view of the information received from the VID, the first applicant had been handcuffed under section 161(1)3) and 4) of that legislation on the grounds that he had failed to comply with lawful requests made by the VID officers and to protect an object under guard from unlawful threat. 57. At the same time, there was no information in the case material regarding lawful requests made by the VID officers which the first applicant had failed to fulfil. Similarly, there was no information that the VID officers had guarded the furnace facility. Accordingly, there had been no legal or factual obstacles preventing him from entering it. 58. Also, there was no objective reason why less restrictive measures could not have been used to prevent obstruction of the criminal investigation. In view of this, the use of handcuffs had not been necessary. 59. As a result of the handcuffing, the first applicant’s freedom of movement and right to liberty had been restricted. At the same time, during an inspection under section 163 of the Criminal Procedure Law the rights of those present could not be restricted. The procedure for arrest was laid down in the Code of Administrative Violations and the Criminal Procedure Law, which provided that a record of arrest had to be drawn up. The first applicant had not been detained under Article 253 of the Code of Administrative Violations, and in the criminal proceedings he had only been detained at 10.10 a.m. on 18 November 2011. A record of his arrest had not been drawn up with regard to the restriction on his right to liberty during the inspection on 17 November 2011. This had therefore not been in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. There had been a violation of Article 5 of the Convention. 60. There was no dispute that VID officers could invite anyone to participate in the inspection. However, in accordance with section 163(3) of the Criminal Procedure Law, such persons were not under an obligation to participate. At the same time, in its judgment of 14 November 2006 (in case no. SKA-454/2006) the Administrative Cases Division of the Senate of the Supreme Court (Augstākās tiesas Senāta Administratīvo lietu departaments) stated that a request made by a police officer in the performance of his or her official duties was regarded as binding on the person concerned. The Ombudsperson was therefore of the view that the person concerned was prevented from refusing to comply with a request made by an investigating authority, unless informed of the right to do so. In the present case, the first applicant had not been informed of the right to refuse to participate in the inspection. This had not been examined by the prosecution service.

5. The applicant was born in Zimbabwe and lives in London. 6. The applicant arrived in the United Kingdom in May 2001 and was granted six months’ leave to enter as a visitor. In or around 2003 he began suffering from a mental illness which led to his hearing voices in his head and at least two suicide attempts. 7. In 2004 and 2005 the applicant was convicted of a number of driving offences, including driving otherwise than in accordance with a licence, using a vehicle while uninsured and driving whilst disqualified. He was also convicted of resisting or obstructing a police officer and failing to surrender to custody. No custodial sentence was passed. 8. On 18 April 2005 the applicant made an application for asylum. However, the application was refused on 22 June 2005 on non-compliance grounds as the applicant had failed to attend his substantive asylum interview. Notice of this decision was served on the applicant on 27 June 2005. On the same day, he was served with notice of liability to removal as an overstayer. 9. The applicant did not appeal against this decision. When he subsequently failed to comply with his reporting conditions he was treated as an absconder. 10. On 13 August 2007 he was convicted of possessing Class A drugs with intent to supply and sentenced to three years’ imprisonment. He did not appeal against conviction or sentence. 11. While serving his sentence the applicant was prescribed a variety of anti‑psychotic drugs. This was the first time he had received any treatment for his mental illness as he had previously declined to engage with psychiatrists and other health care professionals. 12. The applicant made a second asylum application on 27 March 2008. In doing so, he described two violent incidents he had experienced in Zimbabwe: first, he claimed that in 2000 he had been attacked by Zanu-PF supporters with knives, sticks and sandbags while protesting about gay rights; and secondly, he claimed that later that same year he had been arrested for demonstrating and beaten on his back and the soles of his feet while detained at a police station. 13. On 30 October 2008 the applicant was interviewed in relation to his second asylum claim. 14. On 14 November 2008 the applicant was served with a notice of liability to automatic deportation. As a consequence, when he completed his sentence on 28 November 2008 he remained in detention under the Secretary of State for the Home Department’s immigration powers. 15. On 20 February 2009 the applicant was admitted to hospital for a psychiatric assessment and was sectioned for six days after his mental health deteriorated significantly. 16. On 26 May 2009, a further asylum interview took place following which the applicant submitted further evidence in support of his claim. 17. On 22 October 2009, an interview took place with the applicant for the purposes of obtaining a travel document. The applicant refused to provide bio-data for the purposes of the travel document asking to contact his solicitor first. 18. On 3 November 2009 the applicant’s representatives asked the Government to allow them more time to submit medical evidence supporting the applicant’s second asylum claim. The Government did not indicate whether they responded to this request. 19. On 3 December 2009 the applicant applied for bail which was refused on 9 December because the tribunal judged he posed an unacceptable risk of absconding. 20. On 16 February 2010 the Secretary of State enquired of the applicant’s representatives about their intentions concerning the medical report. The applicant’s representatives indicated they had requested an appointment and asserted that it would be unreasonable for the Secretary of State to make a decision without awaiting the outcome. On 10 June 2010 the Secretary of State telephoned the applicant’s representatives again to ask what their intentions were regarding the medical report. The representatives indicated they would reply in writing. 21. On 22 June 2010 the applicant was interviewed again to obtain further bio-data to issue a travel document but he would not provide further details. 22. On 28 June 2010 the applicant’s representatives wrote to the Secretary of State. The letter stated that his detention was unlawful and that he should be released. The representatives sent a second letter to the Secretary of State on 8 July 2010, in which they again requested that the applicant be released due to his medical conditions and pursuant to the Secretary of State’s policy on not detaining mentally ill persons. 23. The Secretary of State replied to these letters on 12 July 2010 in the following terms: “1. The Secretary of State, having considered the particulars of your client’s case, is satisfied that the presumption in favour of release is outweighed by the seriousness of the offence, risk of harm to the public, and risk of absconding and that your client’s detention is justified and lawful. 2. It has been decided that your client should be detained because: - Your client is likely to abscond if given temporary admission or release. - Your client does not have close enough ties (e.g. family or friends) to make it likely that he will stay in one place. - Your client has previously failed to comply with conditions of his stay, temporary admission or release. - Your client has previously absconded. - Your client has used or attempted to use deception in a way that leads us to consider he may continue to deceive. - Your client has not produced satisfactory evidence of his identity, nationality, or lawful basis to be in the United Kingdom. - Your client has previously failed or refused to leave the United Kingdom when required to do so. - It is conducive to the public good for your client to be detained.” 24. On 26 July 2010 the Secretary of State set a time limit of 31 August 2010 for the provision of further information in support of the applicant’s asylum claim. 25. On 28 August 2010 the applicant was examined by Dr S. and her expert report, dated 3 October 2010, was sent to the Secretary of State on 22 November 2010. 26. Dr. S noted that the applicant had a number of scars which accorded with his description of the first assault by supporters of Zanu-PF. She also noted that he had a clear history of a psychotic illness which was characterised by many first-rank symptoms of schizophrenia. He was being treated but still experienced some symptoms, including auditory hallucinations and ideas of reference. In addition, he had symptoms of post‑traumatic stress disorder, including poor sleep, nightmares, intrusive daytime thoughts, and physical symptoms of fear, hopelessness and isolation. 27. On 3 November 2010 the detention centre where the applicant was detained raised concerns about his mental health. He was assessed by the Health Care Manager as unsuitable for detention under the Mental Health Act on 8 November 2010 and on 12 November 2010 as not requiring compulsory mental health treatment. 28. On 16 November 2010 the applicant applied to the tribunal for bail but withdrew his application on 19 November. 29. On 22 November 2010, the medical report was provided to the Secretary of State. 30. On 14 January 2011 the applicant submitted his application for permission to apply for judicial review, in which he challenged his continuing detention on the grounds that it was contrary to the Secretary of State’s published policy on the detention of persons suffering from serious mental illness (“the mental health concession”); that it was contrary to the Secretary of State’s published policy on the detention of persons who had been victims of torture (“the torture concession”); and that it was contrary to the principles set down in R v. Durham Prison Governor ex parte Hardial Singh [1984] 1 WLR 704 (“the Hardial Singh principles”). The applicant also claimed damages for unlawful detention. 31. On 18 January 2011, the applicant’s representatives sent a new medical report and informed the Secretary of State that they were no longer relying on the medical report provided on 22 November 2010. 32. On 8 February 2011 the Secretary of State refused the applicant’s second asylum claim and made a deportation order pursuant to section 32(5) of the United Kingdom Borders Act 2007. The applicant’s appeal was dismissed on 7 April 2011. On 4 May he was refused permission to appeal against that decision. 33. On 3 June 2011 the applicant was refused permission to apply for judicial review on the papers by Mr Justice Calvert-Smith. In refusing permission, he observed that the mental health concession only applied where the detainee was suffering from a serious mental illness which could not be satisfactorily managed within detention. As a consequence, he concluded that the applicant’s condition fell short of the severity required. 34. With regard to the torture concession, the judge noted that the alleged torture which had happened some eleven years previously and which was said to be the cause or part cause of the mental illness the claimant was suffering from could have no bearing on the reasonableness or otherwise of the current detention. Finally, he found that the Hardial Singh principles were not infringed because: “a. the 1st principle is not engaged. b. The 2nd and 3rd principles are not infringed. The dangers of absconscion and reoffending are and have always been real in view of the claimant’s behaviour between July 2005 and his arrest in respect of the drugs matter. The recent decision of October 2010 means that the detention is not open-ended. c. the 4th principle is not infringed. There has been no lack of expedition by the defendant since the expiry of the claimant’s sentence in late 2008.” 35. The applicant was released from detention on 15 September 2011 after being granted bail by the Upper Tribunal. 36. On 28 October 2011 the applicant was again refused permission to apply for judicial review by Mr Justice Ouseley at a renewed oral hearing in which he heard from representatives for both parties. In the renewed application, the applicant had contended that his detention became unlawful on 28 June 2010, when the pre-action letter was sent to the Secretary of State. However, Mr Justice Ouseley rejected that claim and found that the applicant had no arguable case. In particular, he noted that there was no evidence to suggest that his mental illness could not be satisfactorily managed in detention; that there was no independent evidence that he had been tortured because his scarring was only consistent with an assault by Zanu-PF supporters which did not amount to torture, and there was no scarring consistent with his allegations of ill-treatment at the police station; and finally, that there was nothing to indicate the applicant’s prospects of removal at the relevant time were nil or that efforts did not take place to effect his removal. 37. On 22 February 2012 the Court of Appeal, Civil Division refused the applicant permission to appeal the decision of 31 October 2011, finding that the High Court had been correct on every point. There was no independent evidence of torture and the fact that the mental health concession had been clarified on 26 August 2010 to refer to satisfactory management in detention did not mean that the position was otherwise before that date. 38. In the meantime, the applicant had challenged the decision to refuse his asylum claim and sought to appeal to the Court of Appeal. On 28 April 2012 the Secretary of State agreed that the decision of 8 February 2011 refusing the applicant’s asylum claim was flawed and that the case should be remitted to the Upper Tribunal. 39. On 20 November 2012 the Upper Tribunal allowed the applicant’s asylum appeal on human rights grounds. On 30 January 2013 the deportation order was revoked and the applicant was subsequently granted discretionary leave until 25 September 2013. He applied for further discretionary leave on 26 September 2013. According to the observations submitted, a decision on that application remains outstanding.

5. The applicant was born in 1949 and lives in Donji Milanovac. 6. He was employed by Ðerdap, a company in Kladovo (Ribarsko gazdinstvo “Ðerdap” – hereinafter “the debtor company”). 7. On 28 December 1998 the applicant was reassigned to a lower post by his employer. He was subsequently dismissed on 20 January 2000. These two decisions, taken by the company’s managing director, were upheld by its board of management. 8. On 18 February 1999 the applicant filed a civil claim against the debtor company; on 26 April 2000 he filed a separate claim seeking reinstatement to a suitable position, as well as the outstanding salary payments and social benefits. 9. On 19 June 2003 the Majdanpek Municipal Court (hereinafter “the Municipal Court”) ruled in favour of the applicant and ordered the debtor company to reinstate the applicant to a post which corresponded to his professional qualifications and to pay him specified amounts on account of salary arrears and social insurance contributions, plus the costs of the civil proceedings. This judgment became final on 23 October 2003. 10. On 16 February 2004, 9 March 2004, 18 and 19 October 2004, respectively upon the applicant’s requests to that effect, the Municipal Court accepted the enforcement of the said judgment and further ordered the debtor to pay the applicant the enforcement costs. 11. The Municipal Court provided the National Bank of Serbia (Narodna banka Srbije – “the Central Bank”) with the above-mentioned enforcement orders on 14 April 2004, 20 July 2004 and 11 November 2004, respectively. 12. It would appear that none of the above-mentioned enforcement orders have been enforced to date. 13. On 8 April 2010 the Central Bank informed the Zaječar Commercial Court of the suspension of the debtor company’s accounts for three years. 14. On 13 April 2010 the Commercial Court opened preliminary insolvency proceedings against the debtor company. 15. On 30 June 2010 the Commercial Court opened and closed the insolvency proceedings against the debtor company and that decision became final on 10 August 2010. 16. The debtor company was ultimately struck from the relevant public register on 31 August 2010. 17. The debtor company in the present case had been a socially owned company. In 1991 it was transformed into a limited company which remained mainly socially owned, and remained as such until it was struck off the register (see http://apr.gov.rs/, accessed on 1 December 2016).

5. The applicants are the wife and daughter of Mr Ivan Mirchev Pashaliysky, who was killed on 2 June 2000 in an office situated in a hotel in Sofia. He died as a result of suffering severe trauma to his brain, chest, torso and limbs, which led to irreversible damage to several of his vital organs. The trauma was caused by a number of kicks and punches and blows inflicted with different objects. 6. On the day of the incident a private security guard was called to the office premises where Mr Pashaliysky was later found dead in order to investigate a brawl reportedly happening there. The security guard knocked on the office entrance door and an individual, S.V., opened it. The security guard caught a brief glimpse of Mr Pashaliysky lying helpless on the floor with blood on his face. S.V. was holding a long oval-shaped object. Having been told by S.V. that there was no problem, the security guard left. 7. It would appear that earlier that day, using the telephone of the office in question, S.V. had called Ch.M., a friend and business partner of Mr Pashaliysky, threatening to kill them both if Ch.M. failed to deliver an undisclosed sum of money to S.V. without delay. 8. The incident was reported to the police by an investigator, who had been tipped off earlier the same day. The police arrested S.V. that night. Traces of the crime having been discovered on S.V.’s hands and clothes, an investigator charged him on 3 June 2000 with murder. On 5 June 2000 a prosecutor indicted S.V. for the murder of Ivan Mirchev Pashaliysky, which had been committed three days earlier. 9. A prosecutor from the Sofia city public prosecutor’s office found on 20 April 2001 that there were reasons for amending the indictment by applying a law providing for a heavier penalty. She also found that not all available evidence had been collected. In particular, no expert DNA analysis had been carried out on the material found under the victim’s nails; several key witnesses had not been questioned about the reasons for their presence in the office in which the victim had been killed on the day in question and about the reason for the return to the office of one of them during the evening of the same day; no confrontation had been held between two of those witnesses, despite several discrepancies between their respective statements; and no information had been collected about the state in which the police officers had found the accused at the time of his arrest. On 20 April 2001 the prosecutor returned the case to the investigating authorities for further investigative measures, giving specific instructions aimed at the remedying of the deficiencies in the investigation. 10. The case was returned on three other occasions (on 17 July 2001, 18 July 2003 and on 2 October 2003) for further investigative steps, which the prosecutor listed specifically. 11. The case file was sent to the Sofia City Court on an unspecified date in November 2003. Both applicants were named as private prosecutors and the second applicant, at her request, also as a civil party seeking non‑pecuniary damages. 12. At the start of the trial the defendant’s lawyer claimed that the indictment was defective because it did not contain a clear description of the offence with which the defendant had been charged; the lawyer sought, without success, the return of the case for further investigation. A number of hearings took place during the trial. The proceedings before the Sofia City Court ended on 11 June 2007, when the court sentenced S.V. to fifteen years’ imprisonment and ordered him to pay damages to the second applicant. 13. Both S.V. and the applicants lodged appeals with the Sofia Court of Appeal. S.V. submitted in particular that the sentence had been based entirely on guesswork as to who the perpetrator had been. Most importantly, S.V. claimed that the indictment had been entirely silent about the manner in which he was considered to have killed the victim, there being no description of the circumstances in which the victim was killed. Referring to interpretative decision no. 2 of 2002 of the Supreme Court of Cassation (see paragraph 21 below), he claimed that these procedural flaws were fundamental and that the court should have returned the case to the investigation stage. 14. On 18 July 2008 the Sofia Court of Appeal accepted that the indictment had not contained a description of how the accused had killed the victim and that this had been a fundamental procedural defect which had prevented the defendant from effectively exercising his rights. The court then quashed the first-instance court sentence and returned the case to the pre-trial stage so that the procedural flaw in question could be redressed. 15. On 16 August 2008 the prosecution indicted S.V. anew for the murder of Mr. Pashaliysky and the first-instance court, the Sofia City Court, opened fresh proceedings against him. The first two scheduled hearings were postponed because the defendant’s lawyer failed to appear. On 11 February 2009 the court recognised the second applicant as a civil party seeking non-pecuniary damages but refused to name both applicants as private prosecutors. After an appeal by the applicants that refusal was quashed on 13 March 2009 by the Sofia Court of Appeal. The witnesses were then heard again in the course of the trial so that the applicants could exercise their rights as private prosecutors. 16. Sixteen hearings took place thereafter, at which the applicants made numerous requests for evidence to be gathered and witnesses to be heard. Subsequently, the presiding judge was elected President of the Supreme Administrative Court as a result of which the trial stage was started anew. A new presiding judge was appointed, yet no further hearing was scheduled for about a year. The applicants complained about the delay to the Inspectorate of the Supreme Judicial Council, asking that disciplinary sanctions be imposed on the new presiding judge. The Inspectorate replied on 21 February 2012. It acknowledged that the criminal proceedings in the case had lasted eleven years and recognised that this was incompatible with the requirement of a reasonable length of proceedings. It nonetheless held that the judge in question could not be sanctioned, given that the duration of the other cases that she had heard had not exceeded an acceptable length. 17. On an unspecified later date the new presiding judge was sent back to the court from which she had been transferred and the case had to begin anew once again. 18. On 9 December 2013 the proceedings before the first-instance court ended. The Sofia City Court found S.V. guilty of murder and sentenced him to twelve years’ imprisonment. The first-instance court also ruled that S.V. had to pay some 50,000 euros (EUR) in damages to the second applicant as a civil party. After an appeal by S.V. the Sofia Court of Appeal carried out a thorough analysis of the witness statements given at first instance, of the record of the examination of the murder scene conducted on the day after the killing, of the search and seizure measures, and of the conclusions of the numerous expert reports, the autopsy, etc. Following this, on 22 December 2014 the appellate court upheld the guilty verdict and sentence, but lowered the amount in damages to be paid to the second applicant to around EUR 8,000. Following a cassation appeal by S.V. the Supreme Court of Cassation upheld the appellate court’s judgment in its entirety in a final judgment of 2 November 2015.

5. The applicant was born in 1995. According to the last information received by the Court on 6 October 2016, the applicant is detained in Lisbon. 6. On 5 December 2013 criminal proceedings were initiated against the applicant by the public prosecutor of the Department of Investigation and Prosecution (Departamento de Investigação e Ação Penal) in Sintra in respect of allegations of him having committed the crimes of coercion (coação), aggravated attacks upon the physical integrity of a person (ofensas à integridade física qualificada), rape (violação), and failing to assist a person in danger (omissão de auxílio). 7. On 2 June 2014 the public prosecutor issued a European arrest warrant (“EAW”) in respect of the applicant in order to secure his presence before a judicial authority to be questioned (primeiro interrogatório judicial). 8. On 28 August 2014 the applicant was arrested in the United Kingdom. Under the EAW issued by the Portuguese authorities, he was surrendered to the Portuguese authorities on 27 February 2015. 9. On 27 February 2015, the applicant was given the status of defendant in the criminal proceedings against him (constituição de arguido) and questioned by the investigating judge (primeiro interrogatório judicial). On the same day, the investigating judge remanded the applicant in custody. 10. On 19 March 2015 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Lisbon Court of Appeal, challenging the lawfulness of the decision remanding him in custody, pursuant to Article 219 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 11. On 2 April 2015 the investigating judge declared the appeal admissible and requested that the public prosecutor be asked to submit observations on the applicant’s appeal. 12. On 27 April 2015 the public prosecutor submitted observations on the applicant’s appeal. 13. On 29 April 2015 the investigating judge ordered that the applicant be notified of the public prosecutor’s observations and that the file be sent to the Lisbon Court of Appeal. 14. On 4 May 2015 the file was sent to the Lisbon Court of Appeal. On 11 May 2015 it was received and distributed. 15. On 13 May 2015 the public prosecutor issued an opinion on the appeal, pursuant to Article 416 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The applicant was subsequently notified of the opinion and given ten days to reply, pursuant to Article 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 16. On an unknown date, a judge rapporteur appointed to the case made a preliminary examination of the applicant’s appeal and prepared a draft decision which was presented to two other judges. The judge rapporteur’s analysis of the appeal was afterwards put on the agenda for discussion by the judge rapporteur and the two other judges. 17. On 24 June 2015 the applicant lodged a habeas corpus application with the Supreme Court, claiming that the lack of analysis of his appeal in respect of the lawfulness of the decision placing him in pre-trial detention had violated Article 5 § 4 of the Convention. He further argued that the time-limit of thirty days established under Article 219 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure had not been complied with. Therefore, his pre-trial detention had been unlawful. 18. On 2 July 2015 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s habeas corpus application. Examining the effects of the thirty-day time-limit on pre-trial detention orders, it considered that the thirty-day time-limit on pre-trial detention orders simply constituted a guiding principle illustrating the urgency of such matters. It further noted that the lack of a speedy review of an order remanding a person in custody did not constitute a ground for a habeas corpus application under Article 222 of the Code and pointed out that Article 219 § 1 did not, in any case, stipulate the maximum length of any pre-trial detention. In this regard, the non-compliance with the thirty-day time-limit did not mean that the applicant’s pre-trial detention had been unlawful. 19. On 2 July 2015 the Lisbon Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the investigating judge’s decision of 27 February 2015 to hold him in pre-trial detention.

5. The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Moscow. 6. On 14 June 2001 charges of fraud were brought against the applicant, and he signed a written undertaking not to leave his place of residence. Some of the applicant’s assets, specifically his flat, parking spaces and three cars, were frozen. 7. On 21 June 2001 the investigation of the criminal case against the applicant was terminated and he began examining the case file. 8. However, on 26 September 2001 the investigation resumed. 9. On 26 September 2001 the Prosecutor General’s Office of Russia decided that in view of the seriousness of the charges faced by the applicant, the risk of his absconding, as well as the necessity to “secure the enforcement of the conviction” the applicant should be placed in pre-trial detention. 10. On 28 September 2001 the applicant was remanded in custody and placed in a specialised detention facility at the Moscow Clinical Hospital no. 20 owing to a provisional diagnosis of acute myocardial infarction, arterial hypertension and an exacerbating duodenal ulcer. He stayed there until 20 November 2001, following which he was transferred to a remand prison. The attending doctor found the applicant fit to participate in the investigative actions. 11. In the meantime, on 8 October 2001 the investigation was completed and the applicant was informed that he could start to examine the case file. 12. On the same date the applicant brought an application for release. He argued that there was no indication that he would abscond or otherwise obstruct the administration of justice: the applicant had no criminal record; he had a family, a permanent job and a permanent place of residence, and he suffered from a number of chronic cardiovascular and surgical diseases; the choice of a custodial measure had thus not been justified. 13. On 24 October 2001 the Moscow Babushkinskiy District Court examined the applicant’s arguments with references to his medical documents, documents attesting to his family situation, his positive references from work, and the arguments by the investigator to the effect that the applicant had ignored the investigator’s summonses to appear on 22 and 25 July, 13 and 14 August and 24 September 2001 without giving reasons, that he had often been several hours late to appear before the investigator, that he could appear for fifteen minutes and then leave saying that nobody could tell him when to come and when to leave, and that throughout the summer, in the eyes of the investigator, the applicant had been out of contact. Having considered the reasons which prompted the choice of preventive measure, in particular, the seriousness of the charges against the applicant and his conduct during the pre-trial investigation, the District Court held that there were no grounds for releasing the applicant. 14. On 20 November 2001 the Moscow City Court upheld the above decision on appeal. 15. On 22 November 2001, 21 January and 9 April 2002 the Deputy Prosecutor General extended the applicant’s detention until 28 January, 28 April and 28 June 2002 respectively. 16. Meanwhile, on 15 January 2002 the forensic medical expert did not confirm the applicant’s medical diagnosis. 17. On 20 June 2002 the criminal case against the applicant was submitted to the Moscow Presnenskiy District Court for trial. 18. The Moscow Presnenskiy District Court repeatedly extended the applicant’s detention pending trial. Such extensions were granted upon the prosecutor’s request on 16 December 2002, 19 March, 23 June, 24 September, 23 December 2003 and 24 March 2004. On each occasion the District Court referred to the seriousness of the charges against the applicant and the risk of his absconding or otherwise obstructing justice, and the absence of grounds for changing the preventive measure imposed. Those decisions were upheld on appeal by the Moscow City Court on 21 January, 27 May, an unknown date and 3 December 2003, 23 March and 29 April 2004 respectively. 19. On 26 May 2004 the Moscow Presnenskiy District Court sitting in a bench composed of Judge F. (presiding judge), Ms Kh. and Ms Shch. (lay judges) convicted the applicant of fraud and sentenced him to seven years and six months’ imprisonment. The court further held that the civil claim against the applicant, as well as the question of lifting the restriction imposed on the applicant’s property, should be referred for consideration within the framework of the civil procedure. 20. The applicant appealed. He complained that, inter alia, the judgment had been given by a court whose composition had not been in accordance with law. In particular, he referred to the fact that the lay judges who participated in the examination of his case had at the same time been examining a criminal case against a certain Mr Tver. He also complained that the trial court had read out the testimonies of the majority of the witnesses for the prosecution, including testimonies by key prosecution witnesses, and had thus deprived him of the possibility of cross-examining them. This was despite the absence of any exceptional circumstances which had prevented the court from securing their attendance at the court hearing. 21. On 17 August 2004 the Moscow City Court reduced the sentence to six years and upheld the rest of the judgment on appeal. In reply to the applicant’s argument regarding the alleged unlawfulness of the composition of the trial court, the City Court held that the composition of the court had remained unchanged throughout the trial in accordance with Article 242 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and that the participation of lay judges, who had also been involved in the examination of another case, had had no legal consequences and had not amounted to a violation of the law. The City Court further held that the reading out of the testimonies of certain witnesses had been carried out by the trial court on the request of the prosecutor and in compliance with the requirements of Article 281 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 22. On 30 December 2004 the Presidium of the Moscow City Court, by way of supervisory review, modified the charges the applicant had been convicted on and reduced his sentence to five years six months’ imprisonment. 23. On 9 March 2005 the Sukhinichskiy District Court, Kaluga Region, ordered the applicant’s conditional early release.

5. The applicant is a taxi driver. 6. On the night of 25 July 2009 traffic police stopped the applicant’s car. Following the applicant’s failure to produce his driving licence and suspecting that it had been withdrawn, police officers took him to the duty unit of the Ezhvinskiy District police station, where he was kept in a cell for administrative detainees until the following morning. A record of the applicant’s administrative arrest was drawn up. 7. On 26 July 2009 the Justice of the Peace of the Vezhdinskiy Court Circuit of the Ezhvinskiy District found the applicant guilty of driving a vehicle after the withdrawal of his driving licence (an administrative offence under Article 12.7 § 2 of the Russian Code of Administrative Offences) and sentenced him to fifteen days of administrative detention. 8. On 31 July 2009 the applicant made a written request to the head of the detention unit seeking a family visit. The next day the request was returned to the applicant bearing a handwritten note by the acting head of the detention unit, Mr S., which stated that family visits were not “provided for [by law]”. 9. On 14 August 2009 the applicant’s representative lodged a complaint with the Syktyvkar Town Court, alleging that the applicant’s right to family life guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention had been unlawfully restricted. 10. The police officials filed a written objection, arguing that the Internal Rules governing Detention Facilities for Administrative Detainees did not provide administrative detainees with the right to have a family visit. 11. On 15 September 2009 the Syktyvkar City Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint, having accepted the police authorities’ argument that administrative detainees were not entitled to a family visit under the domestic law in force and that the applicant had been subjected to those limitations of his rights as a negative consequence of the administrative detention. 12. The applicant’s representative appealed. Relying on the Court’s judgments in the cases of Messina v. Italy (no. 2) (no. 25498/94, § 61, ECHR 2000‑X) and Vlasov v. Russia (no. 78146/01, § 123, 12 June 2008), he argued that the authorities’ assistance in maintaining contact with close family was an essential part of a detainee’s right to respect for family life. Limitations imposed on the number of family visits constituted an interference with the applicant’s rights under Article 8 of the Convention. Restrictions of that kind could only be applied “in accordance with the law”, should pursue one or more legitimate aims and, in addition, should be justified as being “necessary in a democratic society”. The representative submitted that there was no norm in Russian law imposing restrictions on family visits for administrative detainees. 13. On 22 October 2009 the Supreme Court of the Komi Republic upheld the City Court’s decision, having reasoned as follows: “There is no prohibition on family visits for administrative detainees. ... [At the same time] a refusal to authorise a family visit has a basis in Russian law; however, it should be warranted by circumstances and conditions providing the competent authorities with the right to apply the disputed restriction. Providing law‑enforcement bodies with unlimited powers in issues pertaining to fundamental rights could run contrary to the superior role of the law and could result in arbitrary interference with human rights. In the case under examination, there are no grounds for concluding that the actions of the acting head [of the detention unit of the police station where the applicant had been detained] were unlawful because, having applied for a family visit, [the applicant] had not indicated whom he had wanted to see and what the relationship was between him and that person. If those important details are not provided, the authorisation of a family visit cannot be considered lawful.”

5. The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Chisinau. 6. In January 2008 the Balti police organised an undercover operation with the purpose of apprehending a criminal group specialised in the production and circulation of forged documents. For that purpose an advertisement was placed in a local newspaper specialised in advertising, stating as follows: “Need help with obtaining passport (Romanian-Bulgarian)” followed by a telephone number. 7. According to the applicant, at that time he was interested in leaving Moldova for Romania or another country in the European Union in order to find a job. He was therefore interested in obtaining a Romanian passport which would facilitate his plans. Since he understood the newspaper advertisement as proposing assistance with obtaining Romanian passports, he called the number from it and met a person who introduced himself as E. During their conversation he understood that E. was himself looking for a Romanian passport. Both men agreed to let each other know in the event that one of them found an easy way of obtaining a Romanian passport. 8. Some time later a friend of the applicant (D.) recommended to him a person called Z. who could help obtain a Romanian passport in a short time. Both D. and Z. confirmed during the subsequent court proceedings that it was D. who had recommended Z. to the applicant in March 2008. The applicant met Z. and found out that his services cost 1,500 euros (EUR), a sum of money which he did not possess at the time. 9. It appears from the materials of the case-file that approximately three weeks after the applicant’s first meeting with E., the latter called him to find out whether he had progressed in his search for a way of obtaining a Romanian passport. This was submitted by the applicant in the proceedings and not contested by the prosecution. The applicant informed E. that he had found a person, Z., who could help in exchange for EUR 1,500 and proposed to put E. in contact with Z. However, E. refused to get into direct contact with Z. and informed the applicant that he did not have the money at the time. He also told the applicant that he had an acquaintance T. who was also interested in obtaining a Romanian passport and proposed a deal to the applicant. In particular, he proposed to him to act as an intermediary between Z. and T. and tell T. that the price was EUR 2,300. The difference of EUR 800 between the price asked by Z. and the sum paid by T. was to be split between the applicant and E. This information was not contested by the prosecution during the proceedings. The applicant accepted E.’s proposal and agreed to arrange a meeting with T. 10. The applicant then discussed the matter with Z., who gave him a list of documents necessary for T.’s new Romanian identity card. The applicant submitted during the proceedings that he had been convinced at the time that the identity card was not going to be forged and that Z. would only act as a representative of T. before the Romanian authorities. This information was contested by Z. during proceedings, who stated that he had informed the applicant from the very beginning that T.’s Romanian identity card was going to be false and that he was to avoid travelling to Romania with it. 11. On 3 April 2008 the applicant met with T. and obtained from him the necessary documents and an advance of EUR 750 for which he had written and submitted to T. a receipt. He then transmitted the money and the documents to Z. The identity card was later produced in the United Kingdom and reached Z. and then the applicant by the middle of April 2008. On 16 April 2008 the applicant met with T. and gave him the identity card in exchange for the rest of the money. He was then arrested by the police. 12. On 17 April 2008 an official criminal investigation was initiated against the applicant on charges of manufacturing and trading with forged official documents. 13. In the meantime, Z. signed an agreement with the prosecutors acknowledging his guilt and was convicted on the basis of that agreement and given a suspended sentence of four years. 14. During the criminal proceedings the applicant argued inter alia that he had been entrapped by E. and T. and requested that they be heard in court. The court of first instance refused to hear E. and T. and referred to the fact that the law governing undercover operations made it possible to hear undercover officers in court only if they consented to that. 15. On 17 December 2008 the Balti District Court found the applicant guilty of participating in the production of a false Romanian identity card and of selling it to T. The court sentenced him to a criminal fine of some EUR 200. The judgment did not make any mention of the applicant’s assertion concerning incitement. 16. The applicant lodged an appeal in which he submitted inter alia that the first instance court had not paid attention to the fact that the offence had been committed as a result of police incitement and that the court had refused to hear the persons who had entrapped him. 17. During the appeal proceedings, the applicant asked again that E. and T. be heard in court. Initially the Court of Appeal agreed to hear them; however, later it decided otherwise. 18. On 4 March 2009 the Balti Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal and confirmed the judgment of the first instance court. The court examined the applicant’s argument concerning entrapment and dismissed it on the sole ground that it was the applicant who had first telephoned the number indicated in the newspaper advertisement. In so far as the issue concerning the hearing of E. and T. was concerned, the court considered that that was not important as their statements had not been used against the applicant. Moreover, according to the law, they could not be heard unless they agreed to that. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law and submitted the same arguments as in his appeal. 19. On 8 July 2009 the Supreme Court of Justice dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law and upheld the previous judgments.

6. The applicants complained of the excessive length of different civil and criminal proceedings under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. 7. All applicants obtained decisions of the Constitutional Court of Serbia, which found a violation of their right to a hearing within reasonable time (see appended table for details of each civil proceedings and Constitutional Court’s decisions). The court, additionally, declared that the applicants were entitled to the non-pecuniary damages sought, in accordance with Article 90 of the Constitutional Court Act (see paragraph 14, Article 90, below). 8. All the applicants filed requests with the Commission for Compensation for payment of non-pecuniary damages. 9. On 14 October 2010 the Commission for Compensation offered to pay Ms Prohaska Prodanić RSD 60,000 (at the time approximately EUR 600) for non-pecuniary damage incurred and RSD 25,000 for costs and expenses. She refused to accept that payment as the Commission did not specify the deadline by which the sum would be paid. On 15 September 2015, the Ministry of Justice paid her RSD 85,000. 10. The applicant V. Tomić contacted the Commission for Compensation on several occasions and requested the payment of non-pecuniary damage. It would appear that he had received no response. 11. On 16 March 2011 the Commission for Compensation offered to pay Mr D. Trpković RSD 35,000 (at the time approximately EUR 350), but he refused to accept this amount, deeming it insufficient.

4. The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Chita. 5. On 2 September 2004 the applicant was arrested on the charges of fraud and forgery of official documents. On 4 September 2004 the Tsentralnyy District Court of Chita authorised the applicant’s pre-trial detention. The court reasoned as follows: “The evidence collected ... incriminated [the applicant] ... in a serious crime which entails a custodial sentence exceeding ten years. ... The court takes note of the [applicant’s] character. However, ... it considers that, if at large, [the applicant] might put pressure on victims and witnesses or otherwise interfere with administration of justice or continue criminal activities, Accordingly, ... the court considers it necessary to remand [the applicant] in custody.” 6. On 11 November 2004 the Chita Regional Court upheld the decision of 2 September 2004 on appeal. 7. The applicant remained in custody pending investigation and trial. The court extended his pre-trial detention on several occasions reiterating, in substance, the reasoning employed by the District Court on 2 September 2004. 8. On 4 June 2007 the District Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to eight years’ imprisonment.

5. The applicant company is a German company based in Auengrund. 6. In July 1994 the applicant company purchased land underneath which lay a limestone deposit (Kalksteinvorkommen). It acquired a mining licence (Bewilligung) to quarry the deposit for twenty-five years. Subsequently the open-cast quarrying of limestone began. It was necessary that the applicant company operated a plant directly next to the quarry in order to process the limestone into construction material. In 1997 it received permission to use the quarry as a landfill (Deponiezulassung) using waste soil from earthworks at other sites. 7. Meanwhile, the federal authorities began the planning of a new motorway with the preferred option being a route across the quarry. From 29 October until 6 December 1993 maps and documents were disclosed for public inspection in the municipality where the quarry was located. Additionally, on 28 October 1993 information about the planning process was published in the municipality’s gazette. It was apparent from the disclosed documents that the quarrying operation would be affected by the motorway. However, the extent of the adverse effects was not entirely foreseeable because the exact route had not been finalised. The applicant company claimed that it had not been aware of the planning process when it had bought the land in 1994. 8. On 7 November 2000, in the light of the chosen route across the quarry, the Bad Salzungen Mining Authority (Bergamt) declined to approve the applicant company’s entire operation plan (Hauptbetriebsplan) for the years 2000-02, an administrative prerequisite to operate and continue operating a quarry. Only quarrying limestone in a specific area was approved and only to the extent that the route for the new motorway was not affected. Consequently, the applicant company had to stop quarrying limestone in 2001 and transferred its activity to another nearby mining site. At the old site, 4,700,000 cubic metres of limestone (67% of the original volume) remained in the ground. The applicant company had to bear the costs of relocating the plant, including the removal of machinery and the construction of roads and buildings. An administrative objection (Widerspruch) it lodged against the decision of the Mining Authority was never decided upon. 9. On 26 May 2003 the Land of Thuringia issued a planning decision (Planfeststellungsbeschluss) for the construction of the motorway, which stated, inter alia, that it would be too costly and time consuming to circumvent the applicant company’s land. 10. The applicant company brought an action before the Federal Administrative Court. It requested the annulment of the planning decision; in the alternative that it be stipulated in the planning decision that the applicant company be compensated for the interference in its quarrying operation; or in the alternative that it be stipulated in the planning decision that the Land of Thuringia was obliged to take over the quarrying operation, the remaining land and the mining licence. 11. On 2 February 2004, after the Federal Administrative Court had stated that the relevant part of the planning decision was not sufficiently precise, the Land modified it. It changed the wording that “the amount and scale of the compensation [had to] be agreed upon in a private-law agreement” and “if the parties d[id] not reach an agreement, the expropriation authorities [would] determine the compensation in separate compensation proceedings” into the wording that “the seizure [Inanspruchnahme] entitle[d] to compensation” and that “the amount and scale of the compensation w[ould] not be decided on in the planning decision”. Subsequently, the applicant company and the Land declared the matter resolved (erledigt) and the Federal Administrative Court therefore decided in 2004 to discontinue the proceedings. It split the costs of the proceedings between the applicant company and the Land. 12. In 2005 the Federal Government seized the applicant company’s land for road construction purposes after it had reached a settlement with the applicant company during the proceedings concerning provisional seisin (vorläufige Besitzeinweisung). On 19 June 2006, following the initiation of formal expropriation proceedings, a court-sworn expert’s report recorded losses and additional costs amounting to 3,589,566.42 euros (EUR), including the value of the limestone, and forgone profits from the landfill, relocation costs and interest. 13. On 26 March 2008 the Administrative Office of Thuringia Land (Landesverwaltungsamt) expropriated the part of the applicant company’s land on which the motorway had been built and decided that the Federal Government should compensate the applicant company by a payment of some EUR 865,000. That amount included about EUR 22,800 in compensation for the land value as farmland and some of the costs of the relocation of the plant (new infrastructure, transport of machinery and opening the ground of the new mine). There was no formal expropriation of the mining licence. 14. Both parties requested a judicial review. The Federal Government was, in particular, of the opinion that the cost of the quarrying plant’s relocation should not be compensated. The applicant company requested compensation of an additional EUR 2,301,649.53 plus interest, specifically EUR 1,108,297.00 for the loss of landfill capacity and the respective profits, EUR 492,763.22 for further relocation costs and EUR 700,589.31 for reduced delivery capacity during the transition period. Claims for compensation regarding the value of the land and the value of the limestone were dropped. 15. On 18 February 2009 the Meiningen Regional Court dismissed the applicant company’s request and – on the request of the Federal Government – reduced the amount of compensation to about EUR 22,800. It held that only the value of the expropriated land – not taking into account that there existed a limestone deposit underneath it – had to be compensated. Pursuant to section 124(3) of the Federal Mining Act (Bundesberggesetz, see “Relevant domestic law”, paragraph 22), mining rights under the terms of that Act were granted only on the statutory condition that they would have to yield to a public infrastructure project without compensation. Consequently, the actual right to quarry and the linked costs and losses for relocation and the impeded landfill did not generate a compensation claim. While the acquired mining rights constituted “property” under Article 14 of the Basic Law, the holder of a mining licence could not rely on making unhindered use of his or her mining rights; he or she could only operate under the limitations stipulated, inter alia, under section 124(3) of the Federal Mining Act. The planning decision was therefore merely actualising the determination of content and limits already inherent in the acquired mining right. 16. On 27 January 2010 the Thuringia Court of Appeal dismissed a prior appeal lodged by the applicant company. It held that the construction of the motorway had not led to a loss of the applicant company’s mining rights but only to a factual impairment in the exercise of those rights which followed from the preference given to transport infrastructure projects. The relevant provisions, section 124(3) and (4) of the Federal Mining Act, excluded compensation claims. The clarification of the planning decision had not generated a claim regarding the impairment of the applicant’s mining rights and the business operation linked to it, including the landfill. Article 14 of the Basic Law (see “Relevant domestic law”, paragraph 20) had not been infringed because the measure taken had not been unreasonable, even considering that 67% of the mining right had been rendered valueless. 17. On 14 April 2011 the Federal Court of Justice dismissed an appeal on points of law by the applicant company. It rejected the claim for compensation for the alleged interference with the mining right, mainly relying on section 124(3) of the Federal Mining Act, and in particular on the grounds that an interference with the rights of an established and operational business enterprise (Eingriff in den eingerichteten und ausgeübten Gewerbebetrieb) should not be compensated either. The enterprise could not enjoy more extensive protection under the law than the economic basis it rested on: the mining right. Referring to its case-law, it reiterated that it made no difference that the applicant company was the owner of the land and, at the same time, the holder of the mining licence. Under German mining law, both entitlements needed to be assessed separately. 18. The Federal Court of Justice further acknowledged that quarrying was de facto no longer possible. Mentioning that for reasons of proportionality the planning decision might in a case like the present one call for a formal expropriation of the mining rights with corresponding compensation, it found that such a claim – as well as the issue of disproportionality as such – should have been raised in the proceedings concerning the planning decision before the Federal Administrative Court (see paragraph 10). Lastly, it observed that the loss of future profits from the landfill was a mere hope for future returns and could thus not be considered a “property right” under Article 14 of the Basic Law, but fell only under Article 12 of the Basic Law (right to exercise one’s profession). 19. On 21 December 2011 the Federal Constitutional Court declined to consider a constitutional complaint lodged by the applicant company without providing reasons (1 BvR 1499/11).

5. The applicant was born in 1947 and lives in Yerevan. 6. On an unspecified date the applicant brought a claim in the Arabkir and Kanaker-Zeytun District Court of Yerevan against K., a private individual, seeking payment of a certain amount of money. It appears that before the beginning of the court’s examination of the case the applicant and K. concluded an agreement to settle the debt, which envisaged, inter alia, a time-frame for payment. 7. On 3 May 2005 the District Court delivered a judgment upholding the settlement. It also stated that bailiffs would enforce the judgment if it was not complied with. No appeal was lodged and the judgment became final. 8. As K. did not comply with the terms of the settlement, the District Court issued a writ of execution and on 13 June 2005 a bailiff instituted enforcement proceedings. According to the applicant, the bailiff found no funds or property belonging to K. during the enforcement procedure. 9. By a letter of 7 June 2007 the bailiff informed the applicant that he had found out during the enforcement proceedings that K. had inherited a house but had not registered her ownership of it. The bailiff advised the applicant to institute proceedings against K. in order to have her ownership of the house recognised. 10. It appears that later in 2007 the applicant brought a claim in the Arabkir and Kanaker-Zeytun District Court to have K.’s ownership of the house recognised. 11. On 24 October 2007 the District Court, relying on Article 1225 § 5 of the Civil Code, granted the applicant’s claim and recognised K. as the owner of the house in question. There was no appeal and the judgment became final. 12. On 19 November 2007 the bailiff, acting on a writ of execution issued by the District Court, instituted proceedings to enforce the judgment of 24 October 2007. 13. On 22 November 2007 the bailiff requested that the State Committee of the Real Estate Registry recognise K.’s ownership of the house, register it and issue a copy of the ownership certificate. 14. In reply, the Real Estate Registry on 4 December 2007 informed the bailiff that in order to register K.’s rights to the house it needed an application from K., the original of the District Court’s judgment of 24 October 2007 and receipts for the State fee and other related payments. It also mentioned that K. was unlawfully occupying a plot of land whose status was unclear. 15. On 8 February, 4 July and 4 August 2008 respectively, the bailiff made similar requests to the Real Estate Registry in which he stated, with reference to section 22 of the Law on the State Registration of Property Rights, that an application from K. was not required. He also stated that the issue of registration-related payments would be decided upon initiation of the registration process and that receipts would be submitted. 16. In 2008 the applicant brought a claim in the Administrative Court against the Real Estate Registry and the bailiff, seeking to oblige them respectively to register K.’s ownership of the house and to confiscate it from her. 17. On 1 December 2008 the Administrative Court granted the applicant’s claim by ordering the Real Estate Registry to register K.’s rights to the house and the bailiff to confiscate it from her. In particular, the Administrative Court found that both the refusal of the Real Estate Registry to register K.’s ownership rights and the non-enforcement by the bailiff of the judgment of 3 May 2005 owing to a lack of funds on the part of K. had been groundless as K.’s ownership of the house had been recognised by the final court judgment of 24 October 2007. It appears that no appeal was lodged against the Administrative Court’s judgment and it became final. 18. According to the applicant, none of the three court judgments was enforced. 19. On 18 February 2010 the applicant sought the payment of interest by K. via a claim in the District Court. On 1 March 2011 the District Court accepted his claim and ordered K. to pay him 17,727 US dollars (USD), to be converted into Armenian drams. The judgment became final on 1 April 2011. The applicant sought enforcement of the judgment on 2 April 2012 but was refused by the bailiff since he had failed to act within the time-limit of one year starting from the final judgment. That term had expired on 1 April 2012. Moreover, the applicant had also failed to submit a power of attorney to the bailiff. 20. On 10 February 2012 K. submitted a receipt for the payment of the debt to the bailiff and he terminated the enforcement proceedings on 13 February 2012.

5. The applicant was born in 1948 and lives in Bucharest. 6. As an officer in a sub‑unit of the special anti-terrorist unit within the special forces for State security (hereinafter “the Securitate”), the applicant participated in the events which commenced in Bucharest on 21 December 1989 and led to the fall of the Ceausescu dictatorship on 22 December 1989. 7. The applicant was arrested by army forces and held in detention from 22 December until 23 December 1989. He was then held by the unit’s commander from 25 December 1989 until 2 February 1990. During this period of time, he was subjected to ill-treatment and, as a result, he suffered depression and he was placed on the officers reserve list on the grounds of poor health (see paragraphs 8 - 13 below). 8. On 29 April 1990 the applicant filed a criminal complaint with the military prosecutor, alleging that he had been ill-treated and illegally detained in the Securitate building and requesting the punishment of various officials, including the unit’s commander, G.A. The military prosecutor questioned the defendants and a large number of witnesses during the criminal investigation and gathered medical evidence. 9. On 2 December 1993 the military prosecutor found that the unit’s commander G.A. had been responsible for the applicant’s deprivation of liberty and his injuries; however, criminal proceedings could not be initiated because the commander had died. 10. On 16 December 1993 the applicant asked the military prosecutor to extend the investigation to other officials he alleged were involved, including doctor P.I. and various Securitate officers. 11. On 2 March 1995 the military prosecutor decided not to initiate criminal proceedings against the doctor P.I. on the ground that the constituent elements of the alleged offence were not present. Following the applicant’s appeal, this decision was set aside by a decision of 25 September 1996 and the investigation continued. 12. On 21 October 1997 the military prosecutor found doctor P.I. liable to pay an administrative fine; however, the type of offence he committed had been pardoned by a decree of July 1997. The military prosecutor discontinued the investigation in respect of the dead defendant, G.A. The criminal case related to the other defendants, the Securitate officers, was severed into separate proceedings. 13. On 20 February 1998 and 16 February 1999 the military prosecutor decided not to initiate criminal proceedings against some of the defendants as the applicant’s complaint had become partly statute-barred. The investigation into crimes allegedly committed by three of the defendants was severed and jurisdiction was relinquished to the prosecuting authorities at the High Court of Cassation and Justice in order to be joined to the main criminal investigation into the events of December 1989. 14. On 27 June 2005 and 23 August 2007 the applicant was heard as a witness and as a civil party in the main criminal investigation. 15. The most important procedural steps taken in the main criminal investigation are summarised in Association “21 December 1989” and Others v. Romania (nos. 33810/07 and 18817/08, §§ 12-41, 24 May 2011), and Alecu and Others v. Romania (nos. 56838/08 and 80 others, §§ 10-13, 27 January 2015). Subsequent developments are as follows. 16. Following the entry into force of the new Code of Criminal Procedure in February 2014, jurisdiction over the case was relinquished in favour of the military prosecutor’s office. 17. On 14 October 2015 the prosecutor’s office closed the main investigation, finding that the complaints were partly statute-barred and partly ill-founded. The parties have not submitted any information on whether there was an appeal against that decision.

5. The applicant was born in 1945 and lives in Jonava. 6. In 1994 the applicant bought an apartment in Jonava. In 1998 he lost his regular job and was no longer able to pay for utilities. 7. In 2000 the utility provider instituted civil proceedings against the applicant concerning his debt of 2,861 Lithuanian litai (LTL – approximately 828.60 euros (EUR)). The domestic courts allowed the claim. In 2003 the judgment was transferred to a bailiff for enforcement. The bailiff decided to direct enforcement against the applicant’s apartment. On 6 October 2004 he organised a public auction at which the apartment was sold to a third party for LTL 3,390 (approximately EUR 982). On 18 November 2004 a district court confirmed the transfer of the apartment to the third party. 8. Since that date, the applicant has not had a permanent home. He submitted that he had been living in temporary accommodation, at times in unsuitable conditions, and often in exchange for manual work. 9. Between 2006 and 2008 the apartment was resold and gifted to different individuals on several occasions. 10. In November 2007 the applicant instituted civil proceedings before the Jonava District Court, arguing that the sale of his apartment at the public auction had been unlawful. The applicant submitted that, in accordance with the domestic law, taking a person’s home in order to enforce a court judgment was only permitted when the debt in question was larger than LTL 3,000 (see paragraph 22 below), which had not been the case here (see paragraph 7 above). The applicant also submitted that he had owned 0.05 hectares of land near Jonava, so the enforcement should have begun in respect of that property and not his only home (vienintelė gyvenamoji vieta). In view of the alleged unlawfulness of the sale, the applicant claimed damages jointly from the bailiff and the bailiff’s professional liability insurer. According to the applicant, restitution in integrum was not possible because there was no indication that the third party who had bought the apartment at the public auction had acted in bad faith. Therefore, he claimed LTL 51,000 (approximately EUR 14,770) in damages, an amount corresponding to the market price of the apartment at the time of the submission of the claim. 11. The defendants (the bailiff and his professional liability insurer) contested the applicant’s claim. They submitted that the value of the applicant’s land had been insufficient to cover his debt, so the enforcement had had to be directed against the apartment. They also argued that the applicant’s debt (LTL 2,861) and the enforcement expenses (LTL 540), taken together, had exceeded LTL 3,000, and thus the sale of his apartment had been in accordance with the domestic law. The defendants further argued that the applicant had acted in bad faith – he had not appealed against the execution writ or the results of the public auction, and he had submitted his claim at the very end of the time-limit because he had been waiting for the market price of the apartment to increase. Therefore, they argued that the applicant could not claim damages corresponding to the market price of the apartment at the time of the submission of the claim, but only the price for which the apartment had been sold at the public auction – LTL 3,390 (see paragraph 7 above). 12. On 17 June 2009 the Jonava District Court dismissed the applicant’s claim. It acknowledged that his debt had been below the required threshold of LTL 3,000 and that the bailiff had erred by calculating the debt together with the enforcement expenses. However, the court considered that this breach had not been such as to warrant the annulment of the sale. Accordingly, it dismissed the applicant’s claim for damages. The court also noted that the applicant had submitted his claim three years after the sale and on the last day permitted by the time-limit, when the market price of housing was several times higher than in 2004. Therefore, his claim for damages corresponding to the market price of the apartment at the time of the submission of the claim could be regarded as an attempt at unjust enrichment (vertintinas kaip siekimas nepagrįstai praturtėti). 13. The applicant appealed against the Jonava District Court’s judgment. He and the defendants presented essentially the same arguments as in their pleadings before the first-instance court (see paragraphs 10-11 above). 14. On 1 October 2009 the Kaunas Regional Court quashed the first‑instance judgment and allowed the applicant’s claim in its entirety. The court held that the bailiff had acted in violation of domestic law, firstly by failing to direct the enforcement against the applicant’s land, but also by selling his apartment at a public auction even though his debt had been less than LTL 3,000. The court considered that the bailiff had failed to respect the balance between the interests of the debtor (the applicant) and the creditor. It held that, because of the material breaches of the relevant law, the sale of the applicant’s apartment had to be declared unlawful. 15. Accordingly, the Kaunas Regional Court decided to award the applicant damages from the bailiff’s professional liability insurer. It stated that it “essentially agreed with the amount claimed by the applicant” (iš esmės sutinka su ieškovo nurodyta suma) and awarded him LTL 51,000 (approximately EUR 14,770), after subtracting the amount of his debt (see paragraph 7 above). 16. The bailiff’s professional liability insurer appealed against the Kaunas Regional Court’s judgment. It submitted, inter alia, that the amount of damages awarded to the applicant had no basis, and the court should have either ordered restitution in integrum or awarded the applicant the amount for which his apartment had been sold at the auction (see paragraph 7 above), but not its market price in 2007, which had increased significantly since 2004. 17. The applicant contested the appeal, arguing that there was no legal obligation for him to ask for restitution rather than for damages, and that the amount of damages was a question of fact which the Supreme Court could not examine. 18. On 8 February 2010 the Supreme Court amended the judgment of the Kaunas Regional Court in part. It upheld the conclusion that the sale of the applicant’s apartment had been unlawful for the reasons established by the lower court (see paragraph 14 above). The Supreme Court then reiterated its own case-law that, where the sale of property at a public auction is unlawful because of a bailiff’s actions, restitution in integrum should not be applied; accordingly, it considered that the most appropriate way of protecting the applicant’s rights was by awarding him damages. However, the court considered that, in line with “the nature of the obligation and the principles of equity, reasonableness and good faith” (pagal prievolės esmę, atsižvelgiant į teisingumo, protingumo ir sąžiningumo kriterijus), the amount of damages in the applicant’s case had to be assessed at the moment of the unlawful act, that is, the sale of the apartment. According to the State Enterprise Centre of Registers, the market price of the applicant’s apartment at the time of its sale had been LTL 12,100 (approximately EUR 3,504). Therefore, the Supreme Court awarded the applicant that amount, after subtracting his debt (see paragraph 7 above) and the bailiff’s enforcement expenses (see paragraph 11 above).

5. The applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Poznań. 6. On an unspecified date A.R., a member of the political party Self‑Defence of the Republic of Poland (“Samoobrona”) sent Gazeta Wyborcza, a daily newspaper, an electronic mail containing information about an alleged “sex scandal” in the party. 7. The following day the applicant, who is a journalist, contacted A.R. on the telephone. After their conversation he informed her that he had recorded the call and that he intended to use the transcript for an article. 8. On 6 December 2006 the applicant published an interview with A.R. in the Gazeta Wyborcza. The interview, entitled “Payment for sex, the choice is yours” (“Płaca ze seks, wybór należy do pani”) concerned the “sex scandal” story which had broken in Poland earlier in 2006. Public figures, including Samoobrona activists, had offered and accepted sexual favours in the course of exercising public functions. A.R. told the newspaper that she had begun working with the party through her contacts with A.K. Initially, she had been unpaid and when she had demanded payment, one of the activists, K.Z., had told her: “I will pay if you go to bed with me” She also said that in July 2004 during a party organised by A.K. a prominent Samoobrona activist, B.S., had offered to find a post for her in a parliamentary deputy’s office – specifically R.C.’s – in return for sexual favours. According to A.R., B.S. was so forward that she had to ask K.S. for help. K.S. then called a taxi to take B.S. home 9. Then the applicant asked A.R.: “Did you get the job?” 10. On the same page, to the right of the article, the newspaper quoted three prominent Samoobrona activists referred to in the interview, namely K.Z., B.S. and K.S. They all, denied that there had been any sexual propositions made to A.R. 11. Also on the same page the newspaper published a short interview with A.K. who confirmed that she knew A.R. but had never recommended her for any work. When asked about the “sex scandal” A.K. said: “What are you saying? I have never heard of it. This cannot be true.” 12. On 30 November 2007 M.C., a Member of the European Parliament, lodged a private bill of indictment against the applicant. He demanded that the applicant be charged with defamation. According to the indictment the defamation consisted of the publication of the interview with A.R. in which she said that B.S. could arrange a job for her in M.C.’s office in return for sexual favours. According to M.C. this suggested to readers that he had been involved in the “sex scandal”. He also claimed that he had been defamed in the published interview at the point where A.R. had accused him of nepotism by saying that he had employed his own daughter. 13. On 16 March 2010 the Warsaw District Court ruled the indictment partially accurate: it then discontinued the proceedings for a probationary term of one year and ordered the applicant to pay 1,000 Polish zlotys (PLN – 232 euros (EUR)) to charity and to pay the costs of the proceedings. 14. The District Court found the applicant guilty of the defamation of M.C. with respect to his publication of the statements made by A.R. concerning nepotism (see paragraph 23 below). According to the court the applicant neglected his professional obligations because he did not verify that the job had been offered to M.C.’s daughter. At the trial it became clear that this information could not be accurate because M.C. did not have a daughter. It did not accept the applicant’s argument that he had acted with due diligence because before publication he had sent the text of the interview to A.R. who had accepted its contents and returned it to the applicant without making any objection or comment (autoryzacja). 15. The District Court did not hold that the applicant was guilty of defamation when he had suggested that M.C. had been involved in the “sex scandal”. It found that in this respect the applicant had fulfilled his professional obligations because he had published the statement of B.S., who had denied propositioning A.R. For the above reasons, in the District Court’s view, the average reader should not have had the impression that M.C. was involved in the “sex scandal”. 16. The applicant and M.C.’s lawyer appealed against the first‑instance judgment. 17. On 18 June 2010 the Warsaw Regional Court upheld the challenged judgment, repeating in essence the same reasoning as the District Court. Regarding the applicant’s arguments concerning his right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the Convention, it noted that “in the light of the journalist’s right to publish critical comments (prawo do krytyki dziennikarskiej), an individual’s right to legal protection of good name and reputation should also be taken into account”. 18. On 3 February 2011 the applicant’s lawyer requested the Ombudsman to lodge a cassation appeal on the applicant’s behalf. 19. On 6 May 2011 the Ombudsman informed the applicant that she had found no grounds to lodge a cassation appeal.

4. The applicant was born in 1987 and lived in Voronezh prior to her arrest. 5. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 6. On 14 July 2007 the applicant, together with B., travelled to Moscow by car. At about 3.40 a.m. the police stopped the car; two men from the narcotics unit approached the car and asked the passengers to step out and produce their identity documents and luggage for inspection. An officer opened the sports bag which, according to the applicant, her friend had asked her to take to another friend in Moscow, and found a black plastic bag. The applicant stated that she was not aware of its contents. The officers then put the black bag into the trunk of the police car and took the applicant and B. to the premises of the narcotics unit. 7. The applicant and B. were interviewed in separate rooms. In the morning the applicant was taken to another office, in which one female officer, a forensics expert and two individuals who were introduced as “attesting witnesses” (понятые) were present. The applicant was told to open the black bag and to show its contents. Four plastic bags containing yellow and green herb and cash money were found inside. At 8.15 a.m. the police drafted a report on the seizure of objects and substances. The expert later determined that the herb was marijuana having a total weight of almost three kilograms. 8. At 6 p.m. a senior investigator of the narcotics unit instituted criminal proceedings against the applicant and B. on suspicion of attempted large‑scale sale of drugs. 9. At 8.15 p.m. the investigator compiled the record of the applicant’s arrest. The time of arrest was given as 7.50 p.m. on 14 July 2007. 10. On 15 July 2007 the applicant was formally charged and the investigator applied to a court for a detention order. 11. The detention hearing before the Zyuzinskiy District Court in Moscow began at 7.15 p.m. on 16 July 2007. Counsel for the applicant submitted that, in view of the actual time of the applicant’s detention, the maximum statutory period of forty-eight hours had already expired. However, the court did not heed that argument and ordered that the applicant be remanded in custody because the gravity of charges against her. 12. On 19 July 2007 counsel for the applicant filed an appeal. On 25 July 2007 copies of the appeal were forwarded to the applicant and to the prosecutor for comments. The appeal hearing was initially scheduled for 22 August 2007 but subsequently adjourned for one week because one of the applicant’s representatives did not show up. 13. On 27 August 2007 the City Court rejected the appeal against the detention order in a summary fashion, noting that “the pre-trial investigation authorities did not commit any substantial breaches of the rules of criminal procedure”. 14. The case against the applicant was referred for trial to the Babushkinskiy District Court in Moscow. 15. The defence claimed that the attesting witnesses who had been present during the opening of the bag were in fact employees of the narcotics unit rather than independent observers as required by law. Both of those witnesses – Ms P. and Ms A. – did not appear before the trial court. Instead, a court bailiff submitted reports about his unsuccessful attempts to ensure their attendance. The reports contained the same text to the effect that the witnesses could not be reached on the phone, that no one opened the door at their residence and that neighbours had told the bailiff that they had not seen them for a long time. 16. Counsel for the applicant requested the court to obtain the visitors journal from the reception of the narcotics unit. Since the unit was located within a security perimeter, all civilian visitors were to be recorded in the journal. The trial court refused the motion, without giving any reasons. It further held that there existed “exceptional circumstances” for the absence of the witnesses Ms P. and Ms A. and allowed their pre-trial statements to be read out, overriding the objections from the defence. 17. The trial court also authorised the reading-out of the pre-trial statement of Mr F., the driver of the car, of which the applicant and B. had been passengers. The bailiff submitted similarly worded reports to the effect that Mr F. was unavailable on the telephone or at his residence. 18. By judgment of 8 April 2008, the District Court found the applicant and B. guilty as charged and sentenced each of them to eight years’ imprisonment in a high-security correctional colony. It held in particular that the applicant’s claim that she did not know she was carrying marijuana in her friend’s bag was refuted by the seizure report of 14 July 2007 and the statements by the witnesses Ms P. and Ms A. 19. On 28 July 2008 the Moscow City Court examined and rejected her appeal against the conviction.

4. The applicant was born in 1948 and lives in Donetsk, Ukraine. According to him, at the material time he had obtained a basic education (середня спеціальна освіта) in law and was working as a police officer. 5. On the morning of 23 August 2001 the applicant had a fight with D. in the course of which blows were exchanged. At least three people witnessed the fight. After the fight the applicant went to work for a twenty‑four hour shift. The next morning D. was found dead in the vicinity of the applicant’s place of work. 6. According to the applicant, he was arrested on the same day – that is to say 24 August 2001 – and was detained at the police office until the evening of 25 August 2001. The applicant also submits that during this period he was ill-treated by the police, who forced him to plead guilty, and that he was coerced into declining legal representation. The applicant submits that he did not yield to such pressure and did not make any statements nor confess to committing the murder. He further maintains that the police planted evidence against him, putting a blood stain on his shirt. 7. On 25 August 2001 the local police instituted criminal proceedings against the applicant, charging him with inflicting grievous bodily harm on D., which resulted in his death. At the end of that day the applicant was released, having signed a written undertaking not to abscond. 8. Between the end of August and the beginning of September 2001 a hoe was found close to the place where D.’s body had been found. 9. According to the applicant, he was arrested again on 14 September 2001. However, the arrest report refers to 15 September 2001. On 18 September 2001 the Kirovsky District Court of Donetsk (hereafter “the District Court”) extended the applicant’s arrest until 25 September 2001. On the latter date the District Court ordered the applicant’s detention on remand. It is not clear from the applicant’s submissions whether he appealed against that court decision. 10. On 25 August, 15 September and 18 September 2001 the applicant, having been apprised of his right to legal assistance, declined to exercise this right and wished to defend himself in person. On 2 October 2001 he changed his mind and on 16 October 2001 a lawyer was appointed for him (according to the applicant, however, he was only represented by a lawyer from 6 December 2001). 11. By November 2001 the investigator had taken a number of investigative steps including an on-site inspection, a post-mortem examination of the victim’s body and other forensic examinations, questioning of the applicant and witnesses, and face-to-face confrontations between the latter and the applicant. 12. On 26 November 2001 the indictment was approved by the district prosecutor and sent to the District Court. 13. According to the applicant, the decisive evidence against him, namely the aforementioned bloodstained shirt and the hoe, which was believed to be the murder weapon, were not sealed during the investigation, as required by the relevant rules of procedure, and were later replaced with other items more consistent with the charges against him and consequently more incriminating. He denied the charges. 14. On 11 December 2001 the District Court took over the case and commenced the trial. 15. On 25 December 2001 it held the first hearing. The applicant and his lawyer filed several motions and requests, including one to record the hearings using audio and video equipment. In order to arrange the latter, the court postponed the hearings until 12 March 2002. 16. During the trial the applicant filed numerous further requests (for example, to summon additional witnesses, to familiarise himself with the case file, etc.) and challenged the judge and prosecutor on numerous occasions; as to the charges against him, the applicant pleaded not guilty. 17. On 10 September 2002, after four hearings, the District Court found the applicant guilty of the murder of D. and sentenced him to eleven years’ imprisonment. 18. On 9 December 2002, in the course of the applicant’s study of the case file, which at the material time consisted of two volumes, the District Court found that the applicant was abusing this right by requesting simultaneous familiarisation with the court minutes and the audio and video recordings, and challenging the lawfulness of the minutes of the court hearings and how the case file was processed. Eventually on 8 January 2003 the District Court terminated the applicant’s study of the case file. On 27 January 2003 the District Court dismissed the applicant’s complaints concerning the lawfulness of the minutes of the court hearings. 19. The applicant appealed against the rulings of 8 and 27 January 2003, but the result is not clear. According to the applicant, he was not provided with access to the audio and video records of the court hearings, some of the documents in the case file (for instance, minutes of the court hearings) were drafted in an improper manner (in his view he was not provided with the final version of court minutes but only with a draft version) in illegible handwriting, the case file was improperly processed, etc. 20. The applicant and his lawyer appealed against the judgment of 10 September 2002, challenging the conclusions of the forensic examinations and the testimonies of a number of witnesses, and alleging procedural shortcomings in the investigation and the trial. They requested discontinuation of the proceedings in question due to lack of evidence of the applicant’s guilt. 21. On 11 July 2003 the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”), pointing out a number of the inferior court’s shortcomings (for example, failure to establish how D.’s injuries had been caused and how the blood stain had appeared on the applicant’s shirt, failure to address the applicant’s version of events, etc.), found that the applicant’s guilt was not sufficiently proven, and quashed the judgment. Accordingly, the case was remitted for fresh consideration. 22. On 23 September 2003 the District Court resumed the trial. 23. As in the course of his first trial, the applicant again filed a large number of mostly unsuccessful requests and complaints (including some concerning the quality of his defence lawyer’s services) and challenged the judges and prosecutor on numerous occasions. The situation culminated on 26 March 2004 when the applicant was expelled from the court room during the hearing because of his shouting and interrupting the proceedings. After ten hearings had been held, at which, it appears, the applicant’s lawyer was present, the applicant was once again allowed to be present at the court hearing on 21 July 2004. 24. On 13 June 2004 the applicant refused the assistance of his lawyer, alleging the latter’s collusion and incompetence, and on 21 July 2004 the applicant requested that the court appoint another specified lawyer to represent him. The applicant’s lawyer also sought leave to discontinue his services to the applicant, citing the latter’s offensive behaviour and defamatory statements concerning him. On 21 and 30 July 2004 the District Court dismissed all those requests. 25. According to the applicant, on 30 July 2004 the court interrupted him and prohibited him from finishing his last plea. 26. According to the applicant, at several points during the trial and re‑trial he requested the summoning of certain witnesses (in particular, C., the investigator; an unidentified policeman who on 24 August 2001 escorted the applicant to the police station; A., the policeman in whose office on 25 August 2001 his bloodstained shirt had allegedly been produced; S., the policeman who signed the protocol on the examination and seizure of the aforementioned evidence), but to no avail. On several occasions he also unsuccessfully challenged the judges who were examining his case. 27. In June and July 2004 additional forensic examinations were held. 28. On 2 August 2004, after nineteen hearings, the District Court, having examined the case before it, found the applicant guilty of D.’s murder and sentenced him to eleven years’ imprisonment. In convicting the applicant, the court took into account: (a) the eye-witness testimonies to the fight between the applicant and D. on the morning of 23 August 2001. These stated that D. had sustained no injuries from the fight and that the applicant and D. had had these types of conflicts before; (b) medical evidence of injuries on the applicant’s body. The Court referred to the reports of 25 and 29 August 2001 stating that, according to them, the applicant’s injuries had been caused on “23-24 August 2001” and noted that, according to the applicant’s own explanation to the medical expert, these injuries had been caused by the fight with D. (see paragraph 40 below); (c) the testimonies of those who discovered D.’s body; (d) the testimonies by the applicant’s colleagues, according to which the hoe had been at their workplace on 23 August 2001, before the murder, but could no longer be found there on 24 August 2001, after the murder; (e) the statement by L., the police officer who interrogated the applicant in August 2001, that the applicant had pleaded guilty but refused to confirm his confession in writing; (f) the forensic cytological examination report of 7 September 2001 according to which the blood stain on the applicant’s shirt “could be from any person, including D.” and was not identified as being the applicant’s blood; (g) the post-mortem examination report of 15 September 2001 according to which the injuries to D. could have been caused either by a blunt instrument or by a hoe; (h) the forensic expert report of 9 October 2001 concluding that it was not possible to establish the features of the instrument with which D. was attacked but “the probability that the injuries to D. [had been] caused by the hoe under examination [could] not be excluded”; (i) the additional forensic expert report of 9 July 2004 stating that blood would not have gushed out of D.’s injuries during the assault but could have spattered onto surrounding objects. 29. The court also noted that the procedural shortcomings committed during the pre-trial investigation were not so serious as to prejudice its examination of the case. It did not specify those shortcomings. In addition to the judgment, the court on the same day delivered a special ruling (окрема ухвала) informing the superior investigation authorities of the bad faith and negligence of their subordinates in charge of the applicant’s case. In particular, the court noted that, initially, blood and hair samples had been found on the hoe, but these had subsequently been lost by the investigators at the pre-trial stage. In another special ruling given on the same day, the court informed the head of police of its subordinates’ failure to bring the applicant to the courthouse for the hearings scheduled for 9 March, 28 and 29 July and 2 August 2004 notwithstanding the court’s requests; such a failure, according to the court, had delayed the examination of the applicant’s case. 30. The judgment itself states that the hearing was public and that the defence lawyer was present. According to the applicant, this judgment was pronounced to him “secretly” on 2 August 2004 in the SIZO, that is to say the remand centre, where he was being detained. In support of his claim, the applicant submitted a copy of the District Court’s letter of the same date requesting that the SIZO administration provide them with a room in which to pronounce the judgment to the applicant. 31. From 7 October 2004 to 28 February 2005 the applicant familiarised himself with the case file. On the latter date the District Court, alleging the applicant’s abuse of this right, terminated the applicant’s study of the case file. On 9 December 2005 the Court of Appeal remitted the case to the District Court so that the applicant could be given additional opportunity to familiarise himself with the case file. The applicant studied the file additionally from 27 April to 6 May 2005. 32. At this stage of the proceedings the applicant again challenged the lawfulness of the minutes of the court hearings, obliging the District Court to give interlocutory decisions. 33. The applicant further appealed against the judgment of 2 August 2004. He maintained, inter alia, that the impugned judgment lacked reasoning and had been “secretly” pronounced to him in the SIZO. 34. On 29 March 2005 the applicant repeatedly refused the assistance of his lawyer, alleging his collusion and incompetence. 35. According to the Government, on 9 December 2005 the applicant refused legal assistance from any lawyer. On 17 March 2006, after the applicant had changed his mind, the Court of Appeal ordered that a lawyer be appointed for the applicant and for that reason adjourned the hearing until 31 March 2006. 36. On 31 March 2006 the Court of Appeal, having reiterated the aforesaid pieces of evidence, upheld the judgment of 2 August 2004. It did not address the alleged lack of “publicity” of the criminal proceedings against the applicant as maintained in his appeal. 37. The text of the appellate court’s decision states that the hearing was held in the presence of the applicant and the prosecutor; no indication of the applicant’s lawyer’s presence at the hearing can be found. However, on the same day the applicant, apparently, filed a written statement before the hearing that he rejected the defence lawyer provided to him, and he did not request another one. 38. On 25 October 2007 the Supreme Court of Ukraine, sitting in camera, rejected the applicant’s appeal on points of law. According to the applicant, he familiarised himself with that decision on 28 November 2007. 39. According to the applicant, on 24 and 25 August 2001 he was “beaten” (“избивали”) by police officers and threatened and psychologically pressurised by the investigator, who allegedly coerced him into pleading guilty. 40. On 25 August 2001 a forensic medical expert examined the applicant, found some bruises on his shoulders and right elbow, and classified them as light ones. Forensic expert report no. 2948 (акт судово‑медичного освідування) concluded that these injuries had been caused two or three days before the examination, during a fight or in self‑defence. The report contains a typed statement by the expert to the effect that during the examination the applicant had said that he had sustained the injuries in the course of the fight with the victim. The applicant denies that he had made that statement. On 29 August 2001, following an order from the investigator, the same expert re-examined the applicant and came to the same conclusion, stating additionally that the injuries could have been caused between 23 and 24 August 2001 (forensic expert report no. 2948/787). 41. On 9 November 2001 the prosecutor, having examined the matter proprio motu as required by domestic law, noted that, as the injuries caused to the applicant were light ones, the investigation of such offences was a matter for private prosecution. In the absence of a corresponding complaint by the applicant, the prosecutor refused to institute criminal proceedings. 42. According to the Government, the applicant had not complained to the prosecutor of ill-treatment by the police and the investigator until 15 December 2001. In his description of ill-treatment the applicant stated that on 24 August 2001 L. had exerted pressure under the applicant’s ear with his finger, had slapped him with the palm of his hand on his forehead and had hit him on the nose with a passport; at the same time another police officer had pushed the applicant in the back with his hand, and had punched him below the knee and on his head. In reply, on 26 December 2001, after holding a preliminary inquiry, the prosecutor refused to institute criminal proceedings, finding no prima facie case. The applicant states that no copies of that or any other decisions on the matter were served on him and he could therefore not challenge them before the domestic courts. 43. Subsequently the applicant repeatedly asked the prosecutor to institute criminal proceedings against certain specified policemen and the investigator, but to no avail. In particular, the decision of 26 December 2001 was set aside and an additional investigation was ordered; eventually, by decisions of 13 April and 20 June 2002 the prosecutor refused to institute criminal proceedings, finding no corpus delicti in the behaviour of the investigator or the police officers. In particular, in reaching her conclusions in the latter decision the prosecutor took into account: - the conclusions in the forensic report of 25 August 2001 (see paragraph 40 above), namely that the injuries had been caused before the applicant first came into contact with the police; - the report of 12 June 2002 from the ITT (the police detention facility) that in the period from 15 to 18 September 2001 no bodily injuries had been found on the applicant; - the report of 29 December 2001 from the SIZO (the remand prison), according to which the applicant did not complain and had no bodily injuries upon arrival; - the explanations offered by the police officers and the investigator against whose actions the applicant had complained. 44. The applicant did not appeal against these decisions. According to the Government, both decisions were sent to the SIZO for the applicant’s information. According to the applicant, he was served with a formal notification that the prosecutor had refused to institute criminal proceedings but not with copies of the relevant decisions. On several occasions he asked to be provided with the copies of the relevant prosecutor’s decisions (among others, letters no. Л247 sent on 25 May 2004; no. Л343 sent on 20 July 2004; no. Л23 sent on 18 January 2005; no. Л31 sent on 21 May 2008). In fact, a copy of the decision of 20 June 2002 was not sent to him until 11 June 2008. 45. During the trial the applicant also complained that he had been ill‑treated, without however alleging that this treatment resulted in a statement and a confession. On 10 September 2002, in the course of examining the charges against the applicant, the District Court declared the complaint to be unfounded. 46. On 11 July 2003 the Court of Appeal remitted the criminal case against the applicant for fresh consideration, pointing out the inferior court’s failure to address the applicant’s complaints of ill-treatment. 47. In its judgment of 2 August 2004 the District Court referred to the applicant’s injuries in the terms set out in paragraph 28 (b) above. 48. On 9 December 2005, having examined the applicant’s appeal against the judgment of 2 August 2004, the Court of Appeal remitted the case to the District Court and ordered the local Prosecutor’s Office to hold an inquiry into the applicant’s complaints of alleged ill-treatment in the course of the pre-trial investigation. On 7 February 2006 the District Court remitted the case to the prosecutor in compliance with the appellate court’s instructions. According to the Government, the prosecutor sent the copies of the earlier decisions of 13 April and 20 June 2002 to the court and the latter was satisfied with them. 49. In their decisions of 31 March 2006 and 25 October 2007 the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Ukraine, respectively, rejected the applicant’s complaints of ill-treatment as unsubstantiated (see paragraphs 36 and 38 above). 50. In the course of the criminal proceedings against the applicant, the applicant or his lawyer applied to the courts on several occasions for release (at least on 27 November and 3 December 2001, 27 August and 21 September 2002) but it is not clear whether the courts examined their requests. 51. On 23 September 2003 the defence lawyer requested that the District Court release the applicant. He argued that the applicant had had no previous convictions, had his permanent residence in Donetsk and had not gone into hiding during the initial stage of the proceedings against him, had not obstructed the investigation, and that the suspicions raised in the detention order were no longer justifiable. The applicant’s lawyer also referred to the principle of the presumption of innocence. On 27 February 2004 the District Court dismissed the request, limiting its reasoning to a statement that “there [were] no grounds for replacing the applicant’s detention on remand with a non-custodial preventive measure”. In the operative part the court noted that its decision could be appealed against to the Court of Appeal. 52. In judgments of 10 September 2002 and 2 August 2004 the District Court and in rulings of 11 July 2003 and 9 December 2005 the Court of Appeal (see paragraphs 17, 28, 21 and 31 respectively) ordered, without any argumentation, that the applicant should remain in detention; they did not specify any time-limit for his detention. 53. On an unspecified date the applicant requested that the local police and the Prosecutor’s Office institute criminal proceedings in respect of the theft of his property which allegedly took place following his detention in 2001. In February 2002 the local police refused to institute the requested proceedings. Subsequently this decision was quashed and the preliminary inquiry was resumed several times. On 12 October 2006, the latest available decision, the local police again refused to institute the requested proceedings. 54. The applicant did not appeal against these refusals to a court. 55. On an unspecified date the applicant requested the local department of the State Pension Fund (hereafter “the SPF”) to grant him a pension in so far as he was eligible due to his age. In a letter of 6 July 2006 the local department of the SPF replied that the applicant was not entitled to a pension under national law as long as he was serving a prison sentence. 56. On 16 August 2006 the local department of the SPF stated that the applicant would be entitled to a pension upon his release from prison. 57. It appears that the applicant did not challenge the aforesaid refusals before any domestic court.

5. The facts of the applications, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 6. The first applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Perm. 7. On 6 May 2003 the first applicant was stopped by a customs officer at a Moscow international airport and found to be in possession of 10,200 euros (EUR) and 8,755 US dollars[1] (USD) which he failed to report on his customs declaration. 8. On 4 December 2003 the Golovinskiy District Court in Moscow convicted the first applicant of smuggling and issued a confiscation order in respect of the foreign currency he had carried on him. On 5 February 2004 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment on appeal. 9. Further to an application from a deputy Moscow prosecutor, on 5 December 2008 the Presidium of the Moscow City Court amended the judgment. Noting that there was no evidence that the confiscated currency had been the instrument of a crime or had been criminally acquired, it cancelled the confiscation order and ordered the confiscated money to be refunded to the first applicant. 10. On 3 June 2009 the amount of 628,750 Russian roubles (RUB)[2] was credited into the first applicant’s bank account. 11. The first applicant sued the Ministry of Finance, seeking to recover the interest accrued on the retained amount during the period from 6 May 2003 to 3 June 2009, which he assessed at RUB 458,777. 12. On 25 August 2009 the Tverskoy District Court in Moscow granted his claim in part. It awarded the first applicant RUB 11,719.20[3] in respect of the period from 2 April 2009 when his representative had submitted the bank details to the Ministry of Finance until 3 June 2009 when the transfer had been made. The District Court did not say anything about the part of the claim concerning the previous six-year period. 13. The second and third applicants were born in 1967 and 1971 respectively and live in Graz, Austria. 14. On 11 October 2004 the customs officer at a Moscow international airport stopped the second and third applicants as they were carrying EUR 14,600 and 14,980 euros in cash, respectively, which they had not reported on their customs declarations. 15. On 14 and 16 February 2006 the Golovinskiy District Court in Moscow found the second and third applicants guilty as charged and issued confiscation orders. On 10 April 2006 the Moscow City Court upheld the conviction on appeal. 16. On an application from a deputy Moscow prosecutor, on 26 August 2011 the Presidium of the Moscow City Court amended the judgments in respect of the second and third applicants. Noting that there was no evidence that the confiscated currency had been the instrument of a crime or had been criminally acquired, it cancelled the confiscation orders and ordered to refund RUB 526,471.62 to Ms Sumann and RUB 540,174.30 to Mr Sumann.[4]

5. The applicants were born on 18 September 1971 and 24 December 1994 respectively and live in Moscow. 6. A two-roomed flat at 29-1-26 Ozernaya Ulitsa, Moscow, was owned by the city. G. and her son resided there as tenants under the social housing agreement with the city. 7. On 16 November 2002 G. died. On 17 September 2003 the municipal authorities de-registered her tenancy. 8. On 3 October 2003 G.’s son died. On an unspecified date the municipal authorities de-registered his tenancy. 9. On an unspecified date A. submitted a forged copy of a court judgment to the Department of the Municipal Housing and Housing Policy (the “Housing Department”) recognising her right to reside in the flat and on 9 February 2005 the Housing Department entered into a social housing lease agreement with A. and her family. 10. On 25 February 2005 the Housing Department transferred the title to the flat to A., her husband and her daughter under the privatisation scheme. 11. On 15 December 2005 A. and her husband sold the flat to the applicant. On 29 December 2005 the city registration body issued a certificate confirming the first applicant’s title to the flat. The applicants moved into the flat and resided there. 12. On an unspecified date the Housing Department obtained information that the court judgment submitted by A. might have been forged and on 15 December 2005 the housing authorities asked the prosecutor’s office to conduct a relevant inquiry. 13. On 20 March 2008 the Nikulinskiy District Court of Moscow invalidated the social housing lease agreement of 9 February 2005 and the privatisation agreement of 25 February 2005. 14. On an unspecified date the Housing Department brought an action against the applicants seeking the transfer of the flat to the city and the applicants’ eviction. 15. On 9 October 2009 the District Court granted the Housing Department’s claims in full. The court ruled that the case fell under one of the two exceptions to the protection of a bona fide purchaser’s title, which required that precedence be given to the previous owner who had been deprived of the property against his or her will. The first applicant’s title to the flat was annulled and the title was transferred to the City of Moscow. The court also ordered the applicants’ eviction. The applicants appealed. 16. On 25 February 2010 the City Court upheld the judgment of 9 October 2009 on appeal. 17. On an unspecified date the bailiff instituted enforcement proceedings. 18. On 12 March 2012 the District Court granted the applicant’s additional time to comply with the judgment of 9 October 2009. The applicants were required to vacate the flat by 1 August 2012. On 14 May 2012 the City Court upheld the said decision on appeal. 19. The applicants continued to reside in the flat. On 14 August 2013 the Housing Department entered into a housing agreement with them in respect of the flat for a term of five years.

4. The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Vladimir. 5. In 2008 the applicant was indicted with fraud. On 21 March 2008 the Frunzenskiy District Court of Vladimir (“the district court”) ordered temporary suspension of the applicant from the post of the chief accountant of municipal hospital no. 4. At the same time, the district court awarded the applicant an allowance for the period of the suspension in the amount of five statutory monthly wages. The decision came into force on 1 April 2008. 6. On 11 August 2009 the district court cancelled the suspension of the applicant from the office as no longer necessary. The decision came into force on 24 August 2009. 7. On 12 July 2010 the Presidium of the Vladimir Regional Court (“the regional court”) quashed the decision of the district court of 21 March 2008 in the part concerning the monthly allowance. The Presidium of the regional court found that while ordering the suspension and the allowance for the period of such suspension, the district court had failed to specify from which funds the allowance was payable, thus the decision of the district court in that part had remained unenforced. The case was remitted for a new examination. 8. On 3 August 2010 the district court awarded the applicant monthly allowance for the period of her suspension from the office in the amount of 266,812.92 Russian roubles. The allowance was to be paid from the federal budget. That decision was upheld on appeal on 22 September 2010. 9. On 31 January 2011 the amount mentioned above was transferred to the applicant.

7. The applicant was born in 1988 in Margilan, Uzbekistan. He arrived in Russia on 2 October 2014. 8. On 5 September 2014 the applicant was charged in absentia with participation in the extremist religious movement Hizb ut-Tahrir al Islami and activities threatening the constitutional order. On the same day the authorities ordered his pre-trial detention and issued an international search and arrest warrant bearing his name. 9. On 24 December 2014 the applicant was arrested in Moscow. On 26 December 2014 the Cheremushkinskiy District Court of Moscow ordered and subsequently prolonged his detention. 10. On 22 January 2015 the applicant was further charged with organising a local branch of Hizb ut-Tahri al Islami in one of the regions of Uzbekistan. 11. On 23 January 2015 the Uzbek prosecution authorities requested the applicant’s extradition on the above charges. The request included assurances regarding the proper treatment of the applicant, which were formulated in standard terms. 12. On 21 May 2015 the applicant’s extradition in respect of certain charges was authorised by the Deputy Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation. 13. The applicant challenged this decision in the courts, arguing that he belonged to a vulnerable group and therefore faced a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 at the hands of the Uzbek authorities. 14. On 13 October 2015 his appeals were dismissed by a final decision of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. Without reference to any relevant evidentiary material, the Supreme Court considered that the applicant’s claims were hypothetical and lacked specific indications regarding the level of risk, and observed that the situation in a requesting state might change over time. It also found that the assurances of the Uzbek authorities were satisfactory. 15. On 5 June 2015 the applicant lodged a request for refugee status, referring to persecution in Uzbekistan on religious grounds. 16. On 9 November 2015 his request was refused by a final administrative decision of the migration authorities. The applicant challenged this decision in the courts, referring inter alia to the risk of ill‑treatment. 17. On 18 May 2016 his appeals were dismissed by a decision of Moscow City Court. 18. On 25 December 2015 the Meshchanskiy District Court of Moscow ordered the applicant’s expulsion for violating the migration rules. The applicant’s appeal, which referred to the risk of ill-treatment, amongst other factors, was dismissed by the Moscow City Court on 24 February 2016. 19. On 16 February 2016 the applicant applied for temporary asylum. No information concerning the outcome of these proceedings was supplied by the parties.

5. On 30 May 2003 the Gjirokastra Commission recognised, amongst others, the applicants’ inherited property rights over an agricultural land measuring 655,400 sq. m. The applicants and other heirs would be awarded compensation in the sum of 2,297,398 Albanian leks (“ALL”) in respect of the entire land. 6. To date, no compensation has been paid. 7. On 15 September 1995 the Korça Commission recognised, amongst others, the applicant’s inherited property rights over some land measuring 2,800 sq. m of which 300 sq. m were restored. Since the remaining plot measuring 2,500 sq. m, which was situated within the village boundaries and used to be arable land, was occupied, the applicant and other heirs would be compensated in State bonds in the event the buildings located on the land were not privatised (“u kompensohet me obligacion shtetëror sipërfaqja 2,500 m2 ish tokë arë, brenda vijave kufizuese të Zvarishtit, në rast se objektet (...) nuk do të privatizohen”). The Commission stated that the applicant owned one sixths of the land. 8. On 21 December 1998 the Korça Commission recognised, amongst others, the applicant’s inherited property rights over another plot of arable land and meadow measuring 19,796 sq. m. Since the arable land and meadow were occupied, the applicant would be compensated in State bonds equivalent to a financial amount of ALL 36,890. 12. On 28 August 2000 the Kavaja Commission recognised, amongst others, the applicant’s inherited property rights over two plots of land totalling 17,500 sq. m. Since the plots of land were occupied, the applicant and other heirs would be compensated in kind in respect of a plot measuring 10,000 sq. m and in State bonds in respect of another plot measuring 750 sq. m. No decision was taken in respect of any right to compensation as regards the remaining plot measuring 6,750 sq. m. 14. On 13 December 1996 the Devoll Commission recognised the applicants’ inherited property rights over an agricultural land measuring 27,200 sq. m. The applicants would be awarded compensation by way of State bonds in the sum of ALL 367,000. 16. On 23 June 1995 the Tirana Commission recognised the applicant’s inherited property rights over a plot of land measuring 836 sq. m of which 513 sq. m were restored. Since the remaining plot was occupied, the applicant would be compensated in one of the ways provided by law. 17. On 17 March 2008 the Agency on Restitution and Compensation of Properties amended in part the Commission decision and decided that the applicant would be compensated in one of the ways provided by law even in respect of the plot of land measuring 513 sq. m.

5. The applicants were born in 1946, 1966 and 1973, respectively, and live in Sisak. 6. On 17 October 1991 the body of Stevo Borojević, the applicants’ respective husband and father, was found on the right bank of the river Kupa in Sisak. An on-site inspection was carried out immediately as well as an autopsy the following day which showed that the victim had been stabbed to death. 7. On 24 October 1991 the Sisak Police lodged a criminal complaint with the Sisak County State Attorney’s Office. 8. The police interviewed Ms Jasenka Borojević, the victim’s wife, on 5 December 1991. She told them that her husband had left her workplace at about 10.30 a.m. on 6 October 1991 to return home because a general emergency had been announced and their daughter, who was a minor, was there alone. However, after he left she had not seen him again. 9. In 1996 the United Nations Security Council established the United Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (the “UNTAES”). On 15 January 1998 the UNTAES mandate ceased and the transfer of power to the Croatian authorities began. 10. On 27 February 2002 the police interviewed Jasenka Borojević and Edita Mihić, respectively the wife and daughter of the late Stevo Borojević. They said that prior to Stevo Borojević’s disappearance on 6 October 1991, Croatian soldiers had carried out searches in their flat in July 1991 and on 3 October 1991. One of the soldiers, T.P., had been known to them. They had subsequently learned that an individual named G. had also been implicated. A certain M.T. had also told them that he had asked Đ.B. about the killing of Stevo Borojević and that Đ.B. had shown M.T. a list of persons to be followed and a list of persons to be liquidated, and that Stevo Borojević had been on neither of those lists. 11. On 29 July 2005 the State Attorney’s Office issued a document concerning enquiries into the killings of civilians between 1991 and 1995. The document was addressed to the County State Attorney’s Offices, which were required to examine all the information collected to date on the killings of civilians during that period and to concentrate their activities on identifying the perpetrators and gathering the relevant evidence in order to initiate criminal proceedings. 12. On 9 October 2008 the State Attorney’s Office issued an instruction to the County State Attorney’s Offices for implementation of the Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure, in which it indicated that an inspection of their work had indicated two main problems: possible partiality of the persons involved in the pending proceedings as regards the ethnicity of the victims or the perpetrators, and the problem of trials in absentia. The instruction advocated the impartial investigation of all war crimes, irrespective of the ethnicity of those involved, whether victims or perpetrators, and reiterated the duties of those working for the State Attorney in that respect. 13. On 11 December 2008 an investigating judge at the Sisak County Court heard evidence from Jasenka Borojević and Edita Mihić, who repeated what they had said to the police. 14. The police interviewed J.B., a relative of Stevo Borojević, on 30 December 2008 but he had no knowledge of the latter’s disappearance and killing. 15. On 5 January 2009 the police interviewed V.P. and on 8 January 2009 they questioned T.P. 16. On 27 January 2009 an investigating judge at the Sisak County Court heard evidence from T.P., a neighbour of the Borojević family. He said that one day in 1991 when Sisak was being shelled, he and other tenants from the building had been in the basement when three armed men dressed in military uniforms had entered. He had exited the basement with them and they had told him that someone had been shooting from the building. T.P. had shown them the flats where Serbs lived. The three men had entered the flat of the Borojević family while T.P. waited outside. They had not taken anyone from the flat. T.P. remembered that the men had been young. 17. On the same day the judge heard evidence from V.P., who said that a certain T.Š., who had died in the meantime, had told him that he had learned that Stevo Borojević had been taken to Žabno by the men who controlled the roads. He had been tortured and then taken to Vurot. V.P. had the impression that T.Š. knew who had taken Stevo Borojević but he had not identified that person. Later he had seen a vehicle belonging to Stevo Borojević on the Topolovac agricultural estate. However, when he had attempted to find out who was driving the vehicle, a man wearing a camouflage uniform and a balaclava and armed with a Kalashnikov had threatened to kill him. 18. On 20 June 2011 the Sisak County Police lodged a criminal complaint against Đ.B., V.M and D.B. on charges of war crimes against the civilian population. This included the killing of the applicants’ relative. On the same day Đ.B., Head of the Sisak Police Department in 1991 and 1992, V.M., police commander at the border territory of Sisak and Banovina in 1991 and 1992 and Deputy of Sisak Police Department, and D.B., a member of the “Wolves” Unit of the Croatian Army, were arrested. 19. On an unspecified date the investigation was opened. On 13 July 2011 Đ.B. died. 20. On 16 December 2011 the Osijek County State Attorney’s Office lodged an indictment against V.M. and D.B. at the Osijek County Court, alleging that they had been in command of the unit whose unknown members had committed a number of crimes against the civilian population between July 1991 and June 1992, including the killing of the applicants’ relative. They were charged with war crimes against the civilian population. 21. On 9 December 2013 a first-instance judgment was delivered. V.M. was found guilty of war crimes against the civilian population in that, in his capacity as “the commander of police forces in the broader area of Sisak and Banovina” and “Deputy Head of the Sisak Police”, he had allowed the killings of persons of Serbian origin and had failed to undertake adequate measures to prevent such killings. The relevant part of the judgment concerning the applicants’ relative reads: “in the morning of 6 October 1991 at a checkpoint in Odra Sisačka, some unknown members of the reserve police stopped a white vehicle, a Fiat 127, which was being driven by Stevo Borojević, took the vehicle from him and kept it for themselves, and arrested Stevo Borojević and took him to an unknown location where they killed him, after which his body was found on 17 October 1991 on the right bank of the river Kupa at the location called “Rušetina” in Sisak, with several open wounds and contusions on his head and a wound caused by stabs and cuts in his chest.” 22. On 10 June 2014 the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of V.M. and increased his sentence to ten years’ imprisonment. 23. On various dates the applicants brought separate civil actions against the State, seeking compensation in connection with the death of their close relative. The claims were dismissed on the grounds that they had been lodged after the statutory limitation period had expired. 24. Following the criminal conviction of V.M., the applicants sought the reopening of these proceedings in the Petrinja Municipal Court. Their request is now pending.

5. The applicants were born in 1962 and 1958 respectively and live in Sisak. 6. On 20 June 2011 the Sisak-Moslavina Police Department (Policijska Uprava Sisačko-moslavačka; hereinafter: the “police”) lodged a criminal complaint against the applicants and one other person, alleging that in 1991 and 1992 they had committed war crimes against the civilian population in the area of Sisak and Banovina. 7. Having collected extensive evidence in the course of the preliminary investigation, on 22 June 2011 the Osijek County State Attorney’s Office (Županijsko državno odvjetništvo u Osijeku) requested an investigating judge of the Osijek County Court (Županijski sud u Osijeku) to open an investigation in respect of the applicants on suspicion of war crimes against the civilian population, as alleged in the criminal complaint lodged by the police. 8. The investigating judge questioned the applicants in connection with the request of the Osijek County State Attorney’s Office. Both applicants denied the allegations against them. 9. On 22 June 2011 the investigating judge opened an investigation in respect of the applicants on suspicion of war crimes against the civilian population. The investigating judge found, on the basis of the available material, that there was a reasonable suspicion that the first applicant, acting in his capacity as commander of police combat units in the area of Sisak, had ordered and carried out arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment of civilians, and that he had failed to prevent, supress and punish arbitrary arrests and searches and seizures, as well as ill-treatment and killings perpetrated by his subordinates. With regard to the second applicant, the investigating judge found that there was a reasonable suspicion that, as a member of a special police unit of the Sisak police, he had organised a group which had carried out arbitrary arrests, ill-treatment and killings. 10. During the investigation the investigating judge heard evidence from the applicants and questioned numerous witnesses. He also obtained a number of relevant forensic reports on the crime-scene examinations, autopsies and ballistic expertise, and voluminous evidence and documentation concerning the actions of the police units in Sisak at the relevant time. 11. On the basis of the evidence obtained during the investigation, on 16 December 2011 the Osijek County State Attorney’s Office indicted the applicants in the Osijek County Court on charges of war crimes against the civilian population. The first applicant was charged with twenty-four counts of arbitrary arrests, ill-treatment and the killing of civilians, and the second applicant with four counts of ill-treatment and the killing of civilians. The relevant part of the indictment concerning the applicants’ participation in those events reads: “I. Defendant Vladimir Milanković in the period between July 1991 and June 1992, while defending the wider area of Sisak and Banovina from armed attacks carried out by paramilitary formations of a part of the local Serbian population and the Yugoslav People’s Army in the conflict on the Constitutional and territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia, ... as a commander of the police units in the wider area of Sisak and Banovina ... authorised thereby to give orders to all police units and responsible for [securing] compliance with and application of the laws of war and international humanitarian law relative to the protection of civilian persons on that territory and for the humane treatment of prisoners of war, aware that, due to the conflict and occupation of an important part of Banovina and the terrorising and expulsion of the non-Serbian population from the occupied territories, intolerance towards the Serbian citizens of Sisak was growing, that the security situation in the city was ... extremely complex, that inter-ethnic relations were very tense, that there was a perception amongst the Croatian and other non-Serbian citizens of Sisak that all Serbs were collectively responsible for the war, ... at the same time aware that the police units under his command were mostly composed of members of the local population affected by the suffering, that amongst the members of his subordinate police units there were some individuals who had been previously in conflict with the law, while the members of the reserve police units had not been instructed about or trained on all the obligations arising from the norms of international laws of war and humanitarian law, aware that in the Sisak area members of his subordinate units frequently and without any legal basis carried out searches [and seizures] in the houses and flats of persons of Serbian origin, ... who were, in the course of these unlawful actions, often arrested ... although aware that the arrested persons were subjected to unlawful actions, that during questioning they were accused of collaboration with the enemy, offended, humiliated and coerced, that some of them were physically and psychologically ill-treated and that grave bodily injuries were inflicted on them, and that already on 4 August 1991, during one such intervention ... V.B. [was arrested and subsequently] brutally beaten by a number of unknown members of the reserve police unit ..., and that the numerous injuries he had sustained led to his death the same evening in the Sisak hospital, although aware that in the above-noted circumstances, if he failed to take timely and adequate measures, the members of his subordinate units would continue their unlawful actions against the citizens of Sisak of Serbian origin and their inhumane treatment of prisoners of war, although under the commonly recognised rules of international laws of war and humanitarian customary law relative to the protection of civilian persons, and the command responsibility for the acts of subordinates in times of armed conflict, contrary to Articles 3 § 1 (a) and (c), 13, 27, 31 and 32 of the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949, Article 4 §§ 1 and 2 (a) and Article 13 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts of 8 June 1977 (Protocol II), Articles 75, 86 and 87 of the Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I) and Article 3 § 1 (a) and (c) and Article 13 of the Third Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949, he was required to take measures to prevent, supress and punish such unlawful actions, he failed to do so. On the contrary, by using his authority as commander of the police units, he prevented the taking of necessary measures to identify the direct perpetrators and thereby condoned the unlawful actions of his subordinates and encouraged them to take such actions, accepting that they would continue with their actions and condoning their consequences. Meanwhile he also personally participated in ill-treatment and attacks on certain civilians and ordered the unlawful detention of a number of civilians of Serbian origin ... II. Defendant Drago Bošnjak in the second half of August 1991, ..., as a member of the special police unit V. of the Sisak Police Department, together with, at present, unknown members of that unit, ..., in order to carry out coercion and revenge on citizens of Serbian origin, contrary to Articles 3 § 1 (a) and (c), 13, 27 and 32 of the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949, Article 4 §§ 1 and 2 (a) and Article 13 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts of 8 June 1977 (Protocol II), organised and led a group of unknown members of the said unit with whom he carried out unlawful arrests, ill-treatment and the killing of persons of Serbian origin ...” 12. The applicants objected to the indictment. On 27 January 2012 a three-judge panel of the Osijek County Court confirmed the existence of a reasonable suspicion that they had committed the offences listed in the indictment, and sent the case to trial. 13. At a hearing held on 21 May 2012 before the Osijek County Court the applicants pleaded not guilty to the charges. 14. In the further course of the proceedings a number of hearings were held before the Osijek County Court, notably on 11-13 June; 2-4 and 9-11 July; 4-5 and 17-19 September; 9-10 and 15-17 October; 5, 7, 19, 20-21 November, 11-12 December 2012; as well as on 4-5 and 18-20 February; 18-20 March; 29 April; 14 and 28 June; 26 August; 29 September; and 14-16 October 2013. Several witnesses were questioned and voluminous evidence was examined. 15. The closing hearing was held on 2 December 2013. By a judgment of 9 December 2013 the Osijek County Court found the first applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to eight years’ imprisonment. It acquitted the second applicant on the grounds of lack of evidence. 16. The first applicant challenged the first-instance judgment before the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske), alleging a number of substantive and procedural flaws. The Osijek County State Attorney’s Office also lodged an appeal before the Supreme Court, challenging the acquittal of the second applicant and complaining that the sentence given to the first applicant was lenient. 17. On 10 June 2014 the Supreme Court upheld the acquittal of the second applicant and increased the first applicant’s sentence to ten years’ imprisonment. The judgment of the Osijek County Court thereby became final. 18. On 20 June 2011 the applicants were arrested in connection with the criminal complaint lodged against them by the police (see paragraph 6 above). 19. On 22 June 2011 the investigating judge ordered the applicants’ pre-trial detention for one month under Article 102 § 1 (2) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (risk of collusion and gravity of charges). The relevant part of the decision reads: “As an investigation has been opened in respect of the defendants concerning the offences at issue, the general condition [related to the existence of reasonable suspicion] for ordering detention against ... the second defendant Vladimir Milanković and the third defendant Drago Bošnjak has been met. ... A request for the questioning of 232 witnesses has been made. Most of these witnesses live in the Sisak area and most of them still work or have worked as police officers ... who were subordinate to the second defendant Vladimir Milanković. Specifically, in the period at issue the second defendant Vladimir Milanković was a deputy to the Chief of the Sisak Police Department ... and the real commander of the entire police force [in the Sisak area]. The records of the police interviews show that several witnesses who should be questioned [during the investigation] are in fear of the second defendant because they gave statements concerning the impugned actions ... and the second defendant was their superior in the period at issue. Furthermore, amongst the witnesses – including victims who have been ill-treated or are family members of the victims, there is a fear of the defendant and the available material in the case file shows that the witnesses have been threatened ... There is therefore a risk of collusion, [that is to say a risk] that the defendant could, if at large, hinder the investigation by influencing the witnesses. Thus detention under Article 102 § 1 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is justified. Furthermore, since the defendant ... has been charged with individual and command responsibility for the unlawful deprivation of liberty and ill-treatment of thirty-eight civilians of Serbian origin and the killing of thirty-one persons of Serbian origin from the Sisak area, all of which was perpetrated in a particularly brutal manner, including entire families irrespective of the sex or age [of the victims], and in view of the fact that the criminal offence at issue carries a sentence of more than twelve years’ imprisonment, and also the circumstances described in [the decision on opening of the investigation], ... it follows that detention under Article 102 § 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is justified. Detention under Article 102 § 1 (2) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is also justified in respect of the third defendant Drago Bošnjak. ... A number of witnesses who should be questioned during the investigation, and who were members of unit V., have given different statements about the [relevant] events from those given by the defendant ... which suggests that there is a risk that if at large he could hinder the conduct of the investigation by influencing these witnesses ... The same circumstances which have been stated above concerning the first and the second defendants accordingly apply to the third defendant with regard to the existence of a risk that if at large they could continue with threats to the mentioned witnesses, who have already been threatened several times concerning their statements against the defendants in the proceedings at issue. Thus the detention under Article 102 § 1 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is justified. In respect of the third defendant, reasons for detention under Article 102 § 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure also exist. In particular, he is suspected of individual responsibility in the commission of war crimes against the civilian population and arbitrary arrests, ill-treatment and the killing of two families Vi. and T. in a highly brutal manner. The description of the offences [referred to in the decision on opening of the investigation] suggests that the circumstances of the offences were particularly serious. The offences were motivated by revenge and ethnic discrimination and were committed in a highly brutal manner against civilians and entire families ... Detention under Article 102 § 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is therefore justified.” 20. The applicants appealed against the decision of the investigating judge before a three-judge panel of the Osijek County Court, arguing that it lacked the relevant reasoning. 21. On 5 July 2011 a three-judge panel of the Osijek County Court dismissed the applicants’ appeals as unfounded, endorsing the reasoning of the investigating judge. In particular it noted the following: “There is therefore a reasonable suspicion that the defendants committed the offences alleged [in the decision on opening of the investigation] and thus the general condition for ordering pre-trial detention under Article 102 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has been met. The impugned decision contains sufficient reasoning as to the existence of a reasonable suspicion, and the appeal arguments, concerning the manner in which the offences were committed or the extent of the criminal wrongdoing relate to something which will be examined during the proceedings. At this stage of the proceedings the existence of a reasonable suspicion is a sufficient condition for ordering pre-trial detention ... and when examining an appeal against the decision ordering detention, the second-instance court is not authorised to examine the facts with regard to the actual existence of the offences at issue or the criminal responsibility of the perpetrator. The justification for pre-trial detention under Article 102 § 1 (2) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure in respect of the defendants follows from the material in the case file. In this respect the impugned decision provided relevant and detailed reasons, which this second-instance panel accepts. ... Furthermore, the appeal arguments that in the case at issue the same purpose of the detention could be achieved by one of the alternative measures under Article 90 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be accepted ... In view of all the circumstances of the case, this panel finds that detention under Article 102 § 1 (2) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is necessary and the only appropriate measure for the prevention of collusion, especially given the particular gravity of the offences at issue.” 22. On 19 July 2011 the investigating judge extended the applicants’ detention for a further two months under Article 102 § 1 (2) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (risk of collusion and gravity of charges). He found that some more witnesses needed to be questioned and that some of them had been threatened with regard to their statements in the criminal proceedings at issue. The investigating judge also reiterated the previous findings concerning the gravity of the charges against the applicants. 23. The applicants appealed against that decision and on 1 August 2011 a three-judge panel of the Osijek County Court dismissed their appeals as ill-founded, reiterating its previous arguments. 24. On 19 September 2011 the investigating judge extended the applicants’ detention for a further three months under Article 102 § 1 (2) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (risk of collusion and gravity of charges). He held that thus far, out of 232 witnesses, sixty-one had been questioned and that the remainder should be questioned within a period of three months. The investigating judge also reiterated the specific circumstances of the case justifying detention on the grounds of gravity of the charges. 25. The applicants challenged that decision, arguing that their continued detention was not justified. On 30 September 2011 a three-judge panel of the Osijek County Court dismissed their appeals as ill-founded, endorsing the findings of the investigating judge. 26. On 28 October 2011 the first applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske), contending that his pre-trial detention was not based on relevant and sufficient reasons. 27. On 11 November 2011 the Constitutional Court dismissed the first applicant’s constitutional complaint, endorsing the reasoning of the Osijek County Court. The Constitutional Court in particular stressed: “The Constitutional Court reiterates its opinion, on which the appellant relies in his constitutional complaint, that the mere existence of a ‘reasonable suspicion’ is not sufficient after a certain lapse of time to justify pre-trial detention. It is necessary in such instances, (even under) the case-law of the European Court [of Human Rights], to ascertain the conditions for a possibility [of detention]: a) the existence of ‘relevant and sufficient’ reasons justifying [the detention], and b) whether the competent criminal justice authorities displayed the necessary diligence in the conduct of the proceedings. ... Since Article 102 § 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not explicitly provide for a legitimate aim of detention, as provided for in the other relevant provisions on detention, it is particularly important that the competent criminal justice authorities correctly establish the necessity of applying Article 102 § 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure ... In view of the findings of the Osijek County Court, and taking into account the sentence of imprisonment which can be imposed in this specific case, as well as the gravity of the charges, the Constitutional Court finds that the decisions of the investigating judge and the three-judge panel of the Osijek County Court comply with the relevant opinions and requirements when extending the pre-trial detention under Article 102 § 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure ...” 28. Following the filing of the indictment against the applicants in the Osijek County Court (see paragraph 11 above), on 19 December 2011 a three-judge panel of that court extended the first applicant’s detention pending trial under Article 102 § 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (gravity of charges). The relevant part of the decision reads: “There is a reasonable suspicion (and therefore the existence of the general condition for pre-trial detention) that the accused Vladimir Milanković and Drago Bošnjak committed the [war crimes against the civilian population]. ... The second condition [for detention] under Article 102 § 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure has also been met. This follows from the indictment against the accused Vladimir Milanković and Drago Bošnjak, which describes the physical and mental ill-treatment of the detained civilians, who were beaten until they lost consciousness, subjected to such brutality as to cause bodily harm, arbitrary arrests and beatings. [The accused are suspected of] shooting and bombing family houses, locking civilians in basements without windows or light, taking civilians to unknown locations and shooting them or killing them with hard or sharp objects, and the killing of the entire V. family and part of the T. family out of revenge and ethnic discrimination ... Therefore both defendants are suspected of particular cruelty and mercilessness ..., which, in view of the number of [victims] and the consequences of such conduct, the impugned offences in their entirety significantly surpass the usual circumstances pertinent to such grave offences. This justifies detention under Article 102 § 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure in respect of the accused Vladimir Milanković and Drago Bošnjak ... The preventive measures [under the Code of Criminal Procedure], in view of the specific circumstances of the offences at issue, could not achieve the purpose of detention ...” 29. The first applicant appealed against that decision to the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske), challenging the necessity of and the lack of relevant and sufficient reasons for his continued detention. 30. On 13 January 2012 the Supreme Court dismissed the first applicant’s appeal, upholding the decision of the Osijek County Court. The relevant part of the decision reads: “The impugned conduct of both accused, which includes ill-treatment and other extreme forms of inhumane treatment of civilians, and in the case of the accused Vladimir Milanković also of prisoners of war, some of whom were killed, as well as the failure to prevent such conduct by [Vladimir Milanković’s subordinates] ... suggests a particularly high level of brutality, mercilessness and unimaginable cruelty. Taking also into account that the seriousness of the impugned conduct of both accused on account of its intensity, recurrence and modality, as well as the period in which it took place, significantly surpasses the usual circumstances and consequences of such offences, which are in themselves particularly grave, [the Supreme Court finds] that the circumstances of the offence are particularly grave [justifying detention] under Article 102 § 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The appellate arguments of both accused that the purpose of detention could be achieved by alternative preventive measures cannot be accepted ... as there is public interest justifying the restriction of the accused’s right to personal liberty, guaranteed under the Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights. The fact that the impugned offences took place twenty years ago does not diminish their gravity and their moral public condemnation ... In particular, the conclusion as to the existence of particularly grave circumstances [of the offences] follows from the specific facts and the conduct with which the accused are charged, and they significantly surpass the usual circumstances related to the commission of such offences. The appellate arguments challenging the existence of a reasonable suspicion, and the assessment of evidence, are not relevant for the decision on detention, as at this stage of the proceedings the existence of a reasonable suspicion follows from the indictment. The second-instance panel, when examining an appeal against a decision on detention, cannot examine the factual findings or the criminal responsibility of the accused.” 31. The first applicant challenged the decision of the Supreme Court by lodging a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court. He argued that his continued detention had been arbitrary and contrary to the Constitution and the Convention. 32. On 2 March 2012 the Constitutional Court dismissed the first applicant’s constitutional complaint as unfounded. It reiterated the necessity of examining in detail all the relevant circumstances of the case when ordering and extending pre-trial detention under Article 102 § 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 27 above), noting in particular: “The Constitutional Court accepts the findings of the Supreme Court ... that detention is justified by the public interest in the case. The Supreme Court correctly stated that the fact that the impugned offences took place twenty years ago does not diminish their gravity or their moral public condemnation ...” 33. On 9 March 2012 a three-judge panel of the Osijek County Court extended the first applicant’s detention under Article 102 § 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (gravity of charges), reiterating its previous arguments. 34. The first applicant appealed against that decision to the Supreme Court. On 4 April 2012 the Supreme Court dismissed his appeal as ill-founded on the grounds that, in the particular circumstances of the case, his detention had not been disproportionate or unjustified. 35. On 4 June 2012 a three-judge panel of the Osijek County Court extended the first applicant’s detention under Article 102 § 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (gravity of charges), relying on the seriousness of the specific charges against him and finding that the overall duration of his detention had not been excessive. 36. The first applicant challenged that decision before the Supreme Court, reiterating his previous arguments. On 29 June 2012 the Supreme Court dismissed his appeal as ill-founded on the grounds that the public interest related to his remand in custody prevailed over his right to liberty. 37. The first applicant lodged a constitutional complaint before the Constitutional Court against the decision of the Supreme Court, arguing in particular that his continued detention was not based on relevant and sufficient reasons. 38. On 26 July 2012 the Constitutional Court dismissed the first applicant’s constitutional complaint, endorsing the reasoning of the Supreme Court. 39. On 27 August 2012 a three-judge panel of the Osijek County Court extended the first applicant’s detention under Article 102 § 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (gravity of charges), relying on its previous findings as to the gravity of the charges against him. 40. The first applicant appealed against that decision to the Supreme Court, invoking his state of health related to an injury to his right hip and challenging his continued pre-trial detention. 41. On the basis of medical documentation submitted by the first applicant, on 26 September 2012 the Supreme Court found that the relevant information concerning his health had not been known to the first-instance court when extending his detention; it thus remitted the case and ordered the first-instance court to examine the matter. 42. On 17 October 2012 a three-judge panel of the Osijek County Court, relying on an expert report which indicated that there was no imminent risk to the first applicant’s health or necessity for urgent surgery, extended the first applicant’s detention. 43. The first applicant appealed against that decision before the Supreme Court. On 15 November 2012 the Supreme Court dismissed his appeal as ill-founded on the grounds that the Osijek County Court had correctly established all the relevant circumstances of the case warranting the extension of his detention. 44. The first applicant challenged the decision of the Supreme Court before the Constitutional Court, arguing that his continued detention was no longer reasonable or justified. On 8 January 2013 the Constitutional Court dismissed his complaint as ill-founded, upholding the decision of the Supreme Court. 45. On 14 January 2013 a three-judge panel of the Osijek County Court extended the first applicant’s detention under Article 102 § 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (gravity of charges) on the grounds that, in the particular circumstances of the case at hand, there was nothing calling into question the necessity of his continued detention. 46. The first applicant appealed against that decision to the Supreme Court and on 30 January 2013 the Supreme Court dismissed his appeal as ill-founded. The Supreme Court held as follows: “It is therefore, in the view of this court, justified to remand the accused Vladimir Milanković in custody under Article 102 § 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure ... In view of the fact that the purpose of detention under the cited provision is to prevent persons whose actions provoke particular moral condemnation from being at large, the appeal arguments, according to which the decision of the first-instance court with regard to the necessity of detention lacks the relevant reasoning, cannot be accepted.” 47. The first applicant challenged that decision before the Constitutional Court. On 15 March 2013 the Constitutional Court dismissed his complaint, endorsing the findings of the Supreme Court. 48. On 28 March 2013 a three-judge panel of the Osijek County Court extended the first applicant’s detention under Article 102 § 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (gravity of charges), reiterating its previous arguments. 49. The first applicant challenged that decision before the Supreme Court. On 17 April 2013 the Supreme Court dismissed his appeal on the grounds that there was a persisting public interest warranting his detention. 50. On 14 June 2013 a three-judge panel of the Osijek County Court extended the first applicant’s detention under Article 102 § 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (gravity of charges), reiterating its findings as to the particular gravity of the charges against him. 51. The first applicant appealed against that decision to the Supreme Court and on 5 July 2013 the Supreme Court dismissed his appeal as ill-founded, endorsing the findings of the Osijek County Court. 52. The first applicant then lodged another constitutional complaint before the Constitutional Court, challenging his continued detention. On 26 August 2013 the Constitutional Court accepted his complaint and remitted the case to the Osijek County Court on the grounds that it had failed to indicate in sufficient detail the specific reasons warranting the first applicant’s continued detention. The Constitutional Court explained the relevant principles in the following manner: “Under Article 102 § 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure on the purpose and aim of detention, and bearing in mind the [Court’s] case-law, which the Constitutional Court accepts, detention on the grounds of ‘particularly grave circumstances’ of an offence ... cannot by itself serve as a purpose. The consequences of the fact that a criminal offence is particularly grave and that its social dangerousness and the ‘extent’ of society’s condemnation are expressed through the possibility of imposing a (long) sentence, are reflected both subjectively and objectively. A defendant facing serious charges and a possibility of incurring a long sentence inevitably has a subjective [incentive] to escape and/or to hinder the proper conduct of the proceedings and/or to reoffend. However, objectively ... there is a possibility of ‘disturbance of the public’, which requires additional care and protection of the public interest. ... ... Accordingly, the extension of detention under Article 102 § 2 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be grounded on a simple repetition of the description of the offence imputed [to a defendant] ... but requires an analysis and a detailed reasoning of all the facts and circumstances, particularly those related to the personality of the defendant, the public interest in his or her remand in custody, as well as the conduct and the results of the proceedings.” 53. On 2 September 2013 a three-judge panel of the Osijek County Court examined the specific circumstances of the case and extended the first applicant’s detention under Article 102 § 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (gravity of charges). The relevant part of the decision reads: “The release of the accused Vladimir Milanković in respect of whom there is a reasonable suspicion that he has committed the offences at issue, would create public disturbance, particularly amongst members of the Serbian minority, specifically those who were the victims of these offences in the area of Sisak. It should be borne in mind that this concerns not only Sisak, as a small community, but also the surrounding rural areas where the consequences of the war are still present and where the process of normalisation of mutual relations and peaceful coexistence of the citizens, irrespective of their ethnic background, is still ongoing. Thus, the release of the accused from detention would not only disturb the population [of this area] but would also diminish [citizens’] confidence in the judiciary and the social [order] as such. This is especially so given that the mission of the judiciary is not only prosecution, establishing of guilt and punishment of the perpetrators of criminal offences, but also the [creation of a sense] of justice and rule of law from the perspective of citizens.” 54. The first applicant appealed against that decision to the Supreme Court, challenging the extension of his detention. On 27 September 2013 the Supreme Court dismissed his appeal as ill-founded, endorsing the reasoning of the Osijek County Court. 55. The first applicant challenged the decision of the Supreme Court by lodging a constitutional complaint before the Constitutional Court. On 7 November 2013 the Constitutional Court dismissed the complaint as ill-founded. The relevant part of the decision reads: “... the Constitutional Court accepts the fact that the Supreme Court, in compliance with the decision ... of 26 August 2013, in the impugned decision provided reasons justifying the necessity of detention under Article 102 § 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the circumstances of the present case. In particular, the Supreme Court provided reasons showing that in view of the local circumstances in Sisak and the [Court’s] case-law relevant to the prevention of disturbance to public order (in the terminology of the Supreme Court: public disturbance), the appellant’s detention under Article 102 § 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was justified. ... ... For these reasons the Constitutional Court finds that the competent courts provided sufficient reasons for their decisions, as required by the decision of the Constitutional Court ... of 26 August 2013. ...” 56. On 26 November 2013 a three-judge panel of the Osijek County Court extended the first applicant’s detention under Article 102 § 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (gravity of charges), reiterating its previous arguments. 57. Following the first applicant’s conviction at first-instance on 9 December 2013 (see paragraph 15 above), he was remanded in custody pending a final judgment. 58. On 19 December 2011, following the filing of the indictment against the applicants in the Osijek County Court (see paragraph 11 above), a three-judge panel of that court extended the second applicant’s detention pending trial under Article 102 § 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure on the grounds of gravity of the charges (see paragraph 28 above). 59. The second applicant appealed against that decision to the Supreme Court, challenging the necessity of his detention and complaining of a lack of relevant and sufficient reasons for ordering it. On 13 January 2012 the Supreme Court dismissed his appeal, upholding the decision of the Osijek County Court (see paragraph 30 above). 60. On 9 March 2012 a three-judge panel of the Osijek County Court extended the second applicant’s detention under Article 102 § 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (gravity of charges), reiterating its previous arguments (see paragraph 33 above). 61. The second applicant challenged that decision before the Supreme Court. On 4 April 2012 the Supreme Court dismissed his appeal as ill-founded on the grounds that, in the particular circumstances of the case, his detention was not disproportionate or unjustified (see paragraph 34 above). 62. The second applicant lodged a constitutional complaint before the Constitutional Court against the decision of the Supreme Court, arguing that his continued detention was not justified. On 31 May 2012 the Constitutional Court dismissed his constitutional complaint as ill-founded on the grounds that the Osijek County Court and the Supreme Court had provided relevant and sufficient reasons for his continued detention. 63. On 4 June 2012 a three-judge panel of the Osijek County Court extended the second applicant’s detention under Article 102 § 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (gravity of charges). They relied on the particularly grave circumstances of the specific charges against him and found that the overall duration of his detention had not been excessive (see paragraph 35 above). 64. The second applicant challenged that decision before the Supreme Court. On 29 June 2012 the Supreme Court dismissed his appeal as ill-founded on the grounds that the public interest in his being remanded in custody prevailed over his right to liberty (see paragraph 36 above). 65. On 27 August 2012 a three-judge panel of the Osijek County Court extended the second applicant’s detention under Article 102 § 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (gravity of charges), relying on its previous findings as to the gravity of the charges against him (see paragraph 39 above). 66. The second applicant challenged that decision before the Supreme Court. On 26 September 2012 the Supreme Court dismissed his appeal as ill-founded, endorsing the decision of the Osijek County Court. 67. On 21 November 2012 a three-judge panel of the Osijek County Court extended the second applicant’s detention under Article 102 § 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (gravity of charges). The relevant part of the decision reads: “It is alleged in the confirmed indictment that there is a reasonable suspicion that the accused Drago Bošnjak, in the second half of August 1991, while defending the wider area of Sisak and Banovina from armed attacks carried out by paramilitary formations of part of the local Serbian population and the Yugoslav People’s Army, as a member of special police unit V. of the Sisak Police Department, together with several unidentified members of that unit, organised and led a group of unidentified members of the said unit with whom he carried out unlawful arrests, ill-treatment and the killing of persons of Serbian origin. Five members of the Vi. family as well as [a certain] N.T. were killed, while [N.T.’s] sons Z. and B. were taken to an improvised detention camp and beaten up, after which they disappeared. The alleged conduct of the accused, especially given the intensity and recurrence of the acts as well as the period in which they took place, was in itself particularly merciless and cruel. In the view of this court, the particularly grave circumstances of the offence surpass the usual circumstances and consequences of such offences and thus justify the detention under Article 102 § 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.” 68. The second applicant appealed against that decision to the Supreme Court, arguing that his detention was not justified. On 7 December 2012 the Supreme Court dismissed his appeal as ill-founded. The relevant part of the decision reads: “... the finding of the first-instance court that the grounds for the continued detention of the accused Drago Bošnjak under Article 102 § 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure still apply is correct. The confirmed indictment shows a relevant degree of reasonable suspicion that the accused committed the offence under Article 120 § 1 of the Criminal Code. Thus the general statutory condition under Article 102 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has been met. There is a reasonable suspicion that the accused, in the second half of August 1991, while defending the wider area of Sisak and Banovina from armed attacks carried out by paramilitary formations of part of the local Serbian population and the Yugoslav People’s Army, as a member of special police unit V. of the Sisak Police Department, together with several unidentified members of that unit, organised and led a group of unidentified members of the said unit with whom he carried out unlawful arrests, ill-treatment and the killing of persons of Serbian origin. Five members of the Vi. family as well as [a certain] N.T. were killed, while [N.T.’s] sons Z. and B. were taken to an improvised detention camp and beaten up, after which they disappeared. Contrary to the appeal arguments, the behaviour of the accused described above, particularly given the intensity and number of impugned acts and the period in which they took place, was in itself particularly merciless and cruel. In the view of this second-instance court, the particularly grave circumstances of the offence surpass the usual circumstances and consequences of such offences and thus justify the detention under Article 102 § 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The remaining appeal arguments concern the assessment of evidence and the proceedings and are not decisive for the decision on detention. They are a subject of discussion before the first-instance court. In addition, the detention of the accused Drago Bošnjak does not raise an issue under the principle of proportionality with regards to the gravity of the offence, the sentence which could be expected and the necessity of detention.” 69. The second applicant lodged a constitutional complaint against the decision of the Supreme Court, challenging the necessity of his detention. On 31 January 2013 the Constitutional Court dismissed it as ill-founded. The relevant part of the decision reads: “Bearing in mind all the circumstances of the present case enumerated in the impugned decisions, the fact that there is a reasonable suspicion that the appellant (in detention since 20 June 2011) ‘committed an offence under Article 120 § 1 of the Criminal Code by which a general statutory condition under Article 102 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure’ has been satisfied, and ‘in particular the intensity and recurrence of the impugned acts’, the Constitutional Court finds that, notwithstanding the presumption of the appellant’s innocence (and the fact that he has been in detention for nineteen months) the compelling public interest outweighs the accused’s right to liberty. Therefore, the Constitutional Court finds that the detention ‘with regard to the gravity of the offence and the sentence which could be expected’ is entirely proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, and that the impugned decision does not limit the rights or freedoms of the appellant contrary to [the Constitution].” 70. On 5 February 2013 a three-judge panel of the Osijek County Court extended the second applicant’s detention under Article 102 § 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (gravity of charges), reiterating its previous arguments. 71. The second applicant appealed to the Supreme Court, challenging the existence of relevant and sufficient reasons for his detention. On 27 February 2013 the Supreme Court dismissed his appeal as ill-founded, endorsing the reasoning of the Osijek County Court. 72. The second applicant challenged the decision of the Supreme Court by lodging a constitutional complaint before the Constitutional Court. On 18 April 2013 the Constitutional Court dismissed his complaint as ill-founded on the grounds that the lower courts, when extending his detention, had provided relevant and sufficient reasons. 73. On 26 April 2013 a three-judge panel of the Osijek County Court extended the second applicant’s detention under Article 102 § 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (gravity of charges), relying on its previous reasoning. 74. The second applicant appealed against that decision before the Supreme Court. On 17 May 2013 the Supreme Court dismissed his appeal as ill-founded, endorsing the reasoning of the Osijek County Court. 75. The second applicant challenged that decision before the Constitutional Court, arguing that his continued detention had been excessive and disproportionate. 76. On 11 July 2013 the Constitutional Court, having examined the second applicant’s constitutional complaint, remitted the case to the Osijek County Court on the grounds that the impugned decisions on detention lacked the relevant reasoning. The Constitutional Court reiterated its case-law relevant to the requirements for ordering and extending pre-trial detention on the grounds of gravity of the charges under Article 102 § 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 52 above). 77. On 17 July 2013 a three-judge panel of the Osijek County Court extended the second applicant’s detention under Article 102 § 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (gravity of charges), reiterating its previous findings concerning the specific circumstances of the offences with which the second applicant was charged. 78. The second applicant appealed against that decision to the Supreme Court. On 31 July 2013 the Supreme Court dismissed his appeal as ill-founded, pointing out the following: “It goes without saying that the release of a person, in respect of whom there is a reasonable suspicion that he has committed the impugned acts, would consequently create a public disturbance, in particular by the national minorities, amongst whom there are also family members of the victims of the conduct at issue, which took place during the war in the Sisak area. This is all the more so since [Sisak] is a small community which has been seriously affected by the war and where the long and difficult process of normalisation of mutual relations and peaceful coexistence is ongoing.” 79. The second applicant lodged a constitutional complaint before the Constitutional Court against the decision of the Supreme Court, challenging the reasonableness of his continued detention. 80. On 27 September 2013 the Constitutional Court dismissed the second applicant’s constitutional complaint, finding that his detention so far had been based on relevant and sufficient reasons. However, the Constitutional Court stressed: “In view of the findings [with regard to the possibility of ordering detention on the grounds of the gravity of the charges] and the length of the appellant’s continued detention, as well as the length of the criminal proceedings and the expected termination of the main hearing, and in view of the fact that the detention was ordered twenty years after the alleged commission of the offences with which the appellant has been charged, the Constitutional Court finds that the validity of the findings of the Supreme Court [with regard to the avoidance of public disturbance] has reached its temporal limits. In particular, every further reliance on the risk of public disturbance as a ground for extending the appellant’s detention could turn that ground for detention into a strong basis [for detention], which would mean in practice a constitutionally unacceptable and prohibited obligatory deprivation of liberty ... It therefore follows from the circumstances of the present case that a further extension of detention on the grounds of a risk of public disturbance could lead to a violation of the appellant’s constitutional right to liberty. It is time therefore for the competent court to [re]examine the justification for the appellant’s continued detention in view of this new fact.” 81. On 30 September 2013 a three-judge panel of the Osijek County Court extended the second applicant’s detention under Article 102 § 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (gravity of charges), reiterating that in view of the specific charges held against him, his release from detention could create a public disturbance. 82. The applicant appealed against that decision to the Supreme Court, arguing that his detention was no longer justified. On 25 October 2013 the Supreme Court dismissed his appeal as ill-founded, endorsing the reasoning of the Osijek County Court. 83. On 2 December 2013 a three-judge panel of the Osijek County Court, anticipating the pronouncement of the first-instance judgment acquitting the second applicant (see paragraph 15 above), ordered his immediate release from detention. The second applicant was released on 9 December 2013. 84. Meanwhile, the second applicant lodged a constitutional complaint before the Constitutional Court challenging the extension of his detention by the Osijek County Court on 30 September 2013, which had been upheld by the decision of the Supreme Court on 25 October 2013 (see paragraphs 81-82 above). 85. On 13 January 2014 the Constitutional Court found that the extension of the applicant’s detention from 30 September to 9 December 2013 (see paragraphs 81-82 above) had violated his right to liberty under Article 22 of the Constitution. The relevant part of the decision reads: “... in the impugned decisions [the Osijek County Court and the Supreme Court] failed to cite any new reason satisfying the Constitutional Court that the temporal limits [for detention based on the necessity to prevent public disturbance] had not been attained, but they nevertheless extended the appellants detention. Moreover, seventy days after the first-instance court had extended the appellant’s detention by means of the impugned decision, and forty-five days following the confirmation of the lawfulness of such decision by the Supreme Court, the competent criminal court terminated the criminal proceedings against the appellant at first instance, acquitting him. Thus in the appellant’s case what the Constitutional Court indicated in its decision ... of 27 September 2013 was confirmed: that ‘every further reliance on the risk of public disturbance as a ground for extending the appellant’s detention could ... turn that ground for detention into a strong basis [for detention], which would mean in practice a constitutionally unacceptable and prohibited obligatory deprivation of liberty’. The Constitutional Court does not find such conduct by the competent courts acceptable since the liberty of a person is an essential value protected by the Constitution. ... It follows that for the period of validity of the impugned decisions of the Osijek County Court and the Supreme Court (between 30 September 2013 and 9 December 2013) the appellant’s right to liberty, guaranteed under Article 22 of the Constitution, has been violated. Lastly, the Constitutional Court should also point out that there has been a flagrant violation of the appellant’s constitutional right to liberty in the period between 2 December 2013 and 9 December 2013. ... The Constitutional Court finds that from the perspective of the appellant’s constitutional right to liberty it is irrelevant that the [Osijek County Court] in its decision of 2 December 2013 to terminate the detention referred to the (forthcoming) judgment of 9 December 2013 by which the appellant was acquitted. From the perspective of the appellant’s right to liberty, it is exclusively relevant that in the operative part of the decision of 2 December 2013 [the Osijek County Court] ordered that the appellant should be ‘immediately released’, but that the court order was not executed until seven days later. ... In these circumstances the seven days of the appellant’s detention (between 2 and 9 December 2013) should a priori be considered as a flagrant violation of his right to liberty, guaranteed under Article 22 of the Constitution.” 86. In October 2014, after he had been finally acquitted, the applicant instituted the friendly settlement procedure with the State concerning the compensation for his unjustified detention. Following an unsuccessful arrangement with the Ministry of Justice (Ministarstvo pravosuđa) over the amount of compensation, the applicant lodged a civil action for damages in the Osijek Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Osijeku). On 15 October 2015, on the basis of the State’s partial admission of the claim, the Osijek Municipal Court adopted a partial judgment and awarded him 108,900 Croatian kunas (HRK; approximately 14,300 euros) in non-pecuniary damage plus the applicable statutory interest. This partial judgment became final on 5 November 2015, and the Osijek Municipal Court commissioned an expert report in order to determine the possible extent of the State’s responsibility for the applicant’s suffering in detention. These proceedings are still pending.

4. The applicants in the present cases are Russian nationals. Their names, years of birth and places of residence are tabulated below. 5. The applicants sued different municipal companies, referred to in the Appendix as the “debtor companies”, in various unrelated sets of the court proceedings. 6. The companies were incorporated as municipal unitary enterprises set up by decisions of local administrations and provided services tabulated below in the respective municipal districts in several regions of Russia. The companies had “the right of economic control” (право хозяйственного ведения) over the assets allocated to them by the administrations in order to carry out their statutory activities. 7. On the dates tabulated below by decisions of the local authorities some of the assets allocated to the companies were transferred back to the administration. 8. At a later point insolvency proceedings were opened in respect of the debtor companies. As a result, the companies were subsequently liquidated. The dates on which the insolvency started and ended are tabulated below. 9. On the dates tabulated below domestic courts by separate judgments made pecuniary awards in the applicants’ favour, to be paid by the debtor companies. Particulars of each judgment are summarised in the appended table. 10. On the dates listed in the Appendix the awards became enforceable. 11. The final judicial decisions in the applicants’ favour have remained unenforced due to companies’ insolvency and subsequent liquidation. Several applicants’ subsequent court actions against authorities, including subsidiary liability claim, legal succession proceedings or claims for damages against the respective local administrations, as well as repetitive complaints to the bailiffs’ service or the prosecutor’s office in connection with pending criminal proceedings brought in 2006-07 with regard to the company’s insolvency (applications nos. 20018/07, 10313/08, 36611/08, 56499/09, 42111/10, 43017/10, and 61212/10) proved futile. 12. On 20 November 2009 the applicant in application no. 10313/08 died. On 1 November 2010, his widow, Anishchenko Raisa Yakovlevna, expressed her willing to participate in the proceedings before the Court in her late husband’s stand.

5. The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Cheboksary. He is a former head of the civil law department in the Cheboksary State University. 6. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7. On 28 February 2004 baby V. was born. One month later her mother, H., sued the applicant to establish his paternity and to receive alimony. A genetic study confirmed the applicant’s paternity in respect of V.; however, a medical study concluded that the pregnancy “could not have occurred naturally”. 8. On 7 December 2004 the Moskovskiy District Court in Cheboksary held a hearing with the participation of the applicant and Ms H. and rejected her claim. On 31 January 2005 the Supreme Court of the Chuvashiya Republic quashed the District Court’s judgment and remitted the matter for a new examination. 9. On 17 October 2005 the District Court gave judgment in favour of H. It was quashed on appeal by the Supreme Court on 14 December 2005 in particular on the ground that the parties had not been informed of the date and place of the hearing in which genetics experts had been cross-examined. 10. In March 2007 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of large-scale bribery. He was detained in remand prison IZ-21/1 in Cheboksary. 11. On 15 March 2007 the District Court sent a letter of request (судебное поручение) to the director of the remand prison, asking him to clarify the applicant’s position on the merits of the dispute and to ascertain whether he agreed to having the matter examined in his absence or wished to appoint a representative. On 20 March the director interviewed the applicant who declared his wish to take part in the proceedings and to defend himself in person. The applicant also claimed that he possessed new evidence he wished to submit to the court. On 26 March the District Court refused the applicant leave to be present at the hearings on the ground that the Code of Civil Procedure made no provision for bringing detainees to courts. 12. On 4 April 2007 the District Court held the hearing in the presence of Ms H., as well as Mr K. and Ms U. who represented the applicant. The judgment of the same date was given in Ms H.’s favour. It mentioned that the applicant was held in a remand prison, that he did not recognise the paternity and that he had “previously given similar testimony before the court”. 13. On 16 May 2007 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant’s appeal. It held that the applicant’s absence from the hearing did not entail a violation of his rights because he had been represented and had previously given testimony to the court. 14. On 9 June 2007 the applicant was released on bail. 15. On 27 March 2008 the Moskovskiy District Court decided that he had breached the terms of the bail by exercising pressure on witnesses, issued a detention order and put the applicant’s name on the list of fugitives from justice. The applicant was not present at the hearing and could not be immediately re-arrested. 16. At about 11 p.m. on 8 April 2008 three police officers showed up at the entrance of the applicant’s residence. They had been allegedly tipped off that the applicant was there. As it happened, the applicant received in-patient treatment at the infections centre but his daughter was inside. 17. She did not open the door to the police immediately and told them that her father was in a hospital. According to her, the police began banging at the door and threatened her to break in. She was thus compelled to open the door. The police entered the flat, inspected all the rooms, opened closets and boxes, lifted the sofa and bed, and then left. 18. On the following day the applicant was arrested and placed in custody. 19. On 24 April 2008 the Supreme Court found that the detention order of 27 March 2008 was not justified. In its view, the District Court had wrongly attached decisive weight to the statements by witnesses who had not mentioned any actual threats emanating from the applicant. The Supreme Court quashed the detention order and released the applicant. 20. The applicant complained to a prosecutor about the unlawful actions of the police on 8 April 2008. On 16 May 2009 the prosecutor refused to institute criminal proceedings, finding that no criminal offence had been committed. 21. The applicant then sued the Ministry of Finance for compensation in respect of an unauthorised search of his home carried out by the police. The District Court heard a number of witnesses. The applicant’s daughter insisted that the police officers’ presence in the flat had lasted as long as two and a half hours. The officer K. testified that he had entered the flat with the consent of the applicant’s daughter and that he had stayed inside no longer than two or three minutes. He had not searched the flat or opened closets. S., a relative who was present at the scene, stated that the police had entered the flat with the daughter’s consent, that they had “moved beds, looked under the carpets, displaced closets and paintings, gone into the basement”. 22. By judgment of 29 October 2009, the Leninskiy District Court rejected the applicant’s claim. Citing section 11 of the Police Act and section 8 of the Operational-Search Activities Act, the District Court held that the officers had acted lawfully, on the basis of the detention order of 27 March 2008, and that they had the right to enter the applicant’s flat because they had information that he might have been at home. Since the Russian law only established the right to compensation in case of unlawful actions, the applicant’s claim was dismissed. 23. On 9 December 2009 the Supreme Court upheld the District Court’s judgment on appeal. 24. On 17 April 2009 the Moskovskiy District Court found the applicant guilty of forcing students to pay bribes into the account of his law firm in exchange of passing grades and gave him a custodial sentence. On 2 July 2009 the Supreme Court upheld the conviction on appeal. 25. The applicant sued the Ministry of Finance for compensation in connection of his unlawful detention from 9 to 24 April 2008. 26. By judgment of 27 November 2009, the Leninskiy District Court rejected his claim, noting that the applicant had been ultimately convicted in the criminal proceedings and given a custodial sentence and that the Supreme Court had quashed the detention order as being “unjustified” rather than “unlawful”. In the latter case, no compensation was payable. 27. On 11 January 2010 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant’s appeal.

5. The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Călărași. 6. On 26 October 2005 the applicant and her daughter drank water from taps in their apartment and shortly thereafter they felt unwell. On 29 October 2005 the applicant’s daughter, who was twelve at the time, was admitted to hospital with a diagnosis of “serious acute dysentery”. The applicant was admitted to hospital with the same diagnosis on 31 October 2005. She was released from hospital on 13 November 2005, a day later than her daughter. 7. The applicant lodged a court action against the local utilities provider (“the provider”), a State-owned company, claiming 100,000 Moldovan lei (“MDL”, approximately 6,700 euros (EUR) at the time) in compensation for the harm caused to her health and for the related inconveniences, including subsequent investigations and disinfection. 8. On 1 March 2006 the Călăraşi District Court found in her favour. It found that various sanitary, medical and technical reports had established that in the vicinity of the applicant’s apartment block the sewage pipe was situated above the drinking water pipe and was leaking. The water pipe had cracked on 26 October 2005 and sewage water had infiltrated the drinking water pipe. The court also established that the pipes had been used since 1977 and that their expected lifespan was fifteen years. A total of five people, all of whom had drunk water from taps connected to the same water pipe, had been admitted to hospital with the same diagnosis at approximately the same time as the applicant. Taking into consideration such elements as the amount of physical and mental suffering caused to the applicant and her daughter, the court awarded her MDL 10,000 (approximately EUR 648 at the time). 9. The parties appealed. On 26 April 2006 the Chişinău Court of Appeal rejected the applicant’s appeal and partly accepted the provider’s appeal. It reduced the award to MDL 5,000 (EUR 310) because it found exaggerated “both the sum claimed by [the applicant] and that awarded to [her]”. 10. The parties appealed. On 25 October 2006 the Supreme Court of Justice upheld the judgment of 26 April 2006. It found that the lower court had taken into consideration the nature and seriousness of the mental suffering caused to the applicant, as well as the degree of guilt of the defendant. That judgment was final.

5. The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Chelyabinsk. 6. In 1971 a local factory, which was the owner of a block of flats, assigned the flat at 125-56 Ulitsa Kommuny, Chelyabinsk, to P. under a social housing agreement. In 1992 the title to the building was transferred to Chelyabinsk Municipality. P. resided in the flat as a tenant until his death on 3 December 2010. 7. Following P.’s death, Chelyabinsk Municipality started the process for registering the flat as vacant in order to assign it to another person eligible for social housing. However, it turned out that, according to the documents, the flat was no longer municipal property and that it belonged to L. The federal registration service sent the relevant data to the head of the municipality’s administration on 16 February 2011. The head of the administration asked the regional prosecutor to look into the situation with the flat. 8. The prosecutor established that the flat had been subject to a number of transactions. According to the relevant documents, on 9 November 1992 the factory had signed a privatisation agreement to transfer the flat to Kh. On 3 December 1992 the transaction was registered by the registration service. On 25 January 2011 Kh. sold the flat to L., who sold it on 21 April 2011 to Ya. Those transactions were also registered by the registration service. 9. A police investigator questioned Kh., who denied having anything to do with the flat. As regards his passport details indicated in the privatisation agreement, he explained that in 2009 and 2010 he had lost his passport twice and that he had never met P. or L. The police further established that L., who was serving in the army at the time, had also lost his passport in 2009. 10. On 31 March 2011 the prosecutor responded to the head of the administration advising him as follows: “It appears that the persons who were parties to the transactions with the flat committed a crime in this respect. Accordingly the materials have been forwarded to the [police] for further inquiry ... . [The police] will inform you of the results of the inquiry ... . Furthermore, in order to prevent further transactions with the flat, I have asked the Chief State Registrar to refuse state registration of any future transactions with the flat.” 11. On an unspecified date the police opened a criminal investigation into the transactions involving the flat. 12. On 22 June 2011 Ya. sold the flat to the applicant. 13. On 30 June 2011, acting on behalf of the municipality, the prosecutor brought an action against Kh., L. and Ya. to seek repossession of the flat and the annulment of all transactions executed in respect of it. The prosecutor argued that Kh., had never resided in the flat and that the flat had never been transferred to him from the municipality under a privatisation scheme. The prosecutor asked the court to invalidate the privatisation agreement of 9 November 1992 and subsequent transactions in respect of the flat as having no basis in law. The Tsentralniy District Court of Chelyabinsk fixed a hearing for 1 September 2011. 14. On 6 July 2011 the registration service issued a certificate confirming the purchase of the flat by the applicant and her title to it. 15. On 16 September 2011 the District Court granted the applicant’s request and allowed her to take part in the proceedings initiated by the prosecutor. She claimed that she had bought the flat in good faith and that the municipality could not recover it from her. 16. On 5 October 2011 the District Court issued an injunction against the registration of any transactions involving the flat. 17. On 23 December 2011 the Tsentralniy District Court of Chelyabinsk granted the prosecutor’s claims brought on behalf of the municipality. The applicant’s title to the flat was annulled and transferred to the municipality. The court also ordered the applicant’s eviction. Lastly, it ruled that Ya. should return to the applicant the sum she had paid for the flat. The court reasoned as follows: “Pursuant to Article 302 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, if a property has been purchased from a person who had no right to sell it, and the purchaser is unaware and could not have been aware [of that fact] (the bona fide purchaser), the owner shall have the right to reclaim that property from the purchaser, if the said property was lost by the owner or by the person into whose possession the owner has conveyed the property, or if it was stolen from either of them, or if it left their possession against their will in another way. It has been established in the course of the proceedings that the flat in question left the municipality’s possession against the latter’s will. Accordingly, the flat ... should be recovered from [the applicant] and transferred to the municipality.” 18. On 5 March 2012 the Chelyabinsk Regional Court upheld the judgment of 23 December 2011 on appeal. The court also noted that the applicant could not be recognised as a bona fide purchaser given that she had known that the flat had been resold three times within five months. 19. On 13 December 2013 Ya. died. The part of the judgment of 23 December 2011 concerning the monetary award in the applicant’s favour remains unenforced. 20. According to the Government, the applicant has not been evicted and continues to reside in the flat. 21. On an unspecified date the applicant brought an action against the State, alleging that the local authorities’ inaction had resulted in her buying a flat from a person who had no right to sell it to her. 22. On 19 December 2013 the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow dismissed the applicant’s claims. 23. On 16 June 2014 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment of 19 December 2013 on appeal.

6. The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Tolyatti. The applicant is the widow of Mr Vitaliy Sergeyevich Postnov. 7. On 5 December 2000 the Leninskiy District Court of Ulyanovsk (“the District Court”) ordered the Administration of the Ulyanovsk Region to pay Mr Postnov 228,000 Russian roubles (RUB) in reimbursement of costs for purchase of housing. The amount was to be paid from the federal budget funds allocated for housing of the military servicemen. The District Court further awarded Mr Postnov RUB 810, the cost of the expert examination. 8. On 15 December 2000 the decision of the District Court came into force. 9. In January 2001 Mr Postnov obtained two writs of execution and forwarded them to the bailiffs’ service in Ulyanovsk. 10. On 26 April 2002 Mr Postnov passed away. 11. On 16 June 2003 the applicant joined the enforcement proceedings in her late husband’s stead, pursuant to a domestic court’s decision. 12. In 2003 the applicant and the bailiff in charge of the enforcement proceedings applied for changing the method of execution of the judgment of 5 December 2000. They argued that as the Administration of the Ulyanovsk Region had no authority to administer the federal budget funds, the judgment could not be enforced as prescribed in its operative part. 13. On 25 November 2003 the District Court refused the application for changing the method of execution. 14. On 22 December 2004 the writ of execution in respect of RUB 228,000 was returned to the applicant from the bailiffs’ service without enforcement. 15. On 30 January 2005 the judgment of the District Court in the part concerning RUB 810 was enforced. 16. On 13 November 2003, 13 July 2004, and 20 May 2005 the District Court index-linked the amount due to the applicant under the judgment of 5 December 2000, and awarded her RUB 169,846.46, RUB 17,401.28, and RUB 36,517.69 respectively. These amounts were to be paid from the federal budget funds allocated for housing of the military servicemen. The decisions came into force. 17. In June 2005 the applicant obtained the writs of execution in respect of the three above decisions, and a new writ of execution in respect of the judgment of 5 December 2000 due to the change of the creditor in the enforcement proceedings (see paragraphs 10 and 11 above). 18. On 31 May 2006 the applicant submitted all the writs of execution to the bailiffs’ service. 19. On 2 June 2006 the bailiffs initiated the execution proceedings. On 6 June 2006 the proceedings were terminated. The writs of execution were returned to the applicant as the compulsory enforcement of the judicial decisions in question was impossible. 20. In 2005-2006 the applicant submitted the enforcement documents to the Ministry of Finance of Russia and the Federal Treasury Department for the Ulyanovsk Region. Each time the writs of execution were returned to the applicant without enforcement.

5. The applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Cluj‑Napoca. 6. The applicant is the son and heir of Mr C. Pleş. He replaced his father in the domestic proceedings after his death. 7. The applicant’s father was shot on 21 December 1989 while participating in a demonstration organised in Cluj against N. Ceauşescu. He was immediately hospitalised and diagnosed with “a gunshot wound in the right side of the chest, rupture of the right lung and fracture of ribs seven and eight, plus a gunshot wound in the right arm”. Following surgery, two lobes of his right lung were removed. He was left with a breathing deficit of over 30%, paresis of his right arm, and a permanent disability that prevented him from continuing to work to support his family. Furthermore, in subsequent years he was hospitalised many times because of serious breathing problems. 8. Criminal proceedings were instituted against the army commanders who had ordered the shooting of demonstrators during the events of December 1989 in Cluj. Many victims of the repression joined civil complaints to the proceedings, requesting compensation for pecuniary and non‑pecuniary damage. The applicant’s father lodged one such civil complaint, requesting 150,000,000 Romanian lei (ROL) (approximately 4,100 euros (EUR)) in respect of pecuniary damage, ROL 500,000,000 (approximately EUR 14,000) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, and ROL 50,000,000 (about 1,400 euros) for costs and expenses incurred during the trial. 9. On 17 May 2004 the applicant’s father died. He was replaced as a civil party in the proceedings by the applicant. 10. By a judgment of 23 May 2005 the High Court of Cassation and Justice, acting as a first-instance court, convicted five of the officers involved in the events of December 1989 in Cluj. They were ordered to pay compensation jointly with the Ministry of National Defence to all eighty‑four civil parties in the case. The court granted the applicant ROL 150,000,000 in respect of pecuniary damage and ROL 50,000,000 for costs and expenses. It omitted to grant the claim for ROL 500,000,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, without providing any reason. 11. Eighteen civil parties to the criminal proceedings, including the applicant, lodged an appeal on points of law, complaining about the way in which the first-instance court had examined their claims for damages. The grounds of appeal of the civil parties were not identical. In most of the cases they concerned the amount of damages awarded. The applicant complained that the first-instance court had not granted him the requested compensation for non-pecuniary damage. 12. By a decision of 20 March 2006, a panel of nine judges of the High Court of Cassation and Justice dismissed all the appeals lodged by the civil parties. The court of last resort referred to the general provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Civil Code concerning compensation for damages in the context of civil actions joined to criminal proceedings (see paragraph 13 below) and without examining in particular any of the civil parties’ appeals, it dismissed all the appeals as ill‑founded.

4. The applicant was born in 1945 and is currently detained in HMP Long Lartin. 5. Between 16 May and 13 July 2005 the applicant was tried before a judge and jury in the Crown Court at Snaresbrook for various offences relating to an attempt, together with other unknown persons, to import cocaine worth GBP 35 million into the United Kingdom from Guyana via ports in the Netherlands and Belgium. 6. Pursuant to Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service policy, notes of recordings of trials are destroyed after five years. Although the present application was lodged with the Court in 2007, consideration of the applicant’s complaints was adjourned pending judgment in Al-Khawaja and Tahery v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 26766/05 and 22228/06, ECHR 2011. Consequently, by the date the United Kingdom Government received notice of the application, transcripts of the applicant’s criminal trial had for the most part been destroyed. 7. However, from the information available, the circumstances of the trial which give rise to the present application may be summarised as follows. 8. On the 21 June 2004 a ship called the “Lee Frances” entered the port of Rotterdam. Part of the cargo was a single container which contained palletised drums of molasses from Georgetown, Guyana. The following day the container was searched by customs officials and certain drums – purportedly containing molasses – were found to contain 700 kg of high purity cocaine worth GBP 35 million. The officials refilled the drums with dummy contents and the ship continued to Antwerp where the container was offloaded. The applicant was arrested and interviewed on 29 June 2004, shortly after contacting HM Revenue and Customs to make enquiries about the container. He was charged, inter alia, with assisting in the commission outside the United Kingdom of an offence punishable under the law of Guyana (the export of drugs from that country), contrary to section 20 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, and with the attempted importation of drugs to the United Kingdom. 9. There were allegations that the applicant had been involved in “jury fixing” in a previous, unrelated trial. Therefore, before the trial the prosecution applied to the court for the following security measures:  the assignment of a security team to chaperone the jury at all times;  the identification of the jury by number and not by name;  the verification by police of the identity of anyone wishing to enter the courtroom’s public gallery;  the search of members of the public entering the building;  the retention of all visitors’ mobile telephones during the trial;  the erection of protective screens to shield the jury and the applicant from the public gallery; and  the covering of the glass panels in the doors to the court room to prevent people seeing into the room. 10. The defence were informed of the application and given the opportunity to oppose it. They initially did so on the basis that the protective screens, taken together with the other security measures, would lend a sinister feel to proceedings which would be likely to prejudice the applicant in the eyes of the jury. However, at the conclusion of argument the defence indicated that they were prepared to withdraw their objections provided that the whole of the public gallery was covered rather than just part of it, as had been originally suggested. The trial judge therefore made the order requested. 11. The defence subsequently attempted to withdraw that concession on the basis that the physical appearance of the screens was more imposing than had been anticipated. They again suggested that the whole trial could be heard in camera but this proposal was rejected by the trial judge, who did not consider that the screens could in any way impinge upon the fairness of the trial. 12. It was accepted by the prosecution and the defence that the main issue in the case was whether or not the applicant had intended to import drugs into the United Kingdom. 13. It was the prosecution’s case that the applicant had purchased the cocaine in Guyana under the assumed name of “David Keen”, the manager of a company called Premier Molasses, and that he had intended to import the cocaine into the United Kingdom. The shipment containing the cocaine had been the last of four shipments procured by Premier Molasses from Guyana. The previous three shipments had been delivered via Antwerp to various locations in the United Kingdom, including to an address belonging to an acquaintance of the applicant. There was evidence of telephone calls between the applicant and his acquaintance, which coincided with the deliveries, as well as payments by the acquaintance to the applicant’s account in Guyana. It was suggested by the prosecution that the previous three shipments had been practice runs for the fourth shipment, which contained the cocaine. Although there was one witness in Guyana who stated that the drums containing the cocaine were to be offloaded in Antwerp and transported to the Netherlands (see paragraph 31 below), the prosecution argued that this had been an attempt by the applicant to set up a defence should he be caught. 14. VO, who was based in Antwerp, was the customs broker for Premier Molasses’ shipping agents. 15. VO was responsible for issuing each shipment with an agricultural import licence to confirm that the shipment complied with European Union quotas. He was also responsible for guaranteeing the payment of duty on each shipment. 16. He made three separate statements between 30 June 2004 and 20 January 2005. He also supplied the prosecuting authorities with the original files relating to all four shipments from Guyana. This included all documents relating to the first three shipments, for which he had arranged carriage to the United Kingdom, and correspondence from David Keen asking him to arrange transport for the fourth shipment to the United Kingdom. 17. Having provided the statements and documentary evidence, VO refused to give live evidence at the applicant’s trial. VO’s explanation for refusing to attend court was recounted in the evidence of DH, a United Kingdom customs official who had been present when VO was interviewed in Belgium. According to DH (who gave evidence at trial), VO believed that, in accordance with Belgian practice, having spoken to investigators on three separate occasions, he had done enough. 18. The prosecution made several attempts to convince VO to appear as a witness before the trial began. In particular, they wrote to him emphasising the importance of his evidence, making it clear that all expenses would be met and inconvenience kept to a minimum, and informing him that if he did not attend his previous assistance might be wasted. They also tried to reach him through his employer but were told that he was on leave and could not be contacted. 19. Despite knowing of VO’s reluctance to attend for several months before the trial, the prosecution opened their case referring to his evidence. Two weeks into the trial, when it became clear that VO would not testify, the trial judge directed the prosecution to contact him again. In a letter to VO, the prosecution offered various options to him, including giving evidence via live video link from his home in Belgium. Meanwhile, the defence also wrote to him seeking clarification on apparent inconsistencies in his account. All of these efforts were ignored. 20. Leave was then given for VO’s statements to be read to the jury pursuant to section 116 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. 21. When interviewed, VO provided information about the logistical arrangements for the routing of the fourth shipment to the United Kingdom. He stated that: “It was clear for [sic] all the files that the destination of the load was England. Premier Molasses had already applied for an import licence for the United Kingdom for the job relating to the container and sent it to us. The transport operation ultimately did not take place because I did not receive an original bill of lading; that meant it was physically impossible for me to take delivery of the container.” 22. He also gave evidence of his previous dealings with “David Keen”. He explained that, whilst they had never met in person, he and Mr Keen had done business in May and October 2003, at the time of the importation of two of the earlier three shipments, both of which had been destined for the United Kingdom. 23. VO’s statements referred to a telephone call he had received from a woman at Premier Molasses, who told him that the contents of the container were not to be imported to the United Kingdom but instead sold to a Dutch company. He had asked her for written instructions and details of the Dutch firm, but none was ever given. 24. A United Kingdom customs officer, BT, referred in his evidence at trial to a conversation between the Belgian shipping agents and a woman from Premier Molasses who he believed was called “N”. This would appear to be the same telephone call referred to by VO (see paragraph 23 above). However, in one of his statements VO indicated that he did not know of anyone called “N” in connection with the case. 25. The applicant claimed that BT could only have obtained this information by the interception of the telephone call. He further claimed that, as a consequence, the “discrepancy” between the evidence of BT and VO could not be further investigated as the prosecution indicated that there was a danger that the prohibition on the disclosure of intercept evidence (including telephone intercept evidence) might be compromised (see sections 17 and 18 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (“RIPA”) at paragraphs 55-56 below). However, the Government have submitted a transcript of BT’s evidence which demonstrates that the prosecution did not object to any question based on the prohibitions in RIPA. 26. One month prior to BT giving evidence a discussion had taken place between the trial judge and counsel in the absence of the jury. The discussion touched on issues of intercept evidence and on the “N” call. In the course of the discussion, the defence argued that, since they could not seek disclosure of intercept evidence, when any such issue arose the prosecution should be obliged to satisfy themselves that there was nothing in the material to which they had or could have access which would either undermine their case or assist the defence case. The prosecution neither confirmed nor denied that any interception had taken place, or that they had or had not sought any intercept material. However, they confirmed that they had revisited their duty of disclosure and had nothing further to add. The trial judge subsequently declined to make any ruling on the issue. 27. The prosecution led evidence that “David Keen” was a false identity assumed by the applicant in the context of business carried out on behalf of Premier Molasses. In particular, they submitted evidence from the Home Office that there was no record of any person by that name. There were also three witnesses from Guyana who identified the applicant as David Keen and faxes in the name of David Keen sent from the applicant’s address. 28. The prosecution relied on various pieces of logistical evidence which supported their contention that, as with the previous three shipments, the true destination of the fourth shipment was the United Kingdom. This included details of bank transactions, the issuing of shipping licences and other similar communications between Premier Molasses and VO, and the fact that David Keen had pushed for early delivery of the shipment to the United Kingdom. The paperwork relating to the fourth shipment was consistent with that relating to the previous three shipments. 29. Finally, the prosecution invited the jury to draw adverse inferences as to the applicant’s guilt based on his failure to disclose facts material to his defence when first interviewed. These “material facts” included his apparent belief that he was importing cannabis into the Netherlands and his allegation that VO was a party to the conspiracy (see paragraph 30 below). 30. The applicant’s initial defence was that he believed that he was arranging a shipment of sugar but had been duped by business associates into arranging the importation of drugs. However, during the trial it came to light that he was fabricating evidence to concoct this defence. Consequently, the applicant admitted that this defence was untrue. Thereafter, he advanced a new defence, which was that he had been involved in a conspiracy to traffic cannabis from Guyana to the Netherlands (via Antwerp) and that VO had been party to this conspiracy. He continued to deny the main count on the indictment, which concerned the attempted importation of drugs to the United Kingdom. However, on 23 June 2005 he pleaded guilty to the separate offence under section 20 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 (see paragraph 8 above). 31. The applicant relied heavily on the evidence of one of the shipping agents in Guyana, AA, who recalled a conversation in which the applicant told him that the drums which were later found to contain drugs were to be unloaded at Antwerp. 32. The applicant accepted that import licences for the fourth shipment had been made out for the United Kingdom but claimed that this had been a mistake by customs. Those licences had been returned by Premier Molasses using registered delivery and replaced with the appropriate licences for the Netherlands. 33. The trial judge’s summing-up contained the following directions to the jury. 34. On the measures taken to ensure the safety of the jury, the trial judge said: “Let me remind you of what I said at the beginning of the case about the special security measures taken during the trial. These precautions exist to protect both you, you the jury, and the defendant from any outside interference. Perhaps, as I said at an early stage when we started, it may be that I am being overly cautious, but make no mistake about it at all, none of these measures are to be regarded as any reflection whatsoever on the defendant and they are entirely irrelevant to the issue as to whether he is ‘guilty’ or ‘not guilty’ and we all know that something can appear sinister, which on investigation turns out to be completely innocent. We had, perhaps, an example of it during the case, when someone feared that their spouse was being followed, the matter was fully investigated and although rightly reported to me, it was, in fact, completely innocent. It just demonstrates how careful we must be and assumptions can often be wrong.” 35. In relation to the reading of VO’s statements, the trial judge directed the jury: “[A]s you know the general rule in the courts is that unless evidence is agreed it has to be given orally from the witness box, unless there is an admission, or there is an agreement on both sides. Well there is no agreement as to the accuracy of what [VO] says. On the contrary, the prosecution have been allowed to adduce the evidence; the defence do not accept a word of it - they say that he is on it and that he has acted in a thoroughly dishonest way.” 36. He then considered the practical difficulties that arose in relation to VO’s evidence: “[A]s he did not come to court, his evidence does have certain limitations and I want to draw them to your attention. First of all, when someone’s statement is read out, you do not have the opportunity of seeing him in the witness-box, seeing him in the flesh and sometimes when you do see a witness in the flesh you do get a much clearer idea of whether that evidence is honest and accurate. Secondly, his evidence has not been tested by the defence under cross-examination and, therefore, you have not had the opportunity of seeing how the evidence survived that form of challenge or test. So you must, therefore, consider the evidence of [VO] in the light of those limitations and you should only act upon it if, having taken those matters into account, you are, nevertheless, sure that it is reliable.” 37. The trial judge gave a similar warning as to the limitations of VO’s evidence in the absence of cross-examination just before he summarised VO’s evidence. 38. After this, and having reviewed the efforts made to oblige VO to attend court, the trial judge stated: “What I seek to emphasise, in fairness to the defendant is that when you assess the evidence of [VO], you look at all the circumstances, throw it all into the melting pot, all the warnings that I have given you, take it all into account and then decide the weight you can properly attach to it; it is a matter for you.” 39. Whilst they were considering their verdict, the jury asked for – but was refused – copies of the transcripts of VO’s statements. Instead, the trial judge re-read the relevant part of his summing-up summarising those statements. Having done so, he also reminded the jury of the criticism which had been made of the statements by the defence and of his previous warnings to them. 40. The applicant was convicted unanimously by the jury on 13 July 2005. He appealed against his conviction to the Court of Appeal. 41. The application for leave to appeal was initially considered and rejected by a single judge of the Court of Appeal. 42. The applicant then renewed his application to the full court, which dismissed the appeal on 20 February 2007. 43. There were four grounds of appeal before the Court of Appeal which are relevant to the present application. 44. First, it was argued that the admission of VO’s statements had violated Article 6 of the Convention and, in particular, that the trial judge would never have allowed the statements to be read had he been aware that BT’s evidence regarding the “N” telephone call would cast doubt on VO’s reliability. 45. Secondly, the applicant argued that the prosecution had failed to comply with their duty of disclosure under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 in respect of the telephone conversation involving VO and “N”, since this had been important exculpatory evidence. 46. Thirdly, the applicant maintained that either evidence of the interception of the telephone conversation should have been disclosed to the trial judge or the trial should have been abandoned. 47. Fourthly, again relying on Article 6 of the Convention, the applicant argued that the security measures in place to protect the jury had violated his right to a fair trial. In support of this fourth ground, he relied on a witness statement prepared by a journalist who had tried to cover the trial. In the statement the journalist indicated that when she first tried to enter the courtroom, she was told by a court official that the trial had finished. However, after remonstrating with the official she was allowed to enter. Once inside, the proceedings were inaudible on account of the screens sealing the public gallery. When she asked if anyone else had complained about the arrangements, she was told that she was the first person to try to attend the trial. Furthermore, she had been told that she could not report anything because there were reporting restrictions in place. Finally, the journalist stated that although she had attended major criminal trials throughout the United Kingdom, she had never encountered such measures, and she considered that as a result the applicant’s trial was to all intents and purposes a secret trial. 48. In respect of VO’s non-attendance at trial, the Court of Appeal acknowledged that the prosecution’s failure to mention this fact until late in the proceedings was a cause for concern. However, it considered that the dispute over whether VO knew “N” was a “very slender foundation indeed” for any suggestion that his evidence was so unreliable that it ought not to have been allowed to be read. 49. The court also noted the advantages that the applicant had obtained through VO’s absence: “It meant that, in so far as he [VO] gave evidence inconsistent with that of the applicant, he was not in court to make that contention good. While the statement by him that the container was intended for the United Kingdom was damaging to the applicant’s case, the applicant had the evidence that was available before the jury to the effect that he had identified particular pallets that were to come out of the container at Antwerp [the evidence of the Guyana shipping agent AA]. It was of assistance to the applicant to have the evidence of [VO] about the instructions that the cargo had been sold to a Dutch company.” 50. The court was therefore not satisfied that there would have been any positive advantage to the defence in calling VO and thus concluded that there was no arguable basis for criticising the admission of his statements. 51. The court then turned to the ground of appeal concerning the prosecution’s duty of disclosure. It did not consider that the facts were such as to afford any basis for suggesting that the prosecution had failed either to comply with their duty of disclosure or to follow the Attorney General’s guidelines on the matter (see paragraph 59 below). In fact, even taking this ground together with the absence of VO, the Court of Appeal declared it impossible to find any arguable basis for believing that the prosecution had not fulfilled its duty to ensure that any questions which arose would be examined properly and in accordance with the relevant duties. 52. Finally, as far as the security measures were concerned, the court began by noting a concession by counsel for the applicant that this ground alone, even if successful, could not compromise the safety of the applicant’s conviction. The court recounted the history of the pre-trial proceedings and noted that the essence of the complaint was largely based on the security screens. The court acknowledged that the security measures clearly caused difficulties but had not been raised by the journalist or anyone else at the time. Ultimately, however, the court concluded that the issue had been dealt with “fully and fairly” by the trial judge.

5. The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Sinj. 6. On 29 December 2005 M.R. brought a civil action against the applicant before the Sinj Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Sinju), seeking that a will be declared null and void. M.R. was represented by lawyers, V.Lj. and Ž.V. 7. On 8 December 2006 the Sinj Municipal Court adopted a judgment in the applicant’s favour. 8. The plaintiff lodged an appeal with the Split County Court (Županijski sud u Splitu). The Civil Division of that Court has over forty judges. On 27 August 2009 a panel of three judges presided over by Judge D.P., sitting in a closed meeting, reversed the first-instance judgment and upheld the appeal. It held that the first-instance court had correctly established the facts but had wrongly applied the relevant law. 9. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske) alleging, inter alia, that she had not had a fair hearing before an independent and impartial tribunal because Judge D.P. was the father of a trainee lawyer working at the law office of V.Lj. and Ž.V., who had both represented the plaintiff in the proceedings. 10. On 14 September 2011 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law as unfounded and upheld the second-instance judgment. It held in particular: “The case file shows that N.P., Judge D.P.’s son, did not participate in any manner in the proceedings at issue. This court therefore considers that there are no circumstances which put the impartiality of Judge D.P. in such doubt as to exclude his participation in the adoption of the appeal judgment.” 11. In a constitutional complaint of 29 June 2012 the applicant argued that even though N.P. had not participated at the hearings held in the proceedings at issue, there were no indications that he had not been otherwise involved in the case. He had been in a relationship of subordination (employer-employee) to the opposing party’s legal representative and the law office concerned had employed only a very small number of people. The applicant noted that the first-instance judgment in her favour had also later been reversed on appeal. The constitutional complaint was declared inadmissible on 3 October 2012 by the Constitutional Court.

5. The applicant was born in 1978 and lives in Rheine. 6. On 26 June 2012 the applicant was arrested on the spot for having damaged with a hammer a number of vehicles parked in the Bocholt courthouse’s car park, and resisting a court’s clerk. As a preliminary measure he was confined to a psychiatric hospital. The court appointed defence counsel to the applicant, who had a previous history of psychiatric treatment going back as far as 1999. 7. On Tuesday 18 December 2012, the Münster Regional Court delivered its judgment and ordered the applicant’s confinement to a psychiatric hospital. It held that the applicant could not be held criminally responsible and was mentally ill. According to the court’s psychiatric expert, he was psychotic and aggressive, did not show any awareness of his illness and it was likely that he would commit further, even more serious crimes. 8. When the judgment was delivered in the presence of the applicant, his court‑appointed defence counsel and the applicant’s custodian (gesetzlicher Betreuer), the applicant became agitated. He told the court‑appointed lawyer that he wished for a change in representation and declared that he wanted to appeal against the decision himself. He was informed that this was not possible on the spot. The presiding judge instructed him about the time and form for lodging an appeal on points of law. He was then returned to the forensic hospital where, when in contact with others, he showed no more signs of agitation. 9. On Friday 21 December 2012 the applicant received a letter from the court‑appointed lawyer, dated 19 December 2012, who advised him as follows: “... You already announced immediately after the hearing that you wanted to appeal against the court’s decision and also to mandate new defence counsel. We respect your wish for new counsel and hereby terminate the mandate. Regarding the remedy you wished for, we give the following advice: You may appeal on points of law against the decision of the Münster Regional Court (Bocholt Chamber) within one week after the judgment was delivered, thus until 27 December 2012 at the latest. Appeal on points of law may be lodged either with the record of the registry or in writing. Since you are not at liberty, the special provision of Article 299 of the CCP applies to you. This means that you can make statements relating to appellate remedies to the record of the registry of the District Court in whose district the institution is located. Thus, the Rheine District Court would be competent. According to Article 299 § 2 of the CCP, in order to meet the time-limit it suffices if the record is taken within the time-limit. In your own interest you should take care that the appeal is lodged in time. For the sake of completeness we refer to Article 345 of the CCP which prescribes that the specific grounds of the appeal shall be submitted to the court whose judgment is being contested no later than one month after expiry of the time‑limit for seeking the appellate remedy. If the judgment has not been served by the expiry of that time‑limit, the time‑limit shall start to run upon the service thereof. In your case this may only be done in the form of a notice signed by defence counsel or by an attorney, or to be recorded by the court registry.” 10. Still, on 21 December 2012 the applicant typed and signed an appeal letter to the Rheine District Court and asked the clinic’s staff to post it. This was done on the following day (Saturday 22 December). 11. On Friday 28 December 2012 the applicant’s appeal letter reached the Rheine District Court, and was forwarded to the Münster Regional Court where it was received on 3 January 2013. 12. On 8 January 2013 the Regional Court informed the applicant that his appeal was belated. It underlined that the applicant had been instructed after the judgment’s delivery that an appeal could only be recorded by the registry of the District Court but could not be lodged in writing. 13. On 14 January 2013 the court‑appointed lawyer, who had resumed his activity for the applicant, requested a reinstatement of the proceedings in accordance with Article 44 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Wiedereinsetzung in den vorherigen Stand - see paragraph 19 below) and lodged an appeal on points of law. He explained that the applicant had misunderstood his counsel’s instruction on how to lodge an appeal. The applicant had believed that he was able to choose whether he wanted to lodge the appeal in writing or have it recorded by the registry either at the Rheine District Court or the Münster Regional Court. He could also have expected the appeal, posted on 22 December, to reach the Rheine District Court by 27 December 2012. 14. On 11 March 2013 the Federal Prosecutor General observed, inter alia, that: “He [defence counsel] referred to Article 299 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by using wording which was not per se wrong but potentially misleading because it could be understood that the appeal on points of law might be lodged either (by the applicant himself) with the record of the Rheine District Court’s registry or in writing with the same court.” However, according to the Federal Prosecutor General, the oral instruction on the day of the hearing was sufficient. 15. On 9 April 2013 the court-appointed lawyer submitted that: “... already at the time of trial the applicant was confined to a psychiatric clinic because of his mental illness. It may be that the oral instructions on the right to appeal given after the delivery of the judgment were correct and complete. However, when judgment was passed which ordered his confinement to a psychiatric hospital, the applicant was not in his right mind. Communication between the applicant and his defence counsel was impossible. The applicant was obviously in an exceptional mental state. In such a situation, taking into account the applicant’s psychiatric illness, it must be assumed that he had not understood the oral instructions on the right to appeal which were given immediately after the delivery of the judgment.” 16. On 24 April 2013 the Federal Court of Justice rejected the applicant’s request for reinstatement and consequently dismissed his appeal on points of law as inadmissible because it had been lodged out of time. It held that it was not necessary to examine whether, with regard to the Christmas holidays, the applicant should have expected his letter to be delivered only on 28 December 2012. Rather, it found decisive that the applicant had been expressly instructed on the day of the judgment’s delivery that an appeal could only be lodged with the Rheine District Court to the record of the registry, but not in writing. An accused who misunderstood the oral instruction and therefore lodged an appeal out of time was himself responsible for this. The Federal Court of Justice distinguished the applicant’s case from case‑law which made exceptions for a foreigner who was not defended by counsel. Moreover, the applicant’s defence counsel had given him instructions on the form and time‑limit for an appeal. According to the Federal Court of Justice, the content of this letter was not misleading but reflected correctly the applicable law. There was nothing to show that the applicant might not have understood the oral instructions by the presiding judge for mental health reasons. He misunderstood the subsequent written instructions of his defence counsel in the same way. 17. The applicant filed a constitutional complaint to the Federal Constitutional Court. He stated, inter alia, that another lawyer had advised him that his court‑appointed defence counsel had been under an obligation to file the appeal on points of law. 18. On 29 June 2013 the Federal Constitutional Court declined to consider the applicant’s constitutional complaint for adjudication, without providing reasons (no. 2 BvR 1243/13).

5. The applicant was born in 1992 and lives in Tbilisi. 6. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7. On 9 November 2006 a classmate of the applicant, Mr T.T. (hereinafter “T.T.”), was stabbed several times in a secondary school playground. The applicant, aged fourteen at the material time, was present at the scene. There were no eyewitnesses to the incident. 8. According to the applicant’s version of the events, on the above date and at the material time, she met with T.T. in the school playground. They were discussing T.T.’s need for a certain sum of money when four young men – strangers to the applicant – appeared and two of them immediately attacked T.T. One of the two attackers held T.T. down on the ground and both men stabbed him several times with two different knives. The applicant claimed that T.T. had owed them money. One witness (“the witness”) stated that at the material time she had seen two young men fitting the description given by the applicant climb into the school playground swearing and leave after a while. 9. According to the official version of the events based on T.T.’s statements, the applicant and T.T. met in the school playground following the former’s promise to lend T.T. a certain sum of money. In the course of the conversation, T.T. kneeled with his back to the applicant. At that moment, the applicant hit him on the head. T.T. fell to the ground and the applicant stabbed him with a knife from behind. While T.T. remained conscious, the applicant held him down with one hand and continued stabbing him with the other. T.T. was facing the ground during the entire incident and could not see whether the applicant was using a knife. T.T. managed to escape from the applicant and ran approximately forty metres before falling unconscious on the school’s basketball court, where he was eventually found. Later he was transported to a hospital where, after emergency surgery, his life was saved. 10. On 14 November 2006 the applicant was arrested in view of T.T.’s statement given to the investigating authorities. She was subsequently remanded in custody on charges of attempted aggravated murder. 11. On 9 January 2007 a forensic expert report of the Ministry of the Interior (“the first MI report”) confirmed that multiple wounds had been inflicted upon the victim with “a sharp object, possibly a knife”. A forensic chemical examination report no. 443/sq produced by the Ministry of the Interior (“the second MI report”) found particles of grey cotton fibre on the applicant’s jacket that by their colour, structure, and type were similar to the grey cotton fibre contained in the textile of the victim’s jacket. 12. On an unspecified date an initial forensic medical expert report no. 6135 by the National Forensic Bureau (“the first NFB report”) concluded that T.T.’s wounds had been inflicted with a sharp object and that taken together, they had been life-threatening. The expert attached particular importance to two wounds to the chest which had perforated T.T.’s lungs. Between 16 and 20 February 2007 the same forensic expert carried out an additional examination and issued report no. 998/31 (“the second NFB report”) at the applicant’s request. The second report specified that six wounds had perforated T.T.’s lungs and re-confirmed that “all the wounds had been inflicted with some sharp object/objects and, taken together, were life-threatening.” Concerning the question of whether the injuries were inflicted on the victim with one or several weapons, the NFB expert stated: “In order to answer that question it is necessary to convene a panel of forensic‑medical experts, and additionally to have the clothes as well as the object/objects possibly used to inflict the injuries presented, if available.” 13. The expert testified during the proceedings before the first-instance court that the discrepancy between the first and the second NFB reports concerning the number of wounds inflicted on the victim had been caused by the poor quality of the photocopied material relied on during the first NFB expert examination. The expert confirmed that the second NFB report was therefore more accurate and six, rather than two, wounds had perforated T.T.’s lungs. The exact figure depicting the total number of wounds was not explicitly specified either by the experts or by the domestic courts. 14. On 12 June 2007 the Tbilisi City Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced her to ten years’ imprisonment, of which the last five years were suspended on probation. Dismissing altogether the applicant’s version of the events and relying on T.T.’s statements, the first and second NFB reports, the first and the second MI reports and other evidence in the case, the court found that the applicant had stabbed T.T. “with a knife.” The knife was never recovered. Amongst certain other items of evidence, the City Court also referred, in its judgment, to statements of several witnesses, schoolmates of the applicant, according to which the latter was known for having been carrying a knife with her at school on a regular basis. 15. The applicant appealed, reiterating that the victim had been stabbed by two young men with two knives and that she could not possibly have inflicted the wounds alone. She argued that the witness statement supporting her version of the events had been rejected arbitrarily. During the trial at the Tbilisi Court of Appeal, in accordance with Article 364 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 40 below), the defence adduced in evidence two alternative forensic reports, both issued on 2 November 2007, and argued that their results supported the applicant’s version of the events, including the use of two knives, and conclusively excluded the applicant’s guilt. 16. The first report, of a comprehensive alternative forensic expert examination, was prepared by a panel of experts at a private forensic science centre. The descriptive part of the report no. 42/k, which reflected results of an examination carried out between 25 October and 2 November 2007 (“the first alternative forensic report”), was based on the following material: the judgment of the first-instance court, T.T.’s statements, the applicant’s statements, the first MI report and T.T.’s medical file. 17. The applicant’s lawyer presented the panel of experts with the following questions: “1. Based on the [existing evidence and the victim’s statements] ... was the victim capable of showing resistance to G. Kuparadze or otherwise defending himself ...? 2. Considering the existing material, what type of pain and responsive reactions (self-defence, etc.) would the [victim] have had at the time the first injury was inflicted on him? 3. In view of the [victim’s] statements and considering the mechanism used to inflict the injuries described in the [forensic reports], how plausible is it that G. Kuparadze inflicted them on the [victim] by holding his shoulder with one hand while the latter was initially kneeling and then crawling on the ground face-down? 4. In view of the convicted G. Kuparadze’s statement, how possible is it that the [victim’s] injuries described in the [forensic reports], given the mechanism used to inflict them, were inflicted by two different persons if one of them had been holding [the victim]?” 18. The part of the report entitled “circumstances of the case” contained excerpts from the applicant’s criminal case file with the following concluding paragraph: “Given that the [first-instance] court accepted the [victim’s] statements and dismissed the statements given by the convicted G. Kuparadze and [the witness], that the statements given by the [victim] and the convicted G. Kuparadze essentially contradict each other, that there is no eyewitness in the case except for [the witness], as well as the fact that the weapon of the crime is missing, the lawyer commissioned the alternative expert examination to determine the truth regarding the case and in order to receive answers to his questions.” This was followed by a more detailed account and an assessment of the matter. 19. After examining all the material at hand, the experts came to the following conclusions in response to the questions posed by the applicant: “1. ... Before losing consciousness, T.T. was able to carry out various active measures (self-defence, punching, running, etc.). 2. ... [considering the nature of the injuries] T.T. would have experienced a sharp, strong pain at the moment of their infliction which would have triggered adequate self-defensive or other movements. 3. Considering the statement given by T.T. ... the location of the wounds ... and the anatomical-physiological differences between the sexes ... it is hard to imagine how G. Kuparadze could have inflicted the wounds on T.T. in the conditions described by the latter. 4. Considering the nature and location of T.T.’s wounds, it is entirely possible that they were inflicted in the conditions described by G. Kuparadze (by two individuals, one holding T.T. and both stabbing him with knives).” 20. The applicant’s lawyer commissioned a second forensic expert report from the Research Centre for Independent Forensic Examinations of the Georgian Technical University concerning the instrument of the crime and other technical aspects of the incident. The report no. 2-e-116, which reflected results of an examination carried out between 19 October 2007 and 2 November 2007 (“the second alternative forensic report”), was based on the following material: the statements of T.T., the statements of the applicant, the first MI report, the second NFB report, T.T.’s medical file and the first-instance court judgment. 21. The lawyer presented the panel of experts with the following questions: “1. In view of the [forensic] expert reports presented, were the injuries to [the victim’s] body and [through his] clothes inflicted with one or several objects (knives)? 2. How possible is it that G. Kuparadze inflicted the wounds as described in T.T.’s statement, by holding his shoulder with one hand while he was initially kneeling and then crawling on the ground face-down, in view of the mechanism used to inflict the wounds [described in the forensic and forensic medical reports]? 3. How possible is it that the ... wounds were inflicted by two different individuals and accordingly with two different knives, in accordance with the statement given by G. Kuparadze?” 22. Having provided a reconstruction of the incident by means of sketches and having analysed the case materials, the experts reached the following conclusions: “1. The wounds were inflicted on T.T.’s body and [through his] clothes not with one but with two sharp objects, possibly knives, of different sizes, 2 and 4 centimetres wide [respectively]. 2. G. Kuparadze could not have inflicted the wounds as described in T.T.’s statement, by holding his shoulder with one hand while he was initially kneeling and then crawling on the ground face-down, in view of the mechanism used to inflict the wounds [described in the forensic and forensic medical reports] and bearing in mind the limited access to the areas of impact. 3. ... it is possible ... that the ... wounds were inflicted by two different individuals (and accordingly with two different knives), as described in G. Kuparadze’s statement.” 23. On 7 December 2007 the Tbilisi Court of Appeal upheld the conviction. Concerning the applicant’s argument that the witness statement confirmed her version of the events, the court reasoned that although the witness had stated that she had seen two men climb in and out of the school playground, she had also said that that was a common sight at that school. Accordingly, the court found it impossible to establish that those persons had been implicated in T.T.’s stabbing. 24. The Court of Appeal dismissed the two alternative forensic reports commissioned by the defence. Regarding the first alternative forensic report, the court stated the following: “The court cannot accept the findings of the [first alternative forensic report] given that it is drafted in violation of a number of procedural norms. In particular, information as to which specific materials were presented [to the experts] and relied on when reaching the conclusions is missing; the research part of the forensic report contains a legal assessment of the [first-instance court] judgment and of a number of pieces of evidence, whereas under Article 96 of the Code of Criminal Procedure an expert examination is not to be carried out to determine legal matters. Furthermore, the concluding part of the expert examination [report] is presumptive, speculative and based on probability which, in the first place, is beyond the expert’s competence as provided for in Articles 365 [and] 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, [and] no evidentiary value may be attributed to speculative findings, in accordance with Article 371 (6) [of the Code].” 25. As regards the second alternative forensic report, the court noted the following: “The court cannot accept the findings of the [second alternative forensic report] as they are also speculative. Furthermore, the report relies on the conclusions of the medical and forensic expert examinations [medical documentation, the MI report and the second NFB report] which themselves do not categorically determine the nature of the object used to inflict the injuries on the victim, and even more so the number [of such injuries]. Without referring to a concrete scientific study, the [report] analyses and rejects the victim’s statement and relies on the statement of the accused.” 26. The appellate court also reasoned that the applicant’s argument that two unidentified men had beaten the victim while stabbing him was not confirmed in view of the absence of any physical signs of beating in the relevant forensic medical report. In the subsequent part of the judgment the Court of Appeal referred to the first and the second MI reports and the second NFB report, among other evidence, while upholding the judgment of the first-instance court. 27. On 12 September 2008 the Supreme Court of Georgia dismissed an appeal on points of law lodged by the applicant as inadmissible. Without responding to the applicant’s arguments that the lower courts’ dismissal of the alternative forensic reports had been erroneous and arbitrary, and that the main argument of the defence had been left without an appropriate answer, the court reproduced the relevant provision of the Criminal Procedure Code, holding that “the case [was] not important for the development of the law and coherent judicial practice, the [contested] decision [did] not differ from the Supreme Court’s existing practice in such matters, and the appellate court [had] not committed any major procedural flaws during its examination which could have significantly affected its outcome.” 28. On 16 November 2006 the applicant, aged fourteen at the time, was remanded in custody and placed in a cell together with adult female inmates in Tbilisi Prison no. 5 for Women and Juveniles (“prison no. 5”). According to the case file, the applicant did not complain about the material conditions of her detention in that cell. 29. On 10 January 2007 the Minister of Justice issued an order for the creation of a separate section for juvenile female offenders within prison no. 5, and instructed the relevant authority to separate the inmates accordingly. 30. On 24 January 2007 the applicant was moved to the newly created juvenile section of prison no. 5. She was alone in a cell for five months and subsequently shared the cell with two other juveniles. The applicant complained about the material conditions of detention in that cell during the proceedings concerning the deferral of her sentence (see paragraphs 32‑34 below). 31. On 21 February 2009 the Public Defender of Georgia visited the applicant in prison. In letters dated 6 March and 24 April 2009 addressed to the Minister of Corrections and Legal Assistance, the Public Defender expressed his concerns about the conditions of the applicant’s detention in prison no. 5. According to him, the cell in which the applicant was detained with two other juveniles measured approximately 12-15 square metres, the water tap was out of order, causing humidity in the cell, and the ventilation did not function properly, which led to an unpleasant odour. According to a press release issued by the Public Defender’s Office on 20 March 2009, the tap in the applicant’s cell was fixed shortly afterwards. 32. On 11 March 2009 the applicant instituted proceedings requesting the deferral of her sentence pending the construction of a separate detention facility for juvenile female offenders. She argued that, in the absence of a separate facility, her detention in the adult prison, even if in a separate section for juveniles, as such amounted to a breach of Article 3 of the Convention. She further complained that the cell where she was serving her sentence was too small, the water tap was out of order causing humidity, the ventilation did not function properly, and that she was deprived of the opportunity to have daily walks, contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. 33. On 16 June 2009 the Tbilisi City Court rejected the deferral request as manifestly ill-founded. It reasoned that domestic legislation did not provide for deferral of a sentence pending the construction of a separate detention facility for juveniles and that the complaints concerning the alleged violation of the applicant’s rights under Article 3 of the Convention had not been substantiated. The applicant appealed. 34. On 23 September 2009 the Tbilisi Court of Appeal rejected the appeal as manifestly ill-founded in a final decision. It reasoned that such a deferral was not guaranteed by the domestic legislation. As regards the applicant’s allegation that her rights under Article 3 of the Convention had been violated, the court found the complaint unsubstantiated and contrary to the material available before it. It based its finding on the applicant’s own admission before the court that she had been afforded the possibility of unlimited daily walks but sometimes chose not to use her exercise time, as she preferred not to share the space with other inmates, that she was free to take showers even if taking turns with other juvenile inmates, and that she was able to see the psychologist present in the prison without any problems. 35. According to the applicant, she completed her secondary education while in detention, and was admitted to a university after passing the requisite admission exam. 36. On 11 November 2011 the applicant was released on probation.

5. The applicant was born in 1947 and lives in Fryazino, the Moscow Region. 6. She is retired and receives a monthly pension, which at the material time amounted to 2,440 Russian roubles (RUB). 7. The applicant is also the founder and editor-in-chief of Fryazinets (“the newspaper”), an independent weekly newspaper published in Fryazino with a circulation of 2,000-5,000 copies. 8. On 14 April 2005 the Shchelkovo town prosecutor’s office opened a criminal investigation in case no. 81992 against a woman called S.P. under Article 201 § 1 of the Criminal Code (“abuse of powers by a person performing managerial functions in a commercial or other organisation”). The date is apparent from the decision to resume that criminal investigation, which was taken on 3 July 2006 (see paragraph 17 below). The initial investigation was opened on the grounds that S.P., as a person performing managerial functions at a non‑commercial organisation, had allegedly abused her position by fraudulently receiving 5,243 Russian roubles (RUB) in petty cash from Strela ZhSK[1]. 9. On an unspecified date in April 2005 the applicant published a statement by the Shchelkovo town deputy prosecutor in the newspaper. The statement included the following text: “... On 14 April 2005 the Shchelkovo town prosecutor’s office opened a criminal case against S.P. under Article 201 § 1 of the Criminal Code ...” 10. After publication of the statement the newspaper’s editorial department received a number of telephone calls from residents of Fryazino who informed the applicant that S.P., an employee at Fryazino town administration, had been rude to them when they had tried to make an appointment with the mayor through the administration’s Public Reception Office. 11. In issue no. 16 (228) of 27 April-3 May 2005 of the newspaper the applicant published an article entitled “Reporting the details”, which included, among other statements, the following: “... Our last issue contained information about the opening of a criminal case against S.P. by the Shchelkovo town prosecutor’s office. Who is she and what has she done? S.P. is an employee of the town administration and [as such] is a municipal civil servant working in the mayor’s Public Reception Office. It is forbidden for municipal civil servants to have a second job. However, S.P. combines her activities in the Public Reception Office – where, judging by the telephone calls to the editorial department, she does not always behave appropriately towards visitors: [she] raises her voice and is rude, for which she has been reprimanded by the head of the Public Reception Office, K., – with jobs as accountant at Strela-3 ZhSK ... and head of Strela ZhSK, and so forth. As head of Strela ZhSK, S.P. allowed financial irregularities to take place and [as a result of those] the [residential building] association’s members brought civil proceedings against her.” 12. In August 2005 S.P. brought defamation proceedings against the applicant and the newspaper’s editorial department before the Shchelkovo Town Court (“the Town Court”), seeking a retraction of the information contained in the article and non‑pecuniary damages. 13. On 14 September 2005 the Town Court, without the applicant being present, held a hearing. In particular, it questioned several witnesses: the head of Strela-3 ZhSK, a member of the governing board of Strela ZhSK, an employee of the Public Reception Office and three people who had visited it. It also examined several items of evidence, such as Strela ZhSK’s payroll records, a certificate confirming that S.P. had received a salary from it, and a document from the auditors of Strela ZhSK confirming that some of its funds had been spent in an irregular way. The Town Court did not consider whether the impugned information had consisted of statements of fact or value judgments. It found in the plaintiff’s favour, ordering the newspaper to publish a retraction of the statements that S.P. had not always behaved appropriately towards visitors, had raised her voice and had been rude, that she had combined her functions as a municipal civil servant with jobs at Strela ZhSK and Strela-3 ZhSK, that she had allowed financial irregularities to take place as head of Strela ZhSK and that members of the association had brought civil proceedings against her. The Town Court ordered the applicant to pay S.P. RUB 10,000 in non‑pecuniary damages. The judgment read, in particular, as follows: “... The publication contains statements (сведения) [which are] a negative assessment of S.P.’s personality and her business abilities in connection with breaches of law, improper and unethical behaviour in discharging her official functions, and a lack of conscientiousness in performing her duties as head of ZhSK, which tarnish her honour, dignity and business reputation and are not true. ... The term ‘combining of employment’ in the Labour Code ... is defined as a worker performing other regularly paid work under a contract of employment. No proof has been presented to the court that S.P. has concluded a contract of employment with Strela ZhSK and Strela-3 ZhSK. S.P. has submitted that she performed the functions of bookkeeper and head of those entities as a volunteer and had no contract of employment or payment. ... [A] witness, Ya., a member of Strela ZhSK’s board, has explained that there was no contract between Strela ZhSK and S.P. The court rejects the part of his statement which said that S.P. received a salary from Strela ZhSK because the original of the document presented by the witness as a payroll document bore no statement to confirm that it was a payroll document. ... On the same grounds, the court finds that the certificate issued by [Strela] ZhSK to confirm that a salary was paid is unreliable [as evidence]. ... ... Given that it has not been proved during the court hearing that S.P. concluded contracts of employment with the [Strela ZhSK and Strela-3 ZhSK] associations and received remuneration for her work, the court finds that S.P. ... has not combined her activity as a municipal civil servant with any other employment. Accordingly, the statements ... concerning a breach of the prohibition [for a municipal civil servant] on having a second job, that S.P. had other employment as an accountant at Strela-3 ZhSK, as head of Strela ZhSK and so forth, are untrue. ... ... the allegations of improper behaviour on the part of S.P. towards visitors to the Public Reception Office, such as raising her voice and being rude, have not been proven in the course of the court hearing. ... The law does not define the term “financial irregularities”. ... The Popular Encyclopaedia of Economics ... defines ... finances as the creation, movement, allocation and reallocation of financial resources. Bookkeeping is a documentary record of all commercial and financial operations, expenses and income. Therefore, financial irregularities in respect of [residential building associations] should be recognised as ... expenditure which is against the interests of a ZhSK. ... The court rejects the argument that breaches of the rules of bookkeeping amount to financial irregularities. ... the court comes to the conclusion that the financial irregularities for which S.P. was allegedly responsible during the time she performed the duties of head of Strela ZhSK ... have not been proven [by the applicant] ... In determining non-pecuniary damages ..., the court takes into account that ... the published material was based on unverified information and that S.P., being a municipal civil servant ... is particularly deeply affected by articles alleging violations of the law by her, a lack of conscientiousness and unethical behaviour ...” 14. The applicant appealed against the decision to the Moscow Regional Court (“the Regional Court”). She stated, in particular, that the amount of damages was excessive as the Town Court had failed to take into account the small size of her retirement pension and had failed properly to examine the evidence she had submitted to prove the impugned statements. 15. On 22 March 2006 the Regional Court upheld the Town Court’s judgment in full, leaving the applicant’s arguments without examination. 16. On 17 May 2006 the criminal investigation against S.P. was suspended. 17. On 3 July 2006 the Shchelkovo town prosecutor resumed the investigation against S.P. in case no. 81992. 18. In issue no. 1 (213) of 12-18 January 2005 of the newspaper, the applicant published an article entitled “The town’s black hole and attempted murder”. The article was an interview with N., a local businessman standing for mayor of Fryazino. The text of the article included the following statement by N. concerning L.K., the then head of the Fryazino Technical Inventory Bureau (the BTI)[2] and also the wife of U., the incumbent mayor: “... as transpires from a complaint by residents to the Shchelkovo town prosecutor’s office, U.’s wife, a certain L.K., in abuse of her position as head of the Fryazino BTI ..., committed forgery by stealing ... the land-use plan for the building at 23 Polevaya Street and replacing it with [another] land-use plan ...” 19. On an unspecified date in 2006 L.K. brought defamation proceedings against the applicant and N., arguing that the article had damaged her honour and dignity and tarnished her business reputation. 20. On 11 May 2006 the Town Court found against the applicant andN., ordered that the newspaper publish a retraction and awarded L.K. RUB 15,000 and RUB 30,000 in non-pecuniary damages from the applicant and N. respectively. The Town Court did not examine whether the interview had concerned matters of public interest or the professional activities of a public figure, nor did it provide any reasons for holding the applicant liable for publishing it. N. and the applicant argued that the impugned statement had in fact been a value judgment which had not been susceptible of proof, which the Town Court dismissed as follows: “The argument by N. and his representative that the impugned statement was a value judgment is refuted by the case material. ... N.’s statement ... has a precise statement of fact that L.K. had committed a crime by stealing and replacing the land-use plan ... Having analysed the complaint by members of the public to the Shchelkovo town prosecutor regarding L.K., the court concludes that the defendant presented a statement of fact, not a value judgment, in the newspaper article. It can be concluded from the complaint by the public that she had, possibly, forged the land-use plan for the building and plot of land. Accordingly, it concerns an inquiry into [events] reported in the complaint. However, the defendant has distorted the contents of the complaint in the interview ... and its contents are represented as a statement of fact that L.K. committed forgery ... As can easily be verified by examining the text of ... the complaint, it does not include such a statement. ... A statement of fact that a crime has been committed should be examined in the way established by the Code of Criminal Procedure, therefore N.’s statement cannot be considered by the court as a value judgment or opinion and [its veracity] should be proven by presenting criminal-procedure documents to the court confirming that L.K.’s actions constituted a crime. In breach of Article 152 of the Civil Code, the defendant has not presented the court with such documents. ... The defendant Ms Cheltsova has not presented the court with any evidence to prove that ... the statement was true or with proof that the truthfulness of the statement was checked [prior to publication]. ... L.K. has argued before the court that she ... is a civil servant who discharges her duties in good faith and that publication in the media ... of the statement that she had committed a ... crime caused her distress, on the basis of which the court concludes that L.K.’s claims for non-pecuniary damages should be granted.” 21. The applicant and N. both appealed. The applicant argued, among other things, that the amount of the award had been excessive considering that her monthly pension was only RUB 2,600. 22. On 20 July 2006 the Regional Court upheld the Town Court’s judgment on appeal. In a very succinct judgment, it dismissed the defendants’ arguments as follows: “Given that the [first-instance] court has correctly determined the legally relevant circumstances and properly assessed the evidence, its judgment is lawful and well‑founded. The arguments [contained in] the statements of appeal are aimed at a reassessment of the evidence and do not contain circumstances that would refute the findings of the [first-instance] court and require additional examination.” 23. N. stood for office as mayor of Fryazino in elections scheduled for 4 September 2005. He paid from his election fund to have an appeal addressed to President Putin published in the newspaper, which was signed “N., a candidate for the office of mayor”. The newspaper published the appeal in issue 32 (244) of 17-23 August 2005 under the headline “Approaching the elections. Introducing the candidates for the office of mayor of Fryazino”, mentioning specifically that the article had been paid for from N.’s election campaign funds. 24. The article criticised a local entrepreneur, G.A., one of N.’s opponents in the campaign, and suggested that the authorities should investigate his business activities. The article read, in so far as relevant, as follows: “... One of the covert heads of the limited liability company Roads of the XXI Century, who is also the head of the Prince Casino, a certain G.A., who is in direct contact with the mayor of Fryazino, U., and connected to him by a dubious financial relationship linked to the construction of housing and commercial car parks in Fryazino, arranged for a criminal case opened against U. to be terminated. Meanwhile, in conversation with me, G.A. was open about the fact that he had personally paid ‘werewolves in epaulettes’ [corrupt policemen] one million U.S. dollars!!! In reply to my question as to where he had got such a huge [amount of] money, G.A. said he was a ‘person of immense authority’ in Fryazino and the Shchelkovo district, who had judges, prosecutors and tax officers ‘in his pay’... In addition, G.A. informed me that in the near future he would be working in the Fryazino town administration as chairman of the Council of Deputies – [that he would be] controlling and distributing the funds belonging to ... Fryazino to ‘his own companies’, and, first and foremost, to Roads of the XXI Century. ... ... that very G.A. who paid one million U.S. dollars!!! to ‘werewolves in epaulettes’ to terminate the criminal case [instituted] against U. under three provisions of the Criminal Code in respect of ten [criminal] episodes and who intends in the near future to control and distribute cash belonging to ... Fryazino to companies loyal to him! ... It turned out that, in violation of ... the law on the main guarantees of election rights ..., the campaign material was not paid for from G.A.’s campaign funds, but [from the assets of] the very same company, Roads of the XXI Century!!! ... ... despite being near to the town administration building, G.A. pounced on me, punched me in the chest, and threatened to kill me and my family and shoot my guards. He also said he regretted the fact that he had not been able to organise that crime properly in December 2004 during an attempt on my life. On top of that, G.A. told me that he would shoot all businessmen who were out of favour with him and his construction business partner, K. (of Roads of the XXI Century), and [the mayor] U. G.A.’s promise to shoot businessmen was proved true that day. On the evening of 13 August 2005 Ch., who had had a long-standing dispute with Roads of the XXI Century, G.A. and U., was shot in the head and killed ...” 25. On 22 August 2005 the territorial electoral commission brought a claim in the Town Court against N., alleging that the newspaper article had not complied with election campaign rules and had been an abuse of press freedom. 26. On 27 August 2005 the Town Court found for N. and stated that the impugned publication had been paid campaign material and as such had complied with the relevant regulations. 27. Both N. and G.A. lost the mayoral election. 28. On an unspecified date in 2006 G.A. brought defamation proceedings against the applicant and N. in connection with the publication of N.’s open appeal to President Putin. 29. On 16 May 2006 the Town Court found against the applicant and N. It did not examine whether the impugned information had consisted of statements of fact or value judgments, nor did it provide reasons for holding the applicant liable for publishing the impugned article. The Town Court ordered the newspaper to retract the statements and awarded G.A. non‑pecuniary damages, of which RUB 10,000 in particular were to be recovered from the applicant. 30. The applicant appealed arguing, in particular, that the amount of damages was excessive and disproportionate in view of her small pension and that the Town Court had failed to properly examine the evidence she had submitted to prove the impugned information. 31. On 2 August 2006 the Regional Court upheld the first-instance judgment on appeal. It found, in particular, as follows: “The [first-instance] court found that N.’s statements in the published material could and should have been checked as to their truthfulness, that ... [they] are not truthful, tarnish G.A.’s honour, dignity and business reputation, which has caused him emotional suffering. The court also correctly found that the defendants’ ... argument that the publication ... had been permissible in the course of an election campaign ... was ill-founded. ... The court lawfully found that there were no grounds to relieve N. and Ms Cheltsova of liability for the dissemination of untruthful statements tarnishing [the reputation of] G.A. and that the defendants had not proven the truthfulness of the statements they had disseminated, which the appellate court agrees with. The fact of dissemination of harmful statements was established by the court, which took into account the newspaper’s circulation of 3,000 copies in the course of the election campaign.”

5. The applicants are a married couple, Mrs R.B.A.B. and Mr H.S., their two daughters, X and Y, and their son Z. The children were born in 1991, 1993 and 1996, respectively. The applicants have been in the Netherlands since 2001. 6. On 28 April 2001 the applicants entered the Netherlands, where the first and second applicants filed separate asylum applications, and Mrs R.B.A.B. also filed applications on behalf of the other three applicants (the children, who were all minors). The immigration authorities conducted interviews with the first and second applicants on 8 May 2001 (eerste gehoor) and 9 August 2001 (nader gehoor). An additional interview (aanvullend gehoor) was conducted with the second applicant on 2 November 2001. 7. The first and second applicants stated that they had previously lived in Dilling in Sudan’s South Kordofan province and that they had fled Sudan after Mr H.S. had attracted the attention of the Sudanese authorities on account of his activities for the opposition movement M. 8. On 7 December 2001 the Deputy Minister of Justice (Staatssecretaris van Justitie, the “Deputy Minister”) notified the first and second applicants of her intention (voornemen) to reject their asylum requests. In the light of various contradictions in the statements given by the first and second applicants, their inability to answer basic questions about the respective tribes they claimed to belong to, and the second applicant’s inability to provide simple topographic details of the city and the surroundings of the place where he claimed he had grown up and/or to provide any details about the M. opposition movement (goal, members, structure, leader) for which he claimed to have been active, the Deputy Minister concluded that no credence could be attached to the applicants’ asylum statement. 9. In two separate decisions of 17 January 2002, after the applicants’ lawyer had filed written comments (zienswijze) concerning the intended refusals, the Deputy Minister rejected the first and second applicants’ asylum requests, finding that the written comments had not dispelled her doubts concerning the credibility of their asylum statement. 10. The first and second applicants’ appeal against this decision were declared inadmissible on procedural grounds by the Regional Court (rechtbank) of The Hague sitting in Zwolle in a joint ruling, the first and second applicants having failed to submit the requisite grounds for their appeals, even though they had been given extra time to remedy this shortcoming. The applicants’ objection (verzet) was dismissed on 10 September 2002 by the Regional Court. No further appeal lies against this ruling. 11. On 12 April 2003 the first and second applicants – and Mrs R.B.A.B. also on behalf of the other applicants – filed a second asylum request, which was based on essentially the same grounds as their initial request. They submitted various documents in support of their declaration. On 13 April 2003, the Minister for Immigration and Integration (Minister voor Vreemdelingenzaken en Integratie) notified the first and second applicants of her intention to reject their fresh asylum request, holding that their repeat requests were not based on newly emerged facts or altered circumstances as required by section 4:6 of the General Administrative Law Act (Algemene Wet Bestuursrecht). The new documents submitted by the first and second applicants only served to increase the already existing doubts as to the credibility of their asylum statement. In two separate decisions of 14 April 2003, having received the applicants’ written comments on the intended decision, the Minister rejected the applicants’ second asylum request on the grounds given in his notice of intention. The first and second applicants did not lodge an appeal against this decision before the Regional Court of The Hague even though it would have been possible to do so. 12. On 14 June 2005 the first and second applicants, and Mrs R.B.A.B. also on behalf of the other applicants, filed a third asylum request based on the claim that, if they were to be sent back to Sudan, their daughters X and Y would be subjected to female genital mutilation (“FGM”), contrary to Article 3 of the Convention, due to tribal and social pressure. In interviews with the immigration authorities held on 16 June 2005, the first and second applicants stated that they opposed FGM but would be unable to protect their daughters against it. They further submitted a document issued by the Sudanese Embassy in the Netherlands on 26 April 2005 stating that the applicants “are all Sudanese citizens although they do not possess the requisite documents to enable them to obtain a Sudanese laissez-passer”. 13. On 17 June 2005, the Minister for Immigration and Integration notified the first and second applicants separately of her intention to reject their third asylum request. The Minister doubted the sincerity of the applicants’ purported fear that their daughter would be subjected to FGM because they had not raised this argument in their previous asylum requests. The Minister also took into consideration the order amending the Aliens Act 2000 Implementation Guidelines 2004/36 (Wijzigingsbesluit Vreemdelingencirculaire 2000, “WBV 2004/36”), which was based on an official report on Sudan drawn up by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken) on 3 February 2004 (DPV/AM‑823666), according to which women who had had the benefit of a higher education (namely a university or higher professional level education) and who were living in the larger cities in Sudan did not experience any social stigma for not subjecting their daughters to FGM, whereas women in the rural areas who had received little or no schooling had little choice but to subject their daughters to this practice. As the first and second applicants had still not substantiated their personal identities or given a credible statement concerning their place of residence in Sudan, the Minister considered that they had not established that they did not belong to the group of more highly educated people able to reject the practice of female circumcision. The Minister also considered that the second applicant constituted a danger to public order, having accepted a negotiated penalty (transactieaanbod) in order to settle out of court a criminal charge for shoplifting. 14. On 20 June 2005 the applicants filed their written comments concerning the intended refusal of their third asylum request. They argued that the Minister had failed to present a proper reasoning for her finding that it had not been demonstrated that the first applicant did not belong to the group of highly educated women who would be able to resist the social pressure to circumcise their daughters, especially as the first applicant had stated in her first request for asylum that she had only had a primary school level education. The first applicant therefore offered to take an IQ test to prove her level of education. 15. In two separate decisions of 20 June 2005 the Minister rejected the first and second applicants’ asylum request on the grounds detailed in her notice of intention. The Minister added that it was not for her to examine the first applicant’s level of education through an IQ test but rather for the applicants to prove their identities and background in their asylum application. 16. In a joint ruling given on 12 June 2005 the provisional-measures judge (voorzieningenrechter) of the Regional Court of The Hague sitting in Zwolle granted the first and second applicants’ appeals, quashed the impugned decisions and remitted the case to the Minister for a fresh decision. The provisional-measures judge held: “The judge notes that it is no longer in dispute that the petitioners are Sudanese nationals. Nor is it in dispute that both daughters of the petitioners, currently 14 and 11 years old, have not been circumcised. According to the policy guidelines set out in C1/4.3.3 Vc 2000, a girl can – if return would entail a real risk of genital mutilation – qualify for an asylum-based residence permit ... The following conditions apply: - there exists a risk of genital mutilation; - the authorities of the country of origin are unwilling or unable to provide protection to persons exposed to an imminent risk of genital mutilation; and - no internal relocation possibility is deemed to exist in the country of origin. According to chapter A8 Vc 2000 “Country-specific part, the asylum policy in respect of Sudan” under 5.5 Vc, genital mutilation is widespread in Sudan. Although there is a Health Act forbidding genital mutilation, the Sudanese authorities hardly ensure compliance with that act. The parental freedom of choice (as the court understands, whether or not to have their daughters circumcised) is connected to the cultural attitudes of the family and surroundings. Women with a higher education in larger towns will generally not have their daughters circumcised. This will generally not give rise to problems from their social environment. The term ‘women with a higher education’ is to be understood to mean women who have had an academic or higher vocational education. According to the official report of 3 February 2004, women with a low level of education living in rural areas have little choice. According to the same chapter it cannot be deduced from the official report whether it is possible to avoid circumcision by settling elsewhere in Sudan, meaning that for the assessment of the question whether there is an internal relocation alternative, each individual’s declaration is of decisive importance. The defendant’s refusal to grant the requested residence permit is based to a large extent on the fact that the identity and origin of, in particular, [the first applicant] has not been demonstrated, but also because in the proceedings concerning the first asylum request, it was found that statements lacking credence had been given. For that reason, it is not possible to assess whether the conditions set out in the policy guidelines are met. The refusal thus reasoned cannot be upheld. The policy guidelines are aimed at protecting girls and women against circumcision, an act which according to the policy is to be seen as a violation of Article 3 [of the Convention]. ... The assertion that [the first applicant] based her first asylum request on an asylum statement subsequently found to be implausible is correct. However, it is unclear what the relevance of that conclusion is in the context of the present [asylum] application, which is concerned with the protection of the daughters and not of [the parents].” 17. On 19 July 2005 the Minister filed a further appeal against this judgment with the Administrative Jurisdiction Division (Afdeling bestuursrechtspraak) of the Council of State. 18. On 25 August 2005, the Administrative Jurisdiction Division granted the Minister’s further appeal, quashed the judgment of the Regional Court and rejected the first and second applicants’ appeal against the Minister’s decision of 20 June 2005. It considered that, pursuant to section 31 § 1 of the Aliens Act 2000 (Vreemdelingenwet 2000), it was for the applicants to demonstrate as plausible those facts and circumstances which could lead to the conclusion that they were eligible for admission pursuant to the policy in force, and not for the Minister to demonstrate the opposite. As not only the applicants’ statements about their identity and origin but also their asylum statement had been found to lack credibility in a decision of 17 January 2002 which had obtained the force of res iudicata, the Minister could reasonably have found that the applicants had not made out a persuasive case to show that they complied with the conditions for admission under the policy concerned, that the authorities could not provide them with protection, and that there was no internal relocation alternative for them. No further appeal lay against this ruling. 19. The third applicant, Ms X., gave birth to a daughter on 11 June 2011 and to a son on 15 March 2013. On 1 September 2015 Ms X. was granted a Netherlands residence permit for the purpose of remaining with her partner. On 15 September 2015 she informed the Court that she did not wish to maintain the application in so far as it concerned her. 20. In the meantime, on 7 November 2012, the Minister for Immigration, Integration and Asylum Policy (Minister voor Vreemdelingenzaken en Integratie) rejected a request for a residence permit filed by the fourth applicant, Ms Y., who had come of age in the meantime. On the same day Ms Y. filed an objection (bezwaar) against this refusal and, on 30 November 2015, she attended a hearing on that objection before an official commission during which she stated that in 2012, as a volunteer for two non-governmental organisations, she had disseminated information about FGM, for which purpose she had attended a training course. 21. On 29 December 2015 the Minister rejected the fourth applicant’s objection. In so far as the fourth applicant would allegedly be exposed to the risk of being subjected to circumcision in Sudan, the Minister noted that her parents opposed this practice and therefore found it likely that they would not force Ms Y. to be circumcised. As regards pressure from the social environment, the Minister noted that Ms Y had still not submitted any documents substantiating her identity or alleged Dilling origin. In this situation, the Minister found that it was not necessary to address the question of whether internal relocation would be a possibility. No further information about these proceedings has been submitted. 22. On 11 April 2013 the fifth applicant, Mr Z., applied for a residence permit under the Transitional Regulation on Children Residing Long-Term in the Netherlands (overgangsregeling langdurig in Nederland verblijvende kinderen), which provided that minors without a residence permit who had been residing in the Netherlands for over five years could obtain a residence permit if they met certain criteria. These criteria included that the minor in question must have applied for asylum at least five years before reaching the age of 18 and must not have evaded monitoring by the Netherlands authorities for more than three months. The close family members of such minors could also qualify for accompanying family-member residence permits for close relatives (that is to say parents and siblings). The fifth applicant also sought accompanying family-member residence permits for his parents, his sisters Y. and X., and for the latter’s two children, who are minors. 23. On 30 July 2013 this request was rejected by the Deputy Minister of Security and Justice (Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie), who held that the applicants had not been in touch with the designated immigration authorities for over three months. On 1 September 2015, after remittal of the case by the Administrative Jurisdiction Division on 22 July 2015, the petitioners’ objection was again rejected by the Deputy Minister. No further information about these proceedings has been submitted. 24. In a letter of 24 September 2014, the Deputy Minister informed the Mayor of Amsterdam that he would not avail himself of his discretionary powers to admit the applicants to the Netherlands. The applicants’ objection was declared inadmissible by the Deputy Minister, who held that the content of the letter of 24 September 2014 was not a decision within the meaning of section 1:3 of the General Administrative Law Act which could be challenged in administrative appeal proceedings. Although the applicants’ appeal against this decision was granted on 1 September 2015 by the Regional Court of The Hague sitting in Amsterdam, it nevertheless held that the legal effects of the impugned decision were to remain intact. No further information about these proceedings has been submitted. 25. The official report (ambtsbericht) on Sudan released by the Netherlands Minister of Foreign Affairs in April 2010 states the following in respect of the situation of women in Sudan: “After the regime change in 1989, the position of women deteriorated. Women were forced into the background of public life. Many highly educated women lost both their jobs and their freedom of movement. Strict dress codes and codes of behaviour were imposed on women employed by educational and (semi-)governmental institutions. Genital mutilation There is no specific statutory provision rendering genital mutilation of women (FGM) a criminal offence. The Criminal Code merely mentions a prohibition of damaging acts against girls and women. The interpretation of this legislative provision is left to the judge. In practice, perpetrators of genital mutilation are not prosecuted. In 2008 Sudan pledged to eradicate FGM within 10 years. However, the Sudanese authorities have not been consistent in the implementation of this policy. Whilst the National Council of Child Welfare is active in combatting FGM, inter alia in collaboration with UNICEF, the Council of Ministers, on the other hand, deleted in February 2009 a. provision prohibiting FGM from the draft bill for the Children’s Act. The Children’s Act was adopted on December 2009 and contains no provision prohibiting FGM. FGM is widespread in Sudan. The percentage of women in North-Sudan having undergone FGM is estimated at about 90%. In so far as known, FGM is practiced by all North-Sudanese population groups (Arab and non-Arab). However, other population groups residing in the north, including the southern Sudanese, have also adopted the practice. Nothing is known about the extent to which pressure in exerted on communities in northern Sudan that do not traditionally practise FGM. ... Genital mutilation takes place in childhood, generally between the ages of four and ten. It may occur that women who have not undergone FGM are forced to undergo this when they get married. It is not possible to say anything about the specific circumstances in which circumcision takes place at a later age, such as the place of residence or the level of education of the woman concerned. Because genital mutilation is a parental choice, the question does not arise whether and to what extend girls can avoid it. The parents’ decision is closely connected with the cultural attitudes of the family and the surrounding community. In practice it does not occur that people move home in order to avoid genital mutilation. There are no shelters in Sudan for women or girls seeking to avoid FGM. An increasing number of urban, educated families are refusing to have their daughters circumcised. Generally these families do not experience any problems. The lesser educated and people living in rural areas are often unable or unwilling to make the choice not to have their daughters circumcised due to great pressure emanating from the community.” 26. The country assessment report on Sudan drawn up by the Netherlands Minister of Foreign Affairs in July 2015 reads in its relevant part: “There is no specific statutory provision rendering genital mutilation of women (FGM) a criminal offence. The Criminal Code merely mentions in general terms the ban on ‘female circumcision’ without any further definition. The interpretation of this legislative provision is left to the judge. In practice, those who commit FGM are not prosecuted. FGM in Sudan is still being carried out at a large scale. Girls are circumcised traditionally to prepare them for marriage, for religious reasons and – based on superstition – for ‘health reasons’. The most recent estimate of the percentage of circumcised women between 15-49 years old in Sudan is 89%. ... UNICEF and UNFPA [United Nations Population Fund] conduct large-scale campaigns to stop FGM. These campaigns have rendered circumcision a topic of debate. Discussions are being held within families and in the press and on social media even photographs are being shown. There is, however, also a strong influence of the pro-FGM lobby which presents it as the traditional values and norms being affected by the West. Sheikh Abdel-Hay Yusuf is voicing this. It appears from UNICEF figures that the percentage of girls having been circumcised between the ages of 5 to 9 has reduced from 41 percent in 2006 to 35.5 percent in 2010. Because genital mutilation is a parental choice, the question does not arise whether and to what extend girls can avoid it. The parents’ decision is closely connected with the cultural attitudes of the family and the surrounding community. In so far as known, in practice it does not happen that people move home for the purpose of avoiding genital mutilation. The local NGO SEEMA refers victims for medical help.” 27. FGM comprises all procedures that involve partial or total removal of the external female genitalia or other injury to the female genital organs for non-medical reasons. The World Health Organisation (“the WHO”) noted the following key facts in its Fact Sheet on FGM (as updated in February 2016): more than 200 million girls and women alive today have been cut in 30 countries in Africa, the Middle East and Asia where FGM is concentrated and is mostly carried out on young girls between infancy and 15 years of age. 28. There are different forms of FGM (see “Eliminating Female Genital Mutilation: An Interagency Statement”, 2008, authored by various international organisations including the WHO, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM)). These include clitoridectomy, excision and infibulation. The same Interagency Statement described FGM as a violation of the right to freedom from torture, inhuman and degrading treatment, meaning that protection from FGM was provided for by various international treaties (the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women), by regional treaties (the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights Relating to the Rights of Women in Africa, the “Maputo Protocol”) as well as by consensus documents published by several international organisations. The UN Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment considers that FGM amounts to torture even if it is legal and/or medicalised (Report to the UN General Assembly, 14 January 2008. See also the “Global strategy to stop health-care providers from performing female genital mutilation”, 2010, published jointly by the WHO, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNIFEM and others). Sudan signed the Maputo Protocol on 30 June 2008 but has not yet ratified it. 29. The United Kingdom Home Office Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan of 16 April 2010 includes the following observations on the subject of FMG: “25.40 The USSD [United States Department of State] Report 2008 recorded that: ‘...The law does not prohibit FGM. While a growing number of urban, educated families no longer practiced FGM, there were reports that the prevalence of FGM in Darfur had increased as persons moved to cities. The government actively campaigned against it. Several NGOs worked to eradicate FGM.’ The UNICEF Sudan country page, accessed 15 January 2010, reported that ‘[FGM] and cutting affects 68 per cent of women and girls – mostly in the north of Sudan.’ 25.41 UNICEF reported on 6 February 2009 that the organisation commended the efforts made by the Sudanese government, civil society and local communities to bring an end to the practice of FGM in the country. ‘The dangers that female genital mutilation and cutting create for girls and women have been recognized by the government, religious leaders, health professionals, community elders and individual families in Sudan, and we applaud the collective efforts now being taken to eradicate the practice entirely. It is unacceptable that any girl should face this dangerous and unnecessary violation of her rights,’ noted UNICEF Acting Representative Dr. Iyabode Olusanmi. 25.42 However, The Sudan Tribune reported on 8 February 2009 that Sudanese activists had slammed a decision by the Sudanese cabinet to drop an article banning the practice of female genital cutting in the country. The report stated that the government took its decision in accordance with an Islamic fatwa on the issue: ‘The Council of Ministers on February 5 dropped the article (13) of the draft Children’s Act of 2009, which provides for the ban of female genital mutilation as part of other customs and traditions harmful to the health of the child, and after approval of the draft Children’s Act 2009. The cabinet decided to drop the article, which deals with female circumcision, taking into account the advisory opinion of the Islamic Fiqh Academy, which distinguish between harmful circumcision or infibulation (Pharaonic circumcision) and the circumcision of Sunna, a less extensive procedure. 25.43 A press statement issued by UNICEF on 7 January 2010 however stated that the ‘article dealing with female genital mutilation/cutting which was taken out of this bill [The Child Act] will be included in the revision of the Criminal Act in the near future’.” 30. As regards FGM in Sudan, the Operational Guidance Note on Sudan released in August 2012 by the United Kingdom Home Office cites the following extracts from a country guidance determination issued by the United Kingdom Immigration and Asylum Tribunal (FM (FGM) Sudan CG [2007] UKAIT00060) on 27 June 2007: “‘Significant action is being taken in Sudan, both within government and by NGOs, to combat the practice of female genital mutilation in all its forms. Legal sanctions are, however, unlikely to be applied where a woman has been subjected by her family to FGM’. ... ‘There is in general no real risk of a woman being subjected to FGM at the instigation of persons who are not family members. As a general matter, the risk of FGM being inflicted on an unmarried woman will depend on the attitude of her family, most particularly her parents but including her extended family. A woman who comes from an educated family and/or a family of high social status is as such less likely to experience family pressure to submit to FGM. It is, however, not possible to say that such a background will automatically lead to a finding that she is not at real risk.’ ... ‘The risk of FGM from extended family members will depend on a variety of factors, including the age and vulnerability of the woman concerned, the attitude and whereabouts of her parents and the location and “reach” of the extended family.’ ... ‘If a woman’s parents are opposed to FGM, they will normally be in a position to ensure that she does not marry a man who (or whose family) is in favour of it, regardless of the attitude of other relatives of the woman concerned.’” 31. The “Joint Evaluation of the UNFPA-UNICEF Joint Programme on FGM/C: Accelerating Change 2008–2012” in respect of Sudan, published in July 2013, includes the following: “In 1983, when Sharia law was introduced, the article prohibiting FGM/C was removed from the penal code. Since then there have been several attempts to criminalise all forms of FGM/C but none have been successful. The most significant recent setback occurred in 2009, when the Council of Ministers decided to remove Article 13 of the 2009 Child Act, which would have prohibited FGM/C as a harmful practice and tradition affecting the health of children. Despite limited progress made at the national level, several states in Sudan have managed to pass laws prohibiting all forms of FGM/C. An anti-FGM/C law was passed in the state of South Kordofan in 2008 and is now being used as a model for other states.” 32. The United States Department of State’s “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2014”, published on 25 June 2015, reads: “Female Genital Mutilation and Cutting (FGM/C): There is no national law prohibiting FGM/C. The states of South Darfur and Red Sea passed laws prohibiting FGM/C as a harmful practice affecting the health of children. FGM/C is traditionally practiced in the country. According to UNICEF and the UN Population Fund (UNFPA), the national prevalence of FGM/C among girls and women 15-49 years old was 88 percent. Within the country prevalence varies geographically and depends on the custom of local ethnic groups. The 2010 Sudan Household Health Survey indicated considerable variations in the practice of FGM/C from one region to another, from 99.4 per cent in the Northern State compared with a rate of 68.4 per cent in Western Darfur. Girls are generally cut when they are five to 11 years old. Comprehensive figures were not available for the year. The government and UNICEF reported a shift in attitudes towards FGM/C and observed downward trends in the prevalence of FGM/C between the household health surveys in 2006 and 2010. The 2010 survey concluded 34.5 percent of girls ages five to nine were cut, as compared with 41 percent in 2006. Of girls and women ages 15-19, 37 percent favored FGM/C in 2010, compared with 73 percent in 2006. The government attempted to curb the prevalence of FGM/C and made public awareness campaigns on the subject a top priority. In 2008 the National Council on Child Welfare, with support from UNICEF, launched the National Strategy to Abolish FGM/C in Sudan (2008-18). Under the strategy the government introduced ‘Saleema’, a public awareness campaign to counter FGM/C, which received significant attention through local media. The government agreed to a three-year program with UNICEF, the UNFPA, and the WHO to seek to end FGM/C in the country. In October the government hosted a conference in Khartoum to promote the ‘Saleema’ campaign and anti-FGM/C initiatives.”

5. The applicant was born in 1947 and lives in Plovdiv. 6. Between 1992 and 2000 the applicant was involved in proceedings regarding the restitution of a flat which she and her family had been occupying. The flat, purchased from the State by the applicant’s parents in 1968, had become State property after having been nationalised in the period following 1947, and denationalisation legislation adopted in the beginning of the 1990s provided that under certain circumstances even properties which had in the meantime been sold to private parties could be subject to restitution. At the end of the proceedings at issue the courts found that the pre-nationalisation owners were the true owners of the flat by virtue of restitution. Those proceedings were the subject of the applicant’s first application before the Court, in which the Court found a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, and also a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention due to the length of the court proceedings (see Gyuleva and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 76963/01, 25 June 2009). 7. On 1 February 2002 the persons recognised as owners of the flat at issue (the pre-nationalisation owners) sold it to a Mr and Mrs P. Soon after that, Mr and Mrs P. brought rei vindicatio proceedings against the applicant, who was still living in the property. Their claim was allowed at first instance by the Plovdiv District Court on 24 October 2002. Even though the rei vindicatio proceedings after that remained the subject of appeals, the applicant vacated the property on 10 January 2003. She moved to a house she owned in the village of Hrabrino, where she registered her address on 4 February 2003. 8. On 4 May 2005 Mr and Mrs P. brought another action against the applicant, for unjust enrichment, alleging that she had had no valid legal grounds to live in their flat between 1 February 2002 and 10 January 2003, and seeking compensation. 9. On 16 May 2005 the Plovdiv District Court issued a summons, notifying the applicant of the action brought against her and the date of the first court hearing. The summons was sent to the mayor of Hrabrino for delivery to the applicant. However, in a letter to the District Court dated 16 June 2005, the mayor sent the summons back, stating that “no such person has been registered” as living in the village. 10. On 8 July 2005, upon a request by Mr and Mrs P., the Plovdiv Regional Directorate of the Interior issued a certificate confirming that the applicant’s last declared address was in the village of Hrabrino. 11. Without making any further attempts to find the applicant, on 26 August 2005 the Plovdiv District Court, after concluding that the applicant was of “unknown address”, published a notification concerning the unjust enrichment proceedings in the State Gazette (Article 50 § 1 of the 1952 Code of Civil Procedure, see paragraph 18 below in fine). 12. The District Court appointed ex officio a lawyer to represent the applicant, to whom all subsequent papers and notifications were served. According to the applicant, the lawyer did not adequately defend her interests in the proceedings, because she failed to seek to contact the applicant, to appeal against the Plovdiv District Court’s judgment, which would have been standard practice, to make any evidentiary requests, or to contest in any meaningful manner the claimants’ arguments, including by raising what the applicant considered a valid objection that the claims against her were partially time-barred. 13. On 6 April 2006 the Plovdiv District Court gave judgment, allowing the claim against the applicant and ordering her to pay 3,573 Bulgarian levs (BGN), plus interest, to Mr and Mrs P. 14. Upon an appeal by Mr and Mrs P., in a judgment of 10 July 2006 which was final, the Plovdiv Regional Court ordered the applicant to pay the claimants an additional BGN 1,006.21. 15. The applicant became aware of the proceedings and the judgments against her on 22 February 2008, when she received a notice from a bailiff to pay the sums due. 16. The applicant points to several additional facts. In 2004, she was appointed as a juror at the Plovdiv District Court for the period between 2005 and 2009 and she received notifications of the court hearings she needed to attend at another address she had provided to the authorities (the address of her brother in Plovdiv). At that same address, in 2007 and 2008, she received two summonses related to other unspecified proceedings brought against her by Mr and Mrs P. At that same address, in February 2008, she received the bailiff’s notice mentioned in the previous paragraph. The applicant is a well-known piano teacher at the Academy of Music, Dance and Fine Arts in Plovdiv whose place of work could have been known to the authorities. 17. In the months after February 2008 the applicant paid the sums owed by her in full. The overall amount paid, comprising the damages awarded to Mr and Mrs P., accrued interest and the relevant fees and expenses, totalled BGN 8,767.07 (equivalent to approximately 4,473 euros (EUR)).

5. The applicant company, an editorial and publishing house registered in Moscow, edits and publishes a national newspaper with a circulation of 500,000, the Novaya Gazeta (“the newspaper”). The second applicant was born in 1977 and lives in Moscow. 6. At 11.30 a.m. on 12 August 2000 K-141 Kursk, a nuclear cruise missile submarine of the Russian Navy (“the Kursk”), while in the Barents Sea on a naval training exercise, sank as a result of explosions on board. Most of the crew died within minutes of the explosions. However, twenty‑three crew members (of the 118 aboard) survived the explosions and gathered in a stern compartment. They wrote a note to report the events. All of these twenty-three men died on board the Kursk before the arrival of a rescue team. 7. The Chief Military Prosecutor’s Office launched an official investigation into the accident under Article 263 § 3 of the Russian Criminal Code (a provision on “a breach of safety procedures while using a means of transportation which causes the death of two or more persons by negligence”) in case no. 29/00/0016-00 (“the investigation”). 8. On 22 July 2002 the Chief Military Prosecutor’s Office terminated the investigation for lack of evidence of a crime. 9. On 30 December 2002 B.K., counsel for the relatives of the deceased members of the Kursk crew, challenged the decision to terminate the investigation before the Chief Military Prosecutor. On 4 January 2003 his complaint was dismissed. B.K. challenged both decisions in court. 10. On 21 April 2004 the Military Court of the Moscow Garrison confirmed the decision of 22 July 2002. On 29 June 2004 the Appeal Tribunal of the Military Court of the Moscow Garrison upheld the judgment on appeal. 11. Between 2000 and 2005 the applicant company published in the newspaper a number of articles written by the second applicant covering the Kursk catastrophe and the investigation into it. 12. In late 2004 B.K. lodged an application before the Court on behalf of R.K., the father of D.K., lieutenant-captain of the Kursk, alleging a violation of D.K.’s right to life. 13. On 24 January 2005, in issue no. 5 of 24‑26 January 2005, the newspaper published an article written by the second applicant entitled “The Kursk case is now before the European Court” (“‘Дело ‘Курска’ - в Европейском суде” – “the first article”). 14. The first article reported that R.K. had lodged an application before the Court alleging a violation of Article 2 of the Convention. It described D.K. as the person who had written the note stating that twenty-three men had survived the explosions and had been waiting for rescue in the stern compartment. The note had been discovered in October 2000. According to the first article, the note refuted the official version that all crew members had died as a result of the explosions. The first article stated that after the Kursk had sunk a series of knocks making an SOS signal in Morse code had been audible from the stern part of the submarine. Russian officials, including the then Prosecutor General, V.U., had refused to consider those knocks a plea for rescue, and had established that the noise had originated outside the stern part of the submarine. R.K. had unsuccessfully tried to prove in courts that the omission to consider the knocks an SOS signal amounted to an abuse of public office (“должностное преступление”). His complaints had been rejected by the Moscow Garrison Military Court and the Moscow Circuit Military Court. In particular, the first article read as follows: “R.K., the father of D.K., and his counsel B.K. have repeatedly tried to prove in Russian courts that this [failure to characterise the noise as an SOS signal] is absurd and [constitutes] an abuse of public office, the purpose of which is to help the Navy officers escape criminal responsibility. The abuse of public office, according to the claimants, was perpetrated not only by investigators of the Chief Military Prosecutor’s Office, but also by experts, V.K. and S.K. The reports by those two military officials (V.K. is the chief forensic expert of the Ministry of Defence, S.K. is the chief navigating officer of the Russian Navy) were relied upon by the investigators, headed by A.E. and V.U., who terminated the criminal case in relation to the Kursk catastrophe and delivered a decision refusing to prosecute eleven officers of the Northern Fleet.” 15. On 27 January 2005, in issue no. 6 of 27-30 January 2005, the newspaper published another article by the second applicant entitled “The prosecutor’s office is worried about the prospect of the Kursk case being examined by the European Court. All reasonable offers welcome?” (“Перспективы Европейского суда по ‘делу “Курска”‘ взволновали прокуратуру. Торг уместен?” – “the second article”). The second article described State officials’ reaction to R.K.’s lodging the application. It reported that the Leningrad Military Circuit prosecutor had tried to persuade R.K. that his counsel had lodged the application exclusively for the purposes of self-promotion. B.K. had reportedly stated that his client had been willing to cooperate with the prosecutors, and had implied that R.K. had received an offer to have the official investigation reopened in exchange for the withdrawal of his application to the Court. In particular, the second article read as follows: “B.K., counsel who represents the forty-seven families of the deceased crew members, has also confirmed that the application before the European Court was the last resort. There was no other prospect of success for the Kursk case in Russia, owing to the position adopted by V.U., the Prosecutor General, and A.S., the Chief Military Prosecutor. Apparently, those two officials took a decision to help the officers in command of the Northern Fleet escape criminal responsibility and to terminate the investigation. (B.K. has written about this in his book ‘It has sunk ... The truth about the Kursk hidden by Prosecutor General U.’).” 16. After the publication of the two articles, V.K., the chief forensic expert of the Russian Ministry of Defence, A.E., the head of an investigative group within the Chief Military Prosecutor’s Office in charge of the Kursk investigation, A.S., the Chief Military Prosecutor of Russia, and the Chief Military Prosecutor’s Office of Russia as a legal entity lodged civil actions for defamation against the applicants with the Basmannyy District Court of Moscow (“the District Court”). Each claimant sought compensation for non-pecuniary damage and the retraction of certain statements appearing in the articles. 17. V.K. sought the retraction of the following statement: “... this is ... an abuse of public office, the purpose of which is to help the Navy officers escape criminal responsibility. The abuse of public office ... was perpetrated not only by investigators of the Chief Military Prosecutor’s Office, but also by experts ...” 18. A.E. insisted that his reputation as the head of the investigative group in charge of the Kursk case had been tarnished by the following text: “... this is ... an abuse of public office, the purpose of which is to help the Navy officers escape criminal responsibility. The abuse of public office ... was perpetrated not only by investigators of the Chief Military Prosecutor’s Office, but also by experts ...” 19. The Chief Military Prosecutor’s Office and its head, A.S., sought to have the following parts of the articles retracted: “... this is ... an abuse of public office, the purpose of which is to help the Navy officers escape criminal responsibility. The abuse of public office ... was perpetrated not only by investigators of the Chief Military Prosecutor’s Office, but also by experts ...” “There was no other prospect of success for the Kursk case in Russia, owing to the position adopted by V.U., the Prosecutor General, and A.S., the Chief Military Prosecutor. Apparently, those two officials took a decision to help the officers in command of the Northern Fleet escape criminal responsibility and to terminate the investigation.” 20. On 3 March and 7 July 2005 the District Court joined the proceedings instituted by V.K., A.E., A.S. and the Chief Military Prosecutor’s Office. 21. On 11 April 2005 an expert linguist of the Russian Language Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, at the applicant company’s request, delivered an expert report on the impugned articles. The expert concluded that it was possible to perceive the texts as the reported opinions of R.K. and B.K., and not those of the journalist. 22. On 7 December 2005 the District Court decided the case. It found that it had been established that the newspaper had indeed disseminated information concerning the claimants. It further found that the information in question was damaging to the claimants’ reputation for the following reasons. The allegations that investigators and experts had tried to help the Navy officers escape criminal responsibility had suggested that these officials had lacked the requisite impartiality when performing their duties. The District Court found the expression “to help escape criminal responsibility” defamatory, as it contained an allegation of criminal conduct. The applicants had failed to provide evidence that the claimants had committed a crime. The District Court dismissed as unsubstantiated the applicants’ reference to the fact that the second article had merely reproduced B.K.’s position as reflected in his book. Furthermore, the District Court reasoned that the applicants had been under an obligation to verify the truthfulness of the information before publishing it. It dismissed the applicants’ assertion that the impugned statements amounted to value judgments. The District Court found in the claimants’ favour, ordered the retraction of the statements concerning the claimants’ involvement in an abuse of public office, and awarded each claimant 50,000 and 7,000 Russian roubles (RUB – approximately 1,470 and 205 euros (EUR)), to be paid by the applicant company and the second applicant respectively. To reimburse court fees, the applicant company was ordered to pay RUB 85 and the second applicant was ordered to pay RUB 15 to each claimant. 23. In so far as relevant, the District Court’s judgment read as follows: “... assessing the impugned statements, the court considers that they contain affirmations that V.K., A.E., A.S. and investigators of the Chief Military Prosecutor’s Office broke the Russian law which was in force and committed an abuse of public office, and that such statements tarnish the honour, dignity and business reputation of V.K., A.E., [and] A.S., as well as the business reputation of the Chief Military Prosecutor’s Office as an agency performing, in the name of the Russian Federation, State functions of supervision with regard to respect for the Constitution of Russia and laws in force within the Russian territory. ... The defendants have failed to produce any evidence to prove the veracity of the disseminated statements that the claimants abused public office and adopted unlawful decisions. Looking into the defendant’s claim that the impugned articles reflect the opinion of ... B.K., ... expressed in his complaint before the European Court and his book “It has sunk. The truth about the Kursk hidden by Prosecutor General U.”, the court finds as follows. ... page 170 of the book by B.K. ... contains the following text: “I think that the final decision not to find commanders of the Northern Navy criminally liable was taken by ..., A.S. and ...” In view of the above, comparing the impugned statements of the article ... and the text of the book, the court considers that the meaning of the phrase “to take a decision not to find [somebody] criminally liable” is not equivalent to the phrase “to take a decision to help [somebody] escape criminal responsibility”. The complaint ... lodged by B.K. before the European Court ... does not contain statements alleging that the claimants committed an abuse of public office. Furthermore, the defendants’ arguments that ... the editorial department and the author of the articles are not the authors of [B.K.’s] statements cannot serve as grounds to absolve a mass media outlet and a journalist of responsibility, in view of the following. Under section 49 of ... the Mass Media Act, a journalist must verify the truthfulness of the information he communicates, and section 57 of the Act sets out an exhaustive list of grounds for absolving an editorial department, an editor-in-chief, or a journalist of responsibility for disseminating untruthful statements that tarnish the honour and dignity of individuals and organisations ... The court cannot accept as grounds to dismiss the [defamation] action the defendants’ arguments that the impugned statements are opinions, value judgments that could not be retracted under Article 152 of the Civil Code, for the following reasons. Under Article 17 of the Constitution, freedom of thought and expression, as well as the right to protect one’s honour and good name, are recognised and guaranteed ... At the same time, the realisation of the rights and freedoms of an individual and citizen should not breach the rights and freedoms of other citizens. In view of the Constitution’s provisions, freedom of thought and expression guaranteed by the Constitution should not serve as an instrument to violate the honour and dignity of others. Therefore, expression by a journalist of his opinion on any topic, or the publication of an opinion by another person does not give grounds to absolve [the journalist] of responsibility where damage has been unlawfully inflicted on the values protected by the Constitution and the Civil Code of Russia, [such as] honour, dignity and the business reputation of an individual.” 24. The applicants appealed, arguing in particular that the information contained in the impugned articles amounted to value judgments, and that the articles had reflected the opinions of R.K. and B.K., opinions expressed in the former’s application to the Court and the latter’s book. 25. On 16 March 2006 the Moscow City Court (“the City Court”) dismissed the appeal and upheld the District Court’s judgment in full. In particular, it reasoned “the defendants have not submitted evidence of the veracity of the disseminated statements, [while] the claimants have provided evidence proving that they did not commit the actions mentioned in the disseminated statements.” 26. The applicants also unsuccessfully applied for supervisory review. 27. On 7 December 2005 the District Court issued two writs of execution against the applicant company in V.K’s favour. The first writ contained an order to publish a retraction, and the second one ordered the applicant company to pay V.K. RUB 50,085. 28. On 3 May 2006 the bailiffs’ service received the writs and commenced enforcement proceedings. 29. The newspaper published the retraction regarding V.K. in its issue of 22-25 June 2006. 30. On 26 June 2006 the applicant company transferred RUB 50,085 to the bailiffs’ bank account to be paid to V.K. 31. On 27 June 2006 the bailiffs’ service terminated the enforcement proceedings against the applicant company in respect of the retraction. 32. On 28 June 2007 the second applicant transferred RUB 7,490 to the bailiffs’ bank account to be paid to V.K. 33. On 12 February 2008 the bailiffs’ service initiated enforcement proceedings against the applicants on the basis of writs of execution in A.E.’s favour. They ordered the applicant company and the second applicant to pay RUB 50,085 and RUB 7,015 respectively. 34. On the same date the applicant company transferred to the bailiffs’ bank account RUB 50,085 on its own behalf and RUB 7,015 on behalf of the second applicant, to be paid to A.E.

5. The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Antalya. 6. On 3 July 2004 the Samsun gendarmerie received a telephone call about a woman who had been heard crying for help in a white civilian car heading out of the city. On the basis of the information received, the gendarmerie located the car, which was being driven by the applicant, a police officer, in an isolated area outside the city. According to the incident report drawn up by the gendarmerie, the woman, identified as Ç.V., was crying when they approached the car and said that she had been kidnapped and beaten up by the applicant. There was blood around her mouth. Following preliminary evaluations at the place of the incident, both parties were taken to the gendarmerie station for their official statements. On the way to the station the applicant, who had been allowed to drive his own car, was caught trying to get rid of a knife, a hatchet and a mobile phone that he was hiding in the car. These articles were confiscated by the gendarmerie as evidence, along with a gun, duct tape, a rope, a bloodstained towel, handcuffs and a truncheon found in the applicant’s car in a subsequent search. 7. Upon arrival at the gendarmerie station, Ç.V. was at once brought before the Samsun Public Prosecutor, where she stated that she had been having an extra-marital affair with the applicant for a while, but wanted to break the relationship off because of his constant threats and pressure; that she had agreed to meet the applicant earlier that day to talk for one last time, but that after meeting in his car, the applicant had driven her out of the city without her consent, hit her in the stomach with a truncheon and beaten her, tied her hands with a rope, and threatened to assault her sexually. 8. In his statement to the public prosecutor, the applicant admitted that he had started seeing Ç.V. two years before to help her through her divorce, including financially. However, over time Ç.V. had become very demanding and aggressive, and had threatened to expose their relationship and spread lies about him numerous times. He denied the allegation that he had kidnapped Ç.V. and claimed that it was she who had wanted to meet. He claimed that after they had met in the car she had demanded more money from him, started screaming and threatened to shoot herself, put on his police handcuffs and exhibited other “mentally unstable behaviour”, which had prompted him to hit her. She had then kissed him to calm him down and offered to have sexual intercourse, which he had rejected as she was menstruating. 9. On 12 July 2004 the Forensic Medicine Institute issued its report in relation to Ç.V., which recorded a 0.5 cm cut on her tongue, a red ecchymosis of 3 cm x 2 cm on the right side of her neck, a red lesion on her upper right chest, and pain in her left thumb. The report concluded that the injuries sustained had rendered Ç.V. unfit for work for seven days. 10. On the same day Ç.V. submitted a written statement to the Samsun Public Prosecutor, confessing that she had misrepresented the facts and had falsely accused the applicant in her prior statements because she had been upset with him; that she had not been kidnapped as previously alleged; and that the applicant had only hit her while they were quarrelling and had done her no other harm. 11. Later the same day the public prosecutor summoned Ç.V. to seek an explanation in person. This time, Ç.V. claimed that she had submitted the written statement under duress and that her initial accusations had been truthful. 12. On 16 September 2004 the Samsun Public Prosecutor filed a bill of indictment with the Samsun Assize Court against the applicant, charging him with attempted rape, false imprisonment and robbery. 13. During the criminal proceedings before the Samsun Assize Court, Ç.V. maintained her allegations against the applicant, save for the attempted sexual assault. She claimed in this connection that although the applicant had said he would rape her, had taken off his pants and had told her to get undressed, he had never actually attempted to assault her sexually. The applicant, on the other hand, continued to deny the accusations against him. As evidence of the financial pressure he had received from Ç.V., the applicant submitted to the trial court copies of her phone bills, which she had given him for payment. 14. The gendarmerie commander testified before the assize court that when they arrived at the scene of the incident Ç.V. was crying and looked frightened; she had handcuff marks on her hand and nail scratches on her neck. The applicant was sitting next to Ç.V. in his undershirt. He added here that it was a hot day. When he asked them what was going on, the applicant tried to brush over the matter lightly, while Ç.V. pointed to her bleeding mouth and signalled a gun with her hand. Upon his demand, the applicant retrieved the gun from the boot and handed it over to the commander. Ç.V. then told the commander that the applicant had kidnapped her and would have raped her if she were not menstruating or if the gendarmerie had not intervened. 15. Based on the statements from the parties and witnesses, as well as other information in the case file, the Samsun Assize Court acquitted the applicant on 21 March 2006 of the charges of false imprisonment and robbery. As for the charge of attempted rape, the assize court held that the applicant had not attempted to rape Ç.V. However, his conduct underlying that charge had in fact constituted assault and battery, on which grounds the assize court ordered his conviction. The operative part of the judgment read: “The applicant is acquitted of the charge of false imprisonment as the elements of the crime were not fulfilled since Ç.V. had consented to meet the applicant and get into his car. The applicant is acquitted of the charge of robbery since the elements of the crime could not be proven; and notwithstanding Ç.V.’s allegations, there was no evidence in the case file that could reasonably and beyond any doubt prove that the applicant committed such an act. As far as the charge of attempted rape is concerned, the court finds it established that the applicant was infuriated with Ç.V. on account of the latter’s wish to break up with him and therefore assaulted Ç.V. In the light of the facts, the applicant is convicted of the offence of assault and battery and not on the charge of attempted rape, as was previously and wrongly characterised.” 16. Both the applicant and Ç.V. appealed against the judgment of the Samsun Assize Court. However, in her appeal Ç.V. did not contest the absence of a conviction on the charge of attempted rape. 17. On 17 September 2012 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of the Assize Court on the ground that the five-year limit for the offence of assault and battery had expired, and ordered the discontinuation of the criminal proceedings against the applicant on that basis. It upheld the applicant’s acquittal for the remaining charges. 18. Parallel to the criminal proceedings pending before the Samsun Assize Court, the General Security Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior initiated disciplinary proceedings against the applicant in relation to the incidents of 3 July 2004. 19. The Samsun Police Disciplinary Council, which was in charge of the disciplinary investigation, asked for the applicant’s written defence, which he supplied on 29 November 2004, and concluded on 16 December 2004 that it had been established that the applicant had committed the offences of false imprisonment, attempted rape and threatening violence with a weapon, and transferred the case to the Supreme Disciplinary Council of the General Security Directorate (“the Supreme Disciplinary Council”) for a decision on the applicant’s dismissal from the police force in accordance with the provisions of section 8 § 6 of the Disciplinary Regulations of the Security Forces (“the Disciplinary Regulations”). 20. Basing itself largely on the evidence available in the criminal investigation file, on 15 February 2005 the Supreme Disciplinary Council found it established that the applicant had committed the offences of attempted rape, assault and threatening violence with a weapon, and ordered his dismissal from the police force as requested. 21. The applicant submitted an objection to this decision to the Samsun Administrative Court. He argued, inter alia, that the complainant’s allegations against him were contradictory and that the criminal proceedings on the same charges were still pending before the Samsun Assize Court. 22. On 29 September 2005 the Samsun Administrative Court upheld the dismissal decision of the Disciplinary Council as lawful. The administrative court opined that Ç.V.’s initial statements to the gendarmerie, along with her medical report and the articles confiscated from the applicant’s car on the date of the incident, some of which he had attempted to hide from the gendarmerie, constituted sufficient evidence to hold that the applicant had committed the acts of attempted rape, false imprisonment and threatening with a weapon held against him, although there were no witnesses to corroborate Ç.V.’s allegations. The relevant part of the judgment read: “The acts of ... rape, attempted rape and robbery listed in section 8 § 6 of the Disciplinary Regulations are types of conduct that carry the sanction of dismissal from the civil service ... The applicant is prosecuted in relation to the events that took place on 3 July 2004 and he is accused of attempted rape, false imprisonment and threatening Ç.V. with a weapon. Based on the criminal case file and the disciplinary investigation report, it is understood that the applicant and Ç.V. had been involved in a sexual relationship for two years, which later became a subject of blackmail for both parties. The victim, Ç.V., alleged that the applicant had brought her to the crime scene against her will and forced her to have intercourse with him while handcuffing her hands, taping her mouth closed, and threatening her with a gun, a knife and a hatchet. Although the applicant has denied these allegations, the fact that the weapons and tools used in the assault were found and confiscated at the crime scene, and that the victim’s injuries were corroborated by a medical report, and finally the fact that the applicant tried to conceal evidence, led the disciplinary authorities to rely on the victim’s version of the events, despite the fact that there were no witnesses to corroborate the victim’s allegations. In the present dispute, it can be concluded that the applicant had a relationship with Ç.V. for two years. Notwithstanding the fact that the victim and the applicant gave different accounts of the events and that the specific allegations were not corroborated by witnesses, the court notes, on the basis of the preliminary investigation report of the Samsun Prosecutor’s Office, that an anonymous caller notified the authorities that a cry for help came from a white Şahin type civilian type vehicle in the vicinity of Alanlı Village, and that the applicant and Ç.V. were later spotted by the gendarmerie close to that area, sitting in a similar car. The crime scene report indicated that a search was carried out in the applicant’s car following Ç.V.’s complaint and that a gun, a knife, a hatchet, handcuffs, a truncheon, duct tape, rope and a bloodstained blue towel were found. The victim’s injuries were also documented by a medical report ... In this respect, the court takes the view that the applicant committed the acts he was accused of, basing its view on the consideration that the applicant was with Ç.V. in his car, that Ç.V. stated to the gendarme that she was being held against her will, and that during the search the gendarmerie found and confiscated a pistol, knife, hatchet, rope and a towel stained with blood, and that the applicant tried to conceal other weapons from the authorities. Therefore, the disciplinary offence of which the applicant was accused and the corresponding sanction he received cannot be deemed unlawful.” 23. The applicant appealed against the judgment of the Samsun Administrative Court, drawing the attention of the appeal court to the fact that he had in the meantime been acquitted of the criminal charges of false imprisonment, robbery and attempted rape by the Samsun Assize Court, and that his conviction for assault and battery would not in itself justify his expulsion from public service under the terms of the Disciplinary Regulations. 24. By its decision of 10 April 2007 the Supreme Administrative Court rejected the applicant’s arguments, holding that according to Section 131 of Law no. 657 on Public Service, an acquittal in respect of criminal charges did not preclude the imposition of disciplinary sanctions on the same facts. The relevant part of the judgment read: “The applicant asked the court to quash the decision to dismiss him from the police service and to overturn the decision of Samsun Administrative Court upholding his dismissal on the grounds that he had been acquitted of the criminal charges of false imprisonment, robbery, and attempted rape by the first-instance court, and that the charges of assault and battery on which he was convicted did not constitute conduct that attracted the penalty of dismissal from service. Be that as it may, since exoneration from criminal liability, or lack thereof, does not preclude the imposition of disciplinary sanctions by virtue of section 131 of Law no. 657 on Public Service, the present application must be rejected.” 25. This decision was served on the applicant on 12 July 2007. 26. On unspecified dates, but after the introduction of his complaint to the Court, the applicant brought separate proceedings against the Ministry of Interior and the Governor of Samsun before the Samsun Administrative Court and requested the rectification of his civil servant record and the reopening of proceedings with respect to his dismissal from the police force. The applicant relied on the Court of Cassation’s judgment of 17 September 2012, acquitting him of the charges of false imprisonment and robbery and discontinuing the proceedings in respect of battery and assault, and argued before the Samsun Administrative Court that his right to presumption of innocence had been violated in the course of the dismissal proceedings because he had been dismissed on the basis of allegations that he had committed offences in respect of which the criminal proceedings had not yet become final. The Samsun Administrative Court declared both applications inadmissible, on 11 December and 27 December 2012 respectively, holding that none of the reasons put forth by the applicant for the reopening of the proceedings fell within the exhaustive list of permissible grounds for this extraordinary remedy. 27. On 6 March 2013 the applicant appealed against the decision of the Samsun Administrative Court of 27 December 2012 before the Supreme Administrative Court. 28. On 10 February 2014, the Supreme Administrative Court rejected the applicant’s appeal request, endorsing the reasons given in the judgment of the Samsun Administrative Court of 27 December 2012.

6. The application concerns the murder on 15 January 2005 of Elmas, Zerrin and Eylül Güzelyurtlu, all Cypriot nationals of Turkish Cypriot origin. 7. The applicants are the family of the deceased. The first, second and third applicants are the children of Elmas and Zerrin Güzelyurtlu and the brother and sisters, respectively, of Eylül Güzelyurtlu. The fourth and fifth applicants are Zerrin Güzelyurtlu’s sisters, and the sixth and seventh applicants are her parents. 8. The first five applicants were born in 1978, 1976, 1980, 1962 and 1956 respectively. The sixth and seventh applicants were both born in 1933. The first, fifth, sixth and seventh applicants live in the “TRNC”. The second, third and fourth applicants live in the United Kingdom. 9. Elmas Güzelyurtlu was a businessman and used to live with his wife Zerrin and daughter Eylül in the “TRNC”. In 2000, following the collapse of the bank that Elmas Güzelyurtlu owned, Elmas Güzelyurtlu fled to and settled in Larnaca, in the Cypriot-Government-controlled areas. His wife and daughter joined him in 2001. In 2003 they moved to the Ayios Dometios district of Nicosia. 10. On 15 January 2005 at about 8.00 a.m. on the Nicosia-Larnaca highway, near the Athiainou exit, a police officer spotted a black Lexus car parked on the hard shoulder. The engine was running, the left turn indicator light was flashing and the door of the front passenger seat was open. 11. Zerrin and Eylül Güzelyurtlu were found dead on the back seat of the car. Elmas Güzelyurtlu was lying dead at a distance of 1.5 metres from the car in a nearby ditch. All three were in pyjamas and slippers. Zerrin Güzelyurtlu had adhesive tape on her neck and two rolls of adhesive tape in her hands. Both Zerrin Güzelyurtlu and her daughter Eylül Güzelyurtlu had redness (ερυθρότητα) on the edges of their hands, which indicated that they had been tied with adhesive tape. They also had bruises on their shins which had been sustained in a struggle. 12. The particulars of the investigation and the measures taken, as submitted by the Cypriot Government and as can be seen from the documents contained in the case file, may be summarised as follows. 13. The police officer who discovered the bodies informed Nicosia police headquarters. A number of police officers (some of them high-ranking), arrived at about 8.35 a.m. at the crime scene, which had already been secured and sealed off. 14. A detailed on-the-spot investigation was immediately conducted by the police and a forensic pathologist. Photographs were taken and a video recording was made. Two bullets, two cartridge cases and a kitchen knife were found inside the car. A third cartridge case was found outside the car. 15. An investigation team consisting of eight officers was set up. 16. The car was taken away for further inspection. 17. At about 9.25 a.m. officers went to the victims’ house in Ayios Dometios. The house was secured and sealed off. An investigation was carried out by the investigation team and a forensic pathologist. Photographs and fingerprints were taken and a video recording made at the scene. The investigation determined that the perpetrators of the murders had broken into the house through a window. A suction cup (βεντούζα) and pieces of adhesive tape were found outside the window. Adhesive tape was found in the victims’ bedrooms, the living room and the car park. The security system had been switched off at 4.35 a.m. on that day and one of the cameras appeared to have been turned upwards at 4.29 a.m. 18. Numerous exhibits were collected from the scene of the crime and the victims’ home. These were sent for forensic examination. 19. On the same day the victims’ bodies were taken to the mortuary at Larnaca General Hospital for a post-mortem examination. Death certificates were issued. 20. On 16 January 2005 post-mortem examinations were carried out by a forensic pathologist. It was determined that each of the three victims had died of severe craniocerebral injury caused by a shot from a firearm at close range and that their deaths had been the result of a criminal act. Photographs were taken and a video recording made of the post-mortem examinations. A diary of action (ημερολόγιο ενέργειας) was kept by one of the police officers present during the post-mortem examinations, which recorded, inter alia, the actions and findings of the forensic pathologist. 21. The investigation included the tracing and questioning of numerous witnesses, searching the records of vehicles that had gone through the crossing points between north and south, and examining the security system of the victims’ house and computer hard discs for relevant material concerning the movements of persons and vehicles near the house at the material time. The source of the suction cup and the adhesive tape was determined to be a shop in Kyrenia (in northern Cyprus). 22. From the evidence collected it appeared that on 15 January 2005, between 5.15 a.m. and 5.20 am, three shots had been heard from the area in which the car and the victims were found. 23. According to the witness statements taken by the police, at the time the murders were committed a BMW car without number plates was seen parked behind the victims’ car. Four persons were seen standing around the cars and one person was seen in the passenger’s seat of the Lexus car. It was further ascertained that on 14 January 2005, at 11.00 p.m., a red BMW car with “TRNC” number plates had passed through the Pergamos crossing point located in the British Eastern Sovereign Base Area of Dhekelia but without passing through the Base Area’s checkpoint. At 5.45 a.m. the next day the same car had returned to the “TRNC” through the same crossing point – again without being checked. The driver of the car, who resided in the “TRNC”, had been accompanied by another person. 24. From the evidence gathered, it was determined that the victims had been kidnapped at 4.41 a.m. on 15 January 2005 and had been murdered between 5.15 and 5.20 a.m. 25. According to the relevant police reports, five vehicles and more than eight people were involved in the murder; a fact which pointed to a well-planned and premeditated crime. 26. A ballistics examination established that the bullets had been fired from the same handgun; two of the cartridge cases had been of Romanian manufacture and one of Turkish manufacture. 27. The initial investigation resulted in the identification of five suspects: M.C. (“the first suspect”), E.F. (“the second suspect”), F.M. (“the third suspect”), M.M. (“the fourth suspect”) and H.O. (“the fifth suspect”). It appears from the documents submitted to the Court that the first, second, third and fourth suspects were Cypriot nationals and “TRNC” citizens and that the fifth suspect was a Turkish national. 28. DNA belonging to the first, second and fourth suspects was found on exhibits taken from the crime scene and the victims’ house. DNA belonging to the first suspect was found on the steering wheel of Elmas Güzelyurtlu’s car. The police authorities already had DNA from these three suspects as they had taken genetic material from all of them in the past in connection with other offences (unlawful possession of a firearm and burglary). Moreover, the BMW car was found to be registered in the name of the fourth suspect and to have been driven by the first suspect. 29. Arrest warrants had already been issued in respect of these three suspects with regard to other offences; the first suspect was wanted in relation to a drugs case and for obtaining a passport and identity card issued by the Republic of Cyprus under false pretences; the second suspect was wanted for the unlawful possession and transfer of a firearm, and the fourth suspect was wanted for the unlawful possession of a firearm. 30. The other two suspects were linked to the murder through other evidence. DNA belonging to two unidentified persons was also found. 31. On 20 January 2005 the Larnaca District Court issued arrest warrants in respect of all five suspects on the ground that there was a reasonable suspicion that they had committed the offences of premeditated murder, conspiracy to murder, abducting (απαγωγή) a person in order to commit murder (sections 203, 204, 217 and 249 of the Criminal Code, Cap. 154), and the illegal transfer of a category B firearm (sections 4(1) and 51 of the Firearms and Other Arms Law (Law 113/(I)/2004, as amended). 32. On 21 January 2005 the police authorities sent “stop list” messages to the immigration authorities (that is to say messages asking them to add the suspects to their “stop list” – a register of individuals whose entry into and exit from Cyprus is banned or subject to monitoring) and to notify the police should they attempt to leave the Republic. 33. On 23 January 2005 the police submitted “Red Notice” requests to Interpol to search for and arrest the suspects with a view to their extradition. 34. On 24 January 2005 an official request was made by the Director of the Diplomatic Office of the President of the Republic to the Special Representative and Chief of Mission (“the Special Representative”) of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (“UNFICYP”) to facilitate the handing over to the appropriate authorities of the Republic of Cyprus of all the suspects and all evidential material relating to the crime and/or suspects in northern Cyprus (see paragraph 129 below). 35. On 26 January 2005 Red Notices were published by Interpol in respect of the first four suspects and on 28 January 2005 in respect of the fifth suspect. These sought the provisional arrest of the suspects and stated that extradition would be requested from any country with which the Republic of Cyprus was linked by a bilateral extradition treaty, an extradition convention or any another convention or treaty containing provisions on extradition. 36. As the police authorities were not able to trace the suspects in the areas controlled by the Republic, on 27 January 2005 they applied for the issuance of European arrest warrants. On the same day the Larnaca District Court issued European arrest warrants in respect of all five suspects. 37. As the investigation continued, another three suspects were identified: A.F. (“the sixth suspect”), S.Y. (“the seventh suspect”) and Z.E. (“the eighth suspect”). It appears from the documents submitted to the Court that the sixth and eighth suspects were Cypriot nationals and “TRNC” citizens and that the seventh suspect was a Turkish national. The sixth suspect had been wanted by the authorities since 2003 in respect of a case involving an assault causing serious bodily harm. The relevant case file had been classified as “otherwise disposed of” (Άλλως Διατεθείσα) in 2004. 38. On 4 February 2005 the Larnaca District Court issued arrest warrants against all three suspects on the same grounds as those issued in respect of the other suspects (see paragraph 31 above). 39. On 10 February 2005 the same court issued European arrest warrants against them. 40. On 11 February 2005, at the request of the Cypriot authorities, Red Notices were published in respect of the latter three suspects. 41. On 14 February 2005 a message was sent by Interpol Ankara to Interpol Athens in response to the Red Notice in respect of the fifth suspect. This message stated that the fifth suspect was in police custody and that the Turkish Ministry of Justice had been informed of the crime that he had allegedly committed. They also noted that under the Turkish Criminal Code, a Turkish national who had committed a crime in a foreign country which was punishable with at least three years’ imprisonment under Turkish law could be punished under Turkish law. Furthermore, pursuant to domestic law, it was not possible to extradite a Turkish citizen from Turkey. Consequently, the Ministry of Justice wanted to know if it was possible for the investigation documents to be sent to them via Interpol channels. 42. On 15 February 2005 the police authorities transmitted “stop list” messages to the immigration authorities (see paragraph 32 above). 43. As can be seen from an email dated 7 March 2005 from the Director of the Diplomatic Office of the President of the Republic to the Chief European Union negotiator for Cyprus, the Cypriot authorities around this time forwarded to UNFICYP an interim report by the Laboratory of Forensic Genetics of the Cyprus Institute of Neurology and Genetics in order to facilitate its mediation of the handing over of the suspects in the instant case. The European Commission was asked for any assistance that it might be in a position to provide in bringing the perpetrators of the murders to justice. According to an internal note of a telephone conversation the Diplomatic Office was subsequently informed by UNFICYP that the above-mentioned report had been passed on to the “TRNC” authorities, who had found the evidence that it contained to be insufficient. The “TRNC” authorities requested video tapes but did not clarify whether the suspects would be handed over if such tapes were given to them. 44. The Government submitted that as the investigation had progressed more evidence had been collected implicating the suspects. More than 180 statements had been taken from various persons, including the relatives of the victims, persons who knew or had connections with the victims, and persons involved in the investigation. The authorities had also carried out DNA tests on a number of other possible suspects but no link to the crime had been found. The applicants’ representatives had also met and had been in telephone contact with the Attorney-General. 45. On 12 July 2006 the eighth suspect was arrested by Cypriot police in Limassol (in the Government-controlled area). The next day he was remanded in custody for eight days by order of the Larnaca District Court on the ground that there was reasonable suspicion that he had committed offences under sections 203, 204, 217 and 249 of the Criminal Code (Cap. 154) and sections 4(1) and 51 of the Firearms and Other Arms Act (Law 113/(I)/2004, as amended). He was released, however, upon the expiry of the remand period as the authorities, after questioning him, did not have enough evidence to link him to the offences. According to the relevant police report, some of the allegations he had made could not be looked into as the Cypriot police could not conduct investigations in the “TRNC”. Furthermore, DNA tests did not link him to the crime. 46. In a letter dated 26 July 2006 the Attorney-General assured the applicants’ representatives that the Republic was “doing everything within its power – bearing in mind that it [did] not have effective control over the areas of the Republic occupied by Turkey (in which persons that might be involved [were at that time] and taking into account the relevant Convention case-law – to investigate the ... murder and bring the persons responsible to trial before the Courts of the Republic”. He also informed them that he would keep them informed of the progress of the investigation and reply to the queries that they had submitted on behalf of the victims’ family and that this could be achieved through meetings at his office between him, the applicants’ representatives and the police. 47. A report by the Larnaca police investigation department dated 1 July 2007 stated that the investigation had been extended to the British bases and the occupied areas of Kyrenia and Karavas. It also stated that the investigation was still ongoing as the authorities were waiting for replies from Interpol Ankara. The report also proposed that the officers in the investigation team be commended for their outstanding work on the case. 48. As the authorities were not able to execute the arrest warrants in the “TRNC” or undertake other steps through UNFICYP, and given that the issuance of international arrest warrants had not resulted in the suspects’ surrender by Turkey, the police officer in charge of the investigation suggested in a report dated 30 March 2008 that the case be “otherwise disposed of” (Άλλως Διατεθείσα) pending future developments. 49. On 7 April 2008 the case file was sent, along with the above-mentioned proposal by the Larnaca police investigation department, to the Attorney-General. The latter agreed with the Larnaca police investigation department’s proposal and on 24 April 2008 instructed the police to re-submit (εναποβληθεί) the investigation file if and when the arrest of all or any of the suspects was effected. 50. On 19 May 2008 the case file were transferred to the coroner for the inquest proceedings (inquest nos. 9/05, 10/05 11/05) before the Larnaca District Court. The proceedings were scheduled by the court for 18 August 2009. According to the Cypriot Government, on that date the proceedings were adjourned until October 2009 due to the non-attendance of the first applicant. The first applicant was notified by the officer in charge of the investigation of the inquest proceedings and was requested to attend, as the testimony of a relative of the victims was necessary. No further information has been provided about these proceedings by the Cypriot Government. 51. In a letter dated 25 June 2008 to the Chief of Police, the Attorney-General noted that, despite all efforts on the part of the authorities, the suspects had not been handed over to the Republic, that he had spoken to the President of the Republic and that he had had repeated meetings and telephone conversations with the applicants’ counsel. The Attorney-General noted that the latter had informed him of the applicants’ intention to lodge an application with the Court. The Attorney-General therefore considered that it was necessary – and counsel agreed – that international arrest warrants be issued in respect of the suspects and that Turkey – who had, pursuant to the Court’s judgments, responsibility for whatever occurred in the occupied areas – be requested to enforce them. He requested that, if this had not been done already, international arrest warrants be issued as quickly as possible for the surrender of the suspects to the Republic of Cyprus. 52. On 3 August 2008 the fourth suspect was murdered in the “TRNC”. Following confirmation of his death by UNFICYP and pursuant to instructions by the Attorney-General, the arrest warrant in respect of him was cancelled by the Larnaca District Court on 29 August 2008. 53. On 6 August 2008 the Attorney-General gave instructions for the preparation of extradition requests to Turkey under the European Convention on Extradition of 13 December 1957, to which both States were parties (see paragraphs 164 and 165 below). 54. On 23 September 2008, extradition requests in respect of the six remaining suspects (see paragraphs 45 and 52 above), together with certified translations of all documents into Turkish, were transmitted by the Cypriot Ministry of Justice and Public Order to the Cypriot Ministry of Foreign Affairs for communication through diplomatic channels to Turkey’s Ministry of Justice. The requests were then sent to the Republic’s embassy in Athens for communication to Turkey. 55. By a letter dated 4 November 2008 the embassy of the Republic of Cyprus in Athens informed the Director General of the Cypriot Ministry of Foreign Affairs that on that date the extradition requests and a note verbale from the Cypriot Ministry of Justice and Public Order and had been delivered to the Turkish embassy in Athens in a sealed envelope. The usher of the embassy had given the envelope to the embassy security guard. No receipt of delivery had been given. 56. By a letter dated 11 November 2008 the embassy of the Republic of Cyprus in Athens informed the Director General of the Cypriot Ministry of Foreign Affairs that on that date an employee of the Turkish embassy had left an envelope with the Cypriot embassy’s security guard on which only the address of the Cypriot embassy had been written and which had contained the extradition requests and the note verbale from the Cypriot Ministry of Justice and Public Order, which had been given to the Turkish embassy on 4 November 2008. The person had not stated his identity, but had simply had left (παράτησε) the envelope and departed in haste. 57. By a letter dated 24 November 2008 the Director General of the Cypriot Ministry of Justice informed the Attorney-General of the return of all the above-mentioned documents and stated that it was clear that Turkey was refusing to receive requests for the extradition of fugitives made by Cyprus under the European Convention of Extradition, due to Turkey’s refusal to recognise the Republic of Cyprus as a State. 58. In his reply dated 26 November 2008 the Attorney-General stated that the conduct of Turkey towards the Republic of Cyprus was not that expected of a State which had countersigned the European Convention on Extradition. It was not, however, for the Office of the Attorney-General to decide on the measures to be taken but it was an issue to be taken up on a political level, by the Cypriot Ministry of Foreign Affairs in particular. 59. The Cypriot Government submitted that the domestic arrest warrants were still in force and would remain in force until executed pursuant to section 21 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Law. 60. The particulars of the investigation and measures, according to the submission of the Turkish Government and as can be seen from the documents they provided, may be summarised as follows. 61. On 17 January 2005 the victims’ bodies were taken to the Dr. Burhan Nalbantoğlu State Hospital in Nicosia (“Lefkoşa”) for post-mortem examinations. The “TRNC” police were provided with the death certificates, which had been issued by the Republic of Cyprus. 62. Given that the cause of death required that a coroner’s inquest be held, the “TRNC” police sought a court order for post-mortem examinations. 63. Following a hearing before the “TRNC” Nicosia District Court, the “TRNC” Attorney-General’s office requested the court to waive the requirement for post-mortem examinations, as post-mortem examinations had already been carried out in the Republic of Cyprus. Having heard evidence from two police officers and the hospital’s forensic pathologist the court decided that post-mortem examinations were not required. 64. On 18 January 2005 the first applicant gave a statement to the “TRNC” police. His views were requested concerning potential suspects. In his statement he alleged that there were five likely suspects: M.C, E.F., F.M., M.M. and H.O. (see paragraph 27 above). The “TRNC” authorities checked the entry and exit records of the suspects and established that the first suspect had crossed to the Republic of Cyprus side on the night of the murders and had returned to the “TRNC” side in the early morning hours. There was no record of the entry and exit of the other suspects on that day. 65. On 18 January 2005 the first suspect was taken to Kyrenia (“Girne”) police headquarters (Polis Genel Müdürlüǧü) for questioning by the “TRNC” police. The BMW car he had used to cross the border was seized as evidence. The Kyrenia District Court issued a summons on the same day in respect of both the first and second suspects for the purpose of bringing them before the court on suspicion of theft, vehicle importation and forgery of documents (Hirsizlik Araç Ithali ve Evrak Sahteleme). The first suspect was kept in detention. 66. The first suspect’s BMW car was inspected, but no evidence was found. 67. On the same day (that is to say 18 January 2005) the third and fourth suspects were also taken for questioning by police. An arrest warrant was issued in respect of the third and fourth suspects by the Morphou (“Güzelyurt”) District Court on the same day on suspicion of forgery of documents – specifically, providing fake registered vehicle with falsified documents and statements (Sahte Belge Düzenleme –Yalan Belge ve Beyanlarla Sahte Kayitla Araç Temin Etme). 68. On 19 January 2005 an arrest warrant was issued in respect of the first and second suspects by the Kyrenia District Court for two days (Mahkeme: Zanlilarin 2 gün tutuklu kalmasina emir venir) on suspicion of theft, forgery of documents and “providing fake registry records, etc.” (Hirsizlik, Sahte Belge Düzenlemek, Sahte Kayut Temin Etmek v.s.). 69. The second suspect was arrested the next day and was detained at Lapithos (“Lapta”) police headquarters. 70. The fifth suspect had already left for Turkey (on 18 January 2005) when the Red Notice was published by Interpol on 28 January 2005 (see paragraph 35 above). 71. On 19 January 2005 the “TRNC” Nicosia District Court also remanded the third and fourth suspects in custody for two days on suspicion of theft and forgery of documents. 72. The “TRNC” police searched the houses of the first four suspects, as well as that of another person, on the basis of search warrants issued by the Morphou District Court on 18 January 2005 (in respect of the third and fourth suspects) and by the Kyrenia District Court on 19 January 2005 (in respect of the first and second suspects). No evidence was found. 73. Statements were taken from the four suspects while they were in detention. They all denied involvement in the murders. The “TRNC” police also took statements from a number of other persons, including public servants, mainly in relation to the BMW car that the first applicant had alleged had been used by the murderers. According to the evidence collected, the BMW car had been transferred to the first suspect on 17 May 2004. 74. On 21 January 2005, following an application by the “TRNC” police, the “TRNC” Nicosia District Court remanded the first four suspects in custody for a further three days on suspicion of premeditated murder. 75. On 22 January 2005 the “TRNC” Nicosia District Court issued a summons in respect of the fifth suspect for the purpose of bringing him before the court on suspicion of premeditated murder. “TRNC” Nicosia police headquarters informed all other district police offices that they were searching for this suspect and that a warrant had been issued. 76. On different dates statements were taken from a number of persons, including the first applicant, with a view to obtaining information concerning the fifth suspect. 77. On 23 January 2005 the fifth suspect was arrested as, in the meantime, he had returned to the “TRNC” (see paragraph 75 above). 78. On 24 January 2005 the first four suspects were remanded in custody for another three days by the “TRNC” Nicosia District Court on suspicion of premeditated murder, murder, and possession of an illegal firearm and explosives (Taamüden Adam Öldürme, Adam Öldürme, Kanunsuz Ateşli Silah ve Patlayici Madde Tasarrufu). An arrest warrant was also issued by that court in respect of the fifth suspect in order that he might be remanded in custody for three days. 79. On 25 January 2005 “TNRC” Nicosia police headquarters were informed by the Turkish Ministry of Internal Affairs that a Red Notice had been published by Interpol in relation to the first four suspects. The above-mentioned Ministry requested confirmation of Elmas Güzelyurtlu’s death as the Turkish authorities had been looking for him in order to extradite him to the “TRNC”. They also enquired about the nationality status of the first four suspects, in particular, whether or not they had Turkish nationality. 80. The Turkish Government submitted that on 23 and 28 January 2005 the Turkish Ministry of Internal Affairs received emails from Greek Cypriot Interpol stating that they were searching for the first, second, third and fifth suspects with a view to their arrest and that they should be arrested if they entered into Turkey. 81. On 27 January 2005 the first, second, third, fourth and fifth suspects were remanded in custody for another five days by the “TRNC” Nicosia District Court on suspicion of premeditated murder. 82. On the same day the “TRNC” Nicosia District Court issued a warrant in respect of the sixth and seventh suspects (see paragraph 37 above) for the purpose of bringing them before the court on suspicion of premeditated murder. Search warrants were also issued by the Kyrenia District Court in respect of the house of the fifth suspect and by the Nicosia District Court in respect of the houses of the sixth and seventh suspects. 83. By a letter dated 27 January 2005 “TRNC” Nicosia police headquarters provided the Turkish Ministry of Internal Affairs with information about the suspects’ identities. 84. On 28 January 2005 the “TRNC” Nicosia District Court remanded the sixth, seventh and eighth suspects (see paragraph 37 above) in custody for three days on suspicion of premeditated murder. It also issued a search warrant for the house of the eighth suspect. 85. On the same date the “TRNC” police also took a statement from the fifth suspect. 86. On 31 January 2005 the sixth, seventh and eighth suspects’ detention was extended by a further eight days by the “TRNC” Nicosia District Court on suspicion of premeditated murder. 87. On the same day “TRNC” Nicosia police headquarters requested further information from the Turkish Ministry of Internal Affairs about the criminal record of the fifth suspect. They were provided with his criminal record, photograph and fingerprints on 7 February 2005. 88. On 1 February 2005 the “TRNC” Nicosia District Court extended the first five suspects’ detention for seven further days on suspicion of premeditated murder. 89. On 2 February 2005 “TRNC” Nicosia police headquarters published a notice to all branches of police informing them that they were also looking for another person, M.K., who they also considered to be a suspect in the case. It transpired that this suspect had left for Turkey on 19 January 2005. 90. On 7 February 2005 “TRNC” Nicosia police headquarters requested the Turkish Ministry of Internal Affairs police headquarters to carry out a criminal record check on M.K. and to inform them whether he was in Turkey or not. 91. On 8 February 2005 the “TRNC” police took statements from the first, second, third, fifth, sixth and eighth suspects. An additional statement was taken on 11 February 2005 from the fifth suspect. They all denied involvement in the murders. 92. On or around 11 February 2005 all the suspects were released due to a lack of evidence connecting them to the crime. 93. The Turkish Government submitted that on 11 February 2005 another email was sent to the Turkish Ministry of Internal Affairs by Greek Cypriot Interpol informing them that they had information that the fifth suspect was going to travel to Mersin in Turkey the same day and requesting the Turkish authorities to take the necessary measures. 94. The fifth suspect was arrested on the above date as he was entering Mersin. On 15 February 2005 he was taken to the office of the Mersin public prosecutor, where a preliminary file was opened in respect of the murders and he was questioned by the public prosecutor. The Turkish Government submitted that he was released in the absence of any evidence connecting him to the crime in question and in the absence of an extradition request. 95. M.K. (see paragraph 89 above) was also traced and on 25 March 2005 he was questioned by police at Kyrenia police headquarters. He denied any involvement in the murders. 96. On 15 April 2006 the authorities investigated a well in the village of Myrtou (“Çamlibel”) in the Kyrenia district for evidence. Nothing, however, was found. 97. Throughout the investigation the “TRNC” police questioned and took statements from numerous persons who knew or were somehow connected or related to the suspects. As can be seen from a document in the internal police files entitled “Time/Work Sheet” (İş Cetveli) and the copies of the statements provided, statements were taken from various witnesses, including the suspects. They also searched for evidence and took fingerprints. 98. According to a note/direction in the “Time/Work Sheet”, on 30 January 2006 the “TRNC” Police Chief Inspector (Başmüfettiş - Tahkikat Memuru) wrote to the “TRNC” Nicosia Judicial Police Director – Assistant Police Director (“Polis Müdürü Müavini – Adli Polis Müdürü”) that upon the oral instructions of the “TRNC” Attorney-General (Başsavcı) a copy of the file in respect of the murder of Elmas, Zerrin and Eylül Güzelyurtlu had been prepared and would be submitted for the opinion of the “TRNC” Attorney-General. A note bearing the same date from the “TRNC” Nicosia Judicial Police Director informed the “TRNC” Attorney-General’s Office that the file regarding the case was ready and had been submitted to the “TRNC” Attorney-General. 99. The Turkish Government submitted that, following a report by the “TRNC” Police Chief Inspector, the case had been classified as “non-resolved”. They provided a copy of this report, which was not dated. According to this report, the last action undertaken as part of the investigation appears to have occurred on 22 March 2007, when the fifth suspect’s car, which had been inspected by the “TRNC” police, had been handed over to the “TRNC” Nicosia Customs and Tax Office (Lefkoşa Gümrük ve Rüsumat Dairesi). The inspection had not resulted in the collection of any evidence concerning the crime. In his report the “TRNC” Police Chief Inspector concluded that on the basis of the investigation that the police had conducted from the date of the murders until the time of his writing the report the police had not been able to resolve the case. He therefore suggested that the case be logged as “non-resolved for the time being”. 100. On 19 August 2009 the “TRNC” Attorney-General’s office sent a copy of the case file to the “TRNC” Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They informed the latter that the case had been classified as “non-resolved for the time being” on the instructions of the previous “TRNC” Attorney-General. 101. The Turkish Government submitted that the case file was with the “TRNC” Attorney-General and remained open pending the submission of evidence by the Republic of Cyprus authorities. 102. The Turkish Government submitted that after they received the investigation file from the Cypriot Government through the Court following communication of the case, the “TRNC” police questioned again the first and second suspects on 24 February 2010. The suspects denied their involvement in the killings. 103. Subsequently, in other proceedings, on 31 August 2010 the Kyrenia Assize Court found the first and second suspects guilty of, inter alia, the murder of the first applicant’s bodyguard and passed sentences amounting to thirty years’ imprisonment each. An appeal by the first and second suspects was dismissed by the “TRNC” Supreme Court on 4 January 2012. They are both currently serving their sentences. 104. The Turkish Government submitted that in the context of those proceedings, the first suspect had written on a piece of paper that the second suspect had killed three people. In addition, after being cautioned by the Kyrenia Assize Court that if he made a self-incriminating statement under oath it could be used against him, the second suspect stated: “I saw this Güzelyurtlu incident personally myself. This is what I want to say. There is also one thing, that is what he told me, ... I did not see it, it is what he explained to me. At this stage, I do not want to talk about the Güzelyurtlu murder, your honour”. In its judgment the Kyrenia Assize Court noted that it had to examine the voluntary statements made before it more carefully in the light of the fact that the first suspect had retracted the statements and submitted different statements. The first suspect refused to give any statement to the police. 105. Following the above-mentioned development, the “TRNC” Attorney-General reviewed the investigation file. Taking into account the rules of evidence, he concluded that even if the first suspect had not retracted his statement, in the absence of other evidence, this statement would not have been sufficient for any charges against the suspects to be brought. 106. In a summary of the first applicant’s statements to his lawyers between 2006 and 2007, the first applicant stated, inter alia, the following: 107. On the morning of 15 January 2005 the Cypriot police informed the first applicant of the death of his parents and sister. He went to Larnaca morgue to identify the victims. He signed a form authorising police officers to enter the family home in Ayios Dometios and conduct an investigation. The first applicant was present for part of the investigation and then went with the police to his father’s office in Nicosia, where the police took documents as part of the investigation. 108. The next day the first applicant went to Larnaca morgue and then Larnaca police station, where he spent nine hours giving a statement. In his statement he informed the police of the identities of the persons he suspected of committing the murders and the grounds for his suspicions. 109. On 17 January 2005 the first applicant took the victims’ bodies back to the “TRNC”, where a funeral was held. 110. On 18 January 2005 the first applicant had meetings with the “TRNC” police. 111. On 19 January 2005 the first, second and fourth applicants went to Nicosia police headquarters, where they were shown pictures and sketches of a number of people and asked whether they recognised them. Some of the photos had been taken at the funeral. The first applicant identified one of the suspects. The next day they returned to Nicosia police headquarters and were informed that the Cypriot police had DNA matches for at least three of the suspects and had found other DNA which they could not, however, match to any person in their records. The first applicant also gave them information concerning the investigation by the “TRNC” police. 112. During the two weeks following the killings the first applicant met often with the Cypriot and the “TRNC” police and was informed by both sides of their respective investigations. He also updated each side on the other side’s progress in an effort to prevent the suspects’ release for lack of evidence and to convince the “TRNC” police to surrender them to the Cypriot Government for trial. 113. The first applicant had meetings with a number of “TRNC” high-ranking officials. 114. In March 2007 the Cypriot police informed the first applicant that the car and the material removed from the victims’ home and office could be returned. They also informed the first applicant of the circumstances of the killings, that the investigation remained open and that the evidence had been shown to UNFICYP but that the “TRNC” authorities refused to cooperate. Although the Cypriot police showed the first applicant copies of the Red Notices and witness statements, they refused to give him copies. They also informed him that only a court could take possession of the case file (at the appropriate time). 115. The applicants’ representatives had meetings about the case with the Attorney-General of the Republic of Cyprus in January 2006 and July 2006. 116. Furthermore, on 1 February 2006, at a meeting at Nicosia Police Headquarters, the applicants’ lawyers were informed that one of the suspects had been briefly detained in Turkey. The Cypriot police had received this information from the office of Interpol in Athens. 117. On 15 March 2006 the applicants, upon their request, were given a progress report by the Cypriot police on the case. The applicants submitted that they had requested all the evidentiary material but this was not provided with the report. 118. On 15 July 2007 there was an attempt to kill the first applicant at his home in the “TRNC”. During that month the applicants were also informed by the Cypriot police that the arrest warrant in respect of one of the suspects had been cancelled. 119. In May 2009 the first applicant’s bodyguard was murdered. 120. With regard to the inquest, the applicants submitted that the Larnaca District Court had adjourned the inquest on 19 August 2009 for administrative reasons and not because of the first applicant’s absence. The court had resumed the inquest proceedings on 14 and again on 20 October 2009. Three of the applicants had attended with their counsel and a local lawyer. The inquest had confined itself to investigating whether the deaths had been the result of an unlawful killing. The judge had referred the matter to the Attorney-General as she was functus officio in so far as the criminal proceedings were concerned. 121. The applicants, through their representatives, sent a number of letters to various Cypriot, Turkish and “TRNC” high-ranking officials about the case, including the President of the Republic of Cyprus, the Prime Minister of Turkey and the President of the “TRNC”. 122. In a letter dated 30 November 2006 the applicants’ counsel informed the Prime Minister of Turkey about the case and all the steps that had been taken until that date. They informed him, inter alia, that the Government of Cyprus had stated that they were prepared to hand over the relevant evidence to UNFICYP in order for the latter to decide whether there was a prima facie case against the suspects with the proviso that if UNFICYP concluded that there was indeed such a case, the “TRNC” would undertake to surrender the suspects. As UNFICYP was not prepared to take on this task (see paragraph 149 below) and the “TRNC” insisted on making a decision only after receiving the evidence, the applicants’ counsel stated that “I believe that I have now exhausted the possibilities for reaching the desired compromise through negotiation and mediation”. 123. Following the murders the Cypriot Government, the “TRNC” authorities and the applicants were in contact with UNFICYP officials concerning the case. A number of meetings were held. There was also an exchange of telephone calls and correspondence. The relevant information provided by the parties is set out below. 124. According to this note, the Cypriot authorities made contact with UNFICYP’s Special Representative to see whether UNFICYP could assist. They informed UNFICYP that they intended to carry out a complete investigation into the crime and that the police were working intensively to gather information and evidence. Some of this, however, would have to be collected from the occupied areas. UNFICYP’s Special Representative said that UNFICYP was ready to provide help but suggested, acknowledging the difficulties, that it might be better for the two sides to be in direct contact with each other and to exchange information. The Cypriot authorities had informed him that this was not possible as the Cypriot police could not have direct contact with the “TRNC” police and that it was for this reason they had sought UNFICYP’s intervention. (b) Internal note by the Cypriot police dated 21 January 2005 125. According to this note, a meeting was held on that day at UNFICYP headquarters in Nicosia on the initiative of UNFICYP’s Senior Police Adviser and Commander (“the SPA”) between the SPA and the assistant of the Cypriot Chief of Police. The UNFICYP’s liaison officer was also present. The SPA stated that she had had, on the same day, a long meeting concerning the murders with the “TRNC” Chief of Police in the presence of other officers and the “TRNC” Attorney-General. She had informed the “TRNC” Chief of Police that the Cypriot police had in their possession genetic material linking three of the suspects with the crime (although she was not in a position at that time to tell them who these suspects were), as well as other evidence linking another two persons to the crime, and that one of the cartridges found at the scene had been made in Turkey. She had also informed him that five arrest warrants had been issued by a Cypriot court against the suspects, four of whom were detained in “TRNC” prisons. She had expressed her concerns that if the suspects were released they might leave the “TRNC” and their future arrest would not be possible. The “TRNC” Chief of Police had informed her that these suspects had been detained for minor offences (car theft) and that it was possible that their detention would not be extended by the judge. Although the “TRNC” authorities would try to get their detention extended, they had no evidence to charge them with murder. Although the suspects had already been questioned about the murders and had given some information, this was not enough. No voluntary statements had been made. The “TRNC” Chief of Police had also told her that he was aware that the Cypriot police did not have enough evidence and that only if the two police forces cooperated could more evidence be collected. He had also asked her if, and how, UNFICYP could help; she had informed him that UNFICYP could only intervene if one of the two sides made an official request for help. 126. The “TRNC” Chief of Police had expressed his concerns in respect of the problems that had arisen and might also arise in the future and considered it advisable that the two police forces come to an agreement to enable cooperation in such cases. The “TRNC” Minister of Foreign Affairs was ready to discuss matters of policing and public safety with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Cyprus and other members of the Cypriot police in order to facilitate cooperation without any political ramifications (προεκτάσεις). 127. UNFICYP’s liaison officer had asked if there was a possibility that Turkey could be involved, so that the suspects could be extradited to Turkey and from there to the Republic of Cyprus. The “TRNC” Chief of Police had answered in the negative; it appeared that the “TRNC” authorities had already examined the matter but could not take such action as it was not provided for by their legislation. The “TRNC” Chief of Police had suggested that the Cypriot police hand over the evidence to the “TRNC” police so that the latter could arrest and try the suspects. If the Cypriot police informed their authorities officially about the evidence and exhibits in respect of the case and officially requested the extradition of the suspects, the “TRNC” authorities could cooperate and possibly extradite them. One of the suspects was in Turkey but appeared not to be connected to the murders. The “TRNC” authorities also had information in their possession linking other persons to the murders. 128. According to the SPA the “TRNC” authorities were sincere and wished to cooperate. They had mentioned, inter alia, their concerns that there could be more crimes of this nature – that is to say criminals going through crossing points, committing crimes and then returning to the other side in order to avoid arrest and punishment. UNFICYP was ready to provide advice as to how the Cypriot Government should act and to sit in any negotiations in order to see how UNFICYP could intervene so as to help investigate (εξιχνιαστει) the murders. The SPA had asked the Cypriot authorities whether Interpol could intervene as she considered it unfair that, although the perpetrators of an atrocious crime had been identified, they remained free because of a political problem. The “TRNC” police had requested to be kept informed by the United Nations (UN) of developments in the case and she had promised that they would be. (c) Letter dated 24 January 2005 from the Diplomatic Office of the President of the Republic to the SPA 129. This letter reaffirmed the Cypriot Government’s determination to bring the suspects to justice. The Cypriot authorities had collected sufficient evidence, issued arrest warrants for five suspects and requested UNFICYP to facilitate the handing over of the suspects and evidential material to the relevant authorities of the Republic of Cyprus. It stated that the Cypriot police had issued international arrest warrants in respect of four of the suspects, which had been forwarded to Interpol’s General Secretariat and to all of Interpol’s member States. The Cypriot police were in the process of issuing an international arrest warrant in respect of the fifth suspect. (d) Internal note dated 25 January 2005 130. This note stated that the “TRNC” Attorney-General did not intend to hand over to the police of the Republic of Cyprus the three suspects that were detained in the “TRNC” for the murders, relying on the 1960 Constitution. The “TRNC” Attorney-General had notified UNFICYP of this. An attached memo by UNFICYP stated as follows: “I have seen the [Attorney-General]. Mr A.S. with regard to the inquiries [made in respect of] and the prosecution of the culprits in respect of the Elmas Güzelyurtlu murder. He says that there is no legal and/or constitutional basis for handing over the accused to the Republican Authorities, for the following reasons: The Constitution of Cyprus Articles: 133,153,158,159 (2), (3) and (4) Admin. of Justice Law 14/60 Section 4 Section 5 Section 20 Section 23 He made representation to UN for the Turkish suspect kept by the Greek Police to be handed over to Turkish for prosecution, together with others”. (e) Police note dated 25 January 2005 131. This note stated that the SPA had met with the police at Nicosia police headquarters after she had met the same day with the “TRNC” Chief of Police. The latter had suggested that a meeting be organised with the Cypriot police, in secret, in neutral territory chosen by UNFICYP, so that the issue would not become the object of political manipulation. The “TRNC” Attorney-General had consented to such a meeting. According to the “TRNC” Chief of Police, there were possibly more suspects and the first applicant had given inaccurate information to the Cypriot police, including the wrong photo of the alleged fifth suspect. As a first step, the “TRNC” Chief of Police had suggested the participation in the investigation of an equal number of officers of the same grade from both sides and the presentation of all exhibits collected which could help solve the crime, such as photographs and fingerprints of the suspects and samples of genetic material. He had also mentioned that in order to ensure the continued detention of the suspects, the “TRNC” authorities would like to have the results of the DNA tests linking the suspects to the case. As a second step, the “TRNC” Chief of Police had suggested that the “TRNC” police be given information concerning the ballistic evidence in order to enable the “TRNC” authorities to compare that evidence with information in their database. The SPA had noted that there would be no discussion in any meeting held as to which side would bring the suspects to justice, as the matter at this stage would be limited to the investigation of the case, without giving rise to any political implications. This matter could be discussed later on a political level. The Cypriot police had expressed their hesitations as to the usefulness and repercussions of such a meeting. They would inform her of the Chief of Police’s decision on the matter. (f) Letter dated 18 May 2006 from the Cypriot Chief of Police to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 132. This letter stated that at meetings held with UNFICYP and the Deputy Senior Police Advisor (“the DSPA”), the SPA had suggested that meetings between the Cypriot police, the police of the British Sovereign Bases and the “TRNC” police be held at a technical services level (τεχνικό υπηρεσιακό επίπεδο) in the mixed village of Pyla, which is located in the UN buffer zone between the Cypriot police, the police of the British Sovereign Bases and the “TRNC” police. The Cypriot Chief of Police had rejected this as constituting a move towards recognising a “pseudo-state” which provided refuge to fugitives. It was true that UNFICYP’s arguments for the meetings of the technical committees was valid in that there was a risk that the village of Pyla would become a safe haven for criminals. This could be dealt with, however, through more efficient cooperation between UNFICYP and the Cypriot authorities. The Cypriot Chief of Police sought to obtain the Cypriot Government’s political position regarding this suggestion. (g) Note by the Cypriot police to the Chief of Police dated 18 May 2006 133. This note stated that as concerned a meeting held on 17 May 2006 between the SPA, the DSPA, and members of the Cypriot police and investigation team, the DSPA had raised his concerns as to an increased level of collaboration between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot criminals and their movements across the island. The DSPA had been informed generally about evidence that had been collected. He had also enquired whether: - the Cypriot police intended to give the evidence to UNFICYP for forwarding to the “TRNC” authorities to enable the suspects’ prosecution; - the Cypriot police could make the necessary arrangements for the suspects to be taken to a UNFICYP building at the Ledra Palace Hotel in the buffer zone and be questioned through “the video recording interview method”, and – if this was possible – whether such evidence would be admissible before a Cypriot court; - if one of the suspects were to come over to make a statement against the other suspects, the Cypriot authorities would arrest him and bring criminal proceedings against him. 134. The Cypriot police had informed him that prosecution decisions were made by the Attorney-General. They had also informed him that they would cooperate with UNFICYP but not with the “TRNC” authorities or police. They had highlighted the fact that, despite the Red Notices, Turkey had refused to cooperate and had not surrendered the fifth suspect, who had gone to Turkey. They had arrested him but subsequently released him. 135. The DSPA had stated that the “TRNC” – pursuant to its own laws –could not surrender Turkish Cypriots. It had been stressed by the Police Chief Superintendant that the “TRNC” was not a state. 136. The DSPA had also put forward the suggestion that the suspects could be surrendered to a third country such as Greece, and that steps to bring them to justice could be taken from there. The Police Chief Superintendant had informed him that this was not an option and that Turkey had an obligation to comply with international law. 137. Finally, the DSPA had suggested that the matter could be discussed by the relevant technical committee (see paragraphs 154, 155 and 156 below) in order to avoid the issue taking on a political dimension, to find solutions for cooperation and to bring the perpetrators to justice. He had been informed that this was a sensitive matter and that the political aspects could not be ignored; if the “pseudo-state” authorities were interested in completing the investigation and bringing the perpetrators to justice, they should stop providing refuge to criminals. (h) Internal note about a meeting on 20 June 2006 between UNFICYP and the Cypriot police 138. The note stated that at this meeting, the DSPA had noted that he was trying to convince the “TRNC” authorities to surrender the suspects. The Cypriot police had informed him that they would not be providing any evidence to, or cooperating with, the authorities of the “pseudo-state” but that they were willing to cooperate with UNFICYP without this implying any recognition of any illegal entity. 139. On 24 January 2005 a meeting was held between the private secretary of the “TRNC” Prime Minister, the SPA, the head of UNFICYP’s civil affairs unit, and the envoy of the President of the Republic of Cyprus concerning the suspects held in detention. According to the minutes of the meeting, the “TRNC” authorities needed the results of the DNA tests that had been carried out by the Greek Cypriot authorities, which were reluctant to transmit them on the pretext that this would constitute the [de facto] recognition of the “TRNC”. The “TRNC” authorities suggested these could be transmitted through UNFICYP. A “non-paper” dated 24 January 2005 was given to the envoy. This stated as follows: “According to the Constitution of Cyprus (article 159), any case confined among Turkish Cypriots should be taken by the Turkish Cypriot courts. In the case of murder of Elmas Güzelyurtlu and his family, all the suspects are Turkish Cypriots hence the case should be heard by Turkish Cypriot courts by Turkish Cypriot judges. Since the act took place in Greek Cypriot side and all of the evidences collected successfully by the Greek Cypriot police, cooperation is needed for the justice to be done. This is an urgent situation therefore we need to act together immediately. As a first step the report concerning the DNA analysis is needed to get the court order to have the suspects in custody during the lawsuit. This is a humanitarian issue and totally out of political concerns. The political concerns should not be in the way to prevent the justice to take place.” (b) From the minutes of a meeting on 25 January 2005 140. On 25 January 2005 the “TRNC” Chief of Police held a meeting with the SPA, who gave details about the circumstances of the murders. According to the minutes, Elmas Güzelyurtlu had been known throughout Cyprus and had been suspected of many crimes; some had involved the suspects. The information in the hands of the Greek Cypriot police was sufficient for the purpose of issuing arrest warrants in respect of the suspects. Although the “TRNC” police had already issued such warrants, they did not have evidence to bring proceedings against the suspects; more information was necessary. The SPA had asked for suggestions. (c) From the minutes of a meeting on 26 January 2005 141. On 26 January 2005 a meeting was held between UNFICYP officials and “TRNC” functionaries, including the “TRNC” Deputy Prime Minister. According to the minutes, the question had been raised as to whether the Greek Cypriot authorities were willing to transmit the evidence. The “TRNC” Deputy Prime Minister had mentioned that if this was done the suspects’ detention would be extended; then, if the “TRNC” courts considered the evidence to be credible, the suspects would be handed over to [the Republic of Cyprus] via UNFICYP. (d) From the minutes of a meeting on 31 January 2005 142. On 31 January 2005 another meeting was held between UNFICYP and “TRNC” officials. According to the minutes, the UNFICYP officials had submitted Interpol’s Red Notices in respect of three of the suspects detained in the “TRNC”. They had mentioned that the Greek Cypriot authorities were reluctant to share the suspects’ DNA test results and did not want to collaborate with the “TRNC”. (e) From the minutes of a meeting on 7 February 2005 143. At a meeting held on 7 February 2005 UNFICYP officials and the Prime Minister of the “TRNC” discussed the reluctance of the Greek Cypriot authorities to cooperate. (f) From the minutes of a meeting on 18 February 2005 144. On 18 February 2005 a meeting was held between the head of UNFICYP’s civil affairs unit and the Undersecretary of the “TRNC” Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The former stated that the Greek Cypriot authorities’ attitude concerning their cooperation with the “TRNC” was changing and that they were planning to send the evidence through UNFICYP. He also asked the Undersecretary whether the suspects could be re-arrested and given to the Greek Cypriot authorities through UNFICYP. The Undersecretary replied that under the 1960 agreements if the suspects were Turkish, then they should be tried in a Turkish court. (g) From the minutes of a telephone conversation on 30 March 2005 145. On 30 March 2005 the head of UNFICYP’s civil affairs unit had a telephone conversation with the “TRNC” Head of Consular Affairs. The former informed the latter that the courts of the British Sovereign Base areas did not have jurisdiction to try the suspects; however, the courts of the Republic of Cyprus could sit at the bases and the hearing could take place there. The Head of Consular Affairs stated that the “TRNC” authorities were not planning to take any steps until the evidence and records were given over to them because it was unacceptable to the “TRNC” authorities for the Greek Cypriot authorities to work alone on this matter. (h) From the minutes of a meeting on 5 April 2005 146. On 5 April 2005 UNFICYP officials had a general meeting with the “TRNC” Head of Consular affairs who mentioned that the DNA results given to them were not sufficient in order to proceed further with the case file. The “TRNC” authorities needed more concrete evidence such as police investigation records and security camera records. The head of UNFICYP’s civil affairs unit promised to discuss this with the Greek Cypriot side. 147. Between 2005 and 2006, an exchange of correspondence concerning the investigation of the murders took place between the applicants’ representatives and UNFICYP officials. The text of the most relevant communications between UNFICYP and the applicants’ representatives is set out below: 148. In a communication to UNFICYP dated 19 December 2005, the applicant’s lawyer, requested, inter alia, the disclosure of any possible information relating to the UNFICYP’s efforts in the case, in particular, concerning the mistrust and lack of cooperation between the two sides. He wanted to ensure that all local remedies were properly exhausted and UNFICYP to help him to form a view in general terms about the attitude of both sides. If all legal means to bring about the prosecution of suspects of this heinous crime failed, he had instructions to bring an application before the Court against Turkey and Cyprus. 149. In a letter to the applicants’ representatives dated 23 February 2006 the SPA, stated, inter alia, the following: “1. The Senior Police Advisor (SPA) of the UN police in Cyprus first became involved in the case on 16 January 2005 at the request of the Assistant Chief of Police of the Republic of Cyprus, ... who at that time briefed the Senior Police Adviser on the case. A request was made to the SPA to facilitate the exchange of information between the sides. 2. At no time was the SPA asked to operationally assist in the investigation of the murder or apprehend the suspects. If [she had been] asked this would not have been agreed to as this is not within UNFICYP’s mandate. ...(Illegible) 4. A copy of the preliminary investigation report prepared by the authorities in the south was provided to the Turkish Cypriot authorities, with the SPA’s facilitation. UNFICYP limited itself to a mediation role and therefore neither verified the contents nor kept a copy of the report. 6. UNFICYP attempts to facilitate the exchange of information on criminal enquiries when asked to do so by one side or the other. ... (Illegible) 8. As you may be aware, UNFICYP is not part of the internal justice system of the Republic of Cyprus and does not have executive power. UNFICYP is not in any sense an element of the “domestic remedies” available to victims of a crime in the [Republic of Cyprus]”. 150. In an e-mail sent by the DSPA to the applicants’ representative, Ms Meleagrou on 25 October 2006, the following, inter alia, was stated: “I note your request and assure you of the UN’s utmost cooperation in dealing with any matter of a criminal nature, particularly ... in this most serious case. While UNFICYP has been exhausting its efforts to reach some conclusion to this case, it is unfortunate that there is a stalemate at this present time due to the two sides not agreeing on a way forward. I note your comments that: The [Republic of Cyprus] will hand over to the UN in Cyprus all the evidence on the suspects so that the UN legal team can evaluate the evidence and see whether or not there is a prima facie case against them. The [Republic of Cyprus] will only do so if the “TRNC” authorities give an undertaking that they will hand the suspects over to the [Republic of Cyprus] to be tried if the UN is satisfied (possibly after discussion with the “TRNC” – the italicised parenthesis is not strictly speaking part of the proposal at this stage but might be what we will have to argue in order to facilitate matters) that there is such a prima facie case against the suspects: 1. The [Republic of Cyprus] will not hand over any evidence for the purposes of conducting a trial in the north. This is despite the fact that [an]other jurisdiction (United Kingdom) has in the past successfully caused a trial to be conducted in the north [in respect of] a serious crime committed in the UK. 2. The legal processes conducted in the north do not allow for the handing over of any [Turkish Cypriot] suspects to any authorities in the south or any other country in any other circumstances. Therefore UNFICYP stands ready to facilitate [in any way] it can in this case, I can see no resolution being [arrived at] until such time as one side or the other cedes their current position. Either the [Republic of Cyprus] is willing to hand over all the evidence to the north and offer full police and evidentiary cooperation so that a trial can be conducted in that “jurisdiction”, or the north is willing to hand over suspects [on the basis of] sufficient evidence to cause the [issuance] of an arrest warrant in the north, with a view to handling the suspects to UNFICYP for passing on the [Republic of Cyprus]. As always UNFICYP stands ready to cooperate in whatever manner it can.” 151. In an e-mail sent by UNFICYP to the applicants’ representative Ms Meleagrou on 16 November 2006 the following was stated: “As stated in my previous email to you UNFICYP stands ready to facilitate negotiations between the two sides in respect of this matter and indeed continues in its efforts to find a solution. However, UNFICYP is not in a position to formally engage a suitably qualified expert to officially adjudicate on the evidence held by the Republic of Cyprus. It has already been stated that while the UNFICYP believes that there is enough evidence on face value for the two sides to reach a suitable position, it welcomes the delivery of any further or all evidence, copies or otherwise, from the Republic of Cyprus that can be used to further meaningful dialogue between the two sides. I again reiterate the following options that may in my view facilitate further useful negotiations: The [Republic of Cyprus], without prejudice, [should] deliver to the UNFICYP all necessary evidence, allowing this to be used as UNFICYP sees fit, with a view to negotiating the alleged offenders’ arrest and handover to UNFICYP for delivery to the authorities in the south for the purposes of a trial. However, without a clear guarantee that the north will arrest and hand over the alleged offenders there is little chance of this being successful. The only other solution is for the [Republic of Cyprus] to hand over all the evidence to UNFICYP for delivery to the relevant persons in the north with a view to having a trial conducted in the north. This option has already been rejected by the [Republic of Cyprus].” 152. The relevant parts of the UN Secretary-General’s reports on the UN operation in Cyprus are set out below: 153. Report of 27 May 2005: “23. Official contact between the sides is hampered by a high degree of mistrust. On 15 January 2005, three members of a Turkish Cypriot family living in the south were killed ... . Eight suspects were arrested in the north while all the evidence remained in the south. UNFICYP’s efforts to assist the sides to bring the suspects to justice proved unsuccessful, and all suspects were released in the north. This case is an illustration of the growing number of crimes across the cease-fire line, such as smuggling, drug trafficking, illegal immigration and human trafficking. These problems are implicit in the expanding inter-communal contacts, which though positive, have also the potential for adverse consequences if the present lack of cooperation between the sides persists. 24. The continuing absence of official contacts between the sides has accentuated UNFICYP’s role in promoting bicommunal contacts. Although people from either side can meet freely since the opening of the crossings in 2003, the impartiality of the Ledra Palace Hotel venue and the United Nations umbrella are considered indispensable for sensitive humanitarian and other meetings, including those of political parties from the north and the south. It is hoped that under the auspices of UNFICYP, contacts may be established between the sides, without prejudice to their political positions, on humanitarian and related issues generating a climate of trust and easing tensions. During the reporting period, UNFICYP provided facilities for 57 bicommunal events, including those implemented by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)/United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) ...”. 154. Report of 2 June 2008: “4. On 21 March [2008], ... the two leaders met in the presence of my then Special Representative and agreed on a path towards a comprehensive settlement (see annex II). The agreement entailed the establishment of a number of working groups, to consider the core issues pertaining to an eventual settlement plan, and of technical committees, to seek immediate solutions to everyday problems arising from the division of the island. They also agreed to meet again in three months to review the work of the working groups and the technical committees and, using their results, to start full-fledged negotiations under United Nations auspices. In addition, the leaders agreed to meet as and when needed prior to the commencement of full-fledged negotiations. ... 5. On 26 March [2008], representatives of the leaders agreed to establish six working groups on governance and power-sharing, European Union matters, security and guarantees, territory, property and economic matters, as well as seven technical committees on crime and criminal matters, economic and commercial matters, cultural heritage, crisis management, humanitarian matters, health and the environment. ... On 22 April [2008], the groups and committees began to meet. They have been coming together on a regular basis since then, as foreseen by the leaders, and facilitated by the United Nations.” 155. Report of 15 May 2009: “9. On 14 April [2009], the leaders agreed to the implementation of 4 of the 23 confidence-building measures identified by the technical committees, which were aimed at improving the daily life of Cypriots across the entire island. They concern the passage of ambulances through crossing points in cases of emergency, the establishment of a communications and liaison facility (operating round the clock) to share information on crime and criminal matters, an initiative funded by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) on awareness-raising measures for saving water and the establishment of an advisory board on shared cultural heritage. ...” 156. Report of 9 January 2015: “10. (...) UNFICYP police facilitated meetings of the Technical Committee on Crime and Criminal Matters, and the Joint Communications Room continued to work actively, providing the police services of both sides with a forum for enhanced cooperation. The appointment for the first time of serving police officers as Greek Cypriot representatives to the Technical Committee signaled a significant step forward in cooperation. Over and above the exchange of information on criminal matters that have intercommunal elements, the Joint Communications Room focused on the investigation of crimes that took place within and across the buffer zone, the handover of persons of interest through the UNFICYP police and humanitarian cases.”

5. The applicants were born in 1966, 1967, 1988 and 2003 respectively and live in Blagoevgrad. The first and second applicants are cohabiting partners and the fourth applicant is their daughter. The third applicant is the second applicant’s son. At the relevant time all the applicants were living together. 6. The first applicant suffers from muscular dystrophy, which has gradually progressed since the age of twelve. Currently (and at the time of the relevant events), he is only able to move his head and hands. He needs assistance for most daily activities, which is usually provided by the second applicant or his care assistant. According to the applicants, the care assistant, who was specially trained and had taken care of the first applicant for many years, was the only person with whom the latter felt secure when he needed to go out of his home, in particular to go to his office, as this involved the assistant carrying him and installing him in a car. The assistant also drove the applicant’s car. At the time the first applicant owned a pawnshop and managed several companies. One of his activities was giving short-term loans at high interest rates. 7. In 2010 the prosecution authorities opened criminal proceedings against the first applicant for usury. Prior to that, in 2006 and 2009 he had been convicted for an abuse in the exercise of a disputed right and for threatening another person. 8. On 7 April 2011, at about 11 a.m., the first applicant, while travelling in his car which was being driven by his care assistant, was stopped by police officers and ordered to follow them to the police station. Upon arrival, his care assistant was arrested. While the parties have not specified the grounds for this arrest, it is very likely that it was on the basis of the Ministry of the Interior Act, which allowed, inter alia, the detention for up to twenty-four hours of a person suspected of having committed an offence, and that it was related to the investigation against the first applicant. 9. The car remained in the carpark and the first applicant remained in it. Unable to move, he stayed in that position for several hours, guarded by two police officers. At about 3 p.m. his care assistant was brought out under guard to move him to another car, because the first one was going to be impounded as physical evidence. On two or three occasions during the day the second applicant was allowed to come to help him with his physical needs. 10. During the time the first applicant spent in front of the police station, police officers searched his home, his office and his pawnshop, as well as his parents’ flat and house. They also searched the applicant’s cars. The operation against him had been planned in advance. 11. At about 6 p.m., while still in the car and in the presence of his lawyer who had arrived in the meantime, the first applicant had charges of usury brought against him by an investigator. For that purpose the police officers installed the necessary equipment in the carpark, including a computer and a printer. The applicant was invited to make a declaration in relation to the charges; he stated that he was not guilty. 12. The first applicant remained in the car in front of the police station until about 7.30 p.m. After that he was brought in front of the building of the Blagoevgrad Regional Court, which was to hold a hearing to examine an application by the prosecution to place him under house arrest. In the court carpark police officers attempted to take the applicant out of the car and place him in a wheelchair, despite the second applicant’s protests. They gave up, after becoming aware that they could hurt him. After that his care assistant, still in detention, was again brought out under guard. The first applicant was thus able to get out of the car at about 9.30 p.m. He attended the court hearing, which ended at 11.30 p.m. The care assistant remained with him until the end of the hearing. The prosecution’s application to have the first applicant placed under house arrest was allowed. 13. The applicant’s care assistant was released on 8 April 2011 and has not been questioned any further or prosecuted. 14. The Blagoevgrad Regional Court’s decision to place the first applicant under house arrest was upheld on appeal by the Sofia Court of Appeal on 14 April 2011. Before taking its decision, that court heard evidence from, among others, A.Z., who stated that she was the first applicant’s sister and a neurologist and gave evidence concerning the applicant’s state of health. 15. On 22 January 2016 the first applicant had charges brought against him once again, in a detailed bill of indictment listing more than a hundred occasions where he had given loans to individuals at high interest rates. According to reports published in the Bulgarian media, in November 2016 he was indicted and is standing trial at present. 16. The observance of the first applicant’s house arrest was supervised by the police. 17. Between 8 and 14 April 2011 there were no checks on whether he was complying with the measure. 18. On 15 April 2011 the first applicant was seen by patrolling police officers in the city centre. When asked to provide an explanation, he stated that he had gone out to buy something. The police checked on him at his home in the evening of the same day. 19. Between 16 April and 27 May 2011 police officers visited the applicants’ home to check on the first applicant on twenty-nine occasions, once a day and almost every day. On eight days there were no checks at all, and on another four days officers did not go to the applicants’ flat, but observed for some time the building’s entrance. On 29 April 2011 the applicant was met by officers in front of the building as he arrived in his car. 20. On 28 May 2011 officers checked on the first applicant on three occasions, and on two occasions on 30 May. On 31 May they visited the flat on three occasions, but on one of them were not allowed in. 21. On 1 and 2 June 2011 the second applicant did not allow the police into the flat. On 3 June they visited the flat five times; on one of the visits nobody answered the doorbell. 22. Between 4 and 20 June 2011 officers visited the applicants’ flat usually three or four times a day. One of the visits on 16 June was provoked by the fact that the applicant, having received authorisation to visit a physiotherapist, had not shown up for his appointment. 23. During some of the visits the fourth applicant, then eight years old, was present as well. Usually she was taken by her mother to another room. The third applicant, then twenty-three years old, was working full time during this period. 24. On 21 June 2011 the first applicant was released from house arrest, by a decision of the Sofia Court of Appeal, which noted in particular his grave state of health and the fact that much of the evidence in the investigation against him had already been collected.

5. The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Tbilisi. 6. The applicant and K.G. began living together in 1999. On 9 January 2000 their daughter, L.G., was born. She was raised mainly by her maternal grandmother in Georgia while both parents, whose relationship soon ended, left to work abroad. 7. On 31 March 2008 K.G. applied to the Tbilisi City Court for her daughter to be officially registered as resident at her address. On 19 May 2008 a summons was sent to the applicant at his registered address, informing him of K.G.’s action. According to the courier, the summons could not be served as the house was closed up and no one was living there. The summons was only sent once. On 3 June 2008 the court of first instance, acting on the basis of Article 78 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter, “the CCP” – see paragraph 15 below), ordered information concerning the proceedings to be published in a daily newspaper called 24 hours. On 24 June 2008 the Tbilisi City Court granted K.G.’s application. The decision was taken in the absence of the applicant, whose whereabouts, according to the ruling, could not be established. 8. On 12 December 2008 the Tbilisi City Court, acting upon another application by K.G., ruled again by default that L.G. could be issued with an international passport and leave the territory of Georgia without her father’s consent. No specific time-limit for that restriction of the applicant’s parental rights was given in the ruling. The court again stated that the applicant’s whereabouts were unknown and ordered the information about the proceedings to be published in 24 hours. Unlike the first set of default proceedings, the summons was sent twice to the applicant at the address he had registered at. It was again not delivered. The courier noted that the house was closed up. 9. It appears from the case file that the custody and guardianship authority, which represented the interests of the child in the above proceedings, made its own attempts to contact the applicant. In conclusions submitted to the Tbilisi City Court, the authority noted that during its visit to the applicant’s registered address it had learnt from neighbours that he had sold the house in 2003 and left for Moscow. Both default decisions were sent to the applicant’s registered address and, as they could not be served, were consequently published in 24 hours according to the procedure provided for in Article 78 of the CCP (see paragraph 15 below). 10. On 6 June 2012 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Tbilisi City Court, seeking to have both default decisions set aside. He stated that he had learnt about the decisions only in May 2012. He also explained that he had not been living in Georgia at the material time, which his former partner had well known. The default proceedings had been unfair as he had not been properly summoned to the hearings. 11. By a decision of 16 August 2012 the Tbilisi City Court rejected the applicant’s application. The court ruled, with reference to Articles 71 § 3 and 422 of the CCP (see paragraphs 15 and 17 below), that the applicant had been duly informed about the proceedings via public notifications in a newspaper and that there was therefore no legal basis to set the impugned decisions aside. It noted that the applicant had been registered at the address where the summonses had been sent and that for the purposes of the proceedings the courts had been justified in using that very address. 12. That decision was upheld by the Tbilisi Court of Appeal on 31 October 2012. It reasoned that the domestic courts had been right to send the summonses to the applicant’s only available registered address. Furthermore, as it had not been possible to serve the summonses on the applicant, the procedure of delivering a summons via a public notification, as provided for in Article 78 of the CCP, had been duly employed. 13. In his last communication with the Court on 15 December 2014, the applicant stated that he could still not have any contact with his daughter.

5. The applicant was born in 1961 and lives in Blumau. 6. The applicant and his former partner, S.O., have two children, born out of wedlock in 2002 and 2004 respectively. S.O. always had sole custody of the children as the parents never agreed to have joint custody. The applicant and S.O. never cohabited on a permanent basis. The children lived with their mother during the week. At weekends, the whole family usually stayed at the applicant’s house. 7. In April 2008 S.O. and the applicant separated and the children remained with their mother. 8. On 27 June 2008 the applicant lodged an application with the Vienna Inner City District Court (Bezirksgericht Innere Stadt; hereinafter, “the District Court”) to transfer sole custody to him, or to grant him joint custody together with S.O. Furthermore he applied for an interim measure concerning his visiting rights, as he had not seen his children since 20 April 2008. 9. On 8 October 2008 the parents agreed that the applicant would be able to see his children every second Monday from 2.30 pm or 3 pm until 6 pm and every second Saturday from 10 am until 6 pm. 10. On the same day the applicant applied for an extension of his visiting rights to the whole weekend. 11. After five visits from the applicant in October and November 2008, S.O. unilaterally stopped further visits, claiming that these had a negative influence on the children. Between November 2008 and Easter 2009, on his own initiative, the applicant secretly went to see his children at their school and kindergarten a few times. 12. The Vienna Juvenile Court Assistance Office (Jugendgerichtshilfe) submitted its statement on 10 March 2009 and recommended maintaining sole custody for the mother and visiting rights for the applicant according to the agreement the parents had concluded on 8 October 2008. 13. On 6 April 2009 the District Court decided to grant the applicant visiting rights on every second Saturday from 8 am until 7 pm. It dismissed the applicant’s application for sole custody. 14. In its reasoning the court held that the children were well cared for by their mother. According to Article 176 of the Civil Code (Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch) as in force at the relevant time, a transfer of custody was only possible if the children’s best interest was at risk. In the present case the court found no such risk and the applicant actually had not claimed such a risk. The court further held that the visiting rights were decided in accordance with the parents’ mutual agreement. 15. The applicant appealed on 14 April 2009 and argued in essence that he was discriminated against, compared to the mother. Also, he complained that the court had not decided on the question of whether the parents could be awarded joint custody. 16. According to the applicant’s submissions, his visiting rights were resumed on 24 April 2009 in the amount determined by the District Court (see paragraph 13 above). 17. On 28 July 2009 the Vienna Regional Court (Landesgericht) dismissed the applicant’s appeal as unfounded. It confirmed the reasoning of the District Court and held that there was no indication of a risk to the children’s best interest if the mother maintained sole custody. It further held that there was no provision in law ordering a preference for granting one of the parents sole custody. The court also found that the parents had not mutually agreed on joint custody, therefore no further issues arose in this connection. 18. The applicant lodged an extraordinary appeal with the Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof) on 10 November 2009, again claiming that he was discriminated against compared to the mother and that the decision of the lower instances violated his rights under Article 8 of the Convention. 19. On 1 September 2010 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant’s extraordinary appeal for lack of an important issue of law. 20. After the amendment of the Civil Code (see paragraph 22 below), the applicant on 5 February 2013 again applied for joint custody, or sole custody in the alternative. Shortly after, S.O. moved with the children to the south of Austria, about 400 kilometers from Vienna. The applicant’s requests for sole or shared custody were finally dismissed by the Supreme Court on 7 May 2014.

5. The applicant was born in 1967 and until his arrest lived in Menzelinsk, the Tatarstan Republic. 6. In 1999 he was convicted and sent to serve his sentence in a correctional colony. 7. In April 2008 a further set of charges was brought against the applicant. To ensure his participation in the ensuing investigation he was transferred to remand prison no. IZ-16/3 in the Tatarstan Republic (“the remand prison”). On several occasions he was transported to a temporary detention unit at the Naberezhnyye Chelny police station (“the temporary detention unit”). 8. The applicant was detained in the remand prison during several periods between 7 April 2008 and 7 October 2009. At that time he was placed in cells nos. 306, 320 and 512. 9. According to the applicant, for most of the period of his detention, 184 days between 7 April 2008 and 11 February 2009, he was detained alone in cell no. 512. The cell was in a poor sanitary condition and was infested with vermin. The toilet pan was not separated from the living area. The cell was poorly lit and the ventilation system did not function. Metal shutters on the windows blocked access to natural light and fresh air. The cell was not equipped with either a television set or a radio, and newspapers were not available. In the remaining period, until 7 October 2009, the applicant occupied cells nos. 306 and 320. The bedding in those cells was torn and dirty. The cells had no television set or refrigerator. The quality of food in the remand prison was poor. Throughout the entire period of his detention the applicant was allowed access to the exercise yard, which was dirty and dusty, for only fifty minutes a day. 10. During several periods between 23 April 2008 and 21 August 2009, amounting to 207 days in total, the applicant was held in the temporary detention unit. This facility was overpopulated and inmates had no access to outdoor exercise. 11. In October 2008 the applicant complained of toothache to a prison doctor and received painkillers. 12. As the applicant’s suffering continued, on 22 January 2009 an investigator asked the head of the remand prison to arrange for him to be examined by a dentist. A similar request was submitted by the head of the medical unit on 10 February 2009. 13. On 19 May 2009 the custodial authorities transported the applicant to a civilian dentist, who diagnosed chronic pulpitis and periodontitis, and provided some treatment. The dental treatment was not completed. Urgent removal of the applicant’s dental crowns and further treatment with a view to fitting a dental prosthesis were strongly advised. According to the dentist, delay in the treatment could lead to grave complications, such as the loss of the chewing function, osteomyelitis and sepsis. 14. On 25 May 2009 the applicant was taken to a civilian clinic, where a dentist removed his lower dental bridge and one of the problem teeth. The dentist was unable to complete the treatment as the applicant had to be transported back to the detention facility. 15. In June 2009 the applicant brought a civil claim against the prison authorities, seeking dental treatment as advised by the doctor treating him and compensation for non-pecuniary damage. The Naberezhnyye Chelny Town Court dismissed the claim on 19 August 2009, having found that the applicant had been provided with adequate medical assistance. On 17 September 2009 the Supreme Court of the Tatarstan Republic upheld the judgment on appeal. 16. Between 24 December 2009 and 16 March 2010 a civilian dentist removed the dental crowns and bridges from twenty-two of the applicant’s teeth, extracted two teeth, and treated and shaped the remaining teeth for the forthcoming dental restoration work. In a letter to the head of the remand prison dated 30 March 2010, the dentist stressed that it was crucial to ensure that the applicant was transported to the clinic in line with the fixed schedule, starting from 13 April 2010. Failure to do so would entail the necessity to start the treatment anew. The dentist also pointed out that the excessively long time the treatment had taken had already caused substantial suffering to the applicant and increased the risk of digestive problems. 17. Having not been taken to the dentist as recommended, the applicant submitted several requests for the dental treatment, stating that he had lost the ability to chew and in addition to severe teeth pain he started experiencing stomach pain. On 17 June 2010 the authorities gave their approval for the applicant to be transported to the dentist. 18. According to written statements of the applicant’s inmate dated 1 July 2010, the applicant had been tormented by unbearable pain and could not sleep normally for several months. Owing to the constant pain and the lack of teeth the applicant had to refuse prison food for several days. 19. In August 2010 the applicant was taken to a dentist who completed the dental restoration. 20. The applicant complained that throughout the entire period of his dental treatment, when he had been left practically toothless, no alternative soft food had been made available to him.

5. The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Riga. 6. On 5 November 2004 criminal proceedings were instituted in connection with large-scale smuggling of oil products and on 27 September 2005 the applicant was declared a suspect. On the latter date he appointed O.S. as his defence counsel. 7. On 8 June 2006 charges were brought against the applicant and on 22 March 2007 he was issued with a full copy of his criminal case file. It consisted of more than 100 volumes and included – in volumes nos. 33 (64 pages) and 58 (194 pages) – transcripts of the applicant’s telephone conversations with several individuals and also with O.S. (see paragraph 10 below). 8. On 27 March 2007 the case material was sent for adjudication to the first‑instance court. On 9 June 2008 the first-instance court convicted the applicant of large-scale smuggling of oil products, aggravated forgery and money laundering in an organised group and sentenced him to imprisonment of five years and one month. The parties disagree as to whether or not the transcripts of the applicant’s telephone conversations with O.S. were used as evidence against him. 9. On 23 September 2013 the appellate court quashed the first-instance court’s ruling and acquitted the applicant on all counts. In a final decision of 23 April 2014 the Supreme Court refused to institute proceedings on points of law. 10. Over a period of time, the Constitution Protection Bureau (Satversmes aizsardzības birojs), which is one of the Latvian intelligence services, intercepted the applicant’s telephone conversations with several individuals, including O.S. Telephone conversations with the latter were recorded on 8 April, 22 and 27 May, 7 October 2005. Four pages of transcripts of those recordings were subsequently included in the evidence in the criminal case material against the applicant (see paragraph 7 above). 11. The parties disagree as to when the applicant learned about those recordings. They also disagree as to whether O.S. was the applicant’s lawyer at the time of those recordings. According to the applicant, O.S. was his lawyer with effect from 8 February 2005. According to the Government, O.S. was the applicant’s acquaintance; he had become his lawyer only with effect from 27 September 2005, when the applicant appointed him as his defence counsel. 12. According to a document (uzziņa) prepared by the Supreme Court on 27 June 2012 and addressed to the Government, on 26 November 2004 an operational measure – the interception of the applicant’s telephone conversations – had been authorised until 26 January 2005. The document was based on “the Supreme Court’s register of special proceedings (lietvedība) relating to classified State secrets for the year 2004, Volume 11, entry no 2‑4249s of 26 November 2004”. That document also contained further similar entries relating to subsequent authorisations on 25 January, 31 March, 1 June, 22 July, 20 September and 16 November 2005. 13. On 27 June 2006 a prosecutor examined the applicant’s inquiry concerning the recording of his telephone conversations, referring to section 35(1) of the Law on Operational Activities (Operatīvās darbības likums). She informed him that a Supreme Court judge had authorised the measure in accordance with section 7(3) and 7(4) and section 17 of the Law on Operational Activities. She explained the legal regulation pertaining to the use of such recordings in criminal proceedings. She also referred to Article 8 of the Convention and the permissible limitations contained therein. 14. On 13 October 2006 the same prosecutor examined a further complaint from the applicant concerning the lawfulness of the recordings. She stated that the interception had been carried out by the Constitutional Protection Bureau from December 2004 to January 2006. It had been done in accordance with domestic law on suspicion of large-scale tax evasion. Transcripts of the telephone conversations that had been of relevance for the criminal proceedings had been sent to the relevant authority (procesa virzītājs) and would be assessed in the context of those criminal proceedings. 15. On 13 November 2006 the same prosecutor refused the applicant’s request to have sight of the decisions authorising the interception of his telephone conversations as they constituted classified information. 16. On 21 December 2007 the applicant lodged another complaint with the prosecutor’s office concerning the fact that his telephone conversations with his lawyer had been intercepted and that the recordings of those conversations had been played back at a court hearing. The applicant argued that the investigating prosecutor, I.K., had been aware that these were conversations between him and his lawyer and that he had therefore violated domestic law. The applicant asked that the lawfulness of the prosecutor’s actions be examined and that it be decided whether he was suitable for his position. The applicant also called for criminal proceedings to be instituted against I.K. 17. On 3 January 2008 a different prosecutor decided to refuse the institution of criminal proceedings against I.K. 18. On 15 January 2008 the applicant appealed against the refusal to institute criminal proceedings and also complained that the reply of 3 January 2008 had not provided an answer to his request for evaluation of the lawfulness of I.K.’s actions and his suitability for the position of prosecutor. He relied on the relevant provisions of domestic law and Article 8 of the Convention. 19. On 21 January 2008 a higher-ranking prosecutor dismissed the applicant’s complaint. She argued that the applicant had not authorised O.S. to represent him in those criminal proceedings until 27 September 2005 and that the intercepted conversations prior to that date had therefore taken place between the applicant and O.S. as a citizen, not as a practising lawyer. As to the conversation of 7 October 2005, she pointed out that it was not the telephone conversations of O.S. that had been intercepted but those of the applicant, which had been duly authorised by a Supreme Court judge. A reference was made to the fact that the applicant’s complaint concerning the playing back of his telephone conversations at a court hearing had been examined by the first-instance court. Lastly, in rejecting the applicant’s complaint under Article 8 of the Convention, she referred to that Article and the permissible limitations contained therein. That decision included a note that it was final.

7. The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in the United States of America. 8. On 21 December 1995 the Tirana District Court (“the District Court”) acknowledged the inherited property rights of some landowners over a plot of land measuring 24 hectares (vendim për vërtetim fakti). On 13 February 1996 the District Court acknowledged that the landowners also had inherited property rights over installations and fuel tanks of a petrol station located on the land (vendim për vërtetim fakti). 9. In the meantime, on the assumption that the landowners’ properties would be restored in natura by the Commission on Property Restitution and Compensation, in January and February 1996, the applicant concluded two agreements with one of the landowners, who was acting on his own and the remaining heirs’ behalf, whereby the applicant would assist the landowners in the process of the privatisation of installations and fuel tanks on the land (see paragraphs 21-22 below). In May 1996 he concluded a sales contract (see paragraph 23 below). Following the conclusion of these contracts, the validity of which became the object of a dispute (see section B below), all landowners appointed the applicant to act on their behalf in proceedings related to the protection of their property rights. 10. On the strength of the District Court’s decisions, on an unspecified date the landowners lodged a request with the Tirana Commission on Property Restitution and Compensation (“the Commission”) seeking restitution of the above-mentioned property by the domestic authorities. On 7 March 1996 the Commission dismissed the landowners’ request on the grounds that the land was not subject to the Property Act as it was located outside the legal city boundaries (ndodhen jashtë vijave kufizuese). The landowners appealed to the District Court. 11. On 24 April 1996 the District Court quashed the Commission’s decision and allocated the landowners a plot of land measuring 56,500 sq. m. Relying on an expert’s report, the court held that the value of the respective installations and fuel tanks constructed thereon did not exceed 20% of the land’s total value. It therefore ordered that these objects be restored at no cost. The petrol station was situated on the main road between the cities of Tirana and Durrës and it was used and administered by two State-owned oil companies. The judgment became final on 7 May 1996, no appeal having been lodged against it. 12. Subsequent to the above judgment, on 30 May 1996 the Mortgage Office issued a property certificate (vërtetim pronësie – Ipoteka), according to which the landowners had registered title to the plot of land measuring 56,500 sq. m. on which the fuel tanks and installations had been erected (mortgage register entry no. 3350 of 8 May 1996). The petrol station and fuel tanks were subsequently expropriated in the public interest. 13. Between 1996 and 1998 the landowners’ property rights were unsuccessfully challenged by various State institutions. On one occasion the domestic courts dismissed the claim, whereas on four other occasions they discontinued the proceedings on various grounds. The applicant joined the proceedings as a third party. 14. On 25 March 1998 the Ministry of Economy challenged the lawfulness of the District Court’s judgment of 24 April 1996 (see paragraph 11 above) recognising the landowners’ property rights. The action was dismissed by the Supreme Court with final effect on 22 December 1999. 15. On 28 December 1999 and 7 January 2000 the Ministry of Economy and the State-owned oil companies lodged two separate applications for supervisory review of the domestic judgments upholding the landowners’ property rights, namely the District Court’s judgment of 24 April 1996 and the Supreme Court’s judgment of 22 December 1999. 16. On 12 May 2000 the Supreme Court Joint Benches gave two separate decisions by accepting both applications for supervisory review and the reopening of the proceedings. A constitutional appeal lodged by the applicant on 1 August 2000 was declared inadmissible by the Constitutional Court on 7 December 2000. As a result of the remittal of the cases to the District Court, on an unspecified date the court decided to join the proceedings. The applicant took part in them as a third party. 17. In the first set of rehearing proceedings, the case was heard by the District Court, the Tirana Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”) and the Supreme Court, which on 18 March 2003 decided to remit the case to the Court of Appeal for a further rehearing. 18. In the second set of rehearing proceedings, the case was heard by the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, which on 27 October 2005 decided to remit the case to the Court of Appeal for fresh consideration. 19. In the third set of rehearing proceedings, the case was heard by the Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court, which gave its final decision on 20 September 2009. The domestic courts ruled in favour of the landowners. 20. In the meantime, on 19 June 2007 the Tirana Agency for the Restitution and Compensation of Property, which had replaced the Commission, recognised the landowners’ inherited property rights over the plot of land measuring 24 hectares (240,000 sq. m) and ordered that they be compensated in respect of 183,500 sq. m in one of the forms prescribed by law, the remaining 56,500 sq. m having already been decided upon by the authorities. The authorities’ failure to pay compensation in respect of the 183,500 sq. m is the subject of application no. 5915/14, of which notice was given to the Government as a follow-up to the Court’s pilot judgment in the case of Manushaqe Puto and Others v. Albania (nos. 604/07, 43628/07, 46684/07 and 34770/09, 31 July 2012). 21. On 18 January 1996 one of the landowners, acting on his own and the remaining heirs’ behalf, concluded an agreement (akt marrëveshje) with the applicant’s company, according to which the latter would secure finance for the privatisation of fuel tanks and installations located on the landowners’ plot of land, in respect of which they would exercise their right of first refusal (e drejta e parablerjes) at the time of privatisation. In return, the landowners would transfer ownership rights to the applicant’s company upon privatisation. Subsequent to this transaction, the parties would form a joint company, whose registered capital would be made up of the applicant’s company’s ownership of the fuel tanks and other installations, as well as the landowners’ ownership of the plot of land. 22. On 29 February 1996 the same landowner, again acting on his own and the remaining heirs’ behalf, concluded a similar agreement (akt marrëveshje) with the applicant’s company for the privatisation of the fuel tanks and installations, the difference being that some objects would remain the landowners’ property. 23. On 23 May 1996 the same landowner, again acting on his own and the remaining heirs’ behalf, concluded a notarised sales contract with the applicant for the sale of almost all of the fuel tanks and installations for 100,000 United States dollars (USD), which, according to the contract, was paid by the applicant to the landowners. On the same date the Mortgage Office issued a property certificate (vërtetim pronësie – Ipoteka), according to which the applicant had registered title to the petrol station fuel tanks and installations (mortgage register entry no. 4135 of 23 May 1996). 24. On 23 and 25 May 1996 the same landowner, acting on his own behalf, concluded two loan agreements with the applicant to lend the latter a total of USD 200,000. The agreements contained no details as to the purpose of the loan. 25. On 10 October 2002 the landowners instituted proceedings against the applicant seeking the annulment of the agreements and contract concluded between February and May 1996 (see paragraphs 21-24 above). They requested the court to declare the agreements and contract null and void (pavlefshmëri absolute) without any legal consequences for the parties whatsoever. The claim was signed by their lawyer, to whom they had given power of attorney. 26. Following remittals of the case, on 31 March 2005 the District Court decided to discontinue the proceedings (pushimin e çështjes) as the landowners had failed to attend court without good reason. 2. Second set of proceeding concerning the nullity of the contract and agreements concluded in 1996 (a) Proceedings before the District Court 27. On 17 April 2005 the landowners instituted a fresh set of proceedings against the applicant seeking the annulment of the agreements and contract concluded between February and May 1996. The claim was signed by only their lawyer. 28. On an unspecified date the landowners requested the District Court to obtain and process all documents from the case-file concerning the first set of proceedings, including the powers of attorney. The court accepted this request. 29. On 27 July 2005 the applicant requested the court to stay the proceedings pending the outcome of a criminal complaint he had lodged with the district prosecutor’s office against the landowners alleging forgery of documents. 30. On 20 October, 11 and 18 November 2005 and 27 February 2006 the applicant, having regard to the number of previous requests that had been rejected, challenged the bench. 31. On 15 November 2005 the presiding judge of the bench withdrew from the case, given the applicant’s repeated requests for withdrawal. On 9 December 2005 the President of the District Court set aside the withdrawal, finding that it did not contain any of the grounds stipulated in Article 72 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 32. On 17 February 2006 the applicant lodged a counterclaim requesting the court to decide the requests he had already submitted for the withdrawal of the bench. According to the counterclaim, the landowners had not authorised their lawyer to represent them in the proceedings and their claim was time-barred. Furthermore, the loan agreements were fictitious and their conclusion with only one of the landowners could not have a bearing on the sales contract of the fuel tanks and installations. The applicant argued that a number of factors pointed to his having lawful property rights over the fuel tanks and installations, such as the fact that all the agreements and contracts were lawful and valid, the property had been registered in his name, he had represented the landowners in the domestic proceedings and he had taken legal action to defend their interests. 33. On 18 April 2006 the District Court declared the agreements and contracts null and void (absolute nullity). It found them to be fictitious on the grounds that they had been concluded at a time when the said property in question was being administered by the State, no property rights having been transferred to the landowners. In accordance with the law, the installations had been privatised at no cost, because their value was less than 20% of the land’s value. Furthermore, no joint company had been set up by the applicant and landowners and no money had been lent to the applicant in accordance with the loan agreements. They had been concluded with a view to having an assurance for the execution of the sales contract, in which the sale price was the same. Despite the property certificate (no. 4135 of 23 May 1996), the fact that no actions had been effected pursuant to the agreements and contracts and that no legal consequences had resulted for the parties, the District Court concluded that the agreements were fictitious in accordance with Article 92(ç) of the Civil Code. It further ordered that the entry of 23 May 1996 (see paragraph 23 above) in the immovable property register be erased. (b) Proceedings before the Court of Appeal 34. The applicant appealed, arguing that the District Court bench was biased because disciplinary proceedings had been instituted for the dismissal of the presiding judge of the bench for breaches of law. In this connection, the withdrawal of the presiding judge of the bench had not been accepted by the President of the District Court and his four requests for the withdrawal of the bench were rejected, no such mention having been made in the hearing records. The applicant further submitted that the claim had been brought outside the statutory time-limit, and had been signed by only the lawyer and not the landowners, the power of attorney dating back to 2002 and being limited in time and scope, and that the facts of the claim were unrelated. He also objected to the fact that his counterclaims of 28 June 2005 and 17 February 2006 had not been admitted to the case-file. Moreover, he contended that the District Court had not accepted any of the twenty-four requests for pieces of evidence he had produced, and had made findings in excess of the requests contained in the object of the claim. He argued that four hearings had been held between 6 April and 4 July 2005, without the landowners providing any good reason for their non-appearance to supplement the claim. In his view, his spouse, who was a co-owner, should have been invited to attend the hearings. Finally, he claimed that the contracts had been concluded in complete conformity with the domestic law and that there had been no need to summon witnesses. In this connection, the landowners had confirmed the applicant’s ownership of the plot of land by way of specific powers of attorney, while the applicant had lodged numerous procedural requests, applications and appeals and had attended hearings to defend his and their property rights. 35. On 30 November 2006 the applicant challenged the bench in the light of the previous decisions given against him. On the same date he requested that thirty-nine items of evidence and twenty procedural requests absent from the case-file before the District Court be readmitted. 36. On 4 December 2006 the applicant requested that eight additional items of evidence be admitted to the case-file. 37. On 19 February 2007 the Deputy President of the Court of Appeal requested the Minister of Justice to appoint three judges from other appellate courts to hear the case, since all of its judges had sat in the proceedings. 38. On 15 March 2007 the Minister of Justice, following a decision taken by the High Council of Justice (“HCJ”), informed the Court of Appeal that three judges of the Military Court of Appeal would hear the case. 39. On 29 March 2007 the applicant challenged the new composition of the bench, submitting that the HCJ should appoint judges from other ordinary appellate courts instead of the Military Court of Appeal. 40. On 25 May 2007 the Court of Appeal, composed of three judges, upheld the District Court’s judgment of 18 April 2006 (see paragraph 33 above). It transpires that the applicant had withdrawn the request for the exemption of the bench from hearing the case, and that the court had partially reopened the judicial examination and accepted new items of evidence as produced by him. The Court of Appeal held that the objects mentioned in the agreements and contracts of 1996 were, at the time of the judgment, being administered by the State and that their ownership had not yet been transferred to the landowners. Consequently, those contracts and agreements were fictitious under Article 92 (ç) of the Civil Code and were of no legal effect. It rejected all of the applicant’s arguments as unfounded and held that he had failed to adduce evidence to object to or challenge the landowners’ claim, which was supported by the documents contained in the case-file. According to the Court of Appeal, a claim requesting absolute nullity was not subject to a statutory limitation period. 41. The presiding judge of the bench, judge Y.M, dissented. In a separate opinion, he stated that the claim had not been signed by the landowners. The evidence in the case-file was not capable of demonstrating that the agreements were fictitious, since the parties’ intentions had been real and lawful. As a result, the landowners did not have legal standing to bring the claim as they could not prove that there had been a breach of a substantial right (e drejta materiale). Their claim was time-barred and the courts had failed to take into account the statutory limitation period. The evidence produced by the applicant showed that the landowners, by virtue of powers of attorney or other documents issued between 1997 and 2005, had appointed the applicant to act as their representative. This pointed to the fact that the parties had wished their transactions to have legal effect and this, in itself, contradicted the fictitious nature of the agreements and contracts. In his view, the court had rejected all of the applicant’s requests without giving any reasons in the decision. (c) Proceedings before the Supreme Court 42. On 9 July 2007 the applicant appealed, raising seventy-two grounds of appeal. In addition to maintaining the same complaints he had raised before the Court of Appeal, he alleged that the composition of the District Court had not been drawn by lots and that the Court of Appeal had not been a “tribunal established by law” as it had been composed of military judges. He claimed that his requests for the withdrawal of the Court of Appeal judges had not been examined and that his requests for the admission of numerous items of evidence had not been processed by the Court of Appeal. He further objected to the lower courts’ application and interpretation of the domestic law since, in his view, he had been authorised by the landowners to act as their representative, had lodged various appeals and other procedural requests and followed the judicial proceedings with the landowners, had requested the enforcement of final decisions on his and the landowners’ behalf and had sought the criminal prosecution of third parties. 43. On 23 November 2007 the Supreme Court decided to stay execution of the Court of Appeal’s judgment of 25 May 2007 pending the outcome of the applicant’s appeal. 44. On 25 January 2010 the Supreme Court declared the applicant’s appeal inadmissible in accordance with Article 472 of the Code of Civil Procedure (no valid grounds of appeal). (d) Proceedings before the Constitutional Court 45. On 18 March 2010 the applicant lodged an eighty-three page constitutional appeal. On 15 September 2010 he supplemented it with a fifteen-page memorandum. In addition to maintaining the same grounds of appeal he had raised before the lower courts, the applicant also complained of a lack of reasoning in the Supreme Court’s decision and about the length of the proceedings. 46. On 17 September 2010 the applicant requested that judges X.Z, S.B and F.A withdraw from the appeal on the grounds that they had rejected a previous constitutional appeal lodged by him on 20 September 2009 in relation to another unrelated set of proceedings. On 27 September 2010 he requested that judge V.T withdraw from the appeal on the grounds that she had been on the bench that had decided against him in another appeal in 2000. 47. On 17 January 2011 the applicant was informed of the Constitutional Court’s decision of 22 November 2010 rejecting his appeal. It found nothing to suggest a lack of impartiality on the part of the Supreme Court bench and that, even though some of the judges had heard previous appeals lodged by the applicant with the Supreme Court, those appeals concerned different facts, parties and sets of proceedings. It dismissed the remaining complaints, finding that they related to the assessment of facts and the outcome of the proceedings, which was within the lower courts’ jurisdiction.

6. The applicant, who is of Roma origin, was born in 1988 and lives in Gyöngyöspata, a village of 2,800 people, about 450 of whom are of Roma origin. 7. On 6 March 2011 the Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom), a right-wing political party, held a demonstration in Gyöngyöspata. Between 1 and 16 March 2011, in connection with the demonstration, the Civil Guard Association for a Better Future (Szebb Jövőért Polgárőr Egyesület) and two right-wing paramilitary groups (Betyársereg and Véderő) organised marches in the Roma neighbourhood of the village. 8. On 6, 9, and 10 March 2011, during the demonstration and the marches, there was a considerable police presence in Gyöngyöspata. 9. At around 11 a.m. on 10 March 2011 Mr J.F., the president of the local Roma minority self-governing body, informed the police that he and the mayor of the municipality had been threatened by people they did not know. The mayor reported on the same events to the police, explaining that earlier that day some fifty members of the Roma minority had confronted approximately fifteen members of the Civil Guard Association, who were joined by four or five unknown persons, one of whom had an axe and another a whip. 10. As it appears from the case file, at around the same time four men passed by the applicant’s house, yelling “Go inside, you damned dirty gypsies!” At this time the applicant was outside the house in her garden together with her daughter and some acquaintances. In response to the four men, the applicant and her acquaintances told them to leave, saying that it was their village. One of the men continued threatening them by yelling that he would build a house in the Roma neighbourhood “out of their blood”. He stepped towards the fence swinging an axe towards the applicant, but was held back by one of his companions. 11. At around 2 p.m. on the same day police officers K.K. and A.B. stopped and searched four individuals, Mr S.T., Mr F.W., Mr Cs.F., and Mr G.M. The mayor of Gyöngyöspata identified two of them, Mr S.T. and Mr F.W., as having participated in the incident that morning. The men were members of Betyársereg. Mr S.T. informed the police that he was the leader of one of the “clans” within the organisation. He said that because some members of his group, about 200 people, intended to come to Gyöngyöspata “to put the Roma situation in order”, he was there to “scout” the village. Later the same day, Mr S.T., who by then was extremely drunk, was again spotted by the police being dragged away from the Roma settlement by a female acquaintance. When questioned by the police, he said he only wanted to play football with the Roma children. 12. On 7 April 2011 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint against “unknown perpetrators” with the Heves County Regional Police Department, alleging offences of violence against a member of an ethnic group, harassment and attempted grievous bodily assault. The police opened an investigation on charges of violent harassment under section 176/A (2) of the Criminal Code. 13. In parallel, the Gyöngyös District Public Prosecutor’s Office opened an investigation on suspicion of harassment based on the report of a third person, Mr J.F., the president of the local Roma minority self-governing body. 14. On 12 April 2011 the applicant was heard as a witness concerning the events. She testified that three men and a woman had passed by her house and one of them, brandishing a whip, had threatened to build a house out of her blood. 15. At the request of her lawyer, the Gyöngyös Police Department informed the applicant that criminal proceedings had been instituted on charges of harassment on the basis of the criminal complaint lodged by Mr J.F. Subsequently, the applicant was informed that her complaint had been joined to that of Mr J.F. 16. On 14 July 2011 the Gyöngyös Police Department discontinued these proceedings on the grounds that harassment was punishable only if directed against a well-defined person, and that criminal liability could not be established on the basis of threats uttered “in general”. 17. The police also instituted minor offence proceedings on the ground that the impugned conduct was “antisocial”. 18. On 14 September 2011 a hearing was held in the ensuing minor offence proceedings in which Mr S.T. and five other persons, Mr C.S.F., Mr F.W., Mr G.M., Mrs A.B.I., and Mr I.N.I. appeared before the Gyöngyös District Court on charges of disorderly conduct. All six persons subject to the proceedings denied having threatened any members of the Roma community. Mr J.F., questioned as a witness, maintained that two of the persons subject to the proceedings had been wielding an axe and a whip and had threatened the inhabitants of the Roma settlement that they would kill them and paint the houses with their blood. Mr L.T., the mayor of Gyöngyöspata, identified one of the persons as having been present in Gyöngyöspata on 10 March 2011, but could not confirm that the threats had been directed at the Roma. Another witness, P.F., identified three of the persons as having participated in the incident and maintained that it was Mr I.N.I. who had threatened the inhabitants of the Roma settlement. The applicant, who was also heard as a witness, identified Mr S.T. and Mr F.W. as having been armed and Mr S.T. as having said that he would “paint the houses with [the applicant’s] blood.” 19. On an unspecified date the applicant attached to the criminal file extracts from comments posted on a right-wing Internet portal in which Mr S.T. had been referred to as the man who had “enforced order among the Roma of Gyöngyöspata with a single whip”. 20. At a further court hearing on 5 October 2011 the applicant’s legal representative requested that the minor offence proceedings be stayed because criminal proceedings against unknown perpetrators were pending. 21. On 7 October 2011, following a complaint that procedural errors had been committed by the Heves County Regional Police Department in the investigation of Mr J.F.’s complaint, the Gyöngyös District Public Prosecutor’s Office informed the applicant that it had opened a separate investigation into the allegations of harassment on the basis of the applicant’s complaint. 22. On 20 October 2011, in the criminal proceedings on charges of harassment, the applicant’s lawyer requested the Gyöngyös District Prosecutor’s Office to open an investigation into “violence against a member of an ethnic group” under article 174/B (1) of the Criminal Code. He maintained that the motive of the threats uttered against the applicant was her Roma origin. His allegation was supported by the fact that at the material time various paramilitary groups were “inspecting” the Roma settlement with the aim of “hindering Gypsy criminality”. 23. On 3 November 2011 the prosecutor’s office refused the request, finding that the use of force, the objective element of the criminal offence of “violence against a member of a group” under article 174/B (1) of the Criminal Code as in force at the material time could not be established at that stage of the proceedings. On 28 November 2011 the applicant reiterated her request, apparently without success. 24. The identities of the persons who had passed by the applicant’s house and that of the alleged perpetrator, Mr S.T., were established by the investigating authorities. Moreover, the Police Department questioned a number of witnesses, including the applicant’s acquaintances present during the incident, but only two of them provided statements relevant for the case. Mr S.T. refused to testify. 25. On 2 February 2012 the Gyöngyös Police Department discontinued the investigation into harassment on the grounds that none of the witnesses heard had substantiated the applicant’s allegation that she had been threatened. The Police Department noted that Mr S.T. had refused to testify and the witness testimony of Mrs I.B. had confirmed only that threats had been made, but not that they had been directed against a certain person. 26. The applicant challenged that decision, arguing that the witness testimonies had clearly stated that Mr S.T. had uttered degrading threats and that from the circumstances of the case it was clear that they had been directed against her. She also submitted that the investigating authorities had failed to hear Mr S.T. and two other individuals suspected of the offences. 27. On 21 March 2012 the Gyöngyös District Public Prosecutor’s Office upheld the first-instance decision. The Prosecutor’s Office found that it could not be established on the basis of the witness testimonies whether Mr S.T. had been armed and whether the threats and insults he had uttered had been directed at the applicant. Thus neither the criminal offence of harassment, nor “violence against a member of a group” could be established. This decision was served on the applicant on 2 April 2012, informing the applicant of the possibility to pursue substitute private prosecution proceedings. 28. On 1 June 2012 the applicant, acting as substitute private prosecutor, lodged an application with the Gyöngyös District Court, which was declared admissible on 13 June 2012. 29. On 6 November 2012 the criminal proceedings were discontinued since the applicant had withdrawn the charges, in her submission, because of for fear of reprisals.

5. The applicants were born in 1960 and 1956 respectively and live in Riga. 6. On an unspecified date the Bureau for the Prevention and Combating of Corruption (“the KNAB”) received information concerning allegedly unlawful activities of officials of the State Pharmacy Inspectorate. Aiming to verify that information, the KNAB launched operational proceedings (operatīvā izstrāde). In the context of those proceedings the second applicant, who at that time was the owner of a chain of pharmacies in Latvia, was summoned to the KNAB to give statements about the activities of certain State officials supervising pharmaceutical matters in Latvia. 7. According to the document (uzziņa) prepared by the Supreme Court on 27 July 2012 and addressed to the Government, on 10 March 2005 an operational measure – the interception of the second applicant’s telephone conversations – had been authorised until 12 May 2005. The document was based on “the Supreme Court’s register of special proceedings (lietvedība) relating to classified State secrets for the year 2005, Volume 13, entry no 2‑1264s of 19 March 2005”. 8. Upon being summoned by the KNAB, on 12 April 2005 the second applicant went to its offices, where he was questioned by two investigators, H. and J. Initially, he refused to cooperate and instead asked J. questions about his duties. 9. On 13 April 2005 the second applicant arranged a meeting with J. away from the KNAB’s offices. On the KNAB’s behalf, the meeting was organised as an undercover operation under section 15(3) of the Law on Operational Activities, and prior authorisation from a specially authorised prosecutor of the Prosecutor General’s Office was obtained. 10. On 13 and 14 April 2005 three meetings took place between the second applicant and J. During the second meeting, which was video and audio recorded by J., the second applicant offered J. a bribe in the amount of 50,000 Latvian lati (LVL) and monthly payments of LVL 1,000 in return for the cessation of any investigative activities concerning his business and the State officials connected with it. During the meeting the second applicant paid J. LVL 18,000 as a first instalment. 11. Meanwhile, the second applicant called the first applicant, who was a board member of the company he owned. He asked her to withdraw cash from the company’s account. He explained that the money would be spent on “protection”. Their phone conversations were intercepted and recorded. 12. The next day, the second applicant arranged another meeting, during which he gave the investigator LVL 27,000. On the same day he was arrested by KNAB officers. 13. After the second applicant’s meeting with J., on 13 April 2005 the KNAB instituted criminal proceedings for bribery. The second applicant was charged as a suspect. The charging decision was sent to the Prosecutor General’s Office so that the prosecution could commence. 14. On 22 April 2005 a prosecutor of the Prosecutor General’s Office questioned the second applicant. The second applicant pleaded guilty and stated that the payments had been intended to prevent further investigation into his business activities. 15. In a letter of 31 May 2005 the KNAB informed the supervising prosecutor at the Prosecutor General’s Office that the second applicant’s phone had been tapped in accordance with section 17(3) of the Law on Operational Activities “upon the authorisation of a judge of the Supreme Court”. The KNAB asked for the recordings to be included in the criminal case file. 16. On 2 June 2005 the Office of the Prosecutor brought a charge of aiding and abetting against the first applicant, and a charge of bribery against the second applicant. 17. On 30 June 2005 both applicants were questioned by a prosecutor of the Prosecutor General’s Office. The first applicant pleaded guilty. 18. On 12 July 2005, having studied the material in the criminal case file, the representative of the first applicant asked the prosecutor to disclose a document attesting to the lawfulness of the interception of the telephone conversations between both applicants. On the same day the supervising prosecutor dismissed that request, arguing that the decision to authorise interception of the telephone conversations of the applicant and other persons had been adopted under 17(3) of the Law on Operational Activities, and therefore was not a procedural document. Moreover, the document had been classified as a State secret. The prosecutor also argued that the existence of such authorisation had been confirmed by the KNAB, and that there were no grounds to question the validity of that confirmation. The first applicant did not appeal against that reply to a more senior prosecutor. 19. On 15 July 2005 the criminal case concerning both applicants was referred to a court. 20. It appears that on 18 October 2005 the representative of the first applicant sent a complaint about the activities of KNAB officials in relation to the phone tapping to the Prosecutor General’s Office. The prosecutor in charge replied that the phone tapping had been authorised by a judge of the Supreme Court, and that the KNAB had not infringed any provisions of the Law on Operational Activities. The prosecutor also stated that the information obtained as a result of the operational activities was open to assessment in the course of the criminal proceedings. The first applicant did not appeal against that reply to the Prosecutor General. 21. On 2 November 2005 the Riga City Vidzeme District Court, acting as a first-instance court and presided over by Judge B.T., acquitted the first applicant. The court found the second applicant guilty and gave him a suspended sentence of two years’ imprisonment. He pleaded guilty during the hearing, therefore the court proceeded without assessing the evidence. 22. On 8 November 2005 the prosecutor submitted an appeal contesting the acquittal of the first applicant, and asked for an immediate custodial sentence to be imposed in relation to the second applicant. He asked the appellate court to give a new judgment in respect of the parts of the original judgment which were contested. The second applicant submitted an appeal concerning the severity of his sentence. 23. Between 24 and 27 October 2006 the Riga Regional Court, acting as an appellate court, held several hearings during which the second applicant pleaded guilty. The representative of the first applicant submitted that the case file did not contain any information pertaining to the authorisation of the interception of phone conversations, which had been the main evidence against her. During the hearing, the prosecutor confirmed orally that judicial authorisation had been obtained. 24. On 31 October 2006 the appellate court adopted a judgment which upheld the prosecutor’s appeal and quashed the disputed parts of the lower court’s judgment. The appellate court found the first applicant guilty, giving her a suspended sentence of one year’s imprisonment. It also revoked the suspension of the second applicant’s prison sentence and he was taken directly to prison from the courtroom. The appellate court stated, inter alia, “the court recognises all the evidence in the criminal case as admissible, on the grounds that the factual information has been obtained and established (nostiprinātas) in line with procedure and in accordance with the order set out by law ...”. 25. In an appeal on points of law the first applicant argued that the tapped phone conversations should not have been admitted as evidence, as they had been obtained without proper authorisation. The second applicant submitted, inter alia, that the appellate court had not assessed the lawfulness of the phone tapping and had ignored the fact that the criminal case had contained no reference to any authorisation to carry out the above activity as prescribed by Article 176¹ of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In this regard, he also submitted that the appellate court had consequently failed to observe that interference in a person’s private life should be in accordance with the law, as required by Article 8 of the Convention. 26. On 19 January 2007 the Senate of the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on points of law in open court. In response to the Article 8 complaint, the Senate stated that the phone had been tapped “in accordance with section 17 of the Law on Operational Activities, and not as a special investigative measure under Article 176¹ of the Code of Criminal Procedure”. 27. Meanwhile, during a judges’ conference on 4 November 2005, the Minister of Justice stated in her opening speech: “Today I would say that I, like the majority of you sitting in this hall, am powerless against the actions of our colleagues, which neither society nor I personally understand”. 28. A daily news report on 4 November 2005 mentioned that the minister had admitted to journalists that she had been referring to the judgment adopted by Judge B.T. in her speech (see paragraph 21 above): “Yes, I am not authorised to comment on particular cases where the adjudication is still pending, but I consider that I have the right to express an opinion on behalf of other judges who carry out their work honestly.”

5. The first applicant was born in 1933 and lives in Brussels. The second applicant was born in 1958 and is detained in Verviers Prison. 6. On 12 January 1998 an attempted robbery was carried out on an armoured van owned by the B.Z. company on the motorway adjacent to the municipality of Waremme in Belgium. Two of the three occupants of the van were killed. Two vehicles abandoned by the perpetrators were found on the scene, and a Kalashnikov, two Fal-type magazines and ammunition were discovered inside the latter. 7. A ballistic expert assessment carried out on 14 February 1998 revealed that the Fal-type weapon had been used in an attack on a mail van in Dison in 1996. 8. The surviving occupant of the armoured van recounted the attack, pointing out that it had been carried out by five masked men wearing gloves. 9. The Liège public prosecutor submitted those facts to an investigating judge, classifying them as assault and robbery accompanied by murder. 10. An anonymous witness stated that the possible offenders included one L.C., who had been convicted of offences linked to organised crime and had been acting as an informer, as well as L.M., who subsequently became a co-defendant (see paragraph 13 below). On 30 March 1998 L.C. stated that he had been invited by the second applicant and C.K., who was also a co-defendant, to reconnoitre the area prior to the attack on the B.Z. armoured van. L.C.’s partner, E.E., subsequently confirmed that witness statement. The anonymous witness was murdered on 4 October 1999. 11. According to a document prepared by the Liège Federal Police on 19 June 2002, an individual who had been detained at the time, R.C., had voiced a wish to “cooperate with the judicial authorities in exchange for certain advantages”. On 11 March 2002 R.C., who was known to the police in connection with numerous robbery offences, had been charged with complicity in armed robbery in a different banditry case, the “B. case”. On 20 June 2002, R.C. was questioned by the police concerning the attack on the B.Z. van and the Dison mail van. 12. On 24 June 2002 the arrest warrant issued against R.C. in the B. case was quashed on the grounds of insufficient evidence, but he remained in detention to serve the remainder of a two-and-a-half year sentence. 13. According to the aforementioned document (see paragraph 11 above), when R.C. had again been questioned by the police on 25 June 2002, he had mentioned, in connection with the attack on the B.Z. van, the names of the applicants and of L.M. and J.S., who subsequently became co-defendants. 14. On 30 September 2002 a warrant was issued for the purposes of a police hearing of R.C., following which he was first questioned officially on 2 October 2002. On that occasion he confirmed his wish to make disclosures on high-profile individuals in the organised crime circles, including the applicants, and, in particular, on the attack on the armoured van in Waremme. 15. On 25 October 2002, according to the aforementioned document prepared by the Liège Federal Police, the Witness Protection Board ordered provisional emergency protection measures in respect of R.C. 16. On 28 October 2002 R.C. was heard by the investigating judge as a witness under oath. R.C.’s statements were reproduced in the indictments subsequently drawn up by the Federal Prosecutor. He admitted his involvement in preparing the attack on the van at the beginning of 1994, stating that the second applicant had been one of the instigators. He explained that in 1997 he had left the group of instigators following his conviction for other offences. Subsequently, while in prison in 2000, he had approached M.A., a member of the aforementioned group, which had in the end refrained from taking part in the attack on the van. M.A. had recounted the course of events and discussed the first applicant’s involvement in the attack on the van. 17. On 5 November 2002 R.C. was released on licence. 18. On 31 October 2002 the first applicant had a face-to-face meeting with R.C. and a warrant was issued for his arrest. The second applicant was arrested on 4 November 2002. 19. Appearing before the investigating judge, the applicants denied any involvement in the attack on the van in Waremme, claiming that L.C. and R.C., who were themselves involved in organised crime, had provided false information. The first applicant also described, as an alibi, exactly what he had been doing and when on the day of the attack on the van. 20. The applicants were released on licence in the absence of sufficient evidence to prolong their pre-trial detention, under decisions taken by the Indictments Division of the Liège Court of Appeal, on 30 October 2003 in respect of the first applicant and on 27 November 2003 in respect of the second applicant. 21. On 15 September 2004 L.M., one of the co-defendants, was murdered. 22. On 15 November 2004 D.S. informed the Liège Federal Police Department that he feared for his life and that he was prepared to submit to questioning on L.M.’s murder in exchange for police protection. The police questioned him on 2 December 2004. On 6 December 2004 he officially informed the authorities of his intention to cooperate with the authorities and to give statements on the Waremme attack. 23. According to the indictment subsequently drawn up by the Federal Prosecutor (see paragraph 34 below), R.C. and D.S. hardly knew each other even though they both belonged to the world of organised crime. 24. On 9, 10 and 16 December 2004 D.S. officially gave evidence as a witness, and his statements were reproduced in the indictment. He provided the investigators with information which he had obtained from L.M., in particular stating the names of those involved in the attack, including the applicants, and mentioning that the attack had been prepared a long time in advance by a different team and that one of the weapons discovered in one of the vehicles abandoned at the scene of the crime had been purchased by L.M. from the first applicant and used in an attack on a van in 1996. 25. On 20 December 2004 D.S. was granted provisional emergency protection. In a statement of 28 October 2005 he mentioned the assistance which he had received by way of protection measures. The special protection was lifted on 22 December 2005. 26. After D.S.’s initial statements, the investigators travelled to France following an international letter of request in order to present M.A. with the statements made by D.S. M.A admitted that he had met the latter and that they had discussed the information which he had given R.C. in confidence (see paragraph 16 above), and also that he had reconnoitred with R.C. prior to the van attack. 27. On 8 March 2005 H.P., the wife of the late L.M., was also questioned, in the framework of police protection measures, in particular concerning the B.Z. van attack. She cited the name of the second applicant but said that she did not know whether the first applicant had taken part in the van attack. 28. In 2006 the applicants had several face-to-face meetings with the witnesses D.S. and H.P., who maintained their statements. 29. In the meantime, on the basis of the statements by D.S. and H.P., the applicants were arrested once again, on 18 May and 8 June 2005 respectively. Appearing before the investigating judge, they contested the new evidence against them, arguing that D.S. was an untrustworthy character who had negotiated his witness statement in order to secure criminal impunity. The second applicant also contested H.P.’s statements. Subsequently, the first applicant admitted that the alibi which he had put forward after his first arrest (see paragraph 19 above) had been “made up”. 30. On 28 September 2006 the Indictments Division of the Liège Court of Appeal ordered the first applicant’s release. 31. On 19 December 2006 the investigation was closed by the investigating judge. On 6 March 2007 the Federal Prosecutor applied for twelve persons, including the applicants, to be committed for trial. On 26 June 2007 the Liège Court of First Instance, sitting in private, committed those twelve defendants for trial before the Indictments Division of the Liège Court of Appeal in order to decide on possible committal for trial before the Assize Court. On 3 December 2007 the Indictments Division committed the twelve defendants for trial before the Liège Assize Court. 32. Four persons, including the first applicant, lodged appeals on points of law against the judgment of the Indictments Division. Those appeals on points of law were dismissed by the Court of Cassation by judgment of 19 March 2008. 33. In February 2008 D.S. died of natural causes. 34. On 2 July 2008 the Federal Prosecutor deposited the 130-page indictment. 35. On 3 September 2008 the Liège Assize Court commenced proceedings against eleven of the defendants, including the applicants, for offences connected with the attack on the B.Z. van, as well as other offences linked to organised crime. 36. During a hearing before the Assize Court, V., a prosecution witness, stated that R.C. had been awarded a bounty. The President of the Assize Court invited R.C. to explain himself. The latter stated, with his face in plain view, that he had been paid 50,000 euros (EUR). He explained that he had received half of that sum in 2006 and the other half just before his appearance before the Assize Court in 2008. 37. On 3 March 2009 the Liège Assize Court acquitted two of the defendants and convicted the other nine, including the applicants. The first applicant was convicted of offences linked to the attack on the van, in his capacity as leader of a criminal organisation. The aggravating circumstances of murder and of bearing or using a firearm were not made out against him. He was sentenced to fifteen years’ imprisonment and twenty years’ placement at the Government’s disposal. The second applicant was convicted of offences of robbery committed in Luxembourg and of the offences committed in Waremme and Dison. The aggravating circumstance of murder was made out against him in the attempted robbery in Waremme. He was sentenced to thirty years’ imprisonment. The applicants’ conviction was also based on the charges of possession of firearms and leadership of a criminal conspiracy and a criminal organisation. 38. On 30 September 2009, since the Liège Assize Court had given no reasons for its sentences, and with reference to the Chamber’s judgment in the case of Taxquet v. Belgium (no. 926/05, 13 January 2009), the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment inasmuch as it adjudicated on the proceedings brought against four appellants, including the applicants, and referred the case to the Brussels-Capital Assize Court. 39. On 1 February 2010 the Federal Prosecutor filed a bill of indictment. That bill set out R.C.’s and D.S.’s witness statements verbatim (see paragraphs 16, 22 and 24 above). 40. On 2 April 2010 the retrial commenced before the Brussels-Capital Assize Court. 41. During the proceedings the applicants filed conclusions contesting, pursuant to Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the lawfulness of the prosecution inasmuch as it had been based on the statements of R.C. and D.S., the latter having since died. ... 44. By interlocutory judgment of 2 July 2010, the Assize Court declared ill-founded the applicants’ request that their prosecution be declared inadmissible, and ordered the immediate continuation of proceedings.... 49. On 28 September 2010 the jury found the applicants guilty, in particular, of the attack on the B.Z. van in their capacity as leaders of a criminal organisation. The main reasons for the jury’s decision were subsequently summarised as follows in a statement of reasons issued by the Assize Court that same day: “The [first applicant’s guilt] regarding his involvement in the attempted robbery in Waremme on 12 January 1998 transpires from the concurring statements of [R.C. and D.S.], which come from different sources. Those indirect testimonies are corroborated by the objective fact that a Kalashnikov was found in the Chrysler vehicle on the scene of the crime. When an ‘appeal for witnesses’ programme was broadcast, [D.S.] recognised that weapon as one of those belonging to [L.M.], who had purchased it from [the applicant]. ... Among the sources of R.C.’s information to the effect that [the applicant] had taken part in the Waremme attack were [the second applicant and J.S.], both of whom admitted that they had had talks with [R.C.], although they disputed the content of those talks. ... The [second applicant’s guilt] regarding his involvement in the attempted robbery in Waremme on 12 January 1998 transpires from the concurring statements of [R.C., D.S. and H.P.], and from the information provided by C.S. as confirmed by witness E.E. Those statements and information are confirmed by objective facts ... (ballistic links relating to the use of the same Fal firearm and ammunition found in a bag handed over to J.P.M. by [the second applicant]).” 50. By judgment of 30 September 2010 the Assize Court determined the sentence. ... The court sentenced the first applicant to fifteen years’ imprisonment and the second to twenty-five years’ imprisonment. 51. Relying on a series of violations of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the applicants lodged an appeal on points of law against the aforementioned three judgments of the Brussels Assize Court. The Court of Cassation dismissed that appeal on points of law by judgment of 30 March 2011. 52. In contesting the interlocutory judgment of 2 July 2010, the applicants argued that R.C.’s witness statement could only be taken into consideration if it came from a citizen desirous of promoting justice, but not from a person who was testifying for reasons of personal interest. The Court of Cassation dismissed that plea on the following grounds: “... it falls to the trial court to gauge the impact on the evidential value of a witness statement of its purported venal motivation. ... The reasons impelling a witness to testify may give rise to doubts concerning his or her credibility, but that is not necessarily inconsistent with the holding of a fair trial. Article 6, cited above, does not prohibit ... the judge from using in evidence a statement by a witness under police protection pursuant to Articles 102 to 111 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, even where such witness is an informer who has decided, after having provided information under informer status, to testify officially in court.” 53. The applicants submitted that R.C.’s use of the status of informer and then that of witness, given that confidentiality had been observed in respect of his contacts as informer with the police, had amounted to a violation of the principle of adversarial proceedings, because his statement had been used in evidence against them, especially since that witness had received a bounty in the context of his informer status. The Court of Cassation dismissed those arguments as follows: “An official statement by a person having previously provided information under informer status does not infringe the general principle of law relating to compliance with the rights of the defence, given that it has the effect of making the witness statements subject to inter partes debate and that the confidentiality requirement set out in Article 47decies, § 6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not cover evidence referred to the trial court. ... The right to a fair trial requires the communication neither of information supplied by an informer nor of data on the contacts which that informer has had with the police. The subsequent questioning of such informer as a witness has the effect of making his statements subject to inter partes debate. The judgment notes that, according to the police officers having received the statements contained in the case-file, the latter do not diverge from the information previously supplied confidentially. The appellant’s submission to the effect that the confidentiality of the informer’s involvement has the effect of removing the evidence which the latter provided against him from the inter partes debate is therefore unjustified.” 54. The Court of Cassation gave the following reply to the applicants’ criticism of the fact that the procedure for granting a threatened witness assistance and protection is not subject to court supervision and, owing to its confidentiality, prevents the defendant from establishing that the financial assistance provided is tantamount to the covert purchase of witness statements: “Article 6 of the Convention requires the prosecuting authorities to communicate to the defence all the relevant evidence in their possession for or against the defendant. The right to disclosure concerns neither the measures taken in order to protect witnesses at risk of reprisals, on pain of exposing the latter to the danger which those measures are supposed to prevent, nor the management of a police officer’s contacts with an informer, on pain of jeopardising the implementation of that specific investigative method. The limits on the disclosure of those confidential data are adequately offset by the oral adversarial proceedings conducted before the jury, since the case-file presented to the latter comprises no elements other than those communicated to the defence and the latter has had an opportunity before the trial court to criticise the statements received against the defendant, as regards both their content and their origin. The judgment lawfully decides that the lack of supervision by an independent and impartial court of the procedure for granting protection to threatened witnesses has no impact on the fairness of the proceedings.” 55. The first applicant complained that the statement of reasoning of 28 September 2010 had been based on two indirect witness statements whose authors had been paid to testify against the applicants. The Court of Cassation declared that plea inadmissible as being based on a factual premise. For the remainder it considered that Article 6 § 1 of the Convention did not relate to a jury’s assessment of the evidential value of the evidence presented to it. The court also dismissed the second applicant’s argument concerning the insufficiency and irrelevance of the evidence used by the jury to corroborate the statements given by the protected witnesses. 56. Finally, the first applicant complained that the judgment of 30 September 2010 determining the sentence had not taken account of the abnormal length of the proceedings against the applicants when the sentence was passed. The Court of Cassation had dismissed the argument on the grounds that the Assize Court, on the basis of the specific circumstances of the case, had legitimately ruled that the proceedings had not been excessively lengthy. ...

4. The applicants were or are still detained in Ioannina Prison. 5. Of the applicants, the fourth was released on 11 March 2013 and the eighth was transferred to Alikarnassos Prison on 6 December 2012. The fifteenth applicant was released on 1 March 2013 and the twenty-first on 14 March 2013. The twenty-ninth, forty-ninth, fifty-fourth and fifty-seventh applicants were released on 28 February 2013, the forty-third on 11 March 2013, and the fiftieth on 7 March 2013, while the fifty-sixth was transferred to Amfissa Prison on 14 December 2012. 6. Additionally, the ninth, twenty-fifth, thirty-second and thirty-fifth applicants were released on 30 May 2013, the tenth and twenty-sixth applicants on 16 May 2013, the twelfth and forty-fourth applicants on 4 April 2013, the thirteenth on 28 May 2013, the sixteenth on 9 May 2013, the eighteenth on 14 June 2013, the nineteenth, twenty-second, twenty‑fourth, forty-first and forty-fifth applicants on 9 April 2013 and the twentieth on 23 May 2013. The thirty-fourth and fifty-third applicants were released on 31 May 2013, the thirty-ninth and forty-eighth on 26 April 2013, the fortieth and fifty-second on 30 April 2013, the forty-sixth on 10 April 2013 and the fifty-first on 11 April 2013. 7. The applicants alleged that the prison had held 235 prisoners but had only been designed for 85. There were four big cells measuring approximately 45 sq. m each, which had accommodated 32 detainees. There were also four smaller cells: cell no. 5 measured 16 sq. m and had accommodated 20 detainees, cell no. 6 was 12 sq. m and had held 10 detainees, cell no. 7 had an area of 16 sq. m and had housed 20 detainees while cell no. 8, which used to be laundry room, measured 10 sq. m and had accommodated 9 detainees. A corridor of 34.5 sq. m had accommodated 40 detainees. 8. The cells had had no tables or chairs. Inmates had been confined to their cells for seventeen hours a day as recreational or educational activities had not been provided. They had had to take their meals inside their cells. 9. There was not enough separation between prisoners serving sentences and those in pre-trial detention. Additionally, healthy prisoners had been held together with sick prisoners, resulting in exposure to contagious diseases. Inmates had to wash and dry their clothes and underwear in the toilet facilities, which further spread contagious diseases. Medical care had been inadequate, particularly as regards psychological health. 10. On 13 and 25 February 2013 the applicants and other prisoners lodged a complaint with the prison authorities about their conditions of detention, but received no reply. 11. The Government asserted that Ioannina Prison had four cells measuring 50 sq. m with two toilets each, one cell of 36 sq. m, two which measured 15 sq. m, one of 37.63 sq. m and two solitary confinement cells, each 8 sq. m in area. The dining room was 78 sq. m while the corridors had an area of 300 sq. m. At the time of the applicants’ application with the Court, the prison had held 210 to 230 detainees. 12. Extensive repair works had been carried out in 2012 throughout the prison facilities and all areas had been repainted, stools had been placed in the cells, and a bookcase, television and table tennis table had been added to the dining-room, which served several purposes. Moreover, a fully equipped gym had been built for detainees. The detainees’ daily schedule also included free time in the prison yard from 3 p.m. until half an hour before sunset. Numerous cultural events had been regularly organised for the inmates’ entertainment. 13. The cells had been regularly disinfected and cleaned on a daily basis. Ventilation and heating had been adequate in the cells and common areas. Appropriate standards of hygiene had been strictly observed and each new inmate was provided with clean clothing and blankets. All detainees had access to the prison infirmary and there were two general doctors, a dentist and three nurses. In emergencies, inmates were transferred to the Korydallos Prison Hospital or to an external hospital.

4. The applicant was born in 1944 and lives in Kremenchuk. 5. On 11 August 2007 Inna Puzyr, the applicant’s daughter, was found stabbed to death in bushes by the roadside. 6. On the same date the Poltava Regional Police instituted criminal proceedings into the suspected murder. 7. On an unspecified date the applicant was called to testify as a witness in connection with the above investigation, and for this reason his subsequent request to join the proceedings as an aggrieved party was refused. 8. On 18 August 2007 V.K., the applicant’s other daughter, joined the proceedings as an aggrieved party. 9. On 25 August 2007 O.T., a resident of a village close to the place of where the applicant’s daughter was stabbed, was arrested on suspicion of having committed this crime. Having initially pleaded guilty, O.T. subsequently retracted his confession, denying any involvement with the crime and complaining that the police had subjected him to ill-treatment. 10. On an unspecified date the criminal proceedings against O.T. were discontinued as no evidence had been collected to corroborate his confessional statements, which were inconsistent with other evidence on file. 11. On 7 September 2007 V.K. complained to the Chief of the local police department that the investigation into the case had been ineffective. She also complained that she had not been able to participate in it in a meaningful way, as she had not been allowed to consult the case file and had been very poorly informed about the measures undertaken by the authorities with a view to identifying her sister’s murderer. 12. On 12 September 2007 the Acting Chief of the Poltava Regional Police informed V.K. that he had detected no irregularities in the manner in which the investigation had been conducted and that ‒ according to the applicable law ‒ aggrieved parties were not entitled to consult case files until completion of the pre-trial investigation, that is to say, until the likely perpetrator has been identified and committed for trial. 13. On 10 October 2007 the investigation was suspended as no leads had been identified. 14. On 30 October 2007 the District Prosecutor’s Office quashed the decision to suspend the proceedings and ordered a further inquiry, noting that the investigation had been carried out in a perfunctory manner. 15. On 20 November 2007 V.K. again complained to the Kremenchuk prosecutor’s office that the renewed investigation had, in her view, been perfunctory and ineffective. She submitted that she suspected R.P., her sister’s husband, of having murdered her and referred to numerous delays in carrying out the investigative activities, which ‒ in her view ‒ had resulted in the loss of important evidence. 16. On 23 January 2008 the Chief of the Poltava Regional Department of the Interior acknowledged to V.K. that there had been many inadequacies in the investigation of her sister’s violent death and notified her that the chief and deputy chief of the investigative department had been reprimanded for poor planning of their department’s work and supervision of their subordinates. Investigator S.Y., who had worked on the case, had been replaced by V.N., who had extensive expertise in investigating homicide and other violent crimes. 17. On 5 March 2008 R.P. was arrested and confessed to having killed the applicant’s daughter because she had refused to give him a divorce. 18. On 6 March 2008 a reconstruction of the crime scene was organised, at which R.P. demonstrated how he had committed the murder. 19. On an unspecified date R.P. retracted his confession, claiming it had been given under duress from the police. 20. On 15 August 2008 the proceedings in respect of R.P. were discontinued in the light of irreconcilable discrepancies between his retracted confessional statements and other evidence on file. As there were no further leads pointing to a potential perpetrator, the proceedings were suspended. 21. On 26 March 2009 the Poltava Regional Prosecutor’s Office notified V.K. ‒ in response to an enquiry from her concerning progress in the case ‒ that unspecified operative and inquisitorial activities had been underway, but that no leads had been uncovered. 22. Following a new complaint by V.K. concerning the inadequacy of the investigation, on 20 May 2009 the Deputy Minister of Interior ordered a renewal of proceedings. Having consulted the case file, he noted that leads to at least two potential perpetrators had not been properly followed up and identified some twenty-five investigative steps which could have been taken. He also stated that, in his view, virtually no action aimed at identifying the murderer had been taken in 2008, that the operative officers had carried out the instructions received from the investigative officers in a perfunctory manner, and that the investigative and operative departments needed to streamline their methods of communication. 23. On 28 December 2009 S.J., a new investigator assigned to the case, suspended the proceedings, having uncovered no new leads after completion of further investigative steps. 24. The proceedings were renewed and then suspended on several further occasions, reference being made to the insufficiency of the measures taken (specifically, on 11 May 2010, 2 April and 22 October 2011). 25. On 15 April 2013, following the entry into force of the new Code of Criminal Procedure, the applicant was admitted into the proceedings as an aggrieved party and given an opportunity to consult the case file. 26. On 19 August 2013 the applicant complained to the Minister of Interior that, having studied the file, he found that the entire investigation had been marred by prohibitive delays and inactivity. In his view the competent authorities had, for an extensive period of time, focused predominantly on investigating the probability that his daughter had been stabbed by her husband rather than organising a prompt and comprehensive examination of the objective evidence. A lot of time had been lost. The applicant also gave several suggestions as to further potential witnesses to be questioned, the specific type of the knife which could have been used to stab his daughter, and the circle of persons who might possess such a weapon. 27. On 2 October 2013 the Deputy Chief of the investigative department of the Poltava Police informed the applicant that no new leads had been uncovered, but his suggestions would be taken into account in further investigation. 28. On several subsequent occasions the police authorities provided similar answers to further complaints and suggestions made by the applicant and V.K. concerning investigative steps that could be taken.

4. The applicants were all employed at a State-owned limited liability company. Their employment was terminated as of 3 July 2012. 5. The first applicant, I.B. was born in 1957 and lives in Budapest. A certain part of his severance payment was subject to the 98% special tax in the amount of 3,557,737 Hungarian forints (HUF) (approximately 11,900 euros (EUR)). 6. The second applicant, L.C. was born in 1963 and lives in Budapest. Part of his severance payment was subject to the 98% special tax in the amount of HUF 3,675,702 (approximately EUR 12,200). The second applicant withdrew his application on 25 February 2016. 7. The third applicant, A.D. was born in 1968 and lives in Budapest. Part of his severance payment was subject to the 98% special tax in the amount of HUF 2,824,844 (approximately EUR 9,400). 8. The fourth applicant, E.F. was born in 1959 and lives in Monor. Part of his severance payment was subject to the 98% special tax in the amount of HUF 2,650,902 (approximately EUR 8,800). 9. The fifth applicant, E.J. was born in 1954 and lives in Solymár. Part of his severance payment was subject to the 98% special tax in the amount of HUF 5,696,384 (approximately EUR 19,000). Due to subsequent amendments of the relevant legislation, the tax rates applicable to the fifth applicant’s severance payment changed retroactively. Accordingly, the National Tax Authority found that part of the applicant’s severance payment had been subject to a flat-rate public charge of 20% in the amount of HUF 746,808 and another part of his severance payment had been subject to a flat-rate public charge of 75%, amounting to HUF 1,558,949. Therefore, the applicant was reimbursed HUF 3,390,627 by the National Tax Authority. The overall tax burden imposed on the applicant’s severance payment was 30.7 %. 10. The sixth applicant, J.K. was born in 1956 and lives in Budapest. Part of his severance payment was subject to the 98% special tax in the amount of HUF 2,099,845 (approximately EUR 7,000). 11. The seventh applicant, Z.J.K. was born in 1955 and lives in Budapest. Part of his severance payment was subject to the 98% special tax in the amount of HUF 3,119,393 (approximately EUR 10,400). 12. The eighth applicant, G.N. was born in 1960 and lives in Budapest. Part of his severance payment was subject to the 98% special tax in the amount of HUF 2,886,807 (approximately EUR 9,600). The eighth applicant withdrew his application on 14 January 2015. 13. The ninth applicant, I.S. was born in 1957 and lives in Szolnok. Part of his severance payment was subject to the 98% special tax in the amount of HUF 3,972,297 (approximately EUR 13,200). 14. The tenth applicant, S.S was born in 1965 and lives in Monor. Part of his severance payment was subject to the 98% special tax in the amount of HUF 2,376,658 (approximately EUR 7,900). 15. The eleventh applicant, F.V. was born in 1955 and lives in Budapest. Part of his severance payment was subject to the 98% special tax in the amount of HUF 3,345,040 (EUR 11,100).

6. The applicant was born in 1987 and is detained in Lublin. 7. In 2005 the applicant was on two occasions convicted and sentenced to two terms of one year’s imprisonment, which were suspended on probation. On 30 September 2008 the applicant was convicted and sentenced to two years’ imprisonment, which were again suspended. On 24 September 2009 the applicant was again sentenced to two terms of imprisonment. The latter judgments became final and enforceable on 10 October 2009. All the above convictions concerned charges of burglary, theft and robbery. 8. From 8 May 2009 the applicant was detained on remand on suspicion of having committed several armed robberies. 9. In July 2009 he was indicted before the Lublin District Court. He was charged with several counts of armed robbery. 10. On 24 February 2011 the Lublin District Court gave a judgment in the applicant’s case (IX K 79/11). Following an appeal by the applicant, it appears that in 2011 the Lublin Regional Court examined the decision (Vka 370/11). On 11 October 2011 the applicant received two consecutive sentences of one year and ten months’ imprisonment and of two years and eight months’ imprisonment. 11. On 24 February 2011 the Lublin Remand Centre Prison Commission classified the applicant as a “dangerous detainee”. The measures applied in the applicant’s case comprised confinement in a special high-security prison wing and increased supervision of his movements within and outside the cell, which meant that he had to wear joined shackles whenever he was taken out of his cell. The measures involved his segregation from the prison community and restrictions on contact with his family. Also, every time he left or entered his cell he was routinely subjected to a “full strip-search” – a thorough inspection of his body and clothes in which he was required to strip naked and make deep squats in order to enable an examination of his anus. In addition, his cell, including the sanitary facilities, was constantly monitored via a closed-circuit television system. 12. It its decision of 24 February 2011 the commission relied on the fact that the applicant had assaulted a prison guard (Article 88a § 2 (2 b) of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences). The governor of the Lublin Remand Centre, in his application to impose the regime, stated that on 21 February 2011 the applicant had refused to undergo a strip-search, had been aggressive and had attempted to hit a prison officer in the face. 13. The incident of 21 February 2011 was notified to a prosecutor who investigated whether an offence had been committed. It appears that the applicant was originally convicted of the offence but the judgment was quashed by the Lublin District Court. The outcome of this set of proceedings is not known. 14. The applicant appealed against the decision of 24 February 2011, but on 27 April 2011 the Lublin Regional Court upheld it. The court held that the applicant posed a serious danger to the security of the Lublin Remand Centre. 15. The Lublin Remand Centre in its subsequent applications to extend the measure against the applicant underlined that his behaviour had not improved and he had remained unpredictable. 16. On 18 August 2011 the Commission reviewed and upheld its decision classifying the applicant as a “dangerous detainee”. 17. The applicant appealed against that decision. On 26 October 2011 the Lublin Regional Court upheld the decision. 18. On 15 November 2011 the governor of the Lublin Remand Centre applied to the Commission to lift the measure against the applicant. The governor noted that the applicant’s behaviour had improved and he no longer posed a danger to the security of the remand centre. The applicant, as noted by the prison officers and a psychologist, was calm, disciplined, and following the internal regulations. 19. On 16 November 2011 the Commission, having heard evidence from the applicant, lifted the measure. 20. On 5 December 2011 the applicant was transferred to Opole Lubelskie Prison. 21. On 3 January 2012 the governor of Opole Lubelskie Prison applied to the Prison Commission to impose the “dangerous detainee” regime on the applicant. He submitted that since the applicant’s arrival at the prison he had been aggressive towards the prison officers and had been trying to gain prominence in the prison community by plotting to assault a senior officer of the service. The applicant had been aggressive and his behaviour was interfering with order in the prison. Overall, he posed a real danger to the prison officers and to the security of the prison. 22. On 3 January 2012 the Prison Commission of Opole Lubelskie Prison decided to impose the “dangerous detainee” regime on the applicant. The decision stated as follows: “[The applicant] has threatened to assault a senior prison officer or other officers in order to re-establish himself in the criminal prison community and secure for himself a position of high esteem within its structure. There exists a real risk to the security of the prison. During his stay in the Lublin Prison [the applicant] was excluded from the prison community and is eagerly trying to enter it again. Because of his high level of demoralisation, the nature of the offences committed by him, his tendency to want to gain control over others and his personal character, he remains determined to return to the criminal structure and poses a real risk to those surrounding him. The applicant shows an aggressive attitude, directed at the prison officers. Since the beginning of his stay in the prison he has been notorious for causing difficulties of an educational nature and relating to maintaining order; his behaviour is highly reprehensible. His negative attitude is a destructive influence on the atmosphere and order in the wing and in the prison. In view of the information collected, there is a real risk of him carrying out an active assault on a prison officer, as has happened in the past.” The applicant appealed but on 14 February 2012 the Lublin Regional Court upheld the decision. 23. The governor of Rzeszow Prison (to which the applicant had in the meantime been transferred) subsequently requested the extension of the regime imposed on the applicant. In his first request of 3 April 2012 he noted that the applicant had been given a disciplinary punishment for insulting a prison officer and had been taking his daily walks individually. The applicant remained interested in joining the prison community and remained a serious risk to the security of the prison. On the same date the Prison Commission of Rzeszow Prison extended the regime, stating that the applicant “should consolidate his positive behaviour and carry out a deeper reassessment of his previous conduct”. In his second request of 28 June 2012 the governor of Rzeszow Prison pointed out that another disciplinary sanction had been imposed on the applicant for disobeying an order to leave his cell. The prison authorities acknowledged that the applicant had also received rewards for good behaviour and had started to take his daily walks with another inmate in order to see how he would function in a group. The governor considered that the applicant remained interested in belonging to the prison community and that his behaviour continued to pose a risk to the security of the prison. On 28 June 2012 the commission extended the regime, citing the same justification as in its previous decision of 3 April 2012. On 27 September and 27 December 2012 the governor of Rzeszow Prison made further requests to extend the measure imposed on the applicant. The governor noted that the applicant had received some punishments and three rewards, but that it could still not be guaranteed that he would function correctly in the prison. He considered that the applicant continued to pose a serious danger to the security of the prison as he identified with the “prison subculture”, had behaved immorally and had not shown any remorse for the offences he had committed. On 27 September and 27 December 2012 the prison commission extended the application of the regime on the applicant. The decisions reiterated that the applicant “should consolidate his positive behaviour and carry out a deeper reassessment of his previous conduct”. 24. On 27 March 2013 the governor of Rzeszow Prison applied to the Prison Commission to lift the measure. The applicant’s behaviour had improved, he complied with internal regulations and was no longer aggressive towards the prison officers. According to the authorities he no longer posed a threat to the security of the prison. The regime was lifted on 27 March 2013. 25. Between 17 June 2009 and 9 December 2011 the applicant accumulated 372 Polish zlotys (PLN) in his release savings fund. In December 2012 he obtained further PLN 150 out of which half (PLN 75) was placed in his release savings fund. 26. The applicant did not open a deposit or a savings account and it appears that he did not receive any payments afterwards.

4. The applicant was born in 1970 and lives in Murmansk. 5. On 24 September 2004 the applicant was arrested on charges of robbery. Two days later the Polyarniy Town Court of the Murmansk Region imposed on the applicant an undertaking not to leave the place of his residence. 6. On 21 February 2005 the Town Court, presided by Judge D., convicted the applicant of robbery and forgery, sentenced him to seven years and four months of imprisonment and ordered his detention pending the appeal proceedings. 7. On 3 May 2005 the Murmansk Regional Court, under the presidency of judge K., quashed the judgment on appeal and remitted the case to the Town Court for a fresh examination, ordering that the applicant should remain in custody. 8. On 3 June 2005 the Town Court, in its turn, further extended the applicant’s detention and remitted the case to the Murmansk Prosecutor’s Office for the elimination of certain procedural deficiencies preventing the examination of the case on the merits. 9. The applicant’s detention was once again extended by the Town Court, presided by judge D., on 16 August 2005. The applicant challenged the presiding judge on the ground that he had convicted him on 21 February 2005. Judge D. refused to step down. The applicant also raised that point in his statement of appeal against the detention order. On 6 September 2005 the Regional Court, presided by Judge K., found no grounds for Judge D. to step down. The Regional Court reasoned that by virtue of Articles 61 and 63 of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure Judge D., who had already presided over the applicant’s trial once, could not take part in the new trial proceedings, however, he was not prevented from deciding on detention matters. 10. On 18 November 2005 the Town Court further extended the applicant’s detention. The parties disagreed as to whether the applicant had been served with a copy of that detention order. While the applicant argued that he had never received it, the Government stated that the detention order had been served on him on 5 December 2005. They supported their claim with a copy of the Town Court’s letter of 29 November 2005 by which the detention order had been forwarded to the applicant and a copy of the detention order from his personal file kept in a remand prison, bearing the applicant’s signature and the date of receipt. 11. On several occasions the trial court adjourned hearings in the applicant’s case. In particular, on 30 November 2005 the hearing was re-scheduled for 15 December 2005 because the applicant and his co-defendant asked to summon several defence witnesses. The hearing on 15 December 2005 was also adjourned owing to the applicant’s and his co-defendants’ counsel failure to appear. In the same decision the court, of its own motion, extended the applicant’s detention. 12. The applicant appealed, complaining, in particular, that the detention order of 15 December 2005 was delivered in his counsel’s absence. On 17 January 2006 the Regional Court, presided by Judge K., dismissed the appeal, having noted that the counsel had failed to appear without providing any explanation for his absence. The appeal hearing was attended by a prosecutor and the applicant’s counsel, but not by the applicant himself, despite his request to that effect. 13. On 10 April 2006 the Town Court convicted the applicant of extortion and sentenced him to three years’ imprisonment and a fine of 3,000 Russian roubles (RUB). The Regional Court upheld the conviction on 5 September 2006, but reduced the sentence.

4. The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Ufa, the Republic of Bashkortostan. 5. In February 1996 the applicant was severely injured in a traffic accident. 6. On 24 April 1996 he lodged a civil action against the owner of the car, the State Unitary Subsidiary Passenger Transport Company of Ufa No. 3 (Государственное унитарное дочернее уфимское пассажирское автотранспортное предприятие 3 – hereinafter “the transport company”), seeking compensation for damage. 7. On 29 November 2005 the Sovetskiy District Court of Ufa (hereinafter “the District Court”) partly granted the applicant’s claims. 8. On 15 February 2006 the transport company was declared insolvent and it was put into liquidation. 9. On 28 March 2006 the judgment of 29 November 2005 became final, as modified on appeal by the Supreme Court of the Republic of Bashkortostan. The final court award in the applicant’s favour consisted of a sum in compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage sustained (equivalent to 30,462 euros (EUR)), to be paid once the judgment became final, and of a monthly allowance (equivalent of EUR 207), to be paid until the end of the applicant’s life. 10. On 17 June 2006 the Commercial Court of the Republic of Bashkortostan (hereinafter “the Commercial Court”) granted the applicant’s application for aggregation as a lump sum («капитализация») of the amounts of the monthly allowance awarded by the judgment of 29 November 2005, in accordance with section 135 § 1 of the Insolvency Act (see paragraph 20 below). Therefore the transport company’s debt under this head amounted to EUR 69,029. 11. Since the award remained unenforced, on 11 January 2009 the District Court granted a prior application by the applicant to have the amount of the monthly allowance index-linked, and raised it to EUR 909. The judgment became final on 22 January 2009. 12. On 3 March 2009 the Commercial Court once again granted the applicant’s application for payment as a lump sum of the amounts of the monthly allowance. The applicant was awarded EUR 203,673. The judgment became final on 23 April 2009. 13. On 15 July 2009 the Commercial Court accepted the applicant’s claim for transfer of the transport company’s debt to the Russian Federation, as provided for in section 135 § 3 of the Insolvency Act (see paragraph 21 below). The court ordered that the judgment debts in the applicant’s favour were to be paid by the Federal Tax Service of Russia. On 3 December 2009 the Commercial Court of the Uralskiy Circuit upheld that judgment and it became final. 14. Between August and October 2010 the applicant received the equivalent of EUR 15,131, which corresponded to total of the monthly allowance that he had not received in 2005-2010. Furthermore, on 6 August 2010 the applicant started receiving a monthly allowance of EUR 948. 15. The transport company provided public transport services on a commercial basis. It was a subsidiary of another company, Bashavtotrans State Unitary Company (ГУП «Башавтотранс» – hereinafter “the parent company”). The legal provisions on subsidiary companies are summarised in paragraph 22 below. 16. The transport company had the right of “economic control” over the assets allocated to it by the parent company. The parent company was a unitary company with the right of “economic control” over the assets allocated to it by the State Committee on construction, architecture and transport of the Republic of Bashkortostan. 17. On 14 October 2004 the Government of the Republic of Bashkortostan issued Decree no. 918-P, by which all the transport company’s assets were transferred to the parent company; the debts remained with the transport company. 18. On 15 February 2006 the transport company was declared insolvent, and it was put into liquidation. The liquidation proceedings ended on 31 December 2013.

4. The applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Achkhoy-Martan, Chechen Republic. 5. On 13 January 2001 two soldiers of the Russian federal forces M. and P. came to the applicant’s house to buy drugs. After the applicant sold heroin to them, unknown persons attacked the soldiers, put them in a car and took them to a hide-out where they were kept for five days. The kidnappers also took M.’s automatic gun. The soldiers were released by law-enforcement officers on 18 January 2001. The gun was never found. 6. On an unspecified date the authorities opened a criminal investigation into the soldiers’ abduction. The applicant was the only suspect. Other perpetrators had not been identified. 7. According to the applicant, on 4 April 2007 at approximately 7 p.m. he was arrested on suspicion of having participated in abduction of M. and P. According to the arrest record, the applicant was arrested on 5 April 2007 at 10:40 a.m. 8. On 6 April 2007 the Achkhoy-Martan District Court of the Chechen Republic authorised the applicant’s detention pending the criminal proceedings against him. 9. On an unspecified date the investigator questioned M. and P. Both of them submitted that they had been abducted from the inner yard adjacent to the applicant’s house. They had come to the applicant’s house to buy drugs. The applicant had asked them to enter to help him move the car that had been parked inside. After they had been done with the car, they had been attacked by four persons. M. had cried out to the applicant for help, but the applicant had done nothing. After that they had been blindfolded, put in a car and taken to another place. 10. On 26 June 2007 the District Court found the applicant guilty of abduction and theft of firearms and sentenced him to seven years’ imprisonment. The court relied on the statements of M. and P. given during the questioning by the investigator, the written statements made by their parents to whom M. and P. had told about their abduction, the written statements made by other soldiers who confirmed that M. and P. had been missing in 2001. Investigator Mir. testified in court as regards his questioning of M. and P. The court also heard a number of the applicant’s relatives and neighbours who testified as to the applicant’s character and the curfew introduced in the village in 2001 and studied the materials from the case-file prepared by the investigator. As regards the use of M. and P.’s written statements, the court noted as follows: “... According to [the rules of criminal procedure], if the victim of the crime fails to appear in court, the court, if requested by a party to the proceedings or of its own motion, may decide to have the [victim’s] earlier statement read out in the event of a natural calamity or other extraordinary circumstances preventing the [victim’s] appearance in court. The court considers that the victims were prevented from appearing in court for the following reasons: their psychological state, i.e, their lack of desire to reminisce about the circumstances of the abduction coupled with deprivation of liberty and, possibly, with the life threat, and to live through this again; lack of safety during the trip to Chechen Republic where the political situation is still troublesome, especially ... for ethnic Russians who are not locals; a risk that the [applicant’s] relatives might put pressure on them; and the fact that they live far away and do not have means to pay for the trip to attend the court hearing. The court considers such circumstances to be extraordinary and preventing the victims from appearing in court.” 11. On 15 August 2007 the Supreme Court of the Chechen Republic upheld the applicant’s conviction on appeal. 12. On 26 December 2011 the applicant was released.

4. The applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Moscow. 5. On 13 October 2006 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court in Moscow remanded the applicant in custody on the charge of fraud. Subsequently the District Court extended the applicant’s detention on 8 December 2006 and on 2 February, 10 April, 29 May and 18 September 2007. Each time the District Court attached preponderant weight to the gravity of the charges against the applicant. On 21 May and 4 July 2007 the Moscow City Court rejected the appeals against the detention orders of 10 April and 29 May 2007, respectively. 6. The City Court authorised further extensions of the applicant’s detention on 28 September and 26 December 2007. The Supreme Court rejected his appeals on 31 October 2007 and 15 February 2008, respectively. 7. On 14 February 2008 the case was submitted for trial. On 20 February, 30 June and 17 December 2008 and 18 March and 18 June 2009 the District Courts in Moscow prolonged the applicant’s detention pending trial, referring mainly to the gravity of the charges. The most recent extension order was issued for the period until 19 September 2009. 8. Between 27 January 2007 and 16 May 2008 the applicant was detained in the IZ-77/1 remand prison in Moscow. The prison was filled beyond the design capacity and cells were severely overcrowded. He was later transferred to another remand prison in Moscow.

6. The applicant was born in 1964 in Egypt and currently lives in Hamrun, Malta. 7. The applicant had a Maltese tourist visa, which had been issued in 1991 and had been valid for three months. Having overstayed this visa, he remained in Malta illegally. 8. In 1993, when the applicant was twenty-nine years of age and still living in Malta illegally, he met MP, a Maltese citizen, who at the time was seventeen years of age. Three months later, on 13 October 1993, they married in a civil ceremony. On 26 February 1994 they also married in accordance with the Catholic rite. 9. On 18 November 1993 the applicant enquired about his “exempt person status” (see paragraph 34 below) and on 23 November 1993 started the process to obtain Maltese citizenship on the basis of his marriage to a Maltese national. 10. The applicant’s exempt person status was confirmed on 2 March 1994. On 19 April 1994, following the processing of his application and consequent to the marriage, he was registered as a Maltese citizen. On 12 September 1994, he therefore lodged an application to renounce his Egyptian nationality (a copy of the relevant application form has not been submitted to the Court). It transpires from a letter issued by the Consul of the Embassy of the Arab Republic of Egypt in Malta that on 29 September 1994 the applicant’s request was approved and his Egyptian passport withdrawn. At the relevant time, dual nationality was not possible under either Egyptian or Maltese law. 11. According to the Government, in 1994 the applicant and MP had various marital problems, which led the applicant to leave the matrimonial home on two occasions. The applicant had behaved aggressively, and specifically on 5 June 1994 he had physically assaulted his pregnant wife, causing her a permanent disability. MP left the matrimonial home thereafter. 12. The applicant was charged, remanded in custody, and eventually tried and found guilty in respect of the act of assault. He was given a suspended sentence. 13. In the meantime, on 13 December 1994 a child, LR, was born of the marriage. LR is a Maltese citizen. The various family disputes continued between the couple. 14. On 8 February 1995 MP instituted court proceedings to annul the marriage. Following adversarial proceedings where both parties were represented by a lawyer, the applicant’s marriage was annulled by a judgment of 19 January 1998. The court delivering the judgment was satisfied (to the degree necessary in civil proceedings, namely on a balance of probabilities) that the applicant’s only reason for marrying had been to remain in Malta and acquire citizenship; thus he was positively excluding marriage itself, and there had been a simulation of marriage. Since no appeal was lodged against the judgment, it became final. 15. The applicant did not inform the authorities of the judgment concerning the annulment of his marriage and he remained resident in Malta and retained his Maltese citizenship. 16. On 30 June 2003 the applicant married VA, a Russian citizen, four months after their first encounter. The applicant enquired about the exempt person status of his Russian wife and was asked to produce a copy of the judgment of annulment. On 4 July 2003 the applicant produced a copy of the judgment and it was only at that time that the authorities became aware of the reason for the annulment of his first marriage. 17. Following an application to that effect, on 27 September 2004, VA was granted exempt person status and thus had full freedom of movement (see “Relevant domestic law” below). According to the Government, although this was contested by the applicant, attention was drawn to the fact that the benefit of such status would cease if the applicant lost his citizenship. Two sons were born of this marriage, VR and VL, in 2004 and 2005 respectively. They are both Maltese citizens. 18. On 8 May 2006 the applicant was informed that an order was to be made to deprive him of his Maltese citizenship (under Article 14(1) of the Citizenship Act (“the Act”) – see “Relevant domestic law” below), which, according to the judgment of 19 January 1998, appeared to have been obtained by fraud. He was informed of his right to an inquiry. 19. The applicant challenged that decision, claiming that it was not true that he had obtained his marriage by fraud and stressing that he had three Maltese children. 20. In consequence, proceedings were instituted to investigate the applicant’s situation and if necessary divest him of his Maltese citizenship. A committee was set up for this purpose in accordance with Article 14(4) of the Act. A number of hearings were held before the committee where the applicant was assisted by a lawyer. He was allowed to make oral and written submissions and submit evidence, including witness testimony. It appears from the documents available that the applicant contested the basis of the annulment decision and claimed that he had not been aware that he could have appealed against it. He also contested the findings of a court of criminal jurisdiction that had found him guilty of injuring his wife and causing her a permanent disability. 21. The applicant’s ex-wife, a citizenship department official and a priest also gave testimony. 22. The committee’s final recommendation to the Minister of Justice and Internal Affairs was not made available to the applicant. Requests by the applicant’s lawyer for a copy of the acts of those proceedings remained unsatisfied. 23. On 31 July 2007 the Minister ordered that the applicant be deprived of his citizenship with immediate effect, in accordance with Article 14(1) of the Act. 24. By a letter dated 2 August 2007 from the Director of the Department of Citizenship and Expatriate Affairs, the applicant was informed that the Minister of Justice and Internal Affairs had concluded that the applicant had obtained citizenship by fraudulent means and that therefore on 31 July 2007, in accordance with Article 14(1) of the Act, the Minister had ordered that he be immediately divested of his citizenship. He was required to return his certificate of registration as a Maltese citizen and his passport. 25. The applicant instituted constitutional redress proceedings, complaining under Articles 6, 8 and 14 of the Convention. He claimed that he had not had a fair trial and appropriate access to court for the determination on his right to citizenship. Moreover, the revocation of his citizenship had not been in accordance with the law. The prerequisites for such action had not existed as his first marriage had not been one of convenience. 26. By a judgment of 12 July 2011 the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional jurisdiction rejected the applicant’s complaint under Article 6, finding that the committee set up for that purpose had not been a tribunal, but solely an investigative body capable of giving recommendations but not making final decisions. The court, however, found that the applicant’s Article 8 rights would be breached if, as a result of his being divested of his citizenship, he became an alien. His de jure family (in respect of the second marriage) would suffer irremediable upset if, as a father (of the two Maltese children of that marriage), he were required to move to another country. Thus, the revocation of citizenship in the present case was in breach of Article 8. Consequently, the court annulled the order of 31 July 2007 and considered that it was not necessary to rule on any further complaints. 27. On appeal, by a judgment of 25 May 2012 the Constitutional Court overturned the first-instance judgment in part. It rejected the Article 6 complaint on the basis that the provision was not applicable in the absence of a civil right. In that connection, it rejected the applicant’s contention that the revocation of citizenship affected his right to a family life and therefore was civil in nature, as citizenship was a matter of public law and fell under the prerogatives of the State. It also reversed the part of the judgment in respect of Article 8, commenting that it had not been established that the applicant had a family life in Malta, and, even if this were so, the revocation of his citizenship would not necessarily result in his having to leave Malta. Indeed, it had not transpired that the applicant would be denied Maltese residence or that he had applied for it and had been refused, nor had a removal order been issued. 28. Following the lodging of the application with the Court, on 16 November 2012 the applicant’s lawyer wrote to the relevant authorities informing them that the case was pending before the Court and that therefore no action should be taken on the basis of the order of 31 July 2007. No feedback, apart from an acknowledgment of receipt, was received concerning that letter. However, although the order to deprive the applicant of his citizenship with immediate effect remains in force, no action has been taken to date in pursuit of the order and no removal order has been issued. 29. Although the applicant considers that the implementation of the order is only a matter of time, he is currently still residing and carrying out his business in Malta. He has a trading licence, which is periodically renewed. He continued using a Maltese passport to travel until 2014, when it expired, as he had failed to return it to the authorities despite their request. 30. The applicant does not appear to have any contact with his first son, but claims to be in a family environment with his second wife and their children. Following the revocation of his citizenship, the applicant’s second wife lost her exempt person status and the attached freedom-of-movement rights.

5. The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in the village of Krasnyy Yar in the Staropoltavskiy district of Volgograd Region. 6. On 5 August 2002 a quarrel broke out between the applicant and T. on one side and the applicant’s brothers V. and P. and P.’s wife, E., on the other. V. and E. called the police. 7. At about 8 p.m. police officers D., S., Sh. and Z. arrived and took statements from E., who complained that at about 6 p.m. the applicant and T. had burst into her home. The applicant had used obscene language towards her, threatening to “kill everyone” and attempting to hit her and her seven year‑old daughter. The police also took statements from A. who explained that she had been with E. when the applicant and T. had come over, asked about V. and then entered V.’s home. She had then heard shouting, and E.’s daughter had run in to tell her mother that there was a quarrel taking place in V.’s courtyard. E. had attempted to enter the courtyard but T. had not let her in. The applicant had come out of V.’s courtyard, using obscene language towards E. and threatening her with violence. The applicant and T. had followed E. into her house, continuing to insult and threaten her in the presence of her young daughter. This had continued until E.’s husband, P., had arrived home and the applicant and T. had then left. 8. The police officers took the applicant to the Staropoltavskiy district police station. They arrived at about 11 p.m. 9. According to the applicant, he was thrown into the boot of the police car and driven for about 80 kilometres. During the journey the police officers stopped the car and assaulted him. He was allegedly again assaulted at the police station. In particular, he was allegedly punched many times in the head and chest. 10. At an unspecified time that day police officer Sh. drew up a report charging the applicant with petty hooliganism, an offence under Article 20.1 of the Code of Administrative Offences. It was stated in the report that at 6 p.m. on 5 August 2002 the applicant had started a brawl with E., using abusive language and attempting to hit her. 11. At the police station the applicant was placed in a cell for administrative offenders overnight. Another detainee, K., was also being held in the cell. 12. At about 9 a.m. on 6 August 2002 the applicant was brought before a judge of the Staropoltavskiy District Court, who found that at 6 p.m. on 5 August 2002 the applicant had started a brawl with E. while drunk and had used obscene language towards her. The applicant was sentenced to two days’ administrative detention for petty hooliganism. 13. After the hearing the applicant was placed in the Staropoltavskiy district police temporary detention facility. At his request and in view of his condition, an ambulance was called. 14. Before taking him to hospital, an ambulance paramedic, N., diagnosed the applicant with a traumatic rupture of the left eardrum, bruising to the left of the ribcage, two fractured left ribs, a stomach injury and bruising to the left hip. 15. On the same day he was examined by an otolaryngologist from the Staropoltavskiy District Polyclinic. He complained of ringing in the left ear and stated that he had been assaulted by police officers. The otolaryngologist concluded that in addition to chronic otitis, the applicant had signs of traumatic otitis of the left ear. 16. On his admission to the Staropoltavskaya Central District Hospital the applicant stated that on 5 August 2002 he had been assaulted by his brother and then by police officers. He complained of pain in the left of the ribcage, around the eighth and ninth ribs. He had an abrasion measuring 7 by 1.2 centimetres on the left of the chest. His final diagnosis was a fractured eleventh left rib confirmed by X-ray images, soft tissue bruising, abrasions on the left of the chest and traumatic otitis of the left ear. 17. On 8 August 2002 he was discharged and sent for outpatient treatment by an otolaryngologist, a physician assessment and monitoring by a surgeon. 18. The applicant received outpatient treatment at home. He was sent for a neurosurgical examination at the Volgograd Regional Polyclinic, where X-ray images showed that he had sustained fractures to the top and bottom of the left of the skull. He was urgently admitted to the Volgograd Regional Hospital. On admission the applicant complained that he had been suffering from recurrent headaches, ringing in the ears and dizziness, and hearing loss in the left ear. He explained that on 5 August 2002 he had been assaulted by police officers. 19. The applicant’s hospital treatment lasted from 24 October to 11 November 2002. He was diagnosed with a closed head injury, mild bruising on the brain, a fractured left temporal bone (confirmed by X‑ray images), otitis of both ears, loss of hearing in the right ear and first degree mixed hearing loss in the left ear. 20. On 8 August 2002 the applicant lodged a complaint with the chief of the Staropoltavskiy district police regarding his alleged ill‑treatment by police officers. He stated that during the incident before his arrest V. had hit him on the left hip with a spade handle, and he had punched him back in the face. 21. On 10 August 2002 T. submitted a statement to the same chief of police describing the circumstances of the incident before the police arrived. He confirmed the applicant’s version of events. 22. On 20 August 2002 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint with the prosecutor’s office. 23. On 4 September 2002, following a pre-investigation inquiry, the Staropoltavskiy district prosecutor’s office instituted criminal proceedings, finding that there was sufficient indication that the elements of a crime under Article 286 § 3 (a) of the Criminal Code (abuse of powers) were present in respect of the officers’ actions. 24. On 7 September 2002 the applicant was given victim status. 25. On the same day P. was questioned as a witness in relation to the quarrel on 5 August 2002. He stated that he had punched T. but had not touched the applicant, and that the applicant had been “absolutely healthy” and had had no bruises or any other injuries. 26. V. stated that on 5 August 2002 the applicant and T. had entered his house, and that the applicant had punched him in the eye. He had managed to trap the applicant underneath him, and T. had pulled him off the applicant by the legs. 27. N., the paramedic who had provided the applicant with first aid on 6 August 2002 at the police station, gave the following statements as a witness: the applicant had complained of headaches, loss of hearing in the left ear, pain in the chest, stomach and left hip and shortness of breath. He had had hearing loss and fresh coagulated blood around his left ear, a sharp pain around his left ribs and pain in the stomach. 28. On 23 October 2002 the prosecutor’s office ordered a forensic medical opinion to establish the origin of the applicant’s injuries, stating that at about 2 p.m. on 5 August 2002 the applicant had been hit in the right hip by V. with a spade handle, and that the applicant had alleged to have been punched multiple times by police officers on his way to the Staropoltavskiy district police station, where he had allegedly been taken in the boot of a police car. 29. M., an expert from the Volgograd regional forensic medical bureau and A., a radiologist from the Volgograd Regional Hospital examined the applicant’s medical records, X-ray images of his skull and temporal bones taken on 24 and 28 October 2002 and X-ray images of his ribcage taken on 23 October 2002. In their report, dated 17 December 2002, they established that the applicant had a closed head injury in the form of mild bruising on the brain and a fractured left temporal bone, further complicated by traumatic otitis of the left ear. Those injuries had been caused by hard blunt objects and amounted to “severe damage to health”. The applicant also had a blunt injury to his ribcage with a fractured eighth left rib and an abrasion on the left of the chest, caused by hard blunt objects, which amounted to “medium damage to health”. The experts did not exclude the possibility that the injuries had been caused at the time and in the circumstances as alleged by the applicant. 30. On 4 January 2003 the applicant did not identify Z. during an identification parade, saying that he had not seen whether it had been D. and Z. who had assaulted him on the road, but that they certainly had not assaulted him at the police station. On 15 January 2003 the criminal proceedings concerning the two officers were terminated under Article 24 § 1 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“CCrP”) because none of the elements of a crime were present in respect of their actions. 31. On 21 January 2003 the prosecutor’s office ordered an additional forensic medical opinion. 32. On 13 February 2003 S., an expert from the Volgograd regional forensic medical bureau, examined the criminal case documents submitted to him by the prosecutor’s office. These included statements by P., V., the paramedic N. and police officers Sh. and S. (see paragraphs 25-27 above and paragraph 33 below), the applicant’s medical records and X-ray images of his ribs, temporal bones and skull dated 23, 24 and 28 October 2002. S. concluded that on 5 August 2002 the applicant had received the following injuries: a fractured left temporal bone with a rupture of the left eardrum, a displaced fracture of the eighth left rib and a fractured sixth left rib, and an abrasion on the left of the chest. On 24 October 2002 the applicant had been diagnosed with mild bruising on the brain. The expert concluded that all the injuries could have been inflicted in the manner alleged by the applicant, given their nature, number and location, the mechanism of their formation, the means of their infliction, notably by punching and kicking, the positions of the victim and attackers in relation to each other, and the direction of the blows. 33. On 15 January 2003, during his examination as a suspect, police officer Sh. stated that he had not noticed any injuries on the applicant during his arrest on 5 August 2002, journey to the police station or at the police station. Nor had the applicant complained that anybody had injured him. Police officer S., who was also examined as a suspect that day, stated that he had seen abrasions on the applicant’s face immediately after his arrest. 34. On 4 March 2003 the Staropoltavskiy district deputy prosecutor terminated the criminal proceedings against police officers S. and Sh. The decision stated that before his arrest on 5 August 2002 the applicant, who had been drunk, had committed an act of petty hooliganism against V. The applicant and V. had then physically assaulted each other. The decision also included statements by the applicant saying that V. had hit him in the left hip with a spade handle and that he had punched him back in the face, that he had travelled to the police station in the boot of a police car after being thrown in by police officers, that during the journey the officers had stopped the car and beaten him up, punching him in the head and chest, after seeing that he had dented the boot lid, and that they had assaulted him again at the police station. The decision relied on the statements of D., S., Sh., Z. and other police officers who had denied the applicant’s allegations of ill‑treatment. 35. On 15 April 2003 the Staropoltavskiy district prosecutor annulled the decision of 4 March 2003 as the possibility of the applicant’s injuries being inflicted during the fight with V. had not been properly explored. 36. On 16 May 2003 the Staropoltavskiy district deputy prosecutor issued a new decision terminating the proceedings, containing essentially the same wording as the previous decision. It was annulled on 9 February 2004 by the Volgograd regional deputy prosecutor as the exact circumstances of the applicant’s alleged ill-treatment had not yet been determined. 37. On 9 March 2004 an investigator of the Staropoltavskiy district prosecutor’s office terminated the criminal proceedings against police officers S. and Sh. on the same grounds as previously. 38. According to a letter of 27 August 2004, the Volgograd regional prosecutor’s office requested the Staropoltavskiy district prosecutor’s office to examine complaints by the applicant concerning the improper handling of the investigation and report on the results. According to a letter from the Volgograd regional prosecutor’s office dated 24 December 2004, a similar request was made in relation to a complaint by him concerning the termination of the proceedings. The Staropoltavskiy district prosecutor’s office was requested to submit its report before 13 January 2005. 39. According to letters addressed to the applicant from the Volgograd regional prosecutor’s office and an investigator of the Staropoltavskiy district prosecutor’s office, dated 3 February 2005 and 10 February 2005 respectively, the decision of 9 March 2004 was set aside on 4 February 2005 and the investigation was reopened. 8. Decision of 10 March 2005 terminating the criminal proceedings against police officers S. and Sh., annulled on 9 September 2005 40. According to a letter from the Volgograd regional prosecutor’s office dated 3 November 2005, a new decision terminating the proceedings was issued on 10 March 2005 and annulled on 9 September 2005. According to a letter dated 17 May 2005, the Volgograd regional prosecutor’s office had in the meantime requested the district prosecutor’s office to inform the applicant of the results of the investigation and report back before 4 June 2005. 41. On 24 October 2005 the Prosecutor General’s Office informed the applicant that his complaint concerning the termination of the proceedings had been forwarded to the Volgograd regional prosecutor’s office for examination. 42. On 19 June 2006 it requested the Staropoltavskiy district prosecutor to examine the applicant’s complaint concerning the investigation in the case and report back before 30 June 2006. 43. On 17 November 2011 the Court invited the Government to submit information concerning the investigation in the applicant’s case. 44. On 21 December 2011 the Volgograd regional prosecutor’s office set aside the decision of 9 March 2004 terminating the criminal proceedings as the possibility of the applicant receiving the injuries in the fight with V. had not been examined. An additional investigation was ordered. 45. The Volgograd regional prosecutor’s office carried out an internal investigation in connection with some irregularities found in the case file. It stated in its report of 31 January 2012 that the decisions of 4 February and 9 September 2005 (see paragraphs 39-40 above) were nowhere to be found and that according to new information received from the Staropoltavskiy district prosecutor and his deputy, the decision of 9 March 2004 had not been annulled. The prosecutor’s office therefore concluded that the decisions of 4 February 2005 and 9 September 2005 had never been taken. The report also noted other irregularities, such as the failure of the prosecutor’s office to send copies of the decisions taken in the case to their supervisory authorities or the information centre of the Ministry of the Interior, such as the decision of 9 February 2004. 46. On 1 March 2012 the Pallasovskiy inter-district investigation division of the Volgograd regional investigative committee ordered a new forensic medical examination of the applicant in order to determine what, if any, injuries the applicant had had after the events of 5 August 2002, and whether he could have received them as a result of falling over or striking himself against something. 47. Zh., an expert from the Staropoltavskiy district unit of the Volgograd regional forensic medical bureau, examined the applicant but found no injuries on him. As the applicant’s medical records and X-ray images from 2002 had been lost, the expert based his opinion on information contained in previous expert reports, notably a report dated 18 September 2002 containing information about his treatment at the Central District Hospital (see paragraph 16 above) and an expert’s suggestion that an opinion should be sought from a more experienced expert, and reports dated 17 December 2002 (see paragraph 29 above) and 13 February 2003 (see paragraph 32 above). 48. In his report of 29 March 2012 Zh. concluded that the only injuries he could confirm were the abrasion on the chest and bruising to the eighth and ninth ribs. They could have been received on 5 August 2002 as a result of the applicant falling over and striking himself against protruding hard blunt objects – it was unlikely that they had been inflicted by punching and kicking. As regards the other injuries, noted in the expert reports of 17 December 2002 and 13 February 2003, Zh. considered that they could not be taken into account in the assessment of damage to the applicant’s health because no information about the relevant clinical manifestations or reliable X-ray imaging supporting them could be found in the previous expert reports. 49. On 9 April 2012 the investigative committee ordered a new expert opinion, using the same questions as previously (see paragraph 46 above) because the conclusions made by Zh. in his report of 29 March 2012 completely contradicted the conclusions made by the experts in 2002 and 2003. 50. A report of 19 April 2012, prepared by a panel of five experts from the Volgograd regional forensic medical bureau, confirmed the abrasion on the left of the chest which, according to them, could have been caused on 5 August 2002 by a hard blunt object with a limited surface area, as a result of hitting or being hit by it. 51. The experts noted that no traumatic injuries to the skull or healed rib fractures had been found on the applicant’s X‑ray images made on 16 March 2012 and 9 April 2012 respectively. 52. As the X-ray images of the ribcage, skull and temporal bones of 23, 24 and 28 October 2002 had been lost, the experts found it impossible to draw any conclusions as to the fractured left temporal bone, bruising on the brain or fractured eighths and eleventh ribs diagnosed previously. 53. The experts considered that the medical records described in the previous expert reports contained no objective confirmation as to the diagnosis of traumatic otitis of the left ear, such as injuries or bleeding in that area, and concluded that the ringing and impaired hearing of which the applicant had complained had been explained by his chronic otitis. 12. Decision of 30 April 2012 terminating the criminal proceedings against police officers S. and Sh., annulled on an unspecified date 54. On 30 April 2012 the investigative committee terminated the proceedings in accordance with Article 24 § 1 (2) of the CCrP, because none of the elements of a crime were present in respect of the actions of police officers S. and Sh.. The decision was based, inter alia, on the following new statements received during the additional investigation in 2012. 55. On 30 January 2012 E. stated that on 5 August 2002 she had seen the applicant assaulting V. but had not seen V. assaulting the applicant. After the quarrel between the two men the applicant had followed her to her house, where V. had retreated. The applicant had threatened and verbally abused her, and she had had no choice but to call the police. 56. On 30 January 2012 P. stated that the applicant had had no injuries before his arrest on 5 August 2002. He had been behaving aggressively, shouting threats at E. and V. 57. On 30 January and 7 February 2012 respectively, the applicant’s wife and T. stated that the applicant had had no injuries before his arrest. 58. On 19 March 2012 V. stated that the applicant and T. had burst into his house and attacked him. He had pushed the applicant, who had fallen onto his left side. He had then jumped on him and punched him in the head. 59. Police officers D., S., Sh. and Z. stated that on arriving in the village of Krasnyy Yar they had learned that the applicant and T. had assaulted V., and that the applicant had also threatened to kill E. and had hit her. They had arrested the applicant and T. and had then gone to E.’s house and taken statements. They had then set off to the police station. Once outside Krasnyy Yar, they had released T. because there had been too many people in the car, the engine had been overheating. T. had been behaving calmly, unlike the applicant. No violence had been used against the applicant, who had been in the passenger compartment of the car and not the boot as alleged. When arrested, the applicant had had traces of blood on his face and T‑shirt and coagulated blood in his left ear. His untidy appearance and dirty face had given the impression that he had been fighting with somebody. He had been moaning and holding the left of his chest, and had clearly been in pain. 60. K., the detainee who had shared the same cell as the applicant on the night of 5 August 2002, stated that the applicant had had coagulated blood in his left ear and a swollen lip. He had been complaining of chest pain and coughing painfully. It also transpires from statements by K. and police officer G. that on their way to court on the morning of 6 August 2002 the applicant had been walking slowly. At one point he had crouched down, holding his right hand to the left of his body and saying that his ribs were aching. He had also been coughing painfully. On their way back to the police station the applicant had crouched down and complained of feeling unwell. There had been sweat on his forehead. He had been unable to lift his hands above chest height because of the pain. An ambulance had been called. 61. N., the paramedic who had examined the applicant at the police station, stated that he had complained of headaches, loss of hearing on the left side, chest pain, difficulty breathing and pain in the left hip. He had stated that his brother had hit him on the hip with a spade handle. When asked about the origin of the other injuries, he had not said anything. One of the police officers, who had been present during the examination, had shouted that the applicant had also been hit in the ear with a spade handle. 62. According to an examination report of the police car which had been used to take the applicant to the police station on 5 August 2002, the right side of the boot lid, the part closest to the petrol tank, had been dented. The decision stated that the location of the dents was different from where the applicant had said he had dented the lid, that the police officers had been unable to provide any explanation as to the dents, and that it was now impossible to examine the car as it had been written off. 63. Relying on the results of the 2012 forensic medical examination, the decision stated that the only injuries confirmed were the abrasion on the chest and bruising to the ribs, and that the applicant could have received them in the fight with V. as had been confirmed by V. in 2012. 64. It appears that on an unspecified date the decision of 30 April 2012 was annulled and the investigation was reopened. 65. In his report of 29 May 2012, ordered by the investigating authority on 7 March 2012, a forensic psychologist found that the applicant had a tendency to use fantasy and invention in order to fill gaps in his memory, and that during his examination by the expert he had displayed signs of giving already prepared statements, hiding information or giving false information about the conflict situation between him and T. on one side and his brothers and E. on the other. 66. The report referred to witness statements given in the case about the events of 5 August 2002. In particular, on 6 February 2012 V. had stated that the applicant and T. had burst into his house. The applicant had punched him in the face and T. had grabbed him by the legs. The applicant had then, while sitting on him, punched him repeatedly in the face and chest. V. had stated that he had not even struck the applicant once. During his additional examination on 19 March 2012 V. had stated that in the course of the fight with the applicant and T. he had managed to slip out, finding himself on top of the applicant and punching him in the head. During the reconstruction of events V. had stated that after bursting into his house the applicant and T. had knocked him down, T. had held him by the legs and the applicant, while sitting on him, had punched him five or six times in the face and chest. He had punched the applicant in the head. He had then managed to slip out and trap the applicant underneath him. Sitting on the applicant, he had tried to punch him but T. had pulled him off by the legs. 67. On 3 June 2012 the proceedings against police officers S. and Sh. were terminated in accordance with Article 24 § 1 (2) of the CCrP because none of the elements of a crime had been present in respect of their actions. In addition to the evidence set out in the previous decision, the decision of 3 June 2012 relied on statements by E.’s daughter that after the incident between the applicant and V. the applicant had attacked her, throwing her to the ground and kicking her about six times. He had then tried to hit her mother, E. The decision also referred to the conclusions made by the expert psychologist (see paragraph 65 above). 68. It was concluded, as in the previous decision, that the applicant’s allegations of police ill‑treatment had not been based on real facts and that the only injuries confirmed in 2012, namely the abrasion on the chest and bruising to the ribs, could have been received by the applicant in the fight with V., as had been confirmed by V. in 2012.

5. The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Kaunas. 6. In February 1993 the Kaunas Region Municipality (Kauno rajono savivaldybė) assigned a plot of land measuring 0.15 hectares in the settlement of Noreikiškės to the applicant for the construction of a house (hereinafter “the land”). In May 1995 she signed a land purchase agreement with the municipality and bought the land for 29.70 “single-use investment vouchers” (investiciniai čekiai). The purchase agreement indicated that the nominal value of the land was 2,976 Lithuanian litai (LTL  approximately 862 euros (EUR)). The applicant subsequently obtained a building permit and built a storehouse on the land. 7. On 10 May 2002 the Constitutional Court found that Government regulations which allowed land in Noreikiškės to be sold to private individuals were contrary to the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and the Restitution Law (see Padalevičius v. Lithuania, no. 12278/03, § 18, 7 July 2009). 8. In December 2003 the Kaunas County Administration (hereinafter “the KCA”) brought a claim before the Kaunas District Court (Kauno rajono apylinkės teismas) seeking the annulment of the administrative decisions and the purchase agreements on the basis of which plots of land had been sold to the applicant and to several other individuals. The KCA argued that the land in question had to be returned in natura to its former owners and thus had been sold to the applicant and other individuals unlawfully. 9. On 4 June 2004 the Kaunas District Court allowed the KCA’s claim. The court annulled the administrative decision of 1993 assigning the land to the applicant and the land purchase agreement of 1995, and ordered the Kaunas Region Municipality to return 29.70 “single-use investment vouchers” to the applicant. 10. On 7 February 2005 the Kaunas Regional Court partially quashed the first-instance judgment. It found that the lower court had correctly annulled the administrative decision and purchase agreement, and upheld the judgment in that part. However, it noted that the “single-use investment vouchers” could no longer be used as a means of payment. Thus, in accordance with the Civil Code, the applicant should have received the monetary equivalent of what she had paid in 1995. The court remitted that part of the case for re-examination in order to assess the monetary equivalent. On 3 October 2005 the Supreme Court upheld the Regional Court’s judgment. 11. The remitted part of the case was subsequently re-examined by the Kaunas Regional Court sitting as the court of first instance. During those proceedings, the applicant argued that the unlawful allocation and sale of the land had resulted from the State authorities’ negligence. The applicant claimed that she, as a bona fide purchaser, was therefore entitled to receive compensation for the full market value as it was at the time of expropriation, in accordance with Article 6.147 § 2 of the Civil Code (see paragraph 16 below). 12. On 6 March 2008 the Kaunas Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s request for compensation equating to the full market value of the land. The court found that the authorities could not be held solely responsible for the unlawful sale because the applicant had also had a duty to verify whether she had been buying the land lawfully. Thus, the court held that, for the purposes of Article 6.147 § 2 of the Civil Code, the applicant could not be considered a bona fide purchaser and was not entitled to compensation for the full market value. The court awarded her the nominal value of the land in 1995, which it assessed to be LTL 29.70 (EUR 8.60). The court also noted that if the applicant considered that she had suffered pecuniary damage, she had the right to institute separate proceedings against the State for damages. 13. On 19 August 2008 the Court of Appeal partially amended the Regional Court’s judgment. It reiterated that the applicant could not be considered a bona fide purchaser merely because she had bought the land from the State – she had also had a duty to verify the lawfulness of the sale. However, the Court of Appeal found that the lower court had incorrectly assessed the nominal value of the land in 1995. Referring to the text of the purchase agreement (see paragraph 6 above), the court awarded the applicant LTL 2,976 (EUR 862). 14. On 27 January 2009 the Supreme Court upheld the judgment of the Court of Appeal; however, it partially amended the reasoning. The Supreme Court stated that the nominal value of the land had been indicated in the purchase agreement, so it had not been necessary to apply Article 6.147 of the Civil Code and assess the monetary equivalent. As a result, the applicant’s good faith had been irrelevant in determining the amount of compensation and should not have been examined. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court considered that that error had not affected the lawfulness of the Court of Appeal’s judgment.

5. The applicant was born in 1972 and currently lives in Ukraine. Prior to the events at issue, notably during an unspecified period before 1998, the applicant used to serve in the police. He provided no further details in that regard. 6. On 11 June 2004 the police were informed that the applicant and one of his suspected accomplices, who at the time were on a wanted list for having committed multiple robberies, were on a train travelling to Moldova. The police were also informed that they could be in possession of a gun. At about 11 p.m. on that day a group of four police officers boarded the train and arrested the applicant and his accomplice, using, as noted in the relevant official documents, “hand-to-hand combat techniques” and handcuffs to subdue them. According to the Government, during the arrest the applicant tried to escape. Subsequently, the applicant was taken to Kotovsk police station. 7. On 12 June 2004 the police drew up a report on the applicant’s arrest in which it was noted that he had been arrested for “having resisted lawful demands of the police”, which was an administrative offence, on 12 June 2004 in Kotovsk. The police report on the offence, joined to the above arrest report of 12 June 2004, specified that the applicant “had behaved aggressively, had refused to present his identity documents, had tried to run away [and] had grabbed the police officers’ clothes”. According to the parties, the information concerning the time and place of the arrest contained in the reports was false. 8. Later that day the Kotovsk Town Court found the applicant guilty of the abovementioned administrative offence and ordered his administrative detention for twelve days. The applicant remained in police custody. 9. On 17 August 2004 the regional police department examined the circumstances of the applicant’s arrest and issued a report, finding that the police officers concerned had lawfully used “hand-to-hand combat techniques” and handcuffs against the applicant. No further details were given in that connection. In the report, it was also noted that the applicant had had bruises on his body after the arrest. II. Alleged ill-treatment of the applicant 10. According to the applicant, while in police custody during the night of 11 to 12 June 2004, he was ill-treated by several police officers with the aim of extracting his confession to the crimes of which he was suspected (see paragraph 6 above). In particular, police officers allegedly beat him up, administered electric shocks to him, suffocated him using a gas mask, inserted needles under his nails, hung him over a metal bar, and attempted to sexually abuse him. Unable to withstand the ill-treatment, the applicant made self-incriminating statements and also statements incriminating several other persons, who later became his co-defendants in the proceedings. The applicant stated that had he not done so, the police officers would have killed him as they had killed a certain M., whom the police had suspected of being the applicant’s accomplice, during his questioning in the same police station on 18 March 2004. As was later found by the trial court, M. had died in the course of a robbery he had committed together with the applicant (see paragraph 54 below). 11. Allegedly, the police officers also forced the applicant to sign a written statement that he had no complaints about them and that he had received his injuries elsewhere. 12. On 12 June 2004 the applicant complained to a prosecutor’s office that he had been tortured by the police. On the same day, on the prosecutor’s office’s instructions, the applicant was examined by a medical expert who noted multiple bruises on the applicant’s body and face, which the expert classified as minor. During his medical examination the applicant stated that he had been beaten up by the police officers at the police station during the night of 11 to 12 June 2004. The expert noted that the applicant could have been punched and kicked in the head and body during that time. 13. According to the applicant, the police officers continued torturing him for the next three days. The applicant stated that two people had witnessed him being ill-treated by the police. He did not give their details. 14. On 29 June 2004 the applicant handed the investigators a written statement informing them of his wish to withdraw his complaints of ill‑treatment. Notably, he stated that he had no grievances against the police and that he had been injured due to his own fault in a different location. He did not provide any details of how he had been injured. 15. On 30 June 2004 an investigator from the Kotovsk police station, having questioned the applicant in the presence of his lawyer (see paragraph 38 below), decided not to launch a criminal investigation in respect of the applicant’s injuries, noting, mainly, that the applicant had withdrawn his complaints. 16. Subsequently, the applicant lodged new complaints of alleged ill‑treatment by the police on 11-12 June 2004 with a prosecutor’s office. 17. In particular, in August 2004 the applicant complained to the prosecutor overseeing the investigation that he had been beaten up by the police. On 30 August 2004 the prosecutor met with the applicant and allegedly tried to force him to confess to having committed other crimes. As the applicant refused, the prosecutor allegedly beat him up. As a result, the applicant decided to stop making complaints to that prosecutor. 18. The applicant’s complaints of ill-treatment by the police on 11‑12 June 2004 made to other prosecutors were re-examined on several occasions. In particular, the prosecutors’ decisions refusing to prosecute the police officers issued on 6 July and 31 August 2004, 25 January, 28 July and 25 November 2005 were annulled by senior prosecutors for failure to investigate the matter in full. 19. By a decision of 11 February 2006, the prosecutor’s office again rejected the complaints as unsubstantiated, finding that it had not been demonstrated that the police officers had committed a crime and that there was no evidence that the police had forced the applicant to give self‑incriminating statements after his arrest. Statements of a number of police officers were relied upon in that regard. It was also noted that at some point in time the applicant and his lawyer had made statements that the applicant had not been ill-treated by the police after his arrest, and that he had refused to give details as to how he had received the injuries noted in the medical examination of 12 June 2004 (see paragraphs 14 and 15 above). The prosecutor’s office further found no issue in the way the police had arrested the applicant, relying on the report of 17 August 2004 (see paragraph 9 above). 20. The applicant did not challenge that decision in a separate appeal to a higher prosecutor or the courts, though he raised the complaints of ill‑treatment by the police raised during his trial (see paragraph 49 below). 21. According to the applicant, during further stages of the criminal proceedings against him, he was subjected to beatings by the police on several occasions. 22. The applicant also stated that during his trial he had been subjected to various forms of ill-treatment by the guards, who had been escorting him to court hearings. In particular, the guards had twisted his hands and tried to break his vertebral column; they had not provided him with food during the lunch breaks; and they had threatened the applicant with physical punishment. They had also placed him temporarily in cells together with inmates whom the applicant claims he had arrested when he had worked for the police (see paragraph 5 above). The guards had informed the inmates that they would go unpunished had they killed or raped the applicant. Allegedly, the prosecutors to whom the applicant had brought his complaints of ill-treatment did not examine those complaints on the merits. 23. After his trial, in particular between February 2009 and November 2012, the applicant was detained in “ordinary” prisons, where he was allegedly subjected to abuse and threats by inmates on account of his previous service in the police. Eventually he was transferred to a specialised prison in Mena in which inmates with law-enforcement backgrounds were detained. 24. On 15 February 2016 the applicant was released from prison. III. Allegedly inadequate medical assistance to the applicant while in detention 25. The applicant stated that during his detention he had suffered from different health issues, including a gastric ulcer, kidney disease and an eye issue, for which he had not been provided adequate medical assistance. Consequently, his health condition had deteriorated. The applicant had lodged multiple complaints concerning his allegedly inadequate medical assistance with a prosecutor’s office. 26. In 2006 the prosecutor’s office instructed the head of the Prisons Service in Odessa to ensure that the applicant received adequate medical assistance while he was detained in Odesa Pre-Trial Detention Centre (“the SIZO”). Allegedly, the SIZO administration did not comply with that instruction and he was not given the assistance he needed. Thus, he continued to lodge complaints with the prosecutor’s office. The prosecutor’s office eventually rejected the complaints as unsubstantiated, having studied the applicant’s medical file and noted that he had been medically examined and provided with adequate medical assistance during his detention in the SIZO. The applicant’s further complaints of inadequate medical assistance while in prison were also rejected as unsubstantiated. 27. The Government submitted detailed information regarding the medical assistance which the applicant had received in detention. It demonstrates that throughout the period of his detention in the SIZO and in different prisons he had been examined by various doctors, including those from civilian medical institutions, and had been provided with treatment for the different medical issues he had had at the time. IV. The applicant’s detention prior to his conviction on 30 March 2007 28. After his arrest on 11 June 2004, the applicant was detained on the basis of the decision of the Town Court of 12 June 2004 sentencing him to twelve days’ administrative detention (see paragraph 8 above). 29. On 24 June 2004 the applicant was informed that he was being arrested in connection with his criminal prosecution. The next day the Town Court ordered his further detention for two months on the grounds that the applicant was accused of serious crimes and that he might evade investigation or commit a new crime. No further details were given in that regard. 30. The applicant did not appeal against the decision of the Town Court of 25 June 2004. Nor did he appeal against the decision of the same court of 10 August 2004 extending the maximum period of his detention to 21 October 2004. 31. Between 21 October and 24 December 2004 the applicant was detained solely on the basis of his case having been referred to the trial court. 32. Subsequently, the applicant was detained partly on the basis of the decision of the Town Court of 24 December 2004 and the decisions of the Odesa Regional Court of Appeal (“the Appeal Court”) of 3 June 2005 and 10 January 2006 returning the case for additional investigation, and partly on the basis of the decisions of the Appeal Court of 4 March, 29 July and 2 November 2005 and 10 March 2006 repeatedly extending the maximum period of his pre-trial detention. Those decisions were based mainly on the grounds that further investigative measures had to be performed, that the applicant was accused of serious crimes, and that he might evade investigation and trial and obstruct the establishment of the truth in the case. Those decisions contained no further details in that connection. No appeal against those decisions could be lodged. The applicant alleged that they were taken in violation of procedural norms, in particular without him or his lawyer taking part in the hearings on the matter. 33. Some of the periods of the applicant’s detention between 4 March 2005 and 18 April 2006 – notably, from 10 May to 3 June and from 4 to 16 December 2005 – were not covered by any decision at all, the applicant having been detained on the grounds that the case was pending commencement of the trial. 34. According to the applicant, his detention between 10 and 15 May 2005 was also not covered by any decision at all. 35. On 13 June 2004 the applicant was questioned as a witness concerning several cases of robbery. The applicant made self-incriminating statements, giving details of the crimes which he and several other persons had committed. 36. On 15 June 2004 the applicant was questioned on suspicion of murder, as one of his accomplices had given statements implicating him in that crime, which he had allegedly committed in the course of a robbery. The accomplice had been with the applicant when the murder had been committed, but had not seen how it had happened. In the course of the applicant’s questioning on that date he confessed to having committed the murder and gave details in that regard. On the same date the applicant was officially charged with that crime. The applicant stated that he had been questioned without a lawyer being present. The Government did not address this submission. No documents regarding the applicant’s questioning of 15 June 2004 were provided. Reference to that questioning was made in the judgment of 30 March 2007 (see paragraph 53 below). Notably, when assessing evidence concerning the murder charges, the Appeal Court held that: “... [T]he questioning of Sadkov V.A. was conducted with the participation of a lawyer [while Mr Sadkov had the procedural status of] a suspect on 15 June 2004 ([pages] 64-65, [volume] 12 [of the case file]) and an accused ([pages] 69-70, [volume] 12 [of the case file]) ... during which Sadkov explained that he had stabbed [the victim] repeatedly with a knife ... [and that] subsequently, he threw that knife into a lake. [His] statements contained information about the way the victim had been stabbed ... which was later confirmed by a forensic expert ... and which was not present in the statements of [his accomplice] ... [O]n 15 June 2004, immediately after that information was received, the police officers searched the lake which [Mr Sadkov and his accomplice] had indicated and found a knife, which, according to the experts’ report, could have been used to inflict the injuries of the victim ...” 37. Subsequently, the applicant took part in a number of investigative procedures, notably crime reconstructions and witness confrontations. According to the applicant and the information contained in the judgment of 30 March 2007 (see paragraph 53 below), he was not represented by a lawyer during those procedures. 38. According to the parties’ submissions, on 24 June 2004 a lawyer was appointed by the investigator to represent the applicant in the proceedings. No copy of the relevant decision was provided. The applicant was questioned in the lawyer’s presence where he confirmed his previous statements to the police. 39. During questioning at later stages of the investigation and at the trial, the applicant, with his lawyer present, repeatedly changed his version of the events pertaining to the charges against him. For instance, while initially he testified that it had been only him who had committed the murder, during subsequent questioning he stated that one of his co-defendants had also taken part in the murder. Ultimately, the applicant denied his responsibility for the murder and the majority of the counts of robbery. In particular, he stated that the crimes had been committed by his co‑defendants, who had informed him of the relevant details, and that his confession during the initial questioning in June 2004 had been extracted as a result of ill‑treatment by the police. 40. On 22 October 2004 the investigation was completed and the applicant was given the case file to study. 41. On 24 December 2004 the Town Court returned the case for additional investigation for failure to complete the required investigative steps in full. It also instructed the investigator to look into one of the applicant’s co-defendants’ complaints of ill-treatment by the police. 42. Subsequently, the case was returned to the prosecutor’s office for additional investigation two more times, on 3 June and 16 December 2005, mainly for failure to complete the required investigative steps in full. 43. In the meantime, on 28 April 2005 the applicant asked the investigators to terminate the criminal proceedings against him and to release him from detention, stating that the charges against him were based on his self-incriminating statements obtained as a result of ill-treatment in June 2004. 44. On 29 April 2005 the request was refused as unsubstantiated. 45. On 30 November 2005 the investigators rejected a similar request made by the applicant’s lawyer on 29 November 2005, in which he also alleged that the applicant’s complaints of ill-treatment by the police had not been duly examined. 46. During the pre-trial investigation the applicant was given access to the entire case file and studied it together with his lawyer on several occasions, notably in April and September 2005 and February 2006. He was also given access to the case file during the trial. 47. According to the reports of the police, while the applicant was studying the case file on 29 September 2005 he tried to destroy several documents, in particular those concerning his statements made on 29 June 2004 (see paragraph 14 above). The applicant did not make any comments in that regard. 48. In April 2006 the case was referred to the Appeal Court for trial. 49. During the trial the applicant denied being guilty of the crimes he was charged with. The applicant’s principle argument was that the charges were based on his and his co-defendants’ testimony obtained as a result of ill-treatment by the police, and on false evidence. 50. On 30 March 2007 the Appeal Court found the applicant and five others guilty of a number of crimes, including murder, illegal possession of firearms and on multiple counts of robbery, sentenced the applicant to fifteen years’ imprisonment and ordered the confiscation of all his property. 51. The court based its judgment regarding most of the charges mainly on the testimony of the applicant’s co-defendants obtained in the course of the investigation and during the trial. The court also relied on the testimony of a number of witnesses and victims of the crimes and on the conclusions of several forensic, ballistic and other expert examinations. 52. The court noted that the applicant’s and his co-defendants’ arrest and administrative detention at the initial stage of the investigation (in the applicant’s case between 11 and 24 June 2004) had been contrary to Articles 106 and 115 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (setting-out rules on pre‑trial detention), as they had actually been arrested on suspicion of having committed crimes. The court also noted that during that period they had been questioned as witnesses concerning the relevant events and had taken part in other investigative procedures, notably crime reconstructions and witness confrontations. According to the court, that situation had entailed a violation of their right to mount a defence. The court decided not to accept as evidence all the verbatim records of the investigative actions in which the applicant and his co-defendants had taken part as witnesses during the relevant periods (see paragraph 35 above). 53. As regards the charge of murder, the court relied principally on the statements of one of the applicant’s accomplices and the applicant’s self‑incriminating statements made at the pre-trial stage, in particular during his interview on 15 June 2004 and during subsequent questioning, having noted that the applicant had been assisted by a lawyer when he had made those statements (see paragraphs 36 and 38 above). The court found that the statements were reliable and noted that during the trial the applicant had made conflicting submissions concerning the relevant events, which could not be accepted. 54. Relying on the prosecutor’s office’s decision of 11 February 2006 (see paragraph 19 above), the court found that the applicant’s complaints of ill-treatment by the police had been unsubstantiated. The court also found that, contrary to the applicant’s submissions, one of his accomplices, M., had died of blood loss after he had been injured by the applicant’s other accomplice in the course of one of the robberies they had committed. 55. The applicant and the prosecution challenged the judgment of 30 March 2007 on appeal. While the prosecution disagreed with the first-instance court’s legal qualification of some of the crimes, the applicant argued that he had not been guilty, that he had made self-incriminating statements as a result of ill-treatment by the police and that his co‑defendants had made untruthful statements concerning his involvement in the crimes. 56. On 4 December 2007 the Supreme Court heard the case and delivered its decision in the applicant’s presence. It upheld the judgment of 30 March 2007 in so far as it concerned the majority of the convictions, including murder. The Supreme Court found that the applicant’s guilt had been duly established. In its decision, it referred to the statements of the applicant’s co-defendants, witnesses and victims, and also to different forensic evidence. 57. By the same decision, the Supreme Court ordered a retrial of several of the convictions of robbery, holding that the first-instance court had erred in the legal qualification of the crimes. In particular, it ordered the examination of whether those crimes could be considered as having been committed by an “organised group”. 58. The applicant stated that a copy of the decision of the Supreme Court of 4 December 2007 had been given to him, after a substantial delay, on 19 June 2008. 59. During the retrial the applicant argued that he was not guilty and that he had been ill-treated by the police on 11-12 June 2004. 60. On 11 August 2008 the Appeal Court convicted the applicant and his co-defendants on the remaining counts of robbery. It did not change the applicant’s sentence. The conviction was based mainly on the testimony of the applicant’s co-defendants obtained in the course of the investigation and trial. To a certain extent, the court also relied on the testimony of several witnesses and victims and the results of various expert examinations. 61. Relying on the prosecutor’s office’s decision of 11 February 2006, the court found that the applicant’s complaints of ill-treatment by the police were unsubstantiated. 62. The applicant appealed in cassation. 63. On 16 December 2008 the Supreme Court upheld the judgment of 11 August 2008, noting, inter alia, that there had been no evidence that the applicant’s co-defendants had perjured themselves. It also noted that the applicant had acknowledged his guilt and had given details of the relevant events on several occasions during the investigation. The Supreme Court did not specify the period of the investigation to which it referred. 64. The Supreme Court generally noted that the applicant’s complaints of a violation of his right to mount a defence did not have any basis in the case file. It further found no violation of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1960 (“the CCrP”) in that the applicant had taken part in the investigative actions during his administrative detention. The applicant’s complaints of ill-treatment were considered to be unsubstantiated. 65. On 13 February 2009 the Appeal Court sent the applicant a copy of the decision of the Supreme Court of 16 December 2008, noting that after that date the applicant would not be entitled to study the case file. VI. The application to the Court 66. In June and July 2005 the applicant made submissions to the Court, complaining principally of ill-treatment by the police and of the unlawfulness of his arrest and detention. 67. By a letter of 22 August 2005, the Court invited the applicant to provide copies of documents pertinent to his complaints. 68. In his letter of 29 September 2005, the applicant stated that his requests for copies of the necessary documents had been refused by the domestic authorities. In particular, in September 2005 the prosecutor’s office informed the applicant that the CCrP did not provide for the issuing of copies of documents from criminal case files and that once the investigation had been completed the applicant and his lawyer would be given a possibility to study the case file and to make copies of documents by hand. 69. By a letter of 5 December 2005, the Court invited the Government to provide factual information concerning the applicant’s complaints regarding his inability to obtain copies of the documents needed for his application. 70. In January 2006 the applicant and the Government submitted copies of a number of documents relating to the applicant’s complaints of ill‑treatment and unlawful detention. 71. In their reply to the Court’s letter of 5 December 2005, the Government also stated that pursuant to the CCrP the applicant had the right to study the case file and to make copies of documents after the completion of the investigation against him. 72. Subsequently, the applicant allegedly also had difficulties obtaining copies of other documents from the case file. He stated that his requests to the prosecutor’s office and the courts for such copies had been to no avail. According to the documents provided by the parties, it was noted that the applicant had been given access to his case file during the criminal proceedings against him and that the courts had not been required to issue him copies of documents other than judgments in his criminal case. 73. The applicant alleged that the administration of a prison in which he had been detained in August 2009 had destroyed a letter which he had asked them to send to the Court on 3 August 2009. 74. The prosecutor’s office examined the alleged destruction of the letter and found that it had been duly dispatched. 75. The Court did not receive a letter from the applicant dated 3 August 2009.

6. The applicant company B.K.M. Lojistik Tasimacilik Ticaret Limited Sirketi has its registered office in Istanbul. 7. On 13 November 2008 customs officers stopped and checked the applicant company’s lorry, in which they found packages of unknown content. A preliminary test of the content revealed that the packages contained heroin. The customs officers informed the police accordingly. 8. On 14 November 2008 the police inspected the lorry and its trailer and found 105 kg of heroin. The driver, a Turkish citizen, was arrested and detained. The lorry was seized and the trailer and its goods became the object of a customs procedure. On an unspecified date the applicant company received documents enabling the goods contained in the trailer to be delivered to their destination. The trailer was returned to the applicant company. Subsequently, the police filed a criminal complaint against the driver with the Ptuj District State Prosecutor’s Office. 9. On 15 November 2008 the Ptuj District State Prosecutor’s Office charged the driver with the production and trafficking of illegal drugs under Section 186(1) of the Criminal Code. The District State Prosecutor further requested that the applicant company’s lorry be confiscated under Section 186(5) of the Criminal Code since it had been used for the transportation of illegal narcotic drugs. 10. On 25 November 2008 the applicant company asked the Ptuj District Court to provide it with the case-file concerning the charges against the driver. It also enquired when it would be able to retake possession of the seized lorry. On 8 December 2008 the court informed the applicant company of the charges against the driver. It further informed the applicant company that the lorry had been seized in accordance with Section 220 of the Criminal Procedure Act read in conjunction with Section 186(5) of the Criminal Code and that no decision could be made on the return or confiscation of the lorry until a decision on the merits had been issued. On 23 December 2008 the applicant company informed the court that it opposed the District State Prosecutor’s request for confiscation of the lorry. 11. On 29 December 2008 the Ptuj District Court found the driver guilty of drug trafficking and sentenced him to nine years’ imprisonment. It ordered that the lorry be returned to the applicant company. It held that confiscation was possible only if one of the conditions set out in the second paragraph of Section 73 of the Criminal Code were met, namely the existence of reasons of general security or morality. The District Court considered that that condition had not been met, taking into account the fact that there was no indication that the applicant company knew about the transportation of the illegal material. 12. Both the driver and the Higher State Prosecutor appealed. On 21 May 2009 the Maribor Higher Court modified the first-instance judgment and, relying on Sections 73(3) and 186(5) of the Criminal Code, ordered the confiscation of the lorry. It held that the legislative framework provided for mandatory confiscation in cases of drug-related criminal offences since the nature of their commission, their magnitude and the dangerous consequences thereof called for the extension of coercive measures to persons who were not the perpetrators of the criminal offence, irrespective of whether or not the owners of the vehicle knew what the perpetrator had been transporting. The Higher Court explained that in accordance with Section 73(2) of the Criminal Code, objects used in the commission of a criminal offence could be confiscated even when they did not belong to the perpetrator, in so far as the third party’s right to claim damages from the perpetrator was not thereby affected. Moreover, Section 73(3) provided for the possibility of mandatory confiscation in cases provided for by the statute. Thus, Section 186(5) of the Criminal Code implemented those two provisions by providing mandatory confiscation of the means of transport used for transportation and storage of illegal substances. 13. On 17 July 2009 the applicant company lodged a constitutional complaint against the aforementioned decision and an initiative for review of the constitutionality of Section 186(5) of the Criminal Code, alleging a violation of its property rights. It complained in particular that it had not known that the lorry was being used for illegal purposes, adding that the first-instance court had explicitly established its non-involvement in the commission of the criminal offence at issue. Claiming that it had not had an effective possibility to prevent the abuse of its property for criminal purposes, the applicant company stressed that the lorry had been subject to regular controls concerning possible vehicle modifications and hidden compartments. Thus, according to the applicant company, the measure complained of constituted a punishment and an unjustified and disproportionate interference with its property and that it had not had the opportunity to participate in the criminal proceedings. 14. On 29 September 2011 the Constitutional Court dismissed both the constitutional complaint and the initiative. In reviewing the contested legislation, the Constitutional Court confirmed the Higher Court’s view that Section 186 of the Criminal Code provided for mandatory confiscation of vehicles used for the transportation and storage of drugs or illegal substances in sport, regardless of their ownership. According to the Constitutional Court, drug-related criminal offences sanctioned under Section 186 of the Criminal Code represented a great evil and an extremely high degree of threat not only from the perspective of the individual, but also from the perspective of society as a whole; the purpose of the impugned measure was to prevent the commission of such criminal offences in the future and thus to protect important legal values in society, such as health and life – especially of young people. The Constitutional Court stressed that the nature of the criminal offences in question, the manner in which they were committed and their consequences justified the interference with the ownership rights of all owners of the means of transport used for drug-trafficking, regardless of their potential involvement in the criminal activities at issue, adding that a different regulation governing the confiscation of goods would diminish considerably the possibilities for effectively preventing the criminal offences in question. 15. Balancing the general interests in question with the property rights of the applicant company, the Constitutional Court held that the measure complained of did not amount to an excessive interference despite the fact that the applicant company had had no effective possibility for preventing the misuse of its property for criminal purposes and had not participated in the commission of the criminal offence. In this connection, the Constitutional Court pointed out that legal certainty required that every instance of legally recognised damage be adequately protected. Thus, by virtue of Section 73(2) of the Criminal Code, the confiscation did not affect the right of third parties to claim compensation from the offender. Under the general rules of tort law, the injured owner had the possibility and the right to exact compensation from the person responsible for the damage. The Constitutional Court added that it was for the regular courts to establish in each individual case whether all the elements required for recognition of the alleged damage and thus for payment of compensation were fulfilled. 16. Meanwhile, on 29 June 2009 the Ptuj District Court informed the applicant company that the lorry was to be sold at a public auction and that it could submit written comments in this respect. On 6 July 2009 the applicant company replied that it was willing to buy the confiscated lorry. On 20 October 2011 the court ordered the sale of the lorry and informed the applicant company thereof. On 30 November 2011 the lorry was sold at public auction for 12,000 euros (“EUR”). According to the Government the lorry was sold to the applicant company. In this regard, they submitted a document stating that the lorry had been sold to “B.K.M. LOJISTIK, TAS.VE TIC.LTD.STI”, a company from Istanbul. However, the applicant company contested that statement, alleging that it was another company that had purchased the lorry. The Government did not reply to this submission.

5. The applicant was born in 1981 and lives in Piteşti. 6. On 4 September 2014 a gynaecologist prescribed the medicine Utrogestan to the applicant, to be taken twice a day for three months. 7. According to the applicant’s own statement before the Court, the medication was prescribed to help maintain her pregnancy and prevent a miscarriage. 8. According to the medicine’s patient information leaflet, it was recommended for the treatment of medical conditions causing an insufficient secretion of the hormone progesterone and could be used for several conditions, including inter alia, aiding a pregnancy. Its potential side effects included drowsiness and dizziness, usually as a result of an overdose. Stopping the treatment did not have any potential effects. 9. On 29 October 2014 M.N., a prosecutor attached to the National Anticorruption Department (Direcția Națională Anticorupție – hereinafter “the DNA”), summoned the applicant to be interviewed as a witness on 31 October 2014 in criminal proceedings opened by the authorities into alleged acts of corruption involving her father and others. Her father was the mayor of Pitești and a member of a major political party which formed the Romanian Government at the time. 10. According to the applicant’s own statement before the Court, on the morning of 31 October 2014 she started feeling unwell and asked her chosen legal representative to inform M.N. that she might not be able to testify that day because of her health. Her lawyer called M.N. and informed him of the situation. The lawyer also reassured the prosecutor that he would accompany the applicant to the DNA’s offices for the interview once her medical condition improved. Subsequently, the applicant’s lawyer informed her that the prosecutor had refused to allow a lawyer to be present during her interview and he advised her to attend alone. 11. On the same date a general practitioner issued a medical note and referred the applicant urgently to hospital. The note stated that she was suffering from an inflammation of her uterus. 12. On the same date the gynaecology department of the Panait Sârbu Clinical Hospital in Bucharest took an ultrasound of the applicant’s uterus. The ultrasound image produced by the applicant as evidence before the Court did not provide, contain or was accompanied by any explanation or medical report detailing her condition. 13. According to the applicant’s own statement before the Court, the examination at the Panait Sârbu Clinical Hospital confirmed that she was pregnant and was experiencing some complications as a result of stress and her medication’s side effects. However, the scan could not confirm whether the foetus had stopped developing or not. She was advised to continue the prescribed treatment and rest. 14. On the same date M.N. authorised two police officers to enforce a warrant to appear (mandat de aducere) issued in the applicant’s name. It stated that she had unjustifiably ignored the summons of 29 October 2014 and that her presence was required at the DNA’s offices in order to be interviewed as a witness. 15. According to the applicant’s own statement before the Court, on her return from the hospital two police officers presented her with the warrant to appear and took her to the DNA’s offices even though she had informed them of her medical condition and had shown them her medical documents. During the interview she informed M.N. that she was feeling ill and presented him with the medical documents. Even though he was aware that she was pregnant, the prosecutor continued to interview her aggressively, using interview techniques aimed at intimidating her. Her interview was also recorded but in the absence of any procedural rules on the matter she was unable to ask for the recording. When she asked the prosecutor to mention in her statement that she was being interviewed while under treatment, in poor health and after a trip to the hospital, she was told that she would not be allowed to leave the premises for the rest of the evening. She became scared, gave in and fully complied with the investigating authorities’ demands. 16. On 31 October 2014, after the applicant’s interview, prosecutor M.N. prepared a report which stated that according to the statement made by her, she had been late for the interview because she had been feeling unwell on account of health problems (având probleme de sănătate). The report noted that the applicant had supported her statement by submitting a general practitioner’s referral to hospital (see paragraph 11 above) and the results of the ultrasound taken by the Panait Sârbu Clinical Hospital (see paragraph 12 above). The applicant signed the report without objection. 17. According to the applicant’s own statement before the Court, she also gave the prosecuting authorities a prescription for her medication and the medication’s patient information leaflet. 18. On 19 January 2015 the applicant underwent a routine pregnancy check-up at a private clinic in Bucharest. According to the medical report prepared that day, she was thirteen weeks pregnant. 19. At 4 a.m. on 6 November 2014 M.N. authorised the police to enforce a warrant to appear (mandat de aducere) issued in the applicant’s name in order to interview her in the criminal proceedings opened by the authorities into alleged acts of corruption. 20. At 11.30 a.m. two police officers went to the applicant’s home and presented her with the warrant to appear. According to a report produced by the officers, the applicant did not object to the warrant and followed them to the DNA’s offices. The applicant signed the report. 21. According to the applicant’s own statement before the Court, several police officers came to her home and took her to the DNA’s offices. On her arrival, even though M.N. was aware of her pregnancy, he left her waiting for eight hours in the corridor. During that time she was forced to stand and had no access to food or water. She started feeling very unwell because of her treatment and its side effects. After eight hours a statement was taken from her in the presence of her chosen legal representatives. 22. From 12.50 to 1.10 p.m. M.N. informed the applicant in the presence of her two chosen legal representatives that she was suspected of complicity in bribe taking and money laundering in criminal proceedings opened by the authorities into alleged acts of corruption. From 1.15 to 2.45 p.m. she was interviewed as a suspect in their presence. Her statement was recorded. 23. At 6 p.m. M.N. charged (a pus ȋn mişcare acțiunea penală) the applicant with complicity in bribe taking and money laundering. Between 6.05 and 6.10 p.m. he informed her of the charges against her in the presence of her two chosen legal representatives. From 6.15 to 6.20 p.m. she was interviewed in their presence about the circumstances of the case as a person charged with an offence. Her statement was recorded. 24. The applicant and her chosen legal representatives signed, without raising any written objections, all the documents produced by the DNA in respect of her case on 6 November 2014, including her statements. 25. At 7.07 p.m. on 6 November 2014 M.N. decided to place the applicant in police custody for twenty-four hours and ordered that she be taken to the Bucharest Police Detention Centre (Centrul de Reținere şi Arestare Preventivă din cadrul Direcției Generale de Poliție a Municipiului Bucureşti). 26. At 7.12 p.m. M.N. informed the applicant of her impending detention in the presence of one of her chosen legal representatives. 27. According to the applicant’s own statement before the Court, she arrived at the detention centre at around 7.30 p.m. with only a bottle of water and a small box of vitamins and minerals. The detention centre authorities took the vitamins from her immediately. 28. On the same date the applicant signed a statement for the detention centre medical service. According to the statement, she informed them that she had been monitored for endometrial hyperplasia, that she agreed with the information recorded by the medical staff and that the information in respect of her health was complete and accurate. 29. At 7.55 p.m. the medical service produced a report concerning the applicant’s health. The report noted, inter alia, that according to the statement made by her, she had been suffering from endometrial hyperplasia. Furthermore, she did not have her own Utrogestan. In addition, she stated that she would bring her medical documents in case she was detained pending trial and that she was a non-smoker. 30. According to the applicant’s own statement before the Court, she informed the detention centre medical service of her pregnancy and treatment and asked them to give her the medication and vitamins that evening and the following morning as recommended. However, during her detention she was not provided with the treatment needed for her pregnancy and therefore she could have suffered a miscarriage. Furthermore, according to her, the detention centre authorities did not provide her with any food or water until the next morning. The food she received was unsavoury, and she was warned by her cellmates not to eat it. Moreover, she was detained in a cell measuring 5 square metres with three smokers, even though she had informed the authorities that she was a non-smoker and that smoke was harmful to someone in her condition. The cell had four bunk beds and was cold. She was forced to sleep in a bed that had a mattress but no bed linen or duvet. The cell had a sink and a squat toilet. The toilet was separated from the rest of the cell by a curtain and was covered with a plastic device to prevent rats from entering the cell. A shower was fitted above the toilet which was also used for flushing it. No warm water was available and the cold water from the sink was contaminated and could not be used for drinking. Furthermore, she was allowed only thirty minutes of outdoor exercise at the same time as her other three cellmates, in a yard measuring 6 or 7 square metres. It had walls three metres high and was covered by a metal grill. The other three cellmates smoked constantly in the yard, so it was filled with cigarette smoke because fresh air could not enter as a result of the very high walls. 31. At around 7.07 p.m. on 7 November 2014 the Bucharest County Court dismissed the DNA’s request to detain the applicant pending trial for thirty days and ordered her release, on condition that she did not leave the country. In examining her personal situation, the court noted, inter alia, that she was a former national television presenter and a film producer. 32. On 25 February 2015 a gynaecologist prescribed the applicant Utrogestan, to be taken twice a day until the thirty-second week of pregnancy. 33. On 17 December 2015 the DNA informed the Government, inter alia, that on 6 November 2014 similar procedural measures to those taken in respect of the applicant had been taken around the same time against eleven other suspects who were being investigated in the same set of criminal proceedings. Moreover, during the proceedings the applicant had been assisted by her chosen legal representatives and, like all the other suspects, she had been offered water or had been able to purchase food and water. Furthermore, water dispensers and disposable cups had been available in every corridor and office of the building. Everyone inside the building, including those under investigation, had access to its canteen. Lastly, all the defendants and their chosen legal representatives had the option of sitting down during the proceedings. 34. On 28 January 2016 the detention centre coordination department informed the Government that the applicant had arrived at 8.20 p.m. on 6 November 2014. According to the rules in force at the time, detainees were served dinner from 5.30 to 6 p.m. There were no written rules setting out the procedure which needed to be followed for detainees arriving later than 6 p.m. and the applicant had not asked for a meal. In addition, detention centres did not have a clear procedure in respect of detainees statements on whether they were a smoker or non-smoker. As long as detainees were asked about that at the time of their incarceration and opted for smoker or non-smoker status, they would be detained as far as possible according to their preferences. 35. According to the detention centre coordination department, none of the available documents proved that the applicant had stated that she was a non‑smoker at the time of her incarceration. Consequently, she had been assigned randomly to a cell for smokers. In addition, she had had access to running cold water which could have been used for drinking, and her cell had been heated at all times. 36. The applicant submitted excerpts from several newspaper and online articles concerning her detention and the time she spent at the DNA’s offices on 6 November 2014. According to three of these she was interviewed at the DNA’s offices for eight or more hours.

5. The applicants were born in 1984, 1988 and 1987 respectively. The first applicant currently lives in Odessa. The third applicant left Ukraine for Ethiopia on 23 November 2014. His current whereabouts are unknown. The second applicant died on 6 March 2015. According to the applicants’ representative, the second applicant died of a “natural cause”. No further details were given in this regard. The Court was not informed of anyone wishing to pursue the application on his behalf. 6. The following is a summary of the events that led the applicants to seek asylum outside their countries of origin, as submitted by the applicants. 7. The first applicant is an Orthodox Christian. When he was fifteen years old he was forcibly recruited to the army in Eritrea. After having served for two months he deserted and left for Djibouti. In the meantime, his father went missing after he had been arrested by the Eritrean authorities for having complained about the first applicant’s forcible military service. The first applicant believed that his father had been tortured and murdered by the authorities. 8. The second applicant was a Protestant Christian. Initially, he left Eritrea for Ethiopia together with his family. After the outbreak of armed conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the second applicant’s family moved back to Eritrea, though the second applicant remained in Ethiopia as he feared persecution for his religion and forcible military service in Eritrea. As he could have been expelled by the Ethiopian authorities to Eritrea, the second applicant left for Djibouti in 2007. 9. The first and second applicants stayed in Djibouti illegally for several years. In that country both applicants were repeatedly arrested by the authorities allegedly in connection with the armed conflict between Djibouti and Eritrea in June 2008. 10. The third applicant left Ethiopia for Djibouti in 2005 for unspecified reasons. From 2008 to 2010 he was employed by an Ethiopian transport company operating in Djibouti. The third applicant submitted that as he had been a member of the “Medre[k] political party”, he had been dismissed by his employer after that party had lost the 2010 election in Ethiopia to the “Ehadeg party”. The third applicant’s identity card issued by the Ethiopian authorities was retained by his former employer. Thus the third applicant remained in Djibouti illegally and was at risk of possible deportation by the Djiboutian authorities to his country of origin, Ethiopia, where he risked persecution “as a traitor to the Ehadeg political regime”. 11. The Government did not comment on those submissions. 12. On 18 January 2012, with the intention of seeking asylum in any country other than Djibouti or their countries of origin, the applicants covertly boarded a commercial vessel flying the flag of the Republic of Malta. The vessel was leaving the port of Djibouti and heading for Tuzla, Turkey. 13. The next day the applicants were discovered by the vessel crew. The vessel’s owner and insurer were informed accordingly. 14. When the vessel was passing through the Suez Canal, the insurer tried to arrange with the Egyptian authorities that the applicants could disembark in Egypt, but the authorities refused the request. 15. Following the vessel’s arrival in Tuzla on 3 February 2012 the Turkish authorities and a representative of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (“the UNHCR”) in Turkey met with the applicants on board the vessel. The applicants were not allowed to disembark. Their allegations of persecution in their home countries written in the Amharic and Tigre languages were passed by the vessel’s insurer to the representative of the UNHCR office in Turkey. 16. On 21 February 2012 the vessel left Tuzla in the direction of the port of Mykolayiv in Ukraine. 17. On 24 February 2012, sometime before the vessel anchored in the port of Mykolayiv, a non-governmental organisation “Faith, Hope, Love”, which at the time was based in Odesa and assisted refugees and asylum‑seekers under a contract with the UNHCR, contacted the head of the Border Control Service in the Southern Region of Ukraine informing him that there were two nationals of Eritrea and a national of Ethiopia on board the vessel and that, according to the UNHCR, they might require international protection. The organisation requested leave for their lawyer, Z., to meet with the applicants. 18. On 25 February 2012 Ukrainian border guards embarked the vessel and met with the applicants. According to information provided by the Government, the applicants did not submit any requests to the border guards. 19. Later on that day, Z. went to Mykolayiv port to see the applicants. She was allowed to embark the vessel and meet with the applicants. She discussed their situation with them and informed them of the asylum procedures in Ukraine. The discussion was in English in the presence of three border guards and two port security officers. As only the first applicant could speak English, he interpreted the discussion into Amharic, which the other two applicants could understand. 20. According to the applicants, during the discussion they expressed the wish to seek asylum in Ukraine and started filling in asylum applications with the help of one of the border guards who had knowledge of English. That border guard was an official interpreter at the State Border Control Service. However, sometime later the border guards stated that they could not accept the asylum applications from the applicants, as the applicants were on board a vessel flying the flag of a foreign State. Such applications had to be submitted to the vessel’s captain. On the same grounds the border guards refused to allow the applicants to disembark. The border guards asked Z. to leave the vessel. Allegedly, Z. was not given sufficient time and interpretation facilities to provide assistance to the applicants in respect of their asylum claims. 21. According to the Government, during that meeting the applicants did not submit applications for asylum; nor did they express a wish to do so. As the applicants had no identity documents, the head of the border-guard unit decided to refuse them leave to enter Ukraine. No copy of that decision was provided to the Court. The Government submitted copies of reports drawn up by the border guards who had been present at that meeting, which indicated that the meeting had lasted for five hours and that the applicants had stated that they needed time to decide whether they wished to request asylum in Ukraine. Z. left the vessel without raising any complaints. The head of the border-guard unit stated in her report that she had explained to the applicants that “in the circumstances the border guards had not been able to accept asylum applications from them”. 22. On 28 February 2012 the applicants, allegedly having been misled by the vessel’s captain who was acting on the instructions of the Ukrainian border guards, signed type-written statements in English, according to which they had boarded the vessel with the aim of reaching Sweden “in search of better living conditions” and that they did not “need the status of refugee, addition[al] [or] temporary protection in Ukraine”. In a letter he sent to the UNHCR on 6 March 2012, the captain stated that the above‑mentioned type-written statements had been prepared and brought on board by Ukrainian border guards on 28 February 2012. 23. The Government submitted that the applicants themselves had asked the captain to help them to prepare the above-mentioned type-written statements. The Government relied on the captain’s statements obtained on 3 March 2012 when he had been questioned by the migration authorities. In particular, the captain stated that he and the first applicant had prepared the statements and had given them to the other applicants to sign. 24. On 2 March 2012 Z., acting on the applicants’ behalf, lodged with the Court a request for interim measures to be imposed under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. She stated that the applicants risked removal to Saudi Arabia, for which the vessel was scheduled to depart on 3 March 2012. In their submissions before the Court, the Government did not contest this statement. Z. further argued that in Saudi Arabia asylum-seekers were granted no form of protection and were exposed to the risk of being repatriated. According to her, there was a real risk that the authorities of Saudi Arabia would forcibly return the applicants to their countries of origin where they would be subjected to ill-treatment. She essentially requested the Court to indicate to the Government of Ukraine that the applicants should be allowed to leave the vessel and should be granted access to a lawyer and to the asylum procedure. 25. On the same day the Court granted the request. 26. On 3 March 2012 the border guards accompanied by an officer from the State Migration Service embarked the vessel and met with the applicants. According to the Government, it was during that meeting that the applicants requested asylum in Ukraine. They were allowed to disembark and to cross the State border. 27. On 16 March 2012 the applicants were questioned by the migration authorities concerning their asylum applications. According to the applicants, during the questioning they were not provided with adequate translation or any explanation of the relevant regulations. Nor were they provided with legal assistance. 28. The parties have not informed the Court about the outcome of the applicants’ asylum applications lodged in March 2012; nor have they provided any further details as regards their examination by the migration authorities. 29. It appears from their submissions that in 2014 the applicants lodged new asylum applications with the authorities. 30. On 19 August 2014 the Odesa Regional Department of the Migration Service (the “ORDMS”) rejected the third applicant’s asylum application, finding that it was manifestly ill-founded. The third applicant did not challenge that decision on appeal. On 23 November 2014 he decided to leave Ukraine for Ethiopia. The UNHCR helped him to organise the travel arrangements. The applicants’ representative did not provide any further information as regards the third applicant, as since the third applicant’s departure from Ukraine the representative has lost contact with him. 31. On 9 December 2014 the ORDMS refused the second applicant’s application, finding that his submissions were contradictory and did not concern a situation in which refugee status or complementary protection could be granted. He appealed to the Odesa Administrative Court. The proceedings were eventually terminated as the second applicant died on 6 March 2015. 32. On 12 August 2015 the ORDMS refused the first applicant’s application, principally for the same reasons as in the case of the second applicant. The first applicant appealed to the Odesa Administrative Court, which has not yet decided on the matter.

6. The first applicant, Partners 2000 Kft, is a Hungarian limited liability company with its seat in Nyárliget. It is owned and run by the second applicant. The second applicant is a Hungarian national, who was born in 1972 and lives in Sopron. The third applicant is the second applicant’s wife, who was born in 1973 and lives in Sopron. The fourth applicant is the second and third applicants’ minor child, born in 2000. 7. On 11 September 2012 Parliament enacted Act no. CXXXIV of 2012 on the Repression of Smoking of the Youth and on Tobacco Retail. The Act was published on 24 September 2012. 8. According to the Act, tobacco retail was to become a State monopoly (exercised through a State-owned company, ND Nemzeti Dohánykereskedelmi Nonprofit Zrt), and tobacco retailers would become authorised through a concession tender, advertised on 15 December 2012. The time-limit for applying was 22 February 2013. 9. Entities or persons previously engaged in tobacco retail had no privileges in the tender. Legal persons were not entitled to apply. 10. The Act was subsequently amended on several occasions, and the final version was enacted on 6 June 2013, with entry into force on 1 July 2013. Government Decree no. 181/2013. (VI.7.), which contained the detailed rules for the operations of the future concession-holders, was published on 8 June 2013, that is, after the completion of the tendering process, the results of which had become public on 22 April 2013. The decision about the tenders was taken by ND Zrt itself. 11. The first applicant, Partners 2000 Kft had been active in tobacco retail for several years. Since, however, it was not entitled to apply for a concession under the new law, the second applicant applied personally for one, on several occasions. However, ND Zrt turned down his applications, informing him that he had not obtained a tobacco retail concession. The decisions said that his applications did not fully meet the requirements, without developing the shortcomings. 12. No compensation is available for ex-tobacco-retailers who, by not being awarded a concession, lost part of their livelihood. The refusals, such as those of Mr Györkös, were not subject to any legal remedy. 13. The applicants submitted that others in comparable situations – and in the case of those who had never been doing tobacco retail beforehand, in non-comparable situations – were granted concessions, which difference in treatment cannot be explained by any circumstance other than political adherence.

4. The applicants’ dates of birth and places of residence are given in the appendix. At the material time some of them held positions in opposition political parties or groups. 5. Demonstrations were planned to be held on 31 July 2010, 2 April 2011 and 17 April 2011 in Baku. Prior to those assemblies, on 23 July 2010, 18 March 2011 and 11 April 2011 respectively, the organisers, consisting of several members of the opposition, gave notice to the relevant authority, the Baku City Executive Authority (“the BCEA”). 6. The BCEA refused to authorise the holding of the demonstration of 31 July 2010 at the places indicated by the organisers and proposed three other locations on the outskirts of Baku, namely, a stadium in the Binagadi District, a square in the proximity of Zigh road in the Khatai District, and a yard of a driving school situated in the 20th residential area of the Sabail District. The BCEA noted that the squares in one of which the organisers proposed to hold the assembly were designated for public leisure and the other places proposed by the organisers were areas with heavy traffic. 7. Similarly, the BCEA refused to authorise the holding of the demonstrations of 2 and 17 April 2011 at the places indicated by the organisers and in both cases proposed a different location on the outskirts of Baku, namely, the driving school yard mentioned above. The BCEA again noted that the places proposed by the organisers were areas with heavy traffic. 8. Nevertheless, the organisers decided to hold the demonstrations in the centre of Baku. 9. According to the applicants, the demonstrations were intended to be peaceful and were conducted in a peaceful manner. The participants were demanding free and fair elections and democratic reforms in the country. Participants in the demonstration of 17 April 2011 were also protesting against impediments to freedom of assembly. 10. Each applicant attended one of the demonstrations (see appendix), but shortly after they had begun, the police started to disperse them. 11. According to the official records, all the applicants were arrested during the dispersal operations and were taken to various police stations. 12. According to the applicant in application no. 67351/11, he was arrested by people in plain clothes. 13. The applicants were questioned at the respective police stations. 14. On the day of the applicants’ arrests, “administrative offence reports” (inzibati xəta haqqında protokol) were issued in respect of them. The reports stated that by deliberately failing to comply with lawful police orders, the applicants had committed an administrative offence under Article 310.1 of the Code of Administrative Offences (“the CAO”). 15. Some of the applicants refused to sign the respective administrative offence reports. 16. According to most of the applicants, they were never served with copies of the administrative offence reports or with other documents in their case files (applications nos. 57737/11, 67351/11, 67977/11, 69411/11 and 69421/11). According to the applicant in application no. 57737/11, he obtained a copy of the administrative offence report several months after the administrative proceedings against him had ended. 17. None of the applicants was given access to a lawyer after the arrest or while in police custody. 18. Each applicant was brought before a first-instance court on the day of the arrest or the following day. 19. According to most of the applicants, the hearing before the court in each case was very brief. In some of the cases members of the public were not allowed to attend, even though the court had not taken a formal decision to close the hearing to the public. 20. According to all the applicants, they were not given an opportunity to hire lawyers of their own choice. State-funded lawyers were appointed to represent most of the applicants. 21. The applicants in applications nos. 74609/10 and 57737/11 were not assisted by lawyers. The records of the respective court hearings show that those applicants refused the assistance of a State-funded lawyer and decided to defend themselves in person. 22. The record of the hearing in the case of the applicant in application no. 69411/11 shows that in his oral submissions, the State-funded lawyer briefly asked the court to be merciful and adopt a lenient decision. In the cases of the applicants in applications nos. 67351/11 and 67977/11, the State-funded lawyers did not make any oral or written submissions. Similarly, none of the material submitted to the Court in application no. 69421/11 contains any record showing that the State-funded lawyer, Ms R.N., made any oral or written submissions before the first-instance court. 23. The only witnesses questioned during the respective court hearings were the police officers who, according to the official records, had arrested the applicants. In the case of the applicant in application no. 67977/11, a police officer who had issued the administrative offence report was also questioned as a witness. All those police officers testified that the applicants had staged unauthorised demonstrations. 24. In application no. 67351/11 the court did not question any witnesses. 25. The respective first-instance courts found that the applicants had failed to stop participating in unauthorised demonstrations. The courts convicted the applicants under Article 310.1 of the CAO and sentenced them to periods of “administrative” detention ranging from seven to fifteen days (see Appendix). 26. On various dates the applicants lodged appeals before the Baku Court of Appeal, arguing that their convictions were in violation of their rights because the demonstrations in which they had participated or attempted to participate had been peaceful. The applicants also complained that their arrests had been unlawful and that the hearings before the respective first-instance courts had not been fair. They asked the Baku Court of Appeal to quash the first-instance courts’ decisions in their respective cases. 27. Most of the applicants were assisted before the Baku Court of Appeal by lawyers of their own choice. The applicant in application no. 57737/11 was not represented by a lawyer. 28. On various dates the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the applicants’ appeal and upheld the decisions of the respective first-instance courts (see appendix). 29. According to the applicant in application no. 57737/11, on 28 February 2011, following his complaints about the authorities’ failure to serve him with the relevant documents, the Sabail District Court sent him a copy of the administrative offence report issued in respect of him, the first‑instance court’s decision of 31 July 2010 and the Baku Court of Appeal’s decision of 20 August 2010. 30. According to the applicant in application no. 69411/11, he received the decision of the Court of Appeal of 13 April 2011 on 15 October 2011, after having complained about the court’s failure to serve him with that decision.

5. The applicant was born in 1972 and lives in Kerch. 6. At the material time the applicant worked as an investigation officer in the environmental protection prosecutor’s office (природоохоронна прокуратура). 7. On 4 October 2005 S. complained to the Prosecutor’s Office of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (“the ARC”) (прокуратура Автономної республіки Крим) that the applicant and U., a prosecutor’s assistant, had extorted 5,000 United States dollars (USD) from him for the purpose of carrying on a fishing business. Later K. and R. lodged similar complaints. 8. On 7 October 2005 at around 3 p.m. the applicant was arrested at his workplace after receiving 2,000 USD from S., and 200 USD and 500 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH) from R. The applicant’s office was searched and 2,000 USD were found in one of the books on his table. The applicant’s meetings with R. and S. had been taped. On the same day criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant and U. for bribe-taking. 9. On 10 October 2005 the Tsentralnyy District Court of Simferopol (“the Tsentralnyy Court”) authorised the applicant’s pre-trial detention. The court held that the applicant was accused of committing a serious crime and might escape, or hinder the investigation, or continue his criminal activity. The applicant appealed. 10. On 18 October 2005 the applicant complained to the Kerch Local Court that his arrest on 7 October 2005 had been unlawful since there had been no grounds to arrest him. The court forwarded this complaint to the Kerch Prosecutor’s Office, noting that the court was not competent to consider such complaints while the case was under investigation. The Kerch Prosecutor’s Office transferred the applicant’s complaint to the Prosecutor’s Office of the ARC. 11. On 1 December 2005 the Prosecutor’s Office of the ARC informed the applicant that his arrest was justified and lawful. 12. On the same day the Court of Appeal of the ARC upheld the decision of 10 October 2005. 13. On 5 December 2005 the Tsentralnyy Court extended the applicant’s detention until 7 February 2006 on the same grounds as before. The applicant appealed. 14. On 20 December 2005 the Court of Appeal of the ARC upheld the decision of 5 December 2005. It held that there was sufficient evidence that the applicant had committed a serious crime. If at large, the applicant might continue his criminal activity, or hinder the investigation, or abscond. 15. On 18 January 2006 the Feodosiya Town Court (“the Feodosiya Court”) accepted the applicant’s case for trial. 16. On 6 February 2006, in the committal hearings, the Feodosiya Court maintained the applicant’s detention without giving any reason or setting any time-limit. 17. On 21 February 2006 the Feodosiya Court rejected the applicant’s request to change the preventive measure to an undertaking not to abscond, noting that the applicant was accused of having committed a serious crime, and might abscond or hinder the investigation. The applicant appealed. 18. On 23 May 2006 the Feodosiya Court found the applicant and U. guilty of several counts of bribe-taking and sentenced them to six and five years’ imprisonment, respectively, with confiscation of half of their property. 19. On 14 September 2006 the Court of Appeal of the ARC terminated proceedings in respect of one count of bribery concerning the applicant and upheld the remainder of the judgment. 20. On 24 July 2007 the Supreme Court of Ukraine rejected the applicant’s appeal on points of law. 21. From 10 October 2005 to 4 February 2006 and from 5 February to 5 September 2006 the applicant was detained in Simferopol Pre-Trial Detention Centre no. 15 (Ізолятор тимчасового тримання № 15 м. Сімферополя) (“the Simferopol SIZO”) and in the Feodosiya Temporary Detention Centre (ізолятор тимчасового тримання м. Феодосія) (“the Feodosiya ITT”) respectively. 22. In the Simferopol SIZO the applicant shared cell no. 29, which measured 10 square metres, with four other detainees. There were no chairs in the cell and it was in a poor state of repair. There were cockroaches and other insects. The toilet space was very narrow – around 45-50 centimetres in width – which caused the applicant, who is 1.94 metres tall and weighs 160 kilograms, considerable difficulties. The detainees were able to take a shower only once every seven to ten days. 23. In the Feodosiya ITT the applicant was detained in cell no. 27, which measured 4.7 square metres, together with four or more detainees. The cell had no windows and no furniture. The toilet space was very narrow – around 30 centimetres in width. The applicant had not been able to take a shower, and detainees had had to sleep in turns. 30 minutes’ outside exercise was possible once every ten to fifteen days in a small yard which measured 4.5 square metres. The applicant submitted undated photos of a cell, in which it is apparent that the toilet (a hole in the floor plugged by a plastic bottle) is separated from the living space by a wall approximately one metre high. Beside the toilet there is a sleeping place (allegedly a mattress on a wooden bench or on the floor). 24. According to the Government, cell no. 29 in the Simferopol SIZO had been designed for occupancy by three inmates and had had 9.3 square metres of living space, thus allowing some 3.1 square metres per inmate, which had been in compliance with the domestic standards. In accordance with the relevant regulations, the cell had been disinfected on a daily basis and the detainees had had weekly access to bathing facilities. The statutory regulations did not include chair provision for this cell. 25. As regards the Feodosiya ITT, the applicant’s cell had 5.7 square metres of living space and had been designed to accommodate two inmates. The cell had been lit by electric light, equipped with a ventilating system ensuring circulation of air and furnished with wooden sleeping platform, separated toilet and wash-stand. The detainees had been provided with pillows and mattresses. The detention facility had had a shower room with hot and cold water and a small backyard for daily walks. 26. On 6 March 2006 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Feodosiya Court about the conditions of his detention in the ITT (overcrowding, no windows in the cell, no possibility of taking a shower, lack of out-of-cell activities). He requested that the court find the inaction of the Feodosiya ITT authorities in this respect unlawful and to oblige it to remedy the situation. 27. On 14 March 2006 the court forwarded the complaint to the Feodosiya Prosecutor’s Office as the appropriate decision-making body. 28. On 20 March 2006 the Feodosiya Prosecutor’s Office informed the applicant that some violations of the law by the Feodosiya ITT authorities had been established and that the relevant instructions had been given to remedy the situation, with no further details provided. 29. On 23 June 2006 the applicant again lodged his complaint with the Feodosiyskyy Court, having stated that neither his complaint to the Feodosiya ITT authorities nor to the prosecutor’s office had remedied his situation. He requested that the inaction of the Feodosiya ITT authorities be declared unlawful. This complaint was again forwarded by the court to the Feodosiya Prosecutor’s Office. 30. On 23 and 28 July 2006 the Feodosiya Prosecutor’s Office sent the applicant a reply similar to that in the letter of 20 March 2006. According to the applicant, he did not receive these letters. 31. On 1 July 2006 the applicant complained to the Court of Appeal of the ARC (“Court of Appeal”) about the failure of the Feodosiya Court to consider his complaint on the merits. He requested that the Court of Appeal oblige the latter to consider his complaint against the Feodosiya ITT on the merits and to bring disciplinary measure to bear on the respective judge of the Feodosiya Court. 32. On 1 August 2006 the Court of Appeal assigned the applicant’s complaint to the Leninskiy District Court of the ARC (“the Leninskiy District Court”). 33. On 2 August 2006 the applicant complained to the Prosecutor’s Office of the ARC about the alleged failure of the Feodosiya Prosecutor’s Office to consider his complaints about conditions of detention. 34. On 31 August 2006 the Leninskiy District Court refused to open administrative proceedings concerning the applicant’s complaint as the procedural decisions of a judge in such a case were not subject to appeal under the rules of administrative procedure. Any decision to the contrary would, in the court’s opinion, constitute an unlawful interference with the administration of justice. The court dismissed as unsubstantiated the applicant’s allegations that the failure of the Feodosiya Court to entertain his complaint amounted to a denial of access to a court. It noted in this respect ‒ in accordance with the Criminal Procedure Code and the Prosecutor’s Act (Закон України «Про прокуратуру») ‒ that it was for the prosecutor’s offices to supervise observance of the law in detention centres. The applicant was free to complain to the court about the prosecutor’s inaction, if appropriate, but he had failed to do so. 35. The applicant appealed. 36. On 12 October 2006 the applicant received a letter from the Prosecutor’s Office of the ARC in which it referred to the responses given earlier to the applicant by the Feodosiya Prosecutor’s Office. 37. On 12 December 2006 the Court of Appeal of the ARC upheld the decision of 31 August 2006. It noted in particular that the applicant had submitted to the Feodosiya Court a complaint regarding the poor conditions of detention but not an administrative claim against the Feodosiya ITT for the protection of his rights, as was required by the Code of Administrative Justice. This being so, his complaint had been forwarded to the competent authorities as required by the relevant domestic legislation. 38. On 21 April 2009 the Higher Administrative Court of Ukraine rejected the applicant’s appeal on the points of law. 39. On 17 September 2007 the applicant lodged an administrative claim with the Menskiy District Court of the Chernigiv Region (“the Mesnkiy District Court”) against the Feodosiya ITT authorities claiming, inter alia, damages for the harm inflicted by the inhuman and degrading conditions of his detention. 40. On 15 October 2007 the Menskiy District Court admitted the applicant’s claim for consideration. 41. On 23 November 2007 the Menskiy District Court rejected the claim as having been lodged outside the one-year time-limit set by the law, since the applicant had been transferred from the Feodosiya ITT on 5 September 2006. 42. The Court of Appeal and the Higher Administrative Court upheld the above decisions on 1 April 2008 and 21 December 2010 respectively.

5. The applicant was born in 1967 and until his conviction lived in Ivdel, a town in the Sverdlovsk Region. 6. In April 2000 the applicant was arrested on charges of murder and arson. 7. On 24 July 2000, as the investigation unfolded, the local official newspaper the North Star printed an interview with a deputy town prosecutor about a spike in murder rates. The prosecutor said: “In the first half of 2000 our town reported fourteen murders – a historic high, it seems. Twelve of them have already been solved, thanks to the industry of the police department and the investigators from the prosecutor’s office.... The fingerprint identification of ex-convict [N.B.] (whose body was found in [a river]) has allowed to discover his enemies and to prove that he was beaten by three inhabitants of Ivdel seeking [...] to settle scores for his murder of [another man] for which [he] had served almost nine years. It has been established that [N.B.’s] two murderers – [the applicant’s codefendant] and S. Turyev, both ex-convicts – were complicit in the early‑March murder of [L.R.] who had dared to report them to the police for past wrongs. [Her] body was dumped in a wood near the airport and was found only in May. As those crimes were not solved in time, [the applicant’s codefendant] rampaged on and on 20 April killed [another woman] who had witnessed the night-time arson at Vizhayskaya Street that had killed five. By the way, both [L.R.] and [the other woman] (whose body was found in a well next to the sports centre) had been garrotted with a wire. All three persons arrested in this multicount case will undergo forensic psychiatric observation because of the gravity of the crimes committed, which carry up to twenty years or life in prison. But even after these downright senseless murders, the crime wave in the town continued.” 8. When the case came to trial before the Sverdlovsk Regional Court, the applicant moved to disqualify the prosecutor for the prejudice apparent in that interview. On 4 October 2002 the court refused the motion because the prosecutor had only cited facts from the investigative file, had affirmed the applicant’s complicity but not his guilt, and was not personally interested in the outcome of the trial. 9. On 22 January 2003 the court sentenced the applicant to twenty years’ imprisonment for arson and the murders of N.B. and L.R. On 23 October 2003 the Supreme Court upheld the sentence, leaving unanswered the applicant’s complaint about the press interview. 10. In reply to a post-conviction complaint brought by the applicant, in December 2004 the Sverdovsk Regional Prosecutor’s Office found that the interview had breached the agency’s ethics policy as it had preceded the trial without, however, tangibly redressing the applicant.

6. The applicant was born in 1982 and currently lives in Budapest. 7. The applicant crossed the Hungarian border from Serbia clandestinely in the evening of 24 June 2014. Apprehended by a border guard patrol, he was taken into custody, since he was unable to show documentary evidence of his identity or right to stay in the country. The applicant then claimed asylum. 8. At the hearing held on 25 June 2014 by the Immigration Office, the applicant declared that he had fled from his country of origin, Iran, because of his homosexuality. He stated that he had been forced to leave Iran and, with the help of a human trafficker, he had entered Hungary without documents, because he had had no other way of doing so. At the hearing, he again applied for recognition as a refugee. 9. In view of his request, on 25 June 2014 the Csongrád County Police Department suspended the alien administration procedure. On the same day the Office of Immigration and Nationality commenced asylum proceedings. At the ensuing hearing the applicant said that he had intended to go to the United Kingdom, but since Hungary seemed to be a safe country he had requested asylum there. He stated again that he had had to leave Iran because he was homosexual and that criminal proceedings had been instituted against him for this reason, attracting very severe penalties. 10. After the hearing, the asylum authority, a department of the Office of Immigration and Nationality, ordered that the applicant be detained (menekültügyi őrizet), with effect from 7 p.m. on 25 June 2014, in Debrecen, relying on section 31/A (1) a) and c) of Act no. LXXX of 2007 on Asylum (the “Asylum Act”). In its decision the asylum authority observed that the applicant’s identity and nationality had not been clarified. It held that there were grounds for the presumption that if left at large, he would delay or frustrate the asylum proceedings and would present a risk of absconding, given that he had arrived unlawfully in Hungary and had no connections in the country or resources to subsist on. According to section 31/A (6) of the Asylum Act, the maximum length of asylum detention when ordered by the asylum authority is 72 hours. On the basis of section 31/C (3) of the Asylum Act and section 36/C (1) of the relevant Government Decree (see in paragraph 22 below), the applicant could have submitted an objection to the ordering of his asylum detention. 11. On 26 June 2014 the asylum authority applied to the Debrecen District Court for an extension of the asylum detention for a maximum of 60 days. The asylum authority pointed out in its application that Iranian asylum seekers tended to frustrate the procedure and leave for unknown places. To justify its application, it referred to the fact that the applicant’s stay in Hungary was unlawful, that he had no connection to the country, and that he lacked any resources to subsist on. 12. On 27 June 2014 the court appointed a legal representative for the applicant; on the same date – that is, before the expiry of the 72-hour period referred to in paragraph 10 above – it held a hearing. The hearing lasted from 9.40 to 9.45 a.m. In its ensuing decision the court dismissed the applicant’s application to be released and extended the asylum detention by a maximum of 60 days. It noted that the applicant’s identity was unclear, that he had arrived in Hungary unlawfully, and that he had no connections in the country or any means to subsist on. Without referring to other individual circumstances or the applicant’s sexual orientation, the court held that less stringent measures – such as an obligation to check in regularly with the authorities, to stay at a designated place of residence, or to pay asylum bail (menekültügyi óvadék) – were not suitable in the case to secure the applicant’s availability to the authorities. 13. On 8 and 11 July 2014 the applicant applied to the asylum authority to be released from detention or transferred to an open facility. In its reply, the asylum authority informed the applicant that an asylum hearing would be held in a few days: he would have the opportunity to prove his citizenship there. Because of this consideration, the asylum authority did not forward these requests to any other authority. 14. At the asylum hearing held on 18 July 2014 the applicant made the same statements as before. Referring to his sexual orientation, he explained that it was difficult for him to cope with the asylum detention for fear of harassment. At the hearing he provided the asylum authority with relevant and up-to-date information relating to his country of origin. 15. On 25 July 2014 the asylum authority stated that the applicant’s asylum request was neither inadmissible nor manifestly ill-founded and thus it ordered the examination of the case on the merits. 16. On 11 August 2014 the asylum authority again sought extension of the asylum detention by another maximum of 60 days, relying on section 31/A (1) a) and c) of the Asylum Act. In its application, the asylum authority did not give any detailed explanation as to why no other, less stringent measures could be applied in the case. 17. In her submission of 12 August 2014 to the asylum authority, the applicant’s legal-aid lawyer requested the termination of the asylum detention and the designation of a place of residence for the applicant with measures securing his availability during the proceedings. In her submission of the same day to the Debrecen District Court, the lawyer asked the court to hear the applicant and not to extend the asylum detention. 18. On 13 August 2014 the court appointed another legal representative for the applicant. On 19 August 2014 the court heard the applicant and dismissed the application for extension of the asylum detention. Relying on section 31/A (1) a) of the Asylum Act, the District Court stated that the delay caused by the acts of the authority for which the asylum seeker could not be held responsible did not provide grounds for the extension of the detention. Referring to section 31/A (1) c), the court further stated that the asylum authority had not given any specific reasoning for the view it had taken, namely that the applicant would abscond and frustrate the asylum proceedings. 19. On 22 August 2014 the asylum authority terminated the asylum detention and ordered a designated place of residence for the applicant in Debrecen with measures securing his availability during the proceedings. 20. On 31 October 2014 the applicant was recognised as a refugee. His asylum detention lasted from 25 June 2014 to 22 August 2014.

4. All applicants were former employees of “LETEKS” u stečaju (the debtor), which was, at the relevant time, a company predominantly comprised of socially-owned capital. 5. Since the debtor failed to fulfil its contractual obligations towards its employees, on an unspecified date, the applicants instituted civil proceedings against it. 6. On 18 April 2008 the Leskovac Municipal Court ordered the debtor to pay the applicants specified amounts on account of salary arrears, plus the costs and expenses of the civil proceedings. 7. On 3 October 2010 the above judgment became final. 8. Between 20 November 2008 and 30 November 2009 all applicants filed separate requests for the enforcement of the above judgment. 9. The Leskovac Municipal Court ultimately accepted the applicants’ requests and issued the enforcement orders, respectively. The essential information as to the enforcement proceedings in respect of each application is outlined in the Annex to this judgment. 10. On 25 January 2011 the Leskovac Commercial Court opened insolvency proceedings in respect of the debtor (St. 47/2010). 11. The applicants duly submitted their respective claims. 12. On an unspecified date the applicants’ claims based on the judgment of 18 April 2008 were formally recognised. 13. The insolvency proceedings against the debtor are still ongoing. 14. On 31 March 2010, the applicants lodged a constitutional appeal. 15. On 8 July 2013 the Constitutional Court dismissed the appeal in respect of all applicants except the applicants Ms Jagoda Jančić (application no. 62499/10), Mr Predrag Stamenković (application no. 63100/10) and Ms Stana Stanković (application no. 63137/10). 16. On 18 September 2013 the Constitutional Court also found a violation of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time, in respect of Ms Jančić, Mr Stamenković and Ms Stanković. It further awarded each of them 500 euros (EUR) as just satisfaction for non-pecuniary damage and ordered the court in Leskovac to expedite the proceedings.

5. The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Constanţa. At the time of the relevant events, she was an investigative journalist working in Constanţa. 6. During the night of 12 to 13 August 2006 a group of approximately fifty to eighty armed persons were involved in a violent incident that took place in Mamaia, a seaside resort on the outskirts of Constanţa. Several locations in Mamaia – including Hotel F., belonging to a company in which R.M., mayor of Constanţa since 2000, was a shareholder – were attacked and severely damaged. 7. Following that incident, R.M. accepted to participate in a television show hosted by A.G. and broadcast on “R.”, a national television channel. During the show, the applicant intervened and made some remarks which R.M. considered as defamatory. Consequently, he instituted civil proceedings against the applicant (see paragraphs 9-22 below). 8. The relevant excerpts from the television show are set out below: “[A.G., the host of the show, acting as a moderator, asks [the applicant], a journalist in Constanţa]: What types of clans are we talking about, are they gangs, are they clans, who are these people we are talking about? [The applicant]: These are clans, it is well known, the city of Constanţa is divided between the supporters of R.M. and his enemies. More precisely, it is the V. clan, in other words the clan of the V. brothers, who are at war with the supporters of R.M. This war has been going on for several years and it is well known that at the beginning, the V. brothers and R.M. were good friends. The hostility occurred, if my memory is not mistaken, on the occasion of the construction of Hotel O., when one of the V. brothers was excluded from the business, in spite of the initial plan. This doesn’t mean that M. [R.M.] or V. is personally involved in this war. This war continued between the people that represent the two, and the enmity has continued to this day. ... But the crux of the problem is not the conflict between R.M. and the V. brothers. It seems that nowadays they have different claims, at a different level, within different hierarchies ... [A.G.]: The image you describe is that of a city torn between the underworld clans, in which the offenders retaliate against the mayor. The latter is a business partner of the President of the Regional Council and during the night anything can happen because the police have made a pact ... and do not want to sanction anyone. [The applicant]: Lately, the police have been doing their job, as I said before. Except that they do not succeed in finalising it ... Two years ago, when there was a big fight in the city centre, before the eyes of everybody, when the G. clans were opposed to the P. clan – and here we are talking about the same clan masters – the police did not intervene promptly because, they said it clearly, these were R.M.’s men and they were afraid, because M. [R.M.] was and still is the mayor. The only victims were the heads of the city police, who were sacked; the aggressors were allowed to go free. [A.G.]: I have the impression that we are talking about an ungoverned city, in which the delinquents walk freely and the mayor fights different clans. Is this an erroneous conclusion? [R.M.]: I have the impression that [the applicant] needs to be hospitalised – in a psychiatric hospital (la balamuc). How dare she? What is this story, this nonsense? The supporters of R.M. fight I do not know who – V.? I do not even know him, I have never seen him in my life and I have never spoken to him .... I have listened for fifteen minutes to her [the applicant’s] lucubrations, in which she tries to create about Constanţa the image of a demonic city, in which the mayor runs everything, is a smuggler, has clans with Kalashnikovs and bodyguards ... [A.G.]: Would I be entitled to believe that this conflict was generated by one of your actions, or by one of your past activities, or your past partnerships; maybe you had relations with them and in this context they came to vandalise your hotel? [R.M.]: Mr. A.G., [the applicant] is a journalist, she should have submitted a document from the Chamber of Commerce to prove that I have a business partnership with whomever she mentioned. She had not submitted anything because it is all false. I personally asked the police to intervene and arrest the perpetrators. ... I do not know the people who were fighting. It does not interest me what they do in their free time, why they fight. All I said was that it is unacceptable to see forty people armed with axes. Let them identify and arrest the guilty. Everything else is just a fantasy of [the applicant], worthy of a psychiatric hospital ... [A.G.]: ... this is what the mayor says, that everything is false ... [The applicant]: What I have said, I said as an observer of the daily events; these things have been observed, discussed, noted for years. I have presented a general picture of the situation. [R.M.]: And they must be proved ... Just like other journalists, you have learned to drag others in the mud, with no evidence to support what you state. [The applicant]: If I understand correctly, he does not know the V. brothers, he knows them well, but that is not the point, the point is that their men ...(interrupted) [R.M.]: But I do not know them! Prove the contrary if you please; I have never spoken to any of them, I do not know them. Stop lying ... [The applicant]: ... the reality is that they present themselves as being M. [R.M.]’s men, or V.’s men. This does not mean that M. [R.M.] or V. order these conflicts. You know what happens in the world of ordinary people: I am strong because I represent R.M., who is mayor. Or I am stronger because I have the backing of the V. brothers ... Mr R.M., I did not say that you ordered this assault. But this is indeed what has been going on for several years in the city of Constanţa. [A.G.]: Actually, we are dealing with a band of delinquents; it doesn’t matter who they are associated with or who is behind them and supports them, these people were on the street, made noises and I, as a simple citizen, am dissatisfied with not seeing them arrested. This is the only thing I can say, apart from the political connotations and connotations of the clans. I now turn to Mr. M.P, a sociologist, a specialist in violent incidents. This type of incident, what do you think? ... [M.P.]: ... I would ask Mr. R.M. if he is still live ... it is necessary to know that mayors elsewhere in the world, such as Giuliani or Chirac, have had what are called urban policies of prevention and that they were directly involved. I am talking about a sociological perspective, an area that in which I specialise. I am not interested in your relationship with the institutions that accuse you today in one way or another. Do you have an urban prevention policy project? For if this were the case, such events would not happen again. ... [R.M.]: Do you know that according to Romanian legislation, the police are not under the authority of the mayor? ... I have asked the police to intervene and to arrest those who are guilty ... [A.G.]: Thank you ... The story we have followed is a violent one. Hooligans go during the night, armed with axes and knives, something very common lately, and vandalise a hotel. The police, ineffective, react very late, disinterestedly, unconvincing ... At the same time, the name of Mayor R.M. and his business partners appears again directly linked to a strange business. And all these strange things, which I quote ‘need proof’, accumulate and accumulate, one after the other, and create in the end the perception of a mayor who raises certain questions, of a forgotten city and, in general, of inefficiency at all levels. In this story, in my opinion, the two managers are also guilty, the police are also guilty and we are also guilty, because we tolerate endlessly the incompetent authorities. I thank you.” 9. On 24 October 2006 R.M. lodged a civil complaint against the applicant. He alleged that, in her capacity as a journalist, she had made defamatory statements during a television show hosted by A.G. in relation to a violent incident that had occurred during the night of 12-13 August 2006 (see paragraph 6 above). R.M. requested that the applicant write a public letter of apology, that she publish at her own expense the final judgment allowing his claims in two newspapers, one with a nationwide circulation and the other a local circulation, and that she pay him 200,000 Romanian lei (RON) in non-pecuniary damages. 10. R.M. complained that the applicant had attempted to persuade people that Constanţa city was divided between two gangs, “M.’s men and those who were against M.”, and that he himself had at one point been familiar with certain persons from the underworld (“persoane interlope”), namely with the V. clan, who had allegedly been at the origin of the violent incident in August 2006. He considered that the applicant’s imagination had proved to be “diabolical and of an infinite malice”, as her remarks had gone beyond what was permitted not only by freedom of speech, but also by professional deontology. He claimed that the applicant had failed to first check her information before using it, and then to prove her statements. R.M. further claimed that the defamatory statements the applicant had made against him in prime time on national television had seriously damaged his image as a public person and a locally elected official. 11. The applicant submitted that her statements during the television show had reflected her opinion in an honest and ethical manner. Like any other opinion, hers was inevitably subjective, the important issue being that it had been expressed with honesty and in good faith, based on information concerning R.M.’s conflicts with the V. brothers that had been presented more than once in the local press. The applicant further argued that the non-pecuniary damage claimed by R.M. was unjustified, in so far as there was no evidence to prove that her statements had had any impact among R.M.’s supporters in connection with his public image. 12. On 11 October 2007 the Constanţa District Court dismissed R.M.’s claims. The court started with an overview of the ECHR’s case-law on freedom of expression, referring specifically to the essential role played by journalists in a democratic society and to the fact that the essential criteria in assessing their statements is whether they are made in good faith. The court held that in the case before it, the applicant’s statements could not be interpreted as a personal attack on the claimant and in any event, they were not of such a severe nature as to harm R.M.’s honour, reputation or dignity. The court further noted that in answering the questions of A.G., the host of the show, the applicant had provided an objective explanation for her opinion; in support of her opinion, she had submitted before the court excerpts of articles from the local press, as well as from a publication issued by several investigative journalists on the topic of public integrity, a project implemented by Transparency International Romania, in which the name of the mayor, R.M., was connected to several ongoing criminal investigations. The court concluded that the applicant’s intervention had not been made in bad faith; her opinions concerned a matter of general interest and did not have an illicit nature; at the same time, her opinions were not found to have harmed the reputation of the claimant. 13. R.M. appealed against that judgment. He essentially argued that the applicant’s defamatory statements had not only consisted of her personal opinions, but also reports on specific facts which had not been previously verified, nor ever proved to be true. He further argued that by associating his name and image with that of criminal groups or clans, the applicant had seriously harmed his reputation. 14. On 29 May 2008 the Constanţa County Court allowed the appeal and awarded R.M.’s claims in part, holding the applicant liable for the payment of 50,000 RON in non-pecuniary damages, and 7,197 RON in respect of legal costs. It also ordered her to publish the judgment at her own expense in one national newspaper and in another local newspaper and to present R.M. with written public apologies within fifteen days of the date of the final judgment. 15. The County Court considered that the conclusion of the television show, as drawn by A.G., was based essentially on the applicant’s statements, namely that the city was “torn between the underworld clans, in which the offenders retaliate against the mayor” (see paragraph 8 above), and that the same conclusion would have been drawn by anyone else who had watched the show. From that perspective, it was evident that the applicant’s statements had damaged the reputation of the claimant. 16. The court also held that the applicant’s intention had not been to present facts, but to deliberately discredit R.M. by claiming in bad faith that he was involved in illegal activities. Such allegations, made without prior verification and lacking factual support, were of a serious nature and had severely damaged the claimant’s image. Furthermore, in trying to support her allegations with extracts of articles from the press reporting on the activities of R.M., the applicant had only proved that what she had presented in the television show was information, and not her personal opinions. 17. The applicant appealed against that judgment, reiterating her arguments that the impugned statements were in fact her opinions as an investigative journalist, and that they had been expressed in an honest and ethical manner. She pointed out that the County Court had not analysed whether R.M. had participated in the television show in his capacity as a public person or as a private one, so as to attract specific consequences in the balancing-of-rights exercise carried out by the court. She pointed out that the sanction imposed by the court was excessive and lacked appropriate reasoning and any justifying criteria. 18. On 24 November 2008 the Constanţa Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the lower court’s judgment. 19. The appellate court firstly noted that R.M. had participated in the television show in his capacity as a shareholder of Hotel F., as well as in his capacity as a local politician. 20. While drawing a clear distinction between opinions and information, the court held that that the applicant had not put forward any argument or explanation to support her allegation that what she had expressed in the show were her opinions, and not factual elements: “By setting herself up as a connoisseur of what was going on in the local area, she had presented to the public, in the form of undeniable truth, some information that was not true”. 21. The court further referred to the responsibilities of journalists, namely to present information and ideas to the public, while respecting certain limits in relation to the rights and reputation of others. The applicant, as a journalist, “had breached the rules of journalistic ethics by manifesting aggression and intention to blame, with no evidence and without maintaining a balance between the statement made and the unconfirmed allegations”. 22. The court considered the amount of damages to be paid by the applicant to be fully justified, in view of the fact that the defamatory statements had been broadcast in prime time on a national television channel, and that the amount had been reduced by the appeal court to one quarter of the full amount claimed by R.M. The court held: “If she had complied with the first obligation, namely ‘to apologise’, the court would have examined the proportionality of the amount in relation to her intentions, as she does not contest the allegations, but by means of victimisation, she gives them strength, albeit without any evidence or documents having been submitted to the present day”. 23. It appears that in February 2009 the applicant fully complied with the terms of the final judgment.

5. The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Bor. 6. The applicant was employed by the bank called Borska banka AD, (“the debtor”). It would appear that at the relevant time the debtor was predominantly comprised of socially-owned capital. 7. On 13 February 2004 the Zaječar Commercial Court opened insolvency proceedings in respect of the debtor. 8. On 8 February 2005, upon a submission to that effect, the Zaječar Commercial Court recognised the applicant’s claims concerning salary arrears. 9. On an unspecified date the applicant was paid 8,533 Serbian dinars (RSD) on account of the debt in question. The remainder of the debt has not been paid until the present day. 10. The insolvency proceedings are still pending. 11. On 14 December 2006 the applicant applied to the Zaječar Commercial Court for enforcement of the court’s decision of 8 February 2005, by which the applicant’s claims were recognised. The Zaječar Commercial Court, however, declined its jurisdiction ratione materiae and transferred the case file to the Bor Municipal Court. 12. On 7 May 2007 the Bor Municipal Court dismissed the applicant’s enforcement request. In its reasoning, the Court stated that the Commercial Court’s decision of 8 February 2005 was not suitable for execution. 13. On 23 November 2007 the Zaječar District Court upheld the first instance court’s decision, stating that the debtor had been subject to the pending insolvency proceedings. 14. On 18 March 2008 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal against the Zaječar District Court’s decision. 15. On 4 November 2010 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant’s constitutional appeal. It found that the applicant had failed to properly seize the Constitutional Court, having lodged her appeal against “the wrong” decision.

5. During 1991 and 1992 Serbian paramilitary forces gained control of about one third of the territory of Croatia and proclaimed the so-called “Serbian Autonomous region of Krajina” (Srpska autonomna oblast Krajina, hereinafter the “Krajina”). Part of the Zdjelar family – father Milan, mother Anđelija, daughter Dragica (the third applicant) and sons Janko (the first applicant), Slavko (the eighth applicant) and Čedo (the ninth applicant) – lived in Crni Potok, a village situated in the Krajina. At the beginning of August 1995 the Croatian authorities announced a campaign of military operation with the aim of regaining control over the Krajina. The operation was codenamed Storm and lasted from 4 to 7 August 1995. Before that action, the vast majority of the population of the Krajina had fled Croatia, initially for Bosnia and Herzegovina, but later many of them went to live in Serbia. Some returned to Croatia after the war. The number of people who fled is estimated at between 100,000 and 150,000. 6. On 11 October 2001, one S.K. submitted to the State Attorney’s Office (Državno odvjetništvo Republike Hrvatske, hereinafter the “SAO”) a list of persons killed during and after Operation Storm. Milan Zdjelar, the applicants’ father, was on the list and next to his name was a note that he had been shot in the head and a leg on 8 August 1995 by members of the Croatian Army’s “Tigers” brigade. On 16 October the SAO forwarded that list to the Ministry of the Interior. 7. On 25 October 2001 the Gvozd police photographed the site of Milan Zdjelar’s grave. 8. On 29 October 2001 the Gvozd police interviewed Dragica Zdjelar, the third applicant, who said that her father had been killed on 8 August 1995 in Crni Potok. 9. On an unspecified date in 2002 the body of Milan Zdjelar was exhumed and a post mortem was carried out in the Zagreb Šalata Hospital on 20 September 2002. The cause of death was not established and the only injury noted was a broken collar bone. 10. On 23 March 2004 the Gvozd police again interviewed Dragica Zdjelar. She said that of her family members, only she and her father had remained in Crni Potok after the beginning of Operation Storm. On 8 August 1995 at about 12.50 p.m. she had been sitting with her father Milan in front of their house, situated on a hill in Crni Potok, about a hundred metres away from the unpaved main road. A military transport vehicle had appeared on that road, coming from the direction of the village of Gojkovac. When it drew level with their house the vehicle had stopped and three soldiers, dressed in camouflage uniforms, had got out and started to walk towards her and her father. Her father had then said that he did not wish to wait for the soldiers but would run into the woods. When he started to run, she had followed him and then heard three gunshots. She had hidden in the grass and had seen her father shot twice, in the chest and the leg. He had died soon afterwards. The soldiers had returned to the vehicle and continued in the direction of Topusko. The soldiers who had killed her father had been from the “Tigers” brigade. She had hidden in the woods for two days while her father lay dead in the grass. When she returned from the woods she had reported the matter to the Croatian Army and had been given food by some soldiers, who had also buried her father. 11. On 24 March 2004 the Gvozd police interviewed Anđelija Zdjelar, who had no relevant information to give them about the circumstances in which her husband had been killed. 12. On 9 April 2004 the Sisačko-moslavačka Police Department (Policijska uprava sisačko-moslavačka) sent a report to the Sisak County State Attorney (Županijski državni odvjetnik Sisak) stating that Dragica Zdjelar had alleged that on 8 August 1995 her father Milan Zdjelar had been killed by Croatian soldiers, members of the “Tigers” brigade. 13. On 29 July 2005 the State Attorney’s Office issued a document concerning enquiries into the killings of civilians between 1991 and 1995. The document was addressed to the County State Attorney’s Offices, which were instructed to examine all the information collected to date on the killings of civilians during that period and to concentrate their activities on identifying the perpetrators and gathering the relevant evidence in order to instigate criminal proceedings. 14. On 26 September 2005 the applicants and their mother lodged a criminal complaint with the SAO in connection with the killing of Milan Zdjelar, classifying the offence as a war crime against a civilian and alleging that the victim had been of Serbian ethnic origin, unarmed and never involved in any military activity during the war in Croatia. 15. On 29 September 2005 the SAO referred the case to the Sisak County State Attorney’s Office, requesting an investigation into the killing of Milan Zdjelar. 16. Between October 2005 and February 2007 the State Attorney’s Office asked the police about the progress of the investigation on several occasions. Each time the police replied that there had been no progress. 17. On an unspecified date the police asked the Military Police Administration (Uprava Vojne Policije, hereinafter the “MOP”) for information about the killing of Milan Zdjelar. On 7 February 2007 the MOP answered that they had no relevant information. This was forwarded to the Sisak State Attorney’s Office on 13 February 2007. 18. On several occasions between September 2007 and July 2008 the State Attorney’s Office asked the police about the progress of the investigation. Each time the police replied that there had been no progress. 19. On 9 October 2008 the State Attorney’s Office issued an instruction for implementation of the Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure to the County State Attorney’s Offices, in which they indicated that an inspection of the work of these Offices had highlighted two main problems: the possible partiality of persons involved in the pending proceedings as a result of the ethnicity of the victims or the perpetrators; and the problem of trials in absentia. The instruction advocated the impartial investigation of all war crimes, irrespective of the ethnicity of those involved, whether victims or perpetrators, and stressed the duties of those working for the State Attorney in that respect. 20. On 30 December 2008 the Sisak State Attorney’s Office asked the Investigation Department of the Sisak County Court to hear evidence from Dragica Zdjelar. This request was complied with on 25 March 2009, when an investigating judge of that court heard evidence from her. Dragica Zdjelar repeated her earlier statement. 21. On 11 May 2009 the police interviewed F.O. and F.K., both of whom were neighbours of the Zdjelar family in Crni Potok. F.K. confirmed that it had been soldiers from the Croatian Army who had come to the village when Milan Zdjelar had been killed. They had no other relevant information about possible perpetrators. 22. On 12 May 2009 the police informed the Sisak State Attorney’s Office that they had asked the Ministry of Defence for information regarding the members of brigade 153 of the Croatian Army who had arrived in Crni Potok after Operation Storm and the killing of Milan Zdjelar. On 20 July 2009 the Ministry of Defence informed the police that Milan Zdjelar had been buried by members of brigade 153 of the Croatian Army which had been under the command of a person named M., and provided a list of all members of that brigade with that name. One of them, M.Š., had already died. 23. Between 26 January and 3 February 2010 the police interviewed five former Croatian soldiers, A.A., B.J., N.S., G.G. and M.T., all members of the First Brigade of the Croatian army, also called the “Tigers”. None of them had any knowledge about the killing of M.Z. or any other civilians during Operation Storm. 24. On 15 February 2010, in answer to an inquiry from the SAO, the Sisak State Attorney’s Office drew up a short report on the case. There had been no significant progress. 25. On 9 and 16 March 2010 the police interviewed M.J., M.L. and M.M., members of smaller army units belonging to brigade 153 of the Croatian Army. M.J., a former member of the engineering unit, said that his unit had comprised between three and five soldiers and that he had never witnessed the killing of any civilians by any of them. M.L., a former commander of logistics in the artillery unit, stated that his unit had never encountered any civilians at any time during Operation Storm, with the exception of a few in Topusko, to whom they had given food and drink. Most of the villages they had passed through had had no name signs. He had no information to give them about the killing of Milan Zdjelar. M.M. had been a soldier in the unit under the command of I.P., and the smaller unit to which he had belonged had been under the command of K. M.M. had no information to give them about the killing of Milan Zdjelar and denied any involvement of his unit in the killing of civilians during Operation Storm. 26. On several occasions between May and December 2011 the State Attorney’s Office asked the police about the progress of the investigation. Each time the police replied that there had been no progress. 27. In a separate development, on 8 October 2012, Ž.L., who had been a member of the “Tigers” brigade for about a month in 1994, after which he had been transferred to the Third Battalion, lodged a criminal complaint with the SAO against P.M. – the Minister for war veterans – and others for alleged abuse of authority. In that complaint Ž.L. mentioned the killing of a civilian or civilians in Crni Potok, a few days after Operation Storm. He alleged that the crime had been “tolerated by the command of the Third Battalion (bojna) of the First Brigade of the Croatian Army (“gbr.” which stands for “gardijska brigada”) whose commander had been M.A. On 2 November 2012 the SAO forwarded that information to the State Attorney’s Office in Sisak, which forwarded it to the police on 14 November 2012. 28. On 22 November 2012 the police interviewed Ž.L. He said that during Operation Storm, the battalion had been in the village of Krznarić and had then gone on to Crni Potok. A person in charge of logistics, named M., had brought in a civilian, saying that he was a “četnik” (derogatory term for a Serbian nationalist or a member of Serbian paramilitary forces). Ž.L. described the man in question in detail. Soon the vice-commander P.Z. and the commander of the Third Company (satnija) J.M. had arrived and had taken the man away somewhere. P.Z. and J.M. had returned after about twenty minutes, and when questioned about the whereabouts of the man they had taken away, P.Z. had answered that he had “drifted in the river”. After some time they had heard firing on a hilltop above them. Ž.L. and another soldier, M.T., had started walking towards the top of that hill and had come to a house where an old woman was standing wailing. There had been no one in the house, but in a field about twenty metres away they had found an elderly man lying on his belly with gunshot wounds to his back and head. A gun had been lying next to him. The man from logistics had said that he had shot him in the head to “shorten his pain”. Ž.L. had expressed his disapproval of the behaviour of the Croatian soldiers to his commander Ž.M. Later on he had learned that the old woman they had encountered in front of her house had also been killed. 29. On 13 December 2012 the police again interviewed Dragica Zdjelar. She repeated her earlier statement, in essence, and also gave a description of the two soldiers who had killed her father. 30. During 2013 several short reports on the actions allegedly taken were compiled by the police and the Sisak County State Attorney’s Office. 31. On 10 July 2013 the SAO sent to the Sisak County State Attorney’s Office a submission by Ž.L. in which he alleged that he had witnessed the killing of civilians in Crni Potok, which had been both encouraged and perpetrated by the officers in command of the Third Battalion (bojna) of the First Brigade of the Croatian Army. 32. On 16 October 2013 the Zagreb County State Attorney’s Office sent summonses to Dragica Zdjelar, F.O. and Ž.L. for 19 and 20 November 2013. 33. On 11 November 2013 Ž.L. informed the Sisak County State Attorney’s Office that, owing to his health problems, he would not be able to come to Sisak on his own. He asked that transport to Sisak be organised for him or that he be heard in Karlovac, where he lived. In a further letter written on the same day he stated that some police officers had interviewed him on 22 November 2012 and had concluded that “the information he provided did not lead to the conclusion that a criminal offence had been committed”. He further referred to a letter from the Zagreb State Attorney’s Office of 28 May 2013 stating that “the allegations from his objections and criminal complaints were unfounded”. 34. On 19 November 2013 Zagreb County State Attorney’s Office heard evidence from Dragica Zdjelar and on 26 February 2014 from F.O. They both repeated their earlier statements. 35. It appears that on 1 December 2014 the Sisak State Attorney’s Office emailed a summons to Ž.L. requiring him to give a statement regarding the killings in Crni Potok in 1995. On 6 December 2014 Ž.L. sent a note back to the State Attorney’s Office referring to the summons and stating that he refused to give any statements because of his health problems, the passage of time, and the fact that he had not actually witnessed any crimes and that his prior allegations in that respect had been unfounded. He also alleged that he had been denied his rights in connection with his medical treatment. On 31 December 2014 the State Attorney’s Office forwarded Ž.L.’s note to the Sisak County State Attorney’s Office. 36. On 5 June 2015 the investigation in respect of a number of victims killed on the broader territory of the Sisak County by unknown perpetrators during Operation Storm was assigned to the Osijek County State Attorney’s Office (hereinafter the “OCSAO”). 37. On 13 July 2016 the OCSAO, relying on Ž.L.’s statement to the police, asked the Ministry of Defence to provide information about the whereabouts of the people Ž.L. had named, in particular P.J., J.M., a person nicknamed M. and the person who had been in charge of logistics in the “Tigers” brigade. 38. On 23 November 2016 the OCSAO requested that the police in Sisak carry out interviews with one F.K., who possibly had information about the men who had killed Milan Zdjelar; to interview B.J., A.A., N.S., G.G. and M.T., members of the “Tigers” brigade who had been in Crni Potok during Operation Storm, about their whereabouts during the operation; to locate three commanders of the Croatian Army unit whose members had allegedly buried Milan Zdjelar on 10 August 1995 and whose first names all began with M, namely M.J., M.L. and M.M.; and to again interview D.Z., M.V., N.M., D.V, J.V. and M.B., all inhabitants of Crni Potok. 39. On 20 December 2016 the police informed the OCSAO that F.K., N.M., M.B. and J.V. had died. There were also several people in Crni Potok called M.V. and D.V. 40. On 29 December 2016 the police interviewed G.G. and N.S., former members of the “Tigers” brigade. G.G. said it was possible that the brigade had passed through Crni Potok during Operation Storm but that they had not seen any civilians. He also said that B.J., N.S. and M.T. had been part of a patrol group (izviđačka desetina). N.S. said that the “Tigers” brigade had not killed or arrested any civilians or soldiers during Operation Storm. 41. On 11 January 2017 the Ministry of Defence informed the police about the whereabouts of M.J., M.L. and M.M. 42. On 16 January 2017 the police interviewed A.A., who had been a member of a “Tigers” brigade patrol group. He said his group had not been in Crni Potok during Operation Storm and he did not know whether the “Tigers” brigade had been there either. 43. On 24 April 2004 the applicants and their mother brought a civil action against the State in the Gvozd Municipal Court, seeking compensation in connection with the death of their father. They based their claim on the 2003 Liability Act. 44. The claim was dismissed on 14 July 2005. This judgment was upheld on appeal by the Sisak County Court on 18 June 2009 and by the Supreme Court on 5 October 2011. The national courts found that the claim for compensation had been submitted after the expiry of the statutory limitation period prescribed by the law governing damages awards in civil proceedings. 45. A subsequent constitutional complaint lodged by the applicants was dismissed on 5 June 2012.

6. The applicant was born in 1991 and lives in Vladivostok. 7. The applicant is an ethnic Uzbek. He lived in the town of Osh in Kyrgyzstan. After the mass disorders and inter-ethnic clashes in the region in June 2010, he left Kyrgyzstan for Russia. 8. On 4 July 2010 the applicant arrived in Russia. 9. On 9 July 2010 the Kyrgyz authorities charged the applicant in absentia with violent crimes related to these clashes, including the kidnapping and murder of two law-enforcement officers. 10. On 10 July 2010 they ordered the applicant’s arrest. 11. On 12 July 2010 the applicant’s name was put on a national wanted list, and on 16 September 2010 on an international wanted list. 12. On 23 January 2014 the applicant was apprehended in Vladivostok, Primorsk Region, and placed in detention. 13. Shortly after his arrest, the applicant gave an explanation (объяснение) in which he admitted having participated in the beating of one of the law-enforcement officers in June 2010 but denied his involvement in other crimes for which he was to be prosecuted in Kyrgyzstan. He also indicated that although he had not been directly informed about the charges being brought against him in Kyrgyzstan, he knew that his father had been sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder of the same law-enforcement officers and suspected that he was himself also wanted by the Kyrgyz authorities. 14. On 24 January 2014 the Frunzenskiy District Court of Vladivostok decided to remand the applicant in custody. His detention was subsequently extended several times. 15. On 29 January 2014 the Russian Prosecutor’s Office informed the Kyrgyz authorities about the applicant’s arrest. 16. On 16 January 2015 a judge of the Primorsk Regional Court extended the applicant’s detention until 23 July 2015. The applicant’s lawyer appealed, arguing that the applicant would be deprived of judicial review of his detention for a long period of time. 17. On 11 February 2015 the Primorsk Regional Court upheld the extension order on appeal. It did not address the applicant’s argument that he would be deprived of judicial review of his detention for a long period of time. 18. On 27 July 2015 the applicant was released. It appears that the applicant is currently at large. 19. On 11 February 2014 the Kyrgyz General Prosecutor’s Office requested the applicant’s extradition. The request was accompanied by assurances that the applicant would not be subjected to torture or inhuman treatment and that Russian diplomats would be granted the opportunity to visit him. 20. On 17 October 2014 the Deputy Prosecutor General granted the extradition request submitted by the Kyrgyz authorities. 21. On 6 November 2014 the applicant appealed, arguing that as an ethnic Uzbek charged with serious crimes in relation to the mass disorders of June 2010 he would face a serious risk of torture and ill-treatment if extradited. He also referred to the principle of non‑refoulement of asylum seekers pending the examination of his application for refugee status. 22. On 12 December 2014 the Primorsk Regional Court rejected his appeal in the light of the diplomatic assurances given by the Kyrgyz authorities and the improvement of the situation in Kyrgyzstan. As to the non‑refoulement principle, the Regional Court noted that the applicant’s application for refugee status had been refused by the migration authority. 23. On 25 March 2015 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant’s appeal and the extradition order became final. It noted in particular that in addition to the diplomatic assurances provided in writing by the Kyrgyz authorities, the representatives of the General Consulate of the Russian Federation in this country were able to monitor the situation of persons already extradited to Kyrgyzstan, including those held in relation to the mass disorders. For instance, on 30 and 31 July 2014 Russian diplomats had visited some such detainees, who had made no complaints in relation to their transfer, detention, prosecution or treatment. In the Supreme Court’s view, such a monitoring mechanism was effective in observing compliance by the Kyrgyz authorities with their obligations to ensure the rights of the extradited persons, including the right not to be subjected to torture and inhuman treatment. 24. The Supreme Court noted that the applicant belonged to a vulnerable group whose members were at risk of being subjected to torture by the law‑enforcement agencies, according to international reports. It considered, however, that in the absence of specific evidence submitted by the applicant that he would personally be subjected to torture or inhuman and degrading treatment, these circumstances were not in themselves enough to reject an extradition request, since he had been charged with ordinary criminal offences to some of which he had confessed on 23 January 2014. 25. On 7 February 2014 the applicant applied to the Primorsk Region Department of the Federal Migration Service (Управление Федеральной миграционной службы по Приморскому краю) (hereinafter the “Primorsk Region FMS”) seeking refugee status. 26. On 23 April 2014 the Primorsk Region FMS refused the applicant’s application for refugee status. Although it referred in its decision to inter‑ethnic conflicts existing in Kyrgyzstan, it considered that the applicant’s arrival in Russia had rather been motivated by the unemployment situation existing in his country of origin and his wish to escape from criminal prosecution. 27. The applicant appealed to the Federal Migration Authority, (Федеральная миграционная служба (ФМС)) (hereinafter the “FMS”). He claimed that he was being persecuted on the grounds of his ethnic origin and, if extradited, would be subjected to torture. 28. On 18 July 2014 the FMS dismissed his appeal on account of his prolonged failure to apply for refugee status and in view of the opportunity offered to the Russian diplomats to monitor the compliance by the Kyrgyz authorities with international standards as regards persons extradited from Russia. 29. On 13 November 2014 the Basmannyy District Court of Moscow upheld the refusal of the FMS to grant the applicant refugee status, referring in particular to his protracted failure to apply for refugee status. It also indicated that the applicant was not a member of any political, religious, military or public organisation, had neither served in the army nor taken part in any military activities, had never been prosecuted or threatened by the authorities, and had not been involved in any violent incidents. 30. On 8 April 2015 the Moscow City Court upheld this judgment on appeal. The City Court endorsed the reasoning of the District Court, referring in addition to several international sources demonstrating positive developments in the human rights situation in Kyrgyzstan during the period 2011-2012.

5. The applicant was born in 1952 and lives in Rostov region. He took part in the clean-up operation at the Chernobyl nuclear disaster site. He was subsequently registered disabled, and became entitled to various social benefits. 6. In February 2003 the applicant brought proceedings claiming that his benefits should be increased in accordance with a particular method. The adjustment method suggested by the applicant was approved by the domestic courts, which in addition increased the social benefits to which he was entitled to in 2002 in accordance with this same method (judgment of 25 February 2003). 7. In June 2003 the applicant brought a similar set of proceedings in respect of social benefits to which he was entitled to during the first six months of 2003. Relying on their previous judgment by which they approved the adjustment method suggested by the applicant, the domestic courts increased his social benefits for the new period accordingly (judgment of 18 June 2003). 8. In October 2003 the judgment of 25 February 2003 approving the adjustment method suggested by the applicant was quashed by a supervisory review court. 9. In March 2004 the domestic courts quashed on the basis of newly discovered circumstances the judgment delivered on 18 June 2003 on the ground that it was based on the judgment delivered in February 2003 but quashed since then by way of supervisory review. 10. Both judgments, of February and June 2003, remained unenforced prior to their quashing. 11. In 2006 the applicant brought proceedings against welfare authorities claiming arrears for various benefits as well as indexation of those benefits. The Zernogradskiy District Court of the Rostov Region granted the applicant’s claims (judgment of 19 June 2006, upheld on 18 July 2006). This judgment remained unenforced for fourteen months.

7. The applicant was born in 1978 and lives in Nairobi, Kenya. 8. The applicant left Kenya on 29 March 2005. He entered Cyprus unlawfully through the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (“TRNC”) on 4 April 2005. 9. On 6 April 2005 the applicant was arrested at Larnaca Airport as he attempted to travel to London on a forged passport. 10. On 12 April 2005 the applicant, after pleading guilty to using a forged document (sections 331, 332, 335 and 339 of the Criminal Code, Cap. 154; see Seagal v. Cyprus, no. 50756/13, § 100, 26 April 2016) was sentenced by the Larnaca District Court to nine months’ imprisonment (criminal case no. 4728/05). He was detained in Wing 1B of Nicosia Central Prisons. 11. The applicant appealed to the Supreme Court against his sentence (criminal appeal no. 132/05) but it was dismissed on 4 July 2005. 12. In the meantime, on 21 April 2005, the applicant applied to the Asylum Service for asylum. 13. On 10 November 2005, while the applicant was still serving his sentence, the Director of the Civil Registry and Migration Department issued detention and deportation orders against him, pursuant to section 14 of the Aliens and Immigration Law, on the grounds that he was a “prohibited immigrant” within the meaning of section 6(1)(d) of that law (see paragraphs 94-95 below). The enforcement of the deportation order was suspended pending the examination of his asylum application. 14. On 14 November 2005 the applicant was released after serving his sentence. However, he was re-arrested the same day under the detention and deportation orders and placed in the immigration detention facilities in Block 10 of Nicosia Central Prisons. He was presented with the above orders but refused to sign them. 15. On 31 January 2006 the Asylum Service rejected his application. 16. On 22 February 2006 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Reviewing Authority for Refugees (“Reviewing Authority”), which was dismissed on 6 April 2006. 17. On 3 May 2006 the applicant brought a “recourse” (judicial review proceedings) before the Supreme Court (in its first-instance revisional jurisdiction) challenging the Reviewing Authority’s decision (recourse no. 782/06). 18. By a letter dated 11 June 2006 the applicant made a complaint to the Commissioner for Administration of the Republic of Cyprus (“the Ombudsman”) concerning, inter alia, the deportation and detention orders. 19. By letters dated 17 May 2006 and 29 August 2006 the applicant’s lawyer complained to the Minister of the Interior of the unlawfulness of the applicant’s continued detention following the expiry of his sentence and requested his release. He further noted that the authorities had threatened to deport the applicant even though his recourse was still pending before the Supreme Court. 20. By a letter dated 5 December 2006 the Ombudsman informed the applicant that the authorities’ decision to issue deportation orders had been justified as his asylum application had been rejected. 21. It transpires from the documents in the case file that the applicant’s deportation was not possible because he had no valid passport or other valid travel document and refused to cooperate with the authorities. When he eventually decided to cooperate, the authorities contacted the Kenyan Embassy in Italy. On 20 February 2007 it issued a travel document for the applicant in the name of David Kandiri Wanjiku. 22. The previous orders were cancelled and on 22 February 2007 new ones were issued on the same grounds (see paragraph 13 above) under the name in the travel document. 23. On 9 March 2007 the applicant was deported (see paragraphs 26-30 below) and added to the authorities’ “stop list” (a register of individuals whose entry into and exit from Cyprus is banned or subject to monitoring). 24. Following the applicant’s deportation, on 9 May 2007 his lawyer withdrew the recourse from the Supreme Court (see paragraph 17 above). 25. The applicant’s Kenyan passport, issued on 15 October 2009, is in the name of David William Thuo. 26. According to the applicant, in the early hours of 9 March 2007 prison guards and two immigration officers insulted him by saying “come here you stupid mavro (black)”. They were holding a form with the applicant’s photograph on it but the applicant could not read it. They asked him whether the photograph was of him and the applicant replied in the affirmative. The applicant asked to be allowed to call his lawyer but was told “no telephone for you – you have no rights here”. Then one of the immigration officers pushed him into a room, hitting him and pinching his testicles. It was very painful and he thought they were going to kill him. He could not breathe. He stated that the officers had had their hands on his neck. After a struggle the officers allowed the applicant to call his lawyer. The applicant’s lawyer informed him that he was trying to contact the Minister of the Interior and the applicant told his lawyer that he had been beaten by the immigration officers. One of the officers also spoke to the lawyer but the applicant could not understand the conversation as it was in Greek. He was given very little time before leaving the detention facilities to take his belongings and had to leave some behind. 27. The applicant was driven to Larnaca Airport with his hands handcuffed behind his back. He was placed in a room at the airport and the door was closed. The applicant asked to see the officer in charge and speak to his lawyer and began to shout after the officers refused to listen to him. Twenty minutes later three men in military uniform came into the room and, with the two immigration officers, they beat and verbally abused the applicant. They forced him into a chair and held him by the neck while an army officer held his mouth open and stuffed brown paper in it. They then placed adhesive tape with the Cyprus Airways logo on it over his mouth and neck. They wrapped bandages around his head and neck, almost entirely covering those parts. 28. The applicant was escorted onto the aircraft, which was empty. He was seated at the back and was still in handcuffs. He was in pain. He remained in that state until the aircraft was near Milan. 29. The applicant indicated to the officers that he wanted a pen and paper and they were given to him. He managed to write that he would not cause any problems and that he was in pain but they refused to listen to him. They warned him not to cause any more trouble. He stated that the captain and crew had witnessed everything. 30. The applicant was very upset but remained calm during the flight and managed to have a meal. 31. The applicant submitted that four of his top teeth had become loose owing to the ill-treatment and that he had later been informed by doctors that they needed to be replaced with artificial ones. 32. Lastly, he noted that he could identify the three army officers who had ill-treated him. 33. Following his deportation, on 27 December 2007, the applicant, while in Kenya, lodged a complaint with the Ombudsman concerning his deportation and the ill-treatment he had received during the deportation process at Nicosia Central Prisons, Larnaca Airport and on the aircraft to Milan. The applicant included a detailed chronology of the events with his letter of complaint, describing his alleged ill-treatment (see paragraphs 26-32 above). 34. On 4 February 2008 the Ombudsman informed the applicant that she would investigate his complaints and inform him of the outcome. 35. On 4 June 2009 the Ombudsman submitted her report to the Attorney General. She relied on comments by the Chief of Police as well as on a report dated 23 May 2008 by the Director of the Nicosia Police Aliens and Immigration Unit (see paragraph 37 below). She observed that the applicant had made his complaint following his deportation and so gathering evidence had not been easy and had had adverse consequences for the investigation. Given those factors and having examined the evidence that had been given to her, which did not substantiate the allegations of ill-treatment, she found that intervention on her part and the imputing of responsibility to the police for their handling of the applicant’s situation could not be justified. 2. The applicant’s complaint to the Independent Authority for the Investigation of Allegations and Complaints against the Police (“IAIACAP”) and the initial refusal to investigate 36. On 23 February 2008 the applicant lodged a complaint with the IAIACAP (see paragraphs 99-104 below). He complained that he had been deported even though asylum proceedings had still been pending before the Supreme Court and that he had been ill-treated during the deportation process. The applicant attached a detailed chronology of the events to his letter of complaint (see paragraphs 26-32 above) and requested that the IAIACAP conduct an investigation. 37. The president of the IAIACAP conducted a preliminary investigation by collecting material from the police, who denied ill-treating the applicant. The police provided him with a report dated 23 May 2008 by the Director of the Nicosia Police Aliens and Immigration Unit and open statements by the two immigration officers, acting sergeants T.C. and Po.P., who had accompanied the applicant throughout his deportation. According to the above report and statements, when the immigration officers went to take the applicant from his cell, they showed him his travel document, as was the usual practice. The applicant started shouting and asked to call his lawyer, which the officers allowed him to do before leaving the detention facilities. T.C. also spoke to the lawyer and asked him to persuade his client to be cooperative during the deportation process. The applicant calmed down, they handcuffed him and he got into the police car without any problem. They then went to Larnaca Airport. Po.P stated, in particular, that they had sat in the passengers’ waiting area and the applicant had been offered coffee. He had been completely calm. At 9 a.m. the applicant and the two immigration officers had boarded the aircraft for Milan. As soon as they had entered the aircraft they had removed the handcuffs, as the use of handcuffs during flights was prohibited by International Air Transport Association (IATA) regulations. They had stayed in Milan for five hours and had then boarded a connecting flight to Nairobi. The officers denied the allegations of ill-treatment, maintaining that the deportation procedure had been carried out without the use of force and in compliance with the applicable rules. They also stated that the applicant had been a problematic, uncooperative person who had made threats to them throughout the process. T.C. stated that the officers had behaved impeccably and with patience, despite the fact that the applicant had been provocative throughout. 38. On 9 July 2008 the president of the IAIACAP concluded that the seriousness of the applicant’s allegations meant that his complaint ought to be investigated, irrespective of the police officers’ statements that they had not ill-treated him. Nevertheless, in order to reach a decision he required information as to how the IAIACAP could secure medical evidence and a statement from the applicant. The matter was referred to the Attorney General for his opinion. 39. Βy a letter dated 16 July 2008 the IAIACAP informed the applicant that it was willing to investigate the complaint, but there were certain difficulties, such as the fact that he was abroad. The IAIACAP had decided to ask the Attorney General’s opinion on the matter. 40. By a letter dated 28 July 2008 counsel for the Attorney General informed the IAIACAP that the applicant’s complaint could not be investigated because the applicant had left Cyprus. The applicant was informed of that decision on 11 August 2008. 41. By a letter of 17 June 2009 to the IAIACAP, the Attorney General, referring to the applicant’s application to the Court, revisited the above decision and ordered the IAIACAP to conduct a formal investigation into the applicant’s complaint. He noted that he had been informed of the position taken by counsel in the letter of 28 July 2008 (see paragraph 40 above) when he had looked into the case following communication of the applicant’s application by the Court. In his opinion, where an arguable claim for ill-treatment had been made, the fact that the complainant had been deported, was not in Cyprus or that he was on the stop list did not constitute grounds for not conducting an investigation. He therefore did not agree with the opinion expressed by his counsel. 42. The Attorney General requested that the relevant authorities take all the necessary steps to arrange the applicant’s return to Cyprus for the purposes of the investigation. 43. In their observations the Government submitted that the Attorney General had already informed the president of the IAIACAP in a letter dated 5 December 2007 on the taking of statements from witnesses, that when a person complaining to the IAIACAP was abroad, he or she should be asked to visit the IAIACAP in person and provide a statement and that the Government would pay the expenses for a complainant’s return to Cyprus. 44. On 13 July 2009 the applicant was informed of the decision to investigate and that he had been temporarily removed from the stop list for the purposes of the investigation. He was requested to inform the IAIACAP when he would be able to travel to Cyprus to provide a statement. 45. On 14 July 2009 the IAIACAP launched an official investigation into the applicant’s ill-treatment complaint. A member of the IAIACAP was appointed as investigator. 46. In the course of the investigation the investigator collected documents and other physical evidence related to the applicant’s case. It included the records kept by every police unit involved, including at Block 10 at Nicosia Central Prisons and at the airport; domestic court judgments and transcripts; samples of Cyprus Airways adhesive tape; and the aircraft cabin crew supervisor’s report. No mention was made of the incident in the cabin crew report. The footage for that day from the airport’s closed-circuit television (“CCTV”) cameras had already been destroyed. 47. The investigator singled out five police officers as suspects: acting sergeants T.C. and Po.P. (see paragraph 37 above), the commanding officer of the Ιmmediate Response Squad (Ουλαμός Ταχείας/Άμεσης Επέμβασης) (“IRS”) Inspector N.S., and Constables Pa.P. and A.I. 48. On 12 June 2010 the applicant arrived in Cyprus to take part in the investigation. He was examined by two specialist doctors at Nicosia General Hospital, a maxillofacial surgeon and a urologist. Each prepared a medical report. 49. After taking X-rays, the maxillofacial surgeon concluded that as three years had passed since the alleged ill-treatment it was impossible to conclude with any certainty that any damage to the applicant’s teeth that was diagnosed was due exclusively to ill-treatment, especially in view of the applicant’s generally bad oral hygiene. The urologist did not observe any health issues, defects or signs of ill-treatment which could be linked to the applicant’s complaint. 50. The reports were passed on to a forensics pathologist who concluded that there was no way to determine scientifically whether the applicant had been ill-treated, but found such a possibility minimal to negligible (ελάχιστη εώς μηδαμινή). 51. On 15 June 2010 the applicant was interviewed and gave his first written statement to the investigator. He made reference at the beginning of the statement to his conditions of detention and noted that during his detention in Block 10 he had kept a record of events. Until 8 March 2007 the behaviour of the police and immigration officers had been correct. The applicant continued by providing a detailed account of the events of 8 to 9 March 2007 and his alleged ill-treatment (see paragraphs 26-32 above). He stated that when the immigration officers had come to the detention facility to take him from his cell he had refused to leave and had resisted. He noted that the bandages and the paper that had been put in his mouth at Larnaca Airport had been removed when the aircraft had been approaching Milan. The applicant also complained that he had had pain when urinating and when erect but that it had gone away after three months of treatment. He stated that he had been examined by a doctor in Kenya and had been treated there. 52. In support of his allegations the applicant provided the investigator with a certificate dated 9 June 2010 which had been issued by a doctor at Tigoni District Hospital, a public hospital in Kenya. It appears from the document that the applicant had written to the hospital on 21 December 2009 to request such a certificate. According to the certificate the applicant had visited the hospital on 10 March 2007 and had complained of neck and back pain, swelling of the face, dizziness, pain in the testicles and palpitations. It gave the applicant’s blood pressure upon examination at 140/90 and his pulse at 115 bpm. It indicated that the applicant had “facial oedema/puffiness; bruises on wrist; testicles tendon, no obvious cut or fracture; thigh myalgia and bruises”. The applicant was prescribed tablets. According to the certificate the applicant had returned to the hospital on 11 March 2007 because of “painful loose teeth and jaw”. He was referred for a dental examination and told to rest for four days. The medical certificate is signed and was also stamped by the hospital’s superintendent and certified by a notary on 10 June 2010. There is another signature dated 15 June 2010 but there is no indication whose it is. According to the applicant, he was advised to replace his front teeth but decided not to do so as with the passage of time they had gone back into place. 53. On 16 June 2010 all serving members of the IRS who had been on duty on 9 March 2007 from 7 a.m. to 9 p.m. (the date and approximate time of the alleged ill-treatment) were ordered to attend an identity parade the following day. 54. On 17 June 2010 the investigator visited Larnaca Airport where he took an open statement from N.S., who named the members of the IRS who had been on duty on the day of the alleged ill-treatment, including himself, Pa.P and A.I. He could not recall anything related to the applicant. He further stated that on the day of the alleged ill-treatment the members of his unit had worn blue uniforms. He said he did not object to the applicant, who was at the airport the same day, seeing him or members of the unit. 55. Certain members of the IRS, including N.S., Pa.P. and A.I., did not attend the identity parade. N.S. and Pa.P were absent for personal reasons while A.I. had already retired. The applicant did not identify any of the police officers present in the identity parade. As some of the officers were absent the investigator showed the applicant pictures of IRS officers who had been on duty on 9 March 2007. The applicant identified N.S., Pa.P. and A.I. as the men in military uniform who had been responsible for his ill‑treatment that day with the assistance of the two members of the Police Aliens and Immigration Unit. 56. Later the same day the applicant gave a second written statement to the investigator, providing further details of his alleged ill-treatment during the deportation process. The applicant stated that at Larnaca Airport N.S. had introduced himself as the “chief”, put brown paper in his mouth, stuck adhesive tape on part of his face and had then wrapped almost his entire face in bandages. A.I. had assisted N.S. by holding the applicant by the neck. They had left some space so he could see and breathe. He also alleged that Pa.P. had held him by the shoulders and, with the assistance of one of the immigration officers, had immobilised him on the chair in which he had been sitting. He had kept trying to shout. Samples of the adhesive tape allegedly used during the incident were shown to the applicant. He identified the sample with the Cyprus Airways logo but noticed a difference in the colour of the letters. The applicant left Cyprus a few hours after giving his second statement. 57. On 21 June 2010 the investigator was informed by an officer working at the warehouse and storeroom at Police Headquarters that the IRS had introduced blue uniforms on 31 May 2007. Before that, the IRS had worn military uniform. This was verified by another officer who kept the warehouse and storeroom records. 58. On 25 and 28 June 2010 the investigator interviewed Po.P. and T.C and took statements from them. They handed the investigator the statements they had given in the course of the preliminary investigation in which they had denied the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment (see paragraph 37 above). They stated that no force had been used at Nicosia Central Prisons, that they had not insulted the applicant and that he had been allowed to speak to his lawyer. 59. Po.P. stated that the applicant had reacted only verbally at Nicosia Central Prisons and that after calling his lawyer he had cooperated and shown no resistance. They had thus been able to handcuff him and take him to the police car. Po.P. stated that throughout the trip to and at the airport and during the flight, the applicant had threatened the officers but had not been violent. However, according to Po.P., during the wait at the airport, the applicant had started to become uneasy and had tried to hit his head on the wall to harm himself. With the assistance of colleagues from another unit, T.C. had wrapped bandages around the applicant’s forehead to protect him, but they had not under any circumstances gagged him. The force used for that purpose had been minimal and Po.P could not recall whether the applicant had been injured. They had taken the applicant on board the airplane before the other passengers and had removed the bandages once on board in order to assure the captain, who had come to see them, that the applicant was not injured. From then on the trip had gone smoothly. When Po.P was asked why he had not mentioned this incident to his superiors earlier and had not made a note of it, for instance, in any of the police records, Po.P. stated that such things often happened during deportations, he had not considered it to be significant as no one had been injured and the whole deportation process had been carried out smoothly. He could not recall whether he had been informed of the applicant’s specific allegations when he had given his open statement (see paragraph 37 above). 60. T.C. stated that when the applicant had realised he was being deported he had only reacted verbally and had asked to speak to his lawyer. The officers had allowed him to do so. T.C. stated that he had heard the applicant tell his lawyer that the officers had taken him by the neck and had been suffocating him, but that was a lie. T.C. also spoke to the applicant’s lawyer (see paragraph 37 above). The applicant had calmed down, they had handcuffed him and put him in the police car; T.C. stated that the applicant had tried to pull away when they had tried to put him in the car. At the airport in Larnaca, T.C. had left the applicant under Po.P.’s supervision for about twenty minutes for check-in purposes. When he had returned the applicant had been frantic. Po.P had informed him that the applicant had been trying to hit his head on the wall. T.C. stated that he had also noticed that he had tried to hit himself against the chairs and walls in the room. He had been shouting and screaming and causing disruption in the departure hall. The officers had asked him to calm down but to no avail. For that reason, with the help of members of the IRS who had restrained the applicant, they had wrapped the applicant’s head in bandages to protect him from possible self-harm. He could not remember whether they had also tied his feet because he had been kicking. T.C. stated that they had used the amount of force necessary to protect the applicant and immobilise or restrain him. When the aircraft had been ready to depart they had removed the bandages and handcuffs and the applicant had listened to music throughout the flight. When asked why he had not mentioned in his previous open statement that force had been used against the applicant (see paragraph 37 above), T.C. stated that it might have been an omission on his part but at that time he had not thought it essential. 61. On 29 June 2010 the IAIACAP investigator arranged an interview with N.S., who refused to answer any questions or provide a statement. On the same day, the investigator interviewed Constable Pa.P. who stated that members of the IRS had been wearing military uniform on the day of the incident but he did not remember coming into contact with the applicant. He observed that IRS officers did not keep a record when they helped other units as it was the responsibility of the unit itself to do that. He could not remember whether he had made a note in his personal notebook. He stated that he would get back to the investigator when he had found it. 62. On 1 July 2010 the investigator interviewed the applicant’s lawyer. The lawyer stated that on 9 March 2007 he had spoken to the applicant by telephone while the applicant was still at Nicosia Central Prisons. The applicant had informed him that he was being deported. The applicant had not made any mention of ill-treatment. He had next spoken to the applicant a few days after his deportation. The applicant had informed him that he had been ill-treated and insulted by police officers from the beginning of the deportation process in prison to when he had boarded the aircraft. The applicant had not provided further details but had informed him that he had lodged an application with the Court. 63. On 2 July 2010 the investigator started taking a statement from A.I. but A.I. left the interview following a telephone call and promised to return on 5 July 2010. However, A.I. informed the investigator on that date that he refused to answer any questions and referred the investigator to his lawyer. 64. In the course of the investigation statements were taken from various individuals, mainly police officers, inter alia, from the units concerned and from those at the immigration detention facilities at Nicosia Central Prisons. 65. On 22 July 2010 the investigator prepared a report on the investigation procedure and his findings. 66. The report stated that the various police records (records of action and log or duty books) were deficient and had failed to keep track of ongoing events (such as the applicant’s being moved from Block 10 to another area on the night of his deportation and the officers’ actions during the deportation). 67. The investigator stated that it was clear that the applicant, after failing in his asylum claim and lodging his recourse with the Supreme Court, had tried to delay and obstruct his deportation by reacting negatively and not cooperating. In the end he had applied to the Court for compensation. 68. According to the investigator there was a possibility that the applicant had been exaggerating. The officers’ omissions, however, allowed room for questioning the accountability and objectivity which ought to have characterised them as members of the police during the execution of their duties. Furthermore, he noted the discrepancies in the officers’ statements with regard to the colour of their uniform. He observed that that had clearly aimed at hiding the truth (προφανώς για σκοπούς συσκότισης). He also noted the fact that three of them had failed to attend the identity parade. The investigator considered that it was questionable whether the medical certificate provided by the applicant could be accepted as evidence in any procedure given that it did not mention the name of the doctor or doctors who had examined him. Relevant evidence from Kenya would therefore be required. 69. The investigator found that the applicant had reacted negatively and resisted deportation, both at Nicosia Central Prisons and at the airport, either by trying to obstruct it or through resisting in an effort to gain time in order to prevent it. It was likely that he had caused a great deal of disturbance in Larnaca Airport’s departure hall and it had seemed that that would extend to the aircraft. A certain amount of force had had to be used in those circumstances in order to overcome his resistance and calm him down. It was crucial to examine which of the two versions of events – that of the applicant or the officers – better described the level of force used against the applicant. He concluded with the following words: “Theoretically, if the violence was as described by the complainant, it may be considered excessive, inhuman and degrading. In practice, however, it was imperative to use some analogous/proportionate (ανάλογη) force to ensure the success of the deportation, to restore order and to ensure security during the flight, which probably, however, went beyond the permissible limits. It all depends, however, on the credibility of those involved.” 70. According to the investigator, on the basis of the evidence, the applicant had by his reactions and behaviour rendered the use of force necessary. However, as the applicant had described it, that force had been excessive (που όπως την περιγράφει ο ίδιος ήταν υπέρμετρη). In his opinion it was more suitable to take disciplinary action against the officers for improper conduct and neglecting their duty to record and report the events than to press criminal charges. If the officers had acted appropriately from the beginning it would have given more weight to their accounts and made them more convincing. 71. On 27 July 2010 the investigator transmitted a summary of his report and findings to the president of the IAIACAP. 72. The IAIACAP agreed with the investigator’s finding that no criminal action was merited but disagreed with his suggestion that disciplinary action should be pursued against the officers involved. It stated that it believed the officers’ testimony that only the requisite amount of force had been used to enable the applicant’s deportation. After examining the background to the case, it further stated that it was clear that the applicant’s actions had been self-serving and that through lying and using various stratagems he had tried to make sure he stayed in Cyprus or benefitted financially. To that end, he had proceeded to lodge an application with the Court. In addition, the IAIACAP supported its finding by noting that the cabin crew supervisor had stated that he had not noticed anything untoward during the flight, something he would have recorded in his flight report. The IAIACAP concluded as follows: “If [the applicant’s] claim that he was gagged with bandages was true, the cabin crew would have perceived it as an unusual event and would have recorded it. At the same time, omissions by the officers involved have been identified; they are not, however, of such a nature as to justify disciplinary action. Such omissions can be communicated to the Chief of Police for taking corrective steps”. 73. The IAIACAP’s conclusion and the investigator’s report with all the relevant material were submitted to the Attorney General for a decision. 74. On 2 September 2010 the Attorney General decided that the police officers’ actions and omissions did not merit criminal prosecution, noting also that it appeared that the applicant’s actions had been self-serving. He agreed with the findings of the investigator and the IAIACAP that no criminal offence had been committed by the officers in question. In his opinion, the officers’ omission in not recording or reporting the incident did not merit disciplinary action either, given that the applicant had been unruly (ατίθασος) and uncooperative. He left that issue, however, to the discretion of the Chief of Police. 75. On 10 September 2010 the applicant was informed of the Attorney General’s decision. 76. The Chief of Police decided not to take disciplinary action against the officers involved. Instead, on 7 October 2010, he issued instructions to the Immigration Police and the Airport Security Police that in future they had to ensure that all relevant information regarding similar incidents and actions taken by the police in such contexts was meticulously recorded. Furthermore, the police departments concerned held meetings and lectures on the matter. 77. According to the applicant, he was detained in a police detention cell at Nicosia Central Prisons for a long time in conditions which had only been acceptable for a stay of a few days. He had been detained with another detainee in a cell measuring 5.5 sq. m and there had been no room for exercise. The conditions had also been unhygienic: strong smells had emanated from the toilet, the detainees had been made to clean their cells and the area nearby and rubbish had not been collected. He stated that the detention facilities had been overcrowded. 78. The applicant submitted a hand-sketched floor plan of his cell in Block 10. The plan showed that it was 5.5 sq. m in area, measuring 2.75 m by 2 m with a window 75 cm wide. It had a bunk bed which measured 83.5 cm by 200 cm, two chairs and a small table. 79. In May 2006 a fire broke out in Block 10. As a result the Block had been covered in ash and detainees had been exposed to the smell of smoke. However, despite those conditions the detainees, including the applicant, had still been detained in Block 10. They had even been kept there when the Block had been under renovation and had thus had to bear the smell of paint. In support of that statement, the applicant submitted extracts from newspaper articles describing the situation in Block 10. 80. Relying on a letter issued by the Prison Director in June 2009 the Government made submissions about the conditions of the applicant’s detention as follows. 81. From 6 April 2005 until 14 November 2005, when serving his sentence, the applicant had been detained in Wing 1B of Nicosia Central Prisons. 82. On 14 November 2005, following his release and re-arrest, the applicant had been moved to Block 10 (see paragraph 14 above). 83. The applicant had been detained in a cell measuring 2.73 m by 2 m, equipped with a bunk-bed and any other equipment he had desired; it was likely that he had shared his cell with another detainee. A window measuring 87 cm by 68 cm had allowed for natural light and ventilation. 84. Block 10 had had sufficient hygiene facilities such as washbasins, toilets and showers. Although a private cleaner had been hired, the detainees had been personally responsible for keeping their cells clean and had been provided with cleaning products. 85. Air conditioning units provided heat in the winter and cold air in the summer. A communal area measuring 50 m by 3.5 m, which connected the cells, allowed detainees to move freely inside throughout the day so prisoners had had access to water coolers and entertainment rooms; the applicant had been allowed out of his cell from dawn to the evening, as referred to in the European Prison Regulations. After 11 a.m. all detainees were allowed to leave the common area to go to the laundry room where they could stay until the end of the laundry cycle, which could last up to ninety minutes. 86. With reference to access to outdoor activities the Government submitted that all detainees were obliged to go out of the detention area straight after breakfast, from 7.30 a.m. until 9 a.m. Outdoor access was restricted from 9 a.m. to 11 a.m., during visiting hours. At the end of visiting time detainees could leave the detention area and visit the washrooms. Detainees were allowed out of their cells again from 4 p.m. to 8 p.m. when they also had access to the basketball court. 87. Block 10 had been under renovation from October 2005 to October 2010 to improve conditions for detainees and ensure their compatibility with European standards. 88. The Government submitted the file on the applicant which had been kept by prison officers during his detention and a medical certificate. They indicated that the applicant had had visits from his lawyer and other people and that he had received medical examinations on request. 89. In his statement to the IAIACAP on 22 September 2009, the officer in charge of the archives at Nicosia Police Headquarters informed the investigator that on 28 April 1999, the Minister of Justice had declared Block 10 at Nicosia Central Prisons a police detention establishment. He further informed the investigator that for safety purposes Block 10 had been under renovation from October 2005 until October 2007. He provided the investigator with an undated document containing all the steps taken for the renovation of Block 10. With reference to the conditions of detention, the document recorded the following (emphasis in the original): “CONDITIONS OF DETENTION BASED ON EUROPEAN STANDARDS: Cell Size: In Block 10 there are 36 cells measuring 5.4 sq. m. It is noted that according to European standards, each cell should measure at least 7 sq. m for 1 person. - Lighting (metal shutters and natural light): Natural light is considered adequate. - Ventilation [and air conditioning]: There are air conditioning devices which are considered sufficient. There is no ventilation system and the area is ventilated by the windows inside the cells of the detention area. Ventilation is considered adequate. - Hygiene Areas: The toilets and bathrooms are built in a way they cannot be vandalised. - Access to drinking water: There is a water cooler in the common area which is considered sufficient. - Open area for exercise: There is an open area and it is considered sufficient - Chair and table in each cell: Tables and chairs have been placed inside the cells. - Rights of detainees: The rights of detainees are posted within the detention area. They have been translated into seven languages: English, Russian, Turkish, Arabic, Iranian, Chinese and French.” 90. It appears from extracts of the custody logs held in Block 10 in February 2007 contained in the IAIACAP’s investigation file that detainees were allowed into the open area for walking and exercise for approximately one hour each day. It appears from the same record that overall in February a maximum of fifty-eight detainees were held in Block 10. On 15 February 2007 the police officers in Block 10 received instructions from the detention cell supervising officer that any detainee who refused to clean his cell or failed to contribute to the general cleaning of the detention facilities (γενική καθαριότητα των κρατητηρίων) would be placed in isolation until he complied with the cleaning requirements. Food would be provided to the detainee in the isolation cell. 91. In his statement to the IAIACAP investigator on 15 June 2010 (see paragraph 51 above) the applicant stated the following with regards to the conditions of his detention: “The treatment I had in Block 10 was good, I didn’t have any problems with the policemen, but the conditions were not good. We used to be two in the same room and were locked. The cooling system was problematic, because some detainees from Iran burned the place during a protest they carried out. After the beginning of 2007 they started leaving us to go out of our rooms for one hour every day. ...”. 92. The applicant also complained about his conditions of detention in his letter to the Ombudsman dated 11 June 2006 (see paragraph 18 above). In her reply of 5 December 2006 the Ombudsman informed him that she would be conducting an investigation into the conditions of detention of foreigners in general in order to make suggestions for improving the situation.

4. The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Oleksandrivka, Kirovograd Region. 5. On 3 February 2007 the applicant was assaulted. According to the subsequent findings of medical experts, she sustained haematomas on her jaw, shoulder and hip, a bruise under her right eye, concussion, and a displaced rib fracture. The applicant alleges that her assailants were Mr and Mrs K., her daughter’s former parents-in-law, whereas the domestic authorities found that it was only Mrs K. who had assaulted the applicant. The incident occurred in front of the applicant’s two-year-old granddaughter. 6. On 4 February 2007 the applicant lodged a complaint with the police. 7. On 5 February 2007 a forensic medical expert examined the applicant. He found that she had haematomas which he classified as “minor bodily injuries”. 8. On 14 February 2007 the Oleksandrivka District Police Department (“the Oleksandrivka police”) refused to institute criminal proceedings in connection with the incident. 9. On 22 February 2007 a forensic medical examination of the applicant was carried out. The expert found that in addition to the previously noted haematomas, the applicant had also suffered concussion and a displaced rib fracture. The expert classified the injuries as “bodily harm of medium severity”. 10. On 20 March 2007 the Oleksandrivka prosecutor overruled the decision of 14 February 2007 as premature and on 21 March 2007 instituted criminal proceedings in connection with the infliction of bodily harm of medium severity on the applicant. 11. On 20 May 2007 the investigator suspended the investigation for failure to identify the perpetrator. 12. On 29 August and 3 October 2007 the Oleksandrivka prosecutor’s office issued two decisions in which it overruled the investigator’s decision of 20 May 2007 as premature. 13. On 6 October 2007 the investigator questioned Mr and Mrs K. 14. On 1 December 2007 the investigator again suspended the investigation for failure to identify the perpetrator. 15. On 10 December 2007 the Oleksandrivka prosecutor’s office, in response to the applicant’s complaint about the progress of the investigation, asked the Kirovograd Regional Police Department to have the police officers in charge of the investigation disciplined. 16. On 21 January 2008 the Kirovograd Regional Police Department instructed the Oleksandrivka police to immediately resume the investigation. 17. On 7 April 2008 the investigator decided to ask a forensic medical expert to determine the degree of gravity of the applicant’s injuries. On 22 September 2008 the expert drew up a report generally confirming the findings of 22 February 2007. 18. On 15 May 2008 the Kirovograd Regional Police Department informed the applicant that the police officers in charge of the case had been disciplined for omissions in the investigation. 19. On 23 October 2008 the Oleksandrivka Court absolved Mrs K. from criminal liability under an amnesty law, on the grounds that she had an elderly mother who was dependent on her. On 24 February 2009 the Kirovograd Regional Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”) quashed that judgment, finding no evidence that Mrs K.’s mother was dependent on her. 20. On 1 July 2009 the investigator refused to institute criminal proceedings against Mr K. 21. On 7 July 2009 the Novomyrgorod prosecutor issued a bill of indictment against Mrs K. 22. On 24 July 2009 the Oleksandrivka Court remitted the case against Mrs K. for further investigation, holding that the applicant had not been informed about the completion of the investigation until 3 July 2009 and had therefore not been given enough time to study the case file. It also held that the refusal to institute criminal proceedings against Mr K. had contravened the law. 23. On 13 November 2009 the Novomyrgorod prosecutor quashed the decision of 1 July 2009 not to institute criminal proceedings against Mr K. Subsequently the investigator again refused to institute criminal proceedings against Mr K. 24. On 21 December 2009 the new round of pre-trial investigation in the case against Mrs K. was completed and another bill of indictment was issued by the Novomyrgorod prosecutor. 25. On 29 March 2010 the Oleksandrivka Court remitted the case against Mrs K. for further investigation, holding in particular that the decision not to institute criminal proceedings against Mr K. had been premature, since his role in the incident had not been sufficiently clarified. 26. On 13 July 2010 the Novomyrgorod prosecutor quashed the decision not to institute criminal proceedings against Mr K. On 26 May 2011 the investigator again refused to institute criminal proceedings against Mr K. 27. On 20 December 2011 the Znamyanka Court convicted Mrs K. of inflicting bodily harm of medium severity on the applicant, sentencing her to restriction of liberty for two years, suspended for a one-year probationary period. The court found that the decision not to institute criminal proceedings against Mr K. in connection with the same incident had been correct. Mrs K., the prosecutor and the applicant appealed. 28. On 6 March 2012 the Court of Appeal quashed the judgment and discontinued the criminal proceedings against Mrs K. as time-barred.

5. The Republic of Karelia (“Karelia”) is a subject (constituent region) of the Russian Federation. Under Article 73 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, subjects of the Federation possess the full authority of the Russian State in all matters other than those that come within the sole jurisdiction of the federal government or within the shared jurisdiction of federal subjects and the federal government to the degree of the latter’s scope of authority. 6. At the relevant time, the Legislative Assembly of Karelia (hereinafter “the LA”) had fifty members elected by universal direct suffrage for a five-year term. Twenty-five seats were allocated on a proportional representation basis to registered party lists receiving at least 7% of the region-wide vote, while the remaining seats were allocated to the winners of twenty-five single-mandate constituencies, determined by majority vote. There was no minimum turnout for the election to be valid, and each voter could only vote for one party and one candidate in the electoral constituency in which he or she resided. 7. The regional branch of the Yabloko political party was registered by a competent State authority (at that time the regional department of the Ministry of Justice) in 2002. 8. On 26 April 2006 the regional council of the applicant party called for a regional party conference to be held in two sessions on 27 May and 12 August 2006, respectively. The aim was to prepare for the LA elections that were to take place in autumn 2006. 9. Between 27 April 2006 and 26 May 2006 local party branches throughout Karelia held assemblies and conferences in accordance with the Yabloko party’s articles of association (hereinafter, “the charter”) and selected delegates to attend the regional party conference. At the time, the regional party had over 3,800 members, of whom 474 were so-called “registered party members”, that is, members who had specifically asked to be registered with the local party bodies in order to participate more actively in the party’s work, such as regional conferences. As a result, the 474 registered members elected forty-seven delegates to the regional conference. 10. On 27 May 2006 thirty-seven delegates present at the conference expressed their desire to participate in the upcoming LA elections. The nomination of candidates to the party list and electoral circuits was left to the second session scheduled for 12 August 2006. 11. On 10 and 11 June 2006 the Yabloko party at national level held its Thirteenth Party Congress, which adopted several amendments to the party’s charter. The charter maintained the division between party members and registered party members. In accordance with paragraph 9.1.14 of both versions the right to elect and be elected to the party’s governing and controlling bodies was reserved to registered members. The 2006 version specified, additionally, that party members who did not register automatically delegated the right to elect and be elected within the party to the registered party members of the relevant local branch. 12. On 4 July 2006 the LA set an election date of 8 October 2006. 13. On 27 July 2006 the amendments to the Yabloko national party charter were registered with the Federal Registration Service, upon which date they came into force. 14. On 12 August 2006 the regional party conference resumed. Thirty-seven of the forty-seven party delegates were present, and a quorum was declared. In accordance with the party’s charter, the conference nominated a 25-member party list and candidates for three electoral constituencies by secret ballot. The second and third applicants were chosen to run for office in two single-mandate constituencies. 15. The conference was attended by two representatives from the Karelia Directorate of the Federal Registration Service of the Ministry of Justice, and two members of the Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Karelia (“the Electoral Commission”). At that time they did not report any irregularities in the conduct of the regional party conference. 16. On 16 August 2006 the applicant party submitted documents to the Electoral Commission in order to participate in the forthcoming election. On 21 August 2006 it paid the requisite deposits (150,000 Russian roubles (RUB) in respect of the party list and RUB 60,000 in respect of each of the three single-mandate candidates). 17. On 17 and 22 August 2006, after reviewing the documents, the Electoral Commission issued Orders nos. 65/343-3 and 66/352-3, by which it registered the applicant party’s three candidates, including the second and third applicants, and the party list. 18. On 31 August 2006 the Karelia Directorate of the Federal Registration Service wrote to the Electoral Commission and informed it that the party conference of 12 August 2006 had been based on the participation of registered party members, and not party members in general. It referred to the provisions of the legislation on political parties (see below) which guaranteed equal rights of participation in party activities for all members. It argued that the party could not make a distinction between registered and other party members for the purposes of internal activities. As such, the conference of 12 August 2006 had been held in breach of the applicable legislation. 19. On 8 September 2006 the Electoral Commission applied to the Supreme Court of the Republic of Karelia (hereinafter the Karelia Supreme Court) to annul its own decision to register the party list and single-mandate candidates. Referring to the letter of 31 August 2006, the Commission referred to the provision of the Basic Guarantees Act allowing the judicial annulment of the registration of individual candidates and party lists where “new facts” had come to light showing a violation of federal or regional law regulating the nomination of candidates. 20. In the meantime, on 11 September 2006 the Electoral Commission wrote to the head of the Federal Registration Service and informed him of the application lodged with the court. It also enquired which version of the charter should be applicable to the party conference of 12 August 2006 since the party had submitted the 2004 version to the Commission. 21. On 12 September 2006 the Federal Registration Service replied to the Electoral Commission that the new charter had been registered by that service on 27 July 2006 and that on the same day the old version of the document had ceased to be valid. The regional party should therefore have submitted the new version as the one applicable to their conference of 12 August 2006. At the same time, the Service stated that in June 2006 Yabloko had received a warning from it in connection with its differentiating between registered and other party members, and that the new version of the charter had contained provisions designed to correct that. In view of those considerations, the decision of the regional conference of 12 August 2006, which had been based on the previous version and had taken only registered members into account, could be seen as being in breach of the relevant legislation. 22. On 15 September 2006 the Karelia Supreme Court allowed the application of the Electoral Commission and annulled the decisions of 17 and 22 August 2006 to register the applicant party’s list and candidates. It referred to the conclusions of the Federal Registration Service and found that the procedure whereby only registered members had taken part in the decision-making process had contradicted the legislation on elections and on political parties. It also noted that the party had submitted an invalid version of its charter. 23. More specifically, the court concluded that the annulment decision was justified because the participation of a minority of the party’s regional membership in the nomination process had thwarted “the will of the majority”, finding as follows: “If one takes a formal approach to the problem it seems that all the requirements governing the nomination of the lists of candidates were observed. At the same time the court believes that the procedure for the nomination of the lists of candidates [to the LA] was breached. It was established at the court hearing that only so-called ‘registered members of the party’ participated and nominated the lists of candidates [to the LA] at the regional conference. What is the difference between ‘registered members of the party’ and ‘unregistered members’? Let us turn to section 7 of the party’s charter... The practice of applying these provisions of the charter in the party’s regional division in the Republic of Karelia is such ... that members of the party determine themselves whether to actively participate in the work of the regional branch of the party or to participate [only] as needed ... Accordingly, they decide whether to register with the regional branch or not. If a party member asks to be registered, one of the local branches, or the regional one, registers him with the [relevant] branch. From that moment the party member obtains the rights provided for by p. 9.1.14 of the charter... It is impossible to agree with applying the party’s charter in such a way. ... Section 8.4 of the [Political Parties Act] states that political parties should provide an equal opportunity for representation in a party’s governing bodies, in election lists and other positions ... Section 23.4 and 5 of the [Political Parties Act] establish that members of political parties take part in its functioning, have rights and bear obligations in line with the charter. Members have the right to elect and be elected to the party’s governing bodies, ... receive information about the party’s activities and the work of its governing bodies. However, this right, under p. 9.1.14 of the [Yabloko] charter, is reserved to a limited number of persons – ‘registered members’ – which in turn breaches the principle of the equality of party members as set out in Section 8.1 of the [Political Parties Act]. As a result, while the number of party members in Karelia was 3,824 (1 April 2006), the Conference was attended by 37 delegates who represented 394 registered members (15% of the total number of members). ... A democratic regime is characterised by the wide participation of the population in forming the organs of State authority and a wide spectrum of political rights and freedoms for citizens governed by the rule of law, the protection of the rights and legal interests of citizens and others. One can imagine that those exact same elements should appear in the activities of any democratic party. The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation has emphasised the significance of the principle of the mandatory will of the majority, pointing out that ‘...elections as a means of determining the will of the people and forming the corresponding legitimate organs of State authority and local government, on whose behalf they exercise public authority, is based on the priority of the will of the majority of voters taking part in the vote’ (ruling of the Constitutional Court of 5 November 1998...). This principle applies with equal measure to the nomination of lists of candidates to [the legislature], since the basis for forming the representative bodies are the [candidates] nominated by political parties. In this specific case the principle of the ‘will of the majority’ was violated. In such circumstances, the court believes that the order for submitting electoral lists of candidates to the Karelia LA has been breached.” 24. The court dismissed the applicant party’s argument that interpreting the law in such a way constituted interference by the State authorities with the party’s internal organisation. The court responded by saying that it had been the conference’s duty to ensure compliance with the applicable legislation. 25. Lastly, the court noted that the party had submitted an invalid version of its charter. As a consequence, the court cancelled the registration orders of 17 and 22 August 2006. 26. The applicant party lodged an appeal against that decision with the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. It stressed that the difference in treatment between registered and other party members could not be regarded as a “newly discovered fact” since it had been based on the party’s charter of 2004, which had been registered with the relevant service. A record of the entire proceedings of the conference had been submitted to the Karelia Registration Service, together with a copy of the charter on which both stages of the conference had been based. The party also pointed out that the Service had had two members present at the conference in August 2006, and therefore should have been fully aware of the procedure applied. 27. On 29 September 2006 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation dismissed the applicant party’s appeal, with reasoning that was similar to that of the Karelia Supreme Court. 28. As a result of the annulment order coming into force the applicant party lost its election deposits. 29. On 8 October 2006 elections to the Fourth Legislative Assembly took place. The party list and the single constituency candidates nominated by the applicant party were not present on the ballot. The fourth applicant submitted that she had cast a ballot for the Yabloko party list, but that her choice had not been counted in the election results. 30. The Government submitted the following information about the elections which took place on 8 October 2006. Seven parties competed for places in the regional assembly: the Karelia branch of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) (obtained 12.77% of the votes cast), the Party of National Resurrection “People’s Will” (1.58%), the regional branch of the Patriots of Russia party (4.39%), the regional branch of United Russia (38.92%), the regional branch of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) (8.86%), the regional branch of the Russian Party for Life (16.19%) and the regional branch of the Russian Pensioners’ Party (12.06%). The total number of people who voted in the elections was 183,503, or 32.98% of the electorate. 31. The Government also presented information about the subsequent election to the Karelia LA, in which Yabloko candidates had participated. That election took place on 4 December 2011 and had five parties competing. Yabloko obtained 7.13% of the votes and had deputies elected to the LA. A total of 50.03% of voters took part.

6. The applicant was born in 1964 and is detained in Krems. 7. On 9 February 1983 the applicant shot his cousin, P.D., three times in the chest and stomach. His victim died. The applicant then decapitated P.D. and disposed of his head. 8. On 15 February 1983 the applicant shot dead two women, namely his former girlfriend, U.E., as well as her mother, S.E., using the same gun as he had used for the previous murder. 9. The applicant was arrested on 26 February 1983 and remanded in custody. 10. On 14 March 1984 the Vienna Regional Criminal Court (Straflandesgericht – hereinafter, “the Criminal Court”), sitting as an assize court (Geschworenengericht), convicted the applicant of triple murder and disturbing the peace of the dead (Störung der Totenruhe). He was found to be criminally responsible for his acts and was sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment. In addition to the sentence, the Criminal Court ordered his detention in an institution for mentally ill offenders in accordance with Article 21 § 2 of the Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch; see paragraph 31 below). A psychiatric expert, Dr Q., had found in his expert opinion that the applicant presented a distinctive picture of secondary personality defence mechanisms, in the sense of suppression of fear, emotion and sexuality. His potential for aggression was increased and he was emotionally unstable and could easily become aggressive. Moreover, there were clear signs of an identity disorder. 11. The above judgment was upheld by the Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof) on 27 September 1984. 12. The applicant has been detained in institutions for mentally ill offenders since 27 September 1984. He served his prison sentence until 26 February 2003 (as the time he had spent in pre-trial detention – see paragraph 9 above – was counted towards his prison sentence). Thereafter, he remained in preventive detention, subject to yearly review proceedings in accordance with Article 25 § 3 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 32 below). He was first detained in the units for mentally ill offenders of the Vienna-Mittersteig Prison and Graz-Karlau Prison (Justizanstalt), and since 2008 has been detained in the respective unit of Stein Prison in Krems. 13. On an unknown date in 2008, the applicant applied for release from the institution for mentally ill offenders. He argued that he had completed individual therapy with Professor G. in the Vienna-Mittersteig Prison as well as specialised therapy preparing him for his release with an external therapist. Two psychiatric experts had attested that the danger emanating from him had abated or was significantly reduced. Even though different entities had suggested that he be granted privileges (Vollzugslockerung) under section 126 of the Execution of Sentences Act (Strafvollzugsgesetz – see paragraph 41 below), he had not yet been granted any. The applicant claimed that his lawyer had offered him a job and a small apartment if he were released. 14. On 25 February 2009 the Krems a.d. Donau Regional Court (Landesgericht – hereinafter, “the Regional Court”) ordered the continuation of the applicant’s detention in the institution for mentally ill offenders. It referred to an expert opinion of 25 January 2009 by Dr L., who had stated that the applicant’s condition had stabilised and that the danger emanating from him had considerably abated in respect of the closed and protected living environment of the prison. However, the same could not be said with certainty for a life outside prison. The director of the prison did not recommend releasing the applicant either, as the special therapy he needed in order to be prepared for release was only available in the Vienna‑Mittersteig Prison. The applicant waived his right to appeal against that decision. 15. On 20 September 2009 the applicant again applied for release, reiterating that Dr L. in his expert opinion of 25 January 2009 had attested that a process of mental stabilisation had taken place and that it was highly likely that the danger emanating from him was significantly reduced. The applicant claimed that he had successfully completed psychotherapy, which he considered as sufficient preparation for life outside of prison. He emphasised that he was willing to be treated, but that currently he was not receiving any therapy. Moreover, he reminded the court that his lawyer would be able to supply a flat and a job for him if he were released. He complained that the prison authorities had refused his requests to be granted privileges, and as a consequence the domestic courts had dismissed his previous applications for release as he had not been prepared for it. 16. On 15 March 2010 the Regional Court, having held an oral hearing, ordered the continuation of the applicant’s detention. It confirmed that Dr L., in his additional expert opinion of 24 February 2010, had referred to the fact that the applicant’s condition had stabilised. Even though the applicant had developed an aversion to psychotherapy, he did not refuse to talk to psychiatrists. He was actively seeking a dialogue with them. However, Dr L. also found that no protection and support would be provided for the applicant after his release. Without such support, conditional release would be too risky from a psychiatric point of view. The stress caused by the overwhelming feeling of unpreparedness for release could lead to near-psychotic or micropsychotic disorders, the danger of which was unpredictable. 17. The Regional Court also referred to the expert opinion of Dr H. of 31 October 2006 and the forensic expert opinion by the Vienna-Mittersteig Prison of January 2007, as well as the most recent expert opinion by Dr B. (the resident psychologist of Stein Prison, where the applicant was held at that time) of 3 March 2010. The latter had come to the conclusion that the applicant still suffered from a pronounced combined personality disorder with paranoid, schizoid, emotionally unstable and narcissistic elements. Dr B. responded to the generally positive tenor of Dr L.’s opinion and found that the stabilisation process was rather a reaction to the “enemy” institution, namely the prison, in which the applicant was being held, and was not to be considered real or rendering the applicant capable of surviving the challenges of daily life outside prison. Moreover, at that time, Dr B. did not recommend further therapy for the applicant, who was not prepared for any self-reflection and was not ready to process the experiences and challenges of normal social interaction, and thus was still likely to present a danger to others. The director of Stein Prison also recommended the continuation of the applicant’s detention, adding that his institution was not equipped to deal with the preparation of his release, which it considered to be a complex and risk-prone task. Only the Vienna-Mittersteig Prison was capable of preparing the applicant for his release. The applicant in any event refused to undergo any more therapy. 18. The Regional Court found that owing to the applicant’s negative approach to therapy, it was impossible to prepare him for release, even though his counsel had confirmed the offer of a flat and a job, and the applicant appeared to be stable. In line with the argumentation of the expert opinions of Dr B. and Dr L., the court held that in the light of the gravity of the underlying criminal offences, there was a danger that an unprepared release would overwhelm the applicant and could have unpredictable consequences. Therefore, the application for conditional release had to be dismissed. 19. On 26 July 2010, the Vienna Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht – hereinafter, “the Court of Appeal”) dismissed an appeal lodged by the applicant. It referred to the expert opinions obtained in 1983, 2000, 2002, 2006, 2009 and 2010, and confirmed the decision of the first-instance court. It also reiterated that Stein Prison’s psychology service had recommended a transfer to the Vienna-Mittersteig Prison, where the necessary therapy was available. 20. The applicant lodged an application for release with the Regional Court on 20 August 2010 and submitted additional observations on 16 November and 3 December 2010. In essence, he repeated the arguments he had made in the previous review proceedings (see paragraphs 13 and 15 above). He also requested that a new expert opinion be obtained from Dr L. 21. On 7 December 2010 the Regional Court, ordered the continuation of the applicant’s detention in an institution for mentally ill offenders, referring to the most recent expert opinion by Dr B. of 3 March 2010 (see paragraph 17 above). It found that there had been no changes in his circumstances and therefore declined the request for a new expert opinion. Recently obtained information from Stein Prison’s psychology service stated that the applicant still refused to undergo further therapy at their institution and requested preparation for his release. It reiterated that the necessary preparation was not available in Stein Prison, but only in the Vienna-Mittersteig Prison. However, the latter had not yet responded to a request for the applicant’s transfer. The Regional Court further referred to the reasoning in previous review decisions to avoid repetition, in particular the one by the Court of Appeal of 26 July 2010 (see paragraph 19 above). It stressed that the applicant still refused to deal with his offences in a therapeutic setting, which in turn was a prerequisite for being granted privileges. In the light of the gravity of the underlying offence, the statements obtained from the various prison services as well as the recent expert opinions, the Regional Court concluded that the applicant still presented a danger to society. 22. On 25 January 2011 the Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal lodged by the applicant as unfounded, as it was evident that there had not been a change in his negative attitude towards further therapy. 23. On 8 September 2011 the applicant applied for conditional release from the institution. 24. On 23 January 2012 the Regional Court held an oral hearing and subsequently ordered an expert opinion in the framework of the yearly judicial review proceedings. On 1 February 2012 the applicant submitted his observations on the review. He stated that the expert opinion of Dr B. (see paragraph 17 above) had been wrong and the court should therefore rather rely on Dr L.’s expert opinion (see paragraphs 13-16 above). As the applicant refused to be examined by any expert, the court held another hearing on 23 April 2012. On that occasion, the presiding judge reproached the applicant with the fact that he could not expect to be granted privileges if he did not collaborate with the experts and the authorities. The applicant replied that previously one of the experts had found that privileges were a prerequisite for his release, and that another expert had even come to the conclusion that he could already be released. He explained that he had refused to be examined by a psychiatrist because he was not suffering from a mental illness. The applicant repeated that his lawyer had offered him a small apartment and work in his law firm. He was not willing to live in an assisted-living facility or to follow psychotherapy after his eventual release, but would agree to work with a probation officer. 25. On 23 April 2012, the Regional Court ordered the continuation of the applicant’s detention. Based on the information on file, the latest expert opinion of Dr B. of 3 March 2010 and the information from the director of the prison, it concluded that the danger emanating from the applicant still persisted and therefore his application for release had to be dismissed. 26. That decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal on 30 July 2012. The court summarised the genesis of the case so far and the applicant’s complaints, and reiterated the lower court’s findings. As to its own conclusion, it almost exclusively referred to its previous decisions in the applicant’s case of 26 July 2010 and 25 January 2011, holding that there had been no significant changes in the applicant’s situation, in particular that he still refused any further therapy. 27. On 26 March 2013 the applicant applied for release from the institution for mentally ill offenders. 28. On 20 June 2013 the Regional Court again ordered the continuation of the applicant’s detention, essentially reiterating the reasoning it had given in its decision of 23 April 2012 (see paragraph 25 above). It appears that the Regional Court did not hold an oral hearing prior to that decision. It referred to the “current” expert opinion of Dr B. of 2010 (see paragraph 17 above) and statements by the prison administration and the social service of the prison (Maßnahmenteam) that the applicant should not be released, as he refused to undergo therapy and still posed a threat. The Regional Court reiterated that the applicant could only be prepared for his release at the Vienna-Mittersteig Prison, but found that it would be unreasonable to order his transfer because of his negative attitude towards therapy. 29. On 19 July 2013 the Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal lodged by the applicant as unfounded. It held that the Regional Court had had no choice but to take into consideration the expert opinion of 2010, as in the course of the 2011/12 review proceedings the applicant had refused to be examined by an expert. The Court of Appeal again referred to the reasoning it had given in its three previous decisions relating to the applicant. 30. At the time of the above decision, the applicant was almost forty‑nine years old and had spent some twenty-nine years of his life in different institutions for mentally ill offenders.

4. The applicant was born in 1968 and, prior to his conviction, lived in Yaroslavl. 5. On 15 April 2008 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of fraud. Subsequently, he was charged with fraud, attempted fraud, embezzlement, tax evasion and a breach of duties in his work as a tax agent. 6. On 16 April 2008 the Kirovskiy District Court of Yaroslavl remanded the applicant in custody pending investigation. The judge found that (1) the applicant was suspected of serious crimes, (2) he might abscond, (3) he might put pressure on witnesses, or (4) he might interfere with the investigation. 7. On 25 April 2008 the Yaroslavl Regional Court upheld the detention order of 16 April 2008 on appeal. 8. The applicant remained in detention pending investigation and trial. The courts extended his detention, using the same stereotyped formula as described above. 9. On 16 March 2009 he was committed for trial before the Kirovskiy District Court of Yaroslavl. 10. On 27 October 2009 he was convicted of the charges and sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment. 11. On 29 December 2009 the Yaroslavl Regional Court quashed the judgment on appeal and remitted the case to the first-instance court for a fresh examination. 12. On 25 January 2010 the trial court ordered his release on bail. 13. On 27 January 2010 the bail was paid and the applicant was released. 14. On 20 July 2010 the applicant was convicted of fraud and attempted fraud and sentenced to five years and six months’ imprisonment. 15. On 19 October 2010 the Yaroslavl Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal. 16. On 2 December 2014 the Government submitted a unilateral declaration. They acknowledged that the applicant had been detained “between 15 April 2008 and 27 October 2009 ... without relevant and sufficient grounds”, in breach of the requirements of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention. They offered to pay him a sum of 1,850 euros (EUR) as just satisfaction and invited the Court to strike the case out of its list of cases. 17. On 2 February 2015 the applicant replied that he had taken note of the Government’s acknowledgment of the violation, but that the amount of compensation was not acceptable to him.

5. From 1996 onwards the applicant, a former police officer discharged for health reasons, enjoyed disability benefits under the Labour Disablement Insurance Act (Wet op de Arbeidsongeschiktheidsverzekering – “WAO”). He was allowed to earn by his own means a sum not exceeding 60,000 Netherlands guilders (NLG) without losing his entitlement under the WAO. This he did by running a one-man business as a trainer teaching people how to deal with stress. 6. The applicant states that he entered into an arrangement with an official of the competent social-security authority (at that time called Cadans), one Mr G., which was intended to make possible his transition into independent self-employment without the need for additional social security benefits. He alleges that Mr G. gave him the assurance that he would be permitted for a period of five years to earn income over and above the sum of NLG 60,000, the purpose being to allow him to create cash reserves in case his health should deteriorate further. The agreement had been witnessed by another official, one Mr S. 7. In February 1999 the applicant announced his intention to continue his business in the form of a limited liability company (besloten vennootschap met beperkte aansprakelijkheid). He wrote to the social-security authority (re-named Social Security Implementing Institution for Government and Education (Uitvoeringsinstelling sociale zekerheid voor overheid en onderwijs; “USZO”)) asking it to confirm that this change would not affect the arrangements made during the time when he was self-employed. In the ensuing domestic proceedings the social security authorities submitted one or more letters which they stated had been sent in response, including one dated 12 July 1999 denying the applicant the confirmation sought. The applicant states that he never received any reply. 8. In September 1999 the applicant’s business was transformed into a limited liability company. The shares were held by the applicant’s wife. The applicant was its managing director and its only employee; he entered its employ on 1 October 1999. 9. On 3 September 2003 Mr D., an official of the social-security authority (by this time re-named Employee Insurances Schemes Implementing Body (Uitvoeringsinstituut werknemersverzekeringen; “UWV”)) submitted an extensive investigation report implicating the applicant and his wife in suspected social-security fraud. According to the report, the applicant had defrauded the social-security system by declaring only his own income as an employee of the limited liability company but not the company’s profits, which were declared as taxable income by his wife. The report included the following passage: “It was arranged in addition that only what Gillissen earned in self-employment after his discharge would be considered his residual earning capacity (resterende verdiencapaciteit). The labour expert (arbeidsdeskundige) Mr G. has stated that he discussed this extensively with Gillissen, who could agree to that position and who indicated during the conversation that in the coming years more growth was to be expected and that it was his intention to make his own living in self-employment with a corresponding gradual reduction to zero (afbouw) of the WAO benefits.” 10. On 28 January 2004 UWV gave a decision reducing the applicant’s WAO benefits with retroactive effect. On 3 March 2004 UWV gave a second decision ordering the applicant to repay the excess. 11. The applicant lodged objections (bezwaar) against both decisions. As relevant to the case before the Court, the applicant argued that as from 1999 he had kept the competent authorities informed of developments as they occurred, withholding no information, and invoked the arrangement which he had agreed with Mr G. He named Mr S. as a witness. 12. Having held a hearing on 11 January 2006, UWV gave a decision on 31 January 2006 dismissing the applicant’s objections. It found that the applicant could reasonably have been aware that the total of his additional income – the sum of his salary and the profits of the limited liability company – was too high for him to be entitled to the full amount of his social-security benefits. The alleged arrangement to the contrary was not reflected in the case file, and in any case, whatever statements had been made (assuming that any had been made at all) had been made by a person lacking the requisite competence and could not bind UWV. 13. The applicant lodged an appeal (beroep) with the Roermond Regional Court (rechtbank). As relevant to the case before the Court, he complained about UWV’s failure to question Mr G. and Mr S., which in his submission reflected a lack of due care affecting the quality of the investigation. He also submitted that Mr G. had acted within his competence in making the agreement alleged. 14. Having held a hearing on 30 August 2006, the Regional Court gave judgment on 21 November 2006 dismissing the applicant’s appeal. Its reasoning included the following: “The [applicant] has also stated that [UWV] officials had agreed with him that he would be permitted to earn unlimited income in addition to his WAO benefits for a period of five years. The Regional Court has found no evidence of such an agreement in the documents available, nor is there any other reason to consider it plausible. On the contrary, it appears from the labour expert Mr G.’s report of 26 October 1998 that the [applicant’s] income did in fact have to be taken into account. In addition, [UWV] answered the [applicant]’s questions about the possibilities of obtaining income from work (additional income) in a letter of 12 July 1999, which letter incidentally the [applicant] claims not to have received. This letter states in no uncertain terms that [UWV] must always be informed immediately of any taking up of work and generation of income. But even without this letter it ought in reason to have been clear to the [applicant] that income can have an effect on the benefits. This ground of appeal therefore also fails.” 15. The applicant lodged a further appeal (hoger beroep) with the Central Appeals Tribunal (Centrale Raad van Beroep). As relevant to the case before the Court, he again complained in his written submissions about UWV’s failure to hear Mr G. and Mr S. as witnesses. He asked for them both to be heard as a witness in order to prove the existence of the agreement. He also prayed in aid his acquittal by the ‘s-Hertogenbosch Court of Appeal, which had been given in the meantime (see paragraph 22 below). He did not, however, himself summon Mr G. and Mr S. as witnesses by registered letter or bailiff’s writ. 16. The Central Appeals Tribunal held a hearing on 8 August 2008. The applicant did not bring Mr G. and Mr S. along but restated his request to have them heard as witnesses. The Central Appeals Tribunal decided to reopen its examination of the facts of the case in order to put an additional question to UWV. UWV replied to the Central Appeals Tribunal’s question in writing. The applicant and UWV waived the right to a further hearing. 17. The Central Appeals Tribunal gave judgment on 30 January 2009 dismissing the further appeal without having heard any witnesses. Its reasoning included the following: “The agreement relied on by the [applicant], which is denied by UWV, does not appear from the case file and no other credible case for its existence has been made out by the [applicant].” 18. In response to a question by the Court, the applicant acknowledged that he had made no attempt to summon Mr G. and Mr S. himself or bring them along to the hearing of either the Regional Court or the Central Appeals Tribunal, as permitted by section 8:60(4) of the General Administrative Law Act (Algemene wet bestuursrecht; see paragraph 25 below). 19. In parallel with the administrative proceedings outlined above, the applicant was prosecuted for social security fraud and forgery. 20. On 20 January 2006 the single-judge chamber of the criminal division (politierechter) of the Roermond Regional Court convicted the applicant. 21. The applicant appealed to the ‘s-Hertogenbosch Court of Appeal (gerechtshof). 22. Having held a hearing on 4 May 2007, the Court of Appeal gave judgment on 16 May 2007 acquitting the applicant. Its reasoning included the following: “The suspect states that he drew up a common plan with Mr G. of USZO in 1998 with a view to the gradual reduction to zero of the WAO benefits over five years. The applicant further states that he made arrangements with that Mr G. concerning the amount of additional income he would be allowed to earn in the said five-year period. The suspect understood these arrangements in the sense that he would in principle be allowed to earn unlimited additional income without losing his benefits. Prompted by the transformation of the one-man business into one or more limited liability companies the suspect sought confirmation from UWV that it would not matter for the arrangements made whether the provider of the income was the one-man business or the said limited liability companies. To this end he got in touch with USZO on multiple occasions by means of letters. These letters were answered by USZO with automatised standard letters which did not address the specific situation in which the suspect found himself and which the suspect himself had raised with USZO. By the time this question was put by the suspect to USZO Mr G. had been succeeded by Mr M. The latter found no report in the USZO file of the arrangements mentioned by the suspect. It is not apparent from the file that any attempt was made to hear Mr G. about the said arrangements within the framework of this criminal case. In view of the facts outlined above, the Court of Appeal considers it plausible (aannemelijk) that the suspect made arrangements with Mr G. of USZO in one form or another concerning the amount of permitted additional income within the framework of the gradual reduction to zero of his WAO benefits. It makes no difference that no report of any arrangements was found in the USZO file because no attempt has been made to verify the existence of these arrangements with Mr G.”

6. The applicant is an Eritrean national and was born in 1990. He grew up in Eritrea and currently lives in Switzerland. 7. The applicant entered Switzerland illegally on 23 June 2014 and applied for asylum the next day. He was heard in person three times by the Swiss authorities responsible for asylum and migration (until 31 December 2014 the Bundesamt für Migration, renamed with effect from 1 January 2015 as the Staatssekretariat für Migration, SEM – hereafter “the State Secretariat for Migration”). During all three hearings an interpreter was present and the record was translated for the applicant prior to his signing it. 8. The first hearing was a summary interview at the Centre for Reception and Procedure (Empfangs- und Verfahrenszentrum) in Kreuzlingen on 1 July 2014. The applicant stated that he had not been allowed to continue at school beyond the eighth grade because he had failed the national admission exams for secondary school, and had been summoned for military service, which he had tried to avoid. Once he had reported for duty, he had tried to escape but had been caught. He stated that he had been beaten and subsequently imprisoned in Wi’a in conditions of very poor hygiene. He was unable to recall the exact dates of his imprisonment, but stated that he had been imprisoned from June 2012 to September 2013. He had managed to escape from prison one night when the guards were asleep. After staying in Eritrea for one more week, he had left the country on foot on 3 October 2013, crossing the border at Mereb. He had been picked up by Ethiopian soldiers the next day. 9. In order to support his account, the applicant submitted copies of his student card and a card showing that he was a church deacon, as well as the original of a card used for food distribution in Italy. He stated that he had been issued with an identity card in Eritrea in 2010, but had had to hand it in in Ethiopia. The applicant further stated that he was married and had a son born in October 2012. 10. The second, more detailed, hearing took place at the office of the State Secretariat for Migration in Berne on 11 March 2015. A member of a non-governmental organisation was present as a neutral witness, in order to guarantee the fairness of the hearing. He had the opportunity to add comments at the end of the record of the hearing in the event that he had witnessed any irregularities, but did not note down any such observations. 11. The applicant again gave an account of the alleged events in Eritrea leading up to his escape. This time he stated that he had been imprisoned in Wi’a from March to October 2013 following his attempt to escape from the military. When confronted with the discrepancy in comparison with his previous account in that regard, he stated that he might have made a mistake in the first interview. When asked about the conditions of his detention, the applicant claimed that it had been very dirty and very hot, and that he had been locked up all the time. Other than beatings suffered due to his attempt to escape, there had been no particular incidents. He did not recall any rules other than fixed meal times and being brought outside in the mornings and evenings to relieve himself. 12. When asked about his military training, the applicant claimed that he had only been there for a very brief period of time prior to his attempted escape. He had not learned how to use weapons. He could neither provide a name of his superior nor his unit nor his military number. 13. When questioned about his departure from Eritrea, the applicant described leaving A. (a village) on foot at around 6 p.m., together with a person living in the neighbourhood who knew the area. They had walked towards Mereb, but had lost their way as it was night-time. They had been very afraid and also hungry and thirsty. There were lots of thorn bushes in their way and they had heard the howling of hyenas. They had not been sure whether they had reached Ethiopian territory until soldiers who spoke Amharic had apprehended them at around 3 a.m. When informed by the interviewer that his account in relation to his departure might not be considered credible, which would result in the conclusion that he had left the country legally, the applicant said that he could not give more details about the departure because he did not know the area well and had been following the person with whom he had fled. 14. The applicant claimed that he had always been in good health. 15. In order to support his account, the applicant submitted the originals of his marriage certificate of 2010 and his son’s baptism certificate of 2012, as well as an attestation that he was a church deacon. He claimed that these documents had been sent to him from Eritrea. 16. The applicant was heard for a third time by the State Secretariat for Migration on 29 January 2016. Again, a member of a non-governmental organisation was present as a neutral witness, who did not note down any observations relating to irregularities. 17. The interviewer explicitly advised the applicant that the interview was taking place to give him another opportunity to describe his departure from Eritrea, and that the account he had so far provided in this regard would probably be dismissed as not credible, which would result in the conclusion that he had left the country legally. 18. The applicant responded that he had spent two days at his parents’ home in A. after escaping from prison. His family had contacted a people smuggler from the Mereb area. He and the smuggler had left A. on foot at around 6 p.m. When confronted with his previous account that he had left with a person from the neighbourhood, the applicant clarified that the person he had travelled with (the smuggler) came from a neighbouring village. During the night the smuggler had told him that he had taken many people across the border, but that he and the applicant had already been walking for too long a time, which meant that they must have lost their way. They had become disorientated and had only realised that they had crossed the border when they had been apprehended by Ethiopian soldiers at around 4 a.m. who had spoken to them in Amharic. 19. On 8 March 2016 the State Secretariat for Migration rejected the applicant’s asylum request and ordered his departure from Switzerland. It found that his account was not credible, and concluded that, having failed to prove or credibly demonstrate his refugee status pursuant to section 7 of the Asylum Act, the applicant was not a refugee as defined in section 3 of the Asylum Act. 20. The State Secretariat for Migration pointed out that the applicant had stated in the first hearing that he had been detained for a period of one year and three months, from June 2012 to September 2013, whereas in the second hearing he had said that he had been detained for seven months, from March to October 2013. It added that the applicant had also contradicted himself a number of times in the second hearing in relation to the commencement of his military training and the end of his schooling. Furthermore, his account as regards his time in prison and his escape from prison lacked substance, and he could not provide details as to what he had learned during his military training. 21. The State Secretariat for Migration also found that the applicant’s submissions regarding his illegal exit from Eritrea were not credible. Despite being asked several times to provide a detailed account of his departure or specific events in that connection, the applicant’s statement in that regard was superficial and limited to phrases. The State Secretariat for Migration argued that, particularly in relation to the hours during which the applicant and the smuggler had lost their way, it could legitimately be expected that the applicant would provide a substantiated account, which he had failed to do. Nor had he provided a consistent account in that regard. Moreover, he had made contradictory statements as to how long he had stayed at home between escaping from prison and leaving the country. 22. On 14 April 2016 the applicant lodged an appeal against that decision before the Federal Administrative Court. He submitted that the authorities had initially refrained from drafting him because of his role as a deacon – the fact that he was a deacon not having been contested by the asylum authority. He referred to a report of the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), which stated that the relevant authorities had, at times, deferred the draft of clerics, until a change in practice in 2010 had led to a stricter approach (see paragraph 49 below). The applicant submitted that he had had to undergo his military training in Wi’a, a place to which, according to a report by the US Department of State (see paragraph 51), students with poor grades were typically assigned. Shortly after reporting for duty, he had attempted to escape. He had been caught and, as a result, detained in March 2013. He had managed to escape from detention in September 2013 after seven months. Fearing that he would be detained once again or forced to perform military service, he had decided in early October 2013 to leave the country illegally. His family had organised a smuggler. They had fled during the night and, while attempting to cross the border at Mereb, had lost their way. They had been apprehended by Ethiopian soldiers early in the morning of 4 October 2013 and taken to Endabaguna. One week later, they had been transferred to the Hitsas refugee camp. 23. With regard to the alleged discrepancies relating to his schooling, the applicant submitted that he had difficulties with dates concerning the duration of his schooling and his age when he had started and left school, but emphasised that he had consistently stated that he had left school after eighth grade, having failed the exams to move on to secondary school, and referred to a report by EASO regarding the national examination at the end of eighth grade (see paragraph 49 below). Also, during the hearing he had corrected himself in relation to the commencement of his military training. Furthermore, it was comprehensible that he could not give a detailed account about things which he had learned during that training, given that he had attempted to escape almost immediately after reporting for duty. 24. The applicant claimed that the discrepancies between his statements in the first and the second hearings concerning the duration of his detention were due to his poor level of education. He emphasised that his statements as regards the time of the end of his detention, September 2013, were consistent. In relation to the conditions of detention, he argued that the account he had given to the asylum authorities very much reflected his personal experiences: he had stated that the prison had been dirty, that it had been very hot, that detainees had had lice, that there had been fixed meal times, and that he had been taken outside in the mornings and evenings to relieve himself. In light of this monotonous pattern, the mistake, if any, had been on the part of the interviewer, who had asked for a description of specific events. In that regard, the applicant argued that his account that he had been beaten with a wooden stick and kicked while lying on the ground in front of everyone as punishment related to a specific personal event. He emphasised that the interviewer had not questioned him about his scars, which he alleged were the result of that incident, or about specific events surrounding his escape from prison, pointing out that the latter issue had been raised by the representative of the non-governmental organisation who had been present as a neutral witness at the second hearing. As to the time between his escape from prison and his departure from Eritrea, the applicant argued that his first statement that he had left Eritrea one week after escaping from prison, and his second statement that he had spent two days at his parents’ home in A. during that time, were not contradictory. 25. With regard to the circumstances of his departure from Eritrea, he emphasised that his account had been consistent as regards the time when he and the smuggler had left the village and when they had been apprehended by Ethiopian soldiers. It was only logical that he could not make detailed statements about the area, as he had no knowledge of that area and had fled during the night. His most prominent memory related to the fears he had experienced when they lost their way. He could also recall the exact words in Amharic used by the Ethiopian soldiers when they had been apprehended. His account, which revolved around feelings of thirst, hunger and fear, and which mentioned the many thorn bushes in their way and the howling of hyenas, corresponded to his young age and poor level of education. Moreover, the State Secretariat for Migration had wrongfully concluded that there was a contradiction in his statements concerning the smuggler’s reaction when they had lost their way. 26. Lastly, the applicant submitted that he did not belong to any of the groups of people who could possibly obtain a visa to exit Eritrea. Referring to a letter from UNHCR – the original of which he presented – stating that he was registered in the Hitsas refugee camp in Ethiopia on 8 November 2013, and to the fact that crossing the border to enter Ethiopia by land was always unlawful (see paragraph 49 below), he argued that he had proved his illegal exit from Eritrea. 27. In conclusion, the applicant argued that he was a refugee as defined in section 3 of the Asylum Act, on account of his fear of ill-treatment for having deserted from military service. In the alternative, he claimed to qualify for temporary admission because of “subjective post-flight grounds” (as set out in section 54 of the Asylum Act), notably his illegal exit from Eritrea and his asylum application in Switzerland. Further, in the alternative, he alleged that his removal to Eritrea was neither permitted in the light of Article 3 of the Convention nor reasonable, entitling him to temporary admission to Switzerland. 28. On 9 May 2016 the Federal Administrative Court rejected the applicant’s appeal, finding that he had failed to credibly demonstrate his asylum claim. It noted that it was not apparent why the applicant’s age – he was 24 years old at the time of his interviews – or level of education should lead to different conclusions as to the credibility of his account, and considered that his two statements concerning the end of his schooling, either in 2005/2006 or 2007/2008, could not be reconciled with each other or with his student identity card, which indicated that he was a student in 2010. The court also considered that the applicant’s statements regarding the time and content of his military training lacked substance. It commented that, even if the applicant had left the military shortly after reporting for duty, he could be expected to provide a detailed and specific account of it, given that he merely had to talk about something which he had experienced in person. Viewing the duration and dates of the applicant’s detention as key elements of his asylum claim, the court noted that a discrepancy of eight months as regards the duration, and the different dates given in the first two hearings as regards the end of the detention, constituted fundamental contradictions which could not be resolved by his references to conditions of poor hygiene and being let outside twice a day to relieve himself. 29. Referring to its judgment in an earlier case concerning Eritrea, the court reiterated that the only way to exit Eritrea legally was with a valid passport and an additional exit visa, and that the practice concerning the issuance of an exit visa was very restrictive. They were issued to a few people who were considered loyal, in exchange for payment of significant sums. As a rule, children aged 11 or more, men under the age of 54, and women under the age of 47, were not granted exit visas. People attempting to leave the country without authorisation risked their life, as the border guards were under orders to prevent attempts to flee by way of targeted shots (a “shoot to kill” policy), in addition to imposing punishment as set out by law. The Eritrean Government viewed illegal exits as an indication of political opposition, and tried to get both the reduction in defence readiness and the mass exodus under control through draconian measures. 30. The Federal Administrative Court noted that finding that the applicant had concealed the true circumstances of his departure was not in itself sufficient to conclude that he had left the country legally. However, the burden of proof did not shift to the authorities, and the applicant was required to provide a substantiated and consistent account concerning the reasons for and circumstances of his departure. Considering that his account given at first-instance level was not credible, which also raised doubts about his overall credibility, and that he had not provided comprehensible explanations in his submissions on appeal, the court found that the applicant had failed to credibly demonstrate that he had left Eritrea illegally. 31. The Federal Administrative Court added that the applicant could not rely on the letter from UNHCR stating that he was registered in the Hitsas refugee camp in November 2013, since the conditions in Ethiopian refugee camps were chaotic and, in the case of people of Eritrean origin, there was no comprehensive assessment of whether they faced persecution at the time they were registered in those camps. This was supported by the wording of the registration, which read that it constituted a recognition prima facie that the applicant was a refugee within the mandate of UNHCR. 32. Furthermore, the court found that the applicant’s removal was possible, permitted and reasonable within the meaning of section 83(1)-(4) of the Aliens Act. In particular, the applicant was a young man in good health who had a support network in his hometown, notably his wife and their son, who lived in the same house as his parents. 33. On 19 May 2016 the State Secretariat for Migration set a deadline for the applicant’s voluntary departure, which passed on 17 July 2016.

5. The applicants were born in 1980 and 1971 respectively and live in Zubutli-Miatli, Kizilyurt district, Dagestan, Russia. They are the wife and the sister of Mr Kamil Mutayev who was born in 1976. 6. Between 2010 and 2012 the applicants’ relative Mr Kamil Mutayev had been detained on at least three occasions by representatives of law‑enforcement agencies on suspicion of illegal activities and subsequently released. In particular, in 2010 he had been detained pending trial for about six months on suspicion of illegal possession of firearms and assault of a representative of the State and had then been subsequently sentenced to two years’ imprisonment. The sentence was suspended. (b) The abduction of the applicants’ relative 7. At about 1 p.m. on 2 May 2012 Mr Kamil Mutayev and his twelve‑year old son Muradis were driving in their VAZ-21099 car in Shamil Street in the centre of the town of Kizilyurt, Dagestan, when they were blocked by two silver-coloured VAZ Priora cars with heavily tinted windows, one of which had an official registration number containing the digits “78”. Eight masked men in black uniforms and armed with pistols and machine guns got out of the Priora cars, knocked Mr Kamil Mutayev off his feet and forced him into one of their vehicles. They threatened his son with firearms and ordered him to stay in the car. The abduction took place approximately two hundred metres from the district police station (the department of the interior) and the public prosecutor’s office. After the abduction the perpetrators drove away through the local traffic police checkpoint. 8. The applicants submitted to the Court the witness statements of Ms Ya.R. dated 7 February 2013 and of Ms As.I. dated 25 February 2013. According to both women, they did not see the abduction but both saw two Priora cars speeding away from the vicinity of where the incident took place around the time of the abduction. It does not appear that either of the witnesses provided a statement to the investigation. 9. The Government did not dispute the facts as presented by the applicants. At the same time they denied any involvement of State agents in the abduction. 10. In reply to the Court’s first request for a copy of the contents of the investigation file, the Government provided documents from the file, amounting to 43 pages, which showed the steps taken by the investigators from 14 May to 27 June 2012. 11. In reply to the Court’s second and third requests for a copy of the contents of the investigation file, the Government submitted copies of its contents, some 688 pages long, which showed the steps taken by the investigators from the beginning of the proceedings to 15 August 2015. From the documents submitted, the investigation can be summarised as follows. 12. Immediately after the abduction, on 2 May 2012 the applicants complained to the Kizilyurt police station (Отдел внутренних дел по г .Кизилюрт) (hereinafter “the OVD”). 13. On 2 May 2012 the police questioned the second applicant who provided a detailed account of the events similar to the one submitted to the Court and stated that she had learnt of Mr Kamil Mutayev’s abduction from her nephew Muradis. 14. On 2 May 2012 the police examined the crime scene. No evidence was collected. 15. On 2 and then on 10 May 2012 the police questioned Mr Kamil Mutayev’s son Muradis, whose account of the events was similar to that submitted by the applicants to the Court. In addition, the witness stated that the abductors had scared him by threatening to shoot him if he disobeyed their orders not to move. 16. On 2 or 3 May 2012 the police examined Mr Kamil Mutayev’s VAZ‑21099 car. Fingerprints taken from the vehicle on that date were submitted for expert examination on 18 May 2012. 17. On 14 May 2012 the applicants lodged an abduction complaint with the Kizilyurt town prosecutor’s office. 18. On 14 May 2012 the investigations department of the Kizilyurt town prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no. 207127. The applicants were informed thereof on 24 May 2012. 19. On 19 May 2012 the investigators questioned Mr Kamil Mutayev’s son Muradis who reiterated his previous statements and added that he would not be able to identify any of the abductors as he had been scared. 20. On 19 May 2012 the investigators questioned the first applicant whose statement was similar to the applicants’ account submitted to the Court. In particular, the applicant pointed out that when driving away the abductors’ vehicle had gone through the traffic police checkpoint. 21. On 21 May 2012 the first applicant was granted victim status in the criminal case and questioned again. She reiterated her previous statements. 22. On 23 May 2012 the Dagestan Forensic Expert Examinations Bureau informed the investigators that they did not have matches in their database for the fingerprints found on Mr Kamil Mutayev’s car. 23. On 24 May 2012 the investigators again questioned the second applicant whose statement was similar to the applicants’ account submitted to the Court. 24. On 6 June 2012 the investigators again examined the crime scene. 25. On 7 June 2012 the investigators again questioned the first applicant who stated that her husband Mr Kamil Mutayev did not have financial debts or enemies. At the same time she stated that on several occasions he had received threats from unidentified persons on account of his religious beliefs. Those persons had visited their house and had thrown hand-written threats inside. The applicant did not specify whether she had had any suspisions or theories concerning the identities of those persons. 26. On 15 June 2012 the local police informed the investigators that Mr Kamil Mutayev was a member of an illegal armed group, belonged to an extremist religious movement and had, therefore, most probably, staged his own abduction. 27. On 29 June 2012 the investigators questioned five local residents, all of whom stated that they had not witnessed the abduction and found out about it from others. 28. On 6 August 2012 the investigators examined the registration log of detainees of the OVD. No records concerning Mr Kamil Mutayev were found therein. 29. On 6, 7 and 12 August 2012 the investigators questioned police officers from the OVD: Mr M.M., Mr Z.S., Mr R.A., Mr A.M. and Mr D.D. All of them stated that on the date of the abduction they had been on duty at the police station and neither Mr Kamil Mutayev nor his car had been brought in. 30. On various dates between June and November 2012 the investigators received the list of calls made from and to Mr Kamil Mutayev’s mobile telephone as well as replies to their numerous information requests concerning Mr Kamil Mutayev from hospitals, morgues, retirement homes, mosques and detention centres in various regions of Russia. No information pertatining to his whereabouts or the perpetrators’ identities was obtained. 31. On 14 September 2012 the investigation was suspended. It is unclear whether the applicants were informed thereof. 32. On 9 November 2012 the investigation was resumed in order to take further steps. 33. On 30 November 2012 the investigators questioned the head of the OVD officer R.S. who stated that according to their information Mr Kamil Mutayev was an avid follower of the extremist religious movement Wahhabi and that he had staged his abduction to join an illegal armed group. 34. On an unspecified date in 2013 the investigation was resumed. 35. Between March 2013 and February 2014 the investigators questioned a number of Mr Kamil Mutayev’s relatives and neighbours, whose statements did not provide new information. They also questioned again his son Muradis and the first applicant who reiterated their earlier statements. 36. From the documents submitted it follows that between November 2012 and August 2015 the investigation was suspended and resumed on several occasions. The last resumption of the investigation took place on 10 September 2015. The proceedings are still pending.

4. The applicants’ dates of birth and places of residence are given in the Appendix. 5. At the material time the first applicant was a chairman of the Sumgait city branch of an opposition party Musavat and the fourth applicant was a deputy chairman of the Goychay district branch of that party. The third applicant was a member of another opposition party, the Popular Front Party of Azerbaijan. The second applicant was a member of the Coordination Council of an opposition group İctimai Palata. According to the applicants, they participated in a number of peaceful demonstrations organised by the opposition. 6. The number of opposition demonstrations increased in 2011. That tendency continued into the following years. Demonstrations were held, inter alia, on 2 April and 17 April 2011 and 20 October 2012. 7. The second applicant attended the demonstration of 2 April 2011. The first and third applicants attended the demonstration of 17 April 2011. According to the first applicant, he also intended to participate in the demonstration of 20 October 2012. 8. Prior to those demonstrations, on 18 March 2011, 11 April 2011 and 15 October 2012 respectively the organisers had given notice to the relevant authority, the Baku City Executive Authority (“the BCEA”). 9. The BCEA refused to authorise those demonstrations at the places indicated by the organisers and proposed a different location on the outskirts of Baku – the grounds of a driving school situated in the 20th residential area of the Sabail District. 10. The organisers nevertheless decided to hold the demonstrations as planned. According to the applicants, the demonstrations were intended to be peaceful and were conducted in a peaceful manner. The participants were demanding democratic reforms in the country and free and fair elections, and protesting against impediments on freedom of assembly. 11. The fourth applicant was one of the organisers of a rally planned by several opposition parties. The rally was to be held on 18 October 2011 in Goychay. The fourth applicant also intended to participate in that assembly. 12. According to the fourth applicant, prior to the rally of 18 October 2011, on 9 October 2011, he and the other organisers gave notice to the relevant authority, the Goychay District Executive Authority (“the GDEA”). The information about the rally was sent to the GDEA by post and the fourth applicant’s home address was indicated (for reference) as the address of the sender. 13. According to the fourth applicant, the rally was intended to be peaceful. Its purpose was to mark the twentieth anniversary of the Independence Day and to honour the memory of those buried in the Cemetery of Martyrs in the town of Goychay. 14. It appears that eventually the rally did not take place. 15. As mentioned above, the demonstration of 2 April 2011 was attended by the second applicant; the demonstration of 17 April 2011 was attended by the first and third applicants. However, the police began to disperse those demonstrations as soon as the protesters began to gather. 16. The circumstances related to the dispersal of the demonstrations of 2 April and 17 April 2011, the first, second and third applicants’ arrests and custody, and subsequent administrative proceedings against them are similar to those in Gafgaz Mammadov v. Azerbaijan (no. 60259/11, 15 October 2015) (see also Appendix). 17. The circumstances of the fourth and first applicants’ arrests on 15 October 2011 and 20 October 2012 respectively, their custody and subsequent administrative proceedings against them are similar to those in Huseynli and Others v. Azerbaijan (nos. 67360/11 and 2 others, 11 February 2016) (see also Appendix). 18. According to the first and third applicants, after being arrested during the dispersal of the demonstration of 17 April 2011 and brought to a police station, they were subjected to ill-treatment by the deputy chief of the Nasimi District Police Office, police officer S.N. 19. In a photograph, submitted to the Court by the first applicant and allegedly taken after his police custody, he is shown with a bruise on his forehead. In the other photograph, allegedly taken before his police custody, the first applicant is shown without any bruising on his forehead. 20. The third applicant submitted to the Court a medical report of 18 April 2011 confirming that he had a broken rib. According to the third applicant, that medical report was issued when he was taken to a hospital after his trial, before he was placed in a detention facility to serve his sentence. He also submitted a photograph in which he is shown with bruises on his body. 21. The applicants raised their ill-treatment complaints during the administrative proceedings following their arrest on 17 April 2011. Namely, in their appeals against the first-instance court’s decisions the applicants complained that they had been ill-treated during their police custody, and requested the Baku Court of Appeal to order a forensic examination of their injuries, to question particular witnesses and to obtain the review of the medical records drawn up at their check-in to a detention facility where they had served their sentence. 22. On 21 April and 4 May 2011 respectively the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the applicants’ appeals and upheld the decisions of the first‑instance court (see Appendix). The appellate court disregarded the applicants’ ill-treatment complaints and their requests related to those complaints. 23. On an unspecified date the applicants lodged a complaint before the General Prosecutor’s Office asking it to conduct an investigation into the alleged ill-treatment. 24. On unspecified dates, the applicants were summoned to the Nasimi District prosecutor’s office and questioned in connection with their complaint of ill-treatment. 25. On 23 May and 2 July 2011 investigator M.H. adopted decisions refusing to open criminal proceedings into allegations of ill-treatment in respect of the third and first applicants respectively. 26. According to the applicants, for a certain period of time neither they nor their lawyer were informed about any actions taken by the authorities to investigate their ill-treatment complaints. Only in January 2012, after making enquiries about the outcome of the investigation, did they manage to obtain copies of the investigator’s above-mentioned decisions. 27. The applicants did not lodge a complaint with a supervising court against those decisions.

5. The applicant was born in 1967 and is currently serving his prison sentence. 6. At about 10 a.m. on 1 June 2005 O., the president of the Ukrainian Dental Association, was shot at his office with a rifle which the applicant had brought. The applicant was present at O.’s office at the time of the event. He asked for the police and an ambulance to be called and, once the police arrived, stated that an accident had happened. He explained that he and O. were interested in hunting and he had brought the shotgun to O. as a present. While he had been demonstrating the gun to O., the latter had wanted to see it closer and had pulled it towards himself; the gun had accidentally gone off. According to the applicant, once he had replied to the questions of the police, handcuffs were put on him; he was searched and samples were taken from him for forensic examination. His request for a lawyer was allegedly ignored. 7. On the same date the applicant’s arrest report was drawn up which stated that the applicant had been arrested for the murder of O. at 10 p.m. at the police station. He was subsequently questioned in the presence of K., his lawyer. He pleaded not guilty and repeated his statements made earlier. According to the applicant, his lawyer immediately indicated to the investigator that, under the Code of Criminal Procedure, the applicant had to be provided with the possibility to talk with him in private before the questioning, with a view to defining the legal defence strategy. Having heard that, the applicant insisted on such a meeting. The investigator, however, rejected that request on the ground that the applicant would be able to talk to his lawyer later. 8. On 2 June 2005 a reconstruction of the crime was carried out in the presence of the applicant’s lawyer. 9. On 3 June 2005 the applicant’s pre-trial detention was ordered by a court. 10. On 6 June 2005 L. was admitted to the proceedings as the applicant’s second lawyer. 11. On 9 June 2005 the applicant was charged with murder and questioned in the presence of his lawyers. He pleaded not guilty and repeated his previous statement that O. had been shot by accident. 12. On 11 August 2005 the applicant was questioned in the presence of K. The applicant repeated his previous statements. 13. On the same date the applicant and the lawyer K. became aware of the results of a number of forensic examinations in the case. They made no observations in this connection. 14. On 17 November 2005 criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant for illegal production, possession and storage of firearms. On the same day the applicant was charged with the above offence and questioned in the presence of K. Those proceedings were subsequently joined to the murder case against the applicant. 15. On 16 January 2006 the case was referred to the Kyiv City Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”) for trial. Throughout the trial the applicant denied the murder charge and consistently claimed that O. had been shot by accident. 16. On 19 May 2006 the Court of Appeal, acting as a first-instance court, found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to fifteen years’ imprisonment. The court found that on 27 May 2005 the coordinating council of the Ukrainian Dental Association had held its meeting in Kyiv and the applicant had run for the position of acting executive director of the Association. The victim, O., had proposed another candidate for the same position and that candidate had been elected. The applicant had therefore decided to take revenge and had come to the office of O. with a shotgun and fired twice at O.’s head. The applicant had also been found guilty of modifying the shotgun in question prior to the incident. 17. The Court of Appeal noted that although the applicant had never pleaded guilty and had claimed that the incident had been an accident, his guilt was proved by the testimonies of witnesses and the results of forensic examinations. In particular, O.’s wife had testified that she had been in the neighbouring office when the incident had taken place and when she had entered her husband’s office she had seen the applicant smiling with satisfaction. She had also maintained that her husband had not liked hunting and therefore would not have accepted a shotgun as a present. The negative attitude of O. to hunting had also been confirmed by his brother. O.’s secretary and one of his colleagues had also confirmed that the applicant had been smiling when they had entered the office after the incident. 18. Several witnesses had also confirmed that the applicant had shown dissatisfaction with the fact that he had not been elected to the position of the executive director of the Dental Association. 19. The forensic expert, questioned in the court hearings, had confirmed the conclusions of the examination that the shots had been fired from some distance and not from close range, as the applicant had suggested, given that traces of metals and gunpowder, typically found following close-range shots, had not been found on the victim. The court also noted that the outcome of the ballistic examination as to the distance, trajectory and angle of the entry wounds had not matched the applicant’s version of events. 20. The applicant appealed. He submitted, inter alia, that his defence rights had been violated as he had not been given an opportunity to talk to his lawyer in private before his questioning at the police station on 1 June 2005, with no further details given. 21. On 28 November 2006 the Supreme Court, in the presence of the applicant and his two lawyers, upheld the decision of the Court of Appeal, noting the aggregate of evidence against the applicant. 22. From 5 July 2005 to 25 January 2007 the applicant was detained at Kyiv pre-trial detention centre no. 13 (“the SIZO”). 23. According to the applicant, the facility was often overcrowded with the number of detainees exceeding the number of beds. It was infested with insects, cockroaches and mice. The quality and quantity of food was unsatisfactory. There was only one pair of scissors and one hair clippers for the whole SIZO and they were not disinfected prior to or after use. As a result, the applicant contracted Hepatitis B. 24. From 8 July until 8 November 2005 he was detained in cells nos. 18 and 116 in conditions which were detrimental to his health and incompatible with human dignity. In particular, those cells had no access to natural light as the windows were obscured by metal slats. The walls were permanently wet and covered with mould. The applicant had to share cell no. 116, which measured about 12 square metres, with three other detainees who were heavy smokers. The artificial lighting was not sufficiently powerful with the result that the cells were dim. Their clothes and linen were always wet and cold. 25. On 7 September, 7 and 21 November 2006 the applicant requested that the investigator allow visits from his family but to no avail; the investigator attempted to extort money from him for granting permission to see the relatives. 26. On 5 February and 4 July 2006 the applicant asked the Court of Appeal to allow him to correspond with his relatives but received no answer. He unsuccessfully complained of these matters to the prosecutor’s office on a number of occasions. 27. The applicant was not allowed to visit the SIZO church. His requests to the SIZO governor of 15 July and 1 August 2005 to meet with a priest also remained unanswered. On 6 and 7 September 2005 the applicant further complained to the SIZO administration that his religious literature and some items of a religious nature had been seized by the SIZO staff. On 23 September 2005 a “talk” was held with the applicant by one of the prison staff on account of his complaints during which it was explained to him that nothing untoward had happened. On 1 October 2006 the applicant complained to the Prosecutor General about the violation of his right to practise his religion but received no reply. 28. During his stay at the SIZO the applicant was held in twelve different cells (including cells nos. 18 and 116) and was moved fourteen times. 29. The Government could not provide any information about the number of inmates in the cells at the relevant time or regarding the conditions of the floor, walls and linen because the compulsory period for keeping the relevant documents had expired and the records had been destroyed. 30. They stated that the general detention conditions in the SIZO had been satisfactory and in compliance with the domestic standards: all the cells had had windows and had been equipped with sufficient artificial lighting; the applicant had been provided with adequate nutrition in accordance with the applicable standards. Scissors and other hairdressing implements had been disinfected after each use in accordance with the relevant regulations. That fact had been confirmed by the results of an investigation conducted by the Ministry of Health and the prosecutor’s office following the applicant’s complaints. 31. The Government submitted, having provided the relevant documents, that the applicant had requested family visits before the relevant authorities only on 10 and 20 October and 29 December 2005 and on 11 January and 5 February 2006 and had asked for permission to send correspondence to his relatives on 10 and 27 October 2005 and 5 February and 8 August 2006. All his requests were rejected for security reasons. 32. The applicant had been free to ask the investigator in his case or a court to allow him to meet with a priest but had failed to do so. He had also been entitled by law to possess religious literature and other items of a religious nature and never raised any complaint in this connection either before the SIZO governor or with the prosecutor responsible for observing compliance with the law in the detention facilities. 33. No medical aid was provided to the applicant in respect of his heart and teeth problems. On 3 June 2006 the applicant asked the SIZO governor to conduct a medical examination as he believed he had contracted hepatitis B because of the failure of the SIZO staff to respect hygiene rules. This request was rejected; so was another request for a special diet in view of his possible hepatitis infection. On 2 November 2006 the applicant asked the Minister of Health to order a medical examination in view of his possible hepatitis infection, to no avail. No copies of the mentioned requests have been provided by the applicant. 34. According to the Government, during his stay in the SIZO the applicant never went to the medical unit on account of his suffering from hepatitis B, heart pain or problems with his teeth and never lodged any complaints regarding a lack of medical assistance. His state of health did not necessitate a special diet. 35. Following a liver-related complaint that the applicant was suffering from, he was diagnosed with bile-duct dyskinesia (дискінезія сечовивідних шляхів) and from 20 October to 15 November 2006 he underwent inpatient treatment in the SIZO medical unit. A number of laboratory tests were carried out on the applicant, including a specialised blood test for hepatitis indicators. The latter revealed hBs antigens, which meant that the applicant had hepatitis B antibodies in his blood but not that he had been definitely suffering from the active form of the disease. The applicant was prescribed the relevant treatment (Carsil, Livolin, Alochol, Gastronorm, Ursohol), which he received in full, and at the end of his treatment he was deemed to be in good health. 36. On 1 July 2007 the applicant was transferred to prison no. 72 to serve his sentence. On 11 August 2007 he was diagnosed with hepatitis B. Thereafter he lodged a number of complaints with different State bodies alleging that he had contracted hepatitis in the SIZO owing to the failure to disinfect hairdressing implements, and demanding investigation of this matter. Following his allegations, investigations were conducted by the Health Ministry and the prosecutor’s office, which found no evidence to support the applicant’s allegations. The applicant was informed of the results of the investigation by a prosecutor’s letter of 27 July 2009.

5. The applicant was born in 1988 and lives in Baku. 6. The opposition planned to hold demonstrations on 12 and 26 January 2013 in Baku. 7. No prior notice was given to the relevant authority, the Baku City Executive Authority (“the BCEA”), by the organisers of the demonstrations. Information about the demonstrations was disseminated through Facebook or the press. 8. According to the applicant, the demonstrations were intended to be peaceful and were conducted in a peaceful manner. The participants in the demonstration of 12 January 2013 were drawing the public’s attention to the deaths of soldiers in the army. The participants in the demonstration of 26 January 2013 were condemning the use of force by the police against those who had participated in previous demonstrations. 9. The applicant attended both demonstrations, but shortly after they had begun the police started to disperse the assemblies. In both cases the applicant was arrested during the dispersal operation and was taken to a police station, where he was questioned. 10. In both cases, on the day of applicant’s arrest an “administrative-offence report” (inzibati xəta haqqında protokol) was issued in respect of him. The reports stated that the applicant had committed an administrative offence under Article 298.2 (participation in a public assembly that had not been organised in accordance with the law) of the Code of Administrative Offences (“the CAO”). 11. According to the applicant, he was never served with copies of the administrative-offence reports or with other documents in his case files. In neither case was he given access to a lawyer after his arrest or while in police custody. 12. A statement (ərizə) written by the applicant on 12 January 2013 at the police station and submitted to the Court by the Government showed that in the first case, the applicant had declared that he would defend himself in person. 13. A statement written by the applicant on 26 January 2013 at the police station and submitted to the Court by the Government showed that in the second case the applicant had declared that he did “not need a lawyer because of his financial [situation]”. 14. In the first case, after having been held for a few hours in police custody, the applicant was released, subject to an undertaking to reappear at the police station on 14 January 2013. 15. In the first case, the applicant was brought before the Nasimi District Court on 14 January 2013, the day he reappeared at the police station. In the second case he was brought before the Nasimi District Court on 26 January 2013, the day of his arrest. 16. According to the applicant, the hearing before the court in both cases was very brief. Members of the public were not allowed to attend, even though the court had not taken a formal decision to close the hearing to the public. 17. According to the applicant, in both cases he was not given an opportunity to hire a lawyer of his own choice. 18. A statement signed by the applicant on 14 January 2013 and submitted to the Court by the Government showed that in the first case, the applicant had declared that he did not need legal assistance and would defend himself in person. 19. At the court hearing in the second case, a State-funded lawyer was appointed to assist the applicant. 20. The record of the court hearing in the second case shows that in his oral submissions, the State-funded lawyer briefly stated that there had been elements of the administrative offence in the applicant’s actions, and asked the court to adopt a fair decision. 21. In both cases, the court questioned police officers who had participated in the dispersal operations and police officers who had prepared the administrative-offence reports against the applicant. The police officers testified that the applicant had staged an unauthorised demonstration. 22. In both cases the first-instance court found that the applicant had participated in an unauthorised demonstration. 23. In both cases, by decisions of 14 and 26 January 2013 respectively, the first-instance court convicted the applicant under Article 298.2 of the CAO. The court sentenced him to fines of 500 manats (AZN) and AZN 400 respectively. 24. On unspecified dates the applicant lodged appeals before the Baku Court of Appeal, arguing that his convictions were in violation of his rights because the demonstrations in which he had participated had been peaceful. He also complained that his arrests had been unlawful and that the hearings before the respective first-instance courts had not been fair. 25. In the first case, the applicant was not represented before the Baku Court of Appeal by a lawyer. At the appellate court hearing in the second case the applicant was represented by the same lawyer who had represented him before the first-instance court. 26. In both cases, on 25 January and 6 February 2013 respectively, the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the decision of the first-instance court.

4. The applicant was born in 1948 and lives in Budapest. 5. On 9 March 2006 the applicant submitted a request for an increase of her disability pension before the Budapest Governmental Authority (Directorate of Pension Insurance), which dismissed her claim on 21 August 2006. The applicant lodged an appeal against the decision on 10 October 2006. The Central-Hungarian Regional Insurance Directorate acting as a second-instance authority upheld the first-instance decision on 4 January 2007. 6. The applicant sought the judicial review of the second-instance decision within the statutory time-limit. She submitted her statement of claim on 9 February 2007 to the first-instance administrative authority, in line with the applicable procedural laws. 7. In the absence of any developments in the case, the applicant notified the first-instance administrative authority about upholding her claim on 18 March 2010. The first-instance administrative authority subsequently forwarded the applicant’s statement of claim to the Budapest Labour Court on 20 July 2010. 8. The Budapest Labour Court dismissed the applicant’s claim on 14 June 2011.

5. The applicant was born in 1966. At the time she submitted her complaint she lived in Madona Region, Latvia. 6. On 17 November 2006 the Madona District Court, acting as a first‑instance court, found the applicant guilty of a traffic offence which had caused moderate bodily injury to a victim. The court ordered the applicant to perform 100 hours of community service and suspended her driving licence for a year. 7. In establishing the applicant’s guilt, the first-instance court relied on incriminating statements by the victim and two witnesses. It also relied on other evidence, including a medical expert opinion on the bodily injuries sustained by the victim. 8. The applicant appealed against the judgment to the Vidzeme Regional Court. She alleged, inter alia, that the first instance court had failed to order an inspection and a technical examination of her vehicle, and had also not carried out a confrontation of witnesses. 9. On 13 February 2007 the Vidzeme Regional Court upheld the judgment of the first-instance court but changed in part the punishment by revoking the suspension of the applicant’s driving licence. 10. On 8 March 2007 the applicant submitted an appeal on points of law to the Senate of the Supreme Court. She alleged that the appellate court had failed to carry out and to order a number of investigating activities. Specifically, according to the applicant, the appellate court has not carried out a confrontation between the witnesses and the victim. It has not ordered an investigative experiment, an inspection and a technical examination of her vehicle. 11. The applicant maintained that the evidence in the case was not sufficient to establish her guilt, and thus the appeal court had acted contrary to numerous sections of the Criminal Procedure Law. 12. In a letter dated 11 April 2007 a judge of the Senate of the Supreme Court informed the applicant that on 11 April 2007 her appeal on points of law was not admitted for examination in the cassation proceedings. It relied on section 573 of the Criminal Procedure Law and stated that “[the appeal on points of law] was not substantiated by any fundamental infringement of the Criminal Law or the Law on Criminal Procedure”. It was also stated that it was not within the competence of the cassation court to re-examine or obtain evidence, or to explain the factual circumstances of the case.

5. The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Opfikon. 6. The applicant had been employed as a hairdresser since 1993 and she had compulsory accident insurance under the Federal Law on Accident Insurance (see Relevant domestic law below). On 28 August 1995 she was hit by a motorcycle while crossing the road and fell on her back. She was hospitalised overnight owing to suspected concussion resulting from the impact of her head against the ground. 7. On 2 October 1995 the applicant was examined by a rheumatologist who diagnosed her with a cervical trauma and possible cranial trauma. On 6 December 1995 her family doctor certified that her injuries had resulted in total incapacity for work until the end of the year. 8. On 29 January 1996 the applicant was examined at the Zurich University Hospital. The doctor who examined her predicted that she could make a gradual return to work. Nevertheless, on 12 June 1996 another doctor in the same hospital declared the applicant totally incapable of work. 9. At the request of her insurance company, the applicant’s health was assessed by means of orthopaedic, neurological, neuropsychological and psychiatric examinations by the insurance-disability medical examination centre (COMAI) of St. Gallen. On the basis of the assessment carried out by that centre, the applicant was declared fully capable of work with effect from February 1997. 10. By a decision of 23 January 1997 the insurance company informed the applicant that her entitlement to daily allowances would end on 1 April 1997. 11. On 4 February 1997 the applicant submitted an objection to that decision and enclosed a report of a neurologist, who confirmed an almost permanent headache, limited head movement, pain radiation towards the shoulders and arms with sensory disorders as well as sleep disorders. In addition, the specialist suspected that the applicant had suffered whiplash and that she was affected by a neuropsychological dysfunction. 12. In September 1997 the insurance company rejected the applicant’s complaint finding no causal link between the accident and her health problems. 13. The applicant appealed to the Social Insurance Court of the Canton of Zurich (Sozialversicherungsgericht des Kantons Zürich). 14. In a decision of 24 August 2000, the Social Insurance Court allowed the applicant’s appeal. It overturned the insurance company’s decision and remitted the case for further clarifications. Taking into account the partial contradictions that existed between the different medical reports, the court considered that the consequences of the accident for the applicant’s state of health were not sufficiently established. Moreover, a doubt remained as to whether the applicant had suffered trauma to her neck and spine. The insurance company was thus required to clarify the issue. 15. The insurance company subsequently ordered a multidisciplinary examination, which was conducted by an institute of medical experts in Basel. In their report the experts concluded that the applicant was totally incapacitated in respect of the duties required in her profession. However, the insurance company challenged this report once it found that a doctor who had participated in its preparation had previously carried out a private examination of the applicant in the initial stages of the proceedings. 16. The insurance company therefore ordered another medical report, which was delivered on 11 November 2002. The report observed the existence of a causal link between the accident and the damage to the applicant’s health, and was accompanied by a neuropsychological report, which noted a brain dysfunction subsequent to a head injury. 17. Meanwhile, by a decision of 21 March 2002 the competent social security authority (Sozialversicherungsanstalt) of the Canton of Zurich granted the applicant a full disability pension with retroactive effect. 18. Subsequently, the applicant asked the insurance company on several occasions to comment on its obligation to grant her insurance benefits. 19. On 5 October 2003 another expert report commissioned by the insurance company was prepared solely on the basis of the previous examinations. The medical expert confirmed the existence of a causal link between the accident and the applicant’s health problems, and concluded that the applicant’s illness had led to a total incapacity for work. 20. On 14 January 2005 the insurance company issued a decision confirming the termination of the applicant’s benefits as of 1 April 1997. The applicant lodged a complaint against that decision. 21. On 11 June 2005, another independent physician concluded, solely on the basis of the previously drafted medical reports, that these medical findings were not sufficiently explicit as regards causality. According to him, the applicant’s incapacity for work amounted to not more than 20%. He also strongly criticised the approach and findings of other medical experts. On the basis of this report, on 22 September 2005 the insurance company dismissed the applicant’s complaint on the grounds of lack of a causal link between the accident and her medical conditions. 22. The applicant appealed, arguing that most of the medical reports had found a causal link and that the only report denying the existence of such a link was based solely on medical reports by other experts instead of on a direct examination. 23. On 28 December 2005 the Social Insurance Court recognised the existence of a causal link between the accident and the health problems the applicant complained of, and allowed her appeal. The matter was referred to the insurance company for it to decide on the right of the applicant to insurance benefits. 24. Thereafter, the insurance company invited the applicant to undergo a medical evaluation of her functional abilities, which she refused. The applicant was then issued with a formal notice within the meaning of Article 43 (3) of the Social Security Act inviting her to undergo the said evaluation and warning her about the legal consequences of failing to do so indicated in the said provision (see § 38 below). No mention of the possibility of covert monitoring was mentioned. 25. Thereafter, on 3, 10, 16 and 26 October 2006 the applicant was monitored by private investigators, commissioned by the insurance company. The surveillance was performed on four different dates over a period of twenty-three days and lasted several hours each time. The undercover investigators followed the applicant over long distances. Following the surveillance, a detailed monitoring record was prepared. Pursuant to that report, the applicant appears to have become aware of the secret surveillance on the last day of implementation of the measure. 26. In a decision dated 17 November 2006 the insurance company refused the applicant’s representative access to the surveillance report. The applicant then lodged a complaint with the supervisory authority, namely the Federal Office of Public Health, objecting to the failure to take a decision on her benefits entitlement. 27. On 14 December 2006 the insurance company sent the private investigators’ report to the applicant. The report included the surveillance footage and declared that it considered it necessary to conduct a fresh neurological assessment of the applicant. However, the applicant refused to undergo any further examination and asked for a decision on her benefits to be taken. 28. In a decision of 2 March 2007 the insurance company again refused to grant any benefits to the applicant on the basis of the images recorded during the surveillance and her refusal to undergo a neurological examination. 29. The applicant lodged a complaint against that decision, claiming a pension on the basis of a degree of disability of 100% as well as compensation for damage to her physical integrity. She also asked for the surveillance case file to be destroyed. 30. On 12 April 2007 another neurologist appointed by the insurance company, Dr H., released an anonymous expert opinion based on evidence and drafted taking into account all the medical examinations and assessments carried out previously as well as the surveillance images. He found that the applicant’s incapacity to work amounted to 10%. Furthermore, he estimated the damage to the applicant’s physical integrity at between 5% and 10%. On the basis of the analysis of the surveillance images he concluded that the restriction on her capacity to lead a normal life was minimal. 31. On 14 March 2008 the Federal Office of Public Health gave the insurance company a deadline to decide the applicant’s complaint. By a decision of 10 April 2008, the insurance company rejected the applicant’s request for destruction of the images and decided to grant her daily allowances and a pension on the basis of a disability degree of 10%. 32. On 6 May 2008 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Social Insurance Court claiming compensation for damage to her physical integrity as well as a disability pension based on 70% disability. In addition, she claimed interest at 5% on arrears on the daily allowances remaining unpaid since the accident. She also asked for the expert opinion on the evidence taking into consideration the material resulting from the surveillance be to be removed from her case file. The applicant complained that the surveillance had been “reprehensible and inappropriate” and had constituted an “attack on her personality”. 33. On 29 May 2009 the Social Insurance Court found in favour of the applicant. In particular, it ruled that owing to the lack of legal basis for the surveillance the monitoring record was not admissible as evidence. As a result, it denied any probative value of the expert opinion based on the evidence, which had taken into account the illegal surveillance. Moreover, according to the court’s previous decision of 28 December 2005, the applicant was not required to undergo any further examinations. Therefore, she was entitled to refuse a medical assessment of her functional abilities. 34. The insurance company lodged an appeal against this decision before the Federal Court, criticising in particular the amount of benefits to be granted to the applicant. 35. In its judgment of 29 March 2010, of which the applicant was notified on 19 April 2010, the Federal Court ruled that, in accordance with its earlier jurisprudence (see below § 43), the surveillance of the applicant by private investigators had been lawful and the surveillance file was therefore a valid piece of evidence. After evaluating the surveillance file it found that the medical reports contradicted the images and videos showing the applicant walking her dog, driving a car long distances, going shopping, carrying groceries and opening the boot of the car by moving her arms above her head without noticeable restrictions or unusual behaviour. Moreover, it found that there were discrepancies, not only between the results of the surveillance and the medical reports but also between the medical reports which had been drafted before the surveillance. Finally, the examination of the applicant by a neurologist was necessary and admissible because she had previously refused to undergo an assessment of her functional capacities and a neurological examination, which were required in the circumstances. Accordingly, the Federal Court denied the probative value not only of the medical reports attesting to the applicant’s complete incapacity to work but also of the reports attesting to her incapacity to work of a lesser degree. Therefore, the insurance company had acted correctly in ordering a reassessment of her ability to work through a critical review of all previous medical reports. Following an analysis of this expert opinion report based on evidence, the Federal Court held that its findings were convincing. It quashed the decision of the Social Insurance Court, except for the considerations relating to the interest on arrears. 36. Subsequently the applicant lodged a request with the Federal Court for interpretation of its decision in the light of the established case‑law concerning the probative value of the medical reports. The Federal Court dismissed her request, concluding that she had submitted her application not for the purposes defined in this legal remedy, but rather to argue a violation of Articles 6 and 8 of the Convention.

6. The applicants are owners or co-owners of residential buildings which comprise flats that were or still are subject to rent control. They obtained ownership of the flats by various means, such as restitution, donation, inheritance or purchase. Under the relevant legislation they had to accept that the flats were occupied by tenants with a regulated rent and that they could charge them no more than the maximum amount of rent fixed by the State. The relevant legislation precluded them from unilaterally terminating the leases, or selling the flats other than to the tenants (“the rent‑control scheme”). The particulars of the flats affected by the rent‑control scheme are set out in Appendixes 2‑5 (columns A‑F). 7. The situation of the applicants is structurally and contextually the same as in Bittó and Others v. Slovakia (no. 30255/09, 28 January 2014 (merits) and 7 July 2015 (just satisfaction) and three subsequently decided cases concerning the rent control‑scheme in Slovakia (Krahulec v. Slovakia, no. 19294/07; Bukovčanová and Others v. Slovakia, no. 23785/07; and Rudolfer v. Slovakia, no. 38082/07, all adopted on 5 July 2016). 8. It is in dispute between the parties in the present case what amount of rent the applicants would be able to receive by letting their flats under free‑market conditions. By extension, that disagreement translates into an argument over the proportion of the market rent that the regulated rent represents. 9. In that connection, the Government submitted an expert’s opinion drawn up in 2010 in relation to all four applications (“the Government’s expert opinion”), according to which the monthly free-market rent for flats comparable to the applicants’ was between 6.13 and 6.48 euro (EUR) per sq. m in the municipality of Bratislava-Staré Mesto and EUR 5.05 and 5.35 per sq. m in the municipality of Bratislava-Nivy. The regulated rent in the flats owned by the applicants ranged between EUR 0.80 and 1.7 per sq. m. According to those calculations therefore, the regulated rent of the flats possessed by the applicants corresponded to some 14-26% of the market rent in 2010. The relevant data are set out in Appendixes 2‑5 (columns G‑I). 10. The applicants for their part relied on different sources of information to support their contention that the regulated rent was disproportionately low compared with similar flats to which the rent-control scheme did not apply. The data submitted by them are set out below separately in relation to each application. 11. The applicants maintained that in 2007 the regulated rent ranged between EUR 76 and 84 a month whereas the average free-market rent for comparable flats in a similar location was EUR 956 a month. They submitted an expert’s opinion which showed that the difference between the general rental value of the property and the regulated rent they actually received was EUR 88,431.53 for the period between 2000 and 2011. 12. The applicants submitted that in 2010 the regulated rent for their flats amounted to EUR 95 and 105 a month, whereas the monthly free-market rent for comparable flats was EUR 616. They relied on data from the National Association of Real Estate Agencies (“the NAREA”). Depending on the period and the relevant law in force, the regulated rent represented some 5-13% of the market rent for comparable flats in the area. They further submitted that the sum which they and the other co‑owners had invested in repairing the building was ten times the income they obtained from letting the flats under the rent‑control scheme. 13. In 2008 the applicant was allowed to charge a monthly rent of EUR 40 to 60 for each of his flats. He submitted that the market rent in the same area in 2005 was between EUR 305 and EUR 366 a month for the single-room flat and between EUR 396 and EUR 488 a month for the two-room flats. He relied on information about average rental prices published in the press. 14. The applicants submitted that the regulated rent for their flats ranged between EUR 38.5 and 104 a month in 2010. Relying on data from the NAREA, they maintained that the market rent for comparable flats in the area amounted to approximately EUR 616 a month.

4. The applicant was born in 1973 and lives in Ceske Budejovice (Czech Republic). 5. On 26 August 1998 the Wels Regional Court (Landesgericht) issued an arrest warrant against the applicant, as he was suspected, inter alia, of having committed aggravated fraud on a commercial basis in several countries together with numerous other suspects, and of being a member of a criminal organization. 6. On 12 September 1998 the applicant was arrested in Germany and extradited to Austria on an unspecified date. He remained in detention on remand until 23 July 1999. 7. On 14 January 1999 the Wels Public Prosecutor’s Office (Staatsanwaltschaft) filed a bill of indictment against the applicant. The applicant’s objection against it was dismissed by the Linz Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht) on 26 March 1999. 8. On 13 January 2003 the applicant filed a request under section 91 of the Courts Act (Gerichtsorganisationsgesetz) for the setting of a time-limit (Fristsetzungsantrag) in order to accelerate the proceedings. Thereupon, the Wels Regional Court held a first hearing on 25 March 2003. 9. On 29 October 2003 the court decided to separate the proceedings against the applicant from those against the other accused. 10. On 9 December 2003 the applicant requested that the trial against him be resumed. An oral hearing was held on 5 May 2004. 11. In March and July 2004 the applicant filed further requests under section 91 of the Courts Act. 12. On 6 December 2004 the applicant lodged an application with the Court (no. 127/05), complaining under Article 6 of the Convention about the length of the criminal proceedings against him. On 9 June 2008 the applicant and the Government agreed on a friendly settlement of that case against a payment of 12,300 euros (EUR) by the Government. Consequently, the Court decided to strike application no. 127/05 out of its list of cases (see Benes v. Austria (dec.) no. 127/05, 8 July 2008). 13. On 4 September 2008, following the issuance of the above‑mentioned strike-out decision, the applicant requested the Wels Regional Court to discontinue the proceedings against him, or in the alternative to set a new date for a hearing as soon as possible. 14. On 15 April 2009 the Wels Regional Court held another oral hearing. The applicant failed to attend because he had fallen ill. During that hearing, the public prosecutor lodged the request that another expert opinion be obtained, to which the Wels Regional Court acceded. 15. The following oral hearing was set for 21 October 2009, but was cancelled because the court-appointed expert had informed the court that he would need three to five more weeks to finalise his opinion. Following an urgent reminder which the Wels Regional Court had sent to the expert, it learned on 18 October 2010 that the expert had passed away. On 1 September 2011 a new expert was appointed. 16. On 1 September 2011, 17 November 2011 and 13 December 2012, the applicant filed further requests under section 91 of the Courts Act, which were dismissed by the Linz Court of Appeal on 7 November 2011, 1 February 2012 and 2 January 2013 respectively. In its last decision, the Court of Appeal observed that the expert opinion had been finalised and submitted to the trial court on 19 December 2012. 17. On 28 May 2013 the Wels Regional Court acquitted the applicant from all charges, partly because his guilt could not be proven, partly because the public prosecutor had withdrawn the indictment.

5. The first applicant, Ms Jenőné Barcza, was born in 1962 and lives in Solymár; the second applicant, Ms Jánosné Básits, was born in 1957 and lives in Dunabogdány; the third applicant, Mr László Pávai, was born in 1930 and lived in Leányfalu. 6. The applicants were co-owners of a vacant plot of land situated in the urban area of the municipality of Leányfalu. It was originally designated as non-agricultural land and registered under plot no. 2733. 7. On an unspecified date, the Central Danube Valley Directorate of Water Management (Közép-Duna-völgyi Vízügyi Igazgatóság) established a protection zone for the water reserve of Leányfalu municipality. According to this decision, the applicants’ property, together with other plots of land, formed part of the protection zone. The administrative decision ordered the owner of the protected water reserve, the Hungarian State, to make an offer compensating the owners of the plots of land within the protection zone within sixty days. 8. On 16 December 2002 the General Directorate of Water Management (Országos Vízügyi Igazgatóság) upheld the first-instance decision on the establishment of a protection zone for the municipality’s water reserve. The decision also required that if the owner of the protected water reserve was different from that of the land in the protection zone, the owner of the protected water reserve had the obligation to acquire ownership of the land in the protection zone, either through expropriation or through a sale and purchase agreement (see paragraphs 24 and 25 below). That decision also quashed the obligation to proceed with compensation for the landowners within sixty days. 9. By a decision of 4 October 2005 the Szentendre District Land Registry redesignated the applicants’ plot of land as an “inner protection zone”. 10. Under the law, owners of land within the water protection zone were under an obligation to refrain from any activity that could endanger water quality or lead to pollution and from constructing any facility that did not serve the purposes of the water reserve. Moreover, they were obliged to allow the use of their property for any work necessary for the maintenance of the water reserve (see paragraph 25 below). 11. On 16 November 2005 the owners of the plots of land within the protection zone addressed a letter to the Treasury Asset Management Directorate (Kincstári Vagyoni Igazgatóság), the trustee of the water reserve, offering their plots of land for sale and asking the Directorate to make an offer. 12. The Directorate transferred the request to the Central Danube Valley Inspectorate for Environmental Protection, Nature Conservation and Water Management (Közép-Dunavölgyi Környezetvédelmi és Vízügyi Igazgatóság), which, due to lack of jurisdiction, returned the case to the Directorate on 13 December 2005, informing the Ministry of Environment Protection and Water Management about the measure. On 12 April 2006 the Ministry instructed the Danube Regional Waterworks Inc. (Duna Menti Regionális Vízmű Zrt.), the managing body of the water reserve, that the expropriation fell within the Waterworks’ competence. 13. Meanwhile, in proceedings initiated by some of the landowners, the Pest County Regional Court established that the Treasury Asset Management Directorate was under an obligation to proceed with the expropriation. Accordingly, the applicants made a new representation to the Ministry on 31 October 2007, asking it to make an offer within thirty days of receipt of the letter. 14. On 18 February 2008 they re-submitted their request to the Central Directorate for Water and Environment (Vízügyi és Környezetvédelmi Központi Igazgatóság), the body appointed by the Ministry for further decision-making. 15. On 11 August 2008 the owners of the plots of land, including the applicants, asked the Central Hungarian Regional Administration Office (Közép-magyarországi Regionális Közigazgatási Hivatal) to instruct the Ministry to proceed with the expropriation by setting a time-limit. 16. Their request was dismissed on 11 August 2008. According to the Administration Office, the owners had first requested the expropriation of their properties on 31 October 2007, thus the statutory three-year period during which the Ministry could acquire the property had not expired. The owners sought judicial review of this decision. 17. By a decision of 22 October 2009 the Pest County Regional Court overturned the administrative decision and remitted the case to the Administration Office, stating that the three-year period had expired since the expropriation proceedings were initiated, on 16 November 2005, at which time the claimants had offered their plot of land for sale. 18. On 2 December 2008 the Danube Regional Waterworks informed the applicants that any measure concerning the ownership of the disputed plot of land fell within the competence of the State. 19. On 19 January 2009 the Central Directorate for Water and Environment informed the applicants that it had appointed a limited liability company to prepare the sale and purchase agreements and the documents necessary for the expropriation by 29 May 2009. 20. On 27 January 2009 the limited liability company forwarded a purchase offer for the acquisition of the applicants’ plot of land for 3,974,000 Hungarian forints (HUF – approximately 13,000 euros (EUR)). The applicants disputed the amount of the compensation; nevertheless, the case file indicates that they never received an answer to their submissions. 21. On 14 December 2010 the Pest County Governmental Office (Pest Megyei Kormányhivatal) (the legal successor of the Central Hungarian Regional Administration Office) ordered National Asset Management Inc. (Magyar Nemzeti Vagyonkezelő Zrt) (the legal successor of the Treasury Asset Management Directorate) to serve an expropriation notice on the land owners within ninety days of receipt of the decision. This did not take place. After the deadline had passed the applicants applied to National Asset Management Inc. seeking the enforcement of the compulsory expropriation decision. The application was granted by the Government Office; despite this National Asset Management Inc. did not respond to any of the measures taken by the Government Office. Accordingly, the Government Office proceeded with the expropriation of its own motion, commissioning an expert opinion and holding hearings. 22. Finally, the decision on the expropriation of the applicants’ plot of land was issued by the Government Office on 16 December 2011, establishing the amount of compensation at HUF 39,170,000 (approximately EUR 126,000). The applicants received the compensation on 27 January 2012.

4. The applicants were prosecuted in Russia for crimes. They were arrested and detained while the crimes were investigated and pending trial. Their detention was ordered and extended by the courts. The detention orders were essentially based on the gravity of the charges, the primary grounds being the risk of the applicants’ absconding and interfering with the course of justice. The detention and extension orders used stereotypical formulae, without addressing specific facts or considering alternative preventive measures. 5. The first applicant was born on 20 August 1983 and lived, prior to his arrest, in Yekaterinburg, Sverdlovsk Region. The applicant was arrested on 30 March 2005 on suspicion of fraud and placed in detention. He remained in custody pending investigation and trial. 6. On 19 April and 14 July 2006 his pre-trial detention was extended. His appeals against these detention orders were considered on 23 July and 3 November 2006 respectively. The applicant and his lawyer did not attend the hearing on 19 April 2006. 7. On 23 October 2006 the Leninskiy District Court of Yekaterinburg convicted the applicant of fraud and sentenced him to three years’ imprisonment. 8. The second applicant was born on 2 November 1972 and lived, prior to his arrest, in Vorkuta, Komi Republic. The applicant was arrested on 14 January 2008. He remained in custody pending investigation and trial. 9. On 5 June and 2 September 2009 the applicant’s pre-trial detention was extended. His appeals against these detention orders were examined on 24 July and 30 October 2009. The applicant and his lawyer were not present at the hearings on 24 July, 2 September and 30 October 2009. 10. On 6 November 2009 the Vorkuta Town Court of the Komi Republic convicted him of drug dealing and sentenced him to fourteen years and nine months’ imprisonment and a fine. 11. Having regard to the similarity of the main issues under the Convention in the above cases, the Court decides to join the applications and examine them in a single judgment.