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6. The applicant was born in 1977 and lives in Balashikha, a town in the Moscow Region. 7. From 2008 the applicant lived together with A.D. in an extramarital relationship. 8. They separated shortly after A.D. became pregnant in autumn 2009, but continued to maintain regular contact. 9. On 6 July 2010 A.D. gave birth to a baby girl, P. The applicant had regular contact with the child. 10. In January 2011 A.D. started avoiding communication with the applicant and preventing him from visiting the child. 11. On 6 June 2011 the applicant brought a claim seeking the establishment of his paternity of the child and the determination of the terms of his contact with the latter. 12. On 25 June 2012 the Nagatinskiy District Court of Moscow (“the District Court”) discontinued the examination of the applicant’s claim in so far as it concerned the determination of his contact rights. The District Court reasoned that such claims could only be brought by one of the child’s parents, whereas on the date of its examination of the claim in question the applicant’s paternity of the child had not been established. 13. On the same day the District Court established the applicant’s paternity of P. 14. On 20 December 2012, following an appeal by A.D., the Moscow City Court (“the City Court”) quashed the judgment of 25 June 2012 establishing the applicant’s paternity of the child and dismissed the applicant’s claim. 15. On 4 October 2013, following an appeal by the applicant, the Presidium of the City Court, under the cassation procedure, quashed the judgment of 25 June 2012 and the appeal decision of 20 December 2012 and remitted the case to the District Court for fresh examination. 16. On 13 November 2013 the District Court left unexamined the applicant’s claims in view of new proceedings instituted by the applicant (see below). 17. On 29 October 2013 A.D.’s partner, A.K., was registered as the child’s father. 18. On 11 November 2013 the applicant challenged the registration of A.K. as the child’s father, seeking that his own paternity of the child be established and that his contact rights with the latter be determined. 19. On 24 January 2014 the District Court ordered that A.K.’s registration as the child’s father be annulled, established the applicant’s paternity of the child, and held that contact between the applicant and his daughter should take place at A.D.’s place of residence on the first Saturday and second Sunday of every month from 11 a.m. until 5 p.m. 20. On 28 July 2014 the City Court upheld the judgment of 24 January 2014 following an appeal by A.D. and A.K. 21. On 5 December 2014, after failed attempts to persuade A.D. to comply with the judgment of 24 January 2014 ‒ as upheld on appeal on 28 July 2014 ‒ the applicant applied to the Tsaritsynskiy District Bailiffs’ Service in Moscow (“the district bailiffs’ service”) for the institution of enforcement proceedings. 22. On 12 December 2014 a bailiff from the district bailiffs’ service declined to institute such enforcement proceedings, because the operative part of the judgment did not oblige A.D. to carry out or to abstain from certain actions. 23. On 4 February 2015 the applicant lodged a claim challenging the lawfulness of the above-mentioned decision. 24. On 18 March 2015 the District Court dismissed the applicant’s claim. 25. On 6 July 2015 the City Court quashed the above-mentioned judgment, holding that the decision of 12 December 2014 declining to institute enforcement proceedings had been unlawful. 26. On 10 August 2015 a bailiff from the district bailiffs’ service instituted enforcement proceedings in respect of the judgment of 24 January 2014. 27. On 17 August and 24 August 2015 the bailiff telephoned A.D. On the former date A.D. answered the phone. She was informed of the institution of the enforcement proceedings and summoned to appear before the bailiff on 20 August 2015. On the latter date the bailiff telephoned the same number, only to be answered by a woman who told the bailiff that the telephone number did not belong to A.D., after which she hung up. 28. On 6 October 2015 the enforcement proceedings were transferred from the district bailiffs’ service to the newly created Inter-district Department of Bailiffs for the Recovery of Child Maintenance Payments of the Federal Bailiffs’ Service of Russia for Moscow (Межрайонный отдел судебных приставов по взысканию алиментных платежей № 1 УФССП России по г. Москве, “the Inter-district Department of Bailiffs”). 29. On 30 October 2015 a bailiff of the Inter-district Department of Bailiffs decided to accept the proceedings for enforcement. 30. On 30 October and 10 December 2015, and on 12 February and 25 July 2016 the bailiff sent A.D. notices of enforcement of the judgment of 24 January 2014. 31. On 4 December 2015 the bailiff several times called A.D.’s telephone number, but nobody answered. 32. On 7 December 2015 the bailiff again made calls to A.D.’s telephone numbers. One call was answered by a woman who introduced herself as A.D.’s mother and refused to answer any questions. 33. Over the course of 2015 the applicant lodged multiple complaints concerning the inactivity of the the Inter-district Department of Bailiffs to various authorities, including the Inter-district Prosecutor’s Office, the head of the Federal Department of Bailiffs’ Service for Moscow, and the Ombudsman for Children. 34. On 14 February 2016 a bailiff visited A.D.’s presumed place of residence. The door was opened by A.D.’s mother, to whom the bailiff handed a notice of enforcement of the judgment of 24 January 2014. She told the bailiff that she was unaware of her daughter’s whereabouts and that A.D. would not give the child to the applicant. 35. On 17 February 2016 the bailiff received a declaration by A.D., in which she stated that she was not going to let the applicant contact the child as the child did not wish to have such contact. 36. On 2 March 2016 the bailiff sent enquiries to kindergarten no. 1457 in Moscow, the Moscow City Children’s Polyclinic no. 23, the Public Services Centre of the Biryulyovo Vostochnoye District, and the Social Protection Administration for the Biryulyovo Vostochnoye District in order to establish, respectively, whether the child attended the kindergarten, was receiving medical services, and lived with A.D. at the address visited by the bailiff. 37. On 2 March, 17 March and 11 April 2016 the bailiff took decisions to involve a psychologist in the enforcement proceedings. 38. According to the Government, on an unspecified date the bailiff imposed an execution fee on A.D. for her failure to comply with the judgment of 24 January 2014 and warned her of her administrative liability[1] for not complying with that judgment. 39. On 29 April 2016 the bailiff obtained A.D.’s written declaration. A.D. submitted, in particular, that on 14 March 2016 she brought a claim before the District Court to challenge the applicant’s paternity, to withdraw his parental rights and restore A.K.’s parental authority (see 49 below). She furthermore submitted that she could not comply with the judgment of 24 January 2014 since the child strongly objected to having any contact with the applicant. 40. Meanwhile, at the applicant’s request, in June 2016 the Inter-district Department of Bailiffs appointed another bailiff to oversee the enforcement proceedings. 41. In accordance with requests lodged by A.D. on 28 April and 28 July 2016, on the latter date the District Court suspended the enforcement proceedings in respect of the judgment of 24 January 2014, pending the outcome of the proceedings initiated by A.D. on 14 March 2016. 42. Following an appeal by the applicant, on 30 September 2016 the Moscow City Court found the decision of 28 July 2016 to suspend the enforcement proceedings unlawful and unsubstantiated and quashed it. 43. According to the Government, on 3 November 2016 the bailiff imposed an administrative fine on A.D. under Article 5.35 § 2 of the Code of Administrative Offences of the Russian Federation for her non‑compliance with the judgment of 24 January 2014[2]. 44. On 12 December 2016 the bailiff adopted a decision temporarily restricting A.D.’s travel outside the Russian Federation. 45. On 4 February 2017 in the course of the enforcement proceedings the applicant met his daughter for the first time since January 2011. According to the applicant, despite the difficult environment of the meeting, the child was willing to communicate. 46. Subsequently, the applicant tried to see his daughter on 12 February and 4 March 2017 (the second Sunday and the first Saturday of the month respectively); he was unaccompanied by the bailiff. On the first occasion A.D. prevented the applicant from seeing the child; on the second occasion neither she nor the child were present at their place of residence at the scheduled time. Reports of these events were submitted by the applicant to the police and the bailiff. 47. On 12 March 2017 the applicant again came to see his daughter; this time he was accompanied by a bailiff. A.D. brought the child into the applicant’s presence to talk with him; however, she turned the child against the applicant and asked her to decide whether she needed to have any relations with the applicant. The child replied that she refused to communicate with the applicant. A report of this was drawn up by the bailiff. 48. The case file contains no information about the further course of the enforcement proceedings. 49. On 14 March 2016 A.D. brought an action before the District Court seeking to recover child maintenance from the applicant, to terminate his parental rights and to restore the parental rights of A.K. 50. The case file contains no further information on the outcome of those proceedings.

7. The applicants are Syrian nationals. Their initials, dates of birth, application numbers and the other details of their cases are set out in the Appendix. At the time of lodging their applications the applicants were detained at detention centres for foreign nationals run by the Federal Migration Service (hereinafter “the FMS”) in different towns in Russia. 8. The facts of the cases, as submitted by the applicants, may be summarised as follows. 9. On various dates between 2012 and 2016 the applicants came to Russia on various visas and did not leave when the period of their stay had expired. They were apprehended by the police and/or officers of the FMS in various regions in Russia for breaching the applicable immigration regulations, and placed in detention centres for foreigners (see the Appendix for the applicants’ dates of detention and details of the relevant proceedings). The domestic courts in the respective regions examined their cases and found the applicants guilty of breaching various immigration regulations. Some of the applicants lodged appeals, but they were rejected by the domestic courts, whereas other applicants eventually had their expulsion orders quashed by the appeal courts. One of the applicants did not appeal against his expulsion order (see the Appendix for the details of individual cases) 10. All the applicants sought to obtain refugee status and/or temporary asylum in Russia. Some of the applicants voluntarily withdrew their requests and others’ requests were rejected, first by the FMS and then by the domestic courts which examined the appeals against the FMS’s refusals. Only Y.A.’s request for temporary asylum was granted (see the Appendix for details). 11. According to the information provided by their lawyers, while the proceedings before the Court were ongoing, six of the applicants (M.S.A., R.K., H.R., B.Z., S.W. and A.A.) left Russia of their own volition on various dates to go to third countries, where they settled (see the Appendix for details). 12. Between 24 January 2014 and 10 June 2014 M.S.A. and R.K. were detained in a detention centre for foreign nationals run by the FMS in Krasnoye Selo, in the Leningrad Region. 13. According to their submissions, the centre was based in an eight-storey building with windows covered with grills; five of the storeys were designed to accommodate 176 people in total. Each storey comprised around ten to eleven cells. The centre was severely overcrowded during the whole period of the applicants’ detention. In particular, according to a report of the Human Rights Ombudsman in Saint Petersburg, on 26 February 2014 the centre accommodated 400 foreign nationals. 14. Both applicants were detained in cell no. 511, located on the fifth storey, which measured around 9 square metres and was designed to accommodate six people. All places in the cell were occupied during the whole period of their detention. Thus, each detainee had no more than 1.5 square metres of personal space, despite the statutory requirement that each detainee in a detention centre for foreign nationals have at least 4.5 square metres of personal space. The cell was furnished with three bunk beds and two bedside tables. There was no dining table in the cell. 15. The food was of poor quality, with no fruit or vegetables, and included pork, which the applicants could not eat for religious reasons. No alternative food was offered instead of pork, so they were deprived of any meal when pork was served. There were no kitchen and dining facilities in the centre. Food was delivered to the centre in containers and served cold in the cells. Detainees were forced to eat on their beds because there were no tables in the cells. This shortage in food was exacerbated by arbitrary restrictions on the contents of food parcels delivered from outside. Detainees were not allowed to receive fermented milk products, home‑cooked food, fruit or vegetables. 16. Detainees had no free access to drinking water or devices to boil tap water. The cell where M.S.A. and R.K. were detained was only lit by one light bulb, and the detainees were not allowed to switch on the light after 10 p.m. 17. The applicants and other inmates could move around on that storey to get to sanitary facilities, but they were not allowed to leave the storey or enter other detainees’ cells. At the two ends of the common corridor there were bathrooms, each equipped with three lavatories, two washbasins and two showers. The storey was under the control of a dozen “chosen” inmates who, with the tacit consent of the centre’s administration, dictated their rules to others and created an atmosphere of fear, violence and extortion. One of the bathrooms was for their exclusive use. The other seventy to eighty inmates had to use the other bathroom. 18. Outdoor exercise was sporadic and lasted around 15-20 minutes. In winter, the applicants did not go outside, as they did not possess winter clothes. In the period April-May 2014 they were able to enjoy outdoor exercise only four times. Outdoor exercise took place in a closed yard measuring around 50 metres in length and 10 metres in width. There was gravel on the ground, and there were no benches, plants or sports equipment. 19. The facility did not offer any activities, and no library was available. 20. During the administrative hearing concerning his removal from Russia on 26 February 2016, H.R. was not represented by a lawyer. 21. According to the lawyer representing B.Z., H.D. and S.W., on 25 March 2015 he was not allowed to meet with them in the detention centre.

5. The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Sofia. 6. The applicant was employed as a police officer in 1977. After having participated in several international missions, in 2001 he applied for a position as police observer in a new mission. This necessitated an assessment of his psychological suitability, which he underwent at the Ministry of the Interior’s Psychology Institute (hereinafter “the Institute”) on 1 September 2001. 7. The result of the assessment was negative and the applicant was not included in the contingent to be sent to the international mission. 8. The applicant complained of the negative result of his psychological assessment to the head of the Institute, but was informed, in a letter dated 1 February 2002, that a check-up had shown that the assessment had been objective and correct. In an explanatory note sent to the head of the Institute in relation to that check-up the psychologist who had carried out the assessment explained that during his interview with the applicant he had informed the latter of the results of the assessment in a “clement manner”, and that the applicant had been able to pose questions and to comment. 9. After the negative outcome of the assessment, on 1 March 2002 the applicant retired from service. The parties have not specified whether he would have been able to continue working for the Ministry of the Interior at a different position. 10. Despite having formally retired, after the expiry of the statutory time-limit of one year the applicant was allowed to undergo a fresh psychological assessment at the Institute, in relation to the preparation of a new international police mission. The new psychological assessment was conducted on 11 October 2002, and the Institute psychologists concluded once again that the applicant was psychologically unfit for the job. Thus, the applicant’s application to join the new mission was rejected. 11. The applicant complained of this outcome to the Minister of the Interior and other bodies, such as the parliamentary commission on internal security and public order and the President of the Republic. The human resources department of the Ministry of the Interior informed him, in a letter dated 29 January 2003, that the refusals to include him in the international contingents had been lawful. 12. On 12 February 2003 the applicant applied under the Protection of Personal Data Act (see paragraph 22 below) to receive access to the documents contained in his personnel file at the Ministry of the Interior. He argued that the file contained data which could be considered personal for the purposes of this Act, including “appraisals, the results of different tests, data from psychological assessments”. 13. In the subsequent administrative and judicial proceedings, as described below, the competent national authorities did not refer to any individual documents or a category of documents, but instead referred generally to the information sought by the applicant as “personal data” contained in his personnel file. 14. An initial refusal to allow him access to the file, signed by the head of the Ministry’s human-resources department and dated 2 April 2003, was quashed on 17 November 2003 by the Sofia City Court, as it had not been ordered by the competent body, namely the Minister of the Interior. This conclusion was upheld on 30 July 2004 by the Supreme Administrative Court. 15. On 31 January 2005 the Minister of the Interior issued a decision refusing the applicant access to his personnel file. He relied in general terms on the provisions of section 34(3) of the Protection of Personal Data Act and section 182(7) of the Ministry of the Interior Act, as in force at the time (see paragraphs 22 and 25 below). 16. This refusal was quashed by a three-member panel of the Supreme Administrative Court on 29 July 2005, on the grounds that it had not been reasoned, as it had merely referred to the provisions restricting access to personal data without explaining how they had been relevant to the circumstances of the case and without accounting for the applicant’s own right to access to data concerning him. On 15 August 2006 a five-member panel of the Supreme Administrative Court upheld these findings. 17. In a new decision dated 17 October 2006, the Minister of the Interior refused the applicant access to his personnel file at the Ministry. The Minister relied once again on section 34(3) of the Protection of Personal Data Act, as well as on section 161 of the Ministry of the Interior Act of 2006 (see paragraphs 22 and 26 below). He explained that personnel files of officers contained information on “the enquiries in respect of a person applying to be employed” at the Ministry and information revealing the Ministry’s “structures, positions and functions”. He noted that the first category of information was classed as an official secret, but at the same time mentioned that, in accordance with an internal instruction of the Ministry, officers’ personnel files had to be considered to contain information which was a State secret. It was explained further that even though personnel files also comprised documents which contained no sensitive information, owing to the presence of some classified documents the files had to be classified in their entirety. 18. The applicant applied for judicial review. He explained the circumstances in which he had left the Ministry of the Interior and that he had a “particularly strong interest” to get acquainted with his psychological assessments. He stated furthermore that his application for access to his personnel file concerned his “professional identity”. He argued that the Minister of the Interior had not duly taken into account his right to access to information, that there were no legal grounds to consider the information referred to in the decision as classified, and that in any event, seeing that the applicant had left the Ministry in 2002 and that the relevant time-limits for keeping classified documents representing official secrets had expired, any such documents in his file had had in the meantime to be declassified. 19. In a judgment of 25 March 2008 a three-member panel of the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the application for judicial review. It held that the Minister’s decision was well reasoned, and that the Minister had correctly considered that the information concerned was classified. It pointed out that even though personnel files of police officers also comprised documents which contained no sensitive information, they had to be classified in their entirety due to the presence of some classified documents. 20. Upon appeal by the applicant, in a final judgment of 8 July 2008 the judgment above was upheld by a five-member panel of the Supreme Administrative Court. It endorsed the three-member panel’s reasoning, adding that the declassification of documents could only occur after an express decision of the competent official, despite the expiry of the relevant time-limits. 21. In the proceedings before the Court the Government submitted copies of the applicant’s psychological assessments of September 2001 and October 2002. They bear no security markings.

6. The applicant was born in 1965 and lives in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the time of the introduction of his application, the applicant served a prison sentence in Croatia. 7. During June and July 2008 the Istria Police Department (Policijska uprava istarska; hereafter: “the police”) received several complaints concerning the use of counterfeit euro banknotes in Istria. 8. The video surveillance recordings made in one of the shops where the counterfeit currency was used revealed that a certain C.M. had paid using several counterfeit 100 euro notes. 9. According to a police report dated 21 July 2008, further unspecified investigative police work identified the applicant as the person who had supplied a total of 3,000 counterfeit euros to C.M. The report also claimed that the applicant was expected to return from Bosnia and Herzegovina to Croatia for the purpose of uttering a further 20,000 counterfeit euros and, if that proved to be successful, he would bring a further 200,000 counterfeit euros with a view to uttering them in Istria. 10. Acting on the evidence presented in the police report (see paragraph 9 above), on 21 July 2008 the Pula County State Attorney’s Office (Županijsko državno odvjetništvo u Puli) asked an investigating judge from the Pula County Court (Županijski sud u Puli) to authorise the use of special investigative measures in respect of the applicant, namely tapping his telephone, covertly monitoring him using undercover agents, and conducting a simulated purchase operation. 11. The investigating judge granted the request and on the same day issued an order for the use of special investigative measures. The relevant part of the statement of grounds reads: “The request of the [Pula County State Attorney’s Office] is well-founded. As the materials and information available to the police suggest that there is probably cause to believe that Zoran Grba, a national of Bosnia and Herzegovina, engages in the offence of currency counterfeiting under Article 274 §§ 1 and 2 of the Criminal Code, and given that, in the view of the investigating judge, the investigation cannot be efficiently carried out by other means, or would be extremely difficult, the well-founded request of the [Pula County State Attorney’s Office] should be granted and the requested measures are hereby ordered with regard to Zoran Grba as indicated in the operative part of this order. These measures will be implemented by the police between 21 July and 21 November 2008.” 12. On 6 August 2008 the Pula County State Attorney’s Office informed the investigating judge that the applicant also used another telephone number, and requested an authorisation for the tapping thereof. 13. On the same day the investigating judge granted the request, finding that there were no new facts or circumstances suggesting that the use of the special investigative measures in respect of the applicant should be discontinued. 14. Meanwhile, on the same day, the applicant met an undercover police agent who purchased one counterfeit 100 euro note from him. 15. In the ensuing period several further meetings and contacts between the applicant and the undercover agent took place. On 12 August 2008 the undercover agent purchased 149 counterfeit 100 euro notes from the applicant, and on 17 October 2008 the applicant sold him a further sixty‑four counterfeit 100 euro notes. 16. On 17 November 2008 the police informed the Pula County State Attorney’s Office of the actions taken through applying special investigative measures. The police stated that the applicant’s arrest had initially been planned for 17 November 2008, when he was supposed to come to Croatia for the purpose of selling further counterfeit euro banknotes to an undercover agent but he had postponed that meeting. The police therefore requested an extension of the use of special investigative measures in order to identify and arrest all those involved in the uttering of the counterfeit banknotes and to collect evidence concerning the offence at issue. 17. On 18 November 2008 the Pula County State Attorney’s Office made a fresh request for the use of special investigative measures in respect of the applicant. 18. The investigating judge granted the request and on the same day issued an order extending the use of special investigative measures for a further month. The judge found that the grounds set out in his order of 21 July 2008 remained valid (see paragraph 11 above) and that the information provided by the police suggested that it was necessary to extend the use of special investigative measures in respect of the applicant for a further month. 19. On 19 November 2008 the Pula County State Attorney’s Office asked for corrections to be made to the order in relation to an incorrect phone number in its request of 18 November 2008 and also in respect of the omission of another phone number used by the applicant. The investigating judge granted this request on 21 November 2008. 20. On 22 November 2008 the applicant, accompanied by his brother D.S., met the undercover agent in Solin. On that occasion he sold him 600 counterfeit 100 euro notes for 21,000 euros (EUR). Following the illicit transaction, the applicant and D.S. were arrested by the police. 21. After the arrest the applicant and his car were searched. The police found and seized EUR 21,000 in cash. 22. On 23 November 2008 the police lodged a criminal complaint with the Pazin Municipal State Attorney’s Office (Općinsko državno odvjetništvo u Pazinu) against the applicant on charges of currency counterfeiting. No criminal complaint was lodged against D.S. 23. On the same day the applicant was brought before an investigating judge of the Pula County Court for questioning, during which he remained silent. The investigating judge ordered his remand in custody. 24. The investigating judge also heard D.S. as a witness but he invoked his testimonial privilege as the applicant’s brother and gave no evidence. 25. Following a request for the opening of a judicial investigation in respect of the applicant, on 26 November 2008 the investigating judge questioned the applicant, but the applicant again remained silent. On the same day, the investigating judge opened an investigation in respect of the applicant in connection with suspected currency counterfeiting relating to the four occasions on which he had sold the counterfeit banknotes to the undercover agents. 26. In the course of the investigation, the investigating judge obtained an expert report stating that the 600 banknotes of 100 euro which the applicant had sold to the undercover agents were counterfeit. The judge also decided that the undercover police agents would be questioned under the pseudonyms E.K. and A.B. via video link and with distorted images and sound. 27. On 23 January 2009 the investigating judge questioned the undercover agent E.K. The applicant’s lawyer was present during the questioning. 28. In his statement E.K. said that his first contact with the applicant had occurred sometime in late July 2008, when they had spoken on the phone. According to E.K., he had not told the applicant the reason for calling him, but at the time the applicant had been in Sarajevo so they had been unable to meet. E.K. also explained that following this initial contact, he had met the applicant in a restaurant in Duga Resa at the beginning of August 2008. On that occasion they had started talking about business. The applicant had asked him what he was interested in and E.K. had replied that he had heard that the applicant was offering some good “papers”. The applicant had replied that it was true and asked E.K. what he was really interested in and E.K. had repeated that he had heard that the applicant was offering good “papers”. However, E.K. was no longer able to recall the further details of this conversation with the applicant. E.K. explained that during this first meeting the applicant had sold him a 100 euro note for 300 Croatian kunas (HRK) (approximately EUR 40), which E.K. had accepted. According to E.K., the applicant had also said that if E.K. wished, they could arrange a further purchase of a larger quantity of such banknotes. 29. E.K. stated that eight to ten days following his first meeting with the applicant, they had met again in a car park near Zagreb. On that occasion the applicant had offered E.K. the opportunity to buy a further 15,000 counterfeit euros. E.K. had accepted the offer and had paid EUR 6,000 for the counterfeit euros. E.K. testified that a further meeting with the applicant had taken place in Odra after a phone call from the applicant. On that occasion the applicant had asked E.K. whether he knew anybody who would be interested in the purchase of larger quantities of counterfeit currency and E.K. had replied that he had a friend ‒ in actual fact another undercover agent, A.B. ‒ who would be interested. According to E.K., the next meeting with the applicant had taken place some time in mid‑October 2008 in a restaurant in Lupoglav. E.K. explained that on that occasion he had been accompanied by the second undercover agent, A.B. On that occasion E.K. had bought 6,500 counterfeit euros (it later turned out that the amount was in fact 6,400 euros) from the applicant for EUR 2,500. Following this exchange they had been in contact by phone but they had not met. 30. The investigating judge also questioned the undercover agent A.B. in the presence of the applicant’s lawyer. 31. During his questioning A.B. described the circumstances in which he had first met the applicant in the restaurant in Lupoglav in October 2008 (see paragraph 29 above). According to A.B., the applicant had asked him whether or not he wanted to buy counterfeit currency. A.B. had then expressed interest in doing so and the applicant had stated that he could supply 50,000 counterfeit euros, which he would be prepared to bring to Split. They had then agreed to stay in touch and exchanged phone numbers. A.B. also stated that the applicant had called him in early November 2008 and asked him whether he wanted to buy the counterfeit euros. Afterwards they had had several telephone conversations until the applicant had finally called A.B. and offered him 60,000 counterfeit euros for the price of EUR 21,000. A.B. had accepted that and they had met in a shopping centre in Solin. The illicit exchange had then taken place and the applicant had afterwards been arrested. 32. After completion of the investigation, the investigating judge forwarded the case file to the Pazin Municipal State Attorney’s Office for further examination and a decision. 33. On 17 February 2009 the Pazin Municipal State Attorney’s Office indicted the applicant in the Pazin Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Pazinu) on charges of currency counterfeiting in connection with the four occasions on which he had sold counterfeit euros to the undercover police agents (see paragraphs 14-15 and 20 above). 34. A three-judge panel of the Pazin Municipal Court confirmed the indictment on 10 March 2009 and sent the case for trial. 35. At a hearing on 27 March 2009 the applicant, represented by a lawyer, pleaded not guilty with regard to the first three instances of the alleged uttering of counterfeit notes (see paragraphs 14-15 above), whereas he considered himself “responsible” for the transaction on 22 November 2008 because he had “given in to the inducement” by the police. 36. At the same hearing the Pazin Municipal Court questioned the undercover police agents E.K. and A.B. The undercover agent E.K. stated that he could no longer say who had initiated a meeting specifically for the purchase of the counterfeit currency and he was unable to answer the question whether the applicant should have been arrested as soon as he had sold the first counterfeit 100 euro note to him. E.K. was also unable to say whether he would have been authorised to arrest the applicant. The undercover agent A.B. reiterated the statement he had given to the investigating judge. 37. Following the questioning of the witnesses, the trial bench examined the secret surveillance recordings and asked the police to inform them whether the euros paid for the counterfeit notes at the first three meetings (see paragraphs 14-15 above) had been traced and confiscated. 38. On 6 April 2009 the police replied that they had neither traced the money which had been paid for the purchase of the counterfeits nor confiscated it from the applicant on the first three occasions. 39. A further hearing was held on 16 April 2009, at which the trial bench commissioned a psychiatric expert report concerning the applicant’s mental condition at the moment of the commission of the offences. 40. In the course of his examination by a psychiatrist the applicant explained that he had had serious financial difficulties and that he had needed money urgently. He also stated that he had never before broken the law and had never committed an offence. In summer 2008 an undercover police agent had started contacting him, asking him whether he could supply counterfeit euros. The applicant believed that one of the people in Croatia who owed him money must have given his phone number to the police. As the agent had been very persistent in his calls (he had called him at least fifty times), the applicant had agreed to his request. The applicant had not believed that he was doing anything bad by simply delivering counterfeit money. He explained that he would have never agreed to do it had he not been pressurised by the undercover agent. 41. In his report dated 21 April 2009 the expert witness found that the applicant had had full mental capacity at the time of commission of the offences. 42. On 13 May 2009 a further hearing was held before the Pazin Municipal Court at which the expert witness responded to questions concerning his report. 43. At the same hearing the applicant was questioned but decided to remain silent and not to give any evidence. Following the applicant’s questioning, the trial bench concluded the trial proceedings and heard the parties’ closing arguments. The applicant contended that he had been incited by the police to commit the offences at issue. He argued that it had been the undercover agents who had contacted him first and that their evidence concerning the circumstances of their various contacts had been both incomplete and contradictory. He pointed out that there no audio recordings of his meetings with the undercover agents and it was unclear why had they not arrested him before 22 November 2008 if he had committed an offence on the first three occasions, as suggested in the indictment. 44. On 13 May 2009 the Pazin Municipal Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to five years and six months’ imprisonment. It also confiscated HRK 300 (approximately EUR 40) and EUR 8,500 from the applicant and ordered his expulsion from Croatia. The Pazin Municipal Court held that the four occasions on which the applicant had sold counterfeit currency to the undercover agents should be classified as a repeated offence of uttering counterfeit currency under Article 274 § 1 of the Criminal Code. When sentencing the applicant, the Pazin Municipal Court explained that the applicant’s persistence in uttering counterfeit currency on four occasions, as well the quantity of counterfeit banknotes uttered (81,400 counterfeit euros in total), constituted particularly aggravating factors. With regard to the applicant’s plea of entrapment, the Pazin Municipal Court merely noted that it had no reason to doubt the statements provided by the undercover agents. 45. The applicant challenged the first-instance judgment before the Pula County Court arguing, in particular, that the circumstances of his entrapment had not been properly examined. 46. On 20 October 2009 the Pula County Court quashed the first‑instance judgment and remitted the case for re-examination. It found that the first-instance judgment had been based solely on the undercover agents’ statements about their conversations with the applicant, which was contrary to Article 180 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 47. In the resumed proceedings the Pazin Municipal Court excluded from the case file as unlawful evidence all the undercover agents’ statements about their conversations with the applicant. 48. At a hearing on 18 January 2010 the Pazin Municipal Court again questioned the undercover agents E.K. and A.B. 49. In his statement E.K. explained that he could not judge whether he had contacted the applicant more frequently than the applicant had contacted him. He was also unable to recall the details of his conversation with the applicant when they had first talked over the phone. E.K. also explained that a simulated purchase operation was sometimes carried out just once and sometimes on several occasions. In the case at issue, he had been instructed by his superiors to conduct several such simulated purchases. Moreover, it was for his superior and not him to determine the ultimate aim of the simulated purchase operation. In any case, the aim of such a police operation was to eradicate currency counterfeiting. E.K. was unable to recall who had initiated the meeting in Lupoglav in mid-October 2008 when he had introduced the applicant to the second undercover agent A.B. Nor could he say who had initiated the other meetings. With regard to his first meeting with the applicant, he could not say whether the applicant had had only one 100 euro counterfeit note in his possession or more than one. E.K. answered that it was “[the applicant’s] own business”. 50. In his statement A.B. explained that his meeting in Solin had taken place at the applicant’s initiative and that it was the applicant who had contacted him more frequently than vice versa. A.B. further stated that it was his superior who had the authority to decide whether the simulated purchase would be organised just once or on several occasions. 51. Following the questioning of the undercover agents, the defence asked that C.M. ‒ who was initially identified as the person to whom the applicant had allegedly first supplied the counterfeit euros (see paragraphs 7‑9 above) ‒ be questioned at the trial. The trial bench of the Pazin Municipal Court dismissed the request by the defence as irrelevant and adjourned the hearing in order to examine the recordings of the applicant’s secret surveillance. 52. On 30 March and 27 April 2010 the Pazin Municipal Court examined the recordings of the applicant’s communications and meetings with the undercover agents. It found that there had been eight unsuccessful attempts on the part of the undercover agents to contact the applicant. 53. At a hearing on 27 April 2010 the Pazin Municipal Court heard the parties’ closing arguments. The applicant argued in particular that the police had abused their powers in not arresting him after the first illicit transfer of counterfeit euros and had instead incited him to commit further offences by arranging purchases of larger quantities of counterfeit euros. He also contended that there had never been a reasonable suspicion of his having committed an offence which could have justified the investigating judge’s decision to authorise the use of undercover investigative measures. 54. On the same day the Pazin Municipal Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to five years and six months’ imprisonment. It also confiscated HRK 300 (approximately EUR 40) and EUR 8,500 from the applicant and ordered his expulsion from Croatia. When sentencing the applicant, the Pazin Municipal Court reiterated its previous findings (see paragraph 44 above). 55. With regard to the applicant’s plea of entrapment, the Pazin Municipal Court observed: “In the case at issue, examination of the audio recordings of the phone taps confirmed the circumstances surrounding the communication between the undercover agents and the accused, in particular the intensity of the telephone communications. Taking note of the recorded statements of the undercover agents during their communications [with the applicant], it was established that the purpose of the communications was [organising] a meeting with the accused in order to effectuate a simulated purchase. This court considers that it cannot be said that the undercover agents acted improperly in the sense that by their actions they allowed the accused to develop his criminal activity [or] in any manner incited him to commit an offence. Neither the questioning of the undercover agents nor any other [evidence adduced] suggests that the undercover agents incited the accused to commit an offence in the sense that they offered him some reward or brought him presents or such like. It is true [as was established during the proceedings] that, for instance, between 12 and 16 October 2008 the undercover agent tried to contact the accused eight times on his mobile phone, but this court considers that this was not prohibited nor did it incite the accused to commit criminal acts. Those were attempts to contact the accused in the period which was ‘covered’ by the [investigating judge’s order]. It should be also taken into account that in the period at issue there had already been communication between the accused and the undercover agent.” 56. The applicant challenged the first-instance judgment by lodging an appeal before the Pula County Court. He argued, in particular, that the orders for the use of special investigative measures had not been adequately reasoned, as required under the Code of Criminal Procedure. He also contended that there had been no reason to continue with the use of simulated purchases and the undercover agents’ activities after the first illicit transfer of counterfeit euros in August 2008. All further events had constituted entrapment intended to extend the scope of his criminal activity, which eventually resulted in a more severe sentence. The applicant claimed that such measures could have been justified by the necessity to arrest further individuals involved in the offence, but no activity in that respect had been undertaken in his case. 57. On 24 September 2010 the Pula County Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the first-instance judgment. It held that the investigating judge’s orders for the use of special investigative measures had been properly reasoned as required under the Code of Criminal Procedure. With regard to the plea of entrapment, the Pula County Court observed: “... [The investigating judge] ordered that the [special investigative] measures be implemented between 21 July and 21 November 2008, namely over a period of four months. The investigating judge’s order ... of 18 November 2008 shows that the use of [special investigative] measures was extended for a month from 21 November to 21 December 2008. It is apparent from the order that, in response to an application by the State Attorney’s Office, the investigating judge extended the use of [special investigative] measures for appropriate reasons. It [also] follows from the circumstances of the case that there was probably cause to believe that the accused had uttered counterfeit euros, which suggested the commission of a serious criminal offence (currency counterfeiting). Taking into account the nature of such an offence and the fact that the use of special investigative measures was producing certain results, there were relevant reasons for extending the use of [special investigative] measures under Article 180 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It cannot therefore be said that the conduct of the undercover agents broadened the extent of the criminal activity of the accused. It should be noted that it cannot be claimed that the use of special investigative measures under Article 180 § 1(4) and (5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure can be considered as an incitement to commit a criminal offence. The undercover agent E.K. contacted the accused only after the use of special investigative measures had been ordered and there is therefore no unlawfulness in his conduct. Furthermore, the fact that E.K. first contacted the accused without telling him the reason for the contact, as was established by the first-instance court from the statement of E.K., and the fact that the first meeting took place almost a month later (on 6 August 2008) ‒ when the undercover agent in Duga Resa bought one 100 euro counterfeit note from the accused for the amount of HRK 300 ‒ cannot be considered as an incitement but was a tactical action aimed at gaining the confidence of the accused and further uttering of counterfeit euros. The fact that the undercover agent succeeded in his task is self‑evident, since the accused continued to sell him larger quantities of counterfeit euros for real euros until he was arrested.” 58. On 6 November 2010 the applicant filed a request for extraordinary review of a final judgment before the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske), challenging the findings of the Pula County Court. He contended that the Pula County Court had failed to provide adequate reasoning for its findings concerning the incitement. Specifically, it had not thoroughly examined the circumstances of the applicant’s first contact with the undercover agent when the first instance of incitement had occurred. Furthermore, the Pula County Court had not taken into account the fact that the majority of the contacts with the applicant had been initiated by the undercover agents, and it had not analysed the substance of their discussions, even though they had been duly recorded, as a result of the applicant’s phone having been tapped. In this connection the applicant pointed out relevant parts of the transcript of the phone taps, in particular the part where the undercover agent stated: “Come on, you must definitely come. Don’t you know, ok, we are serious people ...”; or where the applicant stated “I will not bring [it] and that’s it”, after which the undercover agent started inciting him to a criminal act. The applicant also contended that the investigating judge’s orders for the use of special investigative measures had not been properly reasoned, as required under the Code of Criminal Procedure. 59. On 5 April 2011 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s request for extraordinary review of a final judgment, endorsing the reasoning of the lower courts concerning the applicant’s plea of incitement. It found that there was nothing in the conduct of the undercover agents suggesting incitement. It also considered that there had been sufficient basis for the use of secret surveillance and that the orders of the investigating judge had been issued in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 60. On 24 June 2011 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint before the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) reiterating the arguments he had presented before the lower courts. He pointed out in particular that the use of special investigative measures had been authorised contrary to the relevant domestic law as the investigating judge’s orders had not been properly reasoned. In his view, this had infringed his right to respect for his private life and the confidentiality of his correspondence guaranteed under Articles 35 and 36 of the Constitution. The applicant also contended that he had been incited to commit an offence by the undercover agents and that the lower courts had not properly examined his plea of entrapment. 61. On 8 December 2011 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant’s constitutional complaint inadmissible on the grounds that the decision of the Supreme Court concerned neither a determination of his rights and obligations nor a criminal charge against him. 62. The decision of the Constitutional Court was served on the applicant’s representative on 5 January 2012.

4. The applicants were born in 1961 and 1996 respectively and live in Muğla. 5. The first applicant was the husband and the second applicant was the son of Mrs Özlem Gürakın, who died on 3 September 2001. 6. On an unspecified date, the applicants brought compensation proceedings against the Dokuz Eylül University Hospital, alleging that Mrs Özlem Gürakın had been a victim of medical negligence. The applicants further requested legal aid for the court fees. In respect of their legal aid claim, they submitted documents attesting to their poor financial situation. 7. On 13 December 2006 the Izmir Administrative Court rejected the applicants’ legal aid claim, without indicating any specific reasons. They were notified that they had to pay 1,683 Turkish liras (TRY) (approximately 870 Euros (EUR)) in court fees within one month to continue the proceedings and that failure to do so would result in the discontinuation of the proceedings. 8. As the applicants failed to pay the court fees within the time-limit, the İzmir Administrative Court sent a further warning letter to the applicants and ordered them to pay the court fees. 9. On 6 April 2007 the applicants made a second request for legal aid and asked the court to reconsider its former decision. 10. On 20 April 2007 the Izmir Administrative Court once again rejected the applicants’ request and granted them one month to pay the court fees. 11. On 12 July 2007 the court decided to discontinue the proceedings, because the applicants had not paid the necessary court fees.

5. The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Zagreb. He was formerly a lawyer practising in Zagreb. 6. In the context of the use of secret surveillance measures in respect of a vice-president of the Croatian Privatisation Fund (Hrvatski fond za privatizaciju, hereinafter “the Fund”), a legal entity established by the State and tasked with carrying out the privatisation of publicly owned property, the authorities intercepted and recorded a number of the applicant’s telephone conversations and messages. The secret surveillance was carried out on the basis of orders issued by an investigating judge of the Zagreb County Court (Županijski sud u Zagrebu). The reasoning of the relevant orders is outlined in the case of Matanović v. Croatia (no. 2742/12, §§ 11‑13, 4 April 2017). 7. On 16 June 2007 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of corruption involving a number of officials of the Fund and other individuals. 8. Following his arrest, an investigation was opened in the Zagreb County Court (see, for further details, Matanović, cited above, §§ 15-28). 9. On 12 February 2008, upon completion of the investigation, the State Attorney’s Office for the Suppression of Corruption and Organised Crime (Ured za suzbijanje korupcije i organiziranog kriminaliteta – hereinafter: “the State Attorney’s Office”) indicted the applicant and nine other individuals in the Zagreb County Court on charges of bribe-taking, offering bribes, and abuse of power and authority. The applicant was indicted ‒ in his capacity as the lawyer acting for the Vice-President of the Fund ‒ for facilitating the receipt of a bribe of 150,000 euros (EUR) for his client and aiding and abetting the abuse of power and authority by him. 10. During the proceedings the applicant challenged the lawfulness of the secret surveillance orders, arguing that they lacked the requisite reasoning and had been issued contrary to the provisions of the relevant domestic law (see, for further details on the procedural actions taken, Matanović, cited above, §§ 29-63). 11. On 15 May 2009 the Zagreb County Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to three years’ imprisonment. It examined in detail and dismissed the applicant’s arguments regarding the unlawfulness of secret surveillance orders on the grounds that they had been issued by the relevant investigating judge in accordance with the law. The trial court also provided detailed reasoning why it considered that the available evidence provided a reliable basis for the applicant’s conviction. When convicting the applicant, the trial court had relied on the secret surveillance recordings, the statement of an informant, who had been questioned at the trial, the statements of other witnesses, and the evidentiary material available in the file. 12. On 24 and 28 September 2009, the applicant both personally and through a lawyer lodged appeals against the first-instance judgment before the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske). In the appeals, the applicant argued that he had been unlawfully monitored and that his conviction had been based on evidence obtained unlawfully by the use of secret surveillance. He also extensively challenged the factual findings and conclusions of the first-instance court. 13. On 17 February 2010 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal as unfounded, endorsing the reasoning of the first-instance judgment. 14. On 22 April 2010 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint before the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) alleging in particular that he had been placed under unlawful secret surveillance and that the evidence thereby obtained had been used in the criminal proceedings against him. He also extensively elaborated on the alleged deficiencies in the lower courts’ factual conclusions. 15. On 21 February 2012 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s complaints as unfounded, endorsing the reasoning of the lower courts. It also stressed that the applicant had actively participated in the proceedings and that there had been no arbitrariness in the findings and decisions of the relevant courts. 16. The decision of the Constitutional Court was served on the applicant’s representative on 23 February 2012.

5. The applicant was born in 1987 and lives in Rotterdam. 6. The applicant was charged with having, with an accomplice called V., robbed three supermarkets and with having, with two accomplices, mugged someone in the street outside a discotheque. 7. V. made statements to the police admitting his own participation in the supermarket robberies and implicating the applicant in all four crimes. 8. The applicant was tried before the Rotterdam Regional Court (rechtbank). V. was summoned as a witness by the defence. 9. Not being suspected of having taken part in the street mugging, V. could not refuse to give evidence about it; he made a statement to the effect that he had not personally witnessed the robbery but had heard from bystanders that it had been committed by a group that did not include the applicant. 10. V.’s statement disculpating the applicant was not believed by the public prosecutor (officier van justitie) and the court. V. was subsequently charged with perjury (meineed). 11. On 30 August 2006 the Regional Court gave judgment convicting the applicant of all four crimes. It sentenced him to four years’ imprisonment and ordered the execution of a suspended two-week sentence of juvenile detention (jeugddetentie) imposed on a previous occasion when the applicant was still a minor. 12. The applicant lodged an appeal (hoger beroep) with the Court of Appeal (gerechtshof) of The Hague. 13. V. was again summoned as a witness by the defence. As relevant to the case before the Court, he kept silence on all four charges, including the street mugging in relation to which he was by this time being prosecuted for perjury. 14. The Court of Appeal gave judgment on 4 March 2008 convicting the applicant of all four charges. It sentenced the applicant to six years’ imprisonment and, as the Regional Court had done, ordered the execution of the two-week suspended sentence of juvenile detention. 15. The evidence on which the conviction of the fourth charge was based may be summarised as follows: (a) The supermarket manager’s report to the police that his supermarket had been robbed; (b) A statement made to the police by a cashier who had been forced at gunpoint to open her cash register, from which one of the robbers had snatched money and other goods; (c) V.’s confession to the police, in which the applicant was named as co-perpetrator. 16. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law (cassatie) with the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad). As relevant to the case before the Court, he complained under Article 6 § 3 (d) of the Convention of the use made by the Court of Appeal of V.’s statements to the police to ground his convictions even though V. had refused to answer the questions of the defence under cross-examination. 17. The Advocate General (advocaat-generaal) submitted an advisory opinion (conclusie) analysing the case-law of the Court, in particular the Chamber judgment Al-Khawaja and Tahery v. the United Kingdom, nos. 26766/05 and 22228/06, 20 January 2009, and expressing the view that V.’s evidence was “sole and decisive” in respect of the fourth charge but not in respect of the first three charges, for which sufficient other evidence was available. 18. On 5 January 2010 the Supreme Court gave judgment dismissing the applicant’s appeal on points of law. Referring to its own case-law (its judgment of 6 June 2006, ECLI:NL:HR:2006:AV1633, Netherlands Law Reports (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie, “NJ”) 2006, no. 332, its judgment in the Vidgen case; see Vidgen v. the Netherlands, no. 29353/06, § 23, 10 July 2012), it found that the applicant had had sufficient opportunity to cross-examine V. or have him cross-examined. The mere fact that V. had refused to give evidence under cross-examination did not mean that use in evidence of his statement to the police was excluded by Article 6 § 3 (d) of the Convention.

5. The applicant was born in 1983 and lives in Bucharest. 6. According to a police report drawn up on 21 June 2005, the police division responsible for fighting organised crime and drug trafficking (“the police”) received information from an undisclosed source that an individual called “Ursu-Degweed” was a member of a network of dealers that was trafficking drugs in Constanţa. 7. The police initiated an investigation of their own motion. On 21 June 2005 the prosecutor authorised the use of an undercover police agent, who was to be helped by a police informer, D., to follow a lead regarding the applicant’s alleged criminal activities. At the time of the events, the applicant was a student; D. was an acquaintance of the applicant, studying at the same university. 8. D. called the applicant and asked him to provide her with some drugs. She informed him that a common friend, L., could help him to find a dealer, set the price for the drugs and sent the money by mail (postal order) on 23 June 2005. 9. On 25 June 2005 the applicant called D. and set up a meeting at the Constanţa railway station for the same day. The applicant was accompanied by three friends. At about 11.45 p.m., while he was waiting for D. at the railway station, police officers from Constanţa Police, acting in league with the undercover agent and D., approached him. They searched the applicant and found eighteen ecstasy tablets and 0.46 grams of cannabis resin in his possession. 10. In his first statement to the police, given on 26 June 2005, the applicant disclosed that the dealer who had sold him the drugs was called B. and helped the police to set up an operation to catch him in the act of committing a crime. 11. The applicant also stated that D. had called and had asked him to buy twenty ecstasy tablets for her. She had sent the money for the drugs by post and had informed him that a common friend, L., could help him to find a dealer. L. had given him the number of a dealer, B., who had sold him seventeen tablets. He had received two tablets as a gift; he had kept one for himself and had given the other one in exchange for the cannabis resin, found in his possession at the search. He intended to spend his holidays in Constanţa with his friends at D.’s invitation. D. had also promised to offer him accommodation. 12. The applicant maintained his allegations in a statement given in the presence of two lawyers of his choice on 19 July 2005. He added that he had accepted to provide D. with the ecstasy tablets in the hope of having an intimate relationship with her during his stay in Constanţa. 13. On 25 July 2005 the prosecutor’s office committed the applicant for trial on charges of drug trafficking, in violation of Law no. 143/2000 on the fight against drug trafficking and illegal drug use (hereinafter “Law no. 143” – see paragraph 22 below). 14. Several hearings were held before the Constanţa County Court. The applicant denied his involvement in drug trafficking and claimed that he had been entrapped by the police. His lawyers insisted on the importance of hearing evidence from D. 15. On 5 June 2007 the Constanţa County Court convicted the applicant of drug trafficking and sentenced him to one and a half years’ imprisonment suspended on probation. The court dismissed his allegations that he had been entrapped. It confined itself in noting that the activity of the informer, D., had been lawful, without referring to the question whether she had been authorised to act as an undercover agent. The relevant part of its reasoning read as follows: “The applicant’s argument that the informer, D., had incited him to commit the offence could not be retained. The court notes the applicant’s recruitment activity in bars in Constanţa, the undercover informer being a simple client among other clients. The activity performed by the undercover informer was in line with Law no. 143/2000.” 16. The Constanţa County Court did not provide any reasons justifying the fact that, in spite of the applicant’s insistence, D. had not been heard. In convicting the applicant, it relied on his own statements, corroborated by the statements made by the friends who had accompanied him on his trip to Constanţa on 25 June 2005, as well as on reports produced by the undercover agent and the police following the police operation organised on 25 June 2005 when the applicant had been caught in the act of committing a crime. 17. The applicant appealed against the judgment of 5 June 2007. His lawyers reiterated that he had been entrapped by the police and that D. should be heard by the court. They also claimed that D. had not been authorised to be part of the undercover operation. 18. On 22 October 2008 the Constanţa Court of Appeal noted that D. had never given evidence as a witness before the investigating authorities and that her name had only been mentioned in the reports drafted by them. Accordingly, her previous statements could not be read in open court pursuant to Article 327 § 3 of the CCP (see paragraph 23 below). 19. On 24 October 2008 the court dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the County Court’s findings. Without providing any additional reasons, the court simply reiterated that the evidence obtained by using an undercover agent was in accordance with Law no. 143. It did not refer at all to the applicant’s argument that D. had not been heard. 20. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, reiterating his complaints. He claimed that he had been unduly incited by D. to commit the offence of which he had been found guilty and that throughout the proceedings he had not had an opportunity to have her questioned. 21. In a final decision of 4 March 2009 the High Court of Cassation and Justice dismissed the applicant’s appeal as ill-founded. It upheld the reasoning of the two lower courts.

5. The applicant was born in 1978 and lives in Nizhniy Novgorod. 6. On 25 October 2002 the Military Court of the Vladikavkaz Garrison (“the Military Court”) ordered, inter alia, the head of the respondent military institute to re-calculate the period of the applicant’s service, applying the favourable terms of such calculation for a specified period of service. The applicant was also awarded some additional allowances and payments for certain periods. 7. The judgment came into force on 5 November 2002. 8. On 3 March 2003 the Military Court issued a writ of execution. On 4 August 2003 the bailiffs’ service instituted the enforcement proceedings. 9. On 19 September 2003 the enforcement proceedings were terminated and the writ of execution was returned to the applicant, as the debt could not be recovered. 10. On 13 November 2003 the head of the respondent military institute issued Order No. 463 requiring to make payments in accordance with the judgment of 25 October 2002. However, no calculations or payments were made at that time. 11. On 4 February 2005 the applicant submitted the writ of execution to the Federal Treasury. 12. On 18 May 2005 the writ was returned to the applicant on the ground that the judgment obliged an official of an organisation to take certain actions rather than ordered to recover payments from a budgetary organisation. Thus, the writ of execution was to be submitted to the bailiffs’ service. 13. On an unspecified date in 2005 the applicant submitted the writ of execution to the bailiffs’ service. 14. On 14 April 2006 the writ of execution was returned to the applicant from the bailiffs’ service without enforcement. The bailiffs explained that for the applicant to be able to receive the payments under the judgment, he should obtain a writ of execution stating the sum of the debt to be recovered. After that, the writ could be submitted to the Federal Treasury for enforcement. 15. In 2005 in accordance with Order No. 463, the defendant military institute calculated the amounts due to the applicant as follows: the compensation for the supplementary ration for the period from October 1998 until March 2000 –11,341.85 Russian roubles (RUB); allowance for special regime of the service in 1998-2002 – RUB 2,720.1; and special allowance – RUB 327,000. In total: RUB 341,061.95.

5. The applicant was born in 1985 and is currently detained in St Petersburg. 6. He was suspected of involvement in large-scale drug dealing. 7. On 2 February 2011 he was arrested. He remained in custody pending the investigation and trial. 8. On 6 October 2011 the Sovetskiy District Court of Kazan (“the District Court”) received the case file and set the trial date for 19 October 2011. 9. On 19 March 2012 the District Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to nine and a half years’ imprisonment. 10. During the trial, which consisted of sixteen hearings, the applicant was confined in a metal cage in the courtroom. There was no desk inside the cage, only a wooden bench, which made it impossible for him to take notes during the hearings. Armed security guards remained beside the cage dock. The applicant’s lawyer could only approach him with the court’s permission. Any conversations between them had to take place in the presence of the guards. 11. On 10 August 2012 the Supreme Court of the Tatarstan Republic upheld the applicant’s conviction on appeal. The applicant participated in the hearing by videoconference. He was placed behind a floor-to-ceiling metal partition on the premises of the remand prison SIZO-3 of the Tatarstan Republic where he was detained and communicated with the judges via a video link.

5. The applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Oslo. She is a well-known lawyer who mainly deals with criminal and child custody cases. She is married to a businessman and was formerly a talk show host and active participant in public debate. 6. In August and September 2010 the applicant lodged two complaints with the Press Complaints Commission (Pressens Faglige Utvalg) against two publications owned and controlled by Mr Trygve Hegnar: the weekly and daily business newspapers Kapital and Finansavisen. Mr Hegnar also owned and controlled the internet portal Hegnar Online, which focused mainly on business and financial news. 7. All three publications had, from late summer 2010, published articles concerning the applicant’s role and relationship with a wealthy, elderly widow from whom she would inherit. The publications contained direct or indirect suggestions that the applicant had exploited her emotionally or financially. After the widow passed away in 2011, her relatives instituted proceedings against the applicant, challenging the validity of her will. The inheritance case, which the applicant won both at first and second instance (in 2012 and 2014 respectively), was covered extensively in the above publications. 8. The Hegnar Online website featured a forum – at a separate web address, but to which access was given via the online newspaper – where readers could start debates and submit comments. There was no editorial content in the forum; all content was user-generated. It was possible for users to comment anonymously and there was no requirement to register. More than 200,000 comments were posted every month and the debate forum was among the biggest of its kind in Norway. The forum was divided into many subforums, with topic headings such as “Shipping”, “IT”, “Finance”, “Property”, “Media” and “Theme of the day” (“Dagens tema”). 9. On 5 November 2010 a forum thread was started in the subforum “Theme of the day” under the heading “Mona Høiness – the case is growing, according to Kapital” (“Mona Høiness – saken vokser, sier Kapital”), where the original poster wrote only “What is the status?” (“Hva er status?”). The next comment, posted the same day, read “Sexy lady. What is the case about ???” (“Sexy dame. Hva gjelder saken ???”), to which another commenter responded “Money.” At 12.32 p.m. the following day another comment was made, in which the poster claimed to “know someone who knows someone” who had been “lucky to have shagged” the applicant (“Sexy hun da! Kjenner en som kjenner en som knulla henne. Heldiggris” – hereinafter “comment 1”). The thread continued the same day with a commenter writing: “status quo” and “ab absurdo”. The following comment was made the next day: “I read about this case briefly several weeks ago. I now see that Kapital gives it the front page. The conflict relates to an apartment at Frogner + wealthy old lady with whom Høiness has developed a mother-daughter relationship over many years.” (“Leste om denne saken såvidt, for flere uker siden. Ser nå at Kapital gir den forsiden. Striden gjelder en leilighet på Frogner + velstående eldre dame som Høiness har utviklet et mor/datter-forhold til over mange år.”) The next comment read: “Is it Kapital’s Case [(“Saken til Kapital”)] which is growing?”, to which another commenter responded with the wordplay: “It is Hegnar’s thing [(“saken til Hegnar”)] which is growing.” This was followed by the comment “If you are looking for pretty ladies, look at the thread ‘Pride of the nation’”, to which another poster added: “And that about the Marilyn-revelation”. The next day, on 8 November 2010, a new comment was made: “With 100 million at stake it is clear that one would bend the ethical rules a little” (“Med 100 mill i potten er det klart du tøyer de etiske reglene litt”), before another poster asked: “Has she become pregnant, or is she only gaining weight?”, and yet another poster followed with the above wordplay: “Is Hegnar’s stake [(“staken til Hegnar”)] still growing?”. At 5.55 p.m. another commenter wrote: “If I were to s–– her, it would have to be blindfolded. The woman is dirt-ugly – looks like a wh––“ (“Skulle jeg k–– henne måtte det bli med bind for øya. Synes dama er dritstygg – ser ut som en h––” – hereinafter “comment 2”). Thereafter a poster asked: “How old is she now?”, to which the last commenter responded: “She’s 83 by now [(“etter hvert”)]. Time flies!” All the comments were made anonymously and thus the number of possible different posters was unknown. According to a printout made at 7.26 p.m. on 8 November 2010, comment 1 had by then been read 176 times, while comment 2 had been read twelve times. 10. The same day, 8 November 2010, the applicant’s counsel wrote a letter to the Press Complaints Commission, in the course of the proceedings concerning one of the above-mentioned complaints in respect of the coverage of the inheritance case (see paragraph 7 above). The counsel stated, inter alia, that a new report had been published in Kapital and that the case had been chosen as the “Theme of the day” on Hegnar Online. In particular, Hegnar “allowed the posters to present serious and degrading sexual harassment” of the applicant. In the letter, it was expressly stated that this was not to be made part of the existing complaint against Kapital, so as not to further delay the handling of that complaint by the publisher. A copy of the printout of the forum thread in question was attached (see paragraph 9 above). 11. Mr Hegnar received a copy of the letter and in an email to the Press Complaints Commission on 9 November 2010 stated, inter alia, that Hegnar Online was a separate newspaper with its own editor, unrelated to Kapital. He submitted that it could not therefore be taken into account in a complaint against the latter. The Commission wrote an email to both parties the following day stating that it – having spoken with the applicant’s counsel – noted that the letter of 8 November 2010 did not amount to a new complaint, but was an appendix to the documents in the pending case against Kapital and did not relate to Hegnar Online. 12. Comments nos. 1 and 2 were not deleted. The applicant’s counsel sent an email at 12.32 p.m. on 17 November 2010 to Mr B. and Mr H., an editor working for Hegnar Online, requesting written confirmation that the comments would be deleted immediately and arguing that Mr Hegnar himself had “declined all responsibility for the matter” (“fraskrev seg alt ansvar for saken”). 13. Mr B. from Hegnar Online responded at 12.45 p.m. the same day, saying that he was sorry that comments in breach of their guidelines had not been deleted, and that he had now deleted the comments he had found. 14. On 19 November 2010 Mr Hegnar wrote an editorial in Kapital commenting on the applicant’s remarks on the forum comments in the context of the complaint against Kapital (see paragraph 10 above). In the editorial, he stated that Hegnar Online was unrelated to Kapital and, furthermore, that Kapital would not take responsibility for what eager commenters wrote on Hegnar Online, which he described as “an open forum”. The editorial read, inter alia, as follows: “... Many strange, annoying and plainly wrong things are written on such open websites, where there is subsequent control and no editorial treatment prior to publishing. Also we ourselves must, at times, endure harsh comments (“tåle røff omtale”) on such websites, but we cannot rush off to the Press Complaints Commission with it.” 15. On 23 November 2010 the Press Complaints Commission examined the applicant’s complaints against Kapital and Finansavisen (see paragraph 6 above), and found that both publications had breached the code of conduct for journalists (Vær varsom-plakaten): Kapital for their use of a misleading headline (case no. 187/10) and Finansavisen for not giving the applicant the opportunity to reply simultaneously (case no. 192/10). 16. On 28 November 2010 a forum thread was started on the subforum “Media”. The thread starter, under the headline “Mona Høiness vs Trygve Hegnar”, commented on the inheritance case and the applicant’s allegation that she was being sexually harassed (see paragraphs 7 and 10 above). The next posting in the thread, made the same day, said only: “Ask if Mona knows trønderbjørn? :))” (“Spør om Mona kjenner trønderbjørn? :))”) On 30 November 2010 the next poster commented: “some have a passion for popstars and football players, while others like to hang around centres for the elderly and old people’s homes”, before another wrote: “are you old, ill and confused? The law firm MH takes the case. NB! Pre-payment only”. At 11.02 a.m. the same day a comment raising the question whether the applicant was “still shagging” someone referred to by the nickname “trønderbjørn” (see paragraph 27 below) (“Driver hun fortsatt å knuller på denne trønderbjørn?”  hereinafter “comment 3”) was posted. On 1 December 2010 a poster wrote: “saw a woman sneak out of borgen kremat. [(a crematorium in Oslo)] with two handbags filled with golden jewellery and wallets. She smiled knowingly ... [(“smilte lurt”)]”. All the comments in the thread were made anonymously. 17. On 3 December 2010 an editor at a radio station (Radio Norge) drew the applicant’s counsel’s attention to the debate that had been started on the Hegnar Online forum on 28 November 2010 (see paragraph 16 above) and enclosed a copy of the relevant thread in an email. From that it emerged that comment 3 had by then been read 115 times. 18. On 6 December 2010 the applicant’s legal counsel wrote to Mr H., attaching the email from the editor at the radio station and demanding confirmation that harassing comments in the “Media” subforum would be deleted immediately. In an email the same day Mr H. replied that he had also been contacted by the radio editor directly on 3 December 2010 and, on checking, had seen that the comments had by then already been deleted. 19. On 7 January 2011 a complaint concerning the two forum threads as a whole (see paragraphs 9 and 16 above) was lodged with the Press Complaints Commission. On 22 February 2011 it concluded in general terms that neither comments with sexual content nor comments that accused the applicant of unethical or unlawful behaviour in the inheritance case were in compliance with the code of conduct for journalists, and that the editors should accordingly have removed them immediately, pursuant to a provision in that code (case no. 002/11). 20. On 7 April 2011 the applicant’s counsel sent a letter to Hegnar Online stating the applicant’s intention to instigate civil proceedings against Hegnar Online and the editor, Mr H., because comments 1 to 3 had been defamatory and contrary to Article 246 of the Penal Code (see paragraph 43 below). For the defamation she would claim redress under section 3-6 of the Compensation Act (see paragraph 44 below), of amounts limited to 250,000 Norwegian kroner (NOK - today approximately 25,000 euros (EUR)) from the company Hegnar Online and NOK 25,000 (approximately EUR 2,500) from Mr H. personally. The applicant’s counsel argued that comments 1 to 3 had constituted sexual harassment beyond what a publicly known person had to endure and that it was settled law that such derogatory comments, discriminatory to women, were not protected by Article 10 of the Convention under any circumstances. Reference was made to the case of Tammer v. Estonia (no. 41205/98, ECHR 2001‑I). 21. Hegnar Online and Mr H.’s counsel responded in a letter of 28 April 2011. The counsel stated that the company Hegnar Media AS, into which Hegnar Online had by then been incorporated, had a procedure that made it simple to complain about forum comments that anyone might consider inappropriate. Next to each post was a link which could be clicked on in order to warn the company (“warning button”). When the company received such complaints, this usually led to deletion of the comment. Between 1,800 and 2,000 comments per month were deleted on the basis of such complaints. In addition, the company had moderators who on their own initiative removed comments in breach of the forum guidelines. Comments 1 and 2 had been removed immediately – within eight minutes of the applicant’s complaint – and comment 3 had been removed on the initiative of a moderator. In the letter it was further stated that Hegnar Media AS apologised for three of its users having made comments with sexual content, directed at the applicant, but that it did not consider itself liable to pay compensation. The three comments had had nothing to do with the company’s journalistic work or editorial responsibility; they had not been uttered or produced by the company, nor had it authorised them for publication. Furthermore, the comments in question had not been defamatory and had been removed as soon as the company had become aware of them. Although the company did not consider itself legally liable, it offered the applicant NOK 10,000 (today approximately EUR 1,000) for the inconvenience she had suffered because of the comments. 22. On 4 May 2011 the applicant instigated civil proceedings before the Oslo City Court (tingrett) against Hegnar Media AS and the editor, Mr H., for defamation. As previously stated in the letter to Hegnar Online (see paragraph 20 above), she claimed that her honour had been infringed because of comments 1 to 3 and that she was therefore entitled to redress. She maintained, inter alia, that the conclusion of the Press Complaints Commission (see paragraph 19 above) supported her argument that the defendants had exactly the same editorial responsibility for the comments as if they had been letters from readers printed in a newspaper. 23. The City Court heard the case from 19 to 20 December 2011. The parties attended with their counsel and one witness was heard. During the proceedings the applicant invoked Articles 246 and 247 of the Penal Code (see paragraph 43 below), in conjunction with section 3-6 of the Compensation Act (see paragraph 44 below). The defendants argued principally that the situation at hand was governed by section 18 of the E-Commerce Act (see paragraph 45 below). They also maintained that Articles 246 and 247 of the Penal Code were inapplicable since they required intent (forsett) on the part of the wrongdoer. In the case at hand the defendants had not even been aware of the comments in question, and the principles relating to editorial responsibility were in any event irrelevant. In any case, editorial responsibility could not apply to the situation before the editor had become aware of the comments, and in the instant case they had been removed as soon as Mr H. had become aware of them. 24. On 4 January 2012 the Oslo City Court ruled in favour of the defendants. It considered that the three comments had not amounted to unlawful defamation as they had been incapable of offending either the applicant’s honour or reputation. 25. As to comment 1, the City Court noted that the comment had been tasteless and vulgar, but had not in itself been an accusation (beskyldning) of promiscuity or some sort of immoral behaviour. In the City Court’s view, it could not harm the applicant’s reputation (omdømme) under Article 247 of the Penal Code (see paragraph 43 below). Furthermore, it had not expressed disdain or disapproval of her, so could not harm her honour (æresfølelse) under Article 246 of the Penal Code (ibid.). 26. With respect to comment 2, the City Court again found that it had been tasteless and “unserious”. An anonymous comment of this sort could not, however, harm the applicant’s reputation or honour. It might be considered to be ridicule, but had not exceeded the threshold over which ridicule would be unlawful. The City Court also had regard to the fact that “Theme of the day” was a marginal forum frequented mostly by anonymous people. It was generally unserious and, according to the City Court, most readers would find that the comments said more about those posting them than about the people mentioned in the comments. The City Court expressed that it completely understood that the applicant found it unpleasant that anonymous persons had posted “sleazy” remarks about her on the Internet. However, based on an overall assessment, the City Court concluded that comment 2, either alone or in conjunction with comment 1, had not been capable of harming the applicant’s honour. 27. Turning to comment 3, the City Court said that this was again a comment that most people would consider inappropriate, tasteless and vulgar. It had to be interpreted as an allegation that the applicant had had a sexual relationship with a person nicknamed trønderbjørn. No further information about who or what kind of person that might be had been given either in the forum or during the civil case. The court found that an anonymous comment indicating that the applicant had had a sexual relationship with an unidentified person could not harm the applicant’s reputation or honour. There had been nothing expressly negative in the comment. Moreover, since the writer had been anonymous there had been no reason to take him or her seriously. 28. The City Court also made an overall assessment of the three comments viewed as a whole, but found that they still had not amounted to unlawful defamation. It remarked that several of the other comments in the forum threads in question, that the applicant had not complained about, could possibly be defamatory, as had also been indicated by the defendants briefly during the hearing, but since the applicant had not complained about any other comments, the City Court could not decide on their lawfulness. 29. The applicant was ordered to pay the defendants’ litigation costs of 225,480 Norwegian kroner (NOK - approximately 24,650 euros (EUR)). The City Court stated that it was in no doubt as to the result of the case and noted that the applicant had turned down the defendant’s offer of settlement (see paragraph 21 above). The defendants had claimed NOK 290,880 (approximately EUR 30,615), an amount which the City Court considered exceeded what was reasonable and necessary under the relevant provisions of the Dispute Act (see paragraph 47 below). 30. On 31 January 2012 the applicant appealed against the City Court’s judgment to the Borgarting High Court (lagmannsrett). Apart from maintaining that the three statements (comments 1 to 3) had amounted to unlawful defamation, she submitted that her right to privacy (privatlivets fred) as enshrined in Article 390a of the Penal Code, and her rights under the general principles concerning the protection of personality (det ulovfestede alminnelige rettsvern for personligheten) had been breached. Moreover, she argued that the comments had been in breach of section 8a of the Gender Equality Act and that under section 17 of that Act compensation was payable (see paragraph 46 below). Lastly, she submitted that the defendants had been awarded an amount of litigation costs exceeding what had been necessary. 31. The High Court heard the case on 10 and 11 September 2013. The parties attended and gave evidence, and one witness was heard. The judgment was delivered on 24 October 2013. 32. The High Court stated at the outset of the judgment that there had been an extensive coverage of the inheritance case both by the Hegnar Group and other media. The coverage had undoubtedly been a strain on the applicant, but was not the topic of the proceedings. It did however form a background to the case and explained why the applicant had come into the spotlight and subsequently been the topic of anonymous statements on the debate forum related to Hegnar Online. 33. The High Court went on to state that it was of the view that the applicant had had good reason to react to the statements on the Hegnar Online forum. The statements had been unserious and sexually loaded. Accordingly, she had by way of a complaint to the Press Complaints Commission achieved a declaration that Hegnar Online had breached the code of conduct for journalists because the content of the forum threads had exceeded what she had had to accept and that Hegnar Online should on its own initiative have discovered and removed the comments more quickly than had happened. 34. Turning to the question of liability to pay compensation, the High Court stated that this was a different question to that considered by the Press Complaints Commission. At this point the High Court had reached the same conclusion as the City Court had, but on different grounds. The City Court had considered each of the three comments in detail and concluded that, although inappropriate, unserious and tasteless (“usaklige, useriøse og smakløse”), they did not fall within the scope of Articles 246 and 247 of the Penal Code (see paragraphs 24-28 above and 43 below). The High Court stated that it shared the City Court’s view with regard to the lack of seriousness, but deemed it unnecessary to assess the three comments against the provisions on defamation. 35. Instead, the High Court proceeded on the basis that the applicant’s claim for compensation could in any event not succeed unless the defendants had acted with sufficient culpability. It would be decisive whether such culpability had been demonstrated by Hegnar Online and Mr H. not having done enough to discover and thereafter remove the impugned comments. 36. The High Court further stated that one characteristic of posts on the type of debate forum in question, and also of comments on editorial content posted online, was that they were posted in real time without any prior censorship being possible. This meant that controls needed to be carried out subsequently, regardless of whether it concerned content subject to editorial responsibility or a website with only user-generated content. 37. With regard to the general system for monitoring content, the High Court noted that there were “warning buttons” on the website, which readers could click on in order to react to comments. Furthermore, the editorial staff had the task of monitoring content and removing comments on their own initiative. However, there were a very large number of posts on the forum as a whole, and the High Court presumed that only a few discoveries of content to be removed had been made at the relevant time. 38. Turning to the three specific comments in question, the High Court noted that comments 1 and 2 had been posted on 6 and 8 November 2010 respectively. The applicant had been notified by others of the comments, and had not read them herself on the website. The editorial staff had been notified of the two comments by email on 17 November 2010, and had responded thirteen minutes later that they had been removed. This had clearly been an adequate reaction. However, the High Court discussed whether the letter from the applicant’s counsel to the Press Complaints Commission on 8 November 2010 (see paragraph 10 above) implied that Mr Hegnar should have initiated a deletion process at that time. Having regard to the fact that the letter was formally made in a different context, namely the pending complaint against Kapital (see paragraph 6 above), and did not contain any request that the comments be removed, the High Court found it appropriate that Mr Hegnar had only considered the letter as a document in the Kapital case. 39. With respect to comment 3, this had been posted on 30 November 2010. On 3 December 2010 staff at Radio Norge had informed the applicant’s counsel, who had contacted Hegnar Online on 6 December 2010. Hegnar Online had by then already looked into the matter, as it had received a similar notification from Radio Norge on 3 December 2010, and had on that date noticed that the comment had already been deleted, presumably by a moderator at Hegnar Online. As this comment had, thus, rapidly been deleted of the staff’s own motion, there was nothing to suggest liability on the part of Hegnar Online. 40. The High Court upheld the City Court’s decision on litigation costs before the City Court and awarded the defendants NOK 183,380 (approximately EUR 20,050) for their costs before the High Court. It remarked that the case had been clear and that neither considerations on the parties’ welfare nor relative strength (see paragraph 47 below) could justify not awarding the winning party costs. The defendants had claimed NOK 231,980 (approximately EUR 24,416), but the High Court found that as their counsel charged a high hourly rate, appropriate for a specialist lawyer, this should have been reflected in a lower amount of hours. 41. On 22 November 2013 the applicant appealed against the High Court’s judgment to the Supreme Court (Høyesterett). She contested the High Court’s assessment that the defendants had acted with sufficient care and alleged that the High Court had erred in law as its reasoning had not been clear with respect to the standard of care required, notably whether it had proceeded on the basis that negligence would suffice for liability, or whether the establishment of gross negligence had been necessary. She also contested the High Court’s assessment of evidence concerning Mr Hegnar’s dealing with the letter of 8 November 2010 addressed to the Press Complaints Commission. The applicant pointed out that Mr Hegnar had written an editorial in Kapital on 19 November 2010, making remarks about how the applicant had complained about comments on the forum (see paragraph 14 above). Furthermore, the applicant argued that the High Court had wrongfully proceeded on the basis that the standards for the moderation of websites with user-generated content had been more lenient in 2010 than at the time of the High Court’s judgment. Lastly, she appealed against the High Court’s decision on litigation costs. The defendant’s counsel charged an hourly rate of up to NOK 3,900 (approximately EUR 410), which was so high that there would be a chilling effect on individuals’ willingness to challenge violations of Article 8 of the Convention. 42. On 7 February 2014 the Supreme Court’s Appeals Leave Committee (Høyesteretts ankeutvalg) refused the applicant leave to appeal against either the High Court’s judgment as a whole or against its decision on legal costs.

5. The applicants were born in 1971, 1953 and 1976 respectively and live in Bergama, İzmir. 6. On 16 August 1989 the public limited company E.M. Eurogold Madencilik (“the company”), subsequently renamed Normandy Madencilik A.Ş., received an authorisation to begin prospecting for gold. Subsequently, the company was authorised to use cyanide leaching in the gold extraction process by the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources. 7. On 19 October 1994 the Ministry of the Environment decided to issue an operating permit to the company for the Ovacık gold mine. 8. On 2 July 1996 the İzmir Administrative Court dismissed a case brought before it for the annulment of the permit of 19 October 1994. On 13 May 1997 the Supreme Administrative Court quashed the first-instance judgment and decided that the permit should be annulled. It referred to the State’s obligation to protect the right to life and to a healthy environment and assessed the physical, ecological, aesthetic, social and cultural effects of the mining activity in question as described in the environmental impact report and the various expert reports which had been submitted to it. It held that those reports demonstrated the risk posed to the local ecosystem and to human health and safety by sodium cyanide use. It concluded that the operating permit in issue did not serve the public interest and that the safety measures which the company had undertaken to implement did not suffice to eliminate the risks involved in such an activity. On 15 October 1997, in compliance with the Supreme Administrative Court’s judgment, the Administrative Court annulled the Ministry of the Environment’s decision to issue a permit for the mine. On 27 February 1998 the İzmir provisional governor’s office ordered that the mine be closed. On 1 April 1998 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the judgment of 15 October 1997. 9. On 5 April 2000 the Prime Minister’s office drew up a report on the mine. It concluded that operations at the mine could be authorised, having regard to the additional measures taken by the company, the conclusions of a report by the Turkish Institute of Scientific and Technical Research (“TÜBİTAK”), the Ministry of the Environment’s favourable opinion and an opinion of the President’s Administration, which had emphasised the economic importance of an investment of that type. 10. On 1 June 2001 the İzmir Administrative Court delivered a judgment on an application for judicial review of the report of the Prime Minister’s office, brought by twenty-five residents of Bergama, including the second and third applicants, Mr Mustafa Demirgan (Demircan) and Mr Yılmaz Acar. The administrative court decided to set aside the report, which, in its opinion, constituted an enforceable administrative decision giving rise to the issuing of permits. Notwithstanding the measures taken by the company, the court held that judicial decisions which had become final had found that the “risk and threat” in question resulted from the use of sodium cyanide in the gold mine and that it was impossible to conclude that those risks could be avoided by implementing new measures. Equally, it had been established that the risk connected with the accumulation of heavy elements or cyanide could persist for twenty to fifty years and was likely to infringe the right of the area’s inhabitants to a healthy environment. Accordingly, it was appropriate to conclude that the decision at issue could lead to the circumvention of a final judicial decision and was incompatible with the principle of the rule of law. 11. On 29 March 2006 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the judgment of 1 June 2001 in so far as it had been brought by nineteen of the plaintiffs, including the second and third applicants and dismissed a rectification application by the Prime Minister’s office on an unspecified date. 12. In the meantime, on 22 December 2000 the Ministry of Health decided to authorise the continued use of the cyanidation process at the mine for an experimental period of one year. The company re-started mining operations on 13 April 2001. 13. In a judgment of 27 May 2004, the İzmir Administrative Court set aside the provisional permit issued by the Ministry of Health on 22 December 2000 in a case brought by fourteen people, including the first applicant, Ms Feride Genç. In particular, it considered that the risks highlighted in the judgment of 13 May 1997 were, inter alia, linked to the use of sodium cyanide in the gold mine and to the climatic conditions and features of the region, which was situated in an earthquake zone. It held that those risks and threats could not be eliminated by supplementary measures which continued to be based on the same leaching process. It also concluded that the issuing of the permit in question had been incompatible with the principle of the rule of law as that administrative decision had in reality been intended to amend a judicial decision that had become final. 14. On 2 February 2005 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the judgment of 27 May 2004 and dismissed a rectification application by the Ministry of Health on 3 April 2006. 15. On 29 March 2002 the Cabinet of Ministers took a “decision of principle”, stating that the gold mine situated in the area of Ovacık and Çamköy, in the district of Bergama (İzmir) and belonging to the Normandy Madencilik A.Ş. company, could continue operations. The decision was not made public. 16. On 23 June 2004 the Supreme Administrative Court ordered a stay of execution of the Cabinet decision in a case brought by twenty-four plaintiffs, including the second and third applicants. The Supreme Administrative Court found that the Prime Minister’s decision had been unlawful as the environmental impact assessment report which had allowed for the operating of the gold mine had been previously annulled. The Prime Minister’s office objected. 17. On 18 August 2004 referring to the decision of 23 June 2004, the İzmir governor’s office ordered the closure of mine. 18. On 7 October 2004 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the stay of execution of 23 June 2004. 19. On 20 May 2005 the goldmine began operating again under a permit of the same date issued by the İzmir governor’s office. 20. On 22 March 2006 the Supreme Administrative Court annulled the decision of the Cabinet of Ministers a decision which was upheld on 21 February 2008 by the Supreme Administrative Court. 21. According to the documents in the case file, various sets of other proceedings were brought between 2006 and 2012 by other residents of Bergama against various administrative authorities and Normandy Madencilik A.Ş. before the administrative courts, some of which are still ongoing. The gold mine was in operation until at least 2014.

5. The applicants were born in 1968, 1960, 1966, 1962, 1959, 1955 and 1954, respectively, and live in Novi Travnik and Bugojno, Bosnia and Herzegovina. 6. By seven judgments of the Travnik Municipal Court and the Bugojno Municipal Court, of 19 January 2007, 15 May 2008, 19 January 2006, 28 October 2011, 2 February 2009, 1 September 2009 and 9 April 2004, respectively, the applicants’ employers, two companies manufacturing weapons and military technology, were ordered to pay them various sums in respect of unpaid work-related benefits together with default interest at the statutory rate and legal costs. The judgments became final on 24 August 2007, 15 May 2008, 19 January 2006, 26 November 2011, 20 August 2009, 13 October 2009 and 13 April 2005, respectively. 7. The applicants’ winding-up petitions were rejected on 27 May 2010 and 14 February 2011, respectively, because the Federal Ministry of Energy had refused authorisation (see paragraph 14 below). Consequently, in accordance with the 2003 Insolvency Act, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina became liable for the debts of the applicants’ employers (see paragraph 14 below). 8. The Sarajevo Municipal Court issued enforcement orders on 9 November 2011, 21 February 2012, 17 April 2012, 25 April 2012, 5 July 2012, 27 March 2012 and 9 August 2012, respectively, in which the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was designated as a debtor. They were transferred to the competent bank and were listed among the charges in the federal budget. 9. On several occasions thereafter the bank informed the competent courts that the enforcement was not possible because the budgetary funds intended for that purpose had already been spent. 10. The applicants complained of the non-enforcement to the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (“the Constitutional Court”). 11. On 17 March 2015 (decision no. AP 2892/13) the Constitutional Court found a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in the applicants’ cases on account of the prolonged non-enforcement of the final judgments in their favour. It ordered the government of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to take the necessary steps in order to secure the payment of its debt arising from the final judgments within a reasonable time. Although the applicants submitted a claim for non-pecuniary damages, the Constitutional Court did not award any compensation. 12. On the following dates in 2017 the final judgments in the applicants’ favour were fully enforced: (i) on 10 January 2017 in respect of Mr Mujo Zahirović; (ii) on 9 January 2017 in respect of Ms Nedžvija Mandara; (iii) on 13 April 2017 in respect of Mr Miralem Mustajbegović; (iv) on 17 January 2017 in respect of Mr Nihad Hrnjica; (v) on 11 January 2017 in respect of Mr Zijad Džugum; (vi) on 17 January 2017 in respect of Ms Đevada Hodžić; and (vii) on 13 April 2017 in respect of Mr Fadil Pandžo. The payments made in the applicants’ favour included the reimbursement of the costs sustained for the enforcement procedure.

6. The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Yerevan. 7. On 19 February 2008 a presidential election was held in Armenia. The main contenders were the then Prime Minister, Mr Sargsyan, representing the ruling party, and the main opposition candidate, Mr Ter-Petrosyan, who had also served as President of Armenia between 1991 and 1998. 8. The applicant, who had occupied the post of Head of the Penitentiary Department at the Ministry of the Interior during Mr Ter-Petrosyan’s presidency, was an active supporter of his candidacy. 9. Immediately after the announcement of the preliminary results of the election, Mr Ter-Petrosyan called on his supporters to gather at Freedom Square in central Yerevan (also known as Opera Square) in order to protest against the irregularities which had allegedly occurred in the election process, announcing that the election had not been free and fair. From 20 February 2008 onwards, nationwide daily protest rallies were held by Mr Ter-Petrosyan’s supporters, their main meeting place being Freedom Square and the surrounding park. It appears that the rallies at Freedom Square, held during the daytime and late into the night, attracted at times tens of thousands of people, while several hundred demonstrators stayed in that area around the clock, having set up a camp. It further appears that the applicant was an active participant in the rallies and was often on the podium, and had made a speech on the first day of the rallies. 10. On 24 February 2008 the Central Election Commission announced that Mr Sargsyan had won the election with around 52% of all votes cast, while Mr Ter-Petrosyan received around 21% of votes. 11. On 29 February 2008 the rallies were still in full swing. That night the applicant camped at Freedom Square. 12. The applicant alleged that on 1 March 2008 at around 6 a.m. the police had arrived at Freedom Square. The several hundred demonstrators who were camping there were mostly still asleep, although some of them were awake, having been informed in advance about the arrival of a large number of police officers. In total about 800 heavily armed police officers appeared. The police cordon started approaching the tents and panic broke out among the demonstrators who started waking the others up. Some of the demonstrators managed to switch on the microphones and the lights on the square. Mr Ter-Petrosyan, who was also at the square, addressed the demonstrators: “We see that police forces have arrived at the square. Please, do not have any contact with them and do not touch them in any way. Please keep your distance from them. Let us wait and see what they want from us. If they have something to tell us, we are ready to listen. Please, be patient and peaceful”. Then there was silence for about a minute. By then the police forces had already encircled the square with a triple cordon. Suddenly, without any prior warning or orders to disperse, the police forces, shouting loudly, attacked the demonstrators, most of whom were still asleep in their tents, violently beating them with rubber batons and destroying the camp. Mr Ter-Petrosyan was immediately arrested and taken away. Within a few minutes no demonstrator remained at the square, since everybody, including the applicant, had tried to save themselves by fleeing. He and other activists were then pursued by the police through the streets and arrested (see paragraph 25 below). 13. The Government contested the applicant’s allegations and claimed that the reason for the police operation of 1 March 2008 at Freedom Square had been information obtained on 29 February 2008 by the Armenian Police and National Security Service, according to which a large number of weapons, including metal rods, wooden clubs, firearms, grenades and explosives, were to be distributed to the protesters to incite provocative actions and mass disorder in Yerevan on 1 March 2008. The police operation had aimed to verify that information. For that purpose, members of the relevant police force, without being equipped with any protective gear, had arrived at Freedom Square where about 800 to 900 demonstrators armed with metal rods and wooden clubs had gathered waiting for the police. The demonstrators had attacked the police officers, hitting them and throwing stones, pointed metal objects and Molotov cocktails at them, as a result of which numerous police officers had been injured. 14. The Government, in support of their allegations, submitted a number of official documents, including six records of inspection of the scene drawn up by investigators of the Principal Department for Investigations of the Armenian Police. According to those records, the inspections were carried out on 1 March 2008 at several locations in Freedom Square and the surrounding park at various times between 8.30 a.m. and 11.45 a.m. and a number of different objects were found including pistols, cartridges, grenades and other explosives, wooden and rubber clubs, metal rods and other metal objects having a spiky, hedgehog-like shape. The Government also submitted a number of expert conclusions produced following the forensic examination of the objects in question. 15. On the same date the Special Investigative Service instituted criminal case no. 62202508 under Article 225.1 §§ 1 and 2, Article 235 §§ 1 and 2 and Article 316 § 2 of the Criminal Code (CC) (see paragraphs 97, 91, 98 and 94 below) in connection with the events at Freedom Square. This decision stated: “After the announcement of the preliminary results of the presidential election of 19 February 2008, the presidential candidate, Mr Levon Ter-Petrosyan, members of parliament, [K.S. and S.M.], the chief editor of Haykakan Zhamanak daily newspaper, [N.P.], and others organised and held mass public events at Yerevan’s Freedom Square in violation of the procedure prescribed by law and incited disobedience to the decisions ordering an end to the events held in violation of the procedure prescribed by law, while a number of participants in the mass events illegally possessed and carried illegally obtained arms and ammunition. On 1 March 2008 at around 6 a.m., when the police took measures aimed at forcibly ending the public events held in violation of the procedure prescribed by law, in compliance with the requirements of section 14 of the Assemblies, Rallies, Marches and Demonstrations Act, the organisers and participants of the events, disobeying the lawful orders of the [police officers], who were performing their official duties, committed a life- and health-threatening assault on them with clubs, metal rods and other adapted objects, which had been in their possession for that purpose, causing the police officers injuries of varied severity.” 16. It appears that, after Freedom Square was cleared of demonstrators, some of them relocated to the area near the French Embassy, the Yerevan Mayor’s Office and the Yerevan Press Building, situated at Grigor Lusavorich and Arshakunyats Streets about 1.7-2 km from Freedom Square, where they were later joined by thousands of others who apparently poured into the streets of Yerevan in response to the events of the early morning in order to voice their discontent. It further appears that the rallies continued throughout the city until late at night, involving clashes between protesters and law enforcement officers and resulting in ten deaths, including eight civilians, numerous injured and a state of emergency being declared by the incumbent President Kocharyan. The state of emergency, inter alia, prohibited the holding of any further rallies and other mass public events for a period of twenty days. 17. On 2 March 2008 another criminal case was instituted, no. 62202608, under Article 225 § 3 and Article 235 § 2 of the CC (see paragraphs 96 and 98 below), in connection with the above-mentioned events. The decision stated: “[Mr Ter-Petrosyan], the candidate running for president at the presidential election of 19 February 2008, and his followers and supporters, members of parliament [K.S. and S.M.], the chief editor of Haykakan Zhamanak daily newspaper, [N.P.], and others, not willing to concede defeat at the election, with the aim of casting doubt on the election, instilling distrust towards the results among large segments of the population, creating illusions of public discontent and revolt and discrediting the election and the authorities, from 1 March 2008 in the area of the Yerevan Mayor’s Office and central streets organised mass disorder involving murders, violence, pogroms, arson, destruction of property and armed resistance to public officials, with the use of firearms, explosives and other adapted objects.” 18. It appears that on the same date a number of police officers who had been involved in the events of 1-2 March 2008, including officers A.Arsh. and A.Aru., were granted victim status within the scope of criminal case no. 62202508 and later gave testimony. It further appears that police officer A.Arsh. underwent a forensic medical examination and, according to the relevant medical conclusion, was found to have suffered a bruise to the left side of his forehead, which had been inflicted by a blunt object and caused light damage to health. 19. According to the testimony of police officer A.Arsh., dated 2 March 2008, on 1 March 2008 he had been on duty at Freedom Square as a member of the Patrol Guard Service (PGS) deployed there for the purpose of preserving public order and assisting the police units which were entrusted with the task of verifying intelligence information concerning the possession of arms by the demonstrators. The demonstrators started assaulting the police officers. The PGS officers tried to calm the demonstrators but one of them, who was a slim man of around 55 with greying hair, a wide forehead and a sharp nose, hit him twice on the head with a stick and fled in the direction of Northern Avenue. Another PGS officer, A.Aru., tried to assist him, after which A.Aru. left in the same direction. 20. According to the testimony of police officer A.Aru., dated 11 March 2008, after the demonstrators started assaulting and resisting the police officers, while standing behind the Hovhannes Tumanyan statue, he had seen one demonstrator assault police officer A.Arsh. by hitting him twice on the head with a stick. Later he had continued to perform his duties in the area of Arshakunyats Street where, near the Yerevan Press Building, he had noticed the same person, who was a slim man of around 50 with a wide forehead, of medium height and with short black hair. He had approached the man and asked him to follow him to a police station but the man had refused to comply with his order and punched him a few times in the chest, kicked his shield and fled. 21. By a letter of 10 March 2008 the Chief of the Special Investigative Service requested detailed information from the Deputy Chief of the Armenian Police concerning the police operation of 1 March 2008 at Freedom Square, including its aim, planning, the number of police officers involved and the weapons and other means of personal protection used. 22. By a letter of 27 March 2008 the Deputy Chief of the Armenian Police replied to the above request as follows. The organisers and the participants in the unauthorised rallies that had been held between 20 and 29 February 2008 had, on numerous occasions, been informed about the unlawful nature of those events. The police operation of 1 March 2008 was based on intelligence information received the previous day by the police and the national security service, according to which a large quantity of metal rods, wooden clubs, firearms, grenades and explosives was to be distributed to the demonstrators in order to instigate mass disorder. The aim of the operation was to verify that information and to inspect the area. A number of unarmed police officers had entered Opera Square where they were attacked by 800-900 demonstrators armed with metal rods and wooden clubs, who were expecting the arrival of the police. The police officers were beaten and stones, pointed metal objects and Molotov cocktails were thrown at them. In order to prevent the disorder, an on-the-spot decision had been taken to engage the auxiliary police forces, which had been deployed earlier on the approaches to the square to prevent a possible deterioration of the situation and had been equipped with helmets, shields and rubber batons. The engagement of the said forces resulted in the demonstrators fleeing Freedom Square. The operation was carried out between 7 and 7.30 a.m. and was followed by a search, as a result of which numerous specially adapted metal objects, arms, ammunition and Molotov cocktails were found. Dozens of the most active and aggressive participants in the mass disorder were taken to various police stations. 23. It appears that many participants in the post-election rallies, including a number of opposition leaders, were charged and stood trial within the scope of the instituted criminal cases. The outcome of criminal cases nos. 62202508 and 62202608, however, is unclear. 24. According to a handwritten document entitled “the record of bringing-in” (արձանագրություն բերման ենթարկելու մասին), the applicant was “brought in” (բերման է ենթարկվել) to Kentron Police Station on 1 March 2008 at around 6.30 a.m. by three police officers, E.R., H.S. and A.A., from 1 Grigor Lusavorich Street “for organising unauthorised demonstrations at Freedom Square in support of Mr Ter‑Petrosyan, resisting police officers and disobeying their lawful orders”. The record was signed by the three police officers and an officer of Kentron Police Station who had drafted it. At the bottom of the record it was noted that the applicant had refused to sign it. 25. The applicant alleged that the above-mentioned record had never been presented to him. In reality he had been taken into custody by about 10-15 persons who did not introduce themselves as police officers and were masked. Those persons had been pursuing him all the way from Freedom Square. He had managed to catch a taxi, but the taxi had been blocked after about 1-2 km by a police car at the intersection of Arshakunyats and Grigor Lusavorich Streets near the Yerevan Press Building. The above-mentioned persons had forced him out of the taxi and started kicking, punching and hitting him with rubber batons. He had then lost consciousness and been transported to Kentron Police Station. 26. The applicant further alleged that upon his arrival at Kentron Police Station the same persons had continued to beat and humiliate him. Different parts of his body had been hit, including his head and legs, as a result of which he had fallen on the floor, bleeding and unable to get up. He had then been hit on the head again, which had resulted in concussion and loss of consciousness. Twice an ambulance had been called to provide medical assistance. His ill-treatment had been inflicted upon the instructions of the police chief. 27. One of the above-mentioned three officers, E.R., reported to the Chief of the Kentron Police Station that: “...today at around 7.30 a.m. I, together with [police officers H.S. and A.A.] brought [the applicant] in to Kentron Police Station from near Yerevan circus for having resisted police officers. While showing resistance, [the applicant] dropped a knife, two mobile telephones and a bunch of keys...” 28. Another report addressed by police officer E.R. to the Chief of the Kentron Police Station and signed by all three officers stated that: “...following an alert received on 1 March [2008, I, together with police officers H.S. and A.A.] was in the area of the unauthorised demonstration held at Freedom Square where the demonstrators were ordered to terminate the unauthorised demonstration and to clear the square. However, they disobeyed our lawful orders and, while showing resistance, swore at the authorities. The crowd, which showed resistance to the police, started running towards the adjacent streets, while continuing to show resistance to the police. During this mass disorder we continued to pursue the most active demonstrators who ran towards the [Yerevan] Press Building through Northern Avenue and Abovyan Street. While pursuing them I noticed one person near Yerevan circus who was showing overly active resistance to the police and who climbed into a random taxi... Being nearby, I approached the car and removed that person, who dropped a knife at that moment. I took the knife and together with the above-mentioned police officers brought that person in to Kentron Police Station, where he was identified as [the applicant].” 29. Police officers E.R., H.S. and A.A. further addressed several other reports to the Chief of the Kentron Police Station, all of which had practically identical content, stating as follows: “...following an alert received on 1 March [2008, we] were in the area of the unauthorised demonstration held at Freedom Square where the demonstrators were ordered to terminate the unauthorised demonstration and to clear the square. However, they disobeyed our lawful orders and [showed] resistance to the police officers, while hitting and swearing at them and the authorities. The most active of these citizens were brought in to the police station from the streets adjacent to the square.” 30. A memorandum signed by the Chief of Kentron Police Station in Yerevan and the Chief of the Yerevan Police, entitled “Assaults and insults of a public official; organisation of public events in violation of the procedure prescribed by law; mass disorder within the territory of Kentron Police Station”, stated: “As a result of mass events organised and held at Yerevan’s Freedom Square in violation of the procedure prescribed by law, on 1 March 2008 at around 7 a.m. officers of the Armenian police, having received an order, demanded the persons gathered at the square to vacate the square and to terminate the mass event that they had been holding for days[. H]owever, they did not obey the lawful orders of the police officers and, by committing health- and life-threatening assault, subjected [them] to mass beatings and did not obey their lawful orders, for which the activists of the above-mentioned rally were brought in to Kentron Police Station in Yerevan, among them: [A.M., the applicant, D.A., M.A., V.H. and H.B.]. A clasp knife was discovered in [the applicant’s] possession during his personal inspection conducted at the police station...” 31. The knife in question was at a later date examined by a forensic expert who classified it as a “bladed weapon”. The applicant alleged that he had never carried a knife, therefore no such object had ever been found in his possession. 32. From 7.20 to 7.40 p.m. the investigator questioned the applicant as a witness. According to the relevant record, the applicant stated that he had been informed in connection with which criminal case he had been summoned to testify as a witness and that it had been explained to him that as a witness he was obliged to testify or risk criminal sanctions. He, nevertheless, did not wish to testify because he had not committed any offence. 33. The applicant was kept in a cell at Kentron Police Station until around 10 p.m., when the investigator came to question him again. The applicant alleged that he had been unable to testify because of the ill‑treatment he had endured earlier. 34. At around 10.30 p.m. the investigator drew up a record of the applicant’s arrest (արձանագրություն անձի ձերբակալման մասին) by filling in the relevant template, indicating “10.30 p.m.” as the time of the applicant’s arrest and “Articles 225.1 § 2 and 316 § 2 of the CC” (see paragraphs 91 and 94 below) as the provisions under which the applicant was suspected of having committed offences. The arrest record was signed by the applicant. 35. On 2 March 2008, in the early morning, the applicant was transferred to police holding cells where, following a medical examination, a number of injuries were noted, including an open wound on the left side of his head and a bluish-red left eye. The applicant complained of pain in his legs. 36. The applicant alleged that the medical examination had not been carried out properly and only the obvious injuries had been recorded for purely formal reasons. 37. At 3.10 p.m. the applicant was questioned as a suspect by the investigator within the scope of criminal case no. 62202508 in the presence of his lawyer. Asked to provide his account of events, the applicant submitted that he had not committed any offence and had been participating in a peaceful demonstration at Freedom Square when, at around 6.30 a.m., thousands of police officers had started beating peaceful demonstrators with rubber batons without prior warning or orders to disperse. He and others had fled, but the police officers had pursued them armed with rubber batons. He had been followed for about 2 km. Being of an advanced age, he had not been able to continue running so he had sat in a random taxi. The police officers had blocked the taxi with a police car, taken him out and brutally beaten him, constantly repeating his name and swearing at the same time. He had then been taken to Kentron Police Station where he had again been beaten by the same police officers, after which they had left. The injuries on his body had been sustained in those circumstances. He had not, however, been ill-treated by any of the officers at the police station. He did not know the identity of those who had ill-treated him but would be able to identify them. The investigator then posed three questions: (a) whether the applicant had participated in any demonstrations held after the presidential election of 19 February 2008 and what his role had been in those demonstrations; (b) which of the demonstrators had had weapons and ammunition, the types of such weapons and the place where they had been hidden; and (c) who were the persons who had ordered the demonstrators, on 1 March 2008 at 7 a.m., to resist the police. The applicant admitted his participation in the demonstrations and marches, but added that he had stayed at Freedom Square around the clock only on 29 February. He had been up on the podium on multiple occasions, but the podium had been accessible to anyone. He had never seen the demonstrators with any weapons or ammunition. The demonstrations had been peaceful and accompanied with song and dance. Nobody had given any orders to resist the police. That would have been pointless anyway, since the police had entered the square covertly and started assaulting the demonstrators with rubber batons. 38. On the same day, the investigator ordered a forensic medical examination of the applicant within the scope of criminal case no. 62202508. The investigator’s decision stated that, during the events of 1 March 2008, a number of persons had been injured, including the applicant. It was therefore necessary to clarify the location, nature, sequence of infliction, age and severity of any injuries on the applicant’s body and the method of their infliction. The decision was transmitted to a forensic medical expert on 6 March 2008. 39. Between 7.30 and 9.30 p.m. the investigator questioned in turn police officers E.R., H.S. and A.A. in connection with the early morning events of 1 March 2008. Their statements, including the questions and answers, were verbatim reproductions with the following content: “Certain police officers, over a loudspeaker, ordered those who had gathered at Freedom Square to terminate the unlawful and unauthorised demonstration and to leave. However, not only did they not leave but some of them incited disobedience to the orders of the police officers and to continue the demonstration. Since the event in question was unlawful and the police officers’ orders to end it were not obeyed, the demonstrators, who were disobeying the police officers, assaulting them and making calls, were being brought in to police stations by [various police officers]. A number of demonstrators were assaulting us, police officers, with stones. In that crowd we were trying to calm the demonstrators who were showing overly active resistance and, besides assaulting [the police officers], were also inciting the crowd to continue their struggle against the police. While trying to restore order in the crowd, some of the police officers, including me, reached the area of Pushkin Street, because part of the aggressive crowd continued the above-mentioned violent actions against the police while running away. At that time, around 7 a.m., in the area of the intersection of Pushkin [Street] and Northern Avenue we noticed several persons who were demonstrating overly violent behaviour. I noticed that these persons were pulling, punching and kicking a group of outnumbered and, to me, unfamiliar police officers in police uniforms, as well as disobeying their lawful orders. Naturally we intervened and managed to transport three of the attackers to the police car, while the unfamiliar police officers continued to pursue other public-order offenders. When seated in the police car these three persons tried to free themselves again but ... eventually we managed ... to bring them in to Kentron Police Station, where they were identified as [D.A., M.A. and V.H.]. We filed relevant reports about what had happened, after which [the investigator] drew up records of bringing them in and subjecting them to personal search. I would like to add that, after the above-mentioned persons had been brought in, the street disorder was still continuing, so I went again to Freedom Square [together with my two colleagues] where we continued our lawful actions. Mass disorder was still continuing at Freedom Square and we were again pursuing the overly active demonstrators, who were running through Northern Avenue towards the [Yerevan] Press Building. While pursuing them, having reached Yerevan circus, I noticed one person who was showing resistance to police officers, punching and kicking them, after which he tried to sit in a random taxi car... However, we managed to capture him, during which a knife, two mobile telephones and a bunch of keys fell from his pockets. We picked up those objects and, together with the above-mentioned police officers, brought that person in to Kentron Police Station, where he was identified as [the applicant]. Question: Did you sustain any injuries and, if yes, in which circumstances? Answer: I did not sustain any injuries. While being brought in to the police station, they just pulled on [our uniforms], trying to free themselves. Question: Are you familiar with the police officers who were assaulted by the persons whom you brought in to the police station? Answer: I was not familiar with them. They were wearing police uniforms. I cannot provide further information about them. Question: Did you notice any weapons or other objects on the persons whom you brought in to the police station when they assaulted you and other police officers? Answer: I did not notice them having any such objects.” 40. On an unspecified date two more police officers, A.P. and M.G., were questioned. Police officer A.P. submitted that on 1 March 2008 he had been at Kentron Police Station when the applicant was brought in and a clasp knife found in his possession was presented. The applicant had not claimed that the knife did not belong to him. Police officer M.G., who was the driver of the police car that took the applicant to the police station, submitted that a knife had been discovered in the applicant’s possession when he was being brought in. 41. On 3 March 2008 the applicant was formally charged under Articles 225.1 § 2 and 316 § 2, as well as Articles 301 and 318 § 1 of the CC (see paragraphs 91, 94, 93 and 95 below), within the scope of criminal case no. 62202608, as follows: “...from 20 February 2008 onwards [the applicant], together with Mr Ter‑Petrosyan and others, organised and conducted unlawful public events, mass demonstrations, 24-hour long rallies, assemblies, pickets and sit-ins disrupting the normal life, traffic, functioning of public and private institutions and peace and quiet of the population in Yerevan and involving calls for a violent overthrow of the government and public insults addressed at public officials connected with the performance of their official duties. Thereafter, on 1 March 2008 at around 6 a.m., when [the police officers] demanded the participants in the demonstration at Freedom Square to give a possibility to verify the veracity of the information that they possessed arms and ammunition, and once again warned them to end the unlawful event, he and other demonstrators, disobeying the police officers’ lawful orders, committed life- and health-threatening assault on [them].” 42. On 4 March 2008 the applicant’s lawyer filed a complaint with the Chief of the Special Investigative Service, alleging that the applicant had been unjustifiably taken to Kentron Police Station under the so-called procedure of “bringing-in”, subjected to ill-treatment and then unlawfully kept there the whole day on 1 March 2008. The record of his “bringing-in” had never been presented to him. His 72-hour arrest permitted by law had already expired, in violation of Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention, and it was still unclear on what evidence the charge against him was based. The lawyer also relied on Articles 3, 10 and 11 of the Convention. 43. On the same day at 7 p.m. the applicant was brought before the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan which examined the investigator’s application seeking to have him detained. 44. The applicant submitted before the court that he had been brutally beaten and humiliated in the street and had sustained numerous injuries. No police officer had approached him to ask about weapons or to say that the demonstration was unlawful and that the demonstrators were to disperse. The applicant submitted that he was not a member of any political party and had not organised any demonstrations, and the charges against him were politically motivated and lacked corpus delicti. As regards the charge of assault under Article 316 § 2 of the CC, a group of 20-25 persons, without presenting themselves as police officers or asking him to follow them to a police station, preemptively attacked him and beat him up in the street and, by doing so, created an appearance of resistance. Moreover, no actual police officer to whom he had put up the alleged resistance had been identified. Furthermore, his rights guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention had been violated because he was prosecuted for simply being one of the demonstrators. As regards the charge under Article 301 of the CC, this was not based on any evidence and it was not even stated what calls for a violent overthrow of the government he had allegedly made. 45. The District Court decided to allow the investigator’s application and order the applicant’s detention for a period of two months. It first recapitulated the circumstances of the case as outlined in the charge against the applicant (see paragraph 41 above) and concluded that the application was substantiated, taking into account that there was sufficient evidence in the case to impose a preventive measure, and in view of the nature and dangerousness of the imputed offence and the fact that, if he remained at large, the applicant could abscond, obstruct the proceedings, continue his criminal activities and evade criminal responsibility. 46. On 5 March 2008 the applicant was transferred to Vardashen Remand Prison. At the time of admission a “record of physical injuries” was drawn up, signed by the applicant, which indicated the following injuries on his body: “...a bruise on the lower left eye socket, scratch wounds on the shins, a bruise measuring 10 x 12 cm on the external surface of the right shoulder blade and a scabbed wound measuring 2 x 3 cm on the rear part of the left temple. The indicated injuries, according to [the applicant], are four days old.” 47. The applicant alleged that this medical examination had not been carried out properly and not all the injuries had been recorded. 48. On 10 March 2008 the forensic medical expert examined the applicant at the remand prison as ordered by the investigator’s decision of 2 March 2008. The applicant reiterated before the expert the circumstances of his alleged ill-treatment (see paragraph 37 above). The relevant expert conclusion, which was produced on 3 April 2008, contained the following findings: “A wound measuring 0.9 x 0.2 cm, covered with a grey crust and mobile when palpated, is detected on the left part of the back of the head; the surrounding skin, in the area measuring 2.3 x 1.7 cm, has changed colour to pale pink. There is a bruise on the left side of the outer part of the upper and lower eyelids and the cheek area of a non-dense nature and pale yellow-greenish colour. Both parts of the chest are symmetrical and are equally involved in the respiration process. There is a bruise measuring 6.3 x 2.8 cm of unclear contour, non-dense nature and pale greenish‑yellow colour on the right part of the chest on the same line as the rear of the armpit and at the level of the third and fourth ribs, which has also partly spread to the rear area of the shoulder line. It is not painful when palpated. There is a bruise measuring 1.8 x 1.5 cm on the front surface of the upper third part of the right leg of a pale greenish-blue colour. There are small scratches covered with grey scabs on the inner surface of the joint between the leg and the foot, which are raised compared to the surrounding unharmed skin. ... Conclusions. The injuries sustained by [the applicant, as described above,] were caused by blunt objects, possibly within the period indicated in the circumstances of the case, which both jointly and separately do not qualify as mild bodily injuries. Since the injuries were inflicted within a short period, it is impossible to determine the sequence of [their] infliction.” 49. The applicant alleged that the expert had not been impartial and independent and had not fully recorded all of his injuries. 50. On the same date the applicant lodged an appeal against his detention order. He argued, inter alia, that the charge against him was unsubstantiated, lacked certainty and clarity, and was not based on sufficient evidence or any witness testimony. In violation of the guarantees of Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention, an artificial ground had been created to justify his detention, that is resisting a public official, which had never happened. Furthermore, there were not sufficient grounds justifying his detention: he was known to be of good character, had a permanent place of residence, did not try to hide from the investigation or refuse to appear before the investigating authority. No real evidence of any attempt to obstruct the proceedings had been presented. If he were to remain at large, he could not engage in similar activities, given the state of emergency declared in the country. 51. On 21 March 2008 the Criminal Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the applicant’s detention was based on a reasonable suspicion and the grounds relied on by the District Court in justification of detention were sufficient. 52. On 28 March 2008 confrontations were held between the applicant and police officers E.R., H.S. and A.P. who reiterated their earlier statements (see paragraphs 39 and 40 above). The applicant refused to have a confrontation with police officer A.A., alleging that E.R., H.S. and A.A. were not the police officers who had apprehended him. 53. On 25 April and 26 June 2008 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan extended the applicant’s detention, each time by two months, finding that it was still necessary to carry out a number of investigative measures and that, if he remained at large, the applicant could abscond, obstruct the proceedings, commit another offence and evade criminal responsibility. The applicant’s request for bail was refused. 54. In the meantime, on 2 May 2008, the applicant’s lawyer wrote to the Chief of Kentron Police Station, enquiring about the circumstances in which the applicant had sustained his injuries; whether they had been inflicted at the police station or prior to his arrival there and, if it was the latter, whether any record had been made in the police registers. 55. On 3 June 2008 the applicant applied to the General Prosecutor requesting that criminal proceedings be instituted and an investigation be carried out into the fact of his ill-treatment. He submitted that the circumstances of his arrest involved an offence against him since he had been beaten and tortured. No assessment, however, had been given to that circumstance in the context of the criminal case against him. 56. It appears that no reply was provided to the lawyer’s above‑mentioned enquiry and no decision taken on the applicant’s above‑mentioned application. 57. On 18 June 2008 seven members of the Armenian parliament filed a request with the General Prosecutor, seeking to have the applicant’s detention replaced with another preventive measure, namely their personal guarantee. They submitted at the outset that the detention of several hundred persons, including the applicant, following the presidential election was a disproportionate measure and was not based on reasonable suspicions. They further submitted that they personally knew the applicant and guaranteed that, if he remained at large, he would not abscond, obstruct the proceedings, commit another offence or evade his penalty, if any. The outcome of this request is unclear. 58. On 28 June 2008 the applicant lodged an appeal against the extension order of 26 June 2008, arguing that his continued detention was not based on a reasonable suspicion and that he was being persecuted for his political views. The courts provided no evidential or factual basis in support of the charges against him. The case against him was trumped up, with police officers being the only witnesses and with the identities of the allegedly injured police officers not being known, and the courts had extended his detention in order for the investigating authority to have sufficient time to fabricate charges. Moreover, the courts provided abstract and stereotyped reasons when extending his detention. 59. On 15 July 2008 the Criminal Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal on the same grounds as previously. 60. On 12 June 2008 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan under Article 290 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“CCP”). He sought to have the relevant police order, which served as a basis for the police operation of 1 March 2008, declared unlawful and unfounded and the ensuing police actions declared unlawful. He submitted that he had participated in the demonstrations held from 20 February 2008 onwards. The demonstrations had been held in compliance with the Constitution and Article 11 of the Convention and involved no criminal behaviour. In the morning of 1 March 2008 armed police forces had suddenly invaded Freedom Square and started beating peaceful demonstrators. The police attack had been unjustified and failed to meet the requirements of paragraph 2 of Article 11 of the Convention. The true purpose of the police operation, which was justified as an attempt to restore public order, was to launch political persecution of the supporters of Mr Ter‑Petrosyan, including himself, by provoking the demonstrators to engage in clashes, creating artificial charges of resistance to police and punishing them for exercising their right to freedom of assembly and for their political opinion. Thus, the exercise of his right to freedom of expression and freedom of peaceful assembly had been criminalised and he was facing unfounded and trumped-up charges as a result of unlawful police actions. Such interference was unlawful, did not pursue a legitimate aim and was not necessary in a democratic society. The applicant requested that the decisions to institute criminal proceedings and to bring charges against him be quashed and the proceedings be discontinued. 61. On 8 July 2008 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan dismissed the complaint, finding that the relevant police order was not a decision or action prescribed by the CCP and therefore could not be contested under Article 290. As regards the applicant’s request to quash the decisions in question and to discontinue the criminal proceedings, the District Court found that such requests could be lodged with a court only after they had been raised before a prosecutor, which the applicant had failed to do. 62. On 21 July 2008 the applicant lodged an appeal in which he argued, inter alia, that the District Court had incorrectly interpreted Article 290 of the CCP. It had failed to make any assessment of the police actions and its conclusion that the police order did not fall within the scope of criminal procedure law had not been based on the circumstances of the case. The police actions had been unlawful and disproportionate and the force used against peaceful demonstrators had been excessive, while the decision to institute criminal proceedings was artificial by its nature. Thus, the police actions and the decision in question should have been found incompatible with the requirements of the CCP. 63. On 19 August 2008 the Criminal Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the District Court and dismissed the appeal. The Court of Appeal found, relying on Article 290 of the CCP, that the contested police order, the decision to institute criminal proceedings, as well as ordering the investigating authority to discontinue the criminal proceedings, were beyond the scope of judicial control over the investigation. Besides, Article 290 presupposed judicial control over pre-trial proceedings and therefore applied only to the period after a decision to institute such proceedings was taken. 64. On 3 November 2008 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. 65. On 21 November 2008 the Court of Cassation refused to examine the appeal on the grounds that it had been lodged out of time and that no proof was attached to the appeal certifying that its copy had been served on the respondent party. 66. On 28 July 2008 about twenty-five police officers, including police officers A.Arsh. and A.Aru., who had allegedly been assaulted during the events of 1-2 March 2008 and had provided a description of the alleged perpetrators, were invited to Vardashen Remand Prison to identify the applicant. It appears that the applicant refused to take part in the identification parade, stating that that investigative measure had no probative value. As a result, the parade did not take place and instead a photo identification of the applicant was carried out. It further appears that police officer A.Arsh. identified the applicant, from among the photographs shown to him, as the person who had assaulted him at Freedom Square on 1 March 2008 at around 7 a.m. by hitting him twice with a stick. Police officer A.Arsh. stated that he recognised the applicant by the general structure of his face, his wide forehead and his haircut and style. Police officer A.Aru. identified the applicant, through the same procedure, as the person who had assaulted police officer A.Arsh. at Freedom Square on 1 March 2008 at around 7 a.m. with a stick and later assaulted him on Arshakunyats Street. Police officer A.Aru. stated that he recognised the applicant by his facial features, the structure of his forehead and his hair. 67. On 5 August 2008 the investigator decided to drop the charges against the applicant under Article 225.1 § 2, Article 301 and Article 318 § 1 of the CC (see paragraphs 91, 93 and 95 below). The investigator found that the charge under Article 225.1 § 2 of the CC had to be dropped since it had been established by the investigation that the order issued by the police officers to the demonstrators on 1 March 2008 at around 7 a.m. at Freedom Square was not to disperse but to allow them to inspect the area. Thus, the applicant’s actions did not contain elements of a crime prescribed by that Article. As regards the charge under Article 301 of the CC, it had to be dropped on the ground of insufficient evidence since the applicant’s involvement in an attempt to seize State power could not be established. As regards the charge under Article 318 § 1 of the CC, it had to be dropped since that Article had been repealed in the meantime. 68. The investigator further decided to supplement the charge under Article 316 § 2 of the CC with new charges under Article 235 § 4 and Article 316 § 1 of the CC (see paragraphs 92 and 94 below). It was stated that the applicant, having regularly participated in the unauthorised demonstrations held following the presidential election, had been present at Freedom Square on 1 March 2008 at around 7 a.m., when some of the demonstrators, using makeshift clubs, rods and other dangerous objects, had assaulted the police officers after the latter had demanded to be allowed to verify the information concerning the possession of arms and ammunition by the demonstrators. The applicant had refused to comply with the lawful orders of the police officers, assaulted police officer A.Arsh., twice hitting him on the head with a stick and causing light damage to his health, after which he had disappeared in the crowd. Police officer A.Aru. had witnessed the act committed by the applicant but failed to bring him in. Thereafter, police officer A.Aru. had continued to perform his duties near the Yerevan Press Building situated on Arshakunyats Street, where he had once again noticed the applicant. He had tried to bring the applicant in but the applicant had resisted, pushed, pulled and kicked police officer A.Aru., thereby assaulting him in a way which did not pose a threat to his health, and tried to escape in a random taxi. Police officers E.R., H.S. and A.A., who were on duty in the same area, had witnessed all this and brought the applicant in to Kentron Police Station, at which time a weapon, namely a knife, was found in his possession. 69. On the same date the investigator invited the applicant for questioning and a confrontation with police officer A.Arsh. The applicant refused to testify or to take part in the confrontation, stating that he did not trust the investigator and the investigative measures in question. His lawyer further stated that a confrontation with a police officer so many months after the event did not appear credible and was simply another attempt to create evidence against the applicant. 70. On 6 August 2008 the applicant’s case was disjoined from criminal case no. 62202608 into a separate criminal case, no. 62215008. 71. On the same date the knife in question was examined by the investigator and its description was recorded. 72. On 13 August 2008 the General Prosecutor approved the bill of indictment under Articles 235 § 4 and 316 §§ 1 and 2 of the CC. It contained an identical statement of facts to that in the charge against the applicant (see paragraph 68 above) and relied on the following evidence: (a) the statements of police officers A.Arsh. and A.Aru. made in their capacity as victims (see paragraphs 19 and 20 above); (b) the records of the applicant’s photo identification by police officers A.Arsh. and A.Aru. (see paragraph 66 above); (c) the statements of police officers H.S., E.R., A.A., A.P. and M.G. made in their capacity as witnesses (see paragraphs 39 and 40 above); (d) the submissions of the police officers made during the confrontations with the applicant (see paragraph 52 above); (e) two expert conclusions: one regarding the injury sustained by police officer A.Arsh. and the other classifying the knife in question as a “bladed weapon”; as well as the record of inspection of the knife (see paragraphs 18, 31 and 71 above); (f) the letter of 27 March 2008 of the Deputy Chief of the Armenian Police (see paragraph 22 above); (g) the records of inspection of the scene and the relevant expert conclusions (see paragraph 14 above). 73. It was lastly stated in the indictment that injuries had been discovered on the applicant, which did not qualify even as light injuries and which had been caused during the clash between the police officers and “the persons assaulting them”. It was stated that the investigation in that respect was still pending. 74. On 13 August 2008 the applicant’s case was sent to the Yerevan Criminal Court for trial. In the course of the proceedings, the Criminal Court summoned and heard police officers A.Arsh., A.Aru., H.S., E.R., A.A., A.P. and M.G. 75. Police officer A.Arsh. submitted that on 1 March 2008, when the police asked the demonstrators gathered at Freedom Square to allow them to carry out an inspection for weapons, the demonstrators had reacted violently. They had tried to calm them down but the applicant had attacked him and hit him twice on the head with a stick, after which he had fled. 76. Police officer A.Aru. submitted that he had seen one of the demonstrators, namely the applicant, attack police officer A.Arsh. and hit him on the head with a stick. He had thereafter continued to perform his duty in the area of Arshakunyats Street, where he had noticed the applicant. He had asked the applicant to go with him to a police station, but the applicant had hit him several times on the chest, kicked his shield and fled. 77. Police officer H.S. submitted that in the morning of 1 March 2008 the applicant had assaulted police officers on Arshakunyats Street near the Yerevan Press Building, by hitting and pulling them. He and police officers E.R. and A.A. had brought the applicant in in a patrol car, and a knife, mobile telephones and a bunch of keys had fallen from his pockets. 78. Police officer E.R. submitted that, when performing his duty on Arshakunyats street in the morning of 1 March 2008, he had seen an individual punching and kicking police officers. That person had tried to flee but he and police officers H.S. and A.A. had brought him in, whereupon he had been identified as the applicant. A knife, a mobile telephone and a bunch of keys had been found in his possession. 79. Police officer A.A. made similar submissions but stated that two mobile telephones had fallen from the applicant’s pockets. He also specified that this had happened at 7.30 a.m. 80. Police officers A.P. and M.G. reiterated their earlier statements (see paragraph 40 above). 81. The applicant denied his guilt and submitted, inter alia, that, even if he had participated in the demonstrations held from 20 February 2008, he had done nothing illegal. He and his co-thinkers who were at Freedom Square on 1 March 2008 had found out about the forthcoming arrival of the police several hours in advance. After the police had arrived, he had not hit anyone and had tried to escape. Having reached Arshakunyats Street, he had been brutally beaten by police officers and transported to Kentron Police Station where he had also been beaten. He had never carried a knife, therefore, no such object had ever been found in his possession. The applicant further contested the allegation that he had assaulted police officers A.Arsh. and A.Aru. He claimed that this could not have happened at around 7.15 a.m. and 7.30 a.m. as alleged by the prosecution, because the police operation had happened at around 6 a.m. as opposed to 7 a.m.. At 6.30 a.m. he had been at the police station already and by 6.45 a.m. there had been nobody at Freedom Square apart from the police. Besides, according to the relevant medical expert conclusion, police officer A.Arsh. had sustained his injury at some point between 1 and 3 March 2008. This cast doubts on the claim that the injury in question had been sustained specifically on the morning of 1 March 2008, especially in view of the fact that police officer A.Arsh. had participated in clashes on both 1 and 2 March 2008. 82. To clarify the above circumstances, the applicant lodged requests with the court, seeking to have a number of persons called and examined as witnesses, including A.M., D.A., M.A., V.H., H.B., N.T., S.M., S.A. and H.T. He argued that the testimony of A.M., D.A., M.A., V.H. and H.B., who were also active demonstrators, would support his allegation that the actions of the police had been unlawful from the very outset, that on 1 March 2008 at around 6 a.m. he and they had been attacked by the police and other forces without prior warning and had been forcibly brought in, and that at 7 a.m. he had already been at the police station and could therefore not have been at Freedom Square. These demonstrators had similarly been brought to Kentron Police Station at around 6.30-7.00 a.m. and they were also able to confirm that he had continued to be ill-treated there upon his arrival. The applicant further argued that N.T. and S.M., who were also opposition activists, had been by his side at Freedom Square when the demonstrators had been attacked by the police and their testimony would clarify a number of circumstances related to the charge against him, including his allegation that as early as at 6.45 a.m. there had been nobody at Freedom Square apart from the police, and that the imputed offence could not have happened in the alleged circumstances. The applicant lastly argued that testimony from S.A. and H.T., who were high-ranking police officials and had apparently given orders for the police operation, was important in order to assess the police actions of the morning of 1 March 2008. The prosecuting authority had failed to investigate the lawfulness of the police actions, including the excessive force used by the police that morning. However, only if these circumstances were investigated would it be possible to assess the charge against him. In this connection, it was also necessary to call and examine other PGS officers who had taken part in the police operation of the morning of 1 March 2008. They would also be able to clarify whether police officer A.Arsh., whose involvement in that operation was debatable, had actually participated in it. 83. The Yerevan Criminal Court decided to dismiss the applicant’s requests. It found that N.T. had already been questioned by the investigator during the investigation and it was sufficient to read out his statement in court. S.M., who was separately also standing trial, had in general refused to give testimony during the investigation. As regards V.H., D.A. and M.A., the argument that they were able to confirm the fact that at 6.30 a.m. the applicant had already been at the police station, was not a sufficient reason to call and examine them in court. Lastly, as regards S.A., H.T. and the unnamed PGS officers, it had been explained to the defence that the police actions could be contested before the courts through a different procedure. In such circumstances, the necessity of calling and examining those police officers was not well-founded. 84. On 23 October 2008 the Yerevan Criminal Court found the applicant guilty under Article 235 § 4 and Article 316 §§ 1 and 2 of the CC. The court sentenced him under Article 235 § 4 to a fine in the amount of 400,000 Armenian drams (AMD), under Article 316 § 1 to a fine in the amount of AMD 500,000 and under Article 316 § 2 to five years’ imprisonment. In doing so, the Criminal Court found it to be established that: “In the period preceding 1 March 2008 intelligence information was received by the Armenian Police and the National Security Service that the demonstrators gathered at Yerevan’s Freedom Square had in their possession firearms, ammunition, clubs, rods and other objects for the purpose of causing physical injuries and violence. On 1 March 2008 at around 7 a.m. police officers demanded the persons gathered at Yerevan’s Freedom Square to allow them to verify the above information by inspecting the area. The mentioned lawful demand of the police was announced out loud several times. Some of the people gathered at Freedom Square, including [the applicant], had already been informed several hours in advance about the planned police operation. The police officers of the Patrol Guard Service brigade of the Armenian Police, with the aim of preserving public order in that area, approached Freedom Square where [the applicant], in front of the statue of Hovhannes Tumanyan, hit the victim, [police officer A.Arsh.], twice on the head with a stick, causing light damage to his health accompanied by a brief deterioration of health, after which he disappeared in the crowd. [Police officer A.Aru., the second victim,] saw the act committed by [the applicant]. [Police officer A.Aru.] continued his duty in the area near the [Yerevan Press Building] situated at Arshakunyats Street, where he once again noticed [the applicant] and tried to bring him in. [The applicant], disobeying [police officer A.Aru.’s] lawful order to appear at the police station, assaulted [him] in a non-health-threatening way by pushing, pulling and kicking [him], and tried to escape in a random taxi. [Police officers A.A., E.R. and H.S.], who were on duty at that time in the same area, noticed the incident and brought [the applicant] in to Kentron Police Station, during which a bladed weapon – a knife – fell from [the applicant’s] pocket, as well as two mobile telephones and a bunch of keys. On 1 March 2008 at 9 p.m. [the applicant] was arrested and on 4 March 2008 he was detained.” 85. In establishing the above findings, the Yerevan Criminal Court relied on the same evidence on which the indictment was based, plus the statements of the police officers made in court (see paragraphs 72 and 75-80 above). It found the applicant’s submissions to be unreliable and an attempt to avoid criminal responsibility. 86. On 10 November 2008 the applicant lodged an appeal in which he argued, inter alia, that the charge against him was trumped-up and politically motivated; that he had been ill-treated both at the time of his apprehension and at the police station and that no investigation had been carried out into his allegations of ill-treatment; that the interference with his freedom of peaceful assembly had been unlawful, unjustified and accompanied with use of excessive force by the police; that the only witnesses in the case were police officers who, being interested in the outcome of the case because of the brutal and unlawful force used against the demonstrators, including his ill-treatment, were not impartial and trustworthy witnesses and had made contradictory statements which were then coordinated towards the end of the investigation and which constituted the sole basis for his conviction; and that the principle of equality of arms had not been respected since his request to call and examine witnesses on his behalf had been groundlessly dismissed. Thus, the entire case was based on police testimony, while he was not allowed to defend himself effectively and to summon any impartial witnesses, including those who were by his side on the morning of 1 March 2008. The applicant contested the reliability of the evidence provided by police officers H.S., E.R. and A.A., pointing, inter alia, to the fact that their statements made in court differed, while those made during the investigation had been identical in wording. Moreover, it appeared from their statements that they had been arresting different demonstrators from different locations, all at the same time, which cast doubt on the veracity of their statements. As regards the statements of police officers A.Arsh. and A.Aru., they concerned events which had taken place in a chaotic situation early in the morning when it was still dark, which cast doubt on the reliability of that evidence. The police officers had effectively refused to answer any questions in court, limiting their answers to either “I do not remember” or “I do not know”. The trial court had failed to make any assessment of the police actions at Freedom Square, including their lawfulness and proportionality, without which the charge against him could not receive a fair determination. What had happened in reality was that the police officers had initiated an unlawful clash with the demonstrators and then rounded up all the activists, many of whom had also been subjected to ill-treatment. The alleged inspection of the scene had been simply a pretext to conceal the police officers’ real intention, which had been to disperse the peaceful demonstration. The applicant alleged that he had been known to the authorities and was persecuted for being a supporter of Mr Ter-Petrosyan and because of a critical speech he had made on the first day of the demonstrations. He had initially been charged with resisting unidentified police officers, until about five months later when a new charge had emerged of him assaulting another police officer in a different location, namely at Freedom Square. Moreover, there were multiple contradictions regarding the time of his apprehension, which in later police statements was alleged to have happened at around 7.30-8 a.m. This was, however, an attempt by the prosecution to link him to the assault on police officer A.Arsh. which, according to the final official version, had taken place at around 7.15 a.m. However, it was a well-established fact that the police operation of 1 March 2008 had taken place at around 6 a.m. and, moreover, according to the relevant record, at around 6.30 a.m. he had already been at Kentron Police Station. The applicant also argued that, if he was suspected of assaulting police officer A.Arsh. on 1 March 2008, he should have been presented for identification as early as on 2 March 2008. Instead, photo identification was performed only about five months later. The evidence regarding the knife was not credible and he had never even been questioned in that connection. The applicant relied on, inter alia, Articles 3, 5, 6, 10 and 11 of the Convention. 87. On 10 December 2008 the Criminal Court of Appeal examined the applicant’s appeal through an expedited procedure and decided on the same day to dismiss it, relying on the same evidence as the Yerevan Criminal Court. In doing so, the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s argument that his conviction was based solely on the statements of police officers who were not impartial witnesses, finding that the fact that the victims and witnesses in the case were police officers did not diminish the probative value of their statements and it was unacceptable to view this as a predetermining or prejudicial circumstance. Furthermore, the criminal case was based also on a number of expert conclusions, the records of inspection of the scene and the records of the applicant’s photo identification. As regards the applicant’s claim that his allegations of ill-treatment had not been investigated, the Court of Appeal stated that, according to a decision of the investigating authority, it was still necessary to carry out a comprehensive investigation – within the scope of criminal case no. 62202608 – into the circumstances under which injuries had been sustained by persons, including the applicant, who had participated in the mass disorder of 1-2 March 2008. Since the investigation into the applicant’s criminal case had been completed, his case was disjoined from criminal case no. 62202608, while the latter was still pending. 88. On 27 January 2009 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, raising similar arguments to those in his appeal of 10 November 2008 and relying on, inter alia, Articles 3, 5, 6, 10 and 11 of the Convention. 89. On 10 March 2009 the Court of Cassation declared the applicant’s appeal on points of law inadmissible for lack of merit. 90. At the end of November 2010 the applicant was released from prison after having served more than half of his sentence.

5. The applicants were owners of plots of land. The municipal authorities reclaimed the plots of land, and the applicants’ title to the real property in question was annulled. The details pertaining to each application are provided below. 6. The applicant in this case is Oleg Dmitriyevich Sergunin, who was born on 10 December 1967 and lives in Kazan. 7. On 5 September 2009 the local council transferred the title to a plot of land in Privolzhskiy district, Kazan, to G. The relevant documents confirming that the plot of land had been earlier assigned to G. had been prepared by Gib. The State land registry verified the legitimacy of the transaction and registered G.’s title to the plot of land. 8. On 10 December 2009 G. sold the plot of land to M. On 8 February 2010 M. sold the plot of land to N. On 16 March 2012 N. sold the plot of land to the applicant. Each time the transfer of the title to a new owner was verified and registered by the State authorities with the issuance of the relevant certificate. 9. On 13 March 2013 the Privolzhskiy District Court of Kazan found Gib. guilty of having committed fraud in respect of the transfer of the plot of land to G. 10. On 5 July 2013 a prosecutor acting on behalf of the local council brought an action seeking invalidation of the decision of the local council of 5 September 2009, invalidation of the applicant’s title to the plot of land and return of the plot of land to the municipality. 11. On 17 October 2013 the District Court granted the claims in full. 12. On 23 January 2014 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Tatarstan upheld the judgment of 17 October 2013 on appeal. 13. On 14 April 2014 the Supreme Court rejected an appeal on points of law by the applicant. 14. On 30 May 2014 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation rejected a second appeal on points of law lodged by the applicant. 15. The applicant in this case is Dmitriy Gennadyevich Isupov who was born on 7 May 1978 and lives in Kirov. 16. On 3 December 2009 the applicant bought a plot of land and a share in another plot of land in Sloboda Solomintsy, Kirov, from S. and T. respectively. The State land registry verified the legitimacy of the transaction and registered the applicant’s title to the plots of land. 17. On an unspecified date the district prosecutor brought an action on behalf of the Kirov City Council with the aim of reclaiming the real property. 18. On 14 May 2014 the Novovyatskiy District Court of Kirov delivered two judgments, allowing the prosecutor’s claims in full. The court noted that the decisions allegedly issued by the local council assigning the plots of land to T. and S. had been forged and could not have served as a legal basis for the transactions in respect of the plots of land. The court recognised the town’s title to the plots of land and ordered their transfer to the town administration. 19. On 15 and 23 July 2014 the Kirov Regional Court upheld the judgments of 14 May 2014 on appeal. 20. On 22 August the Regional Court dismissed an appeal on points of law lodged by the applicant against the above judgments. 21. On 11 March 2015 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation dismissed a second appeal on points law lodged by the applicant against the judgments of 14 May and 15 June 2015. 22. The applicant in this case is Sergey Vasilyevich Prokudin who was born on 19 October 1958 and lives in Kirov. 23. The applicant bought six plots of land in Sloboda Lyangasy, Kirov, from S., A., M., K., Kuz., and R. respectively. The State land registry verified the legitimacy of the transactions and registered the applicant’s title to the plots of land. 24. On an unspecified date the district prosecutor brought an action on behalf of the Kirov City Council with the aim of reclaiming the real property. 25. On 9 and 10 June 2014 the Novovyatskiy District Court of Kirov delivered six judgments, granting the prosecutor’s claims in full. The court noted that the decisions allegedly issued by the district administration assigning the plots of land to S., A., M., K., Kuz., and R. had been forged and could not have served as a legal basis for the transactions in respect of the plots of land. The court recognised the city’s title to the plots of land and ordered their transfer to the council. 26. On 21 and 28 August and 2 September 2014 the Kirov Regional Court upheld the judgments of 9 and 10 June 2014 on appeal. 27. On 19 January 2015 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation dismissed an appeal on points of law lodged by the applicant against the above judgments.

4. The applicants live in Shnogh village. 5. In the 1970s a copper-molybdenum deposit (‘Teghout’) was discovered about four and six km away from the villages of Teghout and Shnogh respectively, in the Lori Region. 6. In 2001 a private company, Armenian Copper Programme CJSC, was granted a mining licence for the exploitation of the Teghout copper‑molybdenum deposit for a period of twenty-five years. 7. On 1 November 2007 the Government adopted Decree no. 1279-N approving the designation of territories situated within the administrative boundaries of the rural communities of Shnogh and Teghout in the Lori Region as expropriation zones, to be taken for State needs, thus changing the category of land use. According to the Decree, Armenian Copper Programme CJSC or Teghout CJSC, founded by the former for the purpose of the implementation of the Teghout copper-molybdenum deposit exploitation project, were to acquire the units of land listed in its annexes. 8. The plots of land belonging to the applicants were listed among the units of land falling within these expropriation zones. 9. The applicants, a family of five, live in Shnogh village and earn their living from agriculture. They jointly owned two plots of arable land in the village. The first plot of land measured 0.334 ha and the second one consisted of two distinct parts measuring 0.932 ha and 0.723 ha. The land was used for growing crops for the family and feeding their livestock. 10. On an unspecified date Teghout CJSC addressed a letter to the applicants containing an offer to buy their plots of land. Compensation of 163,000 Armenian drams (AMD, approximately 355 euros (EUR)) and AMD 950,000 (approximately EUR 2,065) was offered for the two plots of land respectively, plus an additional 15% as required by law. 11. The applicants did not reply to the offer, not being satisfied with the amount of compensation. It appears that they tried to obtain an alternative valuation of their property by another company but did not succeed. They claim that no other valuation company was willing to make an independent assessment of the market value of their land. 12. On 14 May 2008 Teghout CJSC lodged a claim against the applicants, seeking to oblige them to sign an agreement on the taking of their property for State needs. The company based its claim, inter alia, on valuation reports prepared at its request by Oliver Group LLC, a licensed valuation company. According to the reports, the market value of the applicants’ plots of land was estimated at AMD 163,000 (approximately EUR 355) and AMD 950,000 (approximately EUR 2,065) respectively. 13. In the proceedings before the Lori Regional Court the applicants argued that the market value of their land had been underestimated. They further submitted that the valuation of their property had not been carried out correctly, since no account had been taken of the number of trees and their profitability and they were unable to submit an alternative valuation of the market value of their land, since other companies had refused to carry out a valuation. 14. In the course of the proceedings, Teghout CJSC submitted other valuation reports of the applicants’ property, stating that, after the institution of the proceedings, Oliver Group LLC had prepared corrected reports according to which the market value of the applicants’ two plots of land was estimated at AMD 173,000 (approximately EUR 376) and AMD 986,000 (approximately EUR 2,143). The final amount of compensation, including the additional 15% required by law, would thus be equal to AMD 198,950 (approximately EUR 433) for the first plot of land and AMD 1,133,900 (approximately EUR 2,465) for the second. 15. On 7 November 2008 the Regional Court granted Teghout CJSC’s claim, awarding the applicants compensation of a total of AMD 198,950 for the first plot of land and AMD 1,133,900 for the second plot. 16. The applicants lodged an appeal. Relying, inter alia, on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, they complained that the Regional Court had deprived them of their property. 17. On 25 March 2009 the Civil Court of Appeal upheld the Regional Court’s judgment, finding that the latter had properly determined the market value of the property on the basis of the corrected valuation reports prepared by Oliver Group CJSC. 18. The applicants lodged an appeal on points of law, raising similar arguments to those submitted in the previous appeal. 19. On 17 June 2009 the Court of Cassation declared the applicants’ cassation appeal inadmissible for lack of merit.

4. The applicant was born in 1989. 5. On 27 December 2010 the applicant was arrested on drug-related charges and placed in custody. 6. On 14 December 2012 the case was submitted for trial to the Voronezh Regional Court. 7. On 11 July 2013 the court returned the case to the deputy Prosecutor General for remedying certain procedural defects. 8. On 20 September 2013 the Investigations Department of the Federal Drug Control Service received the case file and forwarded it to its regional branch in St Petersburg. 9. On 1 November 2013 an investigator asked the St Petersburg City Court to extend the applicant’s detention for a further four months, until 31 March 2014. On 8 November 2013 the City Court granted the application. The applicant filed an appeal. He pointed out that the maximum statutory time period for keeping him in pre-trial detention had expired a long time ago and that any further extensions had been unlawful. 10. On 27 November 2013 the St Petersburg City Court rejected his appeal in a summary fashion, without examining his arguments in detail.

6. The applicant, is a French citizen, who was born in 1969 and lives in Gaillard, France. 7. In 2003 the applicant met K.B.V., a Hungarian national. In 2009 K.B.V. moved to France and the couple lived together in the applicant’s flat in Gaillard. On 18 October 2013 their son, L., was born. In December 2013 the couple spent the Christmas holidays with the applicant’s family in Nancy. The applicant returned to their home on 27 December 2013. 8. On 28 December 2013 K.B.V. lodged a complaint against the applicant in Toul. She alleged that the applicant had become hostile and sometimes aggressive towards her and constituted a danger to her and their son. 9. On 4 January 2014 K.B.V. left for Hungary with L, without the prior knowledge or authorisation of the applicant. Since then K.B.V. has lived with L. at her parents’ home in Szombathely. 10. On 9 January 2014 K.B.V. initiated custody proceedings in respect of L. before the Szombathely District Court. 11. On 7 February 2014 the applicant instigated proceedings before the Thonon-Les-Bains tribunal de grande instance. On 24 March 2014 the court found that L. had been illegally taken from France, placed the son with his father (that is to say the applicant), and granted the applicant sole custody. The court ordered the provisional execution of the judgment. Following an appeal by K.B.V., in a judgment of 22 July 2014, the Chambery Court of Appeal granted K.B.V. the right to have supervised contact every other Saturday between 2 p.m. and 4 p.m., awarded the parents joint custody, and upheld the remainder of the first-instance decision. 12. On 28 January 2015 the Chambery Court of Appeal issued a certificate of enforceability under Article 39 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and matters of parental responsibility (known “the Brussels II bis Regulation”). 13. On 23 September 2015 the Court of Cassation quashed the second‑instance judgment of the Chambery Court of Appeal and remitted the case to the Lyon Court of Appeal. 14. On 10 December 2014 the Pest Central District Court received from the applicant a request under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (Articles 11-12) and the Brussels II bis Regulation for the child to be returned to France. The applicant maintained that L.’s place of residence was in France and that under French law parents exercised their custody rights jointly. K.B.V. had decided on the child’s place of residence without his approval. On 17 November and 4 and 12 December 2014, and 8, 22 and 28 January and 9 February 2015 the court examined the request in the presence of both parents. 15. By a decision of 12 February 2015 the Pest Central District Court dismissed the request under Article 11 of the Hague Convention and Article 11 of the Brussels II bis Regulation. Relying on the definition of child abduction, as provided in Article 3 of the Hague Convention, the court found that K.B.V. had abducted L. from his habitual residence in France, where the parents had exercised their custody rights jointly. However, on the basis of the evidence before it, the court concluded that if L. (who was still being breastfed) were returned to France, he would be placed in uncertain circumstances, only seeing his mother every second week for a couple of hours. It emphasised that according to the applicant’s own submissions, he was away from home from 7 a.m. until 10 p.m. and that it would be difficult for him to look after the child during weekends. Thus, as he suggested, his sister would look after L. The court also noted that the applicant had lodged his request almost a year after L.’s abduction and that although he had visited Hungary on a number of occasions, he had not been in contact with L. Thus, the court dismissed the applicant’s request under Article 13(b) of the Hague Convention. 16. The Budapest High Court upheld the first-instance decision on 28 April 2015. It reiterated the conclusion of the first-instance court that there was a grave risk that L.’s return to France would expose him to harm. In this aspect the court found relevant that L. was only one and a half years old and if returned to France he would be deprived of all maternal care. Thus, under Article 13 of the Hague Convention, the Hungarian courts were not bound to order the child’s return. The court also held that Article 11 § 4 of the Brussels II bis Regulation was not applicable, since no measures or arrangements were available to secure the protection of L. after his return. 17. The applicant lodged a petition for judicial review of this decision with the Kúria. He argued that Article 13 of the Hague Convention was applicable to exceptional circumstances only and that neither the child’s age nor his closer connection to his mother had any bearing on the matter and could not constitute a decisive element in the decision to refuse to order the child’s return to his habitual residence. He also argued that he had contributed to the child’s care and that his employment, which allowed him to provide for his family, could not be held against him. Furthermore, the decisions had failed to take into account L.’s best interests, which lay in his being raised by both of his parents. He also maintained that his lack of contact with L. was due to K.B.V.’s own conduct and the fact that he had not been aware of the child’s place of residence until August 2014. Finally, the lower-instance courts had not respected the six-week deadline stipulated by the Brussels II bis Regulation. 18. The Kúria dismissed the applicant’s petition for judicial review on 6 October 2015. According to its reasoning both the Brussels II bis Regulation and the Hague Convention had established the presumption that a child’s interests could best be served by his immediate return to his habitual residence. However, under Article 13 of the Hague Convention this presumption could be rebutted in exceptional circumstances. It agreed with the applicant that the child’s young age, his close connection to the parent living in Hungary and his Hungarian roots could not serve as a basis for the refusal to order his return to France. It nonetheless held that at the time of his abduction L. had only been two and a half months old and that a considerable time had passed without him having contact with the applicant. The reason for this was that the applicant had refused to see L. at the premises of a child protection service, as suggested by K.B.V. The Kúria also found it important that according to the applicant’s own statements his sister would take care of L. if the child were returned to France and that, according to the decision of the French courts, K.B.V. would only have very limited contact with L. Furthermore, there was no information about any measure of protection envisaged in the event of L.’s return. Thus, the Kúria concluded that the return of the child, who was less than two years old, to an unknown environment would cause serious psychological harm. 19. On 9 January 2014 K.B.V. initiated custody proceedings in respect of L. before the Szombathely District Court; she also requested the court to adopt an interim measure placing L. under her custody. 20. On 27 August 2014 the District Court discontinued the proceedings, regard being had to the judgments delivered by the French courts. On 31 October 2014 the Szombathely High Court overturned this decision and ordered the District Court to examine whether the judgments of the French courts could be recognised and if not whether it had jurisdiction in the matter. 21. On 5 January 2015 the District Court discontinued the proceedings again, finding that K.B.V. could have exercised her procedural rights before the French courts, submitting her written observations through her representative in the course of the appellate proceedings. This decision was overturned again by the High Court on 5 March 2015 owing to procedural errors. 22. On 22 April 2015 the applicant tried to abduct L., who was walking with his grandfather on the street. Following the incident K.B.V. lodged a criminal complaint against the applicant and requested that a restriction order be imposed on him. On 8 May 2015 the Szombathely District Court issued a restriction order in respect of the applicant, which was subsequently overturned on appeal on the grounds that the mother herself had not been a victim of violent behaviour on the part of the applicant. 23. On 30 April 2015, in an interim decision, the District Court decided not to recognise the judgments adopted by the Thonon-Les-Bains tribunal de grande instance and the Chambery Court of Appeal, established that it did have jurisdiction in the matter, and temporarily placed L. in his mother’s sole custody. According to the District Court the French courts had found that the interests of the child could best be served by his return to France. However, the proceedings before the Thonon-Les-Bains tribunal de grande instance had failed to respect K.B.V.’s right to a fair trial, since – owing to the fact that the applicant had given false information to the French authorities – she had not been informed of the proceedings and had not been able to be heard in person. Thus, the court concluded that the decision could not be recognised, pursuant to Articles 21 § 4 and 23(d) of the Brussels II bis Regulation. It also held that it had jurisdiction under Article 8 (1) of the Brussels II bis Regulation, since the child’s habitual residence was in Hungary. As to the interim resolution of custody rights, the Court held that the interests of the child could be best served if he remained in his habitual environment – that is to say in the company of his mother and maternal grandparents – and that removing him from Hungary would pose a risk of causing him psychological harm. 24. Following a further appeal, on 11 August 2015 the Szombathely High Court overturned the decision concerning custody rights and remitted the case to the first-instance court. As to the decision on the non-recognition of the judgments delivered by the French courts, it found that recognition could not be refused on the basis that K.B.V. had not been heard in person before the French courts, since the Brussels II bis Regulation did not stipulate such an obligation and the mother could have submitted written observations. Nonetheless, the court found that the recognition of the foreign judgments could not be recognised, pursuant to Article 23(b) of the Brussels II bis Regulation, since recognition would have been contrary to the public policy of Hungary, given that the best interests of the child had only been respected in a formalistic way. According to the High Court, restricting the mother’s contact with L. to two hours every second week would have caused harm to L., especially since the applicant himself had stated that L. would be looked after by his sister. The court also had regard to the forensic psychiatric opinion prepared by Dr Gy.L.K. on 28 August 2014 and supplemented by L.K. on 6 March 2015, according to which ‑ from a psychological point of view – the enforcement of the French courts’ judgment would constitute “institutional abuse”. Furthermore, the court found that no measures were being contemplated by the applicant to ensure the protection of the child after his return to France. A petition for judicial review lodged by the applicant with the Kúria was dismissed as time-barred on 15 January 2016. 25. On 13 July 2015, in the course of the custody proceedings, the applicant also lodged a request for an interim measure regulating his access rights. 26. On 8 December 2015 the applicant abducted L. from K.B.V., in the course of which he caused grievous bodily harm to her. L was taken to France. 27. On 10 December 2015 the Szombathely District Court issued an interim decision on the exercise of parental custody and access rights. It noted that since January 2014 the applicant had seen his son only three times and had been in contact with him seven or eight times via Skype. It held that L. needed to have contact with his father and therefore ruled that the applicant could visit him for three hours every second weekend and could contact him via Skype every other weekend. Given the applicant’s violent behaviour towards the mother (and previously towards the child’s grandfather – see paragraph 22 above), the court held that the applicant’s visits should take place under supervision. The applicant appealed. 28. On 11 December 2015 the Szombathely District Court issued a European arrest warrant against the applicant, who was detained in France on 14 December 2015. L. was placed in a childcare institution. 29. By a decision of 24 December 2015 the Thonon-Les-Bains tribunal de grande instance found that the applicant had endangered the child’s development and temporarily placed L. in his mother’s custody. The applicant was granted access rights, in accordance with the Szombathely District Court’s decision of 10 December 2015. The applicant appealed against this decision. 30. L. was returned to Hungary on 28 December 2015. 31. On 3 February 2016 the Szombathely High Court upheld the decision of the District Court of 10 December 2015 on the temporary placement of L. in his mother’s custody, emphasising that the Thonon‑Les‑Bains tribunal de grande instance had arrived at the same conclusion. 32. In the meantime, on 24 February 2015 the applicant applied for the execution of the judgments delivered by the Thonon-Les-Bains tribunal de grande instance and the Chambery Court of Appeal. 33. On 7 September 2015 the Szombathely District Court dismissed the application, relying on the decision of the Szombathely High Court of 11 August 2015 on the non-recognition of the French courts’ judgments. It relied on Article 23(a) of the Brussels II bis Regulation. 34. The applicant appealed, arguing that the District Court had erred in finding that the decision on the non-recognition of the French courts’ judgments was relevant in the case. Since in the meantime the Court of Cassation had overturned the judgment of the Chambery Court of Appeal, the applicant requested the enforcement of the judgment of the Thonon‑Les‑Bains tribunal de grande instance and maintained that this judgment had been declared automatically enforceable. The Szombathely High Court held that the judgment of the Thonon-Les-Bains tribunal de grande instance, under which no rights at all were granted to the mother at all, was contrary to the public policy of Hungary since it did not respect fundamental rights, and in particular the best interest of the child, and refused by a decision of 10 December 2015 to execute it.

5. On 5 and 20 March 2007 the Zagreb County State Attorney’s Office (Županijsko državno odvjetništvo u Zagrebu) asked an investigating judge of the Zagreb County Court (Županijski sud u Zagrebu) to authorise the use of secret surveillance measures in respect of M.M., on the grounds that he was suspected of drug trafficking. 6. During the investigation and while secret surveillance measures were being used against M.M., the authorities intercepted and recorded a number of telephone conversations in connection with drug trafficking. The fourth applicant’s telephone number was noted in that respect. 7. Following an application lodged on 3 May 2007 by the Zagreb County State Attorney’s Office, on 4 May 2007 the investigating judge of the Zagreb County Court authorised the use of secret surveillance measures in respect of the fourth applicant and three other persons, on the grounds that they were suspected of drug trafficking proscribed by Article 173 §§ 1 and 2 of the Criminal Code. Her statement of reasons reads as follows: “On 3 May 2007 the Zagreb County State Attorney’s Office lodged an application for an order for [secret surveillance] measures under Article 180 § 1 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure in respect of A.J., [the fourth applicant], G.P. and N.M., due to [there being] probable cause to believe that the criminal offence proscribed by Article 173 §§ 1 and 2 of the Criminal Code had been committed. The application of the Zagreb County State Attorney’s Office is well founded. The application refers to the police report ... of 3 May 2007 concerning the use of secret surveillance measures in respect of M.M., alleging that there is probable cause to believe that the persons mentioned [in that report] often communicate about purchasing cocaine, [something] which is established on the basis of telephone conversations with M.M., [a person] in respect of whom this court ordered [secret surveillance] measures under Article 180 § 1 (1) and (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure on 5 March 2007. The investigating judge considers that the application is well founded, because in this particular case the investigation of these criminal offences could not be carried out by other means, as [the offences] concern the criminal offence proscribed by Article 173 §§ 1 and 2 of the Criminal Code. Bearing in mind the above facts, the investigating judge [issues] an order under Article 180 § 1 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure ... because the stated circumstances point to there being sufficient grounds for suspecting the commission of the criminal offence proscribed under Article 173 §§ 1 and 2 of the Criminal Code.” 8. On 1 June 2007 the Zagreb County Court issued another order, accepting an application by the Office for the Suppression of Corruption and Organised Crime (Ured za suzbijanje korupcije i organiziranog kriminaliteta, hereinafter “the OSCOC”) for the use of secret surveillance measures for a period of three months in respect of the first and fourth applicants and four other persons, on the grounds that they were suspected of drug trafficking proscribed by Article 173 § 3 of the Criminal Code. The judge’s relevant statement of reasons reads as follows: “In explaining its application for an order implementing measures referred to in Article 180 § 1 (1) [in respect of the first applicant] and (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure [in respect of the first and fourth applicants], the OSCOC refers to the report of the Zagreb Police Department ... of 31 May 2007. Namely, by analysing the implementation of surveillance measures and the recording of telephone conversations, that is remote communication by mobile telephones ... used by A.J. and the number ... used by [the fourth applicant], it was established on several occasions that conversations between the persons concerned and other persons were being held regarding the sale of cocaine, that is that the persons concerned, together with several other persons, continuously, as an organised group, were selling the drug cocaine on the Zagreb narcotics market. In addition to the [information stated] above, it appears that A.J. has three places where he stores drugs ... where there is cocaine, and that G.T., K.K. and [the first applicant] are the persons in charge of [those places], and A.J. is obviously not satisfied with cocaine leaving those places in an uncontrolled manner. ... The enclosed document delivered with the OSCOC’s application ... of 31 May 2007 and the conversations monitored so far indicate that A.J., with the assistance of [the fourth applicant] has organised a criminal group that sells large amounts of cocaine (several kilograms) in the territory of Zagreb and the Republic of Croatia, [a criminal group] which, in addition to [A.J and the fourth applicant] consists of [the first applicant], G.T., K.K. and T.K.. [The first applicant] was also introduced by A.J. and [the fourth applicant] to a legal business for catering facilities, and it appears that he is the third most important person in that organisation, after [the fourth applicant]. It follows that there are grounds for suspicion that the above-mentioned persons are involved in the commission of the offence proscribed by Article 173 § 3 of the Criminal Code. ... Given the information stated above, and since there are grounds for suspicion that an offence of narcotic abuse under Article 173 § 3 of the Criminal Code has been committed and that criminal offences of this kind are still being committed, and taking into consideration that inquiries into the criminal offences could not be carried out in any other way or would be carried out with unreasonable difficulties, given how the offences are committed, the application submitted by OSCOC ought to be accepted ...” 9. On 14 June 2007 the OSCOC requested that an order which included additional telephone numbers be issued against the first applicant and A.J. The following day the investigating judge issued a decision allowing a surveillance measure which included new telephone numbers for a period of three months, and suspended the measure regarding the first applicant’s previous telephone numbers. The investigating judge explained that the police report of 14 June 2007 attached to the OSCOC’s application indicated that the first applicant and A.J. were using new telephone numbers to organise the smuggling and selling of cocaine, and that the measure was necessary in order to identify persons who were committing the criminal offence of drug trafficking – proscribed by Article 173 § 3 of the Criminal Code – together with the first applicant and A.J. The judge further explained that owing to the specific manner in which the latter criminal offence was being committed, inquiries into that criminal offence could not be carried out in any other way, or would be carried out with unreasonable difficulties. 10. While secret surveillance measures were being used against the first applicant, on 27, 28 and 29 June and 2 July 2007 the authorities intercepted and recorded a number of his telephone conversations with the second and third applicants – who lived in the Netherlands at the time – in connection with drug trafficking. 11. On 2 July 2007 the OSCOC requested that the order issued against A.J. and the fourth applicant on 4 May 2007 (see paragraph 7 above) be extended for another two months, stating that the measures carried out thus far indicated that A.J. and the fourth applicant continuously communicated regarding perpetrating the criminal offence proscribed by Article 173 § 3 of the Criminal Code. On the same day the investigating judge allowed the extension, deeming the application “well founded, because in this particular case, the investigation of these criminal offences could not be carried out by other means”. 12. On 6 July 2007 the secret surveillance measures were suspended, since the applicants and several other persons had been arrested and a criminal complaint against them had been filed. 13. On 1 October 2007 the OSCOC indicted the applicants and several other persons in the Zagreb County Court on charges of drug trafficking under Article 173 § 3 of the Criminal Code. In particular, they were charged with associating in the territory of Croatia and the Netherlands from May to July 2007 for the purpose of continuously smuggling large amounts of cocaine from the Netherlands to Croatia, and selling those drugs in Croatian territory with a view to acquiring pecuniary gain. As to the fourth applicant, he was charged with, inter alia, selling cocaine to B.S. in May 2007 in Zagreb, after acquiring that drug from the first applicant. 14. In the course of the proceedings before the Zagreb County Court the applicants challenged the lawfulness of the secret surveillance, alleging that it had not been ordered in accordance with the relevant domestic law and that the evidence so obtained was not relevant or accurate, as nothing suggested that they had been involved in the alleged drug trafficking. 15. On 25 March 2008 the trial court dismissed the applicants’ complaints concerning the alleged unlawfulness of the secret surveillance orders as unfounded, and proceeded with the examination of the case. 16. The latter decision was confirmed by the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske) on 14 May 2008. The relevant statement of reasons given by the Supreme Court reads as follows: “... this second-instance court agrees with the first-instance court’s conclusion that evidence obtained by using an investigative measure ordered against a person in respect of whom there is a reasonable suspicion that he is committing, alone or jointly with others, one of the criminal offences proscribed under Article 181 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, can be used not only against [that person], but also against every other person caught participating in [that person’s] criminal activity, [when] the criminal activity of the other person amounts to the criminal offence proscribed under Article 181 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but always on the condition that the other person has been caught acting together with the person against whom one of the measures under Article 180 § 1(1)-(6) has been lawfully issued. ... Section 22 of the Office for the Suppression of Corruption and Organised Crime Act (Zakon o Uredu za suzbijanje korupcije i organiziranog kriminaliteta, hereinafter ‘the OSCOC Act’) provides that in proceedings concerning criminal offences under section 21 of the OSCOC Act, the Code of Criminal Procedure and other general provisions of criminal procedure shall apply, unless the OSCOC Act provides otherwise. Section 42(1) of the OSCOC Act is an extension of section 41 of that Act. [Section41] provides that other measures provided for in that section may be ordered for criminal offences set out in that section, in addition to measures under Article 180 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Therefore, the content of the cited provisions of the OSCOC Act, to which the appellants refer in their appeals, does not exclude the application of special measures under Article 180 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but such measures are extended in respect of some criminal offences by the measures provided for under section 41 of the OSCOC Act. Consequently, in its application for special measures of inquiry into criminal offences proscribed by Article 173 § 3 of the Criminal Code in the specific case against the defendants, the OSCOC proposed the application of the provisions of Article 180 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which the court had applied when issuing the order ... of 1 June 2007. Therefore, since the OSCOC has jurisdiction over proceedings regarding the criminal offence under Article 173 § 3 of the Criminal Code and proposed ordering special measures of inquiry into such an offence under Article 180 § 1of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the court accepted the application, which is why the issued order is not unlawful. Furthermore, applying Article 180 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to the order at issue, even though daily reports and documentation regarding technical recordings drafted by the members of the police authorities who were implementing the ordered measures were not delivered to the investigating judge on a daily basis – the judge did not ask for this under Article 182a of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but this was done after the special measures had been implemented – this does not render the order in question unlawful pursuant to Article 9 §§ 1 and 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, nor does it make the material evidence obtained from the measures unlawful, contrary to the allegations in the defendants’ appeals. ... restricting the freedom and confidentiality of correspondence ... was necessary for conducting the criminal proceedings. It was not contrary to Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms or contrary to the criteria set by the European Court of Human Rights, because it was based on the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, had a legitimate aim, and was necessary, taking into account all the specific circumstances involved in establishing the perpetrators of the criminal offence.” 17. At a hearing held on 15 December 2008 the trial court heard M.S., a witness called by the fourth applicant. M.S. stated that he had been friends with the fourth applicant, whom he had asked to watch over his son, B.S., who had been a drug addict. In May 2007 B.S. had gone to Zagreb to purchase an air-conditioning device. B.S. had subsequently told him that in Zagreb he had purchased drugs from some people. 18. At a hearing held on 30 January 2009 the trial court heard B.S., a witness called by the fourth applicant. B.S. stated that in May 2007 he had purchased cocaine from S.H., and not from the fourth applicant, and that this fact could be confirmed by A.P. and M.D., who had been with him on that day. The fourth applicant then asked to call A.P. and M.D., who he said would testify about the circumstances in which B.S. had purchased cocaine in May 2007. The trial court dismissed that proposal. 19. On 4 February 2009 the Zagreb County Court found the applicants guilty as charged and sentenced the first applicant to ten years’ imprisonment, the second and the third applicants to six years’ imprisonment, and the fourth applicant to seven years’ imprisonment. In convicting them, the Zagreb County Court relied on the recordings obtained by secret surveillance, finding them lawful and credible. As to the fourth applicant, it explained that it had refused to hear A.P. and M.D. as witnesses since at that point it had already been established beyond doubt, on the basis of the results of the secret surveillance measures and the cocaine found on B.S., that B.S. had purchased the cocaine from the fourth applicant. 20. The applicants challenged the Zagreb County Court’s judgment by lodging appeals with the Supreme Court. They contended that the secret surveillance orders had lacked the relevant reasoning as to the lawfulness and necessity of such surveillance. Moreover, they contended that the procedure for supervising the execution of the secret surveillance orders, which in the case at hand had been based on the Code of Criminal Procedure, should have been based on special legislation concerning organised crime (the OSCOC Act). The OSCOC Act required the police to submit daily reports to the investigating judge concerning the execution of such orders, something which had not been done in their case. The applicants further challenged the findings which were based on the recordings obtained by secret surveillance. The second and third applicants also contended that the secret surveillance orders had not been issued in respect of them, and that the secret surveillance had been conducted outside Croatian territory in the absence of a request for international legal assistance in criminal matters. In their view, there was no provision for this in the relevant domestic law, and thus the secret surveillance carried out in respect of them had run counter to Article 36 of the Constitution and Article 8 of the Convention. The fourth applicant also complained that the trial court had failed to call two defence witnesses he had asked to be called (A.P. and M.D.), who would have confirmed B.S.’ statement that he had not purchased cocaine from the fourth applicant, but from S.H. Lastly, the first applicant, who disputed his conviction and sentence, challenging all factual aspects of the case and alleging procedural errors in the trial, asked that his lawyer be allowed to attend the session of the appeal panel. 21. On 21 September 2009 the State Attorney’s Office of the Republic of Croatia (Državno odvjetništvo Republike Hrvatske) submitted a reasoned opinion proposing that the applicants’ appeals be dismissed. That opinion was not forwarded to the defence. 22. On 13 January 2010 the Supreme Court informed the parties that a session of the appeal panel would be held on 9 March 2010. The parties were invited to attend, but it was expressly stated that the presence of the accused, who were in pre-trial detention and had a lawyer, would not be ensured, and that there would be no order for them to be brought to court. 23. On 9 March 2010 the Supreme Court held a session in the presence of the applicants’ lawyers and the Deputy State Attorney of the Republic of Croatia (Zamjenik Glavnog državnog odvjetnika Republike Hrvatske, hereinafter, “the Deputy State Attorney”). That court stated that it had decided that it would not be useful to have the accused, who were represented by lawyers, brought from pre-trial detention. The Deputy State Attorney stated that he confirmed the proposal submitted under Article 373 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 21 above and 33 below). The parties stated that they had no objections as to how the session had been conducted or the content of the record of the session. The record of the session was signed by the appeal panel president and the clerk. 24. On the same day the Supreme Court dismissed the applicants’ appeals and upheld their convictions. It held that all the secret surveillance orders had essentially provided sufficient reasoning. It explained that although the orders – apart from the first one issued against the fourth applicant – had been based on the Code of Criminal Procedure and not on the special legislation concerning organised crime (the OSCOC Act), that on its own did not render them unlawful. Section 41 and section 42(1) of the OSCOC Act provided for the possibility of ordering such measures. Also, the fact that the police had not submitted daily reports to the investigating judge concerning the execution of the orders did not render the secret surveillance orders unlawful, because a report had been submitted after the measures had been implemented. The court further held that the sovereignty of the Netherlands had not been violated by the interception of the second and third applicants’ telephone conversations, since the Croatian authorities had never issued a secret surveillance order against them. The secret surveillance orders had been lawfully issued in respect of several people in Croatia whom the second and third applicants – who had lived in the Netherlands at the time – had contacted. Since the second and third applicants had participated in the criminal activities of the persons under secret surveillance – activities which had amounted to the criminal offence proscribed under Article 181 of the Code of Criminal Procedure – such evidence (intercepted telephone conversations) could be used in the criminal proceedings against them. The Supreme Court also indicated that the trial court had correctly established the facts which were based on the applicants’ telephone conversations recorded by secret surveillance. 25. The applicants challenged those findings by lodging constitutional complaints with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske). They reiterated their complaints concerning the secret surveillance and the use of evidence so obtained in the criminal proceedings against them. The first, second and third applicants contended that the reasoned opinion of the State Attorney’s Office of the Republic of Croatia submitted during the appeal proceedings had not been forwarded to the defence. In addition, the first applicant complained that even though the Supreme Court had examined a number of legal and factual issues, including the question of an appropriate sentence which he had raised in his appeal, he had not been invited to attend the session of the appeal panel. The fourth applicant also complained that the domestic courts had failed to call two defence witnesses he had wished to call. 26. On 9 January 2014 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicants’ constitutional complaints, upholding the findings of the Supreme Court. As to the first, second and third applicants’ complaint concerning the reasoned opinion of the State Attorney’s Office of the Republic of Croatia not being forwarded to the defence, the Constitutional Court noted that at the session of the appeal panel the Deputy State Attorney had reiterated the arguments submitted in the opinion in question. The applicants’ lawyers had attended the session and had therefore had the opportunity to have knowledge of and comment on those submissions. As to the fourth applicant’s complaint that the trial court had refused to hear two witnesses whom he had wished to call, the Constitutional Court noted that the trial court had given reasons for doing so. 27. The decisions of the Constitutional Court were served on the lawyer representing the first, second and third applicants and the lawyer representing the fourth applicant on 21 and 24 February 2014 respectively.

5. The applicant was born in 1938 and lives in Tbilisi. 6. On 10 September 2003 the applicant was dismissed from a printing company. He brought proceedings against his employer. 7. At the preparatory hearing of 26 December 2003 the Didube‑Chugureti District Court in Tbilisi (“the District Court”) scheduled the main hearing for 3.30 p.m. on 28 January 2004. The preparatory hearing was attended both by the applicant and his lawyer. On 22 January 2004 the applicant’s lawyer wrote to the court informing that he was due to attend a hearing for an appeal on points of law before the Supreme Court of Georgia at 3 p.m. on 28 January 2004 and therefore could not be present. He requested that the hearing be adjourned. No reply followed. 8. The District Court held the hearing on 28 January 2004 as planned. The applicant appeared and submitted that, as he was not a lawyer, he would be unable to argue his case in the absence of his representative. He requested that the hearing be adjourned so that he could be represented by his lawyer. Counsel for the opposing party objected to the request and asked the first-instance court to issue a default judgment against the applicant. The record of the hearing shows that the judge warned the applicant that, if he refused to take any further part, “the court would give a decision in absentia”. The applicant, however, repeated that he would be unable to present his case without his lawyer. 9. According to the record of the hearing, the District Court did not consider the applicant’s request for an adjournment. It ruled that his refusal to participate in the hearing equated to a failure to appear in court within the meaning of Article 232 of the Code of Civil Procedure (“the CCP”, see paragraph 20 below). In view of the above, and concluding that the applicant had been duly summoned to the hearing in accordance with Articles 70 to 73 of the CCP, the judge issued, in accordance with Article 229 § 1 of the CCP (see paragraph 20 below), a default judgment rejecting the applicant’s action without examining it or giving any reasons. 10. The decision stated in its operative part that an application to set aside the judgment could be made to the same court within ten days. 11. The applicant’s lawyer filed an application to set aside the judgment, enclosing a letter from the Supreme Court dated 5 February 2004 confirming that he had participated in the hearing of an appeal on points of law at 3 p.m. on 28 January 2004. He argued that his involvement in the examination of another case was a “valid reason” for his absence (see Articles 233 and 241 of the CCP as cited in paragraph 20 below). 12. On 19 March 2004 the same District Court judge confirmed his own decision of 28 January 2004. He found that the applicant had been summoned to the hearing in accordance with the rules set out in Articles 70 to 78 of the CCP, and pointed out that there was no legal requirement to also summon a party’s lawyer. When he had appeared before the court, the applicant had stated that he objected to the examination of the case without his lawyer present and had refused to take part in the hearing. As conduct of that sort equated to a failure to appear under Article 232 of the CCP and none of the circumstances provided for by Article 233 of the CCP had been established, the judge decided that Article 241 of the CCP should not be applied to set aside the default judgment. 13. The applicant appealed against the decision of 19 March 2004. On 16 July 2004 the Tbilisi Regional Court (“the Regional Court”) found that, in breach of Article 72(z) of the CCP, the applicant and his lawyer had not been properly warned of the consequences of not appearing before the court. Moreover, at the hearing on 28 January 2004 the District Court had not properly explained to the applicant what a default judgment would mean for him. The Regional Court considered that, as the applicant was not a lawyer, he could not have known that a decision in absentia would necessarily be to his detriment. Therefore, as the caution provided for in Articles 70 to 78 had not been issued in the present case, the Regional Court held that there were grounds, under Articles 233 and 241 of the CCP, for setting aside the decision of 19 March 2004. The applicant’s appeal was thus remitted to the District Court for re-examination. 14. The applicant’s former employer lodged an appeal on points of law against the appeal judgment. 15. On 2 March 2005 the Supreme Court of Georgia found that, contrary to the Regional Court’s assertion, the applicant had been informed in the hearing notice of the consequences of a failure to appear. There had therefore been no violation of Article 72(z) of the CCP. The Supreme Court also found that, according to the record of the hearing of 28 January 2004, the judge had warned the applicant that “in the event of a refusal to take part in the hearing, a decision [would] be given in absentia”. The applicant had therefore been sufficiently informed of the consequences of his conduct. Lastly, the Supreme Court pointed out that a court could give a decision in absentia if a lawyer or a party failed to appear at a hearing, on condition that the party had been summoned in accordance with the rules set out in Articles 70 to 78 of the CCP. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the Regional Court’s judgment of 16 July 2004 and remitted the case. 16. On 10 May 2005 the Regional Court followed the Supreme Court’s reasoning and added that the applicant’s lawyer’s involvement in another hearing was not a “valid reason” for setting aside the decision in absentia, given that Article 232 of the CCP did not specify on what grounds a party could refuse to take part in a hearing. According to the Regional Court, this meant that any refusal to take part in the hearing was unjustified. It therefore upheld the decision of 19 March 2004. 17. An appeal on points of law by the applicant was dismissed on 16 September 2005. The Supreme Court ruled that Article 241 contained an exhaustive list of the grounds on which a default judgment could be set aside. It further concluded, in contrast with the finding of the Regional Court on 16 July 2004, that the applicant had been duly informed of the consequences of his failure to appear at the hearing. Thus, this argument could not have served as a valid basis for a re-examination of the case in accordance with Article 241 of the CCP. 18. Nor did the applicant’s refusal to participate in a trial for whatever reason, according to the Supreme Court, merit a re-examination of the case. It emphasised in this connection that the refusal to participate equated to a failure to appear in terms of its legal consequences. 19. No appeal lay against the above decision of the Supreme Court.

4. The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Golasowice. 5. On 1 February 1999 the applicant instituted civil proceedings before the Jastrzębie Zdrój District Court for the purposes of establishing an easement. In particular the applicant sought a decision allowing her to use a strip of land belonging to her neighbours as a roadway allowing her access to her property. The roadway in question, which has been used by her in the past, runs along a causeway (grobla) between fishponds. 6. By a decision of 11 July 2000 (file no. I Ns 57/99) the Jastrzębie Zdrój District Court allowed the applicant’s claim. The other party appealed against this decision. 7. On 15 November 2000 the Katowice Regional Court quashed the first-instance decision and remitted the case (file no. III Ca 661/00). 8. At a hearing on 13 March 2001 the court ordered the preparation of an expert opinion. Two experts declined the invitation to prepare an opinion, and the third expert approached by the court eventually prepared it on 17 October 2001. 9. The defendants contested both the expert opinion itself and the fee for drafting it. In March 2002 they requested preparation of another expert opinion. 10. It appears that the next hearing was held on 23 April 2002. The court questioned the expert and appointed another one to assess the value of the plot of land. 11. On 12 November 2002 the court held a viewing of the property. 12. At a hearing on 13 January 2003 the court decided to appoint yet another expert to establish whether the easement would have any impact on the fishponds. The opinion was submitted to the court on 11 April 2003. The expert was questioned at a hearing on 3 July 2003. On 27 January 2004 another expert submitted a complementary opinion, at the request of the court. 13. The next hearing was held on 17 June 2004. The court subsequently dealt with an application lodged by the applicant to exempt her from payment of the fees for the expert opinion. 14. On 2 June 2005 the Jastrzębie Zdrój District Court allowed, in essence, the applicant’s claim (file no. I Ns 57/99). The other party appealed against the decision. 15. On 26 January 2006 (file no. III Ca 1322/05) the Gliwice Regional Court quashed the first-instance decision and remitted the case for the second time. 16. At a hearing on 26 June 2006 the court requested preparation of an expert geological opinion. The opinion was submitted one year later, on 22 June 2007. 17. At a hearing on 18 October 2007 the court decided that further defendants should join the proceedings. 18. A viewing of the land took place on 6 November 2007. Afterwards anther expert opinion on road construction was ordered by the court. It was submitted to the court in January 2008 and the parties duly commented on it. 19. At a hearing on 23 July 2008 the court questioned the expert and requested the preparation of another expert opinion on the value of the plot of land. 20. The opinion was submitted to the court on 12 January 2009. 21. The court held a hearing on 25 November 2009 and decided to hold another viewing of the property. Two subsequent viewings scheduled for December 2009 and February 2010 were cancelled due to the weather conditions. 22. A hearing was held on 4 March 2010 and on 30 April 2010 the court held a viewing of the land. 23. Another expert opinion ordered by the court was prepared on 6 August 2010. 24. The court held hearings in March 2011. On 31 March 2011 it gave a decision granting the applicant the easement in question. 25. The defendants appealed. 26. On 22 February 2012 the Gliwice Regional Court finally dismissed the appeals. 27. On 9 December 2004 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Gliwice Regional Court under the Law of 17 June 2004 on complaint about breach of the right to have a case examined in judicial proceedings without undue delay (ustawa o skardze na naruszenie prawa strony do rozpoznania sprawy w postępowaniu sądowym bez nieuzasadnionej zwłoki – “the 2004 Act”). She stated that she had lodged her claim in 1999 and that her case had still not been examined. She also claimed PLN 10,000 in compensation. 28. By a decision of 21 December 2004 (file no. III S 36/04) the Gliwice Regional Court rejected the claim on formal grounds, having found that the applicant “had not specified the circumstances on which her complaint had been based.” 29. Subsequently, the applicant lodged another complaint under the 2004 Act. She sought a finding that the length of the proceedings had been excessive and claimed PLN 10,000 in compensation. 30. By a decision of 5 April 2006 (file no. III S 7/06) the Gliwice Regional Court dismissed the claim. It analysed in detail the course of the proceedings after September 2004 and held that they had generally been conducted in a correct and timely manner. As regards the period prior to September 2004, the court relied on the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence and held that the 2004 Act applied to delays caused by the court’s inactivity occurring before that date but only if that delay still continued; what had not been the case in the case under the consideration.

5. The applicant was born in 1990 and lives in Moscow. 6. The background facts relating to the planning, conduct and dispersal of the demonstration at Bolotnaya Square are set out in more detail in Frumkin v. Russia (no. 74568/12, §§ 7-65, 5 January 2016), and Yaroslav Belousov v. Russia (nos. 2653/13 and 60980/14, §§ 7-33, 4 October 2016). The parties’ submissions on the circumstances directly relevant to the present case are set out below. 7. On 6 May 2012 a public demonstration entitled the “March of Millions” was held in central Moscow to protest against the allegedly rigged presidential elections. The event had been approved by the city authorities in the form of a march followed by a meeting at Bolotnaya Square which was supposed to end at 7.30 p.m. The march was peaceful and held without any disruptions, but when the marchers arrived at Bolotnaya Square it became apparent that barriers installed by the police had narrowed the entrance to the meeting venue, allegedly restricting the space allocated for the meeting. To control the crowd the police cordon forced the protestors to remain within the barriers; there were numerous clashes between the two sides. At 5.30 p.m. the police ordered the meeting to finish early and began to disperse the participants. It took them about two hours to clear the square. 8. On the same day the Moscow city department of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation opened criminal proceedings to investigate suspected acts of mass disorder and violence against the police (Articles 212 § 2 and 318 § 1 of the Criminal Code). On 18 May 2012 the file was transferred to the headquarters of the Investigative Committee for further investigation. On 28 May 2012 an investigation was also launched into the criminal offence of organising acts of mass disorder (Article 212 § 1 of the Criminal Code). The two criminal cases were joined on the same day. 9. At the time of his arrest the applicant was working as an artist. According to him, on 6 May 2012 he arrived at Kaluzhskaya Square to take part in the march and walked down Yakimanka Street to Bolotnaya Square. He passed the metal detectors and joined other protestors in front of the stage, where a rock group was performing. Sometime after 6 p.m. he walked towards Malyy Kamenyy Bridge but discovered that movement in that direction had been blocked by a police cordon. The applicant walked back, staying in the general area; at around 7.30 p.m. groups of police officers started pushing into the crowd, forcing it apart by using their truncheons. Protestors were surrounded and squeezed together. At some point the applicant realised that he was facing the police line and that the police were using excessive force to arrest protestors. The applicant was both angered and scared by the actions of the police and actively resisted. He was eventually seized by four police officers and escorted to a police car, which took him to a police station. 10. On 14 May 2012 the Justice of the Peace of the 100th Court Circuit of the Yakimanka District of Moscow found the applicant guilty of non‑compliance with a lawful order by a police officer, an offence under Article 19.3 of the Code of Administrative Offences. The Justice of the Peace established that after the meeting at Bolotnaya Square the applicant had shouted anti-government slogans, ignoring the lawful demands of the police to cease those acts. He had thrown objects at the police officers, including stones, flagpoles, empty plastic bottles, and pieces of asphalt, and had refused to proceed to the police van. The applicant was sentenced to detention of twenty-four hours. It appears that after his release the applicant continued to live at his usual address and pursue his customary activities. 11. On 28 May 2012 the applicant’s flat was searched. On the same day he was detained on suspicion of participation in acts of mass disorder and of committing violent acts against the police on 6 May 2012. 12. On 30 May 2012 the Basmannyy District Court of Moscow ordered that the applicant be placed in pre-trial detention until 6 July 2012. It referred to the gravity of the charges and stated that if he was at liberty the applicant could co-ordinate his position with accomplices whose identities were still being established by the investigation. The court also pointed out that the applicant had forcefully resisted the police officers during his arrest, which had led to them using force and handcuffs against him. In addition, the court relied on information obtained from undercover sources that the applicant had connections with football fans and groups of anarchists. The applicant denied that allegation and challenged the use of information from undisclosed sources. However, the court concluded that there were sufficient reasons to believe that he was likely to abscond, continue his criminal activity, threaten witnesses, destroy evidence or otherwise obstruct the course of the criminal proceedings. It dismissed a request from the applicant for an alternative preventive measure and found that his release was not required on health grounds. 13. On 4 June 2012 the applicant lodged an appeal against the detention order, which was dismissed by the Moscow City Court on 27 June 2012. 14. On 5 June 2012 charges were brought against the applicant under two Articles of the Criminal Code, Articles 212 § 2 (participation in acts of mass disorder accompanied by violence) and 318 § 1 (use of violence against a public official). He was accused, in particular, of active resistance to police officers and of participation in a group assault on a police officer whereby the applicant had allegedly pulled a protective helmet off the officer’s head and had punched and kicked him on the head and body. 15. On 4 July 2012 the Basmannyy District Court examined an application from the investigator for an extension of the applicant’s pre-trial detention. The applicant argued that he had no criminal record, was in work, and had a permanent residence in Moscow where he lived with his family. He denied any involvement with football fans or anarchists and asked for the preventive measure to be changed to house arrest. On the same day the District Court granted the investigator’s application and extended the applicant’s detention until 6 November 2012. It relied on the gravity of the charges and information on the applicant’s character, which gave it sufficient grounds to presume that he might reoffend, threaten witnesses and other participants of the criminal proceedings, destroy evidence or otherwise obstruct the proper administration of justice. 16. On 12 July 2012 the applicant lodged an appeal against the extension order, which was dismissed by the Moscow City Court on 6 August 2012. 17. On 31 October 2012 the Basmannyy District Court examined a new application for an extension of the applicant’s pre-trial detention. Referring to the gravity of the charges and the complexity of the criminal investigation, the court extended his detention until 6 March 2013. 18. On 13 November 2012 the applicant lodged an appeal against the extension order, which was dismissed on 3 December 2012 by the Moscow City Court. 19. On 16 November 2012 the charges against the applicant were updated. The classification of the offences remained unchanged but it was specified that the applicant had struck the police officer once on the head and had kicked him once on the body while he was lying on the ground. 20. On 1 March 2013 the Basmannyy District Court authorised a further extension of the applicant’s detention until 28 May 2013. The court relied on the gravity of the charges and the need to allow the defendants sufficient time to read the investigation case file. That decision was upheld by the Moscow City Court on 10 April 2013. 21. On 23 April 2013 the Moscow City Court granted an extension of the applicant’s detention until 6 July 2013. The court noted that even though the applicant and his lawyer had already finished reading the case file, other defendants had not. It reiterated the grounds given in the previous extension orders and stated that the circumstances justifying the detention order had not changed. The Moscow City Court upheld that decision on 30 May 2013. 22. On 24 May 2013 the applicant’s criminal case was transferred to the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow for the determination of criminal charges. 23. On 6 June 2013 that court granted another extension of the applicant’s detention, until 24 November 2013. The decision concerned eleven defendants. Along with the gravity of the charges, the court based its decision on the findings that “the reasons which initially warranted the detention have not changed” and that “no other measures of restraint would secure the aims and goals of the judicial proceedings”. The Moscow City Court upheld that extension order on 2 July 2013. 24. On 19 November 2013 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court granted another extension of detention in respect of nine defendants, including the applicant. It ordered their detention until 24 February 2014 on the grounds of the gravity of the charges and the nature of the offences imputable to them. On 17 December 2013 the Moscow City Court upheld that extension order. 25. On 6 June 2013 court proceedings began in hearing room no. 338 at the Moscow City Court, moving at the end of July 2013 to hearing room no. 635. The defendants, including the applicant, were held in glass cabins in both hearing rooms. From mid-September 2013 to the end of 2013 the hearings continued at the Nikulinskiy District Court of Moscow in hearing room no. 303, while in January and February 2014 they took place at the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court in hearing room no. 410. Those hearing rooms were equipped with metal cages in which nine defendants (seven from 19 December 2013), including the applicant, sat during the hearings. 26. For a detailed description of the conditions in those hearing rooms see Yaroslav Belousov (cited above, §§ 74-77). 27. On 6 June 2013 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow began a preliminary hearing in a criminal case against ten participants in the demonstration at Bolotnaya Square, who were charged with participation in acts of mass disorder and committing acts of violence against police officers. On 18 June 2013 the court began the trial on the merits. 28. On an unidentified date Police Officer K., the alleged victim of the applicant’s assault, was examined as a witness. He testified that he had been carrying out an order to split the crowd up when someone had pulled at his bullet-proof vest. He had fallen to the ground; someone had hit him several times and had taken off his anti-riot helmet. Other police officers had picked him up to take away him from the crowd. As a result of his fall and the blows, he had sustained injuries. Another police officer, V.K., testified that the applicant had kicked an unidentified police officer. 29. Three other officers, also examined as witnesses, stated that the applicant had resisted arrest by planting his feet firmly on the ground and attempting to escape. He had also uttered obscenities to the police officers and shouted at them. 30. On 21 February 2014 the Zamoskvoretsky District Court found the applicant guilty as charged. It held, in particular, as follows: “Between 4 p.m. and 8 p.m. on 6 May 2012 ... at Bolotnaya Square ... unidentified persons ... called those present [at the venue] to move outside the agreed meeting venue, to defy the lawful orders of the police ..., to use violence ... which led to mass disorder accompanied by the use of violence against public officials in connection with the performance of their duties [and] the destruction of property. On the same day at 5 p.m. at the latest [the defendants] acquired the criminal intent to participate in mass disorder and to use violence against ... police officers ... Moreover ... the participants of the acts of mass disorder threw chunks of tarmac, stones, sticks and other objects at the police ... which hit them on various parts of their body, and [the defendants] ... [who] participated in the acts of mass disorder ... implemented their criminal intent to use violence against public officials ... applied physical force which was not a danger to the life or health of those [officials] ... Thus, [the applicant] used violence against Police Officer [K.] which did not endanger his life or health ... ... between 5.10 p.m. and 8.20 p.m. ... unidentified participants of acts of mass disorder ... intentionally seized [K.] by his uniform and knocked him down, while [the applicant] together with other unidentified participants of acts of mass disorder, acting intentionally ... tore off [K.’s] anti-riot helmet ... and punched and kicked him several times on his head and body, meanwhile [the applicant] punched [K.’s] head at least once and at least once kicked [K.] on the body when the latter was lying on the ground. ... [The applicant] ... pleaded not guilty and testified that ... he wanted to see why the meeting was not starting and went to Malyy Kamennyy Bridge where he saw the cordon ... Around 7.30 p.m. [the applicant] saw how police officers ... started beating people with truncheons. ... Then a jam occurred ... At some point [the applicant] found himself in the first line and saw the police officers harshly arresting and beating people, who tried to evade the blows. He was hit several times on the shoulder and the head, which led to dizziness. He was scared, he felt that his life was in danger, and while in a state of fury he moved towards a police officer, who happened to be [K.] and then moved his leg towards the police officer, who was getting up. [The applicant] did not see who knocked the latter down... [He] did not know whether his hand reached the target but supposed that he was able to touch the bullet-proof vest. He definitely did not touch [K.] with his leg and he caused him no harm. A few minutes later he was taken out of the crowd and beaten, his T-shirt was torn, then ... four police officers seized him and dragged him along the tarmac to the police vehicle. [The applicant] insists that he caused no injuries to the police officer and that his actions, provoked by panic, were taken in response to the events occurring around him. ... ... the court considers the [defendants’] arguments that they were protecting somebody from the police officers or happened to be victims of the police’s use of force as farfetched and aimed at the mitigation of their responsibility ... ... no medical document which could prove the presence of injuries on the [applicant’s] body ... was provided to the court.” 31. The applicant was sentenced to three years and seven months’ imprisonment, calculated on the basis of a three-year prison term under Article 212 § 2 of the Criminal Code, partly concurrent with a term of one year and eight months under Article 318 § 1 of the Criminal Code. The applicant’s pre-trial detention counted towards the prison sentence. 32. The applicant appealed against the judgment. He contested the classification of the crimes under both Article 212 and Article 318 of the Criminal Code. He insisted that he had been a victim of unlawful police action and that his involvement in using violence against the police officer has not been proven. 33. On 20 June 2014 the Moscow City Court upheld the first-instance judgment.

4. The applicants are a family. They were born in 1971, 1968, 1992, 1995, and live in Samara. 5. On 26 April 2004 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Samara (“the Oktyabrskiy District Court”) ordered, inter alia, the management of the State unitary enterprise “16th Military Plant” (“the company”) to provide the applicants with a suitable dwelling, while keeping their names on the list of persons awaiting housing. 6. On 11 May 2004 the judgment came into force. 7. On 28 May 2004 the Department of the Bailiffs’ Service for Oktyabrskiy District of Samara opened the enforcement proceedings. 8. On 22 December 2004 the enforcement proceedings were terminated as the company had no available residential accommodation. 9. On 1 October 2007, due to the reorganisation of the company (see paragraph 16 below), the enforcement file was sent to the Department of the Bailiffs’ Service for the Engelsskiy District of Saratov Region. 10. On 21 April 2008 the bailiffs ruled that it was impossible to enforce the judgment in the part relating to the housing, as the new debtor, FGUP 9 TSARZ (see paragraph 16 below), had no available accommodation. The enforcement proceedings were terminated. 11. On 26 August 2009 the Engelsskiy District Court of Saratov Region, following the bailiffs’ application, replaced the debtor in the enforcement proceedings from FGUP 9 TSARZ to OAO 9 TSARZ (see paragraph 17 below). 12. On 14 October 2009 the Oktyabrskiy District Court clarified the judgment of 26 April 2004 stating that the applicants should be provided with an apartment in Samara. 13. Several times in 2004-2011 the parties applied to the Oktyabrskiy District Court for changing the mode of enforcement of the judgment. Each time the courts rejected the applications finding that a payment of the amount representing the cost of an apartment would be equal to modifying the original judgment. 14. The judgment of 26 April 2004 remained unenforced. 15. The company was incorporated as a municipal unitary enterprise. According to its articles of association, the company’s aim was to produce goods and render services for the Ministry of Defense of Russia, as well as for meeting other public needs and making a profit. 16. Under the Order of the Federal Agency for State Property Management dated 22 September 2005 the company was joined to FGUP 9 TSARZ (FGUP 9 Tsentralnyy Avtomobilnyy Remontnyy Zavod – ФГУП 9 ЦАРЗ or ФГУП 9 Центральный Автомобильный Ремонтный Завод). The reorganisation was completed on 13 February 2007, and the latter company became the universal successor of the company. 17. In accordance with the Decree of the President of Russia of 15 September 2008 and the Decree of the Russian Government of 22 November 2008, FGUP 9 TSARZ was further reorganized into OAO 9 TSARZ, a publicly-traded private open joint-stock company incorporated under the laws of Russia.

5. The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Riga. At the material time he was the chairman of the supervisory board of a Latvian bank – Latvijas Krājbanka (“Krājbanka” or “the Bank”). The State held 32.12% of its shares. 6. A.L. was one of the shareholders of Krājbanka. He was also the President of the Bank until January 2002, when he voluntarily stepped down from this position. In November 2002 he was elected as a member of the Latvian Parliament (Saeima), representing a newly established political party, Latvijas Pirmā Partija (the Latvia’s First Party – also referred to below as the “Pastors’ Party”), which had been established in the same year. 7. At the material time an advertising agency, Z., was contracted by both Krājbanka and the Latvia’s First Party to provide certain advertising services. 8. Neatkarīgā Rīta Avīze (“NRA”) was one of the main daily newspapers in Latvia at the material time. It was published by a joint-stock company, Preses Nams (until 2 January 2003) and, subsequently, by the limited liability company Mediju Nams. 9. On 30 September 2002 the applicant prepared a report on the advertising and marketing expenses incurred by Krājbanka in 2001 and the first seven months of 2002, which he then presented to the Bank’s supervisory board. His report was based on information which he had requested from the heads of the marketing and economics departments. According to the applicant’s report, the Bank had transferred substantial sums for advertising and marketing services to, inter alia, Z., for which no supporting documents could be found. This raised suspicions that the Bank’s funds had been misappropriated. The parties did not provide the Court with a copy of the applicant’s report, nor any further details of that report. 10. On 2 October 2002 the Bank’s supervisory board held an extraordinary meeting and ordered an internal audit to verify the applicant’s findings. At a meeting of 16 October 2002 the head of the internal audit department informed the supervisory board that no undocumented advertising and marketing expenses had been incurred. In response to press reports (see paragraphs 13 et seq. below), the internal audit had verified all deals concluded with Z. in 2002; the internal audit in relation to 2001 was ongoing. The information published in the press had not been confirmed. The conclusions of the final report, dated 30 October 2002, indicated that in 2001 no undocumented advertising and marketing expenses had been incurred. All contracted services had been received, but on some occasions no supporting documents have been kept (for example, copies of certain advertisements in the press and some printed material – such as concert posters and tickets – were no longer available). 11. On 16 October 2002 the supervisory board ordered an additional external audit. In May 2003 the audit agency in its report concluded that while the advertising and marketing expenses incurred in 2001 (755,000 Latvian lati (LVL), approximately 1,074,268 euros (EUR)) and 2002 (LVL 555,000, approximately EUR 789,694) had been greater than in previous years (in 1998 the figure had been LVL 374,000, approximately EUR 532,154; in 1999, LVL 324,000, approximately EUR 461,010; and in 2000, LVL 640,000, approximately EUR 910,638), this could be explained by the fact that the Bank had been in the process of changing its corporate identity during the period under consideration. This process had continued while the external audit was being carried out and the Bank had incurred more expenses in this regard. All contracts with Z. had been approved and signed by the Bank’s highest management. The external audit concluded that there was no evidence that payments had been made for services or goods that had not been received or that the payments had exceeded the value of the services received. No personal links had been found between A.L. or the Bank’s staff members and the advertising companies. There was no evidence that the staff members had been forced to work with the particular service provider or to prepare documents for services which the Bank had not received. 12. Meanwhile, A.L. applied to have criminal proceedings instituted in respect of the alleged intentional dissemination of false information about him. By a final decision of 13 August 2003 the prosecution refused to institute criminal proceedings. The information and conclusions, which the applicant had provided to the journalists, had been based on erroneous findings contained in the applicant’s initial report on the advertising and marketing expenses. However, there was no evidence that the applicant had intentionally disseminated false information about A.L. The latter was informed of his right to lodge a civil claim in that regard. 13. Between August 2002 and May 2003 NRA published numerous articles on various topics of public interest concerning the 2002 parliamentary elections. It appears that NRA journalists contacted the applicant for a comment shortly after the meeting of 2 October 2012 of the Bank’s supervisory board had taken place. 14. In their submissions to the Court, the parties disagreed on the manner and form in which the applicant had provided the respective information to the NRA journalists. The Government stated that the applicant had provided this information to the journalists on several occasions, and that his comments, which had contained concrete descriptions of A.L.’s actions, had been provided in the form of facts susceptible of proof. The applicant, however, stated that he had only on one occasion provided a short comment to the journalists via telephone about the issues discussed at the meeting of the Bank’s supervisory board. Furthermore, the comments had constituted merely his own opinion about Krājbanka’s management; they had still needed to be verified by the Bank’s internal audit. 15. The following excerpts are from nine articles, which were published between 3 and 23 October 2002, and which were based on the information provided by the applicant in this regard: 1. “ ‘Krājbanka’s former management accused of fraud’ ... [Since] the beginning of 2001, [LVL] 522,000 has been transferred [to finance] [Krājbanka’s] advertising and marketing activities, in respect of which no documentation – the relevant contracts, delivery/acceptance deeds etc. – has been provided ... [T]he transfer of this sum in an unknown direction (nezināmā virzienā) actually amounts to the destruction of the Bank’s [available] assets. ... As [the applicant] suggested to [NRA], either ‘somebody is receiving this paid money back’ or Krājbanka’s money is being used to create advertising of a completely different kind than that indicated in the available documents. ‘This is money that has been stolen from the shareholders’, [the applicant] stated. ... Moreover, significant advance payments were made [for services to be provided within a year] shortly before [a] change in Krājbanka’s management at the beginning of [2002]. The supervisory board has ordered an internal audit to discover where these funds have disappeared to ... Documents in the possession of [NRA] show that the role of A.L. in the affair of the strange advertising [funds] transfers could be quite significant ... The [Bank’s] public relations unit has dispatched [LVL] 168,000 to who knows whom and who knows where. The Bank’s marketing department stands out even more blatantly. Of a total of [LVL] 743,000 spent, no documentary evidence exists regarding the expenditure of [LVL] 356,000.” (Information published in NRA, 3 October 2002 edition, article written by R.P. and E.L.: “Krājbanka’s former management accused of fraud”.) 2. “This week, Krājbanka’s current officials discovered massive excess expenditure on advertising that was allowed during the period of management of A.L. and V.K. –evidently these persons had been advertising themselves at the expense of Krājbanka.” (Information published in NRA, 5 October 2002 edition, article written by R.R. and U.D.: “The Pastors’ Party – a Šlesers’ family enterprise”.) 3. “ ‘Advertising for the Pastors’ Party – with Krājbanka’s money’ ... The advertising agency, Z., responsible for creating the Latvia’s First Party’s pre‑election campaign, is one of the companies to which Krājbanka’s former management transferred several hundred thousand [Latvian] lati at the beginning of [2002]. The transfer was carried out without documentary certification as an advance payment for advertising services ... [NRA] has already announced that since the beginning of 2001, Krājbanka has transferred [LVL] 522,000 [to finance] its advertising and marketing activities, in respect of which no documentation is available. ... As [the applicant] admitted to NRA, Z. was the very agency to which more than [LVL] 200,000 of Krājbanka’s funds was transferred at the beginning of [2002] as an advance payment; [details of the] subsequent expenditure [of those funds] are unknown. ‘It is possible that this is the money that provided the foundation for the Latvia’s First Party’s sizable advertising campaign’, admitted [the applicant]. ... Documents in the possession of NRA show that the role of A.L. in the affair of the strange advertising [funds] transfers could have been rather significant.” (Information published in NRA, 12 October 2002 edition, article written by K.P. and E.L.: “Advertising for the Pastors’ Party – with Krājbanka’s money”.) 4. “[The applicant] confirmed to [NRA] that the advertising agency, Z., the creator of Latvia’s First Party’s advertising campaign, is one of the companies to which the former management of Krājbanka transferred more than [LVL] 200,000 at the beginning of [2002] without documentary certification as an advance payment for advertising services. It has already been reported that since the beginning of 2001, Krājbanka has transferred [LVL] 522,000 [to finance] its advertising and marketing activities, in respect of which no documentation – the relevant contracts, delivery/acceptance deeds, etc. – has been provided.” (Information published in NRA, 15 October 2002 edition, article written by R.P.: “Krājbanka’s President concerned about his reputation”.) 5. “ ‘Crisis within Krājbanka’s Management’ ... The scandal revolving around the potentially unlawful activities of A.L., the former President of Krājbanka, has reached its culmination. ... A.L. has a negative opinion of [NRA’s] publications to date regarding the action of Krājbanka’s former management in transferring hundreds of thousands of [Latvian] lati to advertising firms without documentary certification in respect of the expenditure of that money ... [NRA] has already repeatedly written about the long-standing battle among Krājbanka’s shareholders, during which A.L. was accused several times of potentially unlawful actions ... This, however, has not prevented the friends of A.L. from resorting to extreme methods. [NRA] was informed by [the applicant] that ... at the last meeting of the supervisory board, a member of ‘A.L.’s group’, V.D., asked him in a forthright manner: ‘Have the folks from Ventspils insured your property?’ ‘This is an unprecedented event – the chairman of the Bank’s supervisory board being blatantly threatened!’ admitted [the applicant]. He believes that A.L. is now speculating that he will soon be afforded immunity as a member of [parliament], preventing him from being criminally prosecuted without a majority vote of [the Parliament] ... Commenting on the value of marketing, advertising and public relations contracts, [the applicant] admitted that even though it is necessary to carry out in-depth market research, during A.L.’s era various procedures were breached and payments were made whose sums currently cannot be precisely determined ... NRA has already written that [LVL] 522,000 has been transferred [to finance Krājbanka’s] advertising and marketing activities since the beginning of the year 2001, in respect of which no documentation – the relevant contracts, delivery/acceptance deeds, etc. – has been provided ... Additionally, doubts lie in respect of A.L. that certain actions regarding the administration of certificate accounts were also contrary to the interests of both the Bank and the State.” (Information published in NRA, 18 October 2002 edition, article written by R.P.: “Crisis within Krājbanka’s management”.) 6. “[NRA] has already reported that the actions of A.L. as the President of Krājbanka are being questioned in relation to advertising contracts concluded in the amount of several hundreds of thousands of [Latvian] lati. These contracts have no documentary corroboration regarding the specific measures [financed by] the money in question.” (Information published in NRA, 19 October 2002 edition, article written by R.P., E.L. and L.T.: “Repše: the Minister must be morally clean”.) 7. “NRA has already reported that in 2001, when A.L. was still the President of Krājbanka, [LVL] 522,000 was transferred without documentation, apparently for Krājbanka’s advertising and marketing activities, of which [LVL] 200,000 went to the advertising agency, Z., which also happened to be responsible for creating Latvia’s First Party’s pre-election campaign.” (Information published in NRA, 22 October 2002 edition, article written by B.L.: “Parties divide money portfolios!”) 8. “It is possible that during A.L.’s term of office [LVL] 522,000 was transferred [to finance] Krājbanka’s advertising and marketing activities, in respect of which the relevant documentation has not been provided.” (Information published in NRA, 22 October 2002 edition, article written by R.P.: “Krājbanka goes against A.L. at the prosecutor’s office”.) 9. “[NRA] has already written that [LVL] 522,000 was transferred in 2001, without any accompanying documentation, apparently for [Krājbanka’s] advertising and marketing activities, of which [LVL] 200,000 [went] to the advertising agency, Z., which was responsible for creating Latvia’s First Party’s pre-election campaign.” (Information published in NRA, 23 October 2002 edition, article written by B.L.: “Millionaires compete for power”.) 16. On 28 July 2003 A.L. lodged a claim against the applicant and the publishers of NRA seeking compensation and the retraction of a total of thirty‑one allegedly defamatory articles. He also indicated that the applicant had provided false information to NRA, which had formed the basis of the above-mentioned nine articles (see paragraph 15 above). 17. During a hearing of 16 January 2004 the applicant admitted before the first-instance court that the information concerning the possible misappropriation of Krājbanka’s funds, which he had provided to NRA, had proved to be incorrect. He made the following statements: “The information [was] wrong, unfounded. [As part of my duties] I was carrying out my task of managing [the Bank’s] activities. I was not interested in A.L.’s private life. I have always respected him. I tried to organise [my] work correctly. As to the mistake regarding numbers, there was one, and I apologise to A.L. and to the journalists. A.L. worked at the Bank and worked in accordance with [its] budget. A.L. made decisions. There were others responsible for [the Bank’s] budget. [The Bank] did not overpay for [its] advertisements. The mistake regarding numbers could not have offended A.L.’s honour and dignity. There were no public statements; maybe there were other [people] who [provided more information to the press].” 18. On 3 October 2005 the Riga Regional Court (Rīgas apgabaltiesa) delivered its judgment, dismissing the claims against the applicant. The court concluded that the nine articles in question (see paragraph 15 above), which had been based on the information provided by the applicant, had reported his personal opinion about the functioning of Krājbanka and its management, which could not be considered defamatory. Moreover, no claim for defamatory information to be retracted was lodged against the applicant. The claims against both publishers of NRA (Preses Nams and Mediju nams) were partly upheld in so far as they concerned six out of the nine articles which had been based on information provided by the applicant and six other articles reporting on other matters. 19. On 28 May 2007 the Civil Cases Chamber of the Supreme Court (Augstākās tiesas Civillietu tiesu palāta) – after appeals by A.L., Preses Nams, and Mediju nams – re-examined the case and delivered a new judgment. The judgment took immediate effect. 20. The appellate court noted that at the material time the press and other mass media had been widely reporting on the 2002 parliamentary elections – that is to say the political parties and their leaders, including the newly-established political party, of which A.L. was one of the leaders. He had stood for election, his candidacy had been widely advertised and it had been, accordingly, examined by the press and other mass media. NRA had published a series of articles about the money spent on the pre-election advertising of the Latvia’s First Party, linking the source of these funds to Krājbanka and its former President, A.L. It had been reported that during his time in office, LVL 522,000 had been transferred for advertising and marketing purposes without any documentary proof thereof having been preserved and that this had been considered to constitute a misappropriation of the bank’s funds. These funds had been spent on the party’s large-scale advertising; as the applicant had put it: “[T]his money has been stolen from the shareholders”. The nine articles had also contained other information provided by the applicant – that during A.L.’s time in office, there had been breaches not only in relation to the advertising expenses, but also other breaches in respect of banking operations, payments without approval, the administration of certificate accounts against the interests of the Bank and the State. 21. The appellate court stated that the information contained in those articles about the use of Krājbanka’s funds and transactions had been provided by the applicant (who had mentioned specific sums), and that the articles had contained references to his statements. 22. The appellate court found that since the applicant had provided this information to NRA journalists, he had to bear responsibility for giving and disseminating false information. The court held that this information had not corresponded to the facts and that this had been acknowledged by the applicant himself during the hearing before the first-instance court (see paragraph 17 above). This had also been confirmed by the results of the external audit and by the prosecution (see paragraphs 11 and 12). 23. The court also held that the journalists had not had a responsibility to verify the accuracy of the provided information, since the applicant’s status as the chairman of the supervisory board of Krājbanka had created a legitimate expectation that the provided information was correct. 24. Lastly, the court found that, even if the margin of permissible criticism in respect of A.L. as a member of parliament was necessarily a wider one than would normally be the case, the false information had nevertheless offended his honour and dignity, as it had contained serious allegations of unlawful activities and had given the impression that A.L. was a dishonest person. 25. Given the above, and in view of the seriousness of the interference and the applicant’s position in the Bank, the court ordered the applicant to pay compensation to A.L. in connection with the nine articles in the amount of LVL 10,000 (approximately EUR 14,229), together with statutory interest (6% per annum). 26. In addition, the court upheld the claim against Preses Nams alone in respect of one other article, and ordered it to pay compensation in the amount of LVL 5,000 (approximately EUR 7,114), together with statutory interest (6% per annum). 27. The applicant and Preses Nams were also ordered to pay A.L.’s legal costs in the amount of LVL 495 (approximately EUR 704) and LVL 375 (approximately EUR 534) respectively. 28. The appellate court dismissed A.L.’s claims against Preses Nams and Mediju Nams as regards all the other articles that had not been based on any information provided by the applicant. 29. On 28 June 2007 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Senate of the Supreme Court (Augstākās tiesas Senāts). He did not contest that the information he had provided to the journalists had turned out not to be supported by evidence. However, this information had constituted his evaluation of the actions taken by Krājbanka’s management as a whole. He had not directly mentioned A.L. by name, surname or his position when giving the information to the journalists. His allegations regarding the misappropriation of Krājbanka’s funds could only have infringed the interests of the Bank as a legal entity; it could not have offended the honour and dignity of certain executives, who had been under an obligation to inform the supervisory board and the mass media of the truth. Furthermore, the applicant had provided the information in the form of a supposition by indicating that it still needed to be verified by the Bank’s internal audit. It was the NRA journalists who had linked the applicant’s report with the allegations of wrongdoing by A.L. Thus, the applicant could not be held responsible for the manner in which the journalists had decided to present this information, since he had had no means of influencing this. 30. On 30 January 2008 the Senate of the Supreme Court delivered a new judgment, which in essence upheld the appellate court’s judgment. The relevant parts of the judgement read as follows: “[The appellate court’s] conclusion that the applicant had disseminated defamatory and false information was supported by the applicant’s own submissions before the first-instance court, in which he admitted that he had provided incorrect information to [the journalists] ... . The fact that this information was not truthful was confirmed by [the audit agency and the prosecution]. The applicant in his appeal on points of law did not contest these findings. ... He merely noted that he was a source and could not influence the evaluation given by the journalists. Having examined the testimony of [the NRA journalists], the appellate court found that the false information provided by the applicant had related not to Krājbanka’s management, as the applicant indicated, but specifically to A.L., as the then President of the Bank, thus infringing his honour and dignity. ... [The appellate court] found that the journalists had had no reason to doubt the credibility of the information, as it had been provided by the applicant [in his capacity as] chairman of the supervisory board of Krājbanka, and his position had undoubtedly created a legitimate expectation that this information was true ... Accordingly, the appellate court rightly held that the journalists had had no obligation to verify the accuracy of the information provided by the applicant. ... A.L. had requested compensation in the amount of LVL 10,000 from [the applicant]. By granting his claim, the [appellate] court, taking into account the scope of the distributed information and its audience, rightly considered it justified.” The Senate of the Supreme Court also upheld the claim against Preses Nams alone in respect of one other article; they held that A.L.’s honour and dignity had not been offended in other articles. The appellate court had referred to the Court’s case-law and had taken into account A.L.’s status and the fact that he had refused to offer comment. The appellate court had correctly applied the relevant principle that the journalistic freedom also covered possible recourse to a degree of exaggeration, or even provocation; the Senate referred to a/s Diena and Ozoliņš v. Latvia (no. 16657/03, § 84, 12 July 2007) in this regard. Referring to section 2352a of the Civil Law and section 29(3) of the Law on the Mass Media, the Senate of the Supreme Court ordered the applicant (who had disseminated that defamatory information), and not Preses Nams, to retract the relevant parts of the articles in question (see paragraph 15 above). The latter, however, still remained obliged to publish the retracted information.

5. The applicant company was set up in 1998 as a limited liability company. Its founders and sole shareholders were Ms Zhaneta Pavlovska and Mr Rasko Pavlovski. It traded in scrap metal and for that purpose it purchased waste aluminium, copper, iron and other metals, processed them and then offered the product for sale. 6. The applicant was registered for the purposes of the Value Added Tax Act (the “VAT Act”) and declared VAT on all invoices issued. VAT was also declared on all incoming invoices. This made it possible for the applicant company periodically to request VAT deductions from the State, which it did (in accordance with the rules of the “tax credit” system). 7. Until the subsequent events, the applicant company had been submitting regular tax returns to the tax authorities, notifying the State of its VAT calculations, payments and deductions. The State had processed the tax returns without indicating any wrongdoing or additional amounts due on the part of the applicant company. 8. On 22 September 2009 the Internal Revenues Office, regional directorate – Skopje (Управа за јавни приходи, Регионална дирекција Скопје – “the IRO”) issued an order to audit the applicant company for the purposes of VAT. The audit took place over several days during the months of October and November 2009 and took into account the period between 1 January 2005 and 30 June 2009. 9. On 6 November 2009 a tax assessment was compiled by the IRO. It was established that the applicant company’s suppliers were registered for the purposes of VAT but some of them had not declared or paid VAT to the State, even though it had clearly been declared in the invoices sent to the applicant company. That finding was based on earlier audits of those companies, which remained without further specification. The audit further established that some of the invoices did not contain the addresses of the suppliers. Lastly, the audit found that all invoices from the suppliers had been paid in full by the applicant company and that VAT had been declared on all invoices from the applicant company. On account of the above issues related to the applicant company’s suppliers, the audit concluded that the applicant company had failed to meet the conditions necessary to benefit from the VAT deductions it had received. 10. Relying on the tax assessment conducted earlier, on 20 November 2009 the IRO issued two decisions in respect of erroneous calculation of VAT, ordering the applicant company to pay an additional 3,827,546.00 Macedonian denars (MKD, around 62,000 euros (EUR)) in VAT. According to the IRO, those were the amounts the applicant company had unlawfully deducted from its tax obligations during the period 2005-07. An appeal lodged against those decisions had no suspensive effect. 11. The applicant company lodged an appeal with the Minister of Finance against the decisions of 9 December 2009. In the appeal it stated that it had met all of its VAT obligations stemming from the suppliers’ invoices and that it could not be held responsible for the suppliers’ mistakes. 12. On 8 February 2010 the Minister of Finance dismissed the appeal, reiterating the same findings and reasoning as in the audit report. 13. On 22 March 2010 the applicant company received a written reprimand from the IRO. The reprimand stipulated the full amount, including interest, to be paid by the applicant company. It amounted to MKD 6,059,124 (around EUR 100,000). 14. On 23 April 2010 the applicant company lodged an administrative action with the Administrative Court (Управен суд). 15. On 29 April 2010 the IRO blocked the applicant company’s bank account pursuant to the payment decisions. 16. By a decision of 28 March 2011 the Administrative Court remitted the case to the Ministry of Finance, having found that the second-instance decision had been issued by an unauthorised person acting in the name of the Minister. 17. On 26 May 2011 the Ministry of Finance again dismissed the appeal of the applicant company, reiterating the findings from the audit. 18. On 22 July 2011 the applicant company lodged another administrative action. 19. On 1 March 2013 the Administrative Court dismissed the action. The relevant part of the judgment reads: “... the cumulative conditions to obtain a deduction ... were not met. Specifically, the income of the applicant company was created by companies which failed to meet their legal obligations in relation to the payment of VAT ... In the deliberations the court took into account the claims by the appellant that it was wrongfully deprived of the right to claim VAT deductions because the errors found in the tax assessment had pertained to other [companies] ... These claims were rejected by the court ... inter alia taking into account that it is in the interests of every taxpayer to know and be aware of those with whom they engage in business.” 20. On 17 September 2013 the applicant company appealed to the Higher Administrative Court (Виш управен суд). 21. In a final judgment of 13 March 2014 the Higher Administrative Court upheld the findings and conclusions of the tax authorities and stated the following: “... [T]he appellant failed to fulfil the cumulative conditions prescribed in sections 33 and 34 of the VAT Act to obtain a VAT deduction specifically because the monetary inflow of the appellant as a taxpayer was done by other taxpayers who failed to meet their obligations to declare or pay tax. ... The court examined the complaint that all of the outstanding issues in the audit reflected errors committed by third parties and that the appellant should not be forced to bear the obligations of third parties ... but dismissed them ... having in mind that every taxpayer has an interest to enter into relations with other subjects.” 22. On 2 February 2017 the applicant company was removed from the register of companies and ceased to exist. According to a document issued by the register of companies, it was removed in accordance with section 552-B of the Companies Act (Закон за трговски друштва), specifically for not having submitted an annual financial statement (завршна сметка) to the authorities for the year 2014. 23. The applicant company’s bank account remained blocked by the IRO until 10 April 2017, when it was closed. Due to lack of funds on the account, the IRO failed to collect any money from the applicant company. 24. On 9 December 2011 the prosecution for organised crime (Основно јавно обвинителство за гонење на организиран криминал и корупција) filed an indictment against several individuals for criminal enterprise, abuse of office and tax evasion. The indictment encompassed the individuals responsible for several, but not all, of the applicant company’s suppliers. It was alleged that the individuals used the supplier companies to issue fake invoices which were not the result of real commercial activity. The supplier companies as legal entities were not directly indicted. The domestic courts found the accused guilty of the offences by a judgment of 29 March 2013, which became final on 9 January 2014.

4. The applicant was born in 1988 and lives in Szigetvár-Becefa. 5. At 11 a.m. on 4 February 2013 the applicant was taken to Sellye police station for questioning, at first as a witness, in relation to recent occurrences of timber theft. According to the police record, he waived his right to counsel and immediately admitted to his involvement in the offence in question. As a result, from 12.12 p.m. onwards, he was further questioned, this time as a suspect, and disclosed the identity of his accomplices. At 2.15 p.m. the applicant was taken home (in order to change his shoes because the police wanted to seize the ones he had been wearing) and then to the scene of the theft, where he explained to the officers precisely how the offence had been carried out. At 4 p.m. he was released after having signed a document stating that he had not suffered any injuries while in custody and had no complaints about the questioning. 6. On leaving the police station, the applicant met his aunt and a man from his village, who were waiting for him and his accomplice (his cousin), who had been questioned at the same time by other officers. 7. At 4.56 p.m. the applicant was examined by a general practitioner in Sellye and was diagnosed with hyperaemia (redness) measuring 8 cm in diameter on his left cheek and a minor wound in his mouth. His chest was also noted to be tender. On 6 February 2013 X-ray and ultrasound examinations were conducted on the applicant at a hospital in Pécs. No fracture was found, but a bruise was noted at rib cage level. 8. On 6 February 2013 the applicant initiated proceedings on account of ill-treatment inflicted by the police in order to extort a confession. He indicated his willingness to undergo a polygraph test in order to prove the veracity of his allegations. 9. On 28 March 2013 the applicant was examined by the Pécs investigating prosecutor. He contended that, on the morning of 4 February 2013, he had been questioned by five police officers. When he had denied his involvement in the offence, one of them (wearing gloves) had slapped him on both cheeks several times. Another officer had then ordered him to stand up and when he had done so, the officer had kicked him in the chest so that he had fallen back onto the chair. The third officer had slapped him in the face once or twice, and had punched him in the stomach once. The applicant could name two of the officers whom he knew from previous police visits to his village: one of them – who had been in charge of his questioning on 4 February 2013 – had not hit him, while the other one had only “dropped by” but had allegedly taken part in his beating. He gave a description of the two unknown officers who he alleged had beaten him. 10. On 16 October 2013 the prosecutor questioned the police officer who had been in charge of questioning the applicant on 4 February 2013. The police officer firmly denied any kind of ill-treatment and said that, after his release, the applicant had met someone who he had alleged had participated in the crime. The police officer suggested that the applicant’s injuries might well have resulted from that encounter. He further contended that when he had been taken home on 4 February 2013, the applicant had met his mother but had not complained to her of any kind of ill-treatment. 11. On 25 October 2013 the applicant’s aunt and her son (the applicant’s accomplice) were examined by the prosecutor. The applicant’s aunt said that when she had met the applicant at 4 p.m. in front of the police station, she had seen his mouth bleeding. The accomplice also alleged that he had seen wounds inside the applicant’s mouth. 12. A medical expert opinion was obtained. On the basis of the documents previously drawn up by the general practitioner and the doctor at Pécs Hospital, the expert concluded that the applicant’s visible injuries, namely the hyperaemia on his face and a minor wound in his mouth, might have resulted from a single slap inflicted with medium force – the wound being caused by the canine tooth colliding with the mucous membrane. The expert indicated that the sensitiveness of the chest, without any perceivable external symptoms, was a subjective complaint and it could not therefore be considered as an injury for the purposes of criminal law. 13. On 15 November 2013 the prosecutor discontinued the investigation. Having particular regard to the medical expert opinion allegedly contradicting the applicant’s statements (given that it only corroborated one blow, rather than several as described by the applicant), he held that the ill-treatment of the applicant while in police custody could not be proven “beyond reasonable doubt”. 14. The applicant lodged a complaint against the prosecutor’s decision, arguing, among other things, that the authorities had failed to organise a confrontation between him and the police officer in charge in order to resolve the discrepancies in their statements, or an identification parade in order for the applicant to identify the police officers involved. Moreover, the prosecutor’s decision had not given any reasons for disregarding the statements of the two witnesses (the applicant’s aunt and her son) who had seen the applicant with a bleeding mouth immediately after his release (see paragraph 11 above). 15. On 5 December 2013 the Baranya County Chief Prosecutor’s Office rejected the complaint as ill-founded. It stressed that further investigative steps (a confrontation or an identification parade) would have been necessary only if the medical expert had substantiated the applicant’s allegations, which he had not. Since the fact of ill-treatment by the police as such was not sufficiently proven, there was no need for further investigation into the identity of the alleged perpetrators. It also noted that the witnesses had not seen the alleged ill-treatment taking place. 16. This final decision was allegedly served on the applicant on 17 December 2013. The applicant was informed that he had the possibility of bringing a private prosecution, by acting as substitute private prosecutor, under Articles 229-230 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 17. On 13 December 2013 the investigation against the applicant on account of the alleged timber theft was discontinued for want of sufficient evidence. The decision took account of the fact that the applicant had withdrawn his confession and that his brother had provided him with an alibi.

4. The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Vilnius. 5. The applicant’s father, V.P., was a well-known writer in Lithuania. In September 2003 he published a book entitled “The Ship of Idiots” (Durnių laivas – hereinafter “the book”) in which he presented his memoirs of various events in the history of Lithuania, often using a satirical and mocking tone. Several passages in the book discussed the personality and activities of V.L.-Ž. (deceased at the time of publication). V.L.-Ž. had been a minister in the Provisional Government of Lithuania, which operated from June to August 1941, and his son V.L. had been a prominent Lithuanian politician since the 1980s. The book contained the following statements (hereinafter “the disputed statements”), in which V.L.-Ž. was referred to as “[L.] senior” or “the patriarch”: “[V.L.] had to somehow cover for his father, who had for many years collaborated with the KGB ... Having worked as a spy, he was returned home by Moscow ...” ([L.] reikėjo kaip nors pridengti tėvą, ilgus metus bendradarbiavusį su KGB ... Jį kaip atidirbusį žvalgą namo sugrąžino Maskva ...) “Some were already [trying to get familiar with] the new ‘patriarch’, Hitler’s ... friend, ... spy, ... copier of strategic maps, [L.] senior ...” (Kai kas jau vedžiojo už parankių naujai iškeptą „patriarchą“, Hitlerio ... draugą, ... žvalgą, ... strateginių žemėlapių kopijuotoją senąjį [L.] ...) “[L.] senior ... told how in 1918 ... [they] had raised the flag in the castle tower ... [H]ow afterwards they had had to flee to Kaunas in order to escape from the Bolsheviks, how on the way they had been arrested [and] interrogated... (and, as far as I know, recruited).” (Senasis [L.] ... pasakojo, kaip 1918 metais ... pilies bokšte kėlė vėliavą, ... kaip jiems po to teko nuo bolševikų bėgti į Kauną, kaip pakeliui juos areštavo, tardė... (o kiek man žinoma, ir užverbavo).) “The pharmacy was ejected onto the streets. Moreover, the pharmacists were sued because ‘the patriarch’ did not find on the veranda the six-metre oak bench which he had left there before the war.” (Vaistinę išmetė į gatvę. Dar daugiau, vaistininkai buvo paduoti į teismą todėl, kad patriarchas verandoje nerado šešių metrų ąžuolinio suolo, kurį buvo palikęs prieš karą.) 6. On the fourth page of the book it was stated that the author assumed full responsibility for the truthfulness of the facts presented in the book (autorius prisiima visą atsakomybę už knygoje išdėstytų faktų tikrumą). 7. After the book’s publication, V.L. lodged a complaint with the Prosecutor General’s Office (hereinafter “the prosecutor”), seeking the opening of a pre-trial investigation against V.P. for defamation of his late father. On 21 October 2003 the prosecutor opened the investigation. 8. During the investigation, the prosecutor asked various bodies about the activities of V.L.-Ž. described in the disputed statements. He received replies from the Central State Archives, the Genocide and Resistance Research Centre of Lithuania, the National Library of Lithuania, the Archives of Literature and Art, and the State Security Department. They all stated that they did not have any information indicating that V.L.-Ž. had collaborated with the Nazi or Soviet regimes or any information confirming any of the other parts of the disputed statements. The prosecutor also interviewed several individuals who had been quoted as sources in V.P.’s book but they all stated that they were unable to confirm the truthfulness of the events described in the disputed statements. 9. On 10 October 2005 the Vilnius City First District Court acquitted V.P. of defamation on the grounds that the offence could be committed only against a living person, whereas V.L.-Ž. was already dead when V.P.’s book had been published. The court noted that V.P.’s actions could have constituted the crime of contempt for the memory of a deceased person, but that charge had not been included in the indictment. 10. V.L., V.P. and the prosecutor all submitted appeals against that decision, and on 17 January 2006 the Vilnius Regional Court quashed it. The court found that the indictment had not complied with the relevant procedural requirements, and returned the case to the prosecutor. 11. On 9 August 2006 the prosecutor discontinued the pre-trial investigation. He considered that there was sufficient evidence to charge V.P. with contempt for the memory of a deceased person, but criminal prosecution for that offence had become time-barred. 12. In June 2007 V.L. lodged a civil claim against V.P. He asked the court to order V.P. to publicly retract the disputed statements and to award him 100,100 Lithuanian litai (LTL – approximately 29,000 euros (EUR)) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. V.L. submitted that the disputed statements had been erroneous and insulting to the honour and dignity of his late father, as well as to his own honour and dignity. 13. V.P. disputed the claim, submitting that he had not intended to defame or insult anyone and that the disputed statements had been taken out of context. He contended that the book had been a product of literary creativity made up on the basis of his subjective memories, and that it had been written in figurative and exaggerated language which could be interpreted in many different ways. V.P. thus argued that the disputed statements should be regarded as value judgments and not as factual statements. He further submitted that, in any event, when writing the book he had relied on various historical sources and witness testimonies, as well as on his own personal experience – he provided a list of books and other publications which he had consulted, and described the circumstances in which he had found out about the events discussed in the disputed statements. Therefore, he argued that the disputed statements had been sufficiently accurate. Lastly, V.P. contended that both V.L.-Ž. and V.L. had been prominent politicians and public figures and therefore had to tolerate higher levels of criticism. 14. On 10 December 2008 V.P. died. The court adjourned the examination of the case until V.P.’s legal successors were identified. On 7 May 2009 the applicant and her two brothers, who had accepted their father’s inheritance, were issued with certificates of inheritance, stating that they had inherited their father’s estate in equal parts. On 23 July 2009 the court decided to continue with the examination of the case, replacing the defendant V.P. with the applicant and her brothers. 15. V.L. subsequently amended his claim and asked the court to declare that the disputed statements had been erroneous and insulting to the honour and dignity of himself and his late father (see paragraph 36 below), and to award him a symbolic sum of LTL 1 (approximately EUR 0.29) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 16. At the court hearing on 9 December 2009, V.L. argued that the disputed statements amounted to statements of fact and not value judgments. He submitted that, in line with the domestic courts’ case-law, the burden was on the author to prove that those statements were factually accurate, but the evidence collected in both the civil and the criminal proceedings demonstrated that they did not have any factual basis. 17. The applicant and her brothers were represented by the same lawyer who had represented V.P. in the civil proceedings up until his death. They submitted essentially the same arguments that V.P. had submitted before (see paragraph 13 above). They also argued that an obligation to pay compensation for damage allegedly caused by a literary work was a personal obligation of the author and could not be transferred to his heirs. They furthermore submitted that the disputed statements had been based on their late father’s memories and subjective opinions, and so they should not be required to prove the truthfulness of those statements. 18. On 23 December 2009 the Vilnius Regional Court found in V.L.’s favour. It stated that, in line with the domestic law, in order to uphold the claim, four circumstances had to be established: firstly, that certain statements had been disseminated; secondly, that those statements had concerned the claimant (V.L.) and his late father (V.L.-Ž.); thirdly, that the statements had been insulting to the honour and dignity of V.L.-Ž. and V.L.; and fourthly, that the statements had been erroneous. The claimant (V.L.) had to prove that the first three circumstances had existed, whereas the defendants (the applicant and her brothers) had to prove that the fourth circumstance had not (see paragraph 34 below). 19. The Vilnius Regional Court observed that there was no dispute that statements had been disseminated and that they had referred to V.L.-Ž. and V.L. (see paragraph 5 above). However, the parties disagreed as to whether they had amounted to statements of fact or to value judgments. The court found that the disputed statements had been presented as factual statements about V.L.-Ž.: they had implied that certain events had actually occurred, for example, that V.L.-Ž. had been recruited by the Soviet forces and had collaborated with them, or that he had expressed support for Hitler’s ideology (see paragraph 5 above). Accordingly, the court held that those statements should have had a sufficient factual basis. 20. Seeking to determine whether the disputed statements had been factually accurate, the Vilnius Regional Court examined the evidence which had been collected in the criminal proceedings (see paragraph 8 above), as well as the sources indicated by V.P. himself in his written submissions to the court during the civil proceedings (see paragraph 13 above). The court found that none of those sources had been able to confirm any parts of the disputed statements to the standard of proof required in civil cases. 21. The Vilnius Regional Court next examined whether the disputed statements had been insulting to the honour and dignity of V.L.-Ž. and V.L. As for the first three statements (see paragraph 5 above), it considered that, in the historical context of Lithuania, the allegations of collaboration with the Soviet security services or of support for Nazi ideology had clearly been insulting not only to V.L.-Ž. but also to his family, including V.L., who had been a prominent politician himself. As for the fourth statement (see paragraph 5 above), it considered that allegations of ejecting the pharmacy owners onto the streets and suing them for a wooden bench – an item of movable property of low value – had created the impression of V.L.-Ž. as someone with low moral standards and a lack of respect for others, and that that statement had therefore been insulting as well, not only to V.L.-Ž. himself, but also to his family. 22. The court dismissed the defendants’ objection that the case concerned the personal obligations of their father. It held that the domestic law provided several different remedies for victims of defamation in publications (see paragraph 36 below). On the one hand, the victim could ask the court to order the author of the work to retract the disputed statements, which would be a personal obligation on the part of the author which could not be transferred to his or her heirs. On the other hand, the victim could ask the court to declare that the disputed statements were erroneous and defamatory (insulting to the victim’s honour and dignity), in other words to request an objective assessment of those statements. Such an assessment could be made without the involvement of the author and would thus not constitute a personal obligation on the part of the author. Accordingly, the court held that, since V.L. had made the latter request (see paragraph 15 above), domestic law permitted the transfer of civil liability to the author’s heirs. 23. As a result, the Vilnius Regional Court upheld one part of V.L.’s claim and declared that the disputed statements had been erroneous and insulting to his and his late father’s honour and dignity. It dismissed V.L.’s claim for compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage as time‑barred. 24. The applicant and her brothers lodged an appeal against the decision of the Vilnius Regional Court, presenting essentially the same arguments as before (see paragraphs 13 and 17 above). 25. On 13 August 2010 the Court of Appeal upheld that decision in its entirety. It firstly stated that the key difference between statements of fact and value judgments was that the truthfulness of the former could be verified and proved, whereas the latter expressed a subjective view to which the criteria of truthfulness or accuracy did not apply. The court held that, notwithstanding the fact that the book had been based on the author’s memories, the disputed statements had not been limited to expressing a subjective view on any persons or events, but alleged that certain actions had been taken and certain events had occurred. In the court’s view, the average reader, even when reading the disputed statements as part of the entire book and not “out of context” (see paragraph 13 above), would perceive them as statements of fact and not as value judgments. 26. The Court of Appeal agreed with the defendants that V.L.-Ž. and V.L. had been public figures and therefore had to tolerate greater levels of criticism. It observed that, in line with the case-law of the domestic courts, dissemination of factually inaccurate statements about a public figure did not attract civil liability when such statements concerned that person’s public activities and when their author had acted in good faith, seeking to inform society about such activities (see paragraph 35 below). Nonetheless, the Court of Appeal stated that this could not justify dissemination of falsehoods which were insulting to a person’s honour and dignity, even when they concerned a public figure. It held that, in the case at hand, the first-instance court had thoroughly examined the evidence collected during the criminal proceedings and the sources indicated by the author himself (see paragraph 20 above), and had reached the conclusion that, on the balance of probabilities, the events described in the disputed statements “were more likely not to have happened than to have happened”. The Court of Appeal also examined additional sources referred to in the defendants’ appeal, but found that they did not contain any information which would enable it to reach a different conclusion than that reached by the first‑instance court. It therefore held that the factual accuracy of the disputed statements had not been proved. The Court of Appeal also upheld the first‑instance court’s conclusion that those statements had been insulting to the honour and dignity of V.L.-Ž. and V.L. (see paragraph 21 above). 27. Lastly the Court of Appeal dismissed the defendants’ argument that they had been obliged to prove the truthfulness of their father’s memories and subjective opinions. It observed that the disputed statements had been found to constitute statements of fact and not value judgments and it had therefore been necessary to prove their factual accuracy and not the reasons why the author might have held certain opinions. The court stated that the factual accuracy of the disputed statements could be proved by anyone and not only by their author, and that the applicant and her brothers had been able to rely on the material collected during the criminal proceedings and on the submissions made by their father in the civil proceedings, as well as to submit new evidence themselves. The Court of Appeal also observed that the applicant and her brothers had accepted their father’s inheritance (see paragraph 14 above), which included the rights to reprint the book and to receive royalties from it. The court considered that if the author’s heirs had been exempted from the liabilities arising from the book, then the claimant, V.L., would have been denied any possibility to defend his rights against the erroneous and insulting statements published therein. 28. Consequently, the Court of Appeal upheld the first‑instance decision declaring the disputed statements erroneous and insulting to the honour and dignity of V.L.-Ž. and V.L. 29. The applicant and her brothers submitted an appeal on points of law, presenting essentially the same arguments as before (see paragraphs 13 and 17 above). 30. On 14 March 2011 the Supreme Court dismissed that appeal. It underlined the importance of striking a fair balance between the right to freedom of expression and the right to respect for honour and dignity, but stated that the right to freedom of expression did not extend to the deliberate dissemination of falsehoods with the aim of humiliating, insulting or otherwise causing harm to others, even if directed at public figures. The Supreme Court observed that the lower courts had established that the disputed statements had been erroneous and insulting to the honour and dignity of V.L.-Ž. and V.L. (see paragraphs 21 and 26 above); it therefore ruled that the dissemination of those statements could not be justified by the exercise of the right to freedom of expression. 31. The Supreme Court also reiterated that the claim submitted by V.L. did not constitute a personal obligation of the author of the book and could therefore be transferred to his heirs. It stated that the applicant and her brothers had accepted their father’s inheritance, which included certain rights to the book (see paragraph 14 above). Accordingly, once the court had declared that the disputed statements in the book had been erroneous and insulting to the honour and dignity of others, the author’s legal successors had the obligation to ensure that those statements would no longer be disseminated.

5. The first, second and third applicants were born in 1950, 2001 and 2007 respectively, and live in Călărași. 6. The first applicant worked as a foster parent at the Călăraşi office of the Office for Social Care and Child Protection (Direcția Generală de Asistență Socială şi Protecția Copilului, hereinafter “the DGASPC”) from 1999 to 4 July 2011, when she retired. The organisation was part of the Călăraşi County Council (“the County Council”). 7. In May 2001 and April 2008 respectively the Călăraşi DGASPC placed the second and third applicants with the first applicant, decisions which were confirmed by a court. 8. In line with the first applicant’s express wishes, the other applicants remained in her care even after she retired. The third applicant is still in her care. Following an express request by the first applicant, the second applicant was removed from her care on 13 September 2016. 9. On 9 June 2008 the first applicant initiated proceedings against the Călăraşi DGASPC, seeking a court order for payment of her salary rights in respect of financial compensation corresponding to her unspent annual leave for the previous three years, a supplement for extra work she had performed, and overtime pay for work she had done during weekends and public holidays. She also claimed the reimbursement of expenses relating to her regular medical examinations and laboratory tests and argued that for the previous three years the second applicant had not been given the housing, placement and food allowances to which he had been entitled. 10. On an unspecified date the County Council intervened in the proceedings as a third party supporting the Călăraşi DGASPC. It argued that the first applicant had had no right to claim the benefits allegedly not given to the second applicant because only the President of the County Council had a legal right to exercise rights on behalf of the child. 11. On 7 October 2008 the Călăraşi County Court (“the County Court”) allowed the first applicant’s action in part, and ordered the Călăraşi DGASPC to pay her financial compensation corresponding to her unspent annual leave for the period 2005-2007 and a supplement for extra work she had performed. The court also ordered the Călăraşi DGASPC to give the second applicant the allowances provided for under Article 1 of Law no. 326/2003 on the rights enjoyed by children in foster care (see paragraph 37 below) – to which he had been entitled since 8 June 2005 and up to the date of the judgment. It held that, even though the contract between the first applicant and her employer was special in nature because foster parents worked from home and were responsible for raising the children entrusted to their care, the provisions of the Labour Code (“the Code”) applied. Consequently, she had been entitled to compensation for unspent annual leave, and to a supplement for extra work she had performed or overtime pay for work done during weekends and public holidays. Given the specific nature of her contract, which made it impossible to calculate the overtime work done by her, she was entitled to a supplement for extra work she had performed, and not to overtime pay, and could not be granted both. Also, a child was entitled to a food allowance, which had to be paid to the person feeding the child. The argument that only the President of the County Council could claim the allowance (see paragraph 10 above) was “childish” and ill-founded. The claim for housing allowance had to be dismissed, because the applicants had not lived in rented accommodation. 12. The first applicant appealed against the judgment on points of fact and law. She argued that a week earlier the first-instance court had allowed a trade union’s claims against her employer for overtime pay for work done during weekends and public holidays. Also, the court had failed to examine or had unlawfully dismissed her claims for housing allowance, reimbursement of her expenses relating to her medical examinations and laboratory tests, and overtime pay for work done during weekdays. 13. By a final judgment of 12 May 2009 the Bucharest Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”) dismissed the first applicant’s appeal on points of fact and law. It held that she could not claim overtime pay, given the special nature of her work contract, and given that her job required her to provide constant care to the children. Also, she had not claimed the housing allowance and the reimbursement of her expenses relating to her regular medical examinations and laboratory tests from her employer on a monthly basis by providing supporting evidence for her claims, and therefore her claims lodged with the courts for retroactive payment had been ill-founded. Moreover, she had failed to provide supporting documents for her claims concerning the relevant medical expenses. 14. On 14 July 2009 the first applicant initiated proceedings against the Călăraşi DGASPC, seeking a court order for: overtime pay for work done during weekdays; overtime pay for work done during weekends and public holidays, starting from July 2006 until 2009, and continuing thereafter; payment of a holiday bonus for the period 2006-2008; payment of the allowances provided for by Article 3 of the relevant collective agreement contract; payment of the personal needs allowances provided for by law for the second applicant in respect of the period September 2004-June 2008; payment of the second applicant’s remaining food allowance for the period January-March 2008; payment of a supplement for the third applicant’s food allowance for the period May 2008-April 2009; payment of the housing allowance for the period 2004-September 2009; reimbursement of fees for her psychological examination; and non-pecuniary damages. 15. She argued that on 7 October 2008 the County Court had wrongfully dismissed her claims for overtime pay (see paragraph 11 above), even though the same court and other courts in the country had allowed such claims. That court had also wrongfully dismissed her claim for housing allowance and had ignored her claim for payment of a holiday bonus. Consequently, she had lodged a new claim with the court, given that her employer had granted this bonus to public servants and courts across the country had allowed similar claims lodged by foster parents. The principles of non-discrimination and equal treatment of employees of the same unit had been breached by the Călăraşi DGASPC by refusing to pay her benefits. The compensation for non-pecuniary damage was to cover the humiliation and discriminatory treatment she had suffered at the hands of her employer. 16. On 24 November 2009 the County Court allowed the first applicant’s claims in part. It held that, in accordance with legislation which had entered into force in April 2008, she had been entitled to payment of a supplement for the third applicant’s food allowance for the period May 2008-April 2009. However, it noted that as of May 2008 the first applicant had received the above-mentioned supplement for the other child in her care. She had also been entitled to the reimbursement of fees for her psychological examination, as the Călăraşi DGASPC had refused to reimburse her. In addition, she was entitled to the special allowances provided for by Article 3 of the collective agreement for the period 2007‑2009. However, the court dismissed as res judicata her claims concerning overtime pay, the housing allowance and the second applicant’s rights under Article 1 of Law no. 326/2003 for the period 2006-2007. It also dismissed her claim for overtime pay and housing allowance for the period 2008-2009, relying on similar reasons to those relied on by the Court of Appeal in its judgment of 12 May 2009 (see paragraph 13 above). Lastly, the court dismissed her claim for a holiday bonus on the grounds that the collective agreement concerning her employer for the relevant period did not provide that employees were entitled to it. 17. There is no evidence in the file that the first applicant appealed on points of fact and law against the judgment of 24 November 2009. 18. On 8 December 2010 the first applicant initiated proceedings against the Călăraşi DGASPC, seeking a court order for payment of her salary for seven days in November and December 2009, and for a supplementary payment for work done during weekends and public holidays for the period 2008-2010. 19. On 10 February 2011 the County Court allowed the first applicant’s claims in part. It held that, in accordance with the provisions of the Code and the relevant collective agreement concerning her employer, all the employees of that office, including her, were entitled to a supplementary payment for work done during weekends and public holidays for the period 2008-2010. Moreover, she was entitled to be paid for the work she had done on three days in November 2009. However, she had received compensation for the work she had done on the other four days in question. Lastly, the court dismissed the Călăraşi DGASPC’s arguments that her claims had already been examined in the final judgments of 12 May and 24 November 2009 (see paragraphs 13 and 16 above). 20. The Călăraşi DGASPC appealed against the judgment on points of fact and law. 21. By a final judgment of 6 December 2011 the Court of Appeal allowed the Călăraşi DGASPC’s appeal in part. The court dismissed as res judicata the first applicant’s claim for a supplementary payment for work done during weekends and public holidays for the period 2008-2009 because it had already been examined in the judgment of 24 November 2009 (see paragraph 16 above). It held that even though she had used different terminology, in fact her claim concerned the payment of overtime for work done during weekends and public holidays. She had also relied on legal grounds which were similar to those used to justify her claim in the previous proceedings. The court further dismissed her claim for overtime pay for 2010. It held that in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Code (see paragraph 11 above) and of the relevant collective agreement concerning her employer, all the employees of that office for whom overtime could be calculated were entitled to such payments. However, the special nature of foster parents’ work and contracts, which implied the acceptance of the extra work which had to be performed and which could not be quantified, excluded them from the categories of employees who could be granted overtime pay. Given the provisions of the special legislation concerning foster parents, the legal provisions invoked by the first applicant could not be a foundation for her claim. Lastly, the court upheld the remaining part of the first-instance court’s judgment. 22. On 18 August 2011 the first applicant initiated proceedings against the Călăraşi DGASPC, seeking a court order for payment of financial compensation corresponding to her unspent annual leave, and for a supplementary payment for work done during weekends and public holidays for the period January-July 2011. 23. On 3 November 2011 the County Court allowed the first applicant’s claims. It held that her employer had failed to prove that it had paid her during her annual leave. Also, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Code and of the relevant collective agreement concerning her employer she was entitled to a supplementary payment for work done during weekends and public holidays. 24. The Călăraşi DGASPC appealed against the judgment on points of fact and law. 25. By a final judgment of 14 March 2012 the Court of Appeal allowed the Călăraşi DGASPC’s appeal. In dismissing the first applicant’s claim for a supplementary payment for work done during weekends and public holidays, the court relied on similar reasons to the ones provided by the same court on 6 December 2011 when it had dismissed a similar claim raised by her for the year 2010 (see paragraph 21 above). Also, according to the available evidence, the applicant had taken her annual leave in May and June and had been paid for it. It could not be argued that she had not taken her annual leave in May 2011 because she had spent it in the company of her foster child. She had the option of asking the DGASPC to take the foster child during her leave. 26. On 14 December 2010 the first applicant initiated proceedings against the Călăraşi DGASPC, seeking a court order for payment of financial compensation corresponding to her unspent annual leave for the period 2008-2010 and payment of the second applicant’s remaining food allowance for the period January-March 2008. 27. On 24 March 2011 the County Court allowed the first applicant’s claims. It held that, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Code, all employees were entitled to paid leave. Since the applicant had spent her annual leave for the period 2008-2010 in the company of her foster children and had not been relieved of her duties, she was entitled to the financial compensation she claimed. Moreover, her employer had failed to prove that it had paid the second applicant’s remaining food allowance for the period in question. 28. The Călăraşi DGASPC appealed against the judgment on points of fact and law. 29. By a final judgment of 15 December 2011 the Court of Appeal allowed the Călăraşi DGASPC’s appeal in part. It held that the second applicant had not been entitled to an increased food allowance for the period January-March 2008. The legal provisions entitling the first applicant to receive the above-mentioned allowance had entered into force only in April 2008. 30. The first applicant submitted to the Court three judgments delivered by three different courts of appeal. The judgments allowed various claims lodged by foster parents and/or trade unions across the country (representing the interests of their members working as either public servants or foster parents) for payment of financial compensation corresponding to unspent annual leave rights and overtime pay. By a final judgment of 19 June 2007 the Piteşti Court of Appeal held that, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and the Code, the claimants were entitled to compensation for unspent annual leave for the period 2003-2005. To hold otherwise would be to discriminate against them in relation to other categories of employees. By final judgments of 28 January and 28 April 2009 the Cluj and the Bucharest Courts of Appeal held that, in accordance with the provisions of the relevant collective agreement and the Code, the claimants were entitled to overtime pay for work done during weekends and public holidays, and/or to compensation for unspent annual leave for the period 2005-2008. The Bucharest Court of Appeal also held that the claimants were entitled to overtime pay for work done during weekends and public holidays also for the period after 2008. 31. On 17 March 2010 and 8 March 2011 the Călăraşi DGASPC informed the first applicant that following the entry into force of Government Ordinance no. 71/2009 (see paragraph 39 below), only parts of the judgments of 12 May and 24 November 2009 (see paragraphs 13 and 16 above) had been enforced and that the remaining amounts would be paid in two instalments. The first applicant informed the Court on 27 April 2012 that because of the above-mentioned government ordinance, the judgments of 6 and 15 December 2011 (see paragraphs 21 and 29 above) had also remained unenforced. Subsequently, she acknowledged on 31 July 2013 that the authorities had enforced all the judgments. 32. On 4 January and 9 February 2017 the Călăraşi DGASPC informed the Government that the amount corresponding to the first applicant’s unspent annual leave for the period 2008-2010 had been paid to her in full in five instalments between January 2013 and June 2016. In addition, prior to her retirement, she had never asked the Călăraşi DGASPC for financial support for her foster children’s possible extracurricular activities, or to be relieved of her duties during her annual leave. 33. On an unspecified date in 2015 the Iași Court of Appeal asked the bench of judges of the High Court of Cassation and Justice (“the Court of Cassation”) in charge of delivering advisory opinions to clarify the divergent practice of the courts of appeal which had existed both before and after 3 October 2013 as regards the question of whether foster parents who continued to work voluntarily during their annual leave were entitled to financial compensation corresponding to their unspent annual leave. 34. On 17 October 2016 the Court of Cassation dismissed the above‑mentioned proceedings as inadmissible. It held that the impugned question was not a novel legal issue. The courts had examined it repeatedly between 2008 and 2016, and the judgments suggested that a divergent practice existed in this regard. However, that divergent practice could be solved by way of an “appeal in the interests of the law”. 35. On 14 February 2017 the Iași Court of Appeal lodged an “appeal in the interests of the law” with the Court of Cassation in respect of the above‑mentioned legal matter (see paragraphs 33-34 above). It appears that at the date of the latest information available to the Court (4 October 2017) those proceedings are still ongoing.

4. The applicant was born in 1951 and lived in Sarajevo. 5. By its decision of 3 August 2004, and at the recommendation of the Sarajevo Psychiatric Clinic (the “Psychiatric Clinic”), the Sarajevo Municipal Court instituted proceedings for the applicant’s placement in a psychiatric facility. 6. On 18 August 2004, the Sarajevo Municipal Court decided to keep the applicant in the Psychiatric Clinic for a maximum of 45 days (counting from the date of his placement, that is 1 August 2004). 7. On 22 September 2004 the Sarajevo Canton Social Care Centre (the “Social Care Centre”) placed the applicant in the Drin Social Care Home (the “Drin Home”). 8. On 7 January 2005, the Sarajevo Municipal Court deprived the applicant of his legal capacity. 9. On 10 March 2005 the Social Care Centre placed the applicant under the guardianship of D.M., one of its employees. Several other employees were subsequently appointed as the applicant’s successive guardians. 10. By its decisions of 25 February 2010 and 25 December 2014, the Social Care Centre decided that the applicant should remain in the Drin Home. 11. On 16 September 2015 the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (“the Constitutional Court”) held that the applicant’s deprivation of liberty had not been “in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law” within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention as he had been held in psychiatric detention without a decision of a competent civil court. It also found that Article 5 § 4 of the Convention had been breached because of the lack of judicial review of the lawfulness of the applicant’s detention. The Constitutional Court ordered the Social Care Centre to take measures to ensure respect for the applicant’s rights under Article 5 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention. 12. On 7 December 2015, the Sarajevo Municipal Court restored the applicant’s legal capacity. 13. The applicant was released from the Drin Home on 14 December 2015. 14. At the applicant’s request, the Social Care Centre again admitted him to the Drin Home, between 1 January 2016 and 31 March 2016. 15. The applicant requested an extension of his stay in social care, which request was granted on 1 April 2016. The applicant was thus placed in the Social and Health Care Home for Persons with Disabilities and Other Persons (the “Social and Health Care Home”). 16. The applicant died on 26 September 2016, while in the Social and Health Care Home.

7. The applicant was born in 1945 and lives in Yerevan. He was the President of Armenia between 1991 and 1998. 8. On 19 February 2008 a presidential election was held in Armenia. The applicant was running as the main opposition candidate, his main opponent being the then Prime Minister, Mr Sargsyan, who represented the ruling party and was a close ally of the outgoing President, Mr Kocharyan. 9. Immediately after the announcement of the preliminary results of the election, the applicant called on his supporters to gather at Freedom Square in central Yerevan in order to protest against the irregularities which had allegedly occurred in the election process, announcing that the election had not been free and fair. 10. From 20 February 2008 onwards, nationwide daily protest rallies were held by the applicant’s supporters, their main meeting place being Freedom Square and the surrounding park. It appears that the rallies at Freedom Square, held during the daytime and late into the night, attracted at times tens of thousands of people, while several hundred demonstrators stayed in that area around the clock, having set up a camp. The applicant participated in the rallies in his capacity as opposition leader and presidential candidate, giving speeches two to three times a day on issues of political and public interest and regularly calling on his supporters to continue the mass protests. He himself also stayed at Freedom Square around the clock, leaving only for two to three hours a day. 11. On 23 February 2008 the outgoing President held individual meetings with the chief of police, chief of the army and chief of national security, announcing that he would not allow anybody to destabilise the situation in the country and giving instructions to that effect. The applicant alleged that, following those meetings, persecution had begun against many of his supporters. Various political and public figures who had expressed their support for his candidacy, members of his election campaign and other supporters were arrested and charged on various grounds. Furthermore, many of his supporters in the regions were subjected to ill-treatment and psychological pressure at police stations, were dismissed from work or deprived of social benefits. His telephone conversations and those of his supporters were tapped and various party premises searched. 12. On 24 February 2008 the Central Election Commission announced that Mr Sargsyan had won the election with around 52% of all votes cast, while the applicant had received around 21% of votes. 13. On 29 February 2008 the rallies were still in full swing, while all the international election observers had left the country. The applicant alleged that the authorities had deliberately waited for the departure of the international observers before starting their unlawful dispersal of the assembly at Freedom Square. 14. On the same date the applicant applied to the Constitutional Court, contesting the election results and seeking to annul them. 15. The applicant alleged that on 1 March 2008 at around 6 a.m. the police had arrived at Freedom Square. At that time he had been asleep in his car parked at the square. Most of the demonstrators who were camping there were also asleep, but news spread that the police were in the vicinity and the demonstrators began to waken. The applicant was woken by his bodyguard and walked to one of the statues situated in the centre of the square. By then the police forces had already encircled the several hundred demonstrators based on the square. They started making a loud noise by banging their rubber batons against their shields, which spread panic among the demonstrators. Some of them managed to switch on the microphones and the lights on the square, whereupon the applicant addressed the demonstrators from a platform: “We see that police forces have arrived on the square. Please, do not have any contact with them and do not touch them. Please, keep your distance from them. Let us wait and see what they want from us. If they have something to tell us, we are ready to listen. Please, be patient and peaceful”. The demonstrators followed his request and kept their distance from the police forces, which by then had surrounded the demonstrators with a triple cordon. Suddenly, without any prior warning or orders to disperse, the police forces, shouting loudly, had attacked the demonstrators, violently beating them with rubber batons and destroying the camp. In a matter of minutes the demonstrators were pushed out of Freedom Square. They tried to save themselves by fleeing from the police officers who chased, beat and kicked them brutally, regardless of their age and gender. 16. In the meantime, the applicant, who was on the platform, was approached by the Head of the State Protection Department (SPD) of the National Security Service, who was also the chief of the Armenian President’s bodyguard team, and other SPD officers. They surrounded the applicant and his bodyguards and then forcibly took them to one of the central statues on the square, where the applicant was ordered to sit on a bench surrounded only by SPD officers. After the square was cleared of all demonstrators, the Head of the SPD approached the applicant and ordered him to leave the square. The applicant refused to comply, saying that he would not leave the square voluntarily and that they could make him do so only by arresting him. After further attempts to make the applicant leave the square failed, the Head of the SPD forced the applicant into a car and took him to his house in Yerevan. Once there, he was not allowed to leave the territory of his house and garden. The roads to his house were blocked by special police forces, SPD officers, the road traffic police and other police units. Block posts were set up and all vehicles heading to and from his house were checked and searched. No one could reach the applicant or go in or out of his home without the permission of the special forces. The special forces, after carrying out a search of visitors and their vehicles, reported their identity and the purpose of their visit to an unidentified superior and allowed visitors to go in and out only after receiving instructions from that person. 17. It appears that, after Freedom Square was cleared of demonstrators, some of them relocated to the area near the French Embassy, where they were later joined by thousands of others who apparently poured into the streets of Yerevan in response to the events of the early morning in order to voice their discontent. It further appears that the rallies continued throughout the city until late at night, involving clashes between protesters and law enforcement officers and resulting in ten deaths, including eight civilians, numerous injured and a state of emergency being declared by the outgoing President. The state of emergency, inter alia, prohibited the holding of any further rallies and other mass public events for a period of twenty days. 18. The Government contested the applicant’s above-mentioned allegations and alleged the following. Firstly, the reason for the police operation of 1 March 2008 at Freedom Square had been the information obtained the day before by the law enforcement authorities, according to which a large number of weapons were to be distributed to the protesters to incite provocative actions and mass disorder in Yerevan. Members of the relevant police force had arrived on Freedom Square at around 7 a.m. to verify that information, but met with resistance from the demonstrators who had attacked the police officers with wooden bats, metal rods and stones. Secondly, once violence had erupted on Freedom Square, because his security was in danger the applicant had been surrounded on the platform by the Head of the SPD and other SPD officers and taken to the edge of the square, about 20 to 30 metres away, where he sat on a bench surrounded by SPD officers. After the assembly was terminated, the applicant, who was still sitting on the bench, was advised by the Head of the SPD to go home, but he refused. During that time a journalist freely approached the applicant, interviewed him and left. The applicant was then again advised by the Head of the SPD to go home, but did not respond. An SPD car then approached and the applicant got into the car voluntarily and was taken by SPD officers to his home in Yerevan. While being taken home, the applicant did not express any wish to go elsewhere. Later in the afternoon additional SPD and police forces were stationed near the applicant’s house as part of special security measures employed on that day in respect of all persons under State protection, because of the escalating violence in Yerevan. For security reasons SPD officers were instructed to search everyone entering the applicant’s house, but they were never instructed to prohibit anyone from entering the house or to prevent the applicant from leaving. The applicant expressed the wish to leave the house and to join the demonstrators near the French Embassy only once, on 1 March. He was told by the Head of the SPD that he was free to leave and go wherever he wanted, but the SPD would not be able to ensure his security in the area near the French Embassy and they would not accompany him there. The applicant did not wish to leave the house without State protection. 19. On 1 March 2008 the Secretary General of the Council of Europe issued the following press release: “I am very concerned about reports of injuries during the security forces’ operation to disperse protesters in Yerevan this morning. If these reports are confirmed, all allegations of excessive force should be properly investigated. It is also vital to prevent any further violence. I am also alarmed by the reports that the runner-up in the recent presidential elections, former President [Levon Ter-Petrosyan], has been put under house arrest. If this is true, he should be immediately released. If he is accused of committing a crime, he should be properly charged and prosecuted in a court of law like anyone else. In a democracy you cannot arbitrarily detain political opponents.” 20. On the same day the SPD issued a statement that was broadcast on the public television channel, to the effect that SPD officers had decided to remove the applicant from Freedom Square, pursuant to Section 6 § 3 of the Act on Ensuring the Security of Persons Subject to Special State Protection, in order to ensure his safety – as a former President of Armenia subject to State protection – from any danger posed by the situation created during the police operation in the morning of 1 March 2008. The applicant had been removed from the square and taken to his house, which was similarly to be protected by the SPD, pursuant to Section 12 (2) of the same Act. Bearing in mind the necessity of ensuring the applicant’s security, as well as taking into account the fact that the applicant’s leaving his home might lead to unpredictable developments and pose a danger to his security, the SPD – in the situation which had arisen – had warned the applicant that he must categorically refrain from attempting to leave his house, indicating that otherwise the SPD could not bear responsibility for his safety, since they could not accompany him to an unlawful demonstration. 21. On 4 March 2008 the applicant’s representative filed a request at the hearing before the Constitutional Court, submitting that the applicant was under de facto house arrest and unable to attend, and requesting that the Constitutional Court take measures to ensure his attendance. The President of the Constitutional Court replied that the applicant had three representatives at the hearing. However, if the applicant also wished to attend but was unable for whatever reason, the request would be examined and an appropriate decision would be taken. 22. On the same date the Constitutional Court took a decision, ordering the General Prosecutor’s Office to clarify the fact of the applicant’s alleged de facto deprivation of liberty, as claimed by his representatives, and to ensure his attendance at the hearing before the Constitutional Court if he so wished. 23. On the same date the General Prosecutor’s Office replied that the applicant was not deprived of his liberty, there were no restrictions on his freedom of movement, there was no such concept as “house arrest” under the law and he was free to attend the hearing before the Constitutional Court if he so wished. It was not the duty of the General Prosecutor’s Office to ensure his attendance. 24. The applicant alleged that, following the decision of the Constitutional Court, he was allowed to attend the hearing on 5 March 2008 for one hour. Otherwise, his house arrest lasted without interruption until at least 20 March 2008. 25. The Government contested the applicant’s allegations and claimed that the applicant had attended the hearing before the Constitutional Court after he had expressed the wish to do so and had been accompanied by SPD officers. After the hearing was over, he himself had asked to return home and thereafter he did not express any wish to leave his house until the state of emergency was lifted on 20 March 2008. The special SPD reinforcements were removed from the applicant’s house on 16 March 2008. Throughout that period the applicant had numerous visitors at his house, including journalists, diplomats and other persons, none of whom was prohibited from entering. 26. On 8 March 2008 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s application of 29 February 2008.

4. The applicant was born in 1970 and is currently detained in Alytus Correctional Facility. 5. The applicant was arrested on 3 June 2012 and transferred to Kaunas Remand Prison on 4 June 2012. On 5 June 2012 he was examined by a doctor (see paragraph 15 below). During that examination, the applicant did not indicate that he needed any special devices. 6. On 26 November 2012 the applicant consulted a doctor and indicated that he had sleep apnoea and he wished to acquire a continuous positive airway pressure (hereinafter “CPAP”) device for its treatment. 7. On 15 March 2013 a report was issued by a medical expert, indicating that the use of a CPAP device was the most effective way to treat sleep apnoea and that the applicant’s condition was deteriorating because he had not been using a CPAP device. It also indicated that there was a risk of complications if the sleep apnoea was not treated properly. 8. Between 12 and 17 September 2013 the applicant was hospitalised in the Prison Hospital. A doctor recommended that he continue using a CPAP device following his discharge from the hospital. 9. On 19 September the applicant asked the prison administration to allow him to use a CPAP device. On 3 October 2013 the administration of Kaunas Remand Prison responded that under domestic law such a device was not among the items that could be given to detainees by their spouses or close relatives (see paragraph 14 below), but indicated that such an item could be purchased from the prison shop. The applicant then asked the Kaunas Remand Prison Administration to allow his relatives to give him the device. On 29 October 2013, this request was also refused, on the grounds that there were no indications in the applicant’s medical history or in the document issued by the Prison Hospital that the applicant needed the device (see paragraph 16 below). 10. On 20 October 2014 the applicant lodged a complaint before the domestic courts, which he specified on 19 February 2015. He asked the court to award him 86,800 euros (EUR) in compensation for non-pecuniary damage suffered in the period between 4 June 2012 and 20 October 2014. The applicant stated that while he had been detained in Kaunas Remand Prison, he had asked the prison administration to allow him to have a CPAP device to treat his sleep apnoea, as recommended to him by a doctor in the Prison Hospital (see paragraph 8 above). The applicant stated that the prison administration had refused to allow him to have such a device, and he had been experiencing serious health issues. 11. On 12 October 2015 the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court allowed the applicant’s complaint in part and awarded him EUR 1,100 in respect of non-pecuniary damage. The court stated that the prison administration had failed to provide the applicant with the same level of healthcare available to persons who were not detained. It was clear from the case file that the applicant had twice asked the prison administration to allow him to purchase and use a CPAP device. The refusal of permission by the Kaunas Remand Prison Administration had been unfounded because there had been a recommendation issued by a doctor. The court held that the applicant had a right to compensation in respect of non‑pecuniary damage suffered from 3 October 2013 (when his request was refused by the prison administration – see paragraph 9 below) until 20 October 2014 and thus decided to award the applicant EUR 1,100 in this regard. The court also noted that there was no information in the case file to indicate that the applicant had not received appropriate healthcare in Kaunas Remand Prison. It stated that although the recommendation issued by the specialist contained a reference to possible complications, there was no information in the applicant’s case file to show that the inability to use a CPAP device had had any negative consequences for his health. 12. The applicant appealed against the decision of the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court. On 4 October 2016 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the first-instance decision in its entirety. 13. On 12 July 2017 the applicant asked the Prison Department for a transfer to Alytus Correctional Facility from Vilnius Correctional Facility, where he had been transferred on 20 March 2015. The applicant submitted that he had been serving his sentence in premises for disabled persons but that he could be transferred to the standard dormitory-type premises. On 2 August 2017 the applicant’s request was allowed and he was transferred to Alytus Correctional Facility on 21 August 2017 where he was able to continue using his CPAP device.

5. The applicant was born in 1976. He is currently serving a prison sentence in the Institution for the Execution of Criminal Sanctions (Zavod za izvršenje krivičnih sankcija; hereinafter “the IECS”) in Spuž. 6. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7. On several occasions in July and August 2005 explosives were used on the construction site of a hotel on the Montenegrin coast, apparently with the aim of forcing the investors to buy the adjacent plot of land. A high‑ranking police officer, S.Š., was in charge of the police investigation. 8. Shortly after midnight on 30 August 2005, S.Š. was ambushed in front of his house and killed by nineteen shots from an automatic gun. 9. On 16 February 2006 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of criminal enterprise (zločinačko udruživanje), attempted extortion (iznuda u pokušaju) and aiding and abetting aggravated murder (teško ubistvo putem pomaganja). The case was entrusted to the Special Prosecutor for Organised Crime. 10. On 19 February 2006 the investigating judge of the High Court (Viši sud) in Podgorica issued a detention order against the applicant and several other persons for fear that they might abscond, taking into account the gravity of the offences and the severity of the prison sentence prescribed. The decision specified that detention would last for a month starting as of 16 February 2006. It relied on Article 148 § 1(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“the CCP”) in force at the time (see paragraph 94 below). 11. The detention of the applicant and one other person was extended on 16 March, 15 April, 16 May, 15 June and 12 July 2006, each time for another month, in substance for fear that they might abscond and taking into account the gravity of the criminal offences of which they were suspected. Relying on Article 148 § 1(1) of the CCP, the court specified, inter alia, that there was an ongoing investigation against them and that a number of witnesses remained to be interviewed. Those decisions specified that as well as criminal enterprise and attempted extortion, the applicant was also suspected of aiding and abetting aggravated murder. 12. On 14 August 2006 the Supreme State Prosecutor (Special Prosecutor) filed an indictment against the applicant and several other persons. The applicant was indicted for criminal enterprise, attempted extortion, aiding and abetting aggravated murder, helping a perpetrator after the commission of a criminal offence, incitement to forge an official document (isprava), and incitement to endanger the public (izazivanje opšte opasnosti). 13. The defendants’ detention, including the applicant’s, was further extended by the High Court on 15 August 2006, 21 October 2008 and 11 March 2009, in substance for fear that they might abscond taking into account the gravity and number of criminal offences that they had been accused of and the sentences prescribed for them. The latter two decisions also took into account that the defendants were relatively young, that three of them were unemployed, two were single, and one was a foreign citizen. All three decisions relied on Article 148 §1(1) and none of them specified for how long the detention was extended. 14. In addition, on 23 May 2007, during the main hearing (glavni pretres), the applicant requested that his detention be lifted, submitting that he had nowhere to abscond to and that he would duly appear before the court (uredno odazvati na pozive suda). The court dismissed the request the same day, considering that “the grounds for [the applicant’s] detention still persisted”. 15. On 7 August 2009 the High Court found the applicant guilty of several criminal offences and sentenced him to thirty years in prison. 16. On 17 February 2010 the Court of Appeal (Apelacioni sud) in Podgorica quashed the High Court judgment. The same day it extended the detention of four defendants, including the applicant, without specifying for how long, considering that “the reasons for detention still persisted”. The court relied on Article 148 § 1(1) and (4) of the CCP in force at the time (see paragraph 94 below). 17. On 4 March 2011 four defendants, including the applicant, applied for release (predlog za ukidanje pritvora). On 10 March 2011 the High Court dismissed their application, considering that “the circumstances on the basis of which [their] detention had been extended still persisted”. It relied on Article 148 §1 (1) and (4). 18. On 9 May 2011 the High Court again found the applicant guilty of several criminal offences and sentenced him to thirty years in prison. The same day the court extended the detention of four defendants, including the applicant, for fear that they might abscond in view of the sanction imposed, and that their release could seriously jeopardise public order and peace. The court relied on Article 175 § 1(1) and (4) of the 2009 CCP (see paragraphs 100-101 below). 19. On 30 December 2011 the Court of Appeal quashed the High Court’s judgment. The same day the court extended the detention of five defendants, including the applicant, without specifying for how long, considering that “the reasons for detention still persisted”. It relied on Article 175 § 1(1) and (4) of the 2009 CCP. 20. On 1 February 2012, relying on Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention, five defendants, including the applicant, applied for release, maintaining that the reasons for their detention no longer persisted. On 8 February 2012 the High Court dismissed their application, considering that “the circumstances had not changed since the previous decision” and that “the reasons for their detention persisted”. It relied on Article 175 § 1(1) and (4) of the 2009 CCP. 21. On 11 April, 13 June and 10 August 2012 the High Court, acting pursuant to Article 179 § 2 of the 2009 CCP (see paragraphs 96 and 100 below), further extended the detention of five defendants, including the applicant, “until further notice” (ima trajati do dalje odluke suda), for fear that they might abscond and that their release would seriously breach public order and peace. In doing so the court relied on Article 175 § 1(1) and (4) of the CCP. The court took into account the gravity and the number of offences at issue, the sentence provided for the offences, the circumstances in which they had been committed, as well as the fact that the defendants were relatively young and that one of the accused had absconded. 22. On 18 April 2012, during the main hearing, five defendants, including the applicant, applied to the court to lift their detention. The court dismissed their application the same day, considering that “the reasons for extending their detention persisted”. 23. On 9 October 2012 the High Court, inter alia, found the applicant guilty of attempted extortion, public endangerment and aggravated murder, all through incitement (sve putem podstrekavanja), and sentenced him to thirty years in prison. The same day the court extended the detention of four defendants, including the applicant. It considered that the risk of their absconding persisted, and that there were particular circumstances indicating that releasing them would seriously breach public order and peace. The court relied on Article 175 § 1(1) and (4) of the 2009 CCP. 24. On 2 April 2013 the Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance judgment. 25. On 2 April 2014 the Supreme Court quashed the Court of Appeal’s judgment. The same day the Supreme Court extended the detention of four defendants, including the applicant, considering that the reasons for detention persisted. Notably, the defendants at issue had been found guilty of aggravated murder by the first-instance judgment, which had not been quashed. The offence contained two qualifying circumstances: (a) the victim was a police officer, and (b) he had been murdered for profit (koristoljublje). Referring to Article 175 § 1(4), the court considered that releasing the defendants could seriously breach public order and peace. 26. On 1 August 2014 the applicant applied for release to the High Court. Relying on Article 5 of the Convention and the relevant case-law, he complained, inter alia, about the length of his detention, alleging insufficient reasoning of the relevant decisions, the lack of regular review of his detention pursuant to Article 179 § 2 of the CCP, a lack of medical care and poor conditions in detention. He also submitted that in October 2013 he had been diagnosed with ulcerative colitis (an inflammatory bowel disease that causes long-lasting inflammation and ulcers in the digestive tract; it affects the innermost lining of the large intestine (colon) and the rectum) and enclosed the relevant medical reports. On 3 September 2014 the applicant urged the High Court to rule on his application. 27. On 4 September 2014 the applicant applied to the Court of Appeal. On 12 September 2014, during the main hearing before the Court of Appeal, the applicant applied for release, primarily for health-related reasons. He submitted additional medical reports. Between 5 November 2014 and 16 January 2015 he urged the Court of Appeal on six occasions to rule thereon. 28. On 23 January 2015 the Court of Appeal heard a medical expert witness and obtained information from the IECS in this regard. The expert medical witness submitted that the applicant’s illness (ulcerative colitis) was serious, requiring a special diet and specific medical treatment, the absence of which, or even small deviations, could make it worse. He also explained that the illness caused a lot of psychological changes. The IECS submitted that it provided both medical care, including in public health institutions where needed, and various diets. In particular, the applicant had been taken to various hospitals and specialists, and was allowed to provide for his own food. On 13 February 2015 the court dismissed his application. 29. On 20 February 2015 the Court of Appeal upheld the High Court’s judgment on the merits of 9 October 2012. The same day, relying on Article 175 § 4 of the CCP, the court extended the four defendants’ detention, including the applicant’s, finding that the reasons for it persisted. 30. On 12 March 2015 the Supreme Court, acting upon an appeal lodged by the applicant, quashed the order of 20 February 2015 extending the applicant’s detention, finding that Article 175 § 4 of the CCP, on which the Court of Appeal had relied, did not exist, as the relevant provision contained only two paragraphs. The court also acknowledged that there was no reasoning as to whether the applicant’s health affected his further detention. 31. On 16 March 2015 the Court of Appeal extended four defendants’ detention, including the applicant’s, relying on Article 175 § 1(4). It found the applicant’s health of no relevance to his further detention, given that it transpired from the IECS’s submission that the applicant had been provided with adequate medical care and nutrition. 32. On 20 March 2015 the applicant appealed, relying on Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention. He submitted that the order to extend the detention had been issued for all defendants together, and that the court had failed to provide specific reasons for extending his detention. He also complained about the conditions in detention and of a lack of adequate medical care there, including a lack of the medically prescribed diet (see paragraph 45 below). 33. On 27 March 2015 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. While acknowledging that the relevant judgment was not yet final, the court took into account that the defendants had been found guilty of aiding and abetting aggravated murder, for which a prison sentence of ten years or more was prescribed. It also held that the Court of Appeal had sufficiently examined the applicant’s health and its relevance to detention. 34. On 7 May 2015, invoking Articles 3, 5 and 6 of the Convention, the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. He complained, in particular, that (a) the conditions of detention in prison, in particular the medical care, were inadequate; (b) his detention was unlawful given that it was not regularly reviewed; (c) his detention was lengthy and the relevant decisions had been insufficiently reasoned; and (d) his application for release submitted on 1 August 2014 had not been ruled upon. 35. On 16 June 2015 the applicant again applied for release. He invoked the principle of proportionality and submitted that whenever possible the courts were obliged to order a less severe measure instead of detention. He referred to his state of health and relied on Bulatović v. Montenegro, no. 67320/10, 22 July 2014. He attached a medical report of 10 June 2015 (see paragraph 77 below). 36. On 9 July 2015 the High Court dismissed his application, relying on Article 175 § 1(4) of the CCP. It considered that the applicant had been found guilty of aggravated murder by a judgment which was not yet final, and that the criminal offence at issue was particularly grave owing both to the manner in which it had been committed, and to its consequences – the death of a high-ranking police officer, who had been murdered for profit. The court considered that the applicant’s health was of no consequence as he was being, and had to be, provided with an adequate diet and medical care in the IECS. Even if this had not been the case, it would not affect the existence of a reason for detention, but could only indicate that he should be detained in more adequate conditions, such as in the Clinical Centre of Montenegro. 37. On 20 October 2015 the Supreme Court, in substance, upheld the judgment of the Court of Appeal of 20 February 2015 and the applicant’s sentence of thirty years in prison. 38. On 28 December 2015 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s constitutional appeal. The court found, in particular, that the impugned decisions had been rendered by competent courts, in a procedure prescribed by law, on the basis of the CCP, and that the reasons contained therein were not arbitrary. As regards the length of detention, the court held that Article 5 distinguished between detention before and after conviction. It held that the lawfulness of detention could be assessed only until the first‑instance judgment, which did not have to be final. Given that the first‑instance judgment had been issued on 7 August 2009, the applicant’s constitutional appeal in that regard was belated. As regards medical care, the court considered that the applicant’s health had been continuously monitored by a number of specialists in various institutions, and that he had been provided in a timely manner with reasonable available medical care (pravovremeno su pružili razumnu dostupnu medicinsku njegu). The decision did not address the conditions of detention, whether the applicant’s detention had been regularly reviewed or the alleged failure to rule on his application for release. That decision was served on the applicant on 25 March 2016. 39. The parties’ submissions in this regard differed. 40. The applicant maintained that the cell in which he had been detained had been overcrowded, the number of inmates varying, and that he had lacked water and daily exercise. The cell had contained a sanitary facility and a dining table. Due to a frequent lack of water, the applicant had had to collect it in a container (u buretu). Also, the daily walks had lasted for one hour – except for Thursdays and Fridays, when they had lasted for half an hour – and had been cancelled altogether on rainy days. 41. The Government, for their part, submitted that there were no records for the period prior to 5 August 2009. Between 5 August 2009 and 26 March 2010 the applicant had been held in room D4, measuring 30 sq. m, which, at times, he had shared with five other persons at most. Between 27 March 2010 and 8 February 2016 he had been in room L9, measuring 20 sq. m, which he had shared with three other persons at most, and during some periods he had been there alone. Both D4 and L9 had their own toilets, separated from the rest of the room, which the inmates were in charge of cleaning. 42. In the remand section of the prison the applicant had had at his disposal four outdoor walking areas, measuring in the range of 506 sq. m to 900 sq. m. He had also been allowed out of his room during family visits (thirty minutes per week) and during the visits of his representatives, which were not time-limited. 43. On 8 February 2016 the applicant had been transferred to the post‑conviction section of the prison, where he had been placed in a single room on the ground floor in newly-built pavilion F. The room measured 15.09 sq. m, of which the main area measured 5.7 sq. m, the dining area 7.84 sq. m, and the toilet with wash basin 1.55 sq. m, separated from the rest of the room by a dividing wall. In the room there was a bed, a table and a chair, a wardrobe, a television set and receiver, a DVD player, a refrigerator, air-conditioning, a hot plate and an oven. In the immediate vicinity of the room there was a common bathroom with several showers. There were several outdoor yards at his disposal: one of concrete measuring 289 sq. m, and two grass ones measuring 210 sq. m and 2,393 sq. m respectively. There was also a covered gym (natkrivena teretana) of a metal construction. 44. The Government also submitted that the conditions in the prison, for both remand prisoners and convicted prisoners, had been significantly improved after a visit of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman and Degrading Treatment (“the CPT”) in 2013 (see paragraph 139 below). 45. In September 2013 the applicant was diagnosed with ulcerative colitis and was prescribed a special diet (crijevna dijeta) by a specialist in the Clinical Centre of Montenegro (a State-run hospital). The relevant medical report did not contain any details as regards the exact content of the diet. With the consent of the High Court judge of 9 December 2013, special food products were provided by the applicant’s family, at first once a day and then once a week. 46. It transpires from medical reports issued in June, July and November 2014 that the treatment the applicant was receiving for ulcerative colitis was not effective. In 2014 he was, inter alia, admitted twice to the Clinical Centre as his condition had worsened. As he did not wish to undergo surgery, he was prescribed medication called Vedolizumab (“VDZ”) instead. It is unclear from the case file when exactly VDZ was prescribed, but it would appear that it was between September and November 2014. The reports of November 2014 also noted that the applicant did not wish to be hospitalised either. As VDZ was not available in Montenegro, the applicant had four doses bought for him in Germany, the cost of which was 17,222.40 euros (EUR). Those doses were administered in December 2014, January, February and March 2015. After the dose in March 2015 the doctors noted “evident improvement” and considered it of utmost importance that the applicant be given the next dose, as “every delay thereof increased the risk of the illness worsening”. The next dose was planned for May 2015. 47. Twice in May 2015 the IECS informed the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of its attempts to provide VDZ for the applicant. Given that it was not registered in Montenegro, it could be obtained only with the exceptional approval of a request made by a company licensed to distribute medication. The IECS had asked that such a request be made by a pharmaceutical company. 48. On 20 May 2015 the main distributor of VDZ informed the pharmaceutical company that VDZ was under special monitoring (pod posebnim praćenjem). Every administration of it had to be authorised by its medical sector, and each and every individual case examined separately. 49. On 22 July 2015 the applicant had two more doses bought for him in Germany, the cost of which was EUR 5,975.94. They were administered in August and September 2015. 50. On 2 September 2015 the IECS provided for two doses of VDZ, the cost of which was covered by the High Court (one being EUR 4,457.85). They were administered in November 2015 and January 2016. 51. In the course of 2015 the applicant was hospitalised once because his ulcerative colitis had worsened. 52. In 2016 the applicant received five doses of VDZ in total (the one in January 2016 mentioned in paragraph 50 above, and in February, October, November and December 2016). The dose planned for March 2016 was not administered until October 2016. 53. In 2017 the applicant received nine doses of VDZ (January, February, March, April, May, June, July and two in September). There is no information in the case file as to who covered the costs of the doses as of February 2016 onwards. 54. In at least nine medical reports in 2017 the doctor in charge noted that the treatment with VDZ had been prescribed because the applicant had kept refusing surgery. He considered, however, that in spite of the VDZ treatment, the applicant’s health was not satisfactory and that even though he kept refusing to undergo an operation, there was no other option, and the applicant was advised to consider it again. The doctor also considered that it was practically impossible for the applicant to recover (ostvari remisiju), given that the conditions in which he was detained increased the risk of complications and could be life-threatening. 55. Between 15 November and 4 December 2017 the applicant was hospitalised again because his ulcerative colitis had worsened. As he had been recommended surgery, further VDZ treatment was discontinued. 56. On 13 June 2018 the doctor from the Clinical Centre noted that the applicant was feeling well. On 23 July 2018 the applicant underwent an endoscopic examination in the Clinical Centre, in which it was found that the ulcerative colitis was in remission. On 25 July 2018 the prison doctor noted that the applicant was feeling well, that he was in a state of remission and that his ulcerative colitis was in a “tranquil” phase. Between 3 August and 20 December 2018 the applicant had three more specialists’ examinations indicating an inflammatory pseudopolyp and that the ulcerative colitis had reactivated after six months of remission. 57. On 17 October 2013 a discharge note from the hospital stated that the applicant had been, inter alia, recommended an ophthalmological examination in order to determine his dioptres. A discharge note of 25 December 2013 stated that the applicant had diminished vision (oslabljen vid). 58. On 13 January 2014 (during an endoscopic examination at the Clinical Centre), the applicant was told he must undergo an ophthalmological examination on account of his sudden eyesight problems (zbog naglo nastalih smetnji s vidom). 59. On 4 February 2014, with the High Court’s consent of 30 January and 4 February 2014, the applicant was examined by an ophthalmologist in Meljine hospital as well as in a privately-run ophthalmology clinic in Podgorica. The report of the ophthalmologist in Meljine is partly illegible. It transpires from the legible part that the applicant was diagnosed with complicated cataracts (cataracta complicate) in his left eye. The next check‑up was recommended in three to four months. 60. On an unspecified date, apparently in March 2014, the applicant was diagnosed with proliferative retinopathy (Retinopathia proliferativa alia), myopia (OD Myopia), and optic atrophy (OS Atrophia n. optici). A panel of ophthalmologists (konzilijum oftalmologa) recommended eye surgery in a privately-run clinic, which would include a cataract operation. 61. On 26 March 2014 the applicant was examined in a privately-run ophthalmological clinic. He underwent surgery on 27 March 2014, for which he paid EUR 2,600. 62. It transpires from the case file that the applicant had been suffering pain in the knee, spine and feet since 2000. He had undergone surgery to his left leg in 2001, had broken a thighbone in 2003, and both legs were “extremely deformed” (izrazito deformisana) owing to shotgun injuries (prostrelne rane) and a car accident, which would appear to have taken place in 2005. After gangrene had appeared, the applicant had undergone surgery to his right leg and skin grafts. 63. In the course of 2015 the applicant was examined by a number of specialists from the Clinical Centre and the Special Hospital for Orthopaedics, Neurosurgery and Neurology in Risan (“the Risan hospital”), and received various medication. 64. In particular, during his hospitalisation between 28 March and 3 April 2015 (for ulcerative colitis) the applicant was also examined by an orthopaedist who recommended surgery. He had another check-up on 22 April 2015. 65. On 24 April 2015 the applicant was hospitalised again because his surgery wounds were oozing (secernacije) under the left knee and he required further surgery. On 30 April 2015, on his discharge from hospital, he was recommended rehabilitation treatment in the Rehabilitation Institute in Igalo (Institut za fizikalnu medicinu, rehabilitaciju i reumatologiju – “the Igalo Institute”) and, if the results were not satisfactory, an endoprosthesis. 66. On 27 July 2015 the applicant requested that he be allowed the said rehabilitation treatment. The High Court approved the request on 30 July 2015, noting that the exact dates of the treatment would be agreed directly between the IECS and the applicant. 67. On 21 August 2015 the applicant asked the prison authorities to provide him with transportation to the Igalo Institute the first week of September. He submitted that the costs of his treatment and stay there would be entirely covered by his family. On 2 September 2015 he informed the IECS that his treatment was scheduled to begin on 7 September 2015. He repeated that the costs of it would be covered by him. On 7 September 2015 the applicant was taken to Igalo. 68. Following the recommendation of doctors in Risan hospital, the applicant’s request to that effect and the High Court’s consent, his treatment in the Igalo Institute was extended twice. In one of those requests the applicant submitted that the costs thereof would be covered by him. He stayed there between 7 September and 7 December 2015, for which he paid EUR 10,673.60. The discharge note from the Igalo Institute stated that he had received treatment for strengthening his muscles with the aim of preparing him for a possible endoprosthesis. 69. Between 4 September 2015 and 9 February 2016 the High Court informed the IECS on several occasions that the costs of the applicant’s medical treatment, including for VDZ, and the costs of security guards at the Igalo Institute, would be covered by the High Court upon presentation of the relevant reimbursement requests (po podnošenju zahtjeva za naknadu troškova), pursuant to Article 226 §§ 2(5) and 4 of the CCP. Between 14 October 2015 and 12 February 2016 the Judicial Council paid EUR 15,748.80 to the Igalo Institute for the accommodation of the IECS security guards who had accompanied the applicant during his treatment there. 70. On 3 December 2015 a specialist in Risan hospital noted that the applicant was still suffering strong pain in his left knee and that the treatment in the Igalo Institute had not improved it. The specialist recommended inter-ligament corrective osteotomy with external fixing (interligamentarna korektivna osteotomija uz spoljašnju fiksaciju). He diagnosed the applicant with advanced knee arthrosis. 71. Between 2 June 2016 and March 2017 the applicant’s left knee was further examined by a number of specialists: once by an orthopaedist, a vascular surgeon and a neurologist, and three times by a neuro-surgeon. He also had an X-ray of the knee and an MRI scan of the lumbar spine. He was diagnosed with serious osteoarthritis of the left knee (gonarthrosis lateralis sinistri gradus gravis), atherosclerosis, lumbalgia (lumboischialgia), and peroneal nerve dysfunction (leasio nervi peronaei), and further treatment in the Igalo Institute was recommended. 72. During his hospitalisation between 28 March and 3 April 2015 (for ulcerative colitis) the applicant had also been examined by a psychiatrist and prescribed treatment. The report did not specify which treatment, but stated that the next check-up should take place “if needed” (po potrebi). 73. On 25 March 2016 the applicant was examined by the prison doctor, who recommended an examination by a psychiatrist in the specialist hospital in Kotor. On 29 March 2016 the applicant was examined in Kotor, where he submitted that in the previous two months he had felt fear for his physical health and certain aspects of everyday functioning. The doctor prescribed treatment. The next appointment scheduled for 19 April 2016 took place on 18 April 2016. The doctor found that he was suffering from “prominent anxious-depressive psychopathology with vegetative expression” (prominentna anksiozno-depresivna psihopatologija, sa vegetativnom ekspresijom) and prescribed treatment. The next check-up recommended for 4 May 2016 took place on 8 July 2016. The applicant submitted that he had stopped taking the medication “due to changes in the work of the health service” (zbog izmijenjenih okolnosti rada zdravstvene službe). The doctor found that he was suffering from depression, a high level of anxiety and severe somatic symptom disorder. He prescribed treatment and recommended another check-up in a month. The next check‑up took place on 23 August 2016, when severe anxiety was noted. It was recommended that the next check-up be done by telephone in two weeks, and a further one in Kotor hospital in one to two months. It would appear from the case file that there have been no further check-ups. 74. Between March 2013 and 4 December 2017 the applicant was hospitalised eight times (for 128 days in total) and had in addition twenty‑two outpatient hospital treatments. Between September 2013 and January 2018 he was examined outside the IECS 151 times. 75. Between 17 September 2013 and 18 August 2015 the IECS informed the High Court on several occasions that following the referral (uput) of the prison doctor, the applicant had been taken to various medical institutions outside the IECS. 76. Medical examinations had been conducted in the presence of prison guards, including a colonoscopy and psychiatric examinations. The colonoscopy had been performed without anaesthesia. 77. On 10 June 2015 three medical experts (one in forensic medicine, one in internal medicine – a gastroentero-hepatologist and a psychiatrist) issued an opinion on the applicant’s health, after having examined him and his medical file. They stated that ulcerative colitis was incurable and that apart from genetic factors, it was generated by stressful circumstances. They recommended that the applicant be treated in the least stressful environment possible, that is that he be “isolated from the IECS”. They observed that his health had constantly deteriorated until he had started treatment with VDZ, and that “even though the medication was not registered in Montenegro, it was absolutely medically indicated and necessary to try to administer it, as the only other alterative was surgical removal of the colon, which needed to be avoided as long as there was any other option”. 78. The doctors further observed that the applicant suffered from myopia, that he could not see in the left eye and he had an artificial lens implanted in the right eye, that he had a dislocation of the fourth and fifth lumbar vertebrae and ossification of the lumbar part of his spine, ossification of his left knee, an injury to a nerve in his left calf, he walked with crutches, and had two skin infections following the administration of injections as a result of the lack of disinfectant alcohol in the prison. The prison doctor later confirmed that there had indeed been no such disinfectant in the IECS for a considerable time and that it could not provide for the applicant’s special diet, which was why his family was allowed to bring him food. 79. The doctors described the applicant’s cell as a “classic prison cell”, where only the applicant was held at the time, although he sometimes had a cell-mate. There was a toilet, apparently not separated from the rest of the room, and a separate tank of water. The doctors considered that the lack of running water and absence of a shower in the room could additionally cause a deterioration of the applicant’s health because of an increased risk of infection. 80. On 3 July 2015 the IECS informed the High Court, the Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court and the applicant that three types of medication (not VDZ), also unavailable in Montenegro, had been provided for the applicant. 81. On 18 September 2017 a medical expert submitted an expert opinion at the request of the applicant’s representatives. He maintained that there was a threat of malign alteration, which would inevitably result in the applicant’s death, and that it was absolutely necessary to find a solution allowing for adequate nutrition, the permanent administration of complex treatment, moderate daily physical exercise and the elimination of stressful situations. The conditions in which the applicant was detained were described as unfavourable for recuperation. 82. It would appear that on 26 September 2017 the applicant applied for an extraordinary reduction of his sentence for health-related reasons. The court requested an expert opinion in this regard, which was produced in October 2017. The expert submitted that stressful conditions in the IECS and the limited possibility of an adequate diet were such that the applicant would never achieve remission as long as he was in the IECS. Such course of illness was harmful and threatened to cause serious complications, some of which could undoubtedly be life-threatening. 83. On 18 January 2018 the applicant was diagnosed with bronchial asthma and prescribed treatment. 84. On five occasions between 1996 and 2010 the applicant was found guilty of various criminal offences. He received penalties ranging from a six-month suspended sentence to three years of imprisonment. 85. Before the first first-instance judgment was rendered, sixty hearings had taken place (twenty-one in 2007, twenty-two in 2008 and seventeen in 2009), during which more than seventy witnesses and ten expert witnesses had been heard, tens of expert witnesses’ opinions read out, and more than 100 pieces of material evidence examined. In the same period nine hearings were adjourned because of the absence of or various requests by the applicant and/or other defendants and/or their representatives. 86. Between 14 September 2010 and 9 May 2011 eighteen hearings were held. Between 5 April and 9 October 2012 eleven hearings were held. 87. Between 27 June 2014 and 20 February 2015 the Court of Appeal held ten hearings. 88. The ombudsman’s report of December 2017 indicates that half of all prisoners have some sort of mental illness or disorder and that the prison health service is not operating at full capacity. There is a waiting list for psychiatric evaluation and examination. Recommendations were made to the Ministry of Justice and the IECS to urgently consider the need to establish a prison psychiatric unit and to undertake steps to help patients suffering from depression, as well as to ensure that that kind of examination was conducted without the presence of prison guards (unless the psychiatrist explicitly requested their presence).

6. The applicants are Ukrainian nationals of Roma ethnicity. Before 10 September 2002 the applicants lived in the village of Petrivka, Ivanivskyy District, Odessa Region (hereinafter also “the village”). They currently live in Berezivka District, Odessa Region. 7. On 7 September 2002 a 17-year-old ethnic Ukrainian was murdered in the village, allegedly by a Romany man who was apparently convicted of the murder afterwards. It appears that this occurred in the course of an altercation between Romany men and other youngsters from the village at a local bar or dancehall. 8. On 8 September 2002 a crowd of village residents gathered and demanded that the Roma be expelled from the village. According to the statement of the village mayor, Mr M.S., made in the course of a subsequent criminal investigation, the local officials attempted to defuse the situation and urged the villages not to do anything illegal. 9. On the same day the village council met. Among those present were: a representative of the Ivanivskyy District State Administration (“the District Administration”) and the head of the Ivanivskyy District Police Department (“the District Police Department”). According to the minutes of the meeting submitted by the applicants, in his opening remarks the mayor said, inter alia: “... today a cruel crime was committed [in the village] by a group of residents of Gypsy ethnicity. One student of [the village high school] was murdered and three others were injured and are now in hospital in a serious state. This crime was made possible by the fact that no appropriate measures are being taken against them in the event of their [engaging in crimes]. Everybody knows that the spread of drug addiction, which is taking place in our village, is their fault. Today a meeting of villagers took place at which a negative opinion was expressed about the banditry and other [forms of crime] on the part of this category of people ... I invite the council members to speak responsibly and to express their opinion about the crime committed and about the decision of the villagers. I would like this meeting not to turn into something which aggravates inter-ethnic relations.” 10. At the close of the meeting the council decided, in particular, to “support the decision of the meeting of the village residents to expel persons of Gypsy ethnicity from the village”. 11. On 9 September 2002 the village council met again. The heads of the District Administration and the District Police Department and the chairperson and members of the Ivanivskyy District Council were present. The village council examined the question of “bringing the decision of the village council [of 8 September] concerning the expulsion of the persons of Gypsy ethnicity into compliance with legal norms”. The head of the District Administration invited the village council members to carefully consider the wisdom of their decision, drawing a clear line between crime‑related problems and inter-ethnic relations. A council member, D., stated that whatever the wording of the decision it would have no legal consequences and that legal action against drug dealers would also be ineffective. In fact, it was not possible to keep the situation under control. D. furthermore stated that the neighbours of the Roma residents were saying that it was necessary to cut off their gas supply and to burn down the Roma’s houses. At the close of the meeting the village council decided to ask law enforcement authorities “to ensure the expulsion of socially dangerous individuals, regardless of ethnic origin, from the village”. 12. On the evening of the same day the mayor and the local police advised the applicants to leave the village, as a “pogrom” was about to start. Electricity and gas supplies to their houses were cut. Subsequently, in the course of the night of 9-10 September 2002 a crowd of several hundred people, allegedly led by a certain Mr O.M., ransacked the houses belonging to the Roma, destroying their belongings. A number of police officers were present but did not intervene to prevent the looting and apparently concentrated solely on preventing human casualties. The house where the first applicant lived had burned down. According to the Government, the results of the expert analysis of the causes of the fire were inconclusive (see paragraph 118 below). 13. The applicants submitted a number of written statements from the applicants addressed to Ms Duducehava, the leader of a Roma association, and Mr Stoyanov, a lawyer who represented a number of applicants in the domestic criminal proceedings (see below). The statements bear various dates from 2004 and 2007, contain descriptions of the events of 7‑10 September 2002, and ask for help in dealing with the authorities. According to the general tenor of the statements, the applicants’ had been urged to leave by the police prior to the pogrom, and in their absence their houses had been ransacked by the mob – in particular, doors and windows had been smashed, and furniture and belongings destroyed or stolen. 14. According to the fifth applicant’s statement, dated 17 November 2007, she and the fourth applicant (her husband) had been away from the village at the time of the events and had only learned about them when they had returned on 20 September. She had had to sell her house “at half the price” (“за полцены”), as had other Roma victims of the pogrom. The seventh, eighth, thirteenth and sixteenth applicants’ statements, as well as the statements of some other former Roma residents of Petrivka, were similarly worded, speaking of the houses having been sold for less than their normal price (for instance, Mrs M. Burlya, the second applicant’s wife, characterised the price for which her house had been sold as “very cheap”). 15. The applicants submitted eight undated photographs showing the ruins of one or several houses, certain photographs showing signs of fire. The origin of these photographs is unclear. In her statement to Ms Duducehava in 2004 the sixth applicant referred to certain photographs showing damage to her and her relatives’ houses. 16. The seventh and eighth applicants stated that all the Roma had left the village before the attack started. 17. Applicants identified in the Appendix asserted in their statements to Ms Duducehava, Mr Stoyanov or to the police in the course of the subsequent criminal investigation that they had been away from the village at the time of the events of 7-10 September 2002 and of the attack and had only learned about it later. 18. In her statement to Mr Stoyanov dated 18 November 2007 the ninth applicant stated that she had been at home with her two granddaughters (aged ten and fifteen at the time) when the attack started. Stones had started flying through the windows, four attackers had broken down the door and started shouting, and the older granddaughter had pleaded with the attackers not to kill them. The attackers had not touched the applicant or her granddaughters; the applicant had then fled. However, in her statement to the police dated 26 September 2002 this applicant stated that she had fled the village prior to the attack and had returned the next day to find her home ransacked. In her statement (addressed to Ms Duducehava) and dated 13 June 2004 this applicant complained of having been expelled from her home but did not mention that she had personally witnessed any attack. 19. According to a report published on 20 September 2002 in the regional newspaper Porto Franko and information given at a press conference held on 12 September 2002 by the Secretary of State (Державний секретар) for the Ministry of the Interior and by the head of the Odessa Regional Police Department (“the Regional Police”), police officers had been present in force and had observed the attack. However, they had not attempted to prevent or stop it, apparently concentrating solely on preventing casualties. 20. The events were reported in a number of regional and national newspapers. 21. The applicants alleged that after the attack they had had to move to another town and live with family and friends in overcrowded and inadequate conditions. 22. On 10 September 2002 the Ivanivka district police initiated criminal proceedings against persons unknown on suspicion of disorderly conduct committed in a group (хуліганство вчинене групою осіб). 23. On 10 September 2002 police investigators from Ivanivka, Berezivka, and several other districts conducted on-site examinations of the damaged houses in Petrivka (which included the taking of fingerprints). A regional police investigator conducted further on-site examinations in December 2002 and January 2003. 24. On 12 September 2002 it was decided to constitute an investigative team composed of a senior investigator from the regional police department and investigators and other police officers from the Ivanivka district and three other districts. 25. From 12 September to 9 October 2002 the regional police investigator obtained a number of expert opinions concerning the material found on the scene (notably assessing the damage there). 26. On 20 September 2002 an officer of the Ivanivka police questioned neighbours of some of the applicants. Those neighbours stated that on the night of the attack they had seen around 150 and 300 people near the applicants’ houses. 27. From 23 September 2002 to 27 January 2003 at least sixty village residents, including O.М. and P.M. (who were later accused by the applicants’ representative Ms Duducehava of having a role in the attack ‑ see paragraph 36 below), were questioned by the police – four of them by Ivanivka police officers and the rest by the regional police investigator. The villagers generally stated that there had long been tensions in the village between the Roma and non-Roma populations (many mentioning that this was connected with the alleged involvement of Roma residents in the drug trade), and that on the night of 9 September 2002 several hundred individuals had ransacked the houses of the Roma residents. This had been done to ensure that Roma would be expelled from the village. Some expressed approval of the attackers’ actions (as having been triggered by the authorities’ inaction against the drug trafficking), but denied that they had personally taken part in the attack. 28. The police also questioned a number of applicants, who gave statements largely consistent with the account of events set out in paragraphs 7-17 above. 29. On 14 November 2002 a certain Mr V. – apparently a Roma and a Petrivka resident at the time – was questioned. He stated that on 9 September he had been called in to Ivanivka district police station and told that residents of Petrivka would be attacking Roma houses. Upon learning this, he returned to the village and helped to evacuate his family, as well as other Roma residents, to another village. 30. The police recognised the applicants listed in the Appendix as having the official status of aggrieved parties or of civil claimants (see paragraphs 53 and 54 below). 31. In January 2003 (in the summary provided by the Government the relevant dates seem to be misstated as being in January 2002 and January 2007) the regional police investigator questioned three officers of the “Berkut” special police unit. They stated that about 2,000 persons had participated in the pogrom. They had asked the officers not to interfere in their actions. They had entered the houses and asked the individuals there not to resist and to leave. 32. In February 2003 the police obtained an expert opinion in an attempt to identify the voices on a video cassette. It appears that the video cassette contained a recording of a meeting of village residents held before the pogrom. The expert concluded that no voice could be identified owing to the poor quality of the recording. 33. On 4 February 2003 the police suspended the investigation for failure to identify the perpetrators. On 17 February 2003 the regional prosecutor’s office ordered that it be resumed. 34. On 20 February 2003 the Ivanivsky district prosecutor’s office (“the DPO”) refused to institute criminal proceedings against the village council’s officials for lack of constituent elements of a crime in their actions. 35. On 1 April 2003 the regional police investigator suspended it again. 36. On 27 February 2005 Ms Duducehava, the chairperson of Romani Zbora, an NGO, wrote to the Odessa regional prosecutor’s office asking it to institute criminal proceedings against the persons who had participated in the attack and the officials who had allowed it. Specifically, she named Mr O.M., Mr P.M. and Mr I.D., all of whom, she alleged, had incited the attack; she named M.S., the chairman of the village council, and O.V., the head of the district police department, as being among the officials who had allowed it. She named the first fifteen and the seventeenth to nineteenth applicants as persons whose property had been damaged, summarising their statements to her (see, in particular, paragraph 13 above). 37. On 28 March 2005 the Odessa regional prosecutor’s office informed Ms Duducehava that an investigation into disorderly conduct had been initiated and suspended on 1 April 2003 but that operational measures were being taken to identify the perpetrators (see paragraph 58 below for a summary description of the legislative framework in respect of such measures). Twenty-three individuals, including those whose statements had been added to Ms Duducehava’s complaint, had been recognised as aggrieved parties or civil claimants. Concerning the failure of the police to prevent the disorderly conduct in question, the head of the Regional Police had imposed disciplinary sanctions on the police officers at fault. 38. On 21 November 2005 Mr I. Stoyanov, a lawyer representing a number of the applicants, complained to the President of Ukraine and the Prosecutor General that the crime committed had been incorrectly classified as merely disorderly conduct, even though it could be characterised as an act of discrimination and mass disorder. The identity of the guilty parties was well known. 39. On 31 December 2005 the head of the regional police informed Mr Stoyanov that the investigation had been suspended on 1 April 2003 and that the regional prosecutor’s office had examined the case and left the decision to suspend it in force. 40. On 25 January 2006 the DPO informed Mr Stoyanov of the decision not to institute criminal proceedings against the village officials (see paragraph 34 above) and stated that Mr Stoyanov could obtain information about the situation in the hooliganism case from the regional police, who were in charge of it. 41. On 27 January 2006 the Ivanivka district police took over the investigation in respect of the hooliganism case and decided to resume it. On 5 April 2006 they suspended it again. 42. On 22 August 2008 Mr Stoyanov wrote to the Prosecutor General’s Office asking to be informed about the progress of the operational measures to identify the perpetrators and to be allowed to study the case file. 43. On 25 September 2008 the DPO informed Mr Stoyanov that the investigation had been lawfully suspended and that the aggrieved parties could only examine the case file once the investigation had been completed. 44. The applicants submitted a copy of a letter from the district police dated 13 July 2009 addressed to Mr Stoyanov. The letter informed Mr Stoyanov, in response to his query, that on 10 February 2009 the investigation had been renewed and on 2 March 2009 suspended again for failure to identify the perpetrators. No reason for the alleged renewal was mentioned. The Government argued that the letter was not genuine (see paragraphs 88 to 91 below). 45. On 21 March 2003 the Ivanivskyy District Court (“the District Court”), having heard an appeal by the DPO, quashed the village council’s decision of 9 September 2002 on the grounds that it was contrary to the Constitution and had been taken under the pressure exerted by a crowd of angry villagers in order to calm them down and prevent the lynching of the Roma. 46. On 23 December 2005 the applicants (except the fourth and sixteenth) lodged with the District Court a civil claim for damages against the District Administration and the village council. 47. On 23 November 2007 the District Court rejected the applicants’ claim, holding that it fell within the jurisdiction of the Odessa District Administrative Court. No appeal was lodged. 48. On 3 May 2007 the first three and the fifth to nineteenth applicants lodged a claim seeking to have the failure of the DPO and the district police to investigate the incident declared unlawful. 49. On 9 February 2008 the Odessa Circuit Administrative Court rejected the claim without considering it on the merits, holding that it fell outside the jurisdiction of the administrative courts. On 17 March 2008 the Odessa Administrative Court of Appeal upheld this ruling. 50. On 5 June 2008 the District Court initiated proceedings concerning the claim brought by the first three and the fifth to nineteenth applicants under the Code of Criminal Procedure in which they challenged the decision to suspend the investigation. On 19 August 2008 and 8 April 2009 Mr Stoyanov lodged additional complaints on behalf of the first to third, sixth to fifteenth and seventeenth to nineteenth applicants in these proceedings. In those complaints, they stated that they had never been questioned and had never been recognised as aggrieved parties (потерпілі). They asked the court to order the police to recognise them as such. According to the applicants, at the time of the application to the European Court of Human Rights the proceedings were still pending before the District Court and no decision had been made.

5. The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Istanbul. 6. At the material time, the applicant was a civil servant in the Metropolitan Municipality of Istanbul and a member of the local branch of the Tümbel-Sen trade union, which is affiliated to the KESK (Kamu Emekçileri Sendikaları Konfederasyonu – the Confederation of Public Employees’ Trade Unions). 7. In April 2008 two of the largest trade unions, namely the DİSK (Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu – Confederation of Revolutionary Workers’ Trade Unions) and the KESK (Kamu Emekçileri Sendikaları Konfederasyonu – Confederation of Public Employees’ Trade Unions) announced that they were planning a large scale demonstration in Istanbul for 1 May 2008 and that their members would be gathering to celebrate the Labour Day and to commemorate their friends who had lost their lives during the demonstrations of 1 May 1977. 8. In May 2008 the applicant was informed that a disciplinary investigation had been initiated against him for being absent without leave on 1 May 2008 and he was asked to submit his defence submissions. The applicant explained that he had participated in a demonstration organised by his trade union on that day to celebrate International Labour Day. 9. Subsequently, the applicant was given a warning as a disciplinary sanction owing to his being absent without leave on 1 May 2008 pursuant to section 125 of the Civil Servants Act (Law no. 657). 10. On 13 May 2008 the applicant objected to the decision and requested its annulment. 11. On 16 May 2008 the Disciplinary Board of the Istanbul Municipality dismissed the applicant’s objection, finding that the contested decision was in accordance with the law and that there were no grounds to annul it.

4. The applicant was born in 1978 and lives in Naberezhnyye Chelny. 5. The applicant was a police officer. On 1 November 2004 he was arrested on suspicion of having extracted a bribe. 6. On 10 November 2005 the Supreme Court of the Tatarstan Republic convicted the applicant and sentenced him to imprisonment. He stayed under the obligation not to leave his place of residence in Naberezhnyye Chelny until the conviction became final. He could leave his place of residence only upon the summons from the investigator or the court. 7. Several parties to the criminal proceedings, including the applicant, appealed against the conviction. The case was forwarded to the Russian Supreme Court in Moscow, 1,000 km away from Naberezhnyye Chelny. The applicant never received any summons to the appeal hearing due to the Supreme Court’s mistake in the postal code. Neither did he receive copies of the statements of appeal filed by the prosecutor, by the co-accused, G., and the latter’s lawyer. 8. On 28 February 2006 the conviction was upheld by the Russian Supreme Court. The prosecutor and G.’s lawyer attended the appeal hearing. Neither the applicant nor his lawyer was present. 9. In 2011 the applicant lodged a compensation claim for non-pecuniary damages caused by poor conditions of detention. In the text of his claim the applicant explicitly asked the court to consider the claim in his absence. On 14 April 2011 the Bugulminskiy Town Court of the Tatarstan Republic dismissed his claim. The applicant received the notification of the time and date of the hearing after the hearing had actually taken place. 10. The first-instance judgment was upheld on 4 July 2011 by the Supreme Court of the Tatarstan Republic. The applicant had been notified of that hearing on 29 June 2011.

4. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 5. The applicant was born in 1986 in the Georgian SSR of the USSR. In 1996, when he was ten years old, his parents divorced and he moved with his mother to Kaluga in Russia. In 2003, the applicant graduated from high school in Kaluga and began studies at the Finance and Economics Institute. 6. On 4 May and 17 October 2005 the applicant was convicted of various offences and given a custodial sentence. Upon his release on 29 February 2008, he returned to Kaluga. 7. On 12 January 2012 the police stopped the applicant in the courtyard of his house and charged him with illegal residence in Russia. 8. On the following day the Kaluzhskiy District Court in the Kaluga Region found the applicant guilty of the administrative offence under Article 18.8 § 1 of the Code of Administrative Offences (failure to leave Russia upon the expiry of the authorised period of stay and illegal residence) and sentenced him to a fine of 2,500 Russian roubles (62 euros) and administrative removal from the Russian Federation. Pending removal, the District Court held that the applicant should be held in the detention centre. On 24 January 2012 the Kaluga Regional Court upheld the District Court’s decision on appeal. 9. The applicant asked the District Court to postpone the enforcement of the removal order, emphasising that it was currently unenforceable because he had no identity documents and because he was not a Georgian national and could not be sent to Georgia. On 12 April 2012 the District Court refused the applicant’s request in a summary fashion. 10. The applicant was held in the administrative detention centre operated by the Kaluga regional police. He shared Cell 13 measuring 8.7 square metres with five Uzbek nationals awaiting deportation. The cell had only one window, 90 centimetres by 120 centimetres, protected with three layers of thick netting and fitted with a matte glass. Two light bulbs, 40 Watts each, lit the cell. The cell was not ventilated. 11. The toilet bowl sunk into the floor was located 40 centimetres from the nearest bed. It was cleaned with cold water without detergent. Prisoners were given three litres of water per day, it was not allowed to boil it. Once a week prisoners were taken to the shower room. There was not enough hot water for all of them and they took turns skipping the shower. 12. There was no calendar or clock in the cell. Nor was there a radio, television, books or newspapers. Board games were forbidden. The applicant did not speak the Uzbek language and could not communicate with his cellmates. 13. Prisoners were taken outdoors in groups of thirty. The yard was small, six by four metres, so they huddled together. It had no sports equipment or awning for bad weather. 14. The applicant’s complaints to a prosecutor were rejected as unfounded. In January and March 2012 two members of the Kaluga public monitoring commission visited the facility. Their report corroborated the applicant’s description of his conditions of detention. 15. In May 2012 the applicant developed pulmonary tuberculosis. He was transferred for treatment to a civilian hospital in Kaluga. Upon his discharge, he took advantage of the absence of police escort and absconded. A search operation was launched; the applicant was located on 30 January 2013 and returned to the detention centre. 16. On 31 January 2013 the applicant was placed on board of a Tbilisi-bound flight and left Russia.

4. The applicant lives in Shnogh village. 5. In the 1970s a copper-molybdenum deposit (‘Teghout’) was discovered about four and six km away from the villages of Teghout and Shnogh respectively, in the Lori Region. 6. In 2001 a private company, Armenian Copper Programme CJSC, was granted a mining licence for the exploitation of the Teghout copper‑molybdenum deposit for a period of twenty-five years. 7. On 1 November 2007 the Government adopted Decree no. 1279-N approving the expropriation zones of territories situated within the administrative boundaries of the rural communities of Shnogh and Teghout in the Lori Region to be taken for State needs and changing the category of land use. According to the Decree, Armenian Copper Programme CJSC or Teghout CJSC, founded by the former for the purpose of the implementation of the Teghout copper-molybdenum deposit exploitation project, were to acquire the units of land listed in its annexes. 8. The plot of land belonging to the applicant was listed among the units of land falling within these expropriation zones. 9. The applicant lives in Shnogh village and earns his living from agriculture. He owned a plot of arable land in the village measuring 0.186 ha. The land was used for growing crops for the family, feeding the livestock and beekeeping. 10. On an unspecified date Teghout CJSC addressed a letter to the applicant containing an offer to buy his plot of land. The amount of compensation offered was 134,000 Armenian Drams (AMD, approximately 290 euros (EUR)), plus an additional 15% as required by law. 11. The applicant did not reply to the offer, not being satisfied with the amount of compensation. It appears that the applicant tried to obtain an alternative evaluation of his property by other companies but did not succeed. He claims that no other evaluation company was willing to make an independent evaluation of the market value of his land. 12. On 13 May 2008 Teghout CJSC lodged a claim against the applicant seeking to oblige him to sign the agreement on taking of his property for State needs. The company based its claim, inter alia, on the evaluation report prepared at its request by Oliver Group LLC, a licensed evaluation company. According to the report, the market value of the applicant’s plot of land was estimated at AMD 134,000 (approximately EUR 290). 13. In the proceedings before the Lori Regional Court, the applicant argued that the market value of his land had been underestimated. He further submitted that the evaluation of his property had not been carried out correctly since no account had been taken of the number of fruit trees, their profitability and the existence of a fence and a water pipeline on the territory in question. He also claimed to be unable to submit an alternative evaluation of the real market value of his land since other companies refused to perform an evaluation. 14. In the course of the proceedings, Teghout CJSC submitted another evaluation report of the applicant’s property stating that, after the institution of the proceedings, Oliver Group LLC had prepared a corrected report according to which the market value of the applicant’s plot of land was estimated at AMD 137,000 (approximately EUR 298). The final amount of compensation, including the additional 15% required by law, would thus be AMD 157,550 (approximately EUR 343). 15. On 28 November 2008 the Regional Court granted Teghout CJSC’s claim, awarding the applicant a total of AMD 157,550 in compensation. 16. The applicant lodged an appeal. Relying, inter alia, on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, he complained that the Regional Court had deprived him of his property. 17. On 19 March 2009 the Civil Court of Appeal upheld the Regional Court’s judgment, finding that the latter had properly determined the market value of the property based on the corrected evaluation report prepared by Oliver Group CJSC. 18. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law raising similar arguments to those submitted in the previous appeal. 19. On 17 June 2009 the Court of Cassation declared the applicant’s cassation appeal inadmissible for lack of merit.

5. The applicant was born in 1993 and lives in Skopje. 6. At about 1.00 a.m. on 11 February 2012 a physical altercation took place at a night club in Skopje involving the applicant, a certain R., and several other young men. As a consequence, R. suffered injuries to his nose and face and was taken to hospital by his friends. He was released later that same night. 7. The police were called to the scene and drew up an official “note” (службена белешка) in which the event was described as a fight involving the applicant, R. and a certain P. 8. On 11 June 2012 an investigating judge (истражен судија) opened an investigation against the applicant, with oral evidence being provided by the applicant, R., and witnesses J. and K., the latter being friends of R.’s. In their statements they all maintained that on the evening in question R. had been attacked by the applicant. 9. In the course of the investigation, on 6 September 2012 the applicant gave an oral statement and proposed that an eyewitness, P. (see paragraph 7 above), be questioned as a witness on his behalf. In his statement he claimed that during the initial provocations by R. and his friends, P. had been in the toilet but that towards the end of the altercation P. had been present and had witnessed the event and had even grabbed hold (“да придржи”) of one of the witnesses. The applicant maintained that he was the one who had been attacked by R., J. and K. and that he had acted in self-defence. 10. The investigating judge commissioned an expert report regarding the nature and intensity of the injuries suffered by R., which was compiled on 26 September 2012 by G.A., a traumatology surgeon (специјалист хирург ‑ трауматолог). According to the expert report, the injuries suffered by R. fell to be classified in the domestic law category of “grievous bodily injury” (тешка телесна повреда). 11. On 4 October 2012, the applicant was indicted before Skopje Court of First Instance (“Основен суд Скопје I” – “the trial court”) for causing “grievous bodily injury”. The prosecution proposed that R. and two witnesses, J. and K., be questioned. The expert report (see paragraph 10 above) was also adduced as evidence. 12. The applicant lodged an objection against the indictment on 22 November 2012. In his objection he reiterated his request that the eyewitness P. be questioned, as well as two more witnesses, M.K. and B. It was proposed that M.K. testify as an eyewitness to the event and B. testify to the fact that the applicant had come under attack by the same group on a previous occasion, which B. had prevented. 13. The objection was dismissed by a panel of Skopje Court of First Instance on 29 November 2012. 14. At a public hearing before the trial court which took place on 12 February 2013, evidence was given by the applicant, and by R., J. and K. In his statement, witness J. said that during the altercation, P. (the witness proposed by the applicant) had launched himself (“му се фрли”) at K., the other witness. 15. At the same hearing the defence reiterated its request that P. and M.K. be questioned as eyewitnesses to the event. The trial court refused the request on the grounds that neither P. nor M.K. had been an eyewitness to the event. It also pointed out that M.K. had not been mentioned before in the other witnesses’ statements or at any time during the proceedings. At the same hearing, the trial court accepted a request from the defence to examine the official police note of the event (see paragraph 7 above). 16. At the subsequent public hearing, which took place on 19 March 2013, the expert G.A. gave oral evidence. He was cross-examined by the defence counsel with regard to his competence to classify injuries. At this hearing, the same evidentiary requests were reiterated by the defence regarding P. and M.K. It was further proposed that another witness, M.R., be questioned and that a fresh expert examination be commissioned by the trial court because the present one was inconclusive and had been compiled by a traumatology expert. In this regard, it was submitted that due to the nature of the injuries in question, an expert opinion by an ENT (ear, nose and throat) specialist should be commissioned. It was also requested that a neuro-psychiatric specialist prepare an expert opinion in respect of the applicant’s psychological state on the evening of the altercation in order to establish his mental capacity at the time of the events in question. 17. At the same hearing the trial court refused all requests by the defence, stating: “The defence’s request to question witnesses M.R., P. and M.K. is refused for the same reasons as stated in the minutes of 12 February 2013. Since there has already been an expert report commissioned in the case, further requests for the commissioning of additional expert reports are refused, and the court is already in possession of sufficient evidence to establish the facts in the case.” 18. Closing arguments were also delivered at that hearing, in which the applicant complained that all the evidentiary testimony proposed on his behalf had been rejected by the trial court and he had therefore been prevented from proving his case. 19. On the same day the trial court delivered a judgment, finding the applicant guilty and sentencing him to a suspended prison sentence of one year. The trial court based its findings on the expert report, the statement given by R. and the statements given by the two witnesses J. and K. Although the trial court in its reasoning accepted that there had been a third person, the applicant’s friend, involved in the altercation, it considered that the defence’s arguments contradicted the other evidence put before it sufficiently, thereby showing that the applicant was guilty of the offence he had been charged with. 20. The applicant submitted two appeals, one through a lawyer on 17 April 2013 and another personally on 22 April 2013. In the appeals it was stated that none of the witnesses proposed by the defence had been questioned by the trial court and none of the expert opinion requests had been accepted, effectively rendering the taking of evidence in the case completely one-sided. It was further stated in the appeals that the commissioned expert opinion was inconclusive with regard to the type of injury suffered by R., meaning that the trial court could therefore not ascertain whether that type of injury contained the elements of “grievous bodily injury”. 21. On 11 July 2013 the Skopje Court of Appeal (“the appellate court”) held a public hearing. At the hearing a representative of the High Prosecutor’s Office (Вишо јавно обивнителство) proposed that the appeals should be allowed and the case remitted because of omissions made by the trial court in respect of the expert report. 22. On the same day the appellate court dismissed the appeals and confirmed the trial court’s judgment in its entirety. The relevant parts of the judgment read as follows: “In the appeals it is stated that the defence’s request to question P. as a witness was wrongfully rejected and that it could have significantly contributed to different conclusions with regard to the facts ... [T]his court finds that the request was rightfully rejected by the lower court because the witness P. was not an eyewitness to the event in question, which is supported by the statement of the accused given at the investigation stage ... ... from the statement [of R.] ... which finds support in the statements given by J. and K., it can be concluded that on the evening in question the accused insulted R., the accused then hit R. over the head with a glass. ... R. fell down, losing consciousness and K. ran to his aid, but was hindered by a friend of the accused ...” 23. This judgment was served on the applicant’s lawyer on 3 September 2013.

4. The applicant was born in 1961 and lives in Biržai. 5. On 11 April 2008 the applicant’s son, M.P., was arrested on suspicion that he had committed a burglary and stolen a laptop computer. He was taken to a police station in Biržai, where he was held until his death (see below). On 12 April 2008 the police searched M.P.’s home and found an amount of drugs (cannabis). On 13 April 2008 the authorities informed M.P. that he was suspected having committed crimes of theft and possession of drugs. 6. By a ruling of 13 April 2008, a court sanctioned M.P.’s pre-trial detention for a period of eighteen days, on the grounds that he could flee from justice, for previously he had worked in Norway and had connections in that country. M.P. confessed to possession of drugs, but denied the theft. M.P. was present at the court hearing; he also had a lawyer, J.P., representing his interests in the courtroom. The court indicated that M.P. had no criminal record. 7. While detained at Biržai police station, M.P. was kept in cell no. 1 alone for the entire time, given that the other detainees at that station had prior convictions, and, pursuant to the relevant domestic law, persons with no criminal record had to be held separately from those with prior convictions (see paragraph 53 in fine below). 8. As later established by the prosecutor, whilst detained at Biržai police station between 12 and 14 April 2008 M.P. was taken out of his cell four times so that he could meet his lawyer and the investigator. During the pre-trial investigation M.P.’s lawyer, J.P., would later also testify that he had met M.P. at around 2-3 p.m. on 14 April at Biržai police station to discuss whether to appeal against the court ruling imposing detention, but M.P. had stated that there had been no need because he had been ready to confess of the theft. Later that day the lawyer had taken part in M.P.’s questioning by the pre-trial investigator, when M.P. had made a statement about the theft. According to the lawyer, M.P. had communicated in a calm manner, he had not been agitated and had had no complaints. 9. On the morning of 15 April 2008 M.P. was found dead in his cell at Biržai police station. As was later established during the pre-trial investigation, at around 8 a.m. that morning the guards’ shift was changing, and, in accordance with the applicable rules, the doors of all the cells were being opened. M.P. was found standing with his feet on the ground leaning forward; a blanket was looped tightly around his neck while the other end of the blanket was attached to the metal bar at the side of the top bunk of his bunk bed. The body bore the marks of strangulation, without marks of any other injuries. Police Officer D.M. immediately took M.P. out of the noose and laid him on the floor of the cell. 10. As transpires from the medical records and the prosecutor’s decision of 19 December 2014 (also see paragraph 44 below), at 8.08 a.m. on 15 April 2008 officers at Biržai police station called an ambulance, which arrived at the scene within a couple of minutes, at 8.12 a.m. The paramedics indicated in the medical report and also later testified during the pre-trial investigation that they had examined M.P.’s body at 8.12 a.m.: the body had been found lying on the floor, had shown no signs of breathing or a pulse, the pupils had been dilated and had not reacted to light, the neck had shown signs of strangulation, post-mortem discoloration had set in, as had rigor mortis. The paramedics also stated that they had not attempted to resuscitate M.P. because according to what they had seen he had died one or two hours before. The paramedics further asserted that apart from strangulation marks on M.P.’s neck there had been no injuries on M.P.’s face or hands. They also attested that there had been no signs on M.P.’s hands which would have indicated that he had been handcuffed or tied with a rope. The paramedics also noted that, if any other injuries had have been visible on M.P.’s body, they would have been noted in the medical report. 11. There was a suicide note found in the cell. It was addressed “To Mother”. An empty box of matches was found in M.P.’s cell, and the authorities later established that the suicide note had been written with charcoal from used matches (also see paragraphs 21 and 44 below). 12. On 15 April 2008, the incident scene was inspected, photographs were taken, one of them showing a white sheet on the bunk bed, and police officers who worked at Biržai police station had been questioned. The same day the prosecutor also questioned the applicant, who stated that “recently her son [had] not complain[ed] about any problems or troubles, everything [had been] good”. She also stated that previously “M.P. ha[d] never attempted to hang himself or to commit suicide, there [had been] no similar accidents in the past, and he [had] not mention[ed] such things either”. The prosecutor continued questioning the police officers on 17 April 2008. 13. On 15 April 2008 an autopsy was ordered. The prosecutor provided the expert with a plastic bag containing M.P.’s clothes and a blanket which had been found in M.P.’s cell. The expert examination was performed the following day, 16 April 2008. The expert, who was from the Panevėžys branch of the Mykolas Romeris University Forensic-Medicine Institute (Mykolo Romerio Universiteto Teismo medicinos instituto Panevėžio skyrius), concluded that the cause of M.P.’s death had been mechanical asphyxiation as a result of his neck being squeezed by a noose. Whilst noting that there were light scratches on M.P.’s forehead and nose, the expert observed that this could have resulted from scratching of acne and concluded that it was not related to M.P.’s death (report no. M 224/008(05)). 14. The applicant requested that an additional autopsy be performed and the prosecutor granted her request. The additional autopsy was performed on 18 April 2008 (report no. M 759/08(01)). The forensic expert at the Vilnius branch of the Mykolas Romeris University Forensic-Medicine Institute concluded that there were strangulation marks on the neck and bruising on the back. The neck injuries could have been inflicted several minutes prior to death as a result of the neck being squeezed by the bed sheet. As to the bruising on the back, this could have been caused when the body hanging in the noose went into convulsion hitting off hard blunt surfaces. The expert concluded that there were no objective indications which could have denied M.P.’s cause of death as having been asphyxiation when the neck had been squeezed in a noose. The expert noted that there were no signs of strangulation by hands; he also indicated that it had been a one-time constriction on the neck. The findings of this additional autopsy were later confirmed when, following the last reopening of the criminal proceedings, the pre-trial investigation judge ordered another forensic examination (report no. EKM 52/14(01)) to be performed to answer certain questions, including those submitted by the applicant. 15. According to the Government – who have not been contested on this point by the applicant – upon the applicant’s request, after the second autopsy the bailiff examined the corpse and took photographs in order to establish factual circumstances. The bailiff noted injuries on the back and the neck of the corpse. 16. On 7 May 2008 the applicant was granted victim status. She was represented by a lawyer. 17. On 25 November 2008 the prosecutor summarised the findings made as a result of the criminal investigation and decided to discontinue it, citing the lack of any indication of a crime. The prosecutor considered that M.P. had died through suicide, which was corroborated by his suicide note. 18. However, by a ruling of 5 February 2009 the Panevėžys Regional Court, on appeal by the applicant, found that the pre-trial investigation had not been thorough and annulled the prosecutor’s decision to discontinue it. For the court, it had been necessary to investigate whether M.P. had been harmed by other persons, taking into account the injuries on M.P.’s wrists, as alleged by the applicant, as well as to examine the suicide note and to establish whether it had been written by M.P. and with what writing instruments. The video recordings from Biržai police station had not been properly inspected, and the statements of some of the police officers had been contradictory, even false. Moreover, an internal investigation had established gross breaches of duty by the police officers at the police station (see paragraphs 47-50 below), which in turn could attract criminal liability under Article 229 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 52 below). Nevertheless, the prosecutor had failed to assess that internal-investigation report. 19. In March and April 2009 another prosecutor continued the investigation and questioned witnesses. 20. In May 2009, and in order to establish whether the suicide note had been written by M.P., the prosecutor ordered a handwriting expert examination of the note, which then was compared to several other documents handwritten by M.P. One of those other documents was a note which M.P. had handwritten to the applicant on 14 April 2008, whilst detained at Biržai police station. It transpires from the material before the Court that that document had been in the possession of the applicant who had refused to give it to the authorities. A copy of that note had eventually been obtained by the authorities under a court order. 21. In June 2009 the handwriting experts produced a report concluding that the suicide note had been undoubtedly been written by M.P. In December 2009 the forensic experts concluded that there was high probability that the suicide note had been written with burned matches, which could have come from one of the two match boxes that had been found in M.P.’s cell or from another box of matches (expert report no. 11–1457(09)). 22. On 29 January 2010 the prosecutor again discontinued the pre-trial investigation, holding that M.P.’s death had been suicide. In reaching that decision he relied on an abundant body of evidence, including analyses of the video recordings from the police station cameras, which showed that no–one had entered M.P.’s cell at the relevant time. Between 5 p.m. on 14 April 2008, when M.P. had already been in the cell, until 8.04 a.m. on 15 April 2008, when M.P.’s body had been found, the doors of his cell had been opened only once, at 8.00 p.m. on 14 April 2008, when the guards D.M. and D.A. had changed shift. Furthermore, the recordings showed that the guards D.A. and D.M. had checked on M.P. several times though the peep hole, and during the night the guard D.M. had patrolled his area several times. 23. As to the possible criminal liability under Article 229 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 52 below) on the part of the police, the prosecutor took into account the conclusions of the internal investigation to the effect that the Officers D.M. and R.S. had not followed the internal instructions regarding the obligation to constantly observe detainees. That being so, the prosecutor also noted that the two officers could not have foreseen the consequences of such behaviour – M.P.’s suicide – and prevent it, because M.P. had been a quiet and introverted person, he had been calm, had caused no problems in the police station and had not complained. There had been no indication that M.P. had had suicidal tendencies or a tendency to self-harm, and therefore no signs that special supervision had been needed. Accordingly, since there had been no causal link between the actions of the officers and the consequences, there were no grounds to start a pre-trial investigation for failure to perform official duties. 24. On the basis of an appeal by the applicant, who had argued that during such a flawed pre-trial investigation her suspicions that her son had been murdered had only become stronger, by a ruling of 13 May 2010 the Panevėžys Regional Court in a public hearing again annulled the prosecutor’s decision to discontinue the criminal proceedings. This time the court considered that there were certain contradictions with regard to the bed sheet as the object used for strangulation. 25. Having performed an additional examination of the bed sheet in the light of all available evidence, such as the witnesses’ statements, the photographs from the scene and expert reports, by a decision of 6 September 2010 the prosecutor again discontinued the pre-trial investigation into the circumstances of M.P.’s death. 26. The applicant appealed, and on 25 October 2010 the Rokiškis County District Court quashed the prosecutor’s decision. The court considered that, in order to eliminate all doubts as to how M.P. could have killed himself, it was possible to conduct a reconstruction which would also verify the applicant’s version that her son could not have killed himself in the way suggested (see paragraph 9 above). The court also stated that it was necessary to establish why burned matches with which M.P. had written the suicide note had not been found in the cell. Lastly, the specific instrument which had been used as a noose around M.P.’s neck had to be established. That decision was upheld by a higher court. 27. On 14 December 2010 two reconstructions were performed at Biržai police station, with the participation of the applicant, the prosecutor, Police Officer D.M., who had found M.P.’s body, and others. It was examined whether M.P. could have hanged himself in the manner stated by the police officers on 15 April 2008 (see paragraph 9 above). After the first reconstruction the applicant maintained that her son could not have hanged himself in the manner described. She had no remarks as to the results of the second reconstruction. The results of those reconstructions were written down in two reports. 28. In order to find the instrument which had caused M.P.’s strangulation, the prosecutor sent requests to the Biržai county prosecutor’s office and to the forensic experts in Panevėžys, and questioned certain witnesses. Even so, the blanket could not be found. 29. In the meantime, the applicant lodged an application to have a pre-trial investigation on the charges of failure to perform official duties (Article 229 of the Criminal Code, see paragraph 52 below) opened in respect of the prosecutors who had earlier discontinued the pre-trial investigation. By a final ruling of 10 January 2011 the Panevėžys Regional Court refused her application, noting that it was within the prosecutors’ competence which actions to take when handling a criminal case. More importantly, in this case, once the courts had annulled the prosecutors’ decisions to discontinue criminal investigation, the prosecutors had continued the pre-trial investigation and the actions which the court had ordered had been carried out. 30. On 10 February 2011 the Rokiškis County District Court allowed an application by the applicant’s lawyer to have a medical expert evaluate the results of the second reconstruction (see paragraph 27 above) in order to answer the question as to whether in hanging himself in the manner shown during the second reconstruction M.P.’s neck bones should have broken. According to the applicant, one needed “acrobatic” skills to commit suicide in such a manner. Having performed the examination of the second reconstruction report and the additional autopsy report (see, respectively, paragraphs 14 and 27 above), on 27 November 2011 the expert concluded that he could not answer the question posed by the applicant’s lawyer, because the question was speculative. 31. On 13 January 2012 the prosecutor again discontinued the pre-trial investigation into the circumstances of M.P.’s death and also, for the reasons set out earlier (see paragraph 22 above) refused to open one in respect of Officers D.M. and R.S. for failure to perform official duties. His decision was upheld by the first-instance court, which dismissed the applicant’s appeal. 32. By a final ruling of 6 April 2012 the Panevėžys Regional Court rejected an appeal by the applicant and upheld the part of the prosecutor’s decision regarding the refusal to open a criminal investigation in respect of the actions of Officers D.M. and R.S., on the grounds that they had failed to perform their duties. The court reached this decision in a public hearing in which the applicant and her lawyer took part and could present their arguments. The court concurred with the prosecutor’s view that the authorities had not been aware that M.P. had been a suicide risk, so as to confer liability on the officer. Pursuant to domestic law as applied in this case, persons detained in several cells at Biržai police station had to be constantly monitored through spy holes. Even so, on the basis of the medical report the court nevertheless underlined that M.P. had died within a couple of minutes of the moment when the noose had closed around his neck, that is to say within a very short time. It would have been physically impossible for D.M. and R.S. to constantly monitor, through the holes in the cell doors, all the persons detained at the police station, including M.P. This was one more reason why the court could not hold that D.M.’s and R.S.’s failure to perform their duties had caused M.P.’s death. 33. On 27 April 2012 the Rokiškis County District Court granted the applicant’s appeal and quashed the prosecutor’s decision of 13 January 2012 in the part discontinuing the pre-trial investigation into the circumstances of M.P.’s death (see paragraph 31 above). The court held that in order to eliminate any contradictions about alleged violence against M.P., a confrontation had to be performed between the applicant and one of the police interrogators who had questioned her son on 14 April 2008 (see paragraph 8 above). In addition, the applicant requested that other persons who were detained at Biržai police station between 14 and 15 April 2008 be questioned, and the court granted that request. 34. As requested by the court, the prosecutor then performed a confrontation between the applicant and the police interrogator and questioned eight individuals who had been detained at Biržai police station at the time of M.P.’s death. They all stated that they had heard no suspicious sounds during that night. In particular, D.Ž., M.P.’s co-accused in the case of theft, who had also been detained in the same Biržai police station but in another cell, averred that the two of them had talked through the slots intended for passing food at about 9 p.m. on 14 April 2008. M.P. did not state that any violence had been used against him or that he had been threatened. Neither had D.Ž. heard any suspicious sounds from M.P.’s cell. 35. On 22 October 2012 the prosecutor again discontinued the pre-trial investigation into the circumstances of M.P.’s death, holding that it had been the result of suicide. 36. As she was dissatisfied with the way in which the pre-trial investigation had been conducted, on 14 November 2012 the applicant applied to have the entire office of the Panevėžys regional prosecutor’s office removed from the investigation. By a final ruling of 7 March 2013 the Panevėžys Regional Court held that her complaints were without substance, and that there was no reason to believe that any prosecutors from that office would not be able to effectively carry out the pre-trial investigation. 37. By a ruling of 31 January 2013 the Panevėžys Regional Court however allowed an appeal by the applicant against the prosecutor’s decision to discontinue the criminal proceedings (see paragraph 35 above). The applicant was present at the court hearing. She asked that an expert report be prepared in order to establish whether the video recordings from Biržai police station had not been tampered with. The court granted her request. 38. The prosecutor then proceeded with the pre-trial investigation. On 20 June 2013 the forensic experts produced report no. 11–745(13), wherein they concluded that even if there were small gaps between the clips, each of the clips in those video recordings was complete, and that none of the clips had any signs of having been altered by deletion or addition. 39. By a decision of 8 July 2013 the prosecutor again discontinued the pre-trial investigation. He relied on the entirety of the evidence in the criminal file, including the expert conclusions regarding the video–recordings (see the above paragraph). 40. The applicant appealed, arguing that the pre-trial investigation had been flawed, and that a number of pieces of evidence, such as, among other things, the marks on her son’s wrists and the video recordings, had been improperly evaluated. 41. By a decision of 1 October 2013 the Panevėžys Regional Court again quashed the prosecutor’s decision. The court considered that there still remained certain contradictions, in particular, whether the short gaps within the video recording had occurred owing to a technical problem or because of another cause. It was also necessary to ascertain whether the video files had been provided in sequence. Moreover, no clear answer had been obtained from the medical expert as regards the possible reasons for M.P.’s injuries in the light of the results of the second reconstruction (see paragraphs 27 and 30 above). A supplementary medical evaluation had to be performed in which the specialists would be provided with all the existing information about M.P.’s injuries so that the mechanism of his death could be determined and the question of whether there had been signs of violence against M.P. answered. The applicant and her lawyer were given the opportunity to pose questions to the experts. Lastly, the court underlined that a person’s death, and even more so a death in a police station, was “a particular situation (yra ypatingas atvejis)”, which had to be thoroughly examined. 42. In accordance with the Panevėžys Regional Court’s instructions (see the paragraph above), the prosecutor then asked the forensic experts to examine the video recordings at issue. On 1 April 2014 an expert at the Forensic Science Centre of Lithuania (Lietuvos Teismo ekspertizės centras) then concluded (report no. 11–3422(13)) that it was most likely that the gaps between the clips had appeared when transferring the video files to DVD. The video files were in chronological order. The expert also noted that one of the cameras had recorded two paramedics at the police station at 8.12 a.m. on 15 April 2008. 43. As instructed by the Rokiškis County District Court on 25 November 2013, the experts at the State Forensic-Medicine Service (Valstybinės teismo medicinos tarnyba) had been given the material of the pre-trial-investigation file, which had amounted to four volumes, to perform an expert examination of the cause of M.P.’s death. They conducted the examination from 26 May to 28 November 2014 and produced report no. EKM 52/14(01). The experts firstly concluded that M.P. could have died as had been demonstrated during the second reconstruction, which had been performed on 14 December 2010 (see paragraph 27 above). They also noted that M.P.’s neck organs could have been placed under pressure because of his own weight, and also underlined the fact that, when a person’s body is in a certain position, his or her weight is sufficient to bring about suffocation. The experts also explained that the death of M.P. should have occurred while he was in a vertical or similar position, as proven by the location of the post-mortem discolouration, and that the bruises on M.P.’s back could have been caused when he was in the noose and his back came into contact with the frame of the bunk bed during his convulsions. As to the injuries to M.P.’s wrists, which the applicant alleged had been inflicted during handcuffing, the experts had explained that those had appeared after the first autopsy when M.P.’s hands had been bound during preparation of his body for burial, which was the usual practice. On the basis of the documentary evidence – photographs of M.P.’s corpse from the scene, the bailiff’s statements of 16 April 2008 (see paragraph 15 above) and the additional autopsy report (see paragraph 14 above) – the experts also categorically and officially stated that there had been no bruising around M.P.’s eyes, unlike what had been claimed by the applicant. 44. By a decision of 19 December 2014 the prosecutor again discontinued the pre-trial investigation. He relied on the entirety of the evidence which he cross-referenced – including that obtained after the last resumption of the criminal investigation – and held that no crime had been committed, holding that M.P. had died as a result of suicide. For the prosecutor, suicide as the cause of death was also corroborated by the statements of M.P.’s lawyer, who stated that on 14 April 2008 M.P. had been acting calmly, had been responsive, had not complained about anything and had not been agitated (see paragraph 8 in fine above). Among other things, the prosecutor also noted that an empty box of matches had been found in M.P.’s cell, and that the cell had had a toilet and burned matches could have been disposed of there (see paragraphs 11, 21 and 26 above). Although the blanket which had been given to the forensic expert on 15 April 2008 (see paragraph 13 above) had not been found during the later stages of the pre-trial investigation, there was sufficient data to confirm that M.P. had put his neck into a noose made from a blanket, and there was no evidence that someone had forced him to do that or that someone had hanged him. 45. The applicant appealed against the prosecutor’s decision, asserting that the criminal investigation had not proven that her son had committed suicide. She still insisted that the evidence which had been gathered during the pre-trial investigation had been contradictory and had raised doubts. The applicant still considered that her son could have been a victim of police violence. 46. The criminal proceedings in respect of M.P.’s death were ultimately terminated by a ruling of the Panevėžys Regional Court on 27 April 2015, dismissing an appeal by the applicant. The court noted that numerous pieces of evidence had been collected and examined. It also emphasised that two of the applicant’s main criticisms had been answered. Firstly, after the last re-opening of the pre-trial investigation an examination of the video recordings was performed by a forensic expert, who had disproved the applicant’s allegation that the video recordings from Biržai police station had been tampered with (see paragraph 42 above). Secondly, report no. EKM 52/14(01) (see paragraph 43 above), as well as earlier medical reports (see paragraphs 13 and 14 above), had reached the same conclusions – that M.P. had died as a result of being strangled in a noose. The court noted that those medical reports had explained that M.P. could have died in the manner which had been demonstrated in the second reconstruction, and also noted that there had been no signs of injuries on M.P.’s body which he could not have inflicted himself. The applicant’s allegation that M.P.’s death could have been caused by someone else had been examined throughout the criminal investigation but no evidence of that had been found. The court also noted that the prosecutor had reached reasoned conclusions after having performed a comprehensive analysis of the gathered evidence. Although the applicant had expressed doubts in respect of the evidence gathered, in her appeal she had not presented any new arguments regarding what particular pre-trial investigation actions had not been performed, what data had not been evaluated, or what investigative actions, had they been performed, would have clarified any important circumstances in this case. Lastly, the court concluded that during the pre-trial investigation all actions provided by law had been used to obtain evidence. Even so, there was “no unquestionable data (neabejotini duomenys)” that a crime had been committed. 47. After M.P.’s death, the police also conducted an internal investigation. It was led by a senior investigator at the Panevėžys city police. On 30 May 2008 the internal investigator produced report no. 50-1-IS-42, which was approved by the chief of the Panevėžys city police. 48. Having examined the available material, which included both the criminal case-file regarding the theft and the material of the criminal case-file concerning the circumstances of M.P.’s death, the internal investigator concluded that there was no information which could lead to a conclusion of any kind of abuse of M.P. by the police officers. 49. Within the course of the internal investigation, the safeguarding of M.P. while in police custody was also examined. On the basis of video recordings from the police station the internal investigation established that during his shift the guard D.M. had patrolled his area only a few times and had stopped only briefly at the doors of the cells. He had also only twice slowly walked the corridor along his post and only once, while patrolling his area, had he looked inside cell no. 1, where M.P. had been held. The investigator concluded that D.M. had thus failed to perform his duties in accordance with the internal instruction on ensuring constant supervision of detainees, and had thus committed a disciplinary offence. Lastly, the investigator noted that by making a statement during the internal investigation that he had ensured constant supervision of the detainees, D.M. had given false testimony. Afterwards D.M. was given a reprimand. 50. As to the other guard – R.S. – the internal investigation established that he had monitored the situation at his post via video cameras, which he considered a possible way of carrying out his duties. The internal investigator admitted that such a method of carrying out his duties could not be seen as unreasonable, even if there had been certain technical errors in how his functions had been assigned. As a result, no disciplinary sanctions were imposed on R.S.

5. The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Khorly. 6. At the material time the applicant was the head of Khorly Village Council. 7. On 8 May 2007 he signed a permit allowing a businessman, Ya., to set up a tent with game machines in the village. This permit had no official stamp on it. According to the applicant, it was not stamped because the council’s accountant was away on a work matter and had the stamp with her. However, according to the court findings in the criminal case against the applicant (see below), the applicant told Ya. that the permit would be stamped upon receipt of 20,000 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH – approximately 3,800 euros (EUR)). 8. On 14 May 2007 Ya. complained to the police. On the same day he was given audio and video-recording equipment and marked banknotes. When he entered the applicant’s office the applicant showed him a piece of paper with something written on it, pointed to the bus stop outside his window and said “There is a man out there”. Ya. went to the bus stop and gave money to V., who was standing there. Later, police officers seized the marked banknotes from V. in the presence of I. and L. 9. On the same day criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant for requesting a bribe. 10. At 7 p.m. on 14 May 2007 the applicant was arrested. 11. On 16 May 2007 the applicant was charged with taking a bribe. 12. On 17 May 2007 the Komsomolskiy District Court (“the District Court”) authorised the applicant’s custody until 24 May 2007. The court held that there was no information about the applicant’s previous convictions, if any, or his family situation, state of health and so on; therefore the court “could not authorise a preventive measure, such as pre-trial detention”. That decision was not open to appeal. 13. On 22 May 2007 the District Court remanded the applicant in pre-trial detention, since he had been accused of a serious crime and might abscond, hinder the investigation or continue his criminal activity. 14. The applicant appealed. His lawyer indicated that, when requesting that the applicant be remanded in custody, the prosecutor’s office had failed to comply with the court decision of 17 May 2007 (see paragraph 12 above), and had submitted only documents referring to the absence of previous convictions and the applicant’s satisfactory state of health. The lawyer further argued that the applicant had not committed any crime, there were no indications that he would abscond or hinder the investigation, his state of health was not satisfactory, and that council members and village inhabitants had signed a petition for his release. 15. On 1 June 2007 the Kherson Regional Court of Appeal upheld the decision of 22 May 2007 (see paragraph 13 above). The court noted that the case file contained material confirming the applicant’s wish “to go to Russia to his brother”. It also noted that he might hinder the investigation by using his official position. 16. On 27 July 2007 the District Court released the applicant on bail. 17. On 16 January 2008 the District Court again remanded the applicant in pre-trial detention at the prosecutor’s request. The relevant decision reads as follows: “On 16 January 2008 the Komsomolskiy District Court of Kerson ... established: The criminal case concerning the accusation of [the applicant] under Article 368 paragraph 2 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine is pending before the Komsomolskiy District Court of Kherson. The prosecutor requested that the preventive measure against [the applicant] be changed in view of the fact that [the applicant], using publications in ... newspaper, is putting pressure on witnesses in the case (K. and A.) who have not yet been questioned by the trial court. [This] could affect the truthfulness of their testimony and their appearance before the court. In the hearing, the prosecutor further provided additional evidence to confirm the fact of [the applicant’s] putting pressure on I., a witness, and the victim, Ya. Having heard the prosecutor’s explanations, as well as [the applicant] and his lawyers, the court finds that the application has to be allowed on the following grounds. [The applicant] is accused of having committed a crime under Article 386 paragraph 2 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine. The sanction established for the crime is imprisonment for the period from five to nine years. On 27 July 2007 bail ... was chosen as a preventive measure in respect of [the applicant]. Pursuant to Article 148 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, preventive measures shall be applied to a defendant with the aim of preventing attempts ... to obstruct the truth from being established in a criminal case. ... Preventive measures shall be applied if there are sufficient grounds to consider that the defendant will try to abscond from the trial or obstruct the truth from being established in a case. [The applicant] has no criminal record, has committed a serious crime linked to his professional activity as the head of Khorol Village Council, is currently removed from his position and accordingly is not able to continue his criminal activity, [and] is well thought of at his place of work and place of residence. However, the court believes that [the applicant], acting through unidentified individuals, has taken steps aimed at obstructing the truth from being established in the case in the course of the court’s consideration of his case. Thus, according to statements of 28 December 2007 made by the victim, Ya., and I., a witness, unknown individuals acting on [the applicant’s] behalf, have put psychological pressure on them, trying to prevent their appearing at the hearing of 29 December 2007. The above-mentioned fact is evidence of a breach by [the applicant] of his undertakings. Bearing in mind that the court proceedings in the criminal case are still ongoing, that K. and A., witnesses, have not yet been questioned, and that there may be a need for additional questioning of I., a witness, and Ya., the victim, the court believes that the prosecutor’s application is well-founded and should be granted in order to prevent further possible pressure [being put] on the witnesses and the victim, and thus to eliminate obstacles to establishing the truth in the case ... Given what has been stated above, ... the court rules to change the preventive measure in respect of [the applicant] ... ” 18. On the same date the President of the District Court rejected an application by the applicant’s lawyer for the judge who was dealing with the case to be withdrawn on the basis of bias. He held that the expression “has committed a serious crime” used by the court concerned “the classification of the offence of which the applicant was accused”, and did not mean that the court was biased. 19. On 23 January 2008 the Kherson Regional Court of Appeal refused the applicant leave to appeal against the decision of 16 January 2008 remanding him in pre-trial detention (see paragraph 17 above), since that decision was not open to appeal. 20. On 15 and 22 February 2008 the applicant unsuccessfully asked the court to change the preventive measure to a non-custodial one. 21. On 29 February 2008 the District Court released the applicant on bail. It found that Ya. and I. had complained on 28 December 2007 to the police that that they had been threatened by individuals unknown to them. However, by 29 February 2008 no further investigation of this allegation had been carried out by the police, so it was decided that the applicant should be released. 22. On 16 April 2008 the District Court sentenced the applicant to five years’ imprisonment for taking a bribe. The applicant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the principle of the presumption of innocence had been breached in his case. 23. On 24 June 2008 the Kherson Regional Court of Appeal upheld the District Court’s judgment. 24. On 26 February 2009 the Supreme Court of Ukraine rejected an appeal by the applicant on points of law. 25. The applicant served his sentence at Dariyivska Correctional Colony no. 10 (“the prison”) from 16 July 2008 to 14 March 2011. According to the applicant, there were up to ninety inmates in the living quarters. There was no ventilation. The washing facilities were situated in the basement, which was constantly flooded by underground water. There were five basins and three taps for 300 detainees. There was no electricity or light at night. The food was of a very low quality and the water was undrinkable. 26. According to the Government, the applicant was held in a block which measured 271.7 square metres and was designed to accommodate up to ninety prisoners, thus each prisoner had no less than 3 square metres of personal space. They did not provide any facts or comments with respect to the remainder of the applicant’s complaint.

4. The applicant was born in 1978. According to the most recently available information, at the time of the events in June 2016 the applicant was detained in Kirovograd pre-trial detention facility no. 14 (“the SIZO”). 5. In January 2013 the applicant started serving a sentence of ten years’ imprisonment for murder. In February 2013 he was placed in Kirovograd prison no. 6 (“the Prison”). 6. In April 2014 the applicant’s health deteriorated. He complained of fever, abdominal pain and vomiting. Following his examination in Kirovograd Regional Hospital, the applicant was diagnosed with chronic calculous cholecystitis (calculi within the gallbladder) and acute chronic gastroduodenitis. 7. On 11 April 2014 the applicant complained of feeling unwell to the Prison medical unit. He was examined immediately and diagnosed with acute gastroduodenitis and chronic calculous cholecystitis. According to the case-file material, he was not prescribed medical treatment. 8. On 22 August 2014 the applicant further complained to the Prison medical unit of feeling unwell. He was diagnosed with acute chronic gastroduodenitis and was prescribed dietary treatment for three days. 9. On 6, 8 and 13 October and 5 November 2014, and 6 March 2015, in response to further complaints by the applicant, he was prescribed outpatient treatment. According to the Government, the outpatient treatment consisted of medicine, which was administered to the applicant in various combinations, notably, papaverine, co-trimixazole, azithromycin, and bromhexin. 10. Following another such complaint, on 16 April 2015 the Prison doctor diagnosed the applicant with acute chronic gastroduodenitis and recommended that he be further examined at a specialist institution with a view to deciding whether he required surgery. The parties did not inform the Court whether the applicant had undergone the recommended examination. 11. From 2 to 29 May and from 3 to 11 June 2015 the applicant underwent inpatient treatment for acute chronic gastroduodenitis in the Prison medical unit. According to the Government, he was administered the prescribed medication and his state of health improved. 12. On 10 July 2015 he was examined by a general practitioner of Kirovograd City Hospital, who confirmed the earlier diagnoses and recommended inpatient treatment and dietary treatment. 13. From 28 July to 10 September 2015 the applicant underwent inpatient treatment for calculus cholecystitis in unstable remission at the hospital in Bucha prison no. 85. The applicant alleged that the treatment which he had received there had been inadequate and had led to an aggravation of his condition. He also alleged that surgery for his calculus cholecystitis had been scheduled but had not been performed owing to lack of funds. 14. On 21 September 2015 he was transferred back to the Prison. In the meantime he had been detained in the Kyiv SIZO and the Odessa SIZO. During his detention from 14 to 21 September 2015, he complained to the SIZOs’ administration of abdominal pain and vomiting, but allegedly to no avail. 15. On 8 October 2015 the applicant was placed in a disciplinary cell in the Prison for three months as a penalty for consumption of alcohol. According to the applicant, the conditions of his detention there were very poor: he suffered from lack of fresh air, low temperatures, unsanitary conditions and high humidity. Furthermore, he allegedly had no mattress to sleep on. 16. According to the Government, on 8 October 2015 the Prison governor issued a decision on the applicant’ placement in a disciplinary cell for consumption of alcohol. On 30 December 2015 he was early released from the disciplinary cell. 17. On 12 October 2015 the applicant’s lawyer complained to the Kirovograd regional prosecutor’s office that the applicant was not receiving the requisite medical care in detention. He submitted, in particular, that the surgery which the applicant required had been postponed owing to the lack of funds. 18. On 23 October 2015 the Prison doctor examined the applicant once again and diagnosed him with chronic calculous cholecystitis in unstable remission. He prescribed the applicant medication and recommended elective surgery. 19. On 9 November 2015 the prison service of Kirovograd Region sent a request for the applicant’s placement in the hospital in Bucha prison no. 85. On 9 December 2015 this request was refused owing to the lack of available places in the hospital. 20. On 11 December 2015 and 16 January 2016 the prison service again requested the applicant’s placement in the hospital at correctional colony no. 4 of Dnipropetrovsk Region. On 27 January 2016 the prison service took a decision on the applicant’s transfer to the hospital for the required surgery. 21. On 12 February 2016 the applicant informed the Prison governor that he had refused the treatment offered to him in the hospitals within the Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv SIZOs because of lack of trust in the doctors of those facilities. On the same day the applicant gave his consent to receive treatment at any other medical institution. 22. On 22 April 2016 following deterioration of his health, the applicant was transferred by ambulance to Kirovograd Regional Hospital, where he was examined by a surgeon and diagnosed with calculous cholecystitis, chronic pancreatitis and “diffusive changes” of the liver (дифузні зміни печінки). 23. According to the Government, as of November 2016 the applicant’s state of health was satisfactory. The Government did not provide documentary evidence in respect of that statement.

5. The applicants are sisters, who were born in 1949 and 1950 respectively and live in Vilnius and Varėna. 6. On 23 May 1996 the national authorities issued a decision to restore the applicants’ father’s property rights in respect of a plot of land measuring 9.87 hectares. His property rights were registered on 6 June 1996. 7. Following their father’s death on 23 December 1995, the applicants were issued with a certificate of inheritance on 27 June 1996 and inherited his property in equal parts. Two plots of land measuring 8.93 hectares and 0.94 hectares respectively were returned to them in natura. These plots were marked out in October 1995, but an engineer did not indicate in the plan that there was a house situated on the plot of land of 8.93 hectares that did not belong to the applicants. 8. On 5 July 2001 J.P. bought a house and a storehouse. The cadastral measurements of the house were taken in September 1992, and the building was classified as residential. The plot of land under the house and for residential purposes measured 0.5204 hectares, and although J.P. did not buy the land on which the house stood, he used it. On 4 August 2005 A.P., who was J.P.’s mother, had her property rights restored, and transferred her plot of land of 0.51 hectares to the place where J.P.’s house was located. J.P., as A.P.’s heir, asked for the plot of land of 0.51 hectares to be entered into the land registry in his name. However, his request was refused by the national authorities, because that plot overlapped the applicants’ land. 9. In June 2007 the Alytus County Administration (“the ACA”) stated that the applicants’ father’s rights had been restored in respect of the land under the buildings that did not belong to him. The ACA also explained that, if there was no dispute, the decision of 23 May 1996 (see paragraph 6 above) could be amended and the borders of one of the applicants’ plots of land could be changed as well (see paragraph 39 below). If there was a dispute, the ACA would initiate court proceedings in order to annul part of the decision of 23 May 1996. The applicants were given until 1 August 2007 to reply in writing to the ACA’s proposal. The applicants did not agree with the ACA’s proposal. 10. In December 2007 the National Land Service held that domestic law did not allow the restoration of property rights to land under buildings owned by third parties. As a result, the documents restoring the property rights of the applicants’ father had to be amended. 11. As there was a dispute, the ACA asked a prosecutor to start court proceedings. In April 2008 the prosecutor lodged a claim with the Varėna District Court and asked it to annul part of the decision of 23 May 1996 (see paragraph 6 above) restoring the property rights of the applicants’ father in respect of 0.4863 hectares of land, and the relevant part of the succession document issued to the applicants. 12. On 21 April 2009 the Varėna District Court allowed the prosecutor’s application, indicated that the part of the decision of 23 May 1996 regarding the 0.4863 hectares had to be annulled, and held that a plot of land of 0.51 hectares had to be demarcated for J.P. The applicants’ property rights would be protected by giving them an equivalent plot of land in another area. It appears that the court suggested several times that the parties conclude a friendly settlement agreement, but the applicants refused. 13. The applicants appealed. They claimed, among other things, that the prosecutor had missed the thirty-day time-limit for lodging a claim. 14. On 4 November 2009 the Vilnius Regional Court upheld the decision of the court of first instance. The court held that the prosecutor had only found out about the situation at issue on 31 March 2008, and had lodged the complaint on 30 April 2008, thus the time-limit for lodging a claim had not been missed. The court further held that the plot of land that J.P. had been using had been formed back in 2001 when the buildings had belonged to V.G., and that the applicants had signed the documents and agreed with the borders of the plot under the buildings. The court also held that the restitution of property was a matter of public interest, because it not only related to specific individuals, but to public opinion in general (formuoja visos visuomenės nuomonę). The property rights of land owners were not absolute, and in the case at issue the lawful interests of a third party had to be protected. 15. The applicants submitted an appeal on points of law, and on 19 April 2010 the Supreme Court sent the case back to the Court of Appeal for fresh examination, stating that the lower courts had not examined the factual circumstances regarding how big the plot of land had to be in order for the buildings to be used. The Supreme Court also held that the Vilnius Regional Court should assess the fact that no plot of land under the buildings had been demarcated at the time the applicants’ father’s property rights had been restored. 16. On 2 February 2011 the Vilnius Regional Court sent the case back to the court of first instance for fresh examination, stating that the substance of the case had not been examined thoroughly. The court held that one of the buildings belonging to J.P. had previously been a school building, but since 1992 it had been registered in the register of immovable property as a residential building. The court observed that some mistakes had been made in the process of restoring both J.P.’s mother’s and the applicants’ father’s property rights. The court further held that the conclusion of the Varėna District Court that J.P. was entitled to a plot of land measuring 0.51 hectares was unfounded. Although there were some buildings on the land that had been returned to the applicants’ father, the exact size of the plot necessary in order for the buildings to be used had not been determined. Moreover, although the applicants and J.P. had provided some evidence, this was insufficient to prove that the size of the plot of land under the buildings had to be 0.51 hectares. Lastly, the Vilnius Regional Court obliged the parties to the proceedings to provide documents proving how big the plot of land had to be in order for J.P.’s buildings to be used. 17. On 20 February 2012 the Varėna District Court established that J.P.’s buildings were on the plot of land measuring 0.51 hectares. The court also held that J.P. was using the exact plot which had been marked out for V.G., and the plan of the land had been signed by the applicants (see paragraph 14 above). The court considered that the person who had measured the land for the applicants had not marked the house in that area, and had not taken any actions to find out who the owner of the house was; therefore, he was the person who had made a mistake. The court noted that in fact 0.5019 hectares overlapped the applicants’ land, but as J.P. was not asking for this, only 0.4863 hectares of land had to be taken from the applicants. Lastly, although the 0.4863 hectares of land had to be taken away from the applicants, their property rights had to be protected by providing them with a new plot of land of equivalent value in another place. 18. The applicants appealed, and on 24 July 2013 the Vilnius Regional Court upheld the decision of the Varėna District Court of 20 February 2012. The court held that, although the applicants claimed that J.P.’s house was not a residential building and thus no land for residential purposes could exist, the data from the register of immovable property and the purchase agreements showed that the building was a residential building. The court also held that the applicants’ father’s property rights to the land under the buildings at issue could not have been restored, as those were not his buildings. In fact, since 1992 the relevant documents had referred to there being a plot of land of 0.5204 hectares near the buildings. 19. The applicants submitted numerous appeals on points of law, but they were dismissed by the Supreme Court on 5 September 2013, 7 and 25 October 2013 and 10 December 2013 as either not raising important legal issues or being repetitive. 20. On 27 January 2014 the National Land Service sent a letter to the applicants explaining that the legal registration in respect of their plot of land of 0.4863 hectares had been annulled following the decisions of the domestic courts, and asked them to choose the means by which they wanted their property rights in respect of the plot of land of 0.4863 hectares to be restored. The National Land Service noted that the restoration of property rights in natura was not possible. 21. In February 2014 one of the applicants wrote to the National Land Service and asked for the return of the plot of 0.4863 hectares in natura. She also claimed that J.P. was using the plot of land for residential purposes unlawfully and that she had sustained damage. 22. In March 2014 the National Land Service informed the applicant that she could start court proceedings for damages. The National Land Service also explained that the purchase agreement in respect of J.P.’s buildings was valid, and that, in accordance with the decisions of the domestic courts, J.P. was entitled to use the plot of land under the buildings. 23. In September 2014 the National Land Service replied to a request by one of the applicants in July 2014 for an explanation of the actions of the Varėna Division of the National Land Service and compensation in respect of pecuniary damage. The National Land Service stated that the applicants were aware of the court proceedings regarding the decision of 23 May 1996 to restore their father’s property rights. It also held that J.P. was entitled to buy the plot of land for residential purposes located under the buildings from the State. 24. In June 2014 J.P. was included into the list of candidates to buy a plot of land of 0.51 hectares and on 18 November 2015, after some measurements had been carried out, the plot of land of 0.5082 hectares was sold to J.P. 25. In March 2015 the National Land Service replied to a complaint by one of the applicants about the restoration of her father’s property rights. Among many other things, the applicant asked for: the process of amending the borders of their plot of land to be terminated; J.P. to be prohibited from constructing buildings and growing plants; his property to be kept on the plot of land at issue; an opportunity to buy the plot of land that had been taken from them; and an easement under J.P.’s buildings to be established. The National Land Service indicated that such a request had already been dismissed by the domestic courts (see paragraph 29 below). It was impossible to allow the applicants to buy the same plot of land that had been taken from them, because that plot of 0.4863 hectares had not belonged to their father in the first place. In addition, J.P. was not stating that he wanted an easement to be established, thus the applicant’s request in this respect was unfounded. 26. The applicants complained to a member of the Seimas, who sent their complaint to the Varėna Division of the National Land Service. The member of the Seimas asked for explanations about the procedure for restoring the applicants’ property rights and why their property rights to the 0.4863 hectares of land had not been restored. In May 2015 the Varėna Division of the National Land Service explained that the applicants’ property rights to the plot of land of 0.4863 hectares had been annulled in accordance with the decisions of the domestic courts (see paragraphs 17-19 above). In January 2014 the applicants had been asked to choose the means by which they wished their property rights in respect of the 0.4863 hectares of land to be restored (see paragraph 20 above), but they still insisted on having the land returned in natura (see paragraph 21 above), which was not possible. The Varėna Division of the National Land Service also provided detailed information about monetary compensation as a means of restoring the applicants’ property rights. The monetary compensation procedure could be started after the applicants submitted a request for their property rights to be restored by means of monetary compensation. As a preliminary estimate, the value of the plot at issue was estimated at 217 euros (EUR). 27. In June 2015 the Varėna Division of the National Land Service once again informed the applicants that returning the 0.4863 hectares of land in natura was not possible and that they could have monetary compensation. The applicants were also informed that the procedure could be started after a request to restore their property rights by means of monetary compensation was received by the authorities (see paragraph 42 below). The preliminary estimate as to the value of the plot was also indicated as being EUR 217. It appears that the applicants did not reply to this letter, nor did they submit a request for monetary compensation, but the National Land Service calculated the compensation at EUR 433 after having adjusted it in line with the inflation index, and on 12 July 2017 invited the applicants to come and discuss the restoration of their property rights. The meeting was adjourned once until 25 July 2017 because the applicants’ lawyer had holidays planned. On 24 July 2017 the applicants’ lawyer asked to adjourn the meeting again because one of the applicants was ill, but she did not provide any documents confirming this. The National Land Service decided to hold a meeting as planned on 25 July 2017, and issued a decision to restore the applicants’ property rights to the 0.4863 hectares of land by paying them monetary compensation of EUR 433.60. One of the applicants collected the decision on 8 September 2017. The decision was not appealed against. 28. In 2010 one of the applicants asked a prosecutor to start a pre-trial investigation into J.P.’s actions. According to her, J.P. was using land to which he had no rights. In November 2010 the prosecutor decided to terminate the pre-trial investigation, as there was no evidence of a criminal act. That decision was upheld by a higher prosecutor in December 2010 and by the Varėna District Court and the Vilnius Regional Court in January 2011. 29. In 2011 the applicants asked for interim measures to be applied and for J.P. to be prohibited from constructing buildings, temporary constructions and roads, and from growing plants and farming on the plot of land at issue. Their application was dismissed by the Varėna District Court and Vilnius Regional Court in May 2011 and November 2011 respectively. 30. On an unspecified date one of the applicants started court proceedings regarding the cadastral measurements of the land. The applicant also claimed that J.P. had acquired his building unlawfully and that he had been using her land without any legal grounds. On 6 May 2014 the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court held that the applicant’s allegations had already been rejected by the decision of the Varėna District Court of 20 February 2012 (see paragraph 17 above). The court also stated that the cadastral plan proposed by the applicant was not approved, because she had included J.P.’s land on it and marked it as hers. As a result, the applicant’s complaint was dismissed. 31. In 2015 the applicants initiated civil proceedings regarding the change of purpose of one of the buildings belonging to J.P. They claimed that J.P.’s house had previously been a school, and thus its purpose was communal and not residential. In November 2015 the Varėna District Court dismissed their claim. In April 2016 the Kaunas Regional Court upheld the first-instance decision, and in July and August 2016 the Supreme Court dismissed appeals by the applicants on points of law.

5. The applicant was born in 1960 and was serving a prison sentence at the time in question. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 6. The applicant was arrested on 20 July 2003 and sentenced by the first-instance court on 19 May 2004 to twelve years’ imprisonment for murder. His conviction was upheld on appeal by the Supreme Court of the Autonomous Republic of Adjara on 19 July 2004. 7. According to the available medical file (covering the periods between 30 July-10 September 2005, 25 January - 27 March 2008, and 5 June – 8 September 2008), the first time the applicant was transferred to the prison hospital after his arrest was on 30 July 2005. At that time he was diagnosed with viral hepatitis C, chronic cholecystitis, and radiculitis. The applicant complained of suffering from sleeping disorders and anxiety and was placed in the psychiatric ward of the prison hospital. On 16 August 2005 he was transferred to the infectious ward, where he was treated for his viral hepatitis C. The applicant was discharged from the prison hospital on 10 September 2005. 8. According to the applicant, in October 2007 he had an operation for an ingrowing toenail on his right foot. After the operation the scar became infected and the applicant was sent to the prison hospital on 25 January 2008 on account of his deteriorating health. At that time the applicant’s diagnosis was as follows: chronic arterial insufficiency of the lower limbs, arterial occlusion and obliterating arteritis, and subungual panaritium. 9. On 29 January 2008 the applicant had his toenail removed. He spent the post-surgery period under permanent medical supervision in the prison hospital. Although he was provided with painkillers and treated with antibiotics, the applicant, according to the case file, complained every day about severe pain in his right foot. On 25 February 2008 he was seen by an angiosurgeon, who recommended that he undergo a dopplerography of the legs and that his transcutaneous oxygen pressure (“Tc PO2”) be measured. The surgeon would decide on the need to amputate the big toe on the applicant’s right foot on the basis of these tests. 10. According to a note made by a prison hospital doctor in the applicant’s medical file on 25 March 2008, the dopplerography and Tc PO2 test could not be organised in the prison hospital for technical reasons. The doctor noted an improvement in the applicant’s general condition and concluded that in any event, and notwithstanding the specialist’s recommendation, there was no need for those examinations, given that there were no “absolute indications” that surgery was called for. On 27 March 2008 the applicant was discharged from the prison hospital and sent back to Tbilisi Prison no. 1 with a recommendation that he continue palliative treatment on an outpatient basis. 11. At the request of the applicant, on 5 May 2008 the board of forensic experts of the Ministry of Justice – having examined him – drew up a medical report (“the 5 May 2008 medical report”), which diagnosed the applicant as suffering from the following: arteritis, occlusion of the arteries in the right shin, stenosis of the arteries in the left shin, artery deficiency in the right lower limb (at stage IV of the disease), necrosis of tissue in the right big toe, cardiac ischaemia, second-degree angina pectoris, second‑degree arterial hypertension, second-degree cardiac insufficiency, and low‑activity chronic hepatitis C. The experts concluded that from a cardiological point of view the applicant’s condition was potentially serious. As for his vascular condition, the main blood vessels in both of his legs were damaged and his condition was serious. They recommended that he be placed in a specialist cardiology clinic and have his toe amputated. 12. On 20 May 2008 the applicant’s lawyers complained to the Director of the Prisons Department of the Ministry of Justice (“the Prisons Department”) that their client, who had been in the prison hospital since 25 January 2008, had been sent to Tbilisi Prison No. 1, despite the seriousness of his state of health, and that the treatment in that hospital had not produced any results. They complained that the applicant’s condition had deteriorated there. The lawyers requested that the applicant be taken to hospital on the grounds that his life was in danger. On the same day they sent the same request to the director and the head doctor at the medical unit of Tbilisi Prison No. 1. 13. On 27 May 2008 the head of the welfare unit of the Prisons Department referred the lawyers’ request to the prison governor and a group of qualified medical experts “for an opinion”. He observed that, in accordance with ministerial order no. 717, patients were hospitalised on the orders of the prison governor, following a report by the head doctor of the prison’s medical unit. 14. Following that letter, on 3 June 2008 one of the applicant’s lawyers contacted the prison governor reminding him of the terms of ministerial order no. 717 and asking him what the response of the head doctor had been and enquiring as to when the applicant would be hospitalised. 15. On 9 June 2008 the Prisons Department informed the lawyers that the applicant had been placed in the prison hospital on 5 June 2008. 16. According to the daily notes made in his medical file, the applicant continued to suffer from pain in the right foot. It can be seen from the contents of the medical file that his right foot was treated with antiseptic products and bandaged daily. During that period the applicant was examined by a vascular specialist twice: on 11 June and on 31 July 2008. On 11 June 2008 the vascular specialist recommended that the bandage be changed regularly and the toe treated with antiseptic products. He also prescribed Alprostapint infusions. On 31 July 2008 the vascular specialist recommended a Tc PO2 test in order to assess the possibility of amputating the toe, and prescribed continuing palliative treatment. It appears from the case file that the relevant drugs were administered to the applicant by his wife and other family members. 17. On 7 August 2008 the applicant underwent a Tc PO2 test at a specialist hospital. On the basis of the results of the test the examining doctor concluded that the microcirculation in the lower limbs of the applicant (particularly in the right foot) was very low. In his view, surgical intervention was not appropriate because the particularly low level of oxygen in the right foot would have hampered the healing of the resulting wound. 18. On 8 September 2008 the applicant was discharged from the prison hospital because of the appeal court’s decision to suspend his prison sentence (see paragraph 28 below). 19. On the basis of the 5 May 2008 medical report (see paragraph 11 above), and in view of the fact that his treatment at the prison hospital was producing no results, on 14 May 2008 the applicant applied to the Tbilisi City Court for his sentence to be suspended on health grounds (under Article 607 § 1 (a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure – “the CCP”). A representative of the Prisons Department opposed the application on the grounds that the prison hospital had “a medical service capable of treating the applicant” and that “if necessary he [would] be transferred to a specialist clinic”. One of the experts who had produced the above-mentioned report confirmed to the court judge that the applicant was seriously ill. However, as he had no knowledge of the medical facilities at the prison hospital, he said he could not judge whether it was appropriate to keep the applicant there. He also confirmed that the applicant’s right big toe had to be amputated. 20. On 11 June 2008 the Tbilisi City Court dismissed the applicant’s request, on the grounds that the prison hospital had a medical service capable of providing the necessary treatment and that the applicant, who was being looked after by specialist doctors, would be transferred to a specialist clinic if necessary. 21. On 18 June 2008 the applicant’s lawyer submitted to the court his comments on the record of the hearing of 11 June 2008. The record of the hearing, according to those comments, did not refer to the expert’s opinion in respect of the risk to the applicant’s life. The expert had said that the applicant’s gangrene, which was now at the fourth (and last) stage, could cause septicemia and death if not properly treated. Regarding the applicant’s heart condition, the expert had said that the applicant needed treatment in a specialist clinic to prevent sudden death. On 19 June 2008 the court granted that request and ordered that the record of hearing be amended by adding the expert’s comments. 22. The applicant appealed against the decision of 11 June 2008, pointing out that, according to the medical experts who had examined him, the treatment at the prison hospital had produced no results and that, if he was not properly treated, the question of the amputation of various parts of his right lower limb could arise. The applicant’s lawyers pointed out that prisoners frequently died as a result of a lack of treatment at the prison hospital. They also complained about the Prisons Department having joined the trial as a party to the proceedings, which was in breach of Article 617 § 4 of the CCP. In their view, a representative of the Prisons Department was not in a position to assess the danger that detention might pose to the life of the applicant. Subsequently, the lawyers requested that the applicant’s doctor and the doctor from the specialist hospital who had treated the applicant on 7 August 2008 be heard as witnesses (see paragraph 17 above). At the examination in the specialist hospital in question, apart from the findings of the above-mentioned expert report, Buerger’s disease of the lower limbs had also been diagnosed. 23. At a hearing before the Court of Appeal on 4 September 2008 the applicant’s lawyers requested that the representative of the Prisons Department be debarred from joining the proceedings as a party, in accordance with Article 617 § 4 of the CCP. The Court of Appeal allowed that request but authorised the representative in question to attend the hearing in order to reply to any questions. It also decided to call the prison hospital surgeon, the vascular specialist (see paragraph 17 above), and the forensic expert (see paragraph 11 above) as witnesses. 24. At the next hearing on 8 September 2008 the forensic expert repeated that the applicant’s state of health was serious, and that Article 7 § 2 of order no. 72/N (issued by the Health Minister) concerning the early termination of prison sentences on health grounds was indisputably applicable. He added that necrosis of the tissue of the lower limb had set in and was progressively affecting the limb from the bottom up. If that were to continue, the applicant might develop septicemia and die. In his view, it was impossible to cure the applicant completely. 25. The applicant’s doctor – a surgeon who was a member of the prison hospital’s permanent staff – also gave evidence before the Court of Appeal, explaining the diagnosis and confirming that his patient was seriously ill, with the arterial disease having reached the fourth and final stage. He said that he had seen the applicant in December 2007 and also in May 2008 and that no serious necrosis had been observed at that time. He further explained that at that stage of the disease the treatment usually prescribed was either palliative or surgical. The applicant was being given palliative treatment with medicines (antioxidants, protective drugs, sedatives). An operation was not recommended because it might make his condition worse. The likelihood of the scar healing was nil. The doctor was gradually removing the necrosed tissue in the right foot. The doctor also confirmed that the applicant’s illness was chronic, progressive and that he needed constant medical treatment. He added that he could not be cured at the prison hospital but that there was a clinic outside the prison that could treat this kind of patient. In answer to a question from the judge, the doctor said that the applicant had been hospitalised twice after his operation and that at the relevant time the necrosis had not reached such an advanced stage. At that time the prison hospital doctors had done all they could to halt the development of the necrosis but without much success. If the situation continued, the applicant might have to have his entire right leg amputated. 26. The vascular specialist – a doctor at the prison hospital – said that he had examined the applicant in December 2007 and found that the gangrene had already affected the big toe of the right foot. This had then quickly spread, despite the treatment administered. Shortly before the hearing the applicant had been prevented from lying down and had been made to stay in a sitting position. His state of health was worsening daily. The results of the Tc PO2 test had shown that the oxygen tension in the right foot stood at level 2 in the lying-down position and at level 21 in the sitting position (the normal level being 60-70; an indicator of 30 was necessary if the wound could be expected to heal properly). Accordingly, amputation was impossible. The vascular specialist said that the prison hospital was complying with his orders but that there was no specialist unit. In his view, the applicant’s lower left limb was also damaged, but not yet affected by gangrene. At the time it was a question of saving the applicant’s life and subsequently considering whether to amputate the right leg. 27. In his final address the applicant’s lawyer drew the Court of Appeal’s attention to the fact that, despite the presence of gangrene as early as December 2007, the applicant had been sent to Prison No. 1 and left there untreated. Given that, according to the doctors, the applicant could not be cured, the lawyer requested that her client be dispensed from having to serve the remainder of his prison sentence (under Article 608 § 1 of the CCP). 28. In a judgment of 8 September 2008 the Court of Appeal ordered that the applicant’s prison sentence be suspended pending a substantial improvement in his state of health, provided that he undergo a medical examination every six months and provide the court with the results thereof. The applicant was immediately released. 29. According to a medical report of 6 March 2009, the applicant suffered from cardiac ischaemia, second-degree angina pectoris, third‑degree hypertension and second-degree heart failure. From a cardiological point of view, his heart condition remained serious. With regard to his arteries, the applicant suffered from Buerger’s disease, occlusion of the arteries in the right tibia, stenosis of the arteries in the left tibia, chronic arterial deficiency in the right lower limb at the fourth stage of the disease and gangrene of the tissue in the right big toe. The gangrene was still described as progressive. The experts concluded that the applicant required cardiological and angiological treatment in a specialist institution. 30. Over May and June 2011 the applicant underwent another forensic examination. It appeared from the report of 21 June 2011 that on 6 February 2011 the applicant had had the lower part of his right leg amputated. At the same time he was diagnosed with gangrene on the big toe of the left foot. While confirming his diagnosis from a cardiological point of view as potentially serious the four experts involved in the examination also concluded that the applicant’s angiological condition had deteriorated as a result of ischemia. Thus, from the angiological point of view he was categorised as a seriously ill patient.

5. The applicant was born in 1972 and lives in Albania. He was a Member of Parliament from 2013 until 20 October 2015. 6. On 20 March 2015 the General Prosecutor’s Office (“the GPO”) initiated criminal proceedings against the applicant for making a false report of a crime and false statements before a prosecutor and for threatening people in order to obtain false statements in breach of Articles 305, 305/a and 312/a of the Criminal Code (“the CC”). 7. Having regard to his parliamentary immunity, on 26 March 2015 Parliament authorised the applicant’s arrest. As a result, on the same day the GPO ordered his arrest, which was carried out with immediate effect. 8. On 27 March 2015 the GPO asked the Supreme Court to validate the applicant’s arrest. 9. On 28 March 2015 the Supreme Court found that the GPO had complied with domestic law in ordering the applicant’s arrest, since it had obtained Parliament’s prior authorisation in accordance with Article 73 § 2 of the Constitution. The applicant had been charged with a number of offences. Given his public office, his financial situation, the possibility that he could tamper with evidence, and information obtained from the Belgian authorities about his alleged involvement in the commission of a crime in Belgium, there was reasonable suspicion that he might flee. The Supreme Court thus considered that the applicant’s deprivation of liberty was lawful. As to the security measure to be imposed on the applicant, the Supreme Court ordered his placement under house arrest. 10. On 27 March 2015 the Interpol office in Tirana (“Interpol Tirana”) informed the GPO of the existence of an international arrest warrant against the applicant. The warrant, no. B1/07 OPC, had been issued on 3 December 2014 by the Belgian prosecutor’s office at the Brussels Court of Appeal, in connection with the criminal offence of premeditated murder committed in collusion with others. It appears from the case file that, according to a Red Notice issued by Interpol in respect of the applicant, he was wanted for prosecution purposes. 11. On 28 March 2015, relying on Article 6 of the CC, Article 287 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“the CCP”) and Article 38 § 7 of the Jurisdictional Relations Act, the GPO initiated fresh criminal proceedings against the applicant for committing premeditated murder in collusion with others under Article 78/1 and 25 of the CC. On the same day the prosecutor’s office requested authorisation from Parliament with a view to ordering the applicant’s arrest. 12. On 2 April 2015 Parliament authorised the applicant’s arrest, in line with the GPO’s request of 28 March 2015. 13. On 1 April 2015, relying on a criminal report filed by the High Inspectorate for the Declaration and Audit of Assets and the Prevention of Conflicts of Interest, the prosecutor’s office initiated criminal proceedings against the applicant for laundering the proceeds from a criminal offence or activity and refusing to state or falsely stating what his possessions were in breach of Articles 287 and 257/a of the CC. On the same date the prosecutor’s office decided to join that set of proceedings to the second set of proceedings. 14. On 2 April 2015, following Parliament’s authorisation on the same day (see above), the applicant was detained in connection with the second and third set of criminal proceedings. The arrest warrant referred to a letter from the Tirana Police Directorate stating “the enforcement of the security measure of house arrest cannot be entirely guaranteed, on account of the geographical position of the applicant’s house, the large surface area of the house, the existence of more than two entry and exit gates, and the existence of numerous buildings constructed adjacent to and around the house”. 15. On 2 April 2015 the prosecutor asked the Supreme Court to validate the applicant’s detention. 16. On 3 April 2015 the Supreme Court decided that the applicant’s detention was lawful. Since he had been charged with offences punishable by no less than two years’ imprisonment, his detention was in compliance with Article 253 of the CCP. There were reasonable grounds to believe that there was a risk of flight on account of the offences with which he was charged. The applicant was a member of parliament, he had financial means, and there was a risk that he might tamper with the collection of evidence or abscond from justice. 17. The Supreme Court further stated that the security measure of detention (arrest) should be imposed in accordance with Articles 228-230 of the CCP, and this entailed the fulfilment of three conditions: firstly, that there was a reasonable suspicion, based on evidence, that the accused had committed a crime; secondly, that the facts attributed to the accused constituted a criminal offence which had not become time-barred, as provided for by the criminal law; and thirdly, that the accused was criminally responsible for the alleged criminal offence. In the Supreme Court’s view, all three conditions had been cumulatively fulfilled in the applicant’s case. Further, the applicant’s detention complied with the criteria laid down in Article 229 of the CCP, and would also be justified by the need to prevent any interference by the applicant in the administration of justice because of his public office, and the need to prevent further consequences resulting from the offence. 18. In his dissenting opinion, Judge A.B. stated that a risk of flight should not rest on assumptions, hypotheses, suppositions or second guesses. The fact that the police could not secure the applicant’s house arrest should not have been held against him. The prosecutor had not discharged the burden of proof in relation to the assertion that the applicant intended or would attempt to flee. The case file did not contain evidence of any risk of flight. 19. On 26 May 2015 the applicant appealed to the Constitutional Court. He complained that the prosecutor should firstly have sought Parliament’s authorisation to institute a criminal investigation against him before seeking authorisation for his arrest. Further, no authorisation for his arrest had been given by Parliament in relation to the charges under Articles 287 and 257/a of the CC. The criminal proceedings initiated against him in relation to the alleged crime in Belgium had been in breach of the European Convention on the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters, because the Belgian authorities had not asked the Albanian authorities to initiate any proceedings against him. 20. On 6 July 2015 the Constitutional Court, composed of a bench of three judges, dismissed the applicant’s appeal. It reasoned that Article 73 § 2 of the Constitution, as amended in 2012, required Parliament’s authorisation for, amongst other things, the arrest of a member of parliament, Parliament’s authorisation for the institution of a criminal investigation having been repealed. The security measures imposed on the applicant by the Supreme Court had been in response to all the criminal proceedings initiated against him, including the charges under Articles 257/a and 287 of the CC. 21. On 19 February 2015 the Belgian Assize Court of Brabant Wallon decided to reopen the criminal proceedings against the applicant, and scheduled a hearing for 19 October 2015. 22. On 15 July 2015 the Albanian GPO decided that it did not have the authority to examine a request by the applicant to attend the hearing of 19 October 2015 in Belgium. 23. On 4 September 2015 the Assize Court of Brabant Wallon adjourned the proceedings sine die. 24. On 25 September 2015 the GPO decided to extend the period of investigation for three more months, on account of the voluminous files received from Belgium in the framework of mutual legal assistance, the complexity of the case, the need to question more people, and so on. On 29 September 2015 the applicant challenged the GPO’s decision of 25 September 2015 before the Supreme Court. 25. On 2 October 2015 the applicant asked for the “personal security measure” of detention to be changed to house arrest. On 12 October 2015 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant’s request. It reasoned that there was still a risk of flight and a risk of the applicant tampering with the collection of evidence. 26. It appears from the case file that the applicant lost his mandate as a Member of Parliament on 20 October 2015. Therefore, on 17 December 2015 the Supreme Court, at the GPO’s request, decided to dismiss the case, noting that the competence to review the personal security measure lay with the court examining the merits of the case. 27. On 26 April 2016 the Tirana District Court decided that the applicant should remain in detention. On 3 May 2016 the applicant challenged the Tirana District Court’s decision of 26 April 2016. The Court has not been informed of any outcome in those proceedings.

5. The applicant was born in 1992 and lives in Istanbul. 6. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7. On 7 December 2009 the applicant was arrested. 8. On 9 December 2009 the applicant was placed in detention on remand by the judge at the Istanbul Assize Court on suspicion of committing crimes on behalf of an illegal terrorist organisation, disseminating propaganda for the same organisation, storage of hazardous materials, and damage to public property. 9. On 30 December 2009 the Istanbul public prosecutor filed his indictment with the Istanbul Assize Court. 10. On 6 May 2010 the first hearing was held before the Istanbul Assize Court. At the end of the hearing the court ordered the continuation of his detention in the presence of the applicant. 11. The applicant filed an objection against this decision. On 20 May 2010 the 10th Chamber of Istanbul Assize Court dismissed this objection without holding an oral hearing. In delivering its decision, the court took into consideration the written opinion of the public prosecutor, which had not been communicated to the applicant or his representative. 12. On 10 December 2010 the applicant was released from detention on remand. 13. At the time when the application was lodged, the proceedings against the applicant were still pending before the first-instance court.

5. In 1957 several plots of land (agricultural land at the time) were expropriated from the applicants’ legal predecessors. The present cases concern restitution proceedings in which the applicants sought that the plots of land, which, at present, form part of a campsite on the shore of Lake Ohrid, be restored to their possession. 6. On 14 August 2001 the applicants instituted restitution proceedings. On 15 September 2003 the Ministry of Finance’s Restitution Commission (“the Restitution Commission”) granted the applicants’ claims and awarded them compensation, the form of which was to be determined by a separate decision. It established that according to an urban plan of 20 March 2002 the land was designated as a public green zone in a tourist area. Relying on an on-site inspection (увид) of 1 September 2002, it further held that the land was developed (уреден простор) with access paths and supporting infrastructure. 7. On 4 December 2003 the applicants appealed, arguing that, inter alia, the land was undeveloped and could be restored to their possession. Were the urban plan to be implemented in the future, the land could be expropriated anew. 8. On 31 May 2005 the the Second-Instance Administrative-Procedure Commission in the Area of Denationalisation (Комисија за решавање во управна постапка во втор степен од областа на денационализацијата – “the second-instance commission”) dismissed the applicants’ appeal finding no grounds to depart from the established facts and the reasons given by the Restitution Commission. Relying on section 10 of the Restitution Act (see paragraph 15 below), the second-instance commission held that the land in question was of public interest (јавен интерес) and could not be restored to the applicants’ possession, but that compensation should be awarded instead. 9. On 21 September 2005 the applicants lodged an administrative-dispute claim with the Supreme Court reiterating that the land within the campsite was undeveloped and could therefore be restored to their possession. In submissions lodged subsequently, they further referred to decision no. 44-530/1 of 7 March 2006 in which the second-instance commission had accepted a similar claim and ordered that a neighbouring plot of land located within the same campsite had been restored to possession of the claimants. In that case, the second-instance commission had held, unlike in the applicants’ case, that access paths and supporting infrastructure had not been sufficient for the land in question to be regarded as developed. 10. On 7 February 2008 the Administrative Court, which had in the meantime become competent to decide administrative-dispute claims, dismissed the applicants’ claim and upheld the findings of the administrative authorities. 11. On 28 November 2003 the Restitution Commission upheld the applicants’ restitution claim and awarded them compensation in State bonds. Relying on an on-site inspection of 13 May 2002 and a certificate of 15 September 2002 issued by the competent Ministry, it established that the plot in question was located within the boundaries of the campsite; that it had been designated as a public green zone and that pedestrian paths and other similar infrastructure were planned for construction. It concluded accordingly that the plot could not be restored to the applicants’ possession. 12. An appeal by the applicants of 7 April 2004 was dismissed by the second-instance commission on 15 November 2005. The latter held that, inter alia, the findings of the Restitution Commission had been based on section 10 of the Restitution Act. 13. The applicants lodged an administrative-dispute claim in which, alike the applicants in application no. 38024/08, they referred to the second-instance commission’s decision no. 44-530/1 and asked the Administrative Court to ensure consistent application of the law. 14. On 21 April 2008 the Administrative Court dismissed the applicants’ claim, finding no grounds to depart from the established facts and the reasoning given by the administrative authorities.

5. The first applicant, Ms Mariya Vladimirovna Alekhina, was born in 1988. The second applicant, Ms Nadezhda Andreyevna Tolokonnikova, was born in 1989. The third applicant, Ms Yekaterina Stanislavovna Samutsevich, was born in 1982. The applicants live in Moscow. 6. The three applicants are members of a Russian feminist punk band, Pussy Riot. The applicants founded Pussy Riot in late 2011. The group carried out a series of impromptu performances of their songs Release the Cobblestones, Kropotkin Vodka, Death to Prison, Freedom to Protest and Putin Wet Himself in various public areas in Moscow, such as a subway station, the roof of a tram, on top of a booth and in a shop window. 7. According to the applicants, their actions were a response to the ongoing political process in Russia and the highly critical opinion which representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church, including its leader Patriarch Kirill, had expressed about large-scale street protests in Moscow and many other Russian cities against the results of the parliamentary elections of December 2011. They were also protesting against the participation of Vladimir Putin in the presidential election that was due in early March 2012. 8. The applicants argued that their songs contained “clear and strongly worded political messages critical of the government and expressing support for feminism, the rights of minorities and the ongoing political protests”. The group performed in disguise, with its members wearing brightly coloured balaclavas and dresses, in various public places selected to enhance their message. 9. Following a performance of Release the Cobblestones in October 2011, several Pussy Riot members, including the second and third applicants, were arrested and fined under Article 20.2 of the Code of Administrative Offences for organising and holding an unauthorised assembly. On 14 December 2011 three members of the group performed on the roof of a building at temporary detention facility no. 1 in Moscow. The performance was allegedly held in support of protesters who had been arrested and placed in that facility for taking part in street protests in Moscow on 5 December 2011. The band performed Death to Prison, Freedom to Protest and hung a banner saying “Freedom to Protest” on it from the roof of the building. No attempt to arrest the band was made. A video of the performance was published on the Internet. 10. On 20 January 2012 eight members of the band held a performance entitled Riot in Russia at Moscow’s Red Square. The group sang a song called Putin Wet Himself. All eight members of the band were arrested and fined under Article 20.2 of the Code of Administrative Offences, the same as before. 11. In response to the public support and endorsement provided by Patriarch Kirill to Mr Putin, members of Pussy Riot wrote a protest song called Punk Prayer – Virgin Mary, Drive Putin Away. A translation of the lyrics is as follows: “Virgin Mary, Mother of God, drive Putin away Drive Putin away, drive Putin away Black robe, golden epaulettes Parishioners crawl to bow The phantom of liberty is in heaven Gay pride sent to Siberia in chains The head of the KGB, their chief saint, Leads protesters to prison under escort So as not to offend His Holiness Women must give birth and love Shit, shit, holy shit! Shit, shit, holy shit! Virgin Mary, Mother of God, become a feminist Become a feminist, become a feminist The Church’s praise of rotten dictators The cross-bearer procession of black limousines A teacher-preacher will meet you at school Go to class - bring him cash! Patriarch Gundyaev believes in Putin Bitch, better believe in God instead The girdle of the Virgin can’t replace rallies Mary, Mother of God, is with us in protest! Virgin Mary, Mother of God, drive Putin away Drive Putin away, drive Putin away.” 12. On 18 February 2012 a performance of the song was carried out at the Epiphany Cathedral in the district of Yelokhovo in Moscow. The applicants and two other members of the band wearing brightly coloured balaclavas and dresses entered the cathedral, set up an amplifier, a microphone and a lamp for better lighting and performed the song while dancing. The performance was recorded on video. No complaint to the police was made in relation to that performance. 13. On 21 February 2012 five members of the band, including the three applicants, attempted to perform Punk Prayer – Virgin Mary, Drive Putin Away from the altar of Moscow’s Christ the Saviour Cathedral. No service was taking place, although a number of persons were inside the Cathedral. The band had invited journalists and media to the performance to gain publicity. The attempt was unsuccessful as cathedral guards quickly forced the band out, with the performance only lasting slightly over a minute. 14. The events unfolded as follows. The five members of the band, dressed in overcoats and carrying bags or backpacks, stepped over a low railing and ran up to the podium in front of the altar (the soleas). After reaching the steps, the band removed their coats, showing their characteristic brightly coloured dresses underneath. They also put on coloured balaclavas. They placed their bags on the floor and started taking things out of them. At that moment the video recorded someone calling out for security and a security guard then ran up the steps to the band. The band member dressed in white, the third applicant, pulled a guitar from her bag and tried to put the strap over her shoulder. Another guard ran up to the second applicant and started pulling her away. Moments later the band started singing the song without any musical accompaniment. The guard let go of the second applicant and grabbed the third applicant by the arm, including her guitar, at the same time calling on his radio for help. The radio fell out of his hand but he did not let go of the third applicant and pushed her down the steps. While the third applicant was being pushed away by the guard, three of the other band members continued singing and dancing without music. Words such as “holy shit”, “congregation” and “in heaven” were audible on the video recording. At the same time the second applicant was trying to set up a microphone and a music player. She managed to turn the player on and music started playing. A uniformed security guard grabbed the player and took it away. At the same time four band members, including the first two applicants, continued singing and dancing on the podium, kicking their legs in the air and throwing their arms around. Two cathedral employees grabbed the first applicant and another band member dressed in pink. She ran away from the security guard, while the second applicant kneeled down and started making the sign of the cross and praying. The band continued singing, kneeled down and started crossing themselves and praying. 15. Cathedral staff members escorted the band away from the altar. The video-recording showed that the last band member left the altar one minute and thirty-five seconds after the beginning of the performance. The guards accompanied the band to the exit of the cathedral, making no attempt to stop them or the journalists from leaving. 16. A video containing footage of the band’s performances of the song, both at the Epiphany Cathedral in Yelokhovo and at Christ the Saviour Cathedral, was uploaded to YouTube. 17. On 21 February 2012 a deputy director general of private security company Kolokol-A, Mr O., complained to the head of the Khamovniki district police in Moscow of “a violation of public order” by a group of unidentified people in Christ the Saviour Cathedral. Mr O. stated that at 11.20 a.m. that day unidentified individuals had screamed and danced on “the premises of the cathedral”, thus “insulting the feelings of members of the church”. The individuals had not responded to reprimands by churchgoers, clergymen or guards. 18. A similar complaint was lodged three days later by the acting director of the Christ the Saviour Cathedral Fund, Mr P. He called the applicants’ conduct disorderly, extremist and insulting to Orthodox churchgoers and the Russian Orthodox Church. Mr P. also stated that the band’s actions had been aimed at stirring up religious intolerance and hatred. Printouts of photographs of the band’s performances and the full lyrics of Punk Prayer – Virgin Mary, Drive Putin Away, downloaded from the group’s website, were attached to the complaint. 19. On 24 February 2012 the police instituted criminal proceedings. Cathedral staff members and guards were questioned. They stated that their religious feelings had been offended by the incident and that they could identify three of the band members as they had taken off their balaclavas during the performance. 20. On 3 March 2012 the second applicant was arrested. The first applicant was apprehended the following day. They were charged with the aggravated offence of hooliganism motivated by religious hatred. The third applicant was also stopped by the police in the street and taken in for questioning on 3 March 2012. She had no identification documents and did not provide her real name, instead identifying herself as Ms Irina Vladimirovna Loktina. Her mobile telephone and a computer flash drive were seized and she was released after the interview. 21. On 5 March 2012 the Taganskiy District Court of Moscow issued separate detention orders to remand the first two applicants in custody until 24 April 2012. In terms of the circumstances precluding the application of a less stringent measure to the applicants, the court cited the gravity of the charges, the severity of the penalty they faced, the “cynicism and insolence of the crime” the applicants were charged with, their choice not to live at their places of permanent residence, their lack of permanent “legal” sources of income, the first applicant’s failure to care for her child and the second applicant’s right to move to and reside in Canada. It also cited the fact that certain members of Pussy Riot were still unidentified or on the run. 22. The detention orders became final on 14 March 2012, when the Moscow City Court upheld them on appeal, fully endorsing the District Court’s reasoning. 23. The third applicant was placed in custody on 16 March 2012 by the Taganskiy District Court after finally being identified by the police and charged with the same criminal offence as the first two applicants. The District Court found that the risks of the third applicant absconding, reoffending and perverting the course of justice warranted her detention. Those risks were linked by the court to the following considerations: the gravity of the charges, the severity of the penalty she faced, her unwillingness to identify other members of the band, her lack of a permanent legal source of income, and her use of an assumed identity while communicating with the police on previous occasions. The decision was upheld on appeal by the Moscow City Court on 28 March 2012. 24. By three separate detention orders issued on 19 April 2012 the Taganskiy District Court further extended the applicants’ detention until 24 June 2012. Citing the grounds it had used to substantiate the need for the applicants’ placement in custody, the District Court concluded that no new circumstances warranting their release had come to light. It also noted the first applicant’s blanket refusal to confess to the offence with which she had been charged or to any other act prohibited by the Russian Criminal Code. It also stated that the applicants’ arrests had only been possible due to searches conducted by the Russian police as it had not been possible to find them at their places of permanent residence. 25. On 20 June 2012 the Taganskiy District Court once again extended the applicants’ detention, citing the same reasons as in the previous detention orders. On 9 July 2012 the Moscow City Court agreed that it was necessary to continue holding the applicants in custody. 26. In a pre-trial hearing on 20 July 2012 the Khamovnicheskiy District Court of Moscow allowed an application by a prosecutor for a further extension of the applicants’ detention, finding that the circumstances which had initially called for their being held on remand had not changed. The applicants were to remain in custody until 12 January 2013. The District Court dismissed the arguments the applicants put forward pertaining to their family situation (the first two applicants had young children), the fragile health of the second applicant, the fact that the three applicants had registered their places of residence in Moscow and that the criminal proceedings against them were already at a very advanced stage. The court also refused to accept personal written sureties given by fifty-seven individuals, including famous Russian actors, writers, film producers, journalists, businessmen, singers and politicians. 27. On 22 August 2012 the Moscow City Court upheld the detention order of 20 July 2012, considering it lawful and well-founded. 28. In the meantime, investigators ordered expert opinions to determine whether the video-recording including the performance of Punk Prayer – Virgin Mary, Drive Putin Away downloaded from the Internet was motivated by religious hatred, whether the performance of the song at the cathedral could therefore amount to incitement of religious hatred, and whether it had been an attack on the religious feelings of Orthodox believers. In the first two reports, commissioned by a State expert bureau and issued on 2 April and 14 May 2012 respectively, five experts answered in the negative to those questions. In particular, the experts concluded that the applicants’ actions on 21 February 2012 at Christ the Saviour Cathedral had not contained any signs of a call or an intention to incite religious hatred or enmity. The experts concluded that the applicants had not been violent or aggressive, had not called for violence in respect of any social or religious group and had not targeted or insulted any religious group. 29. A third expert opinion subsequently requested by the investigators from directly appointed individual experts produced an entirely different response. In a report issued on 23 May 2012 three experts – a professor from the Gorky Institute of World Literature, a professor at the Moscow City Psychological Pedagogical University, and the President of a regional NGO, the Institute of State Confessional Relations and Law – concluded that the performance and video had been motivated by religious hatred, in particular hatred and enmity towards Orthodox believers, and had insulted the religious feelings of such believers. 30. On 20 July 2012 the three applicants were committed to stand trial before the Khamovnicheskiy District Court. The trial was closely followed by national and international media. 31. The trial court dismissed numerous complaints by the applicants related to the negative impact of security measures in place at the courthouse on their right to communicate freely with counsel and to prepare their defence. In particular, in applications to the trial court of 23 July 2012 for time for a confidential meeting with their lawyers, they stated that confidential communication was impossible because of the presence of police officers and court ushers around the dock. The applicants raised the issue again in a similar application on 24 July 2012, which was repeated at a hearing on 30 July 2012. 32. The applicants provided the following description of the hearings. Throughout the trial they were held in an enclosed dock with glass walls and a tight-fitting door, which was commonly known as an “aquarium”. There was insufficient ventilation inside the glass dock and it was hard to breathe, given the high summer temperatures. A desk for the applicants’ lawyers was installed in front of the dock. There was always high security around the dock, which at times included seven armed police officers and a guard dog. Colour photographs of the courtroom submitted by the applicants show police officers and court ushers surrounding the dock, either behind or close to the defence lawyers’ desk. Some photographs show female police officers positioned between the lawyers’ desk and the glass dock containing the applicants. The applicants had to use a small window measuring 15 x 60 cm to communicate with their lawyers, which they had to bend down to use as it was only a metre off the ground. The applicants had to take turns to speak to their lawyers as the window was too small for all three to use it simultaneously. According to the applicants, confidential communication with their defence team was impossible as a police officer always stood nearby monitoring their conversations and any documents which were passed between them. Furthermore, a dog was present in the courtroom, which was at times particularly disturbing as it had barked during the hearings and behaved restlessly. 33. According to the applicants, it was virtually impossible to communicate with their lawyers outside the courtroom as they were taken back to the detention facility at night, when it was too late to be allowed visitors. 34. The lawyers applied several times to the District Court for permission to hold confidential meetings with the applicants. The lawyers and applicants also sought an adjournment of the hearings to give the defence an opportunity to consult their clients in private, either in the courthouse or in the detention facility, but those requests were fruitless. 35. Similarly, the court dismissed applications to call the experts who had issued the three expert reports or to call additional experts, including art historians and specialists in the fields of contemporary art and religious studies, who could have provided opinions on the nature of the performance on 21 February 2012. The defence’s challenges to the third expert report issued on 23 May 2012 were also unsuccessful. 36. According to the applicants, when there were hearings they were transported from the detention facility to court in a prison van: they were usually transported in a small vehicle when being taken to the courthouse in the morning and in a bigger one when being taken back to the detention facility in the evening. The bigger van consisted of two long sections so men and women could be transported separately. The vans had two or three compartments separated by metal partitions, each designed to accommodate one inmate. The common area of the vans was equipped with benches, while the roof was so low detainees could not stand up. The space in the common compartment of the smaller van was no more than 2 sq. m and was designed for four people, while the space in the bigger van was approximately 5 sq. m. 37. According to the applicants, they were transported in single-person compartments to their custody hearings and in common compartments later on. Most of the time the vans were overcrowded, with detainees sitting directly against each other, with squashed up legs and shoulders. The bigger vans transported between thirty and forty detainees, making a number of stops at various Moscow facilities to pick up detainees. The vans were sometimes so full that there was no place to sit. Smoking was not prohibited but many detainees did do so. The second and third applicant had severe headaches as a result of the conditions of transport. 38. The temperature in Moscow at the time of the trial was as high as 30oC, while inside the vans it reached 40oC. The natural ventilation in the single-person compartments was insufficient and the system of forced ventilation was rarely switched on. When it was switched on, it was only for a very short time because of the noise it made and so it was hardly ever used. A fan was switched on during the summer but did not make the conditions of the cramped space any more bearable. 39. The journey to the courthouse usually took two to three hours, but could sometimes last as long as five hours. Detainees were not allowed to use the toilet unless the police van drove past the Moscow City Court, where inmates were allowed to relieve themselves. 40. On the days of court hearings the applicants were woken up at 5 or 6 a.m. to carry out the necessary procedures for leaving the facility and were only taken back to the detention facility late at night. The applicants missed mealtimes at the detention facility because of such early departures and late returns. 41. On leaving the detention facility in the morning they received a lunch box containing four packets of dry biscuits (for a total of eight each), two packets of dry cereal, one packet of dry soup and two tea bags. However, it was impossible to use the soup and tea bags as hot water was only made available to them five minutes before they were taken out of their cells to the courtroom, which was not enough time to eat. 42. The applicants were forbidden to have drinking water with them during the hearings: requests for short breaks to drink some water and use the toilet were regularly refused, which caused them physical suffering. 43. On 1 August 2012 an ambulance was called twice to the court because the applicants became dizzy and had headaches owing to a lack of food, water, rest and sleep. They were both times found fit for trial. (b) The Government’s account 44. The Government provided the following information concerning the vehicles in which the applicants had been transported to and from the courthouse: Vehicle Area and number of compartments Number of places KAMAZ-4308-AZ 2 common compartments 2 single-occupancy compartments 32 GAZ-326041-AZ 1 common compartment 3 single compartments 7 GAZ-2705-ZA 2 common compartments (1.35 sq.m each) 1 single compartment (0.375 sq.m) 9 GAZ-3221-AZ 2 common compartments (1.44 sq.m each) 1 single compartment (0.49 sq.m ) 9 GAZ-3309-AZ 2 common compartments 1 single compartment (total area 9.12 sq.m) 25 KAMAZ-OTC-577489-AZ 2 common compartments (4.2 sq.m each) 2 single compartments (0.4 sq.m each) 32 KAVZ-3976-AZ 1 common compartment (5 places) 6 single compartments (total area 6.3 sq.m) 11 45. It appears from the information provided by the Government that between 20 July and 17 August 2012 the applicants were transported between Moscow’s SIZO-6 remand prison and the Khamovnicheskiy District Court twice a day for fifteen days. The trips lasted between thirty‑five minutes and one hour and twenty minutes. The trips back from the court lasted between twenty minutes and four hours and twenty minutes. 46. According to the Government, the daytime temperature in Moscow in July and August 2012 only reached 30oC on 7 August 2012 and that, furthermore, the mornings and evenings, when the applicants were transported, were cooler than the temperature at midday. All the vehicles underwent a technical check and were cleaned before departure. They were also disinfected once a week. The passenger compartment had natural ventilation through windows and ventilation panes. The vehicles were also equipped with a system of forced ventilation. The passenger compartment had artificial lighting in the roof. The Government provided photographs of the vehicles and extracts from the vehicle logs to corroborate their assertion that the number of passengers never exceeded the upper limit on places given in the table in paragraph 44 above. People transported in such vehicles could use toilets in courthouses that were on the vehicles’ route. 47. The Government submitted that the area at the Khamovnicheskiy District Court where the applicants had been held before the hearings and during breaks consisted of six cells equipped with benches and forced ventilation. A kettle had also been available to them. The Government provided reports by the officers on duty at the Khamovnicheskiy District Court on the dates of the applicants’ hearings to corroborate their statement that the applicants had always been provided with a lunch box and boiling water when being transported to court. 48. On 17 August 2012 the Khamovnicheskiy District Court found the three applicants guilty under Article 213 § 2 of the Russian Criminal Code of hooliganism for reasons of religious hatred and enmity and for reasons of hatred towards a particular social group. It found that they had committed the crime in a group, acting with premeditation and in concert, and sentenced each of them to two years’ imprisonment. The trial court held that the applicants’ choice of venue and their apparent disregard for the cathedral’s rules of conduct had demonstrated their enmity towards the feelings of Orthodox believers, and that the religious feelings of those present in the cathedral had therefore been offended. While also taking into account the video-recording of the song Punk Prayer – Virgin Mary, Drive Putin Away, the District Court rejected the applicants’ arguments that their performance had been politically rather than religiously motivated. It stated that the applicants had not made any political statements during their performance on 21 February 2012. 49. The District Court based its findings on the testimony of a number of witnesses, including the cathedral employees and churchgoers present during the performance on 21 February 2012 and others who, while not witnesses to the actual performance, had watched the video of Punk Prayer – Virgin Mary, Drive Putin Away on the Internet or had been present at the applicants’ performance at the Epiphany Cathedral in Yelokhovo (see paragraph 12 above). The witnesses provided a description of the events on 21 February 2012 or of the video and attested to having been insulted by the applicants’ actions. In addition, the District Court referred to statements by representatives of various religions about the insulting nature of the applicants’ performance. 50. The District Court also relied on the expert report issued on 23 May 2012, rejecting the first two expert reports for the following reasons: “... [the expert reports issued on 2 April and 14 May 2012] cannot be used by the court as the basis for conviction as those reports were received in violation of the criminal procedural law as they relate to an examination of the circumstances of the case in light of the provisions of Article 282 of the Russian Criminal Code – incitement to hatred, enmity or disparagement, as can be seen from the questions put [to the experts] and the answers given by them. Moreover, the expert opinions do not fulfil the requirements of Articles 201 and 204 of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure. The reports lack any reference to the methods used during the examinations. The experts also exceeded the limits of the questions put before them; they gave answers to questions which were not mentioned in the [investigators’] decisions ordering the expert examinations. The reports do not provide a linguistic and psychological analysis of the lyrics of the song performed in Christ the Saviour Cathedral, and the experts did not carry out a sentiment analysis and psychological assessment of the song’s lyrics in relation to the place where the crime had been committed (an Orthodox church). [The experts] examined the lyrics of the song selectively. Given the lack of a linguistic and psychological analysis of the lyrics of the song performed in Christ the Saviour Cathedral, the experts made an unfounded and poorly reasoned conclusion, which runs counter to the testimony of the eyewitnesses, the victims of the crime, who expressed an extremely negative view of the events in Christ the Saviour Cathedral and of the video-recording.” 51. On the other hand, the District Court found the expert report of 23 May 2012 to be “detailed, well founded and scientifically reasoned”. The experts’ conclusions were seen by the court as substantiated and not open to dispute, given that the information received from the experts corresponded to the information received from other sources, such as the victims and the witness statements. The court also stressed that it would not call the experts or authorise an additional expert examination as it had no doubts about the conclusions made in the report in question. 52. The District Court’s main reasons for finding that the applicants had committed hooliganism motivated by religious hatred were as follows: “The court cannot accept the defence’s argument that the defendants’ actions were not motivated by religious hatred and enmity or hatred against a social group. The court finds that the defendants’ actions were motivated by religious hatred for the following reasons. The defendants present themselves as supporters of feminism, a movement for equality between women and men. ... At the present time people belonging to the feminist movement fight for equality of the sexes in political, family and sexual relations. Belonging to the feminist movement is not unlawful and is not a criminal offence in the Russian Federation. A number of religions, such as the Orthodox Church, Catholicism and Islam, have a religious, dogmatic basis incompatible with the ideas of feminism. And while feminism is not a religious theory, its adherents interfere with various areas of social relations such as morality, rules of decency, family relations, sexual relations, including those of a non-traditional nature, which were historically constructed on the basis of religious views. In the modern world, relations between nations and nationalities and between different religions must be built on the principles of mutual respect and equality. The idea that one is superior and the others inferior, that a different ideology, social group or religion are unacceptable, gives grounds for mutual enmity, hatred and personal conflicts. The defendants’ hatred and enmity were demonstrated in the court hearings, as was seen from their reactions, emotions and responses in the course of the examination of the victims and witnesses. ... It can be seen from the statements of the victims, witnesses, defendants and the material evidence that Pussy Riot’s performances are carried out by way of a sudden appearance by the group [in public places] with the band dressed in brightly coloured clothes and wearing balaclavas to cover [their] faces. Members of the group make brusque movements with their heads, arms and legs, accompanying them with obscene language and other words of an insulting nature. That behaviour does not respect the canons of the Orthodox Church, irrespective of whether it takes place in a cathedral or outside its walls. Representatives of other religions and people who do not consider themselves believers also find such behaviour unacceptable. Pussy Riot’s ‘performances’ outside religious buildings, although containing signs of clear disrespect for society motivated by religious hatred and enmity and hatred of a specific social group, are not associated with a specific object and therefore amount to a violation of moral standards or an offence. However, placing such a performance within an Orthodox cathedral changes the object of the crime. It represents in that case a mixture of relations between people, rules of conduct established by legal acts, morality, customs, traditions which guarantee a socially tranquil environment and the protection of individuals in various spheres of their lives, as well as the proper functioning of the State and public institutions. Violating the internal regulations of Christ the Saviour Cathedral was merely a way of showing disrespect for society, motivated by religious hatred and enmity and hatred towards a social group. The court concludes that [the applicants’] actions ... offend and insult the feelings of a large group of people in the present case in view of their connection with religion, [their actions] incite feelings of hatred and enmity and therefore violate the constitutional basis of the State. [The applicants’] intention to incite religious hatred and enmity and hatred towards a specific social group in view of its connection with religion, in public, is confirmed by the following facts. A so-called ‘punk prayer’ was carried out in a public place – Christ the Saviour Cathedral. [The applicants] knowingly envisaged a negative response to that performance on the part of society as they had prepared bright, open dresses and balaclavas in advance and on 21 February 2012 publicly and in an organised group carried out their actions, which were motivated by religious hatred and enmity and hatred towards a social group in view of its connection with religion. ... Given the particular circumstances of the criminal offence, its nature, the division of the roles, the actions of the accomplices, the time, place and method of committing the offence of hooliganism, that is to say a gross violation of public order committed by a group of people acting in premeditated fashion and in concert, and which demonstrated an explicit lack of respect for society motivated by religious hatred and enmity and hatred towards a social group, the court is convinced that [the applicants] were correctly charged with the [offence] and that their guilt in committing [it] has been proven during the trial. [The applicants’] actions are an obvious and gross violation of generally accepted standards and rules of conduct, given the content of their actions and the place where they were carried out. The defendants violated the generally accepted rules and standards of conduct accepted as the basis of public order in Christ the Saviour Cathedral. The use of offensive language in public in the vicinity of Orthodox icons and objects of worship can only be characterised as a violation of public order, given the place where those actions were carried out. In fact, there was mockery and humiliation of the people present in the Cathedral, a violation of social tranquillity, unauthorised and wilful entry into the cathedral’s ambon and soleas, accompanied by intentional, stubborn and a lengthy period of disobedience to the reprimands and orders of the guards and churchgoers. ... The court dismisses [the applicants’] arguments that they had no intention to incite religious hatred or enmity or to offend the dignity of a group of people because of their religious beliefs, as those arguments were refuted by the evidence in the case. ... Although the members of Pussy Riot cite political motives for their actions, arguing that they have a positive attitude to the Orthodox religion and that their performance was directed against the uniting of Church and State, their words are refuted by their actions, lyrics and articles found [in the course of the investigation]. The defendants’ arguments that their actions in the cathedral were not motivated by hatred or enmity towards Orthodox churchgoers and Christianity, but were governed by political considerations, are also unsubstantiated because, as can be seen from the victims’ statements, no political claims were made and no names of political leaders were mentioned during the defendants’ acts of disorder in the Cathedral.” 53. Citing the results of psychological expert examinations commissioned by investigators, the District Court noted that the three applicants suffered from mixed personality disorders, which did not affect their understanding of the criminal nature of the act they had carried out in the cathedral and did not call for psychiatric treatment. The psychiatric diagnosis was made on the basis of the applicants’ active social position, their reliance on their personal experience when taking decisions, their determination to defend social values, the “peculiarity” of their interests, their stubbornness in defending their opinion, their confidence and their disregard for social rules and standards. 54. As regards the punishment to be imposed on the applicants, the District Court ruled as follows: “Taking into account the gravity and social danger of the offence, the circumstances in which it was committed, the object and reasons for committing the offence, and [the applicants’] attitude towards their acts, the court believes that the goals of punishment, such as the restoration of social justice, the correction of people who have been convicted and the prevention of the commission of new offences, can only be achieved by sentencing them to prison and their serving the sentence ...” 55. The two-year prison sentence was to be calculated from the date of arrest of each of the applicants, that is from 3, 4 and 15 March 2012 respectively. 56. On 28 August 2012 the applicants’ lawyers lodged an appeal on behalf of the three applicants and on 30 August 2012 the first applicant submitted an additional statement to her appeal. She stated, in particular, that throughout the trial she and the other accused had not been able to have confidential consultations with their lawyers. 57. On 10 October 2012, the Moscow City Court decided on the appeals by upholding the judgment of 17 August 2012 as far as it concerned the first two applicants, but amended it in respect of the third applicant. Given the third applicant’s “role in the criminal offence [and] her attitude towards the events [of 21 February 2012]”, the City Court suspended her sentence, gave her two years’ probation and released her in the courtroom. The Moscow City Court did not address the issue of confidential consultations between the applicants and their lawyers. 58. On 23 December 2013 the first and second applicants were released from serving their sentence under a general amnesty issued by the Duma on 18 December 2013, the Amnesty on the Twentieth Anniversary of the Adoption of the Constitution of the Russian Federation. 59. On 9 January 2014 the third applicant was also amnestied. 60. On 8 February 2013 the Ombudsman, on behalf of the second applicant, applied to the Presidium of the Moscow City Court for supervisory review of the conviction. He argued, in particular, that the applicants’ actions had not amounted to hooliganism as they could not be regarded as inciting hatred or enmity. Breaches of the normal functioning of places of worship, insults to religious feelings or the profanation of religious objects were administrative offences punishable under Article 5.26 of the Code of Administrative Offences. 61. On 15 March 2013 Judge B. of the Moscow City Court refused to institute supervisory review proceedings. 62. In a letter of 28 May 2013 the President of the Moscow City Court refused to review the decision of 15 March 2013. 63. On 8 November 2013 the Ombudsman submitted an application for supervisory review to the Supreme Court. As well as the arguments set out in the previous application, he added that public criticism of officials, including heads of State, the government and the heads of religious communities, was a way of exercising the constitutional right to freedom of speech. 64. On unspecified date the first and second applicants’ representatives also applied for supervisory review to the Supreme Court on their behalf. They argued, inter alia, that the applicants’ actions had amounted to political criticism, not incitement to hatred or enmity on religious grounds or towards any social group. Furthermore, they pointed to a number of alleged breaches of criminal procedure in the course of the trial. 65. On 10 December 2014 the Supreme Court instituted supervisory review proceedings upon the above applications. 66. On unspecified date the third applicant also applied for supervisory review of her conviction. 67. On 17 December 2014 the Supreme Court instituted supervisory review proceedings upon her application. 68. On an unspecified date the case was transferred to the Presidium of the Moscow City Court for supervisory review. 69. On 4 April 2014 the Presidium of the Moscow City Court reviewed the case. It upheld the findings that the applicants’ actions had amounted to incitement to religious hatred or enmity and dismissed the arguments concerning breaches of criminal procedure at the trial. At the same time, it removed the reference to “hatred towards a particular social group” from the judgment as it had not been established which social group had been concerned. It reduced each applicant’s sentence to one year and eleven months’ imprisonment. 70. The group uploaded a video of their performance of Punk Prayer – Virgin Mary, Drive Putin Away at the Epiphany Cathedral in Yelokhovo and at Christ the Saviour Cathedral to their website http://pussy-riot.livejournal.com. It was also republished by many websites. 71. On 26 September 2012 a State Duma member, Mr S., asked the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation to study the video of the group’s performance, to stop its dissemination and to ban the websites which had published it. 72. As a result of that assessment, on 2 November 2012 the Zamoskvoretskiy Inter-District Prosecutor applied to the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow for a declaration that the Internet pages http://www.pussy-riot.livejournal.com/8459.html, http://www.pussy-riot.livejournal.com/5164.html, http://www.pussy-riot.livejournal.com/5763.html and http://pussy-riot.livejournal.com/5497.html were extremist. They contained text posted by Pussy Riot, photographs and videos of their performances, including videos for Riot in Russia, Putin Wet Himself; Kropotkin Vodka; Death to Prison, Freedom to Protest; Release the Cobblestones and Punk Prayer – Virgin Mary, Drive Putin Away (see paragraph 11 above and Appendix for lyrics). The prosecutor also sought to limit access to the material in question by installing a filter to block the IP addresses of websites where the recordings had been published. 73. After learning of the prosecutor’s application through the media, the third applicant lodged an application with the District Court on 12 November 2012, seeking to join the proceedings as an interested party. She argued that her rights as a member of Pussy Riot would be affected by any court decision in the case. 74. On 20 November 2012 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court dismissed her application, finding as follows: “ Having considered [the third applicant’s] argument that a decision issued in response to the prosecutor’s request could affect [her] rights and obligations, the court finds this argument unsubstantiated because the judgment of 17 August 2012 issued by the Khamovnicheskiy District Court in respect of the third applicant became final on 10 October 2012; [she] was found guilty by that judgment under Article 213 § 2 of the Russian Criminal Code of hooliganism committed in a group acting in premeditated fashion and in concert. That judgment can be appealed against by way of supervisory review in entirely different proceedings. [The third applicant’s] argument that charges related to a criminal offence under Article 282 § 2 (c) of the Russian Criminal Code were severed from [the first] criminal case cannot, in the court’s opinion, show that [her] rights and obligations would be influenced by the court’s decision issued in respect of the prosecutor’s request because there is no evidence that [she] took any part in disseminating the materials published on the Internet sites identified by the prosecutor [.] [T]here is no evidence that [she] owns those websites either. Therefore the court concludes that an eventual decision on the prosecutor’s request for the materials to be declared extremist will not affect [the third applicant’s] rights and obligations; and therefore there are no grounds for her to join the proceedings as an interested party.” 75. On 28 November 2012 the third applicant appealed against that decision. 76. On 29 November 2012 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court ruled that video content on http://pussy-riot.livejournal.com was extremist, namely the video-recordings of their performances of Riot in Russia, Putin Wet Himself; Kropotkin Vodka; Death to Prison, Freedom to Protest; Release the Cobblestones and Punk Prayer – Virgin Mary, Drive Putin Away. It also ordered that access to that material be limited by a filter on the website’s IP address. Relying on sections 1, 12 and 13 of the Suppression of Extremism Act and section 10(1) and (6) of the Federal Law on Information, Information Technologies and the Protection of Information, the court gave the reasons for its decision and stated as follows: “According to section 1 of [the Suppression of Extremism Act], extremist activity is deemed to be constituted by, inter alia, the stirring up of social, racial, ethnic or religious discord; propaganda about the exceptional nature, superiority or deficiency of persons on the basis of their social, racial, ethnic, religious or linguistic affiliation or attitude to religion; violations of human and civil rights and freedoms and lawful interests in connection with a person’s social, racial, ethnic, religious or linguistic affiliation or attitude to religion; public appeals to carry out the above-mentioned acts or the mass dissemination of knowingly extremist material, and likewise the production or storage thereof with the aim of mass dissemination. ... Results from monitoring the Internet and of a psychological linguistic expert examination performed by experts from the Federal Scientific Research University’s ‘Russian Institute for Cultural Research’ state that the Internet sites http://www.pussy-riot.livejournal.com/8459.html, http://www.pussy-riot.livejournal.com/5164.html, http://www.pussy-riot.livejournal.com/5763.html and http://pussy-riot.livejournal.com/5497.html contain video materials of an extremist nature. That conclusion is confirmed by report no. 55/13 of 26 March 2012 on the results of the psychological linguistic expert examination performed by experts from the Federal Scientific Research University’s ‘Russian Institute for Cultural Research’. The court concludes that free access to video materials of an extremist nature may contribute to the incitement of hatred and enmity on national and religious grounds, and violates the rights of a specific group of individuals – the consumers of information services in the Russian Federation. The court accepts the prosecutor’s argument that the dissemination of material of an extremist nature disrupts social stability and creates a threat of damage to the life, health and dignity of individuals, to the personal security of an unidentified group of individuals and disrupts the basis of the constitutional order of the State. Accordingly, the aforementioned activities are against the public interests of the Russian Federation. ... Taking the above-mentioned circumstances into account, the court finds that the prosecutor’s application is substantiated and should be allowed in full.” 77. The third applicant appealed against the decision of 29 November 2012. 78. On 14 December 2012 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court rejected the third applicant’s appeal against the decision of 20 November 2012 on the grounds that the Code of Civil Procedure did not provide for a possibility to appeal against a decision to deny an application to participate in proceedings. 79. On 30 January 2013 the Moscow City Court dismissed an appeal by the third applicant against the decision of 14 December 2012. It found that under the Code of Civil procedure no appeal lay against a court decision on an application to join proceedings as an interested party. It noted, furthermore, that the applicant would be able to restate her arguments in her appeal against the decision on the merits of the case. 80. On the same date the Moscow City Court left the third applicant’s appeal against the decision of 29 November 2012 without examination. The appellate court stated, inter alia: “... the subject in question was the extremist nature of the information placed in the Internet sources indicated by the prosecutor and the necessity to limit access to them[.] [A]t the same time, the question of [the third applicant’s] rights and obligations was not examined, the impugned decision did not limit her rights, and she was not a party to the proceedings begun upon the prosecutor’s application. Taking into account the foregoing, [the third applicant’s] allegations contained in her appeal statement concerning alleged breaches of procedural rules on account of the failure to allow her to participate in proceedings which violated her rights and legal interests are unfounded and are based on an incorrect interpretation of the rules of procedural law. Therefore ... [the third applicant] has no right to appeal against the above decision.”

5. The applicants were born in 1976 and 1982 and live in Khust and Kharkiv respectively. 6. The first applicant lodged a claim against a social security authority, seeking an increase in the amount of child allowance she was receiving. A first-instance court allowed her claim in part. That judgment was upheld on appeal but the social security authority lodged a further appeal on points of law. 7. On 6 November 2012 the Higher Administrative Court (“the HAC”), having examined the appeal, quashed the lower courts’ judgments and dismissed the applicant’s claim. 8. The second applicant moved from the territory of the Republic of Moldova controlled by the so‑called “Moldavian Republic of Transdniestria” (“MRT”) (see Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], no. 48787/99, ECHR 2004‑VII) to Ukraine to take up permanent residence. Under domestic law, repatriating Ukrainians were entitled to the tax-free and duty-free import of their foreign-registered vehicles. However, the customs office refused to apply this tax exemption in the applicant’s case on the grounds that the car had not been registered by the appropriate authorities of the Republic of Moldova. She challenged this refusal before the administrative courts. A first-instance court allowed her claim and ordered the customs office to clear her car through customs. That judgment was upheld on appeal but the customs office lodged a further appeal on points of law. 9. On 4 April 2013 the HAC allowed the appeal, quashed the lower courts’ decisions and dismissed the applicant’s claim. 10. Both applicants alleged that the HAC, contrary to domestic law (see paragraph 11 below), had not sent them copies of the appeals lodged in their cases or informed them of the pending appeals by any other means, thus depriving them of an opportunity to respond. They alleged that they had only learned of the appeal proceedings when they had been served with the HAC’s final decisions quashing the lower courts’ decisions in their favour. 11. As worded at the relevant time, Articles 214 and 215 of the 2005 Code of Administrative Justice provided that a HAC judge-rapporteur would decide, having considered an appeal, whether to initiate proceedings to review the lower courts’ decisions on points of law. If the judge decided to initiate such proceedings, he or she was required to inform the parties of that decision and serve a copy of the appeal on the opposing party with a time-limit for responding. 12. The relevant provisions of the Code concerning the procedure for serving court documents are summarised in Lazarenko and Others v. Ukraine (nos. 70329/12 and 5 others, § 15, 27 June 2017).

6. The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Muş. 7. On 19 April 2003 the applicant was arrested and taken into custody on suspicion of membership of an illegal organisation. 8. On 20 April 2003 the applicant’s statements were taken by the police in the absence of a lawyer. During the interrogation, the applicant gave a detailed account of his acts within the illegal organisation PKK (the Kurdistan Workers’ Party). 9. On 22 April 2003 the applicant was heard by the public prosecutor and the investigating judge at the Istanbul State Security Court, again in the absence of a lawyer. In his statements before both the public prosecutor and the investigating judge, the applicant denied the accusations and maintained that his statements to the police had been given under duress. On the same day, upon the order of the investigating judge, the applicant was placed in pre-trial detention. 10. On 6 May 2003 the public prosecutor at the Istanbul State Security Court filed an indictment accusing the applicant of membership of an illegal terrorist organisation under Article 168 of the former Criminal Code, Law no. 765. 11. The State Security Courts were later abolished by Law no. 5190 of 16 June 2004, and the case was transferred to the Istanbul Assize Court. 12. On 19 September 2006, relying on, inter alia, the applicant’s statements to the police, the Istanbul Assize Court convicted the applicant under Article 314 § 2 of the new Turkish Criminal Code and sentenced him to six years and three months’ imprisonment. 13. On 19 November 2007 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment on procedural grounds. 14. On 30 December 2008 the Istanbul Assize Court convicted the applicant again under Article 314 § 2 of the new Turkish Criminal Code and sentenced him to six years and three months’ imprisonment. 15. On 20 March 2012 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the Istanbul Assize Court.

5. The applicants, Suren Osmanyan, Serob Osmanyan, Bakur Osmanyan, Mane Osmanyan and Donara Amiraghyan were born in 1935, 1961, 1988, 1990 and 1966 respectively and live in Teghout village. 6. The applicants are a family of five, making their living from agriculture. They jointly owned a plot of arable land in the village measuring 0.383 ha. 7. In the 1970s a copper-molybdenum deposit (“Teghout”) was discovered about 4 and 6 km from the villages of Teghout and Shnogh respectively, in the Lori Region. 8. In 2001 a private company, Armenian Copper Programme CJSC, was granted a mining licence for the exploitation of the Teghout copper‑molybdenum deposit for a period of twenty-five years. 9. On 1 November 2007 the Government adopted Decree no. 1279-N approving the expropriation zones of territories situated within the administrative boundaries of the rural communities of Shnogh and Teghout in the Lori Region to be taken for State needs, and changing the category of land use. According to the Decree, Armenian Copper Programme CJSC or Teghout CJSC, founded by the former for the implementation of the Teghout copper-molybdenum deposit exploitation project, were to acquire the units of land listed in its annexes. The plot of land belonging to the applicants was listed among the units of land falling within these expropriation zones. 10. On 25 March 2008 Oliver Group LLC, a licensed evaluation company hired by Teghout CJSC, delivered an evaluation report of the applicants’ plot of land. According to the report, the cadastral value of the applicants’ plot of land was AMD 250,865 (approximately EUR 545). By means of calculations based on comparative and income capitalisation methods, the market value of the applicants’ plot of land was estimated at AMD 188,000 (approximately EUR 409). 11. On an unspecified date Teghout CJSC addressed a letter to the applicants containing an offer to buy their plot of land for AMD 188,000 plus an additional 15% as required by law, making the final offer AMD 216,200 (approximately EUR 470). 12. The applicants did not reply to the offer, not being satisfied with the amount of compensation. They claimed that they were unable to obtain an evaluation of their property by another company since no other evaluation company was willing to make an independent evaluation of the market value of their land. 13. On 12 May 2008 Teghout CJSC lodged a claim with the Lori Regional Court (“the Regional Court”) against the applicants and L., the first applicant’s late wife, seeking to oblige them to sign the agreement on the taking of their property for State needs. The company based its claim, inter alia, on the evaluation report prepared by Oliver Group LLC. 14. In the course of the proceedings Teghout CJSC submitted a corrected version of the evaluation report on the applicants’ property stating that Oliver Group LLC had made certain corrections as a result of which the market value of the land was estimated at AMD 194,000 (approximately EUR 422). The final amount of compensation, together with the additional 15% required by the law, would thus be equal to AMD 223,100 (approximately EUR 485). The remainder of the data contained in the original report had not been changed. 15. The applicants argued before the Regional Court that the market value of their land had been underestimated and that the court should order a forensic expert examination to determine the real market value of their property. 16. On 6 October 2008 the Regional Court granted Teghout CJSC’s claim, awarding L. and the applicants a total of AMD 223,100 in compensation. 17. The applicants lodged an appeal complaining, inter alia, that the third applicant had not been duly notified about the proceedings and that L. had died before the proceedings before the Regional Court had started. They further argued that they had not been duly notified about the dates and times of the rescheduled hearings. 18. On 27 February 2009 the Civil Court of Appeal quashed the Regional Court’s judgment and remitted the case for a fresh examination. 19. On 2 June 2009 the Regional Court granted Teghout CJSC’s claim finding, inter alia, that the evaluation reports prepared by Oliver Group LLC should be considered lawful and acceptable evidence to determine the market value of the applicants’ property to be taken for State needs and that the applicants’ request to order a forensic expert examination was groundless. The Regional Court stated that the first applicant, as L.’s successor, should be awarded her share in the amount of compensation and awarded the applicants a total of AMD 223,100 in equal shares as compensation. 20. The applicants lodged an appeal claiming, inter alia, that the amount of compensation was not adequate and that no account had been taken of their fruit trees and their profitability. They argued that the Regional Court had accepted the reports submitted by their opponent as established proof of the market value of their property. Also, they argued that the Regional Court should have exercised its statutory discretion to order an expert examination since such a necessity had arisen in the course of the proceedings and they had no possibility to provide an alternative evaluation themselves. 21. On 31 July 2009 the Civil Court of Appeal quashed the Regional Court’s judgment, stating that it should have granted the applicants’ request by ordering a forensic expert examination to determine the market value of the property. The case was remitted to the Regional Court. 22. On 27 January 2010 the Regional Court ordered a forensic expert examination to determine the market value of the applicants’ plot of land, including that of immovable property or other improvements, if there were any. 23. On 12 August 2010 expert G. of the “Expertise Centre”, a State nonprofit organisation, delivered a report according to which the market value of the property was estimated to be AMD 230,000 (approximately EUR 500). It was stated in the report that the applicants’ plot of land was entirely covered with grass, did not have any water supply and was used to provide fodder. There were four peach trees on the land in question. Relevant photographs of the applicants’ plot of land were attached to the report. 24. On 1 November 2010 the Regional Court ordered an additional forensic expert examination. The expert was requested to determine whether there were any improvements on the applicants’ plot of land and, if so, to describe them and to establish the market value of the land together with the value of the improvements, if there were any. 25. On 17 December 2010 expert A. of “National Bureau of Expertise”, a State nonprofit organisation, delivered his report which estimated the market value of the applicants’ plot of land at AMD 209,100 (approximately EUR 450). The report confirmed the description of the applicants’ plot of land contained in the previous expert report. In addition, it was stated that in the expert’s opinion that the four fruit trees on the land could not have any bearing on the determination of its market value. The report also stated that the first expert report and the evaluation report by Oliver Group CJSC had produced quite realistic results. 26. On 21 April 2011 the Regional Court granted Teghout CJSC’s claim. It relied on the corrected evaluation report prepared by Oliver Group CJSC and two forensic expert reports. The Regional Court granted the applicants AMD 264,500 (approximately EUR 575) by taking the highest market value of the three evaluations at its disposal and adding to that amount the additional 15% as required by law. 27. The applicants lodged an appeal arguing, inter alia, that the second forensic examination report was not credible since the expert had failed to specify the sources of information he had used to reach his conclusions and moreover no account had been taken of the number of the applicants’ trees and their value. They further argued that they had filed an application with the Regional Court seeking to exclude this piece of evidence and assign an additional forensic examination, but their application was dismissed. 28. On 7 July 2011 the Civil Court of Appeal upheld the Regional Court’s judgment finding that the amount of compensation had been correctly determined based on the existing evidence. As regards the applicants’ arguments concerning the fruit trees, the Civil Court of Appeal stated that both experts appointed by the Regional Court had recorded that there were only four fruit trees on the plot of land while expert A. had stated in his report that the trees in question could not have a significant bearing on the market value of the land. 29. The applicants lodged an appeal on points of law. They raised similar complaints to those raised before the Court of Appeal. 30. On 31 August 2011 the Court of Cassation declared the applicants’ cassation appeal inadmissible for lack of merit.

4. The applicant was born in 1970 and lives in St Petersburg. 5. According to the applicant, in 1994 she moved in with her partner, N., who lived in a flat in St Petersburg of which he was the sole owner. 6. The applicant alleged that on 7 April 1998 her partner had borrowed 18,000 United States dollars from her for a period of two years. He had undertaken to give her his flat if he failed to repay her. 7. In 1998 the applicant was registered as living in that flat and lived there with N. for the following fifteen years. They never married. 8. On 9 May 2013 N. died intestate. 9. In October 2013 the applicant instituted court proceedings seeking to have her property rights over her partner’s flat acknowledged on account of usucaption. 10. On 17 June 2014 the Primorskiy District Court of St Petersburg (“the District Court”) dismissed the applicant’s claims, having found that although she had lived in the flat since 1994, there were no grounds to acknowledge her property rights to that flat on account of usucaption. 11. On 30 September 2014 the St Petersburg City Court (“the City Court”) upheld that judgment. 12. On 4 March 2015 a judge of the City Court refused to refer a cassation appeal lodged by the applicant to the court of cassation. 13. In 2015 the administration of the Primorskiy District of St Petersburg (“the district administration”) brought court proceedings against the applicant, seeking her eviction from the flat. The administration claimed that the flat was an heirless estate and therefore the property rights to it had to be transferred to the administration. The district administration, as the new owner of the flat, had the right to seek the applicant’s eviction in accordance with Article 304 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation. 14. The applicant contested those claims on the following grounds: - she and N. had been living in the flat since 1994 as husband and wife; - she had shared a common household with N.; - N. had let her live in the flat as his family member; - she had been paying the charges for the flat; - she had no other housing. 15. On 23 November 2015 the District Court refused to evict the applicant from the flat. The court found, with reference to Article 31 of the Housing Code, that N. had let the applicant live in the flat as a family member, and until his death had shared a common household with her. Therefore, after N.’s death the applicant had not lost the right to live in the flat. 16. In its appeal against that judgment the district administration submitted that it had become the owner of the flat on 10 May 2013 following the death of the applicant’s partner. Therefore the applicant’s right to use that flat had come to an end on the same date. The district administration asked the appeal court to quash the judgment of 23 November 2015 and to issue a new decision granting its eviction claim against the applicant. 17. On 25 April 2016 the City Court quashed the judgment of 23 November 2015 and ordered the applicant’s eviction from the flat. The City Court held as follows: “... The owner of the flat in question, Mr Nikolayev A.A., who had let the defendant live in [the flat], died on 9 May 2013. ... Taking into account that none of the heirs of Mr Nikolayev A.A. had come into an inheritance, ..., the property right to flat no. 20 at 11, Marshal Novikov street in St Petersburg, which was a heirless estate, had been transferred to the city of St Petersburg from the moment the inheritance had been opened, and in accordance with the law it belongs to social housing which is managed by the administration of the Primorskiy District of St Petersburg. ... Mrs Valdgardt Ye.V. [the applicant] had been allowed to live in the flat by the former owner. However, following the death of the owner and the transfer of the property rights in respect of the flat to the City of St Petersburg pursuant to Article 292 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, the right of Mrs Valdgardt to use the contested flat had come to an end. Taking into account that there are no legal grounds which would allow Mrs Valdgardt to continue living in the flat and also because the defendant had not vacated the flat voluntarily, the claims of the administration of the Primorskiy District to evict the defendant from the residential premises should be granted ...” 18. The applicant lodged a cassation appeal with the presidium of the City Court. She submitted, in particular, that the City Court had not taken into account that she was in need of housing and had been put on a municipal housing list. 19. On 15 July 2016 a judge of the City Court refused to refer the applicant’s appeal to the cassation court. The judge noted, in particular, that the fact that the applicant was on a housing list had no legal relevance for the case. 20. The applicant lodged a cassation appeal with the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. She submitted, in particular, that the City Court had failed to examine the proportionality of her eviction in violation of Article 8 of the Convention. 21. On 22 August 2016 a judge of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation refused to refer the applicant’s cassation appeal to the cassation court. 22. On 5 April 2017 the District Court issued a writ of execution. 23. On 15 May 2017 the bailiffs instituted enforcement proceedings. 24. On an unspecified date the bailiffs service informed the applicant that if the writ of execution was not enforced by 8.30 a.m. on 26 July 2017, a forced eviction would be carried out at 9 a.m. on 26 July 2017 with the assistance of the police and bailiffs.

5. The applicant was born in 1945 and lives in Naxxar. 6. The applicant served as a member of parliament between 1976 and 1996, and he served as a government minister between 1987 and 1996. Even before he was elected to Parliament he had already established himself as a political commentator in the media and regularly authored opinions related to national politics which were published in national newspapers. Upon his retirement from Parliament the applicant began writing weekly opinion columns in the newspaper Maltatoday and another weekly paper. 7. On 6 May 2007 Dr Michael Falzon (referred to hereinafter as M.F., for ease of reference – as he has the exact same name as the applicant), the deputy leader of the Malta Labour Party (MLP), delivered a speech in public, which was reported on the national media. During the speech he informed the public that he had received an anonymous email and threatening letters, in respect of which he had complained directly to the Commissioner of Police (CoP). He furthermore referred to the discussion he had had with the latter during which he had asked him to investigate the issue. 8. The most relevant parts of the speech read as follows (translation done by the Registry): “...But the fact that today, one opens the newspaper Illum, front page, and reads the editorial by S.B., who chose to speak about a pending police investigation, about an anonymous email that I received and about a threatening letter that I received... this is a level which should not be acceptable in our country. And whoever is behind these stories – wherever he might be – and let me be clear – wherever he might be – he should be ashamed...ashamed! ... Yes I received an anonymous email...and I received threatening letters last November. I did not disclose this to my family. Today they were told by Maltatoday...I can tell them myself...But when something illegal occurs, I go to the police. And that’s what I did. And I went to the CoP, since people who put forward such stories can disclose them I can also do so now for everyone to know. So I went to the CoP. I will tell you what I told him...and he will confirm it. He told me: ‘What will we do, Mike, if it were to [turn out to] be X or Y?’ I told him: ‘I am telling you as of now, Mr R. Be it whosoever in this country, I am authorising you as from now, in advance, even before you start the investigation, to proceed. Because what is illegal, I condemn it, and we as a party always condemned illegality. And we come to [the subject of] the anonymous email [U wasalna fuq email anonima]. And today ... K.S.N. [a journalist], this person phoned me yesterday as well, told me ‘But you know, this is an innocuous email, it contains nothing.’ And I tell K.S.N. and [other purveyors of] this type of journalism, that when they saw [that] there is a police investigation, is it you, you decide what is illegal and what is not [?] Because [he was] an admirer. And [the sender] of this email, true. I will speak to him, of course. But note, that he sent it anonymously! Generally admirers tell you, ‘Hi, Mike, is everything alright?’ They do not write anonymously. And K.S.N said other things as well, and so did S.B. [the editor of Maltatoday]. Among other things he said ‑ because he knows a lot ‑ he also phoned me yesterday, and I told him. I told him: ‘You are breaking the law. It is now up to the police’. He also said that apparently ‑ apparently ‑ from the investigation into the email conducted by the police, nothing had emerged, and that it will stop there. And I will tell him now in public: ‘Mr K.S.N. and Mr S.B., you have not discovered America!’ Words to that effect have been said by an employee of our party for weeks...at the Centre...for weeks. And he told me that I will make a fool of myself. I will not interfere. I will not interfere with the police investigation. That is for them to see. But yesterday I told the CoP, and Inspector C., that such discourse had long been doing the rounds at the Centre [party club]. I gave [them] the names, and it is now up to the police to decide whether to find out where this information originated from, and who is deciding matters in this country.” 9. On the same day K.S.N., a journalist, published an article in the newspaper Illum, entitled “Email sent to M.F. brings admirer before the Police”. The article started off by stating that an innocent email sent to the deputy leader of the MLP had been passed on to the police, who in turn had identified the sender and subsequently questioned him. It concluded with the statement that when M.F. was asked about him reporting the matter to the police, the deputy leader of the MLP (that is to say M.F.) replied that “he would not confirm nor deny” that he was aware of the case. 10. On 13 May 2007 Maltatoday published an opinion by the applicant entitled “Policing one’s enemies”, prompted by the above-mentioned speech, in which the applicant queried the manner in which the two main political parties perceived the police force. The article’s opening paragraphs read as follows: “During a recent short visit to London, I had the opportunity to watch the film ‘The Lives of Others’ (original title: Das Leben Anderen [sic]) an Academy Award‑winning German movie, set in the 1984 cultural scene of East Berlin, monitored by secret agents of the Stasi: the secret police of the former German Democratic Republic (East Germany). The film puts the methods of the Stasi at the centre of the plot and as a result clearly exposes their repulsive behaviour. The police force, I believe, is simply responsible for making sure that people obey the law, for protecting people and property and for arresting criminals. Using the police in a different context and for the purpose of controlling people’s freedoms is the basic notion of the typical police state, even if you insert the word ‘democratic’ in your country’s official title. For me, the biggest unease was caused by the realisation that the film was set in a period that is only some twenty-two years ago, which in Malta corresponds to the Mintoff [former Labour Party leader and Prime Minister] years when I was already active in politics. Little did I think that events that were to unfold when I was back in my country would make me wonder whether the PN [Nationalist Party] and the MLP look at the duties of the police in somewhat different manner.” 11. Other relevant parts of the article, read as follows: “I say this with deep regret, but I can only be seriously perturbed by the ease with which MLP Deputy Leader Michael Falzon [M.F.] persuaded the Commissioner of Police to investigate the source of a trivial and unimportant anonymous e-mail that he had received. More so, when this e-mail could only have been misguidedly considered ‘suspicious’, and even then in an absolutely far-fetched way, in the context of the infighting and internal feuds within the MLP. According to what Dr. Michael Falzon [M.F.] said, the Police Commissioner ‑ who apparently is on familiar first name speaking terms with Dr. Falzon [M.F.] ‑ asked whether he would proceed in the same fashion whether the culprit eventually proved to be X or Y; implying that the Commissioner was offering to act in a discriminatory way according who the ‘guilty’ person was. Matters are even more worrying because when the police successfully traced the original writer and dispatcher of the e-mail, they impounded his computer and obliged him to go and sign daily at the Police Headquarters even though he was not accused of any crime. Has not MLP Deputy Leader Michael Falzon [M.F.] successfully used the Police Force to control the freedom of an innocent, law-abiding private citizen whom he suspected could be a political enemy? And has not somebody in the police force abused of his powers by condescending to do this for the advantage of the faction led by Michael Falzon [M.F.] in the MLP’s internal squabbles? Why should the police force interfere in Labour’s internal politics where, it is obvious, there are too many cooks spoiling the broth?” ... “Yet the ease with which the MLP Deputy Leader phones him up to complain, and ‑ even worse ‑ the ease with which this leading politician is provided with a service that cannot be linked in any way with the pursuit of ‘criminality’ ‑ as we know it ‑ makes one wonder.” ... “These events seem to indicate that within Labour there are people who can influence and interfere in decisions taken by the Police Force. This is happening when they are still in Opposition. Asking what would happen in this area, once they are in government is, therefore, a legitimate question.” ... “So what is the Government doing about this? Does the MLP Deputy Leader who happens to be my namesake, carry more weight and influence with the Commissioner of Police than the Deputy Prime Minister who is politically responsible for the Police Force?” ... “I firmly believe that Tonio Borg [then Minister of Interior] should set up a high powered inquiry with the specific task of getting to the bottom of this sordid soap opera. He owes it to those who dedicated the best years of their life to ensure the personal freedom of each and every citizen of Malta. He owes it to all present and future Maltese citizens who did not live the past ‑ so that they will live in a future where no one controls their freedom and hence their lives.” 12. On 17 July 2007 M.F., the deputy leader of the MLP, instituted libel proceedings against the applicant (and against the editor of the newspaper) under Article 28 of Chapter 248 of the Laws of Malta (see the “Relevant domestic law” section below), and sought damages, claiming that the above‑mentioned extracts of the article had been defamatory. 13. By way of defence the applicant claimed that (a) the published article had contained his opinion and had consequently constituted a fair comment and the expression of a value judgment, (b) any facts had been substantially correct and based on what had been declared publicly by M.F. himself a few days prior to the impugned publication, and (c) the claimant was a person occupying a public office and was consequently bound to accept a wider level of criticism. 14. During the proceedings the Court of Magistrates heard the testimony of the plaintiff (M.F.), the CoP, the applicant, the editor (S.B.), and two other journalists (A.B.D. and K.S.N.). It saw documentation submitted consisting of an email exchange between the MLP deputy leader and a third person (J.B.), as well as the transcript of the deputy leader’s speech and copies of two articles, both entitled “Email sent to deputy leader brings an admirer before the Police” (one having been published online and one in print). 15. The CoP testified as follows (as summarised by the first‑instance court): - He denied that M.F. had persuaded him or influenced him in respect of his doing his job in connection with the case at issue; - M.F. had requested and obtained a normal appointment with the CoP; when they met M.F. had showed him a letter which the CoP considered to be “injurious and full of threats” towards M.F.; the latter requested the CoP to investigate the contents of the letter; - M.F. also informed the CoP that he had received an email, which was later passed on to the CoP, following an invitation to do so by the same CoP; - The CoP asked M.F. whether he intended to initiate proceedings against the person who should result to be responsible, given that the prosecution of such a crime would require the injured party to lodge a complaint; - The documents which had been passed on to the CoP had in turn been passed on to the Criminal Investigation Department (C.I.D.) for further investigation, and the CoP had had no further contact with M.F. concerning the case, which had not been given any particular priority on his part. 16. The applicant failed to make written submissions within the stipulated timeframe, and his late submissions were not accepted by the court that proceeded to judgment. 17. By a judgment of 4 May 2010 the Court of Magistrates found the applicant guilty of having defamed the deputy leader of the MLP and was ordered to pay him 2,500 euros (EUR) in damages. Costs were also to be paid jointly by the applicant and the editor (who was also ordered to pay EUR 1,000 in damages). 18. The court referred to the CoP’s witness testimony to explain the factual situation. In its view, while noting that public figures such as politicians were subject to wider limits of acceptable criticism, they were nevertheless protected under Article 10 § 2 – their protection having to be weighed in relation to the interests of the open discussion of political issues. The court considered the article defamatory as it had tarnished and impinged on the claimant’s reputation. It rejected the applicant’s defence, noting that it had not been proved that: i) M.F. had manipulated the CoP due to the political office that he held in the party in which he militates; ii) that with his actions M.F. had offended the Police Force since he used the Police Force for his personal aims; iii) that M.F. was some deus ex machina who pulls the strings of the Police Force, from behind the scene, to reach his goals. 19. The applicant appealed. 20. By a judgment of 6 October 2010 the Court of Appeal (in its inferior jurisdiction) rejected the appeal and confirmed the first‑instance judgment. It considered it appropriate to analyse and mention all the relevant evidence that had not been referred to by the first‑instance court: - M.F., as plaintiff and now respondent, submitted that the reader had been induced to believe that he had persuaded the police to harm someone, when all he had done was to file a report requesting that the anonymous letters and emails he had received be investigated. - The court also referred to the statements made by the CoP (see above). - The applicant (appellant before the Court of Appeal) explained that in his view the email received by M.F. had been innocuous and that M.F. had thus reacted disproportionality. According to the applicant, from the speech delivered by M.F. publicly (at the Labour Centre in Rabat), it transpired that there was a certain familiarity between him and the CoP; indeed if that had not been so M.F. would have reported the incident at a police station like an ordinary citizen, and not with the CoP. In his view it was natural to question whether M.F. had used the CoP in connection with the internal affairs of the party. Even when cross-examined, he reiterated that influence had been exerted by M.F. on the CoP. - The editor testified that in his opinion the speech delivered by the deputy leader of the MLP indicated that the latter had put pressure on the CoP to investigate the matter when he had met up with him to discuss the emails and the anonymous letters. - In reply to a question, while being cross-examined, as to whether M.F. had put pressure on the CoP, K.S.N. replied that he was aware that a report had been filed concerning the email and that on the same day of publication, M.F. had declared that he was authorising the CoP to institute proceedings against whomever turned out to be the culprit. 21. The Court of Appeal was of the view that, having examined all the relevant evidence and thus gaining an understanding of the circumstances preceding and surrounding the article, the applicant’s assumption could not be considered as constituting fair comment. In the eyes of the ordinary reader, the comments and criticism made by the applicant could not be considered as objectively reasonable, made in good faith and balanced, given that they were based on a certain assumption – that M.F. had exercised influence over the CoP with the aim of controlling people’s freedom; the attack on M.F. had thus exceeded the limits of just criticism. M.F. had had every right to file a report, and the fact that he was politically active had not justified such an attack, which had not been corroborated by factual evidence. It considered that even though the manifestation of free expression was an established principle, that freedom was to be exercised within those just limits of the canon of objective veracity of facts and restraint (entro l-limiti ġusti ta’ dak il‑kanoni tal-verita’ oġġettiva tal-fatti u tal-kontinenza), as elaborated by the most progressive doctrine and jurisprudence on topical issues and the exercise of criticism. 22. On 9 March 2011 the applicant instituted constitutional redress proceedings complaining that he had suffered, inter alia, a breach of Article 10 of the Convention as a result of the judgments in the libel proceedings. He argued, in substance, that his opinion piece had consisted of criticism, which was a legitimate manner of expressing an opinion about the work of a public figure and was allowed in a democratic society ‑ noting that the extensive protection given to such a public figure served to silence free expression. He further claimed that the ordinary courts had referred to insinuations and allegations which had not been made or implied by the applicant in his article, such as the statement by the Court of Magistrates to the effect that M.F. had “manipulated” the CoP or that the latter had been subjected to pressure which had “impeded the exercise of his function” as well that M.F. “was a deus ex macchina pulling the strings of the Police Force”. The applicant emphasised that these were gratuitous inventions by the ordinary court which had not been mentioned in the article. 23. By a judgment of 30 March 2012 the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional competence dismissed the applicant’s claims. 24. It considered that the applicant was attempting to obtain a revision of the ordinary proceedings and noted that it was not quite true that the applicant had never implied that M.F. had “manipulated” the CoP ‑ indeed his article had precisely questioned “has not the MLP deputy leader MF successfully used the Police Force to control the freedom of an innocent law‑abiding private citizen whom he suspected could be a political enemy?”. In any event, even if the applicant considered the statements made by the Court of Magistrates in its reasoning to be invented, this had not constituted a breach of his Article 10 rights. 25. The court noted the reference to the Stasi with which the applicant had started his article and his narrative of M.F.’s actions, which had resulted in an individual being investigated and subsequently having his computer seized. In that context he had asked whether M.F. had “used” the police against a political opponent. The applicant criticised the CoP for following up on the indications given by M.F., to the extent that the applicant had called on the Minister of the Interior to look into the matter. Indeed, the CoP was also an object of the applicant’s criticism. 26. According to the court, the word “uses” did not mean “manipulate”, as implied by the Court of Magistrates, but within the context of the article at issue, it nevertheless implied an element of abuse. The criticism against M.F. was that he had taken advantage of his political position to put pressure on the police in order that the latter would take action in persecuting an innocent citizen. The court considered that it was legitimate for a victim of a crime to complain to the police, and then it was for the police to act on the matter. Further, the initial reference to the “Stasi” in the opening of the article had been regrettable; even if it was not intended to do so, it had given the impression of a comparison being made. 27. In its view, even accepting that a public person was subject to greater limits of acceptable criticism, given the article at issue, the ordinary courts had not failed to strike a fair balance between the competing rights. 28. The applicant appealed. 29. By a judgment of 11 January 2013 the Constitutional Court dismissed his appeal. 30. It noted that the ordinary court judgments and the penalty inflicted constituted an interference with the applicant’s rights under Article 10, which had been prescribed by law (Article 28 of the Press Act). It emphasised the importance of free expression for the press; nevertheless, it noted that the press could not exceed certain limits and had to exercise its function in a manner consistent with its obligations and responsibilities particularly as regards the reputation and rights of others. Acknowledging that politicians were subject to wider limits of acceptable criticism, it nevertheless noted that they remained holders of their right to the protection of their reputation. The quest for reasonableness and proportionality in such circumstances had to be seen against the background of the importance of public debate. 31. Noting the difference between facts and value judgments (the latter not being subject to the need for proof), it considered that a person could not hide behind an opinion or value judgment to impute untrue facts in respect of other persons. It considered that the Court of Appeal had reached a legitimate conclusion in finding that the applicant’s opinion piece had contained declarations which assumed as a fact that the MLP deputy leader had illegitimately and abusively influenced the police and also that the exercise of illegitimate and abusive pressure on the CoP had not been proved as a fact. 32. The Constitutional Court noted that while the article had contained a series of questions (in respect of which the applicant argued that it was for the reader to answer), it had also contained assertions, some of which had not reflected the real facts, according to the Court of Appeal. Further, the Constitutional Court considered that just because an alleged fact was given the form of a question, this did not entail that it was no longer a factual assertion but rather became a value judgment. Even the way in which the question was posed, namely “Has not M.F. ...” clearly included a factual affirmation and clearly invited a positive reply. Similarly, the quest “Does the MLP Deputy Leader, who happens to be my namesake, carry more weight and influence with the Commissioner of Police than the Deputy Prime Minister, who is politically responsible for the Police Force?” was nothing but an allegation of fact in the form of a question. 33. Lastly, the Constitutional Court noted that the amount of the fine had not been particularly severe, so much so that the quantum had not been appealed. There was therefore no violation of Article 10.

5. The applicant company was a Ukrainian joint-stock company registered in Kyiv. At the relevant time it operated a commercial air carrier business (see East West Alliance Limited v. Ukraine, no. 19336/04, § 7, 23 January 2014). 6. On 12 March 2003 the applicant company brought a claim for damages, in particular loss of profit, against the State Aviation Safety Department. The claim was based on a delay on the defendant’s part in issuing a safety certificate, which the Department had been required to issue in 2001 by a court judgment. 7. On 16 August 2005 the Kyiv City Commercial Court allowed the claim in part. 8. On 18 October 2005 the Kyiv Commercial Court of Appeal quashed the first-instance court’s judgment and rejected the claim, mainly on the grounds that the applicant company had failed to prove the loss of profit it had claimed. It considered the estimates of the loss profit speculative. 9. On 21 February 2006 the Higher Commercial Court reversed the ruling of the Court of Appeal and upheld the judgment of the first instance court. The Higher Court held that because the defendant’s inaction prevented the applicant company from operating its business as from 2001, the first instance court was correct in accepting the information about the applicant company’s gross income for 1999 and 2000. 10. On 6 June 2006 the Supreme Court quashed the ruling of the Higher Commercial Court and upheld the ruling of the Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court considered that no causal connection has been proven between the defendant’s culpable inaction and the alleged loss of profit. It held, in particular, that the applicant company had failed to prove that it had realised a profit, rather than gross income, prior to 2001, or that its income for the preceding years came from operations which required a safety certificate. 11. Following communication of the case and unsuccessful friendly settlement negotiations, on 2 September 2014 the Government informed the Court of their intention to resolve the issue raised by the application. They produced a unilateral declaration, in which they acknowledged a breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and offered to pay the applicant company a sum to cover any pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage together with any costs and expenses. The Government requested that the Court strike out the application in accordance with Article 37 § 1 of the Convention. 12. On 7 November 2014 the applicant company objected to the striking out of its application, wishing to have its merits determined with a view to obtaining appropriate redress. It argued, in particular, that under domestic law the unilateral declaration, unlike a Court’s judgment finding a violation, would not provide grounds for reexamination of its case by the Supreme Court. The Government’s unilateral declaration would therefore not lead to actual restoration of the applicant company’s rights. 13. The Government were invited to comment and on 10 July 2015 informed the Court of the relevant domestic legislation (see paragraphs 15 and 16 below). They submitted a letter from the Supreme Court informing the Government Agent there was no relevant domestic case‑law on the matter. 14. On 3 November 2015 the applicant company’s only shareholder, East/West, informed the Court that on 2 October 2014 the Kyiv City Commercial Court had declared the applicant company bankrupt and opened liquidation procedure and on 8 October 2015 had declared it liquidated. Accordingly, East/West requested that any just satisfaction award due to the applicant company be paid to East/West. Asked to comment, the Government responded on 18 January 2016 that they “do not object against the applicant’s request as to the payment to its sole shareholder the awarded compensation and, thus, leave this question on the Court’s discretion”.

6. The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Larnaca. 7. Following his dismissal from Cyprus Airways Ltd as a trainee pilot, the applicant on 26 June 1998 brought a civil action before the District Court of Nicosia for wrongful dismissal and defamation (civil action no. 7562/98). The defendant company was represented by a law firm. 8. On 29 December 2006 the court dismissed the action. 9. On 9 February 2007 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Supreme Court (appeal no. 43/07). The appeal was tried by a bench of three judges. 10. The hearing of the appeal was held on 11 March 2007. On that date the managing partner of the above-mentioned law firm, Mr P.G.P., appeared for the defendant company and addressed the Supreme Court. Up until that date, other lawyers from the firm had appeared before the appeal bench on behalf of the defendant company. 11. On 21 April 2010 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal unanimously. 12. The applicant submitted that after the judgment of the Supreme Court was given, he discovered that the son of one of the judges sitting on the bench, Judge A.K., and the daughter of Mr P.G.P., were married and that both worked at the latter’s law firm. The lawyer representing him in the domestic proceedings had not requested the exemption of the judge in question because he had not had sufficient knowledge of the relevant facts at the time. The applicant had also not instructed his lawyer to do so as he had found out about this fact only after the appeal proceedings had ended.

5. The applicant was born in 1987 and lives in Argenteuil. 6. On Tuesday 9 June 2009 the applicant’s father, Mr Ali Ziri, who was 69 years old, and A.K., who was 60, set off in the latter’s vehicle after consuming alcoholic beverages. A.K. was driving. At about 8.35 p.m. a police patrol from the Argenteuil station, consisting of officers V.P., B.G. and J.C., having noticed that the car was being driven erratically, waved it down. 7. In the light of the parties’ submissions and the documents in the file, Mr Ziri was asked to get out of the vehicle but refused and began insulting one of the police officers, who decided to arrest him for resistance. The officer grabbed Mr Ziri by the arm and he fell backwards onto the ground, landing on his backside. Officers B.G. and J.C. lifted him up, each taking one arm, and forcibly handcuffed him. Mr Ziri was then placed in the back of the police car together with A.K. and officer B.G., with V.P. at the wheel and J.C. in the passenger seat. Even before the car set off, A.K. insulted and spat at officer V.P. After telling him three times to calm down, unsuccessfully, officer B.G. immobilised him by bending him over, with his head touching his knees. When he saw this, Mr Ziri tried to strike B.G. Officer J.C. then turned round on his seat, with his back to the windscreen, to force Mr Ziri to bend over by pressing his two hands onto the latter’s back, thus using the so-called “double-seated embrace” technique. Mr Ziri remained in that position for the rest of the journey to the Argenteuil police station, which lasted – according to the time between the first radio call made by officer V.P. and the arrival – between three minutes twenty-five seconds and five minutes. 8. On their arrival at the police station, at 8.46 p.m., officer B.G. tried to take Mr Ziri out of the vehicle with the assistance of a few colleagues, by pulling him with both hands under his shirt, while pressing one of his feet against the rim of the car. Mr Ziri was thus extracted and he hit the ground. He was then picked up by the officers, who immobilised his four limbs, and was carried, apparently without reacting and with his head hanging down, into the building. 9. Inside the police station Mr Ziri and A.K. were taken into the transit room and laid out flat, on their stomachs and in a safe lateral position (this is not clear from the file) with their hands cuffed behind their backs. They vomited several times. Referring to the findings of the National Security Ethics Commission of 17 May 2010 (see paragraph 30 below), the applicant added that a large number of police officers witnessed the events. 10. At 9.15 p.m., half an hour after the arrival at the police station, the officer in charge asked a team of four officers to take both men to hospital. Still in handcuffs, they were allegedly taken on foot to the police van, where they waited for 45 minutes before being driven to hospital. 11. Mr Ziri and A.K. arrived at the hospital – about 2 km from the police station – between 10.05 p.m. and 10.09 p.m. One of the officers called for a stretcher on which Mr Ziri was laid, on his back, without handcuffs. While waiting for the medical staff, the officers noted that Mr Ziri was vomiting and choking on his vomit. He moved into or was placed in a safe lateral position until the nurses arrived. 12. A doctor examined Mr Ziri at 10.45 p.m. and noted that he was in a state of cardiac arrest. He was taken to intensive care, where he never regained consciousness. 13. It can be seen from the judgment of the Investigation Division of the Rennes Court of Appeal of 12 December 2014 (paragraphs 39-41 below) that a certificate drawn up by Argenteuil Hospital on 10 June 2009 at about 12.30 p.m. recorded the following details of Mr Ziri’s condition when he arrived in intensive care: “a reactive coma with non-reactive bilateral mydriasis, abolition of corneal reflexes, no coughing, persistence of spontaneous ventilation, periorbital bruising to right eye with skin abrasion of the right cheekbone, skin abrasion on the right kneecap, bruising on the left side of the lower thorax, 1 cm bruise on the left forearm, and an alcohol concentration of 2.4 grams per litre of blood at 11.30 p.m.” 14. It can be seen from the same judgment that later that day, on 10 June 2009, at 2 p.m., Mr Ziri was also examined by Dr R., a forensic medical examiner. He observed that the neurological prognosis was negative owing to a lack of signs of awakening and the duration of the coma, noted the same bruising and skin abrasion as those indicated on the medical certificate, and recorded the hypothesis of the intensive care unit staff that Mr Ziri had succumbed to “hypoxia linked to choking in the context of vomiting with cardio-respiratory arrest then coma”. 15. Mr Ziri died of a second heart attack at 7.30 a.m. on 11 June 2009. A procedure to establish the cause of death was opened at 10 a.m. that same day and the testimony of the doctor who had examined him on his arrival at the hospital was immediately sought. 16. The first autopsy, carried out by Dr R. on 11 June 2009 at the request of the public prosecutor of Pontoise, found that the superficial skin injuries were unrelated to the cause of death. The autopsy report indicated the presence of an arrhythmogenic hypertrophic cardiomyopathy of the right ventricle associated with veno-occlusive disease with signs of pulmonary hypertension. It went on to say that Mr Ziri’s death was potentially due to decompensation of pre-existing pulmonary and cardiac conditions in a context of acute alcoholism, stating that each of the pulmonary and cardiac lesions taken separately could have been a cause of sudden death, especially in association with inebriation. He also raised the issue of medical responsibility, noting that a long period had elapsed between the time when Mr Ziri was reported to be unwell and the time he was examined, forty-five minutes later. 17. On 22 June 2009 a preliminary police investigation was opened against persons unknown on a charge of manslaughter. 18. At the public prosecutor’s request, Dr D., an expert cardiologist, carried out an examination based on the medical file. In his report of 2 July 2009 he stated that “the most likely hypothesis was that of ventricular arrhythmia on top of undiagnosed cardiomyopathy, decompensated on account of moderate hypoxia, electrolyte disturbance due to alcohol and vomiting”. He added that if Mr Ziri had been treated by a nurse on his arrival at Argenteuil Hospital, the clinical appearance, the constant symptoms and the usual complementary tests would have resulted in his being placed under immediate medical surveillance in order to prevent or remedy the cardiorespiratory failure. He concluded that the delay of forty to forty-five minutes between his admission to hospital and his treatment had contributed to his death. 19. On 6 July 2009 a confrontation was organised between the nurse and the doctor who had both treated the applicant’s father in the emergency unit. 20. On 7 July 2009 the public prosecutor discontinued the case on the grounds that no offence had been committed, in the absence of sufficient evidence to engage the liability of the police officers or the hospital staff. 21. However, a criminal complaint, together with an application to join the proceedings as civil parties, had been lodged by Mr Ziri’s family, including the applicant. According to the complaint, A.K. had stated that both he and Mr Ziri had been subjected to violence and that this could have been the cause of the latter’s death. 22. A judicial investigation against persons unknown on the same charge of manslaughter was then opened, on the basis of the public prosecutor’s application of 8 July 2009. 23. On 16 July 2009, at the request of counsel acting for Mr Ziri’s family, the investigating judge ordered a fresh autopsy. It was carried out on 17 July by Dr L. and Dr T., forensic medical examiners. Dated 20 July 2009, their report refers to “multiple hematoma on the right, antero-lateral and posterior half of the body, multiple hematoma on right upper and lower limbs, some of this bruising [possibly] corresponding to restraint-related injuries”. It further found that there had been no fracturing of the skull or any other part of the body, “superficial erosion and hematoma on the front, suggestive of frontal pressure”, “lungs indicating mechanical asphyxia” and “pressure on the right side of the back and thorax, shoulder and right arm”. It thus concluded: “Death from probable anoxia in a multi-factor context. Toxicological and anatomical pathology analyses are indispensable, together with a study of the medical file and procedure for the purpose of any useful synthesis”. 24. On 17 July 2009 the investigating judge asked the same doctors to carry out an autopsy. In their report of 31 August 2009 they indicated that they had found the following, based on a review of the anatomical pathology slides taken from the autopsy samples, a study of the hospitalisation report and their own observations: the presence of multiple bruises on the back, right side of the chest and lower limbs, some of which may be related to restraint; no traces of alcoholism in the liver; no signs of intra-bronchial regurgitation; absence of Mendelson’s syndrome in anatomical pathological examinations; cardiac lesions consisting of an area of old sub-endocardial fibrosis with some small isolated areas, without recent myocardial ischemia and without significant coronary impairment. They thus concluded: “Ziri Ali, aged 69, died of hypoxic cardiac arrest by multifactorial suffocation (pressure on the back and front and known vomiting).” 25. On the same day, observing that it could be presumed from the autopsy that the cause of Mr Ziri’s death arose before his arrival at the hospital and could in particular be related to his arrest, the investigating judge ordered the transfer of the file to the public prosecutor. 26. The prosecutor made a supplemental application on 23 September 2009 for the investigation to be extended to charges of manslaughter by wilful assault committed by a person vested with public authority. 27. A final forensic assessment was requested of Dr P., anaesthetist and emergency doctor. He was asked, in the light of all the evidence in the judicial investigation file and Mr Ziri’s medical records, to determine the causes of death, to ascertain whether any actions taken by the police during the arrest, transfer and custody could have caused the death, and to indicate whether the hospital treatment and medical procedures had followed the rules or could have contributed to the death. In his report of 15 April 2011, Dr P. observed that the successive expert opinions had ruled out, on the one hand, a medical cause of death – either by decompression of pre-existing pulmonary and cardiac pathologies in a context of acute inebriation, or by an inhalation of the gastric contents into the bronchial system capable of creating acute asphyxia – and, on the other hand, a traumatological cause in spite of the multiple bruising, in the absence of major traumatism, notably cranial. He upheld the hypothesis of a cardiac repercussion of an acute hypoxic episode. He relied in this connection on the statements of the police, who said that they had been forced to immobilise Mr Ziri by acts of restraint. Such restraint was capable of leading to respiratory blockage and therefore a difficulty, or even an impossibility, of oxygenation during a certain period, likely to result, in an elderly person, a greater hypoxic repercussion than in a young person, as well as cardiac arrhythmia. According to the expert, the autopsy data and the anatomical pathology analyses made this hypothesis likely. He also took the view that the treatment of Mr Ziri at the hospital had been “in accordance with normal practice”. He concluded as follows: “... – The electromechanical dissociation observed in the emergency department ... is secondary to a major cardiac rhythm disorder, itself secondary to a hypoxic episode related to being immobilised and repeated vomiting. – Regardless of the extent of Mr Ziri’s aggressiveness, he was a 69-year-old man whose lack of judgment led to conduct that was not without consequences for his state of health. – Given Mr Ziri’s condition upon his arrival at hospital, his reason for admission, the influence [sic] at that time, and the cause identified for the cardiac arrest, the treatment was in accordance with standard practice. Under these conditions, it is scientifically impossible to say that the immediate treatment of Mr Ziri, as soon as he arrived in the emergency department, would have changed the prognosis.” 28. As indicated in the judgment of the Rennes Court of Appeal of 12 December 2014 (see paragraphs 39-41 below) and the documents in the file, A.K. had been questioned the next day, and the day after that, by the police investigators, and also on 20 October 2009 by officers from the National Police Inspectorate (Inspection générale de la police nationale – “IGPN”). It is also apparent that officers B.G., V.P. and J.C. were questioned on several occasions, in particular by the IGPN, together with other police officers, four individuals who had been present at the arrest of Mr Ziri and A.K. and five individuals who had been at Argenteuil police station at the same time as the latter. In addition, the radio messages exchanged between officers B.G., V.P. and J.C. and Argenteuil police station at the time when they were transferring Mr Ziri and A.K had been included in the evidence, as had the images of their arrival recorded by the police station’s CCTV system. 29. On 17 May 2010 the National Commission on Security Ethics (Commission nationale de déontologie de la sécurité – “CNDS”) issued an opinion on the facts. 30. In that opinion the Commission began by indicating that it was not in a position to pursue its investigations concerning the allegations that Mr Ziri and A.K. had been struck, as it had not had access to the report of the second autopsy or to the file of the judge’s investigation. On the other matters, the report reads as follows: “As regards the extraction from the police vehicle: The images recorded by the CCTV camera located in the courtyard of the police station established that the vehicle carrying Mr [Ziri] and Mr A.K. stopped in the yard at 20.46 and 37 seconds, that the constable J.C. first violently pulled Mr [Ziri] by the neck, but clearly he was not moving; she was then joined by five colleagues and all together they got Mr Ziri onto the ground at 20.46 and 52 seconds, so the operation lasted 15 seconds. In view of the charges against Mr [Ziri] (rebellion), his manifest state of drunkenness (2.4 grams of alcohol per litre of blood), his age (69 years), the fact that he was handcuffed behind his back and was sitting in the back of a police vehicle stationed in the yard of a police station, the Commission took the view that he posed no danger, neither for himself nor for the ten officials present around the vehicle. The precipitation and violence with which Mr [Ziri] was removed from the vehicle was disproportionate and constitutes inhuman and degrading treatment. Regarding his restraint on the ground while lying down: The statements of the officers, as contained in the preliminary police investigation file or made during questioning by the commission, are inconsistent as to the state of consciousness of Mr [Ziri]. All the officers questioned by the commission indicated that he had been vociferous and insulting, but the senior police officer who met Mr [Ziri] to notify him of his rights indicated in a report drafted on 9 June at 8.50 p.m. as follows: ‘In response to our questions, he answered only by gurgles. ... let us ask the intervening officers to transfer him immediately to Argenteuil Hospital, for medical examination and issuance or not of a certificate of non-admission’. The same officer, when questioned the next day, on 10 June 10 at 2 p.m. said: ‘The individuals were talking and even insulting us in A.K.’s case’. It is possible that the arresting officers’ collective reading of the interview records before the Commission, in the presence of the Chief Superintendent, Head of District (according to whom ‘those documents being personal, they can use them as they see fit’), in the corridors of the Commission, is not unconnected with the question of the consistency of the accounts made before it. It can be seen from all the testimony gathered during the preliminary police investigation and by the Commission that Mr [Ziri] vomited as soon as he entered the police station. Constable D., when questioned on 10 June at 4.25 p.m., indicated: ‘We put him on the ground, in a safe lateral position. He could not stand up or even stay sitting. What’s more, he was vomiting. I in fact left immediately afterwards as I had vomit on my shoes ...’. The Commission has tried to establish the length of time during which Mr [Ziri] and Mr A.K. remained on the floor, face down, in their vomit, handcuffed behind their back: it was between thirty minutes and one hour and fifteen minutes. In fact, the officers questioned indicated that the order to take the persons concerned to hospital had been given at 9.15 p.m.. Immediately, the officers had put them into their vehicle, apparently waiting there until 10 p.m., arriving at hospital between 10.05 p.m. and 10.09 p.m.. In order to check the times, the Commission asked for a copy of the video-recording of their departure, but was unsuccessful as it had not been kept. According to the police record of 10 June 2009, at 1.50 a.m., of sergeant B.L., his team took charge of Mr [Ziri] and Mr A.K. at 10 p.m. and arrived at hospital at 10.05 p.m.. The Commission considers that it is highly unlikely that the officials considered it necessary to extract Mr [Ziri] from the vehicle that took him to the police station in 15 seconds and then to put him in another vehicle and make him wait there for 45 minutes. The Commission has serious doubts about the statements of the officers who put Mr [Ziri] in the van that would take them to hospital, according to which Mr. [Ziri] was sitting on the back seat, where he had remained without difficulty for the entire journey, while all the officers present at the police station say that he was not able to sit or stand, thus explaining why he was lying on the floor all the time. In these circumstances, the Commission takes the view that the fact of leaving Mr [Ziri] and Mr A.K., aged 69 and 60 respectively, lying on the floor of the police station, handcuffed behind their backs, in their vomit, within sight of all the police officers present, who could see that they were in distress, for approximately one hour, constituted inhuman and degrading treatment. Concerning the care provided in the hospital: The choice to place Mr [Ziri] on his back on a stretcher in the hospital, while he was vomiting, rather than in a safe lateral position, is indicative of a lack of knowledge of first aid rules. as confirmed by Mr A.U., who had not followed such training for twelve years. This unsuitable and dangerous position favoured the occurrence of aspiration and the inhalation of gastric fluid, which probably contributed to the death of Mr A.Z., or even caused it directly. ...” 31. In conclusion the Commission called, in particular, for “ disciplinary proceedings to be brought against the police officers who used force disproportionately and with precipitation to extract Mr [Ziri] from the police vehicle on his arrival at the police station, and against those who left two men, aged 60 and 69, handcuffed behind their backs, lying on the floor, with their faces in their vomit, for about one hour, without reacting”. 1. The judge’s decision of 15 October 2012 and the judgment of the Investigation Division of the Versailles Court of Appeal of 18 February 2014 32. A notice that the judicial investigation had concluded was issued to the parties on 22 June 2011. 33. On 29 June 2011 the civil parties asked the investigating judge personally to hear testimony from all the witnesses in the case and also, having placed them under judicial investigation, officers J.C., B.G. and V.P (or in the case of the first two, at least as assisted witnesses); they also asked the judge to order, in the presence of all the ordinary witnesses, of any assisted witnesses, of any individuals under judicial investigation, of the public prosecutor, of the lawyers of the civil parties and of Dr L. and T., a viewing of the video of the arrival at the police station and a reconstruction of the events. 34. Those requests were rejected by the judge’s decision of 22 July 2011, on the grounds that testimony had already been taken in a precise and detailed manner and that the civil parties had not indicated any points which had not been raised, that it was for the investigating judge to decide on the choice of status – whether a person should be placed under judicial investigation or be an assisted witness – without this having any bearing on the establishment of the truth, that the viewing of the video in the presence of witnesses was capable of undermining the sincerity of their testimony, and that, in the absence of any person under judicial investigation or assisted witness, a reconstruction could not take place solely in the presence of witnesses or experts. 35. A fresh notice of the conclusion of the judicial investigation was issued on 2 September 2011 and on 15 October 2012 the investigating judge decided to discontinue the proceedings, on the grounds that “the investigation [had] not established any acts of wilful violence which might have been the direct or indirect cause of Mr Ali Ziri’s death, or any direct or indirect fault attributable to anyone who intentionally caused the death”. 36. That discontinuance decision was upheld by the Investigation Division of the Versailles Court of Appeal, on an appeal lodged by the civil parties, in a judgment of 28 February 2013. 37. Relying in particular on Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention, the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law against the judgment of 28 February 2013. 38. On 18 February 2014 the Criminal Division of the Court of Cassation set aside the judgment on the grounds that the Investigation Division had failed to “ascertain that the restraint techniques used [against Mr Ziri] had not been excessive in the light of the person’s conduct or whether the assistance provided had been appropriate”. It referred the case and the parties back to the Investigation Division of the Rennes Court of Appeal. 39. In a judgment of 12 December 2014 the Investigation Division of the Rennes Court of Appeal held that there was no need to supplement or continue the investigation and upheld the discontinuance decision of 15 October 2012. 40. It noted that the forensic assessments had set out different hypotheses and had reached diverging conclusions, making it impossible to identify any single definite cause of Mr Ziri’s death. It found, however, that as the death had occurred following his arrest by the police, it had to ascertain “whether the police intervention had played, by acts of wilful violence or at least by wrongful conduct, any causal role in the death”. It observed that “whilst, according to the experts, the marks and bruising that might correspond, in some cases, to wounds caused by restraint could not have caused the death of Ali Ziri, there was no evidence to show, or even to suggest, that Ali Ziri had been struck intentionally at any time by the police officers”. It further noted that the statements of A.K. to the effect that Mr Ziri had sustained such acts of violence were not only contradictory but also contradicted by those of individuals who had been present at the time of the arrest and by those of a man who had met him in Argenteuil police station. It lastly observed that there was nothing to show that any acts of violence had been committed by the police officers in the van, on the journey between the police station and the hospital. It concluded from this that the only times when Mr Ziri might have been subjected to acts of violence had been during the journey in the police car between the place of arrest and the police station, or on his arrival at the police station. 41. The court noted in this connection that, in his forensic assessment of 15 April 2011, Dr P. indicated that the restraint techniques applied on Mr Ziri – the use of the so-called “double-seated embrace” position – was capable of “leading to respiratory blockage and therefore a difficulty, or even an impossibility, of oxygenation during a certain period, which would not have had any repercussions for a young person but was likely to entail cardiac consequences ... in an elderly person, with a lesser degree of thoracic compliance”. Taking the view that it had therefore to “ascertain whether the treatment of [Mr Ziri] in the police vehicle constituted a fault which had triggered his death”, it found as follows: “It can be seen from the statements [of B.G., V.P. and J.C.], from the audio recording of the messages exchanged during the journey and from the testimony of the police officers who intervened on arrival at the police station, particularly Lieutenant [S.M.], that the journey, lasting five minutes, had been very agitated and that both [A.K.] and Ziri had been behaving dangerously. It was after [A.K.] had spat at the driver that [B.G.], fearing for the safety of all the occupants, forced down his head and chest. In doing so he left space between himself and Ali Ziri, who took advantage of this to try to head-butt him, thus triggering, for the same safety reasons, the intervention of [J.C.] who, turning round on his seat, grasped him under the armpits and held his head down against his knees. Contrary to the assumption made by the National Commission on Security Ethics, in its report, Ali Ziri’s agitation thus described, while he was probably unsuccessful in attempting to head-butt, on account of his corpulence and the fact that he was handcuffed, was likely, in view of his state of drunkenness and restlessness. His state of extreme agitation inside the vehicle is confirmed by the fact that the driver, unusually, placed a call by radio to request the opening of the gate to the police station courtyard, which was normally opened by a member of the patrol who would get out of the vehicle to type in the access code, and it is also confirmed by Lieutenant [S.M.] who was in the porch waiting for the patrol to arrive. The statement of [V.P.], the driver, and the audio recording of the messages enable an estimate of three to four minutes to be made for the time during which [A.K.], then Ziri, were restrained in that manner, as [V.P.] indicated that he had sent the message, at 20.43 before arriving at the police station at 20.46, just after the immobilisation. It can be seen from those particulars that in the light of the state of agitation and rebellion of the individuals arrested, whose conduct, in the confined space of a vehicle, close to the driver, was highly dangerous for the safety of all passengers and other road users, the immobilisation techniques applied for a few minutes by the police officers, whose professional attitude is not in doubt and is attested by the witnesses to the arrest, did not constitute excessive restraint. The police thus made use only of the degree of force strictly necessary to control the individuals and no fault, voluntary or involuntary, can be imputed to them, and in particular not to [JC], the officer who actually immobilised Ali Ziri. The video recording of the arrival at the police station shows, once again, that it was only because of his resistance that he was forced out of the vehicle and then carried onto the premises to be laid on the floor. While the various statements show that he had trouble standing and confirm his state of inebriation, none of them ... mention a state of unconsciousness, this only being noted at the hospital shortly before the intervention of Dr [M.]. In addition, forensic experts dismissed the idea of any repercussion as a result of Ali Ziri’s hitting his head on the ground when removed from the vehicle. Nor is it apparent from the report of the National Commission on Security Ethics, which has been added to the file, that there were any acts of violence that could have led to the death of Ali Ziri. The Commission states that it has not been able to continue its investigations into the direct acts of violence alleged by [A.K.], those allegations having been refuted by the judicial investigation, as indicated above. It is, moreover, at odds with the facts for the Commission to state that Ali Ziri was placed on his back on a stretcher in the hospital, from which it inferred that this unsuitable and dangerous position had favoured the occurrence of aspiration and the inhalation of gastric fluid, which had contributed to the death; whereas, in reality, he had placed himself or had been placed by the police officer, with the approval of the nurse ... in a safe lateral position, and choking by aspiration is not the cause of death. While the Commission expresses the opinion that inhuman and degrading treatment was constituted as a result of the precipitation and violence with which Ali Ziri was extracted from the vehicle, and also by the fact of leaving the two men, aged 60 and 69, lying on the floor of the police station, handcuffed behind their backs, in their vomit, within view of all the officials for about an hour, it does not follow from this opinion, given the circumstances of the arrival at the police station analysed above, that any of the acts in question could have led to the death of Ali Ziri. In addition, according to [the] hospital reception and orientation nurse, Ali Ziri’s condition was not a concern and did not require special attention. He was conscious and responded to basic instructions and his case was not a priority. The expert [P.] indicated that a sound initial assessment of his condition had been made and that the aggravation of this condition within less than one hour was exceptional. While the expert expressed surprise that the police, although they were not in charge of his medical supervision, nevertheless failed to sound the alarm when Ali Ziri’s condition worsened, Dr [M.] indicated that in the absence of medical knowledge the police officers might have thought that he was sleeping. Consequently, as his condition had not caused any concern to the medical professionals upon his arrival at the hospital and had been assessed as normal given his state of inebriation, and as the police might not have realised that his condition had worsened – exceptionally rapidly according to the expert – no negligent failure to provide assistance that could have led to or contributed to the death of Ali Ziri can be imputed to the police. Therefore, in this presence of the evidence from the judicial investigation, the demands of both the civil parties and the public prosecutor’s office that the investigation be continued or that additional enquiries be ordered do not appear useful for the purpose of establishing the truth. The judicial investigation has not revealed sufficient evidence to show that the charges investigated by the investigating judge, or any other charges, are made out, and no additional enquiries would appear useful. In these circumstances, the decision must be upheld.” 42. Relying in particular on Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention, the applicant appealed on points of law against the judgment of 12 December 2014. 43. On 16 February 2016 the Criminal Division of the Court of Cassation dismissed the appeal by a judgment giving the following reasoning: “... in upholding the discontinuance decision, the judgment notes that it could be seen from the statements of the police officers who were part of the patrol team, from the recording of the messages exchanged during the journey between the place of the arrest and the police station, and the testimony of the police officers who intervened on arrival at the police station, that this journey had been particularly agitated and that the acts of restraint used against [M. Ziri] had been made necessary by the state of agitation and rebellion of those arrested, whose conduct, in the confined environment of a vehicle, close to the driver, was highly dangerous for the safety of all the passengers and of other road users; the court added that the immobilisation techniques applied for a few minutes by the police, whose professional conduct could not be called into question and was attested by the witness to the arrest, did not constitute an excessive degree of restraint. In the light of the above and the conclusion that the police made use only of the degree of force strictly necessary, and since an assessment of the evidence shows that the investigation has been comprehensive, the Investigation Division justified its decision ...”

8. The applicants were born in 1963, 1976 and 1961 respectively and at the time the applications were lodged were detained in the Corradino Correctional Facility, Paola. 9. The first applicant is serving a sentence of thirteen years’ imprisonment in the Corradino Correctional Facility. The sentence was imposed on him by the Criminal Court on 24 May 2010 for drug‑related offences. The Criminal Court also ordered the applicant to pay a fine of 30,000 euros (EUR) as well as EUR 1,898.21 in fees payable to the court experts, which were to be converted into a further eighteen months’ imprisonment if not paid. Pending proceedings before this Court, the first applicant − having served his sentence − was released from detention in September 2016. 10. The applicant alleged that he had been detained in Division 6, a high‑security division, from 12 September 2006 until 23 August 2008. He claimed that during this period he had been unable to use any electronic equipment, to work, study or go to church, and that he had been subjected to psychological torture and inhuman and degrading treatment. He argued that he was neither aggressive nor an addict and there was no reason why he should have been placed in Division 6, which was intended to house very dangerous, problematic, aggressive and addicted prisoners. The Government submitted that the first applicant had been placed in Division 6 following an order from the head of security at the prison, and that, according to documents submitted to the Court, on 1 August 2007 the applicant had been given the option to move to a less secure Division, but had refused. In Division 6 he had had access to the main library of the prison. English lessons and mass were also provided in the Division. He could make phone calls and had had access to the communal TV and DVD player, and TV sets were also allowed in the cells. During that time he had also carried out paid work assembling plastic toys. 11. Since 23 August 2008 the first applicant has been detained in Division 3, specifically in cell 139 since 19 August 2013. 12. He complained that the cell windows were very small and that there was inadequate ventilation and no natural light. The water supply was inadequate and he had to use a bucket to flush the toilet. 13. He claimed to be suffering from symptoms that were the after‑effects of physical and psychological stress. In this regard, the first applicant stated that he had been examined by the prison psychologist, who had prescribed medicine to help him sleep in addition to painkillers. According to the applicant the psychologist had also suggested that he be referred to the psychiatric hospital, but no such transfer had taken place. 14. The Government submitted that the cells in which the first applicant had been housed in both Division 6 and 3 had measured 365cm x 265cm. They noted that the first applicant had been asked (on an unspecified date) whether he wanted to be transferred from Division 3 but he had replied in the negative. He had also been asked, following communication of the complaint to the respondent Government, whether he had a problem with the window in his cell and the reply had been in the negative. They submitted that the applicant had chosen to paint over the glass shade covering the ceiling light in his cell, and when asked about this, he had stated that he had no need for a ceiling light and for that reason had painted over it. According to the Government, the first applicant had a secondary light that he used and he had stated that it provided plenty of light for him. Moreover, the cell had two vents on opposite sides and the cell door had an aperture which was always left open for ventilation purposes. Relying on an indistinct photo submitted to the Court, the Government submitted that the applicant had covered the ventilation grilles on the wall with masking tape, thereby restricting the ventilation. 15. The Government submitted that the cell was equipped with a wash‑basin with running water and an additional wall-mounted tap. According to the Government, when the applicant was asked whether he had an issue with the provision of water, he stated that he no longer had any issues. As far as the use of the toilet was concerned, the Government admitted that Division 3 did not have a combined flushing and WC system and that the inmates had to flush the toilets manually using buckets that were provided in all cells and could be filled from the wall-mounted taps. 16. The Government submitted that the prison psychologist was not in a position to prescribe medicine or to refer inmates to the psychiatric hospital. They stated that when the first applicant was interviewed by the prison psychologist on 18 October 2006, he had stated that he was sleeping three to four hours per night but that he did not want to take medication. According to the medical records kept by the prison medical unit, none of the doctors who had examined the applicant had found it necessary to refer him to a psychiatrist. The in-house doctor at the prison confirmed that the first applicant was never referred for psychiatric treatment as he was not mentally unstable and had not expressed a desire to be referred. The doctor also confirmed that he could not see that there had ever been such a referral by any doctor in the past. The applicant had met the doctor on four occasions and the latter had treated him for his medical needs but no psychiatric concerns had been observed or reported or expressed. On 1 May 2016 the applicant had refused all treatment, which is the right of any patient and must be respected. The Government submitted that the doctor had also confirmed that the medical notes showed that, whilst in Division 6, the first applicant had also been examined by medical doctors and treatment had been provided as needed. 17. The second applicant is currently serving a term of imprisonment of eleven years for drug-related offences in the Corradino Correctional Facility. The Criminal Court, which sentenced him on 26 September 2012, had also imposed a fine of EUR 30,000, which the applicant was to pay within two months and which would be converted to a further term of one year’s imprisonment if not paid. The Criminal Court also ordered the second applicant to pay EUR 1,032.71 in respect of costs arising from the appointment of experts. Likewise, if not paid within fifteen days, this sum would be converted into a term of imprisonment. The judgment was confirmed on appeal on 12 December 2013. The applicant has been held in cell 102 in Division 3 since 9 February 2012. 18. The applicant claimed that he was forced to buy bottled drinking water, as the available water was undrinkable. Since there is no laundry service in prison, he was dependent on donated clothes − which did not always fit him – in order to have access to clean clothing. 19. The applicant alleged that his cell was old and that he was living in squalor. The cell walls contained asbestos and the old paint was peeling off the walls and the ceiling. Moreover, according to the applicant, the building was infested by rats and cockroaches. 20. During summer, the cell was too hot and since the cell window was too small, the ventilation was inadequate. On the other hand, during winter the cell was freezing cold. No heating was provided in the cells and the blankets were not adequate. The applicant stated that he had to wear his jacket in order to be able to sleep in winter. 21. The applicant, a non-smoker, complained that he was not separated from inmates who smoke. He was thus a victim of passive smoking every hour of the day. 22. According to the applicant he was frequently not given any breakfast and more than 95% of the food served in prison consisted of bread and pasta. He also stated that, although tobacco was easily accessible, fresh fruit was mostly restricted. Occasionally, apples that were past their sell-by date and could not be sold in local supermarkets were brought to the inmates. 23. The Government submitted that, when specifically asked by the prison authorities whether he had ever lodged a request to be transferred to a newer part of the prison, the second applicant replied that he had never made such a request and that he did not want to be transferred. 24. They further submitted that the tap water in the cell was fit for human consumption. The water in all parts of the prison facility had been certified by the Public Health Laboratory as being potable (certification submitted to the Court is dated 2015). The water is tested and certified approximately every six months. Division 3 had access to water directly from the mains, that is to say, drinking water. In addition to the availability of the running tap water supply, the inmates had the right to obtain bottled water from the residents’ tuck-shop. 25. In 2015 the second applicant received EUR 40.79 every four weeks in so-called “Work & Pay” remuneration and gratuity money, as well as EUR 169.49 every four weeks for work he carried out assembling plastic dolls. They stated that at the tuck-shop a six-pack of water cost EUR 2.24 and an individual bottle EUR 0.38. 26. The Government submitted that inmates were provided with washing powder − at no cost – so that they could wash their clothes. All cells were equipped with a wall-mounted tap and a sink with running water in which to wash their clothes. It was the duty of the inmates to wash their clothing and to be clean at all times. 27. The Government submitted that the walls did not contain asbestos but were built from Maltese limestone. They stated that the applicant had never painted his cell, nor had he ever requested any materials to do so, even though such material was free of charge. The Government claimed that the applicant had stated that he would never paint his cell himself because he felt that this was the responsibility of the prison officials. 28. The Government denied that the building was infested by rats and cockroaches, pointing out that pest control treatment had been carried out sixteen times at the prison since 2013 (certificates confirming the application of pest control in specific areas of the prison, including Division 3, were submitted to the Court). 29. The Government also submitted that, apart from the window, there were also three vents in the cell, along with an aperture in the cell door which was always left open. However, the applicant had fixed a sheet over the window and had covered one of the ventilation grilles on the wall with a piece of paper, thereby restricting the amount of ventilation. 30. The Government submitted that the second applicant had asked for an extra blanket in January 2012 (while in Division 12) but had then rejected the extra blanket he was given, saying that it was too old. Since the applicant had been in Division 3, he had not asked for any additional blankets. 31. As to the second applicant’s claim concerning passive smoking, the Government submitted that the second applicant resided in a single cell and had access to fresh air in the adjoining yard for most of the day. The learning zones were all smoke-free. 32. The Government contested the applicant’s allegation concerning breakfast and the quality of food, stating that breakfast was served as follows: on weekdays all inmates were served with a ham or cheese sandwich and at weekends and on public holidays sandwiches were served with boiled eggs. The inmates had access to unlimited tea and coffee. The Government submitted to the Court the 15 daily menus constituting the lunch and dinner choices over a six month period – the menus showed a variety of meat and fish dishes, as well as pasta dishes and pies. Apart from the menu of the day, inmates could opt for tuna salad, eggs and chips with corned beef, eggs and chips with ham or cheese, omelette with ham or cheese and soup, or both. According to the Government, in cases where an inmate had been ordered to go on a diet by the doctor, pasta with ricotta or steamed fish would be provided at lunchtime and steamed chicken for dinner. Should a special diet be prescribed by the medical doctor, the food thereby indicated would be provided by the prison authorities. According to the Government, fresh fruit was delivered to the prison every Monday and Thursday − approximately eleven boxes of bananas and fourteen boxes of oranges were delivered to the prison and distributed to the inmates weekly. 33. On 28 April 2015 the second applicant instituted proceedings complaining about his conditions of detention. In particular he noted that, cumulatively, he had been held in the correctional facility since 13 July 2009 and, since that date, had been forced to live in a cell subject to the following hardships: without adequate drinking water; without clothing to keep him warm throughout winter; being dependent on charitable institutions to obtain clothing; the cell contained a significant quantity of asbestos that was causing him physical harm; the cell was infested with rats and cockroaches; the Corradino Correctional Facility lacked adequate sanitary facilities; the cell only had one small window which could not be opened as it was too high up; during winter he was only given one thin blanket although the facility was cold and it was therefore difficult to sleep; all detainees were allowed to smoke wherever and whenever they wanted and, as a consequence, inmates who, like the applicant, are non-smokers, were being subjected to passive smoking; these conditions amounted to a breach of Article 3 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and Article 36 of the Constitution of Malta. 34. On 10 November 2015 the second applicant gave oral testimony and submitted that in prison he generally felt hot and had been advised by a prison guard to buy a fan; after asking for water he had been advised to either buy it or drink the water supplied by the correctional facility. Nothing further was submitted in his oral testimony. 35. The respondent denied the above allegations. According to the medical doctor there were no mental or physical issues, nor had the applicant ever sought medical assistance. As regards the structural complaints submitted by the second applicant, the maintenance official submitted the following evidence in summarised form: 36. The Division in which the complainant was held consists of sixty cells, one of which is not currently in use; complainant is housed in a cell on his own; his particular cell is a normal one with a standard window and adequate light – being built the way it is for security reasons – and the lighting in the cell is appropriate; when the cells are open, inmates may freely walk in and out of them whenever they want, except when “under report” (that is to say confined to quarters); the complainant had access to open spaces from 2.00 p.m. to 5.00 p.m. just like all other inmates and when so authorised; the Correctional Facility conducts a yearly analysis of the water supply to check that it is fit for human consumption, and the most recent report (that of 2015), conducted by a private laboratory, concluded that the water supply is good for drinking and meets the standard for human consumption; the Facility provides potable water from the mains for the inmates and that water is supplied free of charge; inmates are allowed to buy bottled water; when inmates enter the Facility they are given blankets, sheets, pillows and a mattress; upon request, they are also given extra blankets, however, the complainant had never registered any such request; as regards any infestation of rats and cockroaches, the maintenance official presented a report submitted by a private company on these issues (such inspection is carried out yearly) stating that three rodent control visits were carried out in 2014 and the last visit showed that “everything was under control”. As regards smoking: inmates are allowed to smoke in cells; if some inmates within a particular cell are non‑smokers, then the other inmates are not allowed to smoke in that particular cell; the complainant does not smoke, although the prison doctor affirms that he stated upon admission into the Correctional Facility that he was a smoker. 37. By a judgment of 28 June 2016 the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional competence dismissed the second applicant’s complaint. It considered that he had failed to submit the evidence that was deemed legally necessary to prove his case − the complainant had merely alleged the existence of the various shortcomings referred to above, but had failed to submit the relevant evidence to substantiate his allegations. By contrast, the evidence submitted in the proceedings by the doctor and the maintenance official satisfactorily showed that the allegations were unfounded. 38. On the specific issues raised, the court found as follows: Water supply: the Water Services Corporation submitted adequate proof that the water supply used in the Correctional Facility was potable, fit for human consumption and conformed to the Legal Notice on Water intended for Human Consumption Regulation, 2009, after being microbiologically analysed to this end. However, reference is made to the Chemistry (PHL) ‑ Water Analysis Test Report, which stated that the “chloride content exceeds the indicator parameter value in LN 17 of 2009”. Even given the above breach of the statutory limit, the complainant’s allegation is not substantiated as he could make use of viable alternatives to overcome the issue, either consuming warm potable water or buying bottled water from the gratuity money given to him by the facility’s authorities; 39. Blankets and clothing: it sufficiently results that, upon entering the Correctional Facility, inmates are issued with a residential kit consisting of blankets, sheets, pillows and a mattress; if required, inmates may ask their Division officer for more blankets. As regards clothing, the Facility is supported by charities which are allowed to distribute suitable clothing as required. It is apparent that the complainant never submitted a complaint on these issues. 40. Asbestos: The complaint submitted by the complainant alleging that there is asbestos in his cell is not borne out by fact; There is therefore no such danger to the complainant’s health and in fact, no such complaint has been submitted by the complainant at any time during his stay in the facility since 2009. 41. Rodents and cockroaches: pest control by a private company that specialises in this particular activity is constantly and periodically (yearly) undertaken by the Facility’s authorities. According to the treatment report released by the private company involved (dated 4 July 2014) the situation was certified as being under control. 42. Smoking: the complainant is housed in a cell on his own. However, inmates are allowed to smoke in particular areas and at particular times. In the particular division where the complainant is housed, there is no area where smoking is prohibited, and the complainant is therefore being subjected to passive smoking. Ideally, non-smokers should be segregated from smokers in order to avoid unnecessary hardship but, despite this resulting in an unsavoury situation, it is understood that because of the particular circumstances such obvious segregation might not be practically possible. As a result it cannot be held that this situation reaches the level of severity and intensity required by Article 3 of the Convention or Article 36 of the local Constitution. Furthermore, upon examining the medical records presented in the case file of the proceedings, no medical or physical deterioration was recorded in the health of the complainant as a result of the passive smoking analysed herein 43. Cell window and consequent availability of adequate light: the cell at issue is a normal Division cell furnished with a standard window and occupied only by the complainant. The window provides enough light in the cell to serve its purpose. The complainant is allowed to leave his cell at the appointed times, and on the basis of the medical reports that were accumulated throughout the years of confinement, no medical conditions have been reported as arising as a result thereof. 44. No appeal appears to have been lodged against this judgment. 45. The third applicant is currently detained in the Corradino Correctional Facility. By a judgment of the Criminal Court of 22 June 2010 he was found guilty and sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment and a fine of EUR 30,000, which was to be converted into a term of eighteen months’ imprisonment if not paid, along with EUR 1,289.50 in respect of expert fees. The applicant has been detained in Division 3 since 2010; for the first two and a half years he was held in cell 120, which was a little worse than cell 147 in which he has been housed ever since. 46. He stated that his cell window was positioned at a height of more than two metres; he therefore had to climb onto something to open it. It had three metal bars which hampered the entry of natural light. 47. According to the third applicant, the temperature in his cell may be as low as 10 oC during winter, and yet he is not allowed to have a heater in his cell. In winter, the applicant allegedly suffers from arthritis, which causes him unbearable pain. However, he is not able to use Voltaren (which is the only medicine provided by the prison authorities) because he suffers from Hepatitis C. 48. The applicant alleged that during the summer the cells were infested with cockroaches. Furthermore, his cell became very hot and there was inadequate ventilation. However, prison regulations restricted the number of fans per cell to one. Although the applicant had two fans in his cell, he stated that in summer they merely circulated the hot air and the steel door of the cell prevented any fresh air circulation. By contrast, he noted that the offices of the prison personnel (who were exposed to the same temperatures) were equipped with air conditioning and heating facilities. 49. The applicant claimed that in winter the hot water supply was not sufficient to cater for the approximately sixty inmates in his Division. Furthermore, the water was not drinkable and he therefore had to purchase bottled water, which was only possible when he had money. He claimed that when he did not have any money, he was obliged to drink the undrinkable water, which caused him skin blemishes. He stated that drinking water was only distributed to the prison personnel, but did not reach the detainees. 50. The applicant also claimed that inmates did not have access to a laundry and foreign inmates were not given detergents with which to wash their clothes and clean their cells and toilets. 51. According to the applicant, the building was a hundred years old and its condition was inadequate. Dust fell from the applicant’s cell’s ceiling and walls, which he then breathed in. 52. The applicant also stated that since the prison did not provide him with tablets for his migraine, he had been obliged to buy such tablets for six years. 53. According to the Government, the applicant has resided in cell 147 in Division 3 since 8 January 2015, and when asked by the prison authorities if he would like to be transferred to another part of the prison, he declined. 54. In reply to the second and third applicants’ claims, the Government submitted that the window in the cell could be opened using a tool provided by the authorities or by standing on the bed or on a chair or stool. Moreover, the metal bars at the window were a security feature and did not prevent natural light from entering the cell. 55. As to the claim concerning heaters, the Government referred to their submissions below (see paragraph 100). They further noted that – due to the climate in the Maltese islands – such requests were not frequent; however, they submitted that due consideration would be given to the matter if a medical reason was found to be at the root of such request. 56. The Government submitted that the applicant had been diagnosed with right dupuytrens contracture, which is a hand deformity affecting the fingers, so that they cannot be straightened completely. The applicant underwent surgery on the 27 August 2014 which did not result in any complications. The applicant was discharged and prescribed paracetamol and diclofenac. Although the applicant alleged that he suffered from arthritis, he did not visit the medical unit complaining of pain in the joints. 57. The Government also referred to the submissions made in paragraphs 26 and 29 above). They noted that the window in cell 147 could be opened and closed by the occupant. There were also two vents as well as the aperture in the cell door which was always left open. According to the Government the third applicant had covered one of the wall vents with a sheet of paper, thereby restricting the amount of ventilation, and the aperture in the cell door had been covered with a piece of cardboard from inside the cell. Furthermore, the Government submitted that it was permissible for inmates to have more than one fan in their cell. In fact, most of the inmates had two fans, as did the third applicant. 58. As to the quality and provision of water, the Government referred to their submissions in paragraph 86 below. They noted that in 2015, the [third] applicant received EUR 36.45 every four weeks in “Work & Pay” remuneration and gratuity money, as well as EUR 207.50 every four weeks for work he carried out assembling plastic dolls, thereby enabling him to buy bottled water at tuck-shop prices. 59. According to the Government there are no medical records referring to skin blemishes at the Medical Unit. They acknowledged that Division 3 was located within the older part of the facility however they stated that all cells were equipped with the necessary facilities and paint was provided on request so that the inmates could keep their cells in good condition. Relying on photos submitted, the Government considered that the ceiling and walls appeared to be in good condition and there was no flaking. 60. Lastly, the Government acknowledged that the applicant had had to buy migraine tablets, namely Zolmiles 2.5mg. Purchasing these tablets was standard policy for all inmates who suffer from migraine since inmates are eligible for medicine which is supplied by the Government to all citizens for free, but Zolmiles is not on the free medication list. Nevertheless, as can be seen from documentation submitted to the Court, the Secretary of the Malta Community Chest Fund (MCCF) informed the applicant that the MCCF Board had decided to grant him the full cost of treatment upon presentation of the original receipts. They noted that the third applicant had been referred to the State hospital in December 2011 for a common migraine and medication was prescribed as stated above. On 27 August 2014 he was admitted to the Day care unit at the State hospital, where he underwent surgery, and he was discharged the same day, with a follow-up appointment being scheduled for 11 September 2014.

4. The applicant was born in 1987 and is detained in Tiszalök. 5. On 19 July 2012 at approximately 9 a.m. the applicant, who had been placed in pre-trial detention in Budapest Prison, was transported to the premises of the Budapest Main Police Department for questioning. He was accompanied by two guards and was handed over for questioning at around 9.20 a.m., when he showed no sign of injuries. 6. The questioning started at approximately 9.55 a.m. and lasted until approximately 11.30 a.m. It was conducted by police officers A and B The applicant chose not to give a statement. 7. On being released after the interrogation, the applicant was handed over to the guards of Budapest Prison who, in the presence of the police officer, asked him whether he had been ill-treated. The applicant declared that he had not been. 8. After being transported back to Budapest Prison, the applicant underwent a medical examination before his readmission during which he claimed that he had been ill-treated by police officer A. Certain injuries were noted on the applicant. A report was drawn up on the incident and photos were taken of the injuries. 9. Right after the medical examination the applicant was again transported to the Budapest Main Police Department for questioning, from where he was taken to the military hospital by the police officer conducting his interrogation and allegedly assaulting him. At the hospital he was examined in the presence of the police officer. The medical report noted bleeding on the lower lip, jaw sensitive to pressure, and bruises on the ribs, all likely to heal within eight days. 10. According to the applicant’s submission, following his return to Budapest Prison, he was again subjected to a medical examination. 11. The police report filed by A on 19 July 2012 stated that the applicant had not been ill-treated during questioning. None of the police officers had seen the applicant harming himself but A. had observed him biting his nails and lips. Also, according to the report, the applicant had been left alone for a few minutes at the police station without constant surveillance. 12. On 20 July 2012 the applicant complained of a headache and dizziness and was again examined by medical staff at Budapest Prison. He asserted that he had been ill-treated during his interrogation. The medical report recorded the following injuries: swelling on the right cheek, head sensitive to pressure, bruising on the lower lip, and abrasions on the lower right ribs and on the left shoulder blade. 13. Budapest Prison initiated criminal proceedings on charges of forced interrogation. Furthermore, the applicant’s statements given during the medical examination (see paragraph 8 above) were qualified as a criminal complaint by the investigation authorities. 14. In the ensuing criminal investigation conducted by the Central Investigation Office the applicant gave a testimony on 14 November 2012, stating that during his questioning he had refused to make a statement and as a consequence had been punched by one of the police officers several times on his head, neck and back. He had fallen against a chair and when he had tried to get up, he had been slapped four or five times in the face. He had been shown the results of a DNA test, and when he refused to comment on it, had again been beaten by the police officer. The same police officer had also punched him in the mouth when he had failed to recognise a person shown to him in a photograph. He had been pushed against the door and when he again fell over, the police officer had kicked him on his left side. 15. On 24 July 2013 one of the prisoner escort officers, C was questioned, and recalled that the applicant had complained of ill-treatment upon his return to the prison facility, which had surprised him since he had previously asked the applicant whether he had any complaints and had seen no injuries on the applicant’s body. He also stated that he had noted the injuries on the applicant’s face following the medical examination at Budapest Prison. He had asked the applicant why he had not complained of his ill-treatment earlier, to which the applicant had replied that he had been afraid of the police officers. According to C, as a general practice, detainees had been transferred in a special prisoner transport vehicle where they had not been constantly monitored and would have had the opportunity to inflict injuries on themselves. 16. On 25 July 2013 D, the other prisoner escort officer who accompanied the applicant to his interrogation, was also heard as a witness. He did not remember either the applicant or the circumstances of his transfer. He had a vague recollection that since there had been some complaints from the applicant’s side once they had arrived back at the prison facility, they had had to transfer him back to the police department. He maintained that if they had seen any injury on the applicant’s face following interrogation, they would surely have inquired of him whether he had been ill-treated by the police officers. Therefore, in his estimation the applicant could not have shown any visible signs of injury when he was handed back from the interrogation. 17. On 6 October 2013 E, the prison security officer who had taken photos of the applicant’s injuries during his readmission was questioned as a witness. He could not give any details of the incident. He could not remember whether he had escorted the applicant to the medical examination, but suggested that the applicant’s injuries must have occurred before he had been examined by the medical staff, which was why he had been called on to take photos. 18. On 18 November 2013 F, the nurse on duty at Budapest Prison was questioned, but she did not remember the incident. She could only confirm that if she had seen the applicant’s injuries prior to his transfer, she would surely have inquired about their origin. Examining the photos of the applicant, she asserted that the bruises on the applicant’s face would have occurred immediately after an impact and that the applicant could have caused them himself. 19. On 5 December 2013 G, the guard on duty at Budapest Prison, was questioned as a witness; he could not remember either the applicant or anything else concerning his complaint. He nonetheless maintained that if he had seen injuries on the applicant as presented to him on a photo, he would surely have inquired about their origin. 20. On 2 January 2014 the Central Investigation Office also heard evidence from H and I, two prison escort officers from Budapest Prison who had been on duty on the day of the incident, and who were responsible for transferring detainees to the healthcare facilities. They did not remember the applicant and could not recall the circumstances of his medical examination or admission to the prison, since, as one of them explained, they were responsible for escorting thirty to forty prisoners a day. H stated that as a general practice detainees were under constant supervision while waiting for medical examinations, whereas I asserted that there were instances where detainees were left alone when placed in so‑called “healthcare waiting rooms”. Neither of the witnesses knew with certainty whether this had been the case for the applicant. 21. On the same day, three members of the medical staff of Budapest Prison were also heard as witnesses. Two of them could not recall anything about the incident and did not remember the applicant, mostly because they were responsible for a large number of cases. Another member of the healthcare staff stated that she had a recollection of an incident, but was not sure whether it involved the applicant or another person. As a general rule, the witnesses explained that they would not admit a detainee into the prison if he showed signs of injuries. Examining the photos of the applicant, two of the medical staff stated that because of the bad quality of the photos, they weren’t even sure if they showed actual injuries or simply the shape of the applicant’s face, while the third asserted that the injury must have been fresh when the photo was taken. 22. The prison doctor was also questioned the same day. She could not identify the applicant, did not remember whether she had met him, had no recollection of the incident and could only recount what she had previously stated in the medical report. However, she stated that if the applicant had been left alone, he could have inflicted the injuries on himself. 23. The Central Investigation Office commissioned a forensic expert opinion. According to the expert assessment, the applicant’s account of the origins of his injuries was implausible, since if he had been ill-treated in the way described by him, his injuries would have been of a more serious nature. Furthermore, the location of the injuries had not corresponded to the applicant’s description of the incident either. The report stated that it was impossible to establish when the applicant’s injuries had occurred. Referring to the witness testimonies and the location of the injuries, it suggested that the applicant could have inflicted them on himself. 24. The investigation was discontinued on 8 May 2014 on the grounds that the applicant’s allegations could not be substantiated beyond doubt in the absence of any witness testimony and taking into account the conclusions of the forensic expert opinion. According to the reasoning, the available evidence neither refuted nor proved the applicant’s allegations. The applicant complained, seeking the continuation of the investigations. The first-instance decision was upheld by the Chief Prosecutor’s Office on 15 July 2014. The decision called the applicant’s attention to the possibility of lodging of initiating substitute private prosecution proceedings.

6. The applicant, a former member of the Turkish Constitutional Court, is a Turkish national who was born in 1968 and lives in Ankara. He is currently detained. 7. In 1993 the applicant began his career as a public prosecutor. In 2001 he was appointed as a rapporteur at the Constitutional Court. On 27 March 2010 he was appointed by the President of Turkey as a judge of the Constitutional Court for a term of office due to expire when he reached the age of 65. On 26 October 2011 he was elected Vice-President of the Constitutional Court (Anayasa Mahkemesi Başkanvekili) by the court’s judges for a four-year term, which ended on 26 October 2015. At the time of the events to which the application relates, he was a judge at the court. 8. During the night of 15 to 16 July 2016 a group of members of the Turkish armed forces calling themselves the “Peace at Home Council” attempted to carry out a military coup aimed at overthrowing the democratically installed parliament, government and President of Turkey. 9. During the attempted coup, soldiers under the instigators’ control bombarded several strategic State buildings, including the parliament building and the presidential compound, attacked the hotel where the President was staying, held the Chief of General Staff hostage, also attacked television channels and fired shots at demonstrators. During the night of violence, more than 250 people were killed and more than 2,500 were injured. 10. The day after the attempted military coup, the national authorities blamed the network linked to Fetullah Gülen, a Turkish citizen living in Pennsylvania (United States of America) and considered to be the leader of an organisation known as FETÖ/PDY (“Gülenist Terror Organisation/Parallel State Structure”). Several criminal investigations were subsequently initiated by the appropriate prosecuting authorities in respect of suspected members of that organisation. 11. On 20 July 2016 the government declared a state of emergency for a period of three months as from 21 July 2016; the state of emergency was subsequently extended for further periods of three months by the Council of Ministers, chaired by the President. 12. On 21 July 2016 the Turkish authorities gave notice to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe of a derogation from the Convention under Article 15. 13. During the state of emergency, the Council of Ministers, chaired by the President, passed thirty-seven legislative decrees (nos. 667-703) under Article 121 of the Constitution. One of them, Legislative Decree no. 667, published in the Official Gazette on 23 July 2016, provided in Article 3 that the Constitutional Court was authorised to dismiss any of its members who were considered to belong or be affiliated or linked to terrorist organisations or organisations, structures or groups found by the National Security Council to have engaged in activities harmful to national security. The legislative decrees also placed significant restrictions on the procedural safeguards laid down in domestic law for anyone held in police custody or pre-trial detention (for example, extension of the police custody period, and restrictions on access to case files and on the examination of objections against detention orders). 14. The Government stated that during and after the coup attempt, prosecutors’ offices had initiated criminal investigations in respect of individuals involved in the attempt and those who were not involved but had links to the FETÖ/PDY organisation, including members of the judiciary. They specified in that connection that on 16 July 2016, in the context of a criminal investigation opened by the Ankara public prosecutor’s office, some 3,000 judges and prosecutors, including two judges of the Constitutional Court (including the applicant) and more than 160 judges of the Court of Cassation and the Supreme Administrative Court, had been taken into police custody and subsequently placed in pre-trial detention. In addition, warrants had been issued for the arrest of thirty judges of the highest courts who were deemed to be fugitives. 15. On 18 July 2018 the state of emergency was lifted. 16. On 16 July 2016, in the course of the criminal investigation opened by the Ankara public prosecutor’s office (see paragraph 14 above), the applicant was arrested and taken into police custody on the instructions of the same office, which described him as a member of the FETÖ/PDY terrorist organisation and urged that he be placed in pre-trial detention. The relevant parts of the instructions were worded as follows: “The offence of overthrowing the Government and the constitutional order through force and violence is currently being committed across the country; there is a risk that members of the [FETÖ/PDY] terrorist organisation committing the offence in question might flee the country ...” On the same day, the police conducted a search of the applicant’s home and seized computers and other IT equipment belonging to him. 17. On 19 July 2016 the applicant was questioned by the Ankara public prosecutor. He was suspected of having sought to overthrow the constitutional order (Article 309 of the Criminal Code) and being a member of the FETÖ/PDY terrorist organisation (Article 314 of the Criminal Code). During the questioning, the applicant, who was assisted by a lawyer, denied all the allegations against him and argued that they could only have been based on his dissenting opinions as set out in judgments of the Constitutional Court. His lawyer challenged the applicant’s detention in police custody, arguing that the requirements of a case of discovery in flagrante delicto were not satisfied and that his client could not be the subject of a criminal investigation without permission from the Constitutional Court. He requested that his client be released on bail. 18. Later that day, the Ankara public prosecutor’s office ordered the applicant, together with thirteen other suspects – six judges of the Supreme Administrative Court, six judges of the Court of Cassation and another judge – to appear before the 2nd Magistrate’s Court (sulh ceza hakimliǧi). He called for the applicant to be placed in pre-trial detention, bearing in mind that certain members of the FETÖ/PDY organisation had fled after the events and that evidence had yet to be gathered. 19. On 20 July 2016 the applicant, assisted by his lawyer, Mr M. Orak, appeared before the 2nd Magistrate’s Court with the thirteen other suspects. According to the record of the questioning, they were suspected of attempting to overthrow the constitutional order and being members of the FETÖ/PDY organisation, offences punishable under Articles 309 and 314 of the Criminal Code. The suspects’ statements, including those made by the applicant, were recorded using the SEGBİS sound and image information system (Ses ve Görüntü Bilişim Sistemi). The transcripts of the recordings indicate that the applicant, after describing his career as a judge at the Constitutional Court, denied all the accusations against him. They also show that his lawyer challenged all the measures taken against his client, relying on the latter’s special status linked to his position as a Constitutional Court judge. The relevant parts of the transcripts read as follows: “The suspect’s lawyer, Mr M. Orak: ‘... it appears that Articles 109 and 114 [this in fact refers to Articles 309 and 314 of the Criminal Code] were mentioned in the record of the hearing; is the request for detention under Article 114 [314] also being made on the basis of Article 109 [309]?’ The magistrate, M.C.: ‘Not [on the basis of Article] 109 [309].’ The suspect’s lawyer, Mr M. Orak: ‘OK ... Since my client has been brought before you on the basis of Article 114 [314], this is not a case of discovery in flagrante delicto. So all the steps taken in connection with that offence have been ultra vires and unlawful ... In this case, the criminal investigation and trial should be conducted from the start by the plenary Constitutional Court ... There is no concrete evidence that could justify pre-trial detention, and the accusations were based on abstract allegations ... [Furthermore], in this particular case, the cumulative conditions for pre-trial detention were not met, and in any event, we are asking for alternative measures to be ordered ...” 20. On the same day, the magistrate ordered the pre-trial detention of the applicant and the thirteen other suspects, holding as follows: “... In view of the fact that some suspects and their representatives contended that the Ankara public prosecutor’s office and our court did not have jurisdiction [to deal with the case], it should be noted that in accordance with section 16(1) of Law no. 6216 ..., the criminal investigation was governed by the ordinary rules, given that the offence of which the suspects were accused, namely membership of an armed terrorist organisation, was a ‘continuing offence’ (temadi olan suç) and that there was a case of discovery in flagrante delicto. Following an examination of the investigation file, the suspects’ pre-trial detention is ordered, regard being had to the nature of the alleged offence, the state of the evidence, [all the] records included in the file, the decisions of 17 July 2016 by the presidents’ offices at the Court of Cassation and the Supreme Administrative Court, the reports on searches and seizures and the entire contents of the case file, and also the fact that there is concrete evidence giving rise to a strong suspicion that the offence in question has been committed. [It is also noted that] the alleged offence was among the so-called ‘catalogue’ offences listed in Article 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that pre-trial detention is a proportionate measure in view of the length of the sentence provided for by law, and that alternative measures to detention are insufficient on account of the risks of absconding and of damage to evidence.” 21. Also on 20 July 2016 the Government declared a state of emergency for a period of three months as from 21 July 2016; the state of emergency was subsequently extended for further periods of three months by the Council of Ministers, chaired by the President. In addition, on 21 July 2016 the Turkish authorities gave notice to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe of a derogation from the Convention under Article 15 (see paragraphs 11-13 above). 22. On the same day, the applicant lodged an objection against the order for his pre-trial detention. In support of the objection, he argued that there was no concrete evidence that could justify detention, and that such a measure did not comply with the relevant domestic law. He also asked for alternative measures to be applied on the grounds that his son was severely disabled and dependent on his personal assistance. 23. In a decision of 4 August 2016 the Constitutional Court, meeting in plenary session, dismissed the applicant from his post. In reaching that decision it noted, on the basis of Article 3 of Legislative Decree no. 667, that “information from the social environment” (sosyal çevre bilgisi) and the “common opinion emerging over time” (zaman içinde oluşan ortak kanaatleri) among members of the Constitutional Court suggested that the applicant had links to the organisation in question, making him no longer fit to practise his profession. 24. On 9 August 2016 the 3rd Magistrate’s Court dismissed the applicant’s objection against the order for his detention. 25. On 26 September 2016 the applicant applied for release on bail. In support of his application, he repeated his argument that his detention did not comply with the relevant domestic law. He argued firstly that as he had not been accused of having taken part in the attempted coup, this was not a case of discovery in flagrante delicto. He further noted that the cases of in flagrante delicto were listed in Article 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP) and that his own situation did not fall into any of those categories. In addition, he argued that the order for his detention did not contain any specific grounds relating to him and was not based on any fact justifying such a measure. Lastly, he again asked for alternative measures to be applied, referring to the health of his son, who was seriously disabled and dependent on his personal assistance. 26. On various other occasions, the applicant applied for release on bail. In decisions adopted on 7 November and 5 December 2016, in line with an earlier decision of 21 September 2016, the competent magistrates refused his applications. 27. In a letter dated 8 November 2017 the public prosecutor’s office at the Court of Cassation forwarded the case file to the 10th Criminal Division of the same court. On several occasions the Criminal Division reviewed whether it was necessary to keep the applicant in pre-trial detention and ordered the extension of his detention. 28. On 25 October 2017 the Ankara public prosecutor’s office submitted a summary report (fezleke) to the public prosecutor’s office at the Court of Cassation with a view to instituting criminal proceedings against the applicant. In the report it stated that the FETÖ/PDY organisation was the instigator of the attempted coup of 15 July 2016 and that a judicial investigation was being conducted in respect of judges deemed to be members of that structure and to have acted under its orders and instructions. The public prosecutor’s office pointed out that the risk of a coup had not been entirely eliminated and that a case of discovery in flagrante delicto was at issue, falling within the jurisdiction of the Assize Court; accordingly, a criminal investigation had been initiated in respect of the applicant on 16 July 2016 on the basis of the provisions of ordinary law. It noted that statements by anonymous witnesses and suspects, the content of communications between other individuals via the ByLock messaging service and information about signals from mobile telephones (see paragraphs 32-40 below) all showed that the applicant had committed the offence of membership of an armed terrorist organisation. 29. On 7 September 2016 the applicant lodged an individual application with the Constitutional Court. He complained that he had been arbitrarily arrested and placed in pre-trial detention, in breach of the relevant law, namely the Constitutional Court Act (Law no. 6216) and that court’s rules of procedure. He also alleged that there was no specific evidence giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that he had committed a criminal offence necessitating his pre-trial detention. Furthermore, he maintained that the domestic courts had not given sufficient reasons for the decisions ordering his detention. He argued in addition that he had been arrested and detained for reasons other than those provided for in the Constitution. He also complained that the magistrates who had ordered his pre-trial detention were not independent and impartial, and that the conditions of his detention were incompatible with the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment. In addition, he contended that his dismissal and the various measures taken against him had infringed his rights to a fair trial, to respect for his private life and home and to freedom of expression, and had constituted discrimination. 30. On 11 January 2018 the Constitutional Court gave a judgment (no. 2016/15586) in which it decided, unanimously, to reject the following complaints as manifestly ill-founded: the complaint concerning the lawfulness of the detention order and the lack of reasonable suspicion justifying it; the complaint concerning the alleged lack of independence and impartiality of the magistrates who had ordered the applicant’s pre-trial detention; and the complaints concerning the right to a fair trial, the right to respect for private life and the home and the prohibition of discrimination. With regard to the complaint concerning the lawfulness of the applicant’s detention in police custody, the Constitutional Court held that he should have brought an action under Article 141 § 1 (a) of the CCP but had refrained from doing so. It found that the same applied to his complaints concerning his dismissal. Furthermore, it noted that there was no information in his application or the appended material as to whether the applicant had lodged an objection under Article 91 § 5 of the CCP against his detention in police custody. Accordingly, it declared these complaints inadmissible for failure to exhaust the appropriate remedies. 31. In its judgment the Constitutional Court, after describing the characteristics of the FETÖ/PDY organisation and its covert structure within the judiciary, first summarised the evidence gathered by the Ankara public prosecutor’s office (1) and then addressed the complaints concerning the lawfulness of the detention order and the alleged lack of reasonable suspicion justifying it (2). 32. According to the Constitutional Court’s judgment, the allegation that the applicant had knowingly joined the judicial branch of the FETÖ/PDY organisation was based on the following facts and evidence: (a) statements by anonymous witnesses; (b) statements by a suspect; (c) messages exchanged via ByLock; and (d) other facts. The evidence can be summarised as follows. (a) Statements by anonymous witnesses 33. An anonymous witness referred to as “Defne” made several statements to the Kahramanmaras and Ankara public prosecutors’ offices. In her statements of 4 August 2016 the witness said the following: “... I was appointed as a rapporteur at the Constitutional Court. While I was working at the Constitutional Court, we kept seeing friends who belonged to this structure [the FETÖ/PDY organisation] ... There, I noticed that certain files were monitored ... Some practices came to my notice; for instance, applications relating to the election threshold and the funding of political parties ... were monitored by the rapporteurs and members [of the Constitutional Court] belonging to the FETÖ/PDY organisation. After such applications were lodged, [these rapporteurs and members of the Constitutional Court] started to keep track of the cases by enquiring about their outcome. The ones monitoring these cases were Alparslan Altan, who was the mentor, and the chief rapporteurs belonging to this structure. I recall that Alparslan Altan would write a dissenting opinion whenever a decision was not adopted [along the lines] that he wanted.” In her statement of 6 October 2016 the same witness said the following: “On the basis of my own observations, the contacts I had while working at the Constitutional Court as a rapporteur, and the comments and behaviour of rapporteurs whom I know to be members of this structure, I can say that the former member and rapporteur of the Constitutional Court Alparslan Altan was a member of this cemaat [the term ‘cemaat’ literally means ‘community’; however, at the time of the events, the term was commonly used to denote followers of Fetullah Gülen, the presumed head of the FETÖ/PDY organisation – hereinafter ‘the cemaat’]. As in other judicial institutions there was a ‘secret cell’-type organisation within the Constitutional Court ...” 34. In a statement taken on 27 December 2016 another anonymous witness, referred to as “Kitapçı”, said the following: “... When I started working at the Constitutional Court as a rapporteur, I was convinced that, given his social contacts, Alparslan Altan was a member of the cemaat. His social contacts were what led me to reach this conclusion ...” (b) Statements by a suspect 35. In addition, R.Ü., a former public prosecutor and a former rapporteur of the Constitutional Court who was accused of being a member of the FETÖ/PDY organisation, made several statements to the Ankara public prosecutor’s office. The relevant parts of his statement recorded on 9 September 2016 read as follows: “... Previously, I did not know that the former member of the Constitutional Court Alparslan Altan was a member of the cemaat ... However, when I noticed that this member was always in the minority in [decisions on] individual applications in which members of the cemaat were involved, I became firmly convinced that he could be a member of the cemaat ... I had already imagined, from conversations between members of the cemaat, that some members of the Constitutional Court might belong to [this structure]. But I did not know who. Over time, on account of his [positions] in these decisions, I became certain that this member [of the Constitutional Court] belonged to the cemaat ...” 36. In statements taken on 21 October 2016 and 19 July and 5 September 2017 R.Ü. confirmed his previous statements and asserted that although he had not met the applicant at meetings held between members of the FETÖ/PDY organisation, he was convinced that the applicant belonged to that structure. In particular, in his statements of 19 July and 5 September 2017 he mentioned that the applicant’s codename was “Selahattin”. (c) Messages exchanged via ByLock 37. According to information in the case file, it was not established or alleged during the investigation that the applicant was a user of the ByLock encrypted messaging service. However, transcripts of ByLock conversations between other individuals suspected of being members of the FETÖ/PDY organisation, namely Ö.İ., S.E. and B.Y., indicate a number of references to the applicant. According to the investigating authorities, Ö.İ., a teacher, was the “lay imam” responsible for members of the judiciary belonging to the FETÖ/PDY organisation (according to the public prosecutor’s office, each of the structure’s cells that had infiltrated the administrative and judicial authorities was led by a “lay imam”); S.E., a former rapporteur of the Constitutional Court, was in charge of the cell at that court; and B.Y., another former rapporteur of the Constitutional Court, was a member of the structure. Various measures had been taken against these three individuals in the course of the criminal investigations carried out in the aftermath of the attempted coup: in the case of Ö.İ., who had left the country, a warrant had been issued for his arrest; the same applied to S.E., who had been dismissed from his post and had fled; as for B.Y., he had been dismissed from his position as a judge by the Council of Judges and Prosecutors and had been placed in pre-trial detention on suspicion of being a member of the FETÖ/PDY organisation. According to the investigating authorities, in the messages in question each member of the FETÖ/PDY organisation was designated by a codename. According to the suspect R.Ü., the applicant’s codename was “Selahattin” (see paragraph 36 above). It appears from the transcripts of messages exchanged between Ö.İ., S.E. and B.Y. via ByLock that the name “Selahattin” was mentioned on several occasions in connection with cases then pending before the Constitutional Court. The transcripts of the conversations also indicate that certain internal matters of the Constitutional Court, such as the election of the vice‑president, and various cases pending before the court had been discussed by Ö.İ. and the former Constitutional Court rapporteurs. More specifically, the conversations show that, in relation to certain cases that had been brought by suspected members of the FETÖ/PDY organisation and rejected, the dissenting opinion by “Selahattin” had been praised. The transcripts also indicate that “Selahattin” had been provided with a telephone line by the FETÖ/PDY organisation. 38. The Government did not provide any information about the date on which these various items of evidence had been added to the case file. The applicant, however, stated that the Ankara public prosecutor’s office had received the physical digital evidence of the ByLock conversations in December 2016, that the Ankara 3rd and 5th Magistrates’ Courts had asked to have a copy of that evidence forwarded to them on 9 December 2016 and 24 March 2017, and that an expert report had been drawn up four months after the latter date. (d) Other facts 39. After information had been obtained to suggest that a telephone line had been supplied by the FETÖ/PDY organisation to the individual known as “Selahattin” (see paragraph 37 above), investigations were carried out to ascertain whether the telephone line registered in the applicant’s name (“telephone line no. 1”) had sent signals from the same base station as the one used by the telephone line supplied by the FETÖ/PDY organisation (“telephone line no. 2”). It emerged that between 22 November 2015 and 16 July 2016 the two telephone lines had sent signals from the same base station. It also transpired that telephone line no. 2 was used solely for internet access and that both telephone lines had sent signals from the same location for twenty-nine days over different periods. 40. It was also established that two other telephone lines had been used to call individuals who had subsequently been arrested on suspicion of being members of the FETÖ/PDY organisation. 2. The Constitutional Court’s assessment of the complaints concerning the lawfulness of the order for the applicant’s pre-trial detention and the alleged lack of reasonable suspicion justifying it 41. Addressing the complaint about the lawfulness of the applicant’s initial detention, the Constitutional Court held at the outset that this issue should be examined under Article 15 of the Constitution, by which, in an emergency, the exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms could be partially or fully suspended, or measures derogating from the guarantees enshrined in the Constitution for those rights and freedoms could be taken. 42. As to the merits of the complaint, it held firstly that it was not disputed that the alleged offence – membership of an armed terrorist organisation – was an ordinary offence punishable by a heavy sentence and thus falling within the jurisdiction of the assize courts. Secondly, it noted: “123. The offence of which [the applicant] is accused, punishable under Article 314 of the Criminal Code, namely membership of an armed terrorist organisation, undoubtedly falls within the jurisdiction of the Assize Court, and this is not disputed by [him]. Moreover, although [the applicant] claims to have been prosecuted on account of his dissenting opinions as expressed in certain judgments of the Constitutional Court, he does not contend that the alleged offence is not an ordinary offence, that is to say, an offence [that was not] committed in connection with or during the performance of official duties. The classification of an offence (as an ordinary offence or as an offence linked to the performance of official duties) is a matter falling within the competence of the judicial authorities. The compliance of such classification with the law may also be reviewed in the context of an ordinary appeal or an appeal on points of law. Provided that there is no arbitrary interpretation – manifestly breaching the Constitution – and [entailing], as a result, [a violation of] rights and freedoms, it is primarily the task of the courts dealing with the case (derece mahkemeleri) to interpret and apply the law, including [the question of] the classification of an offence. It cannot be concluded that the classification of the offence of which [the applicant] is accused as an ordinary offence was unjustified and arbitrary, bearing in mind the findings reached and the reasons given [by the investigating bodies and judicial authorities], and in particular, the documents concerning [his] pre-trial detention. 124. In the present case, when the investigating bodies found that this was a case of discovery in flagrante delicto, they based that finding on the attempted coup of 15 July 2016 and the fact that the offence of which [the applicant] was accused, namely membership of an armed terrorist organisation, is a continuing offence. 125. According to the Court of Cassation’s consistent practice, the offence of membership of an armed terrorist organisation is a continuing offence (temadi eden suç). ... 127. ... The plenary criminal divisions of the Court of Cassation have also held in a case concerning the conviction of two judges ... that ‘as the current and consistent position of the Court of Cassation makes clear, regarding the offence of membership of an armed terrorist organisation, which is a continuing offence, except in cases where [its continuing nature ends with] the dissolution of the organisation or termination of membership, the continuing nature [of the offence] may be interrupted by the offender’s arrest. The time and place of the offence must therefore be established to that end. For this reason, there is a situation of discovery in flagrante delicto at the time of the arrest of judges suspected of the offence of membership of an armed organisation.’ 128. Having regard to the Court of Cassation judgments cited above, and to the fact that [the applicant] was arrested on suspicion of membership of the FETÖ/PDY organisation – deemed by the judicial authorities to constitute an armed terrorist organisation that premeditated the attempted coup – on 16 July 2016, at a time when [the authorities were taking steps to] defeat the coup attempt, it cannot be concluded that there was no factual and legal basis for the finding by the investigating bodies that the offence of membership of an armed terrorist organisation, of which [the applicant] was accused, involved a situation of discovery in flagrante delicto. 129. In the light of the foregoing, the allegation that [the applicant], a Constitutional Court judge, was placed in pre-trial detention in an manner not complying with law and the safeguards enshrined in the Constitution and Law no. 6216 is unfounded. Accordingly, the order for [the applicant’s] detention had a legal basis. 130. Before examining whether the detention order – which had a basis in law – pursued a legitimate aim and was proportionate, it should be ascertained whether there are ‘facts giving rise to a strong suspicion that the offence has been committed’, this being a prerequisite for pre-trial detention. 131. The [impugned] detention order states, with reference to ‘[all] the reports on searches and seizures and the entire contents of the case file’, that there was concrete evidence giving rise to a strong suspicion in respect of the suspects, including [the applicant]. 132. It also appears from the summary report (fezleke) concerning [the applicant] that the accusation that [he] was a member of a terrorist organisation was based on the following evidence: statements by anonymous witnesses and a suspect, the contents of communications between other individuals and information concerning the signals from [the applicant’s] mobile telephones. 133. It should be noted that in the messages exchanged between other individuals (Ö.I., S.E. and B.Y.) via ByLock, certain references were made to [the applicant]. The investigating bodies found, on the basis of evidence such as the statements by suspects/witnesses and the messages exchanged via ByLock, that Ö.I., who is in fact a teacher, was the ‘lay imam’ responsible for the judges belonging to the FETÖ/PDY organisation, that S.E. (a rapporteur) was in charge of the organisation [within] the Constitutional Court and that B.Y. was a member of this structure. Among those individuals, an arrest warrant has been issued in respect of Ö.I., who has left the country. [Similarly], S.E., who has been dismissed from his post, has fled and a warrant has been issued for his arrest. As for B.Y., he has been dismissed from the position of judge by the Council of Judges and Prosecutors and has been placed in pre-trial detention on suspicion of being a member of the FETÖ/PDY organisation. ... [In paragraphs 134-37 of its judgment, the Constitutional Court assessed the evidence. It then went on to conclude:] 138. It can therefore be observed that there is evidence in the file forming a basis for the suspicions against [the applicant].” The Constitutional Court also observed that, in view of the very specific circumstances surrounding the attempted coup, the extent to which the FETÖ/PDY organisation had infiltrated the administrative and judicial authorities and the fact that the alleged offence was among the so-called “catalogue” offences, the order for the applicant’s pre-trial detention could be said to have been based on justifiable grounds and proportionate. In the Constitutional Court’s view, there was a risk that individuals involved in the coup attempt and those who had not been directly involved but had links to the FETÖ/PDY organisation – which was identified as the instigator of the attempted coup – might abscond, tamper with evidence or take advantage of the disorder that had emerged during or after the coup attempt. The Constitutional Court held that these particular circumstances entailed a higher risk than might arise in what could be described as “normal” circumstances. It added that it was obvious that the applicant, as a member of that court himself, might be in an easier position than others to interfere with the evidence. 43. On 15 January 2018 the public prosecutor’s office at the Court of Cassation filed a bill of indictment in respect of the applicant, charging him in particular, under Article 314 of the Criminal Code, with being a member of an armed terrorist organisation, namely the FETÖ/PDY organisation. After describing the characteristics of that organisation and its covert structure within the judiciary, it set out the following items of evidence against the applicant: the statements by two anonymous witnesses (see paragraphs 33-34 above); the statements by a former rapporteur of the Constitutional Court accused of belonging to the FETÖ/PDY organisation (see paragraphs 35-36 above); the messages exchanged via ByLock and other facts (relating to information about telephone lines and records of journeys abroad). 44. In a summary judgment of 6 March 2019 the 9th Criminal Division of the Court of Cassation sentenced the applicant to eleven years and three months’ imprisonment, in accordance with Article 314 § 2 of the Criminal Code and section 5 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713), for membership of an armed terrorist organisation. The judgment indicated that the applicant had fifteen days in which to lodge an appeal with the plenary criminal divisions of the Court of Cassation. 45. The applicant also lodged two further individual applications with the Constitutional Court. In his application of 3 July 2017 he alleged a violation of Articles 6, 8 and 14 of the Convention. In his application of 26 July 2018 he complained in particular that the length of his pre-trial detention had been excessive. According to the material available to the Court, both cases are still pending before the Constitutional Court.

4. The applicants are a family comprising the husband and wife (the first and second applicants) and their child (the third applicant). They were born in 1976, 1978 and 2001 respectively and live in Kayseri. 5. On 9 August 2001, the second applicant was admitted to a State Hospital in Niğde. She gave birth to the third applicant who has irreversible injuries caused by an intervention performed by that hospital’s medical staff during labor. 6. In their report of 12 May 2004, the Forensic Medicine Institute concluded that the two members of the medical staff who tended to the labor were equally and solely at fault for the third applicant’s injuries. 7. On 1 December 2004, the first and second applicants on their own and on behalf of the third applicant, submitted a claim to the Ministry of Health for compensation arising from the third applicant’s injuries. 8. Following the tacit dismissal of the claim by the administrative authorities, the applicants brought an action for damages before the Konya Administrative Court on 2 February 2005. They claimed 30,000 Turkish liras (TRY) in respect of pecuniary damage and TRY 100,000 in respect of non‑pecuniary damage. 9. In the course of the proceedings, the domestic court decided proprio motu to seek an expert report to determine the amount of pecuniary damage suffered by the applicants. In his report submitted on 14 June 2006 to the court, the expert assessed the amount of pecuniary damage suffered by the applicants to have been TRY 194,916. 10. On 27 June 2006, the applicants requested to increase the amount of their claim for pecuniary damage in the light of the expert report. 11. On 6 July 2006 the court ruled in favour of the applicants and awarded them the full amount of their initial claims in respect of pecuniary damage, namely TRY 30,000 plus interest running from the date of lodging their claims with the Ministry of Health. It further awarded them a total of TRY 50,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage and interest running from the date of the lawsuit. The applicants’ request to increase their claim for pecuniary damage were dismissed by the court which considered itself bound by the initial claim indicated by the applicants when they lodged their case. 12. The applicants’ ensuing appeals were dismissed by the Supreme Administrative Court on 16 June 2009 and 28 December 2010 respectively. 13. On 22 January 2010, the Ministry of Health paid the applicants a total of TRY 144,144. Approximately TRY 53,830 of that sum represented statutory interest accrued on the principal judgment award.

5. The applicant, Mr Gennadiy Mikhailovich Berkovich, was born in 1950 and lives in Moscow. He was represented before the Court by Ms M. Samorodkina, a lawyer practising in Moscow. 6. In 1973 Mr Berkovich started working for the Scientific Research Electromechanical Institute, a State design bureau that developed air defence weapons. 7. Mr Berkovich signed an undertaking concerning the non-disclosure of State secrets which contained a restriction on the right to go abroad. The employer had despatched Mr Berkovich on official missions to France (in 1993 and 1994), China (in 1996 and 2003) and Greece (in 2001 and 2004). On 9 September 1993 he was provided with a travel passport (заграничный паспорт), the identity document that entitles Russian citizens to leave the country and travel abroad. It was renewed on 16 December 1998 and then on 3 November 2003, both times for a five-year period. 8. On 28 September 2004 Mr Berkovich terminated his employment. His employer retained his travel passport and refused to return it to him. 9. On 25 July 2005 Mr Berkovich applied to the Passport and Visa Service of the Akademicheskiy District in Moscow for a new travel passport. On 16 December 2005 the head of the Passport and Visa Service refused his application. The refusal indicated that his right to obtain a travel passport was restricted until 26 February 2009 on account of his past access to State secrets. 10. Mr Berkovich challenged the refusal before the Moscow City Court, relying on the fact that he had been previously allowed to travel abroad on official business. 11. On 8 June 2006 the City Court gave judgment. It found that, even though the law provided that a refusal could be challenged before the Interagency Commission for the Protection of State Secrets, Mr Berkovich could not avail himself of that remedy because the Commission had not held any hearings since 22 June 2004 and had been disbanded by a Government resolution of 21 March 2005. The City Court upheld the restriction on Mr Berkovich’s right to travel abroad, noting that, according to his former employer, he had last accessed confidential information in February 2004 and that the classified status of that information was not due to be reviewed until 2009. As to his previous official trips abroad, the City Court said: “The court has established that Mr Berkovich’s work duties required him to travel abroad for official purposes more than once; each time [his employer] obtained for him through the Consular Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs a travel passport, which was kept by the human resources department [of the employer] until its expiry. His travel abroad – as an individual aware of State secrets – was organised in accordance with the procedure set out in [the internal documents of the employer]. The claimant was allowed to go abroad because his personal participation was required for the performance of the task and because it was impossible to send abroad other employees who were aware of State secrets to a lesser degree.” 12. On 1 September 2006 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the City Court’s judgment on appeal. 13. Following the expiry of the restriction, on 3 April 2009 Mr Berkovich was issued with a travel passport. He used it to travel to Egypt, China, Greece, Croatia and Italy. 14. The applicant, Mr Igor Borisovich Boldyrev, was born in 1958 and lives in Moscow. From February 1987 to 6 February 2007 he was a military serviceman in the Russian Army. 15. Mr Boldyrev was the only son to his parents, who lived in Tallinn, Estonia. His father was born in 1929 and his mother in 1930, and they were both retired and disabled. During his military service Mr Boldyrev visited his parents more than ten times; each time he submitted a report to his military superior indicating the purpose of his visit and the dates and means of transport that he would be using. 16. Following the termination of his military service, on 27 November 2007 Mr Boldyrev applied to the Federal Migration Service for a travel passport. He also submitted medical certificates that attested to the poor health of his parents and justified his need to go and see them. 17. By a letter of 22 December 2010, the Federal Migration Service notified him that his application had been refused on account of his previous awareness of State secrets during the period of his military service. His right to leave Russia was restricted until 22 January 2012. 18. Mr Boldyrev challenged the refusal in court. 19. By a judgment of 24 April 2008, the Moscow City Court upheld the travel ban as lawful. It held that the poor health of Mr Boldyrev’s parents was of no legal significance. On 25 June 2008 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld that decision on appeal. 20. On 9 November 2009 Mr Boldyrev’s mother died in Tallinn. He tried to obtain a travel passport to attend her funeral but received no response to his application. A travel passport was first issued to him in 2012. 21. The applicant, Mr Aleksandr Nikolayevich Ilchenko, was born in 1968 and lives in Moscow. From 1985 to 30 April 2009 he was a military serviceman employed in the Chief Operative Department of the General Headquarters of the Russian Army. 22. On 29 December 2004 Mr Ilchenko signed a contract of employment, which contained a restriction on his right to leave Russia for a period not exceeding five years on account of his awareness of State secrets. In October 2006, the Main Directorate for International Co-operation of the Ministry of Defence issued a new travel passport for him, which he never used. 23. Following his retirement in April 2009, on 13 September 2010 Mr Ilchenko applied to the Federal Migration Service in Moscow for a travel passport. He submitted that he needed to go abroad for rest and recreation and pointed out that he had already surrendered all classified material on 13 February 2009. 24. By a letter of 22 December 2010, the Federal Migration Service notified him that his application had been refused on the following grounds: “During the period of your service in the Chief Operative Department of the General Headquarters of the Russian Military Forces from November 2004 to date, you have been aware of State secrets; accordingly, your right to go abroad has been temporarily restricted until 13 February 2014 [on the basis] of a decision of the Chief Operative Department of the General Headquarters no. 312/3/196 of 8 October 2010.” 25. Mr Ilchenko challenged the refusal in court. 26. On 3 March 2011 the Presnenskiy District Court of Moscow rejected his complaint. It examined the above-mentioned decision of 8 October 2010, according to which “the plaintiff’s right to travel abroad for private purposes [would] be possible after 13 February 2014, but there [were] no objections to his leaving abroad on official missions arranged by organisations or companies affiliated with the Ministry of Defence.” The court found that the decision refusing the application had been made by the competent authority. 27. On 10 October 2011 the Moscow City Court upheld the District Court’s judgment, summarily endorsing its reasoning. 28. Mr Ilchenko also challenged the compatibility of section 15(1) of the Entry and Exit Procedures Act and section 24 of the State Secrets Act with the Constitution. By judgment no. 14-P of 7 June 2012, the Constitutional Court rejected his complaint, holding as follows: “1. To recognise that the interconnected provisions of section 15(1) of the Entry and Exit Procedures Act and section 24 of the State Secrets Act do not contradict the Russian Constitution inasmuch as these provisions ... presuppose that a decision concerning a temporary restriction on the right to leave the Russian Federation may not be predicated solely on the formal grounds that are expressly mentioned in these provisions; such a decision should not have as its sole basis the established fact that the individual concerned has had access to particularly important or top-secret information classified as a State secret; the elements to be verified in every case should include the nature of the specific information which the individual has had access to [through] his work duties, the degree of confidentiality – including at the time when an application to competent authorities is being made in connection with a planned trip abroad – as well as the purpose of the trip and other circumstances which are relevant for determining that the said restriction was necessary.” 29. The applicant, Mr Vladimir Vitalyevich Litavrin, was born in 1965 and lives in the Moscow Region. 30. From June 1986 to October 2008 he was a military serviceman in the Russian Army. In February 2004, with the consent of his commander and the Federal Security Service (FSB), he was issued with a travel passport, which he used to go abroad on private tourist trips in 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007. 31. Following the expiry of his travel passport in February 2009, on 24 March 2009 Mr Litavrin applied to the Federal Migration Service for its renewal. In October 2009 he was notified that his application had been refused and that his right to leave Russia was restricted until 15 December 2011. 32. Mr Litavrin challenged the refusal in court. His complaint was rejected at two levels of jurisdiction, by the Odintsovo Town Court of the Moscow Region on 7 September 2011 and the Moscow Regional Court on 1 December 2011. Both courts upheld the restriction as lawful. 33. The applicant, Mr Roman Aleksandrovich Lytin, was born in 1982 and lives in Moscow. From June 2006 to May 2010 he was a military serviceman in the Russian Army. 34. On 21 September 2010 Mr Lytin applied to the Federal Migration Service for a travel passport which would allow him to go abroad. By a letter of 24 February 2011, he was notified that his application had been refused and that his right to leave Russia was restricted until 29 July 2014. 35. Mr Lytin challenged the refusal in court. His complaint was rejected at two levels of jurisdiction, first by the Moscow City Court on 14 October 2011 and later by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation on 11 January 2012. Both courts upheld the restriction as lawful. 36. The applicant, Mr Aleksey Gennadyevich Khil, was born in 1965 and lives in the Khabarovsk Region. From August 1997 to 9 February 2009 he was a military serviceman in the Russian Army. 37. In September 2010, Mr Khil applied to the Federal Migration Service for a travel passport. By a letter of 27 September 2011, he was notified that his application had been refused and that his right to leave Russia was restricted until 27 November 2012. 38. Mr Khil challenged the refusal in court. His complaint was rejected at two levels of jurisdiction, first by the Khabarovsk Regional Court on 1 February 2012 and later by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation on 18 April 2012. Both courts upheld the restriction as lawful. 39. The applicant, Mr Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Yenin, was born in 1964 and lives in Sochi. He is a lawyer. From January 1997 to June 2011 he was a military serviceman in the FSB. 40. On 27 December 2007 the Sochi division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued Mr Yenin with a travel passport valid for five years. In accordance with the regulations in force, the passport was kept in the human resources department of the FSB. 41. Following his retirement on 25 June 2011, Mr Yenin repeatedly asked the FSB to return his travel passport because he wished to travel abroad for private reasons. His request was refused on the grounds that, by a report of 29 June 2011, his right to go abroad was restricted until 28 July 2015, that is, for a period of five years from his last contact with top-secret documents. It appears that the documents in question contained details of FSB informants. 42. Mr Yenin challenged the restriction in court, seeking to have it lifted or reduced to a period of two and a half years. His complaint was rejected at two levels of jurisdiction, by the Military Court of the Sochi Garrison on 24 January 2013 and the Military Court of the North-Caucasus Circuit on 7 May 2013. 43. The applicant, Mr Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Garkusha, was born in 1987 and lives in Moscow. He was represented before the Court by Mr A. Yenin, a lawyer practising in Sochi (see paragraph 39 above). From July 2009 to October 2011 Mr Garkusha was a military serviceman in the FSB. 44. On 6 February and 12 December 2012 he applied to the Federal Migration Service for a travel passport which would allow him to go abroad. By a letter of 26 December 2012, he was notified that his application had been refused and that his right to leave Russia was restricted until 31 October 2016. 45. Mr Garkusha challenged the refusal in court. His complaint was rejected at two levels of jurisdiction, by the Military Court of the Sochi Garrison on 14 March 2013 and the Military Court of the North-Caucasus Circuit on 26 June 2013. 46. The applicant, Mr Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Burnayev, was born in 1980 and lives in Krasnodar. 47. From November 2002 to August 2012 he was an investigator with the Krasnodar regional investigations department of the FSB. He had a travel passport and in 2008 travelled with his spouse to the United Arab Emirates for a holiday. 48. On 22 April 2013 the chief of the Krasnodar regional office of the FSB decided that Mr Burnayev’s right to travel abroad for private purposes should be restricted until 19 May 2016 on the grounds that he had previously had access to a top-secret investigative file concerning the theft of property committed by a Russian national on Russian territory. 49. Mr Burnayev applied for a judicial review of that decision. His complaint was rejected at two levels of jurisdiction, by the Krasnodar Regional Court on 12 July 2013 and the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation on 23 October 2013. 50. The applicant, Mr Sergey Viktorovich Samasadkin, was born in 1973 and lives in St Petersburg. 51. From 1997 to 2009 he was a military serviceman in the Komi regional office of the FSB. His contract of employment provided that his access to State secrets would be terminated if he or his family members took up permanent residence abroad or started making an application to take up residence abroad. Termination of his access to State secrets would lead to early termination of his employment. 52. Following his retirement in May 2009, his right to travel abroad for private purposes was restricted until 16 November 2012. 53. In July 2012, anticipating the expiry of the restriction on his right to travel, he applied to the Federal Migration Service for a travel passport which would allow him to go abroad. By a letter of 1 August 2012, he was notified that his application had been refused. 54. Mr Samasadkin challenged the refusal in court. His complaint was rejected at two levels of jurisdiction, by the Syktyvkar Town Court on 25 September 2012 and the Supreme Court of the Komi Republic on 30 May 2013. Referring to section 15 of the Entry and Exit Procedures Act and the decision to restrict Mr Samasadkin’s right to leave Russia, the courts held that the refusal to issue him with a travel passport had been lawful. 55. On 17 December 2012 Mr Samasadkin was issued with a travel passport.

4. The applicant was born in 1961 and lived until his arrest in the town of Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, the Sakhalin Region. 5. On 3 April 2003 the applicant was apprehended in a flat with unregistered firearms in his possession. Four tied persons with traces of beatings, including Mr P., were discovered in a cloakroom of the flat. An investigator of the Sakhalin Regional police department drew up an arrest record. 6. On the following day the applicant’s detention on remand was authorised. A week later the applicant was charged with a number of crimes, including organisation and leadership of an armed gang, several counts of aggravated kidnapping, extortion, robbery and fraud, as well as illegal possession of firearms. 7. The applicant’s detention was further extended by the Yuzhno‑Sakhalinsk Town Court and the Sakhalin Regional Court on thirteen occasions up until his conviction. When extending the applicant’s detention, the domestic courts referred to the particular gravity and quantity of the charges against him; complexity of the criminal investigation and difficulties of jury trial; the applicant’s liability to abscond, re-offend and interfere with the course of justice, given his personality and criminal record; significant volume of evidence presented by the defence during the trial. The courts also kept track of the course of the investigation and assessed investigative and operative measures planned by the prosecution, including arrests of the applicant’s accomplices (which were still at liberty or had absconded in breach of the measure of restraint imposed on them and had been put on the wanted persons’ list), complex expert examinations requiring participation of the applicant and the victims and examination of the case-file by the applicant and his accomplices. The applicant’s requests for release on bail, as well as his appeal complaints against the detention orders, were to no avail. 8. On 21 April 2004 the applicant and his lawyers started studying the case file materials comprising nineteen volumes, 200-300 pages long each. On 7 September 2004 the Town Court set a time-limit for studying, affording the applicant additional twenty working days to complete it. On 29 December 2004 the case was referred to the Regional Court for trial. 9. On 6 April 2006 the Regional Court, by a jury verdict, found the applicant and six of his accomplices guilty as charged. On 12 May 2006 the Regional Court, relying on the jury verdict, sentenced the applicant to twenty-one years’ imprisonment. 10. The applicant was found guilty, in particular, of an aggravated fraud, robbery, kidnapping and extortion in respect of Mr L., a businessman from the Moscow Region. The jury found that in May 2001 the applicant had approached Mr L. under the pretence of being a car salesman. The applicant had promised Mr L. to sell him a car for approximately 600,000 Russian roubles (RUB). However, after Mr L. had transferred the money to an account indicated by the applicant, the latter had disappeared. In October 2002 the applicant contacted Mr L., told him that he had just returned from Japan with his car and invited him to come to Sakhalin for it. On his arrival at the airport of Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk on 13 October 2002 Mr L. was met by Mr K., one of the applicant’s accomplices, and taken to the applicant’s country house where he was held until 6 November 2002, being subjected to beatings and extortion by the applicant and his gang. 11. Neither Mr K., nor Mr L. were heard in open court. Mr K. had been found dead in a remand prison cell before the trial commenced. As for Mr L., residing in the Moscow Region, the trial court attempted to secure his presence on several occasions by summoning him and ordering his escort to the court. In reply he informed the trial court about being unable to travel to Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk in view of his spinal disease and a medical contraindication to air travel. He submitted a number of documents in support, as well as a written notice in which he confirmed his pre-trial statements. Having regard to these circumstances, the trial court allowed the prosecution’s request to read out Mr L. and Mr K.’s statements incriminating the applicant, despite the latter’s objections. 12. The jury further established that in September and December 2002 and in March 2003 the applicant had organised an armed robbery and kidnapping of eight other victims, including Mr P. and had extorted a large sum of money in exchange for their freedom. Mr P. also was not heard in court as he was allegedly on vacation in Ukraine. Disregarding the applicant’s objections, the Regional Court read out Mr P.’s pre-trial statements against the applicant. 13. The applicant’s lawyer appealed against the judgment of the Regional Court, complaining, among other matters, about the decision to read out pre-trial statements by Mr L., Mr P. and Mr K. On 14 November 2007 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the judgment of the Regional Court, noting that it had correctly considered that reasons for the witnesses’ absence had been extraordinary and that it had lawfully read out their pre-trial statements.

6. The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Muş. 7. On 30 October 2001 the applicant was arrested and taken into custody on suspicion of membership of an illegal organisation, namely the PKK (the Kurdistan Workers’ Party). 8. On 1 November 2001 the applicant’s statement was taken by the police in the absence of a lawyer. During his interrogation, he confessed being a member of the PKK and gave a detailed account of his acts within the illegal organisation. 9. On 3 November 2001 the applicant was heard by the public prosecutor and the investigating judge at the Istanbul State Security Court, again in the absence of a lawyer. In his statements before both the public prosecutor and the investigating judge, the applicant denied the accusations. On the same day, upon the order of the investigating judge, the applicant was placed in pre-trial detention. 10. On 6 November 2001 the Public Prosecutor at the Istanbul State Security Court filed an indictment with that court, charging the applicant under Article 168 of the former Criminal Code, with membership of an illegal armed organisation. 11. The state security courts were later abolished by Law no. 5190 of 16 June 2004, and the case was transferred to the Istanbul Assize Court. 12. On 6 October 2006 the Istanbul Assize Court, relying on, inter alia, the applicant’s statements to the police, convicted him of membership of an illegal organisation under Article 314 § 2 of the new Criminal Code and sentenced him to seven years and six months’ imprisonment. 13. On 15 December 2009 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the first‑instance court.

4. The applicants are Russian nationals who, at the material time, lived in the Chechen Republic or in the Republic of Ingushetia. Their personal details are set out in the appended table. They are close relatives of individuals who disappeared after allegedly being unlawfully detained by service personnel during special operations. The events concerned took place in areas under the full control of the Russian federal forces. The applicants have not seen their missing relatives since the alleged arrests. Their whereabouts remain unknown. 5. The applicants reported the abductions to various law‑enforcement bodies, and official investigations were opened. The proceedings were repeatedly suspended and resumed, and decisions have remained pending for several years without any tangible results being achieved. The applicants lodged requests for information and assistance in the search for their relatives with the investigating authorities and various law-enforcement bodies. Their requests received either only formulaic responses or none at all. The perpetrators have not been identified by the investigating bodies. It appears that all of the investigations are still pending. 6. Summaries of the facts in respect of each application are set out below. Each account is based on statements provided by the applicants and their relatives and/or neighbours to both the Court and the domestic investigating authorities. The Government did not dispute the principal facts of the cases, as presented by the applicants, but questioned the involvement of service personnel in the events. 7. The applicant is the wife of Mr Girikhan Tsechoyev, who was born in 1967. 8. On 11 July 2004 Mr Girikhan Tsechoyev was visiting his relative in the village of Muzhichi, Ingushetia, when a group of service personnel from the Bamut military command under Major General Starkov arrested him at the outskirts of the village on suspicion of having committed a murder. They handed him over to officers from the Federal Security Service (Федеральная служба безопасности Российской Федерации – hereinafter “the FSB”), who took him away to an unknown destination. 9. On the evening of the same date police officers from the Sunzhenskiy district department of the interior (“the Sunzhenskiy ROVD”) arrived at the applicant’s house in the village of Ordzhonikidzevskaya, Ingushetia. Having informed the applicant that earlier that day FSB officers had arrested Mr Girikhan Tsechoyev on suspicion of murder, they searched the premises and left. 10. On 12 July 2004 Mr Girikhan Tsechoyev’s brother, Mr U.Ts., went to the Sunzhenskiy district prosecutor in search of the abducted relative. His acquaintance, Mr G.M., who worked in the prosecutor’s office, told him that Mr Girikhan Tsechoyev had been detained by the FSB. 11. The next day the prosecutor summoned Mr U.Ts. for questioning. In the course of the questioning a representative of the prosecutor’s office, Mr Kh., and the head of the criminal investigation department of the Sunzhenskiy ROVD confirmed that Mr Girikhan Tsechoyev had been detained by the FSB and was being held on the latter’s premises in Ingushetia. 12. On 13 July 2004 the applicant asked the authorities to investigate the abduction of her husband. 13. On 27 August 2004 the Sunzhenskiy district prosecutor in Ingushetia opened criminal case no. 04600057 under Article 126 of the Criminal Code (“the CC”) (abduction). 14. The Government did not provide the Court with a copy of the criminal case file. From the documents submitted by the applicant it appears that the investigation proceeded as follows. 15. On 10 September 2004 the investigators granted the applicant victim status in the case. 16. On 27 October 2004 they suspended the investigation for failure to establish the identity of the perpetrators. Subsequently, it was resumed on 11 January 2005, 27 October 2006, 4 May 2007, and an unspecified date in 2008. It was suspended on 28 February 2005, 27 November 2006 and 4 June 2007 respectively. 17. In the meantime, on 17 April 2006 and then on 16 January 2008 the applicant enquired about developments in the proceedings. In reply, the investigators informed her that the proceedings had been suspended. 18. On 10 June 2006 and on 9 October 2008 the applicant asked the investigators to resume the proceedings and to allow her access to the case file. Both of her requests were dismissed. There is no information about further developments. 19. On 13 July 2006 and on an unspecified date in 2007 the applicant lodged a claim with the Sunzhenskiy District Court in Ingushetia alleging the investigators’ failure to investigate the abduction effectively. On 13 October 2006 and 27 April 2007 the court allowed the complaints and ordered that the investigation be resumed. 20. On 18 February 2008 the applicant complained to the court of the investigators’ inaction and their decision to suspend the investigation on 4 June 2007. On 24 March 2008 the court dismissed her complaint referring to the fact that the decision to suspend the investigation had already been overruled by a higher investigating authority. 21. On 6 April 2009 the applicant complained to the court about the lack of access to the investigation file. The outcome of the proceedings is unknown. 22. The first applicant is the mother of Mr Shamkhan Shavkhayev, who was born in 1980 (in certain documents the year of birth also indicated as 1981), and the wife of Mr Sharip Shavkhayev, who was born in 1941. The second applicant is the wife of Mr Umar Bekayev, who was born in 1941. 23. At the material time, the first applicant, Mr Sharip Shavkhayev and their children, Mr Shamkhan Shavkhayev, Ms S.Me. and Ms S.Ma., lived in the village of Avtury, Chechnya. 24. At about 2 a.m. on 9 June 2001 the family was at home when a group of fifteen to twenty armed men in military camouflage uniforms broke into their house. Some of the men were in balaclavas. Those who did not have them were of Slavic appearance. All of the intruders spoke unaccented Russian. 25. Having threatened the family members with firearms, the men forced the father and the son out of the house and took them away to an unknown destination. Meanwhile, some of the men searched the premises, seized the identity documents of Mr Shamkhan Shavkhayev and Mr Sharip Shavkhayev and left the house. The abduction was witnessed by several people. 26. The same night, three residents of Avtury, Mr Umar Bekayev, Mr I.Kh. and his brother Mr M.Kh., were abducted by presumably the same group of men under similar circumstances. Eight days later the abductors released Mr I.Kh. and Mr M.Kh. from detention. 27. At about 2 a.m. on 9 June 2001, a group of fifteen to twenty armed men in camouflage military uniforms broke into the second applicant’s house in Avtury, where she was living with her daughter and husband, Mr Umar Bekayev. Speaking unaccented Russian, the men threatened those present with firearms, tied Mr Umar Bekayev’s hands behind his back, put a bag on his head and took him away on foot to an unknown destination. 28. In the morning of 9 June 2001 the applicants went to the Shali district command in search of their relatives. The commanding officer told them that their relatives had been detained by military service personnel. 29. On 9 June 2001 the applicants asked the investigating authorities to open a criminal case into the abductions of their relatives. 30. Three days later the Shali district prosecutor in Chechnya opened criminal case no. 23170 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 31. On 19 August 2001 the investigators questioned Mr I.Kh. and Mr M.Kh. They submitted that at about 2 a.m. on 9 June 2001 they had been abducted by a group of armed men in camouflage uniforms. The abductors had taken them to an unknown destination and placed them in a pit. They had been kept there for about one week, and had been regularly beaten up by the perpetrators. A week later the abductors had blindfolded them, put them in an armored personal carrier (“APC”), transported them into the fields in the Shali district and thrown them out of the vehicle. They had been found by Chechens, who had taken them home. 32. In September 2001 the investigators questioned the relatives of the abducted persons, those who had been eyewitnesses to the abductions, and their neighbours, who gave hearsay evidence. They confirmed the account of the events as described by the applicants in their submissions to the Court. 33. On 12 October 2001 the proceedings were suspended for failure to establish the identity of perpetrators. 34. On 23 January 2002 the investigators opened criminal case no. 59039 into the abduction of Mr I.Kh. and Mr M.Kh. 35. On 12 July 2002 the investigation into the abduction of the applicants’ relatives was resumed, joined to the investigation into the abduction of Mr I.Kh. and Mr M.Kh. and then suspended. 36. On 21 December 2004 the proceedings were resumed again. 37. In January 2005 the investigators sent requests to various military authorities and detention facilitates to investigate the applicant’s version of the abduction by State agents. The bodies that responded, stating that they did not have information about the alleged arrest of the applicant’s relatives on 9 June 2001 and their subsequent detention. 38. On 21 January 2005 the first applicant was granted victim status in the criminal case. On the same day the proceedings were suspended. 39. On 29 January and 9 February 2007 the first and second applicants respectively asked the investigators to allow them access to the criminal case file. Their requests were dismissed on 1 and 18 February 2007 respectively. 40. Subsequently the investigation was resumed on 27 December 2007, suspended on 28 December 2007, and then resumed on 12 August 2008 again. In the meantime, in December 2007 the first applicant was given access to the criminal case file. There is no information about further developments. 41. On unspecified dates the applicants complained to the Shali Town Court of the investigators refusals to allow them access to the criminal case file of 1 and 18 February 2007. 42. On 10 October and 22 November 2007, respectively, the court allowed the first and the second applicants’ complaints and ordered the investigators to provide them with partial access to the case file. 43. The applicants appealed against the above decisions seeking full access to the case file. On 20 February 2008 the Chechnya Supreme Court allowed their appeals. 44. The first applicant is the mother of Mr Murad Zakriyev, who was born in 1973. The second applicant is the mother of Mr Rustam Muradov, who was born in 1977. 45. At the material time the applicants and their sons were temporarily residing in Ingushetia as refugees. Mr Murad Zakriyev and Mr Rustam Muradov were working at a private construction site located on the premises of Mr B.G.’s house in the town of Nazran. 46. At about 12.30 a.m. on 14 July 2003 Mr Rustam Muradov, his colleague Mr V.S. and Mr B.G.’s family members, including his son Mr R.G., were at the site, when a group of ten to fifteen armed service personnel in camouflage uniforms and balaclavas arrived in a GAZelle minivan and a VAZ vehicle. Speaking unaccented Russian, the service personnel broke into Mr B.G.’s home, handcuffed and blindfolded Mr Rustam Muradov, Mr V.S. and Mr R.G., forced them into the minivan and drove off. 47. Several minutes later, allegedly the same group of service personnel arrested Mr Murad Zakriyev on a street on his way to the construction site. They forced him into the minivan and drove off in the direction of the town of Mozdok, passing unrestricted through military checkpoints on their way. The abduction took place in the presence of several witnesses. 48. Later on the same day Mr V.S. and Mr R.G. were released and returned home. 49. About a month after the abduction, a man visited the second applicant and told her that Mr Murad Zakriyev was detained at the main military base of the federal forces in Khankala, Chechnya. 50. At some point later the first applicant learnt from Mr D.M., a police officer from the Ministry of the Interior in Ingushetia, that Mr Rustam Muradov was allegedly detained at a detention facility in Krasnoarmeysk in the Volgograd Region of Russia. 51. The applicants’ attempts to find their sons were to no avail. 52. On 14 July 2003 Mr B.G. contacted the Nazran town prosecutor, complaining of the abductions of Mr Murad Zakriyev and Mr Rustam Muradov. He stated that the culprits’ GAZelle minivan’s number plate had been C293CE95RUS and the VAZ vehicle had had a number plate containing 441 95RUS. 53. Ten days later the prosecutor opened criminal case no. 03560058 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 54. On 25 July 2003 the investigators questioned Mr V.S. and Mr R.G. Their statements were consistent with the applicants’ account of the events before the Court. Among other details Mr V.S. noted that during the two‑hour trip in the GAZelle minivan after the abduction, the perpetrators had used portable radio sets. From the content of their conversations, he had understood that they had been State agents. He also submitted that their car had passed through security checkpoints without any obstacles. 55. In the meantime, the investigators asked various authorities, including the FSB in Ingushetia and the Ministry of the Interior to provide them with information about the special operation in Nazran, the alleged detention of Mr Murad Zakriyev and Mr Rustam Muradov on the premises of local law-enforcement agencies and about the owners of the vehicles with the registration plates noted by Mr B.G. The authorities that responded replied that they had no relevant information. 56. In August 2003 the second applicant was granted victim status in the criminal case and questioned about the incident on 15 August 2003. 57. On 17 September 2003 the investigators questioned Mr M.T., a witness to Mr Murad Zakriyev’s abduction. His statement was similar to the applicants’ submission before the Court. 58. On 24 September 2003 the investigation was suspended for failure to establish the identity of the perpetrators. 59. The Government did not submit any documents concerning the further progress of the investigation. 60. According to the applicants, they were not regularly informed of the developments in the proceedings. Several times they asked the investigators about the progress of the investigation, but each time the latter replied in general terms that all possible measures to establish the whereabouts of the abducted persons were being taken. 61. On 17 July 2008 the second applicant applied for access to the investigation file. Her request was granted on 13 November 2008. There is no information about further developments. 62. The first applicant was the mother of Mr Akhdan (also known as Chingiz) Akhmetkhanov, who was born in 1977. She passed away on 16 August 2014, after the Russian Government had been informed of the case. 63. The second applicant is the wife of Mr Akhdan Akhmetkhanov. The third and fourth applicants are his children. 64. In 2002 the applicants’ family lived in the village of Gekhi, Chechnya. They owned three separate houses with a common garden. The second, third and fourth applicants and Mr Akhdan Akhmetkhanov lived in the first house, the first applicant resided in the second house and Mr B.A., Akhdan Akhmetkhanov’s nephew, lived in the third house. 65. Late at night on 3 July 2002 a group of fifteen to twenty men in camouflage uniforms and balaclavas, armed with automatic weapons and speaking unaccented Russian, broke into the houses. 66. Four intruders entered the first house. They forced Mr Akhdan Akhmetkhanov to the ground and took his documents and his shirt. Then they took him into the garden. 67. At the same time the first applicant was awakened by two men who walked into her room. They asked her how many sons she had. She replied that she had four sons and confirmed that Akhdan was the youngest. Then she heard the second applicant screaming that Chingiz (Mr Akhdan Akhmetkhanov) was being taken away. The first applicant attempted to run into the garden, but the men ordered her to stay in the house. 68. At some point the four applicants were able to walk out of their houses into the garden. They saw the service personnel taking Mr Akhdan Akhmetkhanov away. Two service personnel remained at the entrance gate. The first applicant attempted to follow the soldiers, but one of the men shot at the ground under her feet, and she had to return to the yard. Then the two remaining serivcemen left the gate and joined the group. 69. From the yard the applicants saw the service personnel walking away with Mr Akhdan Akhmetkhanov towards the road to the town of Urus‑Martan. Twenty minutes later the applicants heard the noise of a vehicle which they believed to be an APC. On their way the abductors drove freely through the military checkpoint which blocked the road from Gekhi to Urus-Martan. 70. The applicants submitted a statement by their neighbours Mr M.T and Mr V.I., who confirmed the account of the events as described above. 71. It appears that on the same night another village resident, Mr M.I., was abducted under similar circumstances. 72. On 4 July 2002 the applicants learned that the night before a group of armed soldiers had rushed into the house of the Malsagov family, their neighbours. The service personnel had asked one of the family members, Ramzan Malsagov, if his name had been Chingiz. He had answered in the negative and stated that Chingiz had lived nearby. Then the military had left. Malsagov’s had dog started barking, and a serviceman had shot it. Ramzan Malsagov collected a cartridge case left by the service personnel after the shooting and gave it to the first applicant. 73. On 4 July 2002 the applicants applied to various domestic authorities, including the Urus-Martan District Department of the Ministry of the Interior in the Chechen Republic (“the Urus‑Martan ROVD”) asking for assistance in the search for Mr Akhdan Akhmetkhanov. The applicants’ requests remained unanswered for about one week. 74. A week after Mr Akhdan Akhmetkhanov’s abduction, local police officers questioned the first and the second applicants. The first applicant showed the cartridge case to them, but they did not take it. Owing to her illiteracy she was unable to write an application to accept the cartridge case as evidence. At some point later she lost it. 75. On 22 July 2002 the Urus-Martan district prosecutor in Chechnya opened criminal case no. 61103 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction) and granted the first applicant victim status in the proceedings. 76. On the same day the investigators questioned her. She described the circumstances of the abductions as she did in her submission to the Court. 77. On 24 July 2002 the three applicants’ neighbours, who had witnessed the abduction, were questioned by the investigators. Their statements were consistent with those of the applicants. 78. On 14 August 2002 the investigation into Mr Akhdan Akhmetkhanov’s abduction was joined with the investigation into the abduction of Mr M.I. 79. In the meantime, the investigators unsuccessfully contacted various law-enforcement authorities to establish Mr Akhdan Akhmetkhanov’s whereabouts. 80. On 4 September 2002 the proceedings were suspended for failure to establish the identity of the perpetrators. 81. On 19 December 2002 the first applicant asked a deputy of the Chechen Parliament to assist in the search for her son. On 4 January 2003 her request was forwarded to the investigators. It is not clear if any reply followed. 82. On 2 February and 5 July 2004 the first applicant contacted the Chechen Ministry of the Interior and the President of Chechnya seeking their assistance in the investigation. Her requests were also forwarded to the investigators. By a letter of 20 August 2004 the Ministry and the President informed the first applicant in general terms that despite the suspension of the proceedings in 2002, they were continuing the search for her son. 83. On 10 January 2007 the investigation was resumed. 84. In late January 2007 the investigators questioned the second applicant and her neighbours. All of them stated that Mr Akhdan Akhmetkhanov had not been a member of an illegal armed group. 85. Owing to the lack of any tangible results the investigators suspended the proceedings on 10 February 2007. 86. On 21 April 2008 the above decision was overruled as ill-founded and the proceedings were resumed. Having questioned some of the applicants and their relatives about the events of 3 July 2002, the investigators suspended the proceedings once again on 22 May 2008. 87. On 10 March 2010 the proceedings were resumed. Four days later the investigators examined the crime scene. No evidence was collected. 88. On 10 April 2010 the proceedings were suspended again. There is no information about further developments. 89. The first applicant is the wife of Mr Magomed Mestoyev, who was born in 1964. The second and third applicants are his sons. 90. At about 2 p.m. on 6 August 2002 a white GAZelle minivan without registration plates pulled over at the applicants’ house in the village of Khambi-Irzi, Chechnya. Four armed service personnel waited near the vehicle while the other three entered into the house. Speaking unaccented Russian they asked Mr Magomed Mestoyev to show his identity documents. He could not produce the documents, as his passport had been submitted for renewal. Then the service personnel took him away for an identity check. 91. On 13 August 2002 Mr Magomed Mestoyev was taken by the same service personnel to the outskirts of the village of Khamby-Irzi and then released. 92. Having returned home, Mr Magomed Mestoyev told the applicants that he had been held in an unacknowledged detention facility on suspicion of illegal activities. He had been detained alone and handcuffed in a damp cage in a dark basement, given only bread and water and had had to sleep on the floor. He had been repeatedly taken to another room for questioning. 93. On 29 September 2003 a group of forty to fifty service personnel in camouflage uniforms with semi-automatic weapons arrived at the applicants’ house in five or six UAZ vehicles with registration plates covered with dirt. Some of the service personnel were in helmets without balaclavas and of Slavic appearance. The service personnel surrounded the house; several of them broke inside and searched the premises. They checked the residents’ identity documents and then took Mr Magomed Mestoyev away on suspicion of membership of an illegal armed group. The abductors told the head of the local council, Ms N.A., whose office was located across from the applicants’ house, that they were from the Urus‑Martan Department for the Fight against Organised Crime (Управление по Борьбе с Организованной Преступностью – “the RUBOP”). 94. Immediately after the abduction, Mr Magomed Mestoyev’s brother, sister and a neighbour followed the abductors’ vehicles to the premises of the Urus-Martan ROVD. However, the ROVD police officers denied any involvement in Mr Magomed Mestoyev’s arrest. 95. On the way back home Mr Magomed Mestoyev’s relatives spoke with traffic police officers manning a checkpoint on the motorway to Grozny. Some of them admitted that the UAZ vehicles had gone through their checkpoint on the way to Grozny. 96. Later Mr Magomed Mestoyev’s relatives went to the FSB office in Grozny and enquired about Mr Magomed Mestoyev’s detention, but to no avail. 97. Shortly after the incident the applicants and their fellow villagers organised a protest, blocking the Rostov-Baku motorway for three days to protest against Mr Magomed Mestoyev’s abduction. The protest was stopped after the authorities promised that Mr Magomed Mestoyev would be released. 98. On 12 August 2002 the Achkhoy-Martan district prosecutor opened criminal case no. 63058 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction) into the events of August 2002. On 30 September 2002 it was closed for lack of evidence of a crime. 99. On 13 October 2003 the applicants complained to the prosecutor in respect of Mr Magomed Mestoyev’s abduction on 29 September 2003. 100. On 29 October 2003 the decision to close the criminal case was annulled and the proceedings were resumed. 101. Several days later (the exact date is illegible), in November 2003, the investigators questioned the head of the local council, Ms N.A., who had witnessed the abduction from her office. She stated that as soon as she had seen the arrest of Mr Magomed Mestoyev, she had left the office and approached the abductors. Having introduced herself she had asked the perpetrators to explain what had been happening. The perpetrators had told her that they – FSB officers – had just arrested a leader of an illegal armed group. Ms N.A. had assured them that Mr Magomed Mestoyev had not been a member of an illegal armed group, but they had not believed her. Later she had learned that the abductors had been RUBOP officers and that their commander’s surname had been of a Chechen origin and had started with “A”. 102. In November 2003 the investigators questioned several neighbours, who confirmed the applicants’ account of the events. The investigators also contacted various law-enforcement bodies to establish Mr Magomed Mestoyev’s whereabouts, but to no avail. 103. On 10 January 2004 the investigation of the criminal case was suspended for failure to establish the identity of the perpetrators. 104. Following a request by the first applicant, on 19 October 2004 the Achkhoy-Martan District Court of Chechnya declared Mr Magomed Mestoyev a missing person. 105. On 17 June 2008 the criminal proceedings were resumed and on 18 July 2008 suspended again. 106. On 11 August 2009 the applicants complained of an ineffective investigation to the Chechen President and a number of local authorities. On 20 August 2009 the first applicant was informed that the investigation had been suspended for failure to establish the identity of the perpetrators. 107. On 7 September 2009 the first applicant applied for victim status in the criminal proceedings. Three days later the proceedings were resumed and her application was granted. 108. Subsequently, the proceedings were suspended on 12 September 2009, 25 January 2010, 12 July 2012, 17 June 2013 and 25 April 2014, and then resumed on 25 December 2009, 29 June 2012, 17 May 2013 and 10 April 2014 respectively. No tangible results had been achieved in the meantime. There is no information about further developments. 109. The applicants are close relatives of Mr Magomed Umarov, who was born in 1984. The first applicant, his father, passed away on 13 December 2015. The fourth applicant, his stepmother, wished to withdraw her application on 24 January 2016. The second and third applicants are Mr Magomed Umarov’s siblings. They maintain their applications. 110. At about 4 a.m. on 25 May 2005 the first applicant noticed several armed men in camouflage uniforms, helmets and balaclavas climbing over the fence into the courtyard of his house in the village of Duba-Yurt, Chechnya. When he went out the armed men ordered him to put his hands up and searched him. Then the armed men broke into the house, took Mr Magomed Umarov outside and drove him to an unknown destination in a grey UAZ vehicle. 111. As the first applicant later found out, the abductors had driven from Duba‑Yurt through the Uzhniy checkpoint, which had been manned by the Special Police Force, and had arrived at the Russian military base located in the northern outskirts of the village Stariye Atagi. 112. About one year later, in 2006, the head of a correctional colony in the Kemerovo Region told the applicants that Mr Magomed Umarov had allegedly been detained in his detention facility, but then transported to Chechnya. The applicants have not had any news about their relative since. 113. On an unspecified date the first applicant contacted the NGO Memorial in Chechnya asking for assistance in the search for her son. 114. On 17 June 2005 Memorial asked the Chechnya prosecutor to open a criminal case into the events of 25 May 2005. The request was forwarded to the Shali district prosecutor. On 4 August 2005 the latter opened criminal case no. 46092 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 115. In July 2005, within the framework of pre-investigation inquiry, the investigators questioned Mr Magomed Umarov’s relatives, who had been in the house during the abduction. Their statements were similar to those submitted by the applicants to the Court. They also mentioned that the abductors had taken from their house two mobile phones and a video camera. 116. On 9 August and 6 September 2005 the first and second applicants respectively were granted victim status in the criminal proceedings. 117. In the meantime the investigators contacted military authorities, law-enforcement bodies and detention facilitates to check whether Mr Magomed Umarov had been arrested during a special operation in Duba-Yurt and taken into custody. No positive replies followed. 118. On 4 October 2005 the proceedings were suspended and then on 15 January 2007 they were resumed. 119. On 26 February 2007 the Shali District prosecutor opened a separate criminal case under Article 161 of the CC (robbery) into the theft of the applicants’ belongings by the abductors. On the same day it was joined with case no. 46092 and then suspended. 120. On 14 March 2007 the investigators resumed the proceedings. Having questioned the applicants’ neighbours, who gave hearsay evidence about the abduction, they suspended the proceedings on 15 April 2007. 121. Five days later, in April 2007, the proceedings were resumed again. On 20 May 2007 the investigation was suspended. 122. On 17 March 2008 the investigators informed the applicants that criminal case no. 46092 had been transferred to the Chechnya investigations committee for further investigation. 123. On 8 February 2010 the applicants asked the investigating authority to resume the criminal proceedings and grant them access to the investigation file. 124. On 13 February 2010 the applicants were allowed access to the documents concerning their participation in the proceedings. The request to resume the investigation was dismissed. 125. On 24 June 2010 the proceedings were resumed. Several weeks later the investigators obtained a DNA sample from the first applicant. They compared it with a database of DNA from unidentified corpses, but no matches were found. 126. On 23 July 2010 the first applicant was granted civil-claimant status in the criminal proceedings. The next day the investigation was suspended. There is no information about further developments. 127. On 8 June 2010 the applicants challenged the investigators’ refusal of 13 February 2010 to resume criminal proceedings before the Shali District Court in Chechnya. 128. On 25 June 2010 the court left the complaint without consideration because the investigation had been resumed. 129. On 5 July 2010 the applicants appealed against the decision of 25 June 2010 to the Chechnya Supreme Court, which upheld it on appeal on 1 September 2010. 130. The first applicant is the mother of Mr Umar Ozdamirov, who was born in 1962. The second applicant is his sister. 131. On 30 July 2002 Russian federal forces in Chechnya conducted a special sweep operation in Grozny. Certain city districts were cordoned off with military vehicles. 132. At about 2 p.m. on that day (in the documents submitted the date was also stated as 29 July 2002) Mr Umar Ozdamirov was at a bus stop at a crossroads in the centre of Grozny when a group of armed military service personnel in two GAZelle minivans without registration plates forced him into one of the minivans and took him to the premises of a State agency in Grozny. The service personnel were in balaclavas and camouflage uniforms; they spoke unaccented Russian. The abduction was witnessed by several passers‑by. 133. On the same day around eleven people were abducted under similar circumstances in Grozny. 134. On 12 August 2002 military commanders showed journalists passports of several Chechens who were thought to have been members of illegally armed groups and who had recently been killed. One of those passports belonged to Mr Ozdamirov. 135. The second applicant denied the possibility of her brother being killed in August 2002 as a member of an illegal armed group (see paragraph 144 below). 136. On 1 August 2002 the applicants complained to the authorities of the abduction and requested that a criminal case be opened. 137. On 8 August 2002 the Grozny town prosecutor opened criminal case no. 50116 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 138. On 3 October 2002 the first applicant was granted victim status in the proceedings. 139. On 8 October 2002 the investigation was suspended for failure to establish the identity of the perpetrators. 140. On 1 September 2004 the proceedings were resumed. The investigators contacted a number of law-enforcement authorities to establish the whereabouts of Mr Umar Ozdamirov, but to no avail. 141. On 29 September 2004 the investigators questioned Mr B.V., an eyewitness to the abduction. He said that the abductors had been armed with automatic firearms and had been wearing camouflage uniforms. They had arrived in one white GAZelle minivan, one beige VAZ 2106 car and three camouflaged UAZ vehicles. They had seized Mr Umar Ozdamirov and his acquaintances who had been standing nearby. 142. On 1 October 2004 the investigation was suspended. Three days later the Second Operative-Search Bureau of the Main Department of the Ministry of the Interior in the South Region (ORB-2) (Второе оперативно-розыскное бюро при Главном управлении Министерства внутренних дел Российской Федерации по Южному федеральному округу) informed the investigators that on 11 August 2002 at the outskirts of Malye Varandy village the federal military forces had discovered an illegal armed group consisting of five persons. In a skirmish that followed three members of that group, including Mr Umar Ozdamirov had been killed. It appears that the investigators did not make any assessment of that information. 143. On 30 August 2007 the investigators resumed the proceedings, and a month later suspended them again. 144. On 27 May 2011 the investigators resumed the proceedings and four days later questioned the second applicant. She stated that before the events of 30 July 2002 her brother had submitted his passport to the Ministry of the Interior for renewal and had not received it back. Accordingly, he could not have been the person with the passport shot by military service personnel in August 2002. 145. On 6 June 2011 the investigators suspended the proceedings once again. There is no information about further developments. 146. On 6 May 2011 the applicants lodged a complaint with the Zavodskoy District Court in Grozny regarding the investigators’ decision to suspend the proceedings on 30 September 2007 and their failure to take basic investigative steps. 147. On 27 May 2011 the court dismissed the claim, having found that the investigation had already been resumed. 148. On 29 June 2011 the Chechnya Supreme Court upheld that decision on appeal. 149. The applicant is the wife of Mr Mayr-Khadzhi Gerikhanov, who was born in 1970. 150. At about 5.30 p.m. on 2 October 2004 Mr Mayr-Khadzhi Gerikhanov and an acquaintance of his, Mr Kh.G., were driving on the motorway between the village of Novyye Atagi and the town of Shali, Chechnya, when a group of armed service personnel in camouflage uniforms and balaclavas stopped their car. Speaking unaccented Russian, the service personnel forced Mr Mayr-Khadzhi Gerikhanov and Mr Kh.G into a UAZ minivan parked nearby and drove off in the direction of Novyye Atagi, where a Russian military base was stationed. Later that day Mr Kh.G. was released and returned home. 151. It appears that immediately after the abduction of Mr Mayr‑Khadzhi Gerikhanov his relatives contacted the commanding officer of the Shali district in Chechnya and asked for his assistance in the search for their missing relative. In late October 2004 they brought a formal complaint of abduction. 152. In early December 2004 the investigators of the Shali ROVD questioned Mr Mayr-Khadzhi Gerikhanov’s relatives and Mr Kh.G. The latter stated that on 2 October 2004 he had offered Mr Mayr-Khadzhi Gerikhanov a lift home. They had followed a motorway which had been blocked by a UAZ minivan. As soon as they had stopped, a group of five to six armed individuals in camouflage uniforms and balaclavas approached. Speaking unaccented Russian, they had forced Mr Mayr-Khadzhi Gerikhanov into their car and driven off in the direction of Novyye Atagi. 153. The above witness statement was forwarded to the Shali district prosecutor, which on 24 December 2004 opened criminal case no. 36149 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 154. On 26 December 2004 the applicant was granted victim status in the criminal case. 155. On 11 January 2005 the investigators questioned Mr Mayr-Khadzhi Gerikhanov’s sister, who stated that the commanding officer of the Shali district had established that Mr Mayr-Khadzhi Gerikhanov’s abductors’ car had had the registration plate A452AX and that it had been seen entering the premises of military regiment no. 70. 156. Between 22 January and 1 February 2004 the investigators sent a number of requests to various law-enforcement authorities and detention facilities to obtain information about Mr Mayr-Khadzhi Gerikhanov’s alleged arrest and detention. The respondent authorities replied that they did not have any relevant information. 157. Subsequently the proceedings were suspended on 24 March and 2 July 2005, 15 March 2006, and 17 November 2008; and then resumed on 26 May 2005, 15 February 2006 and 16 October 2008 respectively. 158. In the meantime, the investigators repeatedly questioned the applicant and Mr Mayr-Khadzhi Gerikhanov’s other relatives and submitted new requests to various civil and military authorities, but no tangible results were achieved. 159. On 14 April 2009 the applicant asked the Chechen President to assist in the search for her husband. Her request was forwarded to the investigators. There is no information about further developments. 160. On 14 October 2008 the applicant lodged a claim with the Shali Town Court, seeking to have the decision to suspend the investigation on 15 March 2006 quashed, and an order for the investigation’s resumption. She alleged that the investigating authorities had not conducted the proceeding with the required promptness. 161. On 17 October 2008 the court dismissed her claim, finding that on 16 October 2008 the investigators had already resumed the criminal proceedings. 162. The first applicant is the sister of Mr Rizvan Isayev, who was born in 1981, and the aunt of Mr Anzor Isayev, who was born in 1983. The second and third applicants are the brothers of Mr Rizvan Isayev and the uncles of Mr Anzor Isayev. 163. On 16 March 2003 Mr Rizvan Isayev and Mr Anzor Isayev were taking a bus from Ingushetia to the village of Samashki, Chechnya. At about 2.20 p.m. the bus was stopped at the Kavkaz checkpoint at the border between Ingushetia and Chechnya to check the passengers’ identity. A group of armed service personnel in camouflage uniforms asked the passengers to show their identity documents. The service personnel spoke unaccented Russian; some of them were wearing balaclavas. Having checked the passports, they forced Mr Rizvan Isayev and Mr Anzor Isayev outside, put them into an UAZ minivan and took them away to an unknown destination. The abduction was seen by numerous witnesses. 164. The applicants submitted that immediately after the abduction they attempted to search for their relatives on their own. They went in person to various law-enforcement and military agencies asking about their relatives’ whereabouts, but to no avail. On an unspecified date they lodged an official complaint with the Achkhoy-Martan inter-district prosecutor, asking him to open an investigation into the abduction. 165. On 12 June 2003 the latter opened criminal case no. 44046 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 166. Despite a request by the Court, the Government did not submit a copy of the file of the investigation into the Isayevs’ abduction. Instead, they submitted a copy of the case file concerning the abduction of Mr M.Kh., which is irrelevant to the present application. 167. According to the applicants, the investigation proceeded as follows. 168. On 2 November 2003 the investigators suspended it for failure to establish the identity of the perpetrators. 169. On 27 May 2004 the Achkhoy-Martan inter-district prosecutor criticised the above decision and ordered that the proceedings be resumed. 170. On an unspecified date after the resumption of the proceedings the investigators questioned Ms Kh.Yu. and Ms R.S, two eyewitnesses to the abduction, who had been travelling on the same bus as Mr Rizvan Isayev and Mr Anzor Isayev on 16 March 2003. Their submissions to the investigators were similar to those of the applicants before the Court. Several days later the bus driver, Mr A.E. was also questioned. His statement was consistent with those of Ms Kh.Yu. and Ms R.S. 171. On 1 November 2004 the proceedings were suspended again. It is unclear whether the applicants were informed of that decision. 172. On 31 January 2011 the first applicant asked the investigators to resume the proceedings, to grant her civil-claimant status and to allow her access to the investigation file. 173. The above request was granted in part. The investigators resumed the proceedings on 2 February 2011, on the same day they granted the first applicant victim status and civil-claimant status in the criminal case. Access to the case file was, however, refused. 174. On 2 February 2011 the first applicant was also questioned about the circumstances of her brother’s and nephew’s abduction. Among other things, she stated that immediately after the abduction she had gone to the Kavkaz checkpoint and spoken with the commanding officer there. The latter said that her relatives had been abducted by officers from the Main Intelligence Directorate (Глаавное управленние Генерального штаба Вооружённых Сил Росси́йской Федерации). After that she had searched in various different ways in Chechnya, but to no avail. 175. It appears that shortly after that, in February 2011, the proceedings were suspended. 176. On 23 June 2011 the first applicant again contacted the investigators seeking resumption of the proceedings and access to the case file. Her requests were dismissed. There is no information about further developments. 177. On 1 April 2011 the first applicant lodged a civil claim for compensation for non-pecuniary damage caused by the abduction. 178. On 3 May 2011 the Presnenskiy District Court of Moscow provisionally deferred the examination of the claim in view of a number of procedural defects. The applicant was given time to remedy the defects. The outcome of the proceedings is unknown. 179. On 27 June 2011 the first applicant challenged her lack of access to the investigation file before the Sunzhenskiy District Court in Ingushetia. Her claim was dismissed on 5 July 2011. 180. On 16 August 2011 the Supreme Court of Ingushetia upheld the above decision on appeal. 181. The applicant is the wife of Mr Abdula (also spelled as Abdul) Demelkhanov, who was born in 1970. 182. In the afternoon of 28 March 2004 Mr Abdula Demelkhanov was at the junction of Musorova Street and 8 Marta Street in Grozny, Chechnya, when a group of armed service personnel in camouflage uniforms arrived in APCs, grabbed him and took him away to an unknown destination. The arrest took place in the presence of several witnesses. 183. On 28 March 2004 the sister of Mr Abdula Demelkhanov, Ms S.D., informed the authorities – apparently the Urus-Martan ROVD – of the disappearance of her brother. She stated that he had left the town of Urus‑Martan in his car, but had never arrived at his sister-in-law’s house in Grozny. 184. The next day the traffic police found a car belonging to Mr Abdula Demelkhanov in Grozny. It was parked in the vicinity of the Department of the Interior offices in Oktyabrskiy district in Grozny (“the Oktyabrskiy ROVD”). 185. On 8 April 2004 the investigators from the Urus-Martan ROVD questioned the first applicant and the sister of Mr Abdula Demelkhanov, who confirmed that the latter had been missing since 28 March 2004. Later that day the investigation was transferred to the Oktyabrskiy ROVD, which had to take the decision on the merits of the case. 186. The next day the applicant complained of the abduction to the Oktyabrskiy District prosecutor in Grozny. It appears that on an unspecified date she and the sister of Mr Abdula Demelkhanov were questioned. 187. On 17 April and 25 December 2004 the Oktyabrskiy ROVD and the Oktyabrskiy District prosecutor respectively refused to open a criminal case into the abduction. 188. In the meantime, on 22 April and 9 June 2004 the Oktyabrskiy ROVD, apparently following the applicant’s allegation that her husband had been abducted by State agents, contacted the FSB in Chechnya and the commanding officer of the army in Chechnya to check if Mr Abdula Demelkhanov had been arrested in the course of a special operation. The replies received were in the negative. 189. On 9 August 2005 the Chechnya prosecutor annulled the decision of 17 April 2004 and opened criminal case no. 42104 under Article 105 of the CC (murder). On the same day the Oktyabrskiy district prosecutor in Grozny opened criminal case no. 42094 into the same events under the same Article of the CC. Eight days later the two cases were joined under no. 42094. 190. On 16 August 2005 the applicant was granted victim status in the case. 191. On 9 November 2005 the investigation was suspended for failure to establish the identity of the perpetrators. 192. On 22 March 2006 the applicant contacted the Chechen President asking him to assist in the search for her husband. Her letter was forwarded to the investigators. 193. It appears that on 4 May 2006 the investigators resumed the proceedings and questioned the applicant. She repeated her previous statements and added that her husband had not been a member of any illegal armed groups. Shortly after that the proceedings were suspended again. 194. Subsequently, the investigation was resumed on 17 May 2011, 6 February and 25 May 2012, 9 December 2013, 28 December 2015 and 1 July 2016. It was then suspended on 6 June 2011, 10 February and 22 July 2012, 19 December 2013 and 30 December 2015 respectively. 195. In the meantime, on 4 June 2011 and 7 February 2012, the investigators questioned two eyewitnesses to the abduction, Ms R.K. and Ms T.D. They submitted that at about 5 p.m. on 28 March 2004 they had been in front of 8 Marta Street in Grozny when an APC had stopped beside Mr Abdula Demelkhanov’s car. A group of five to six service personnel in camouflage uniforms armed with automatic weapons had emerged from the vehicle. Some of them had been wearing balaclavas and had spoken unaccented Russian. The men asked Mr Abdula Demelkhanov to show his identity documents. Then they had pulled him out of the car and forced him into the APC, which had driven off in the direction of Chernorechye village. 196. On 29 December 2015 the investigators granted victim status to Mr Abdula Demelkhanov’s mother. There is no information about further developments. 197. On 28 January 2013 the applicant lodged a court claim seeking compensation for non-pecuniary damage caused by the alleged abduction of her husband. 198. On 12 March 2013 the Urus-Martan Town Court granted the claim and awarded the applicant 1,000,000 Russian roubles (RUB) (approximately 13,200 euros (EUR)) in compensation. 199. On 28 May 2013 the Chechnya Supreme Court quashed the above decision on appeal and dismissed the claim as unfounded. (b) Proceedings against the investigators 200. On 22 June 2016 the applicant complained to the Oktyabrskiy District Court in Grozny of the ineffectiveness of the investigation into her husband’s abduction. In particular, she requested that the decision of 30 December 2015 to suspend the investigation be annulled as ill-founded. 201. On 1 July 2016 the court rejected her claim, finding that the decision to suspend the investigation had already been annulled by the investigating authority.

5. The applicant was born in 1984 and lives in Babushkin, Republic of Buryatiya, Russia. 6. On 6 January 2005 M.D. was arrested and taken to a police station. Allegedly, police officers threatened him with murder and ill-treatment if he refused to make a confession. In the presence of counsel, he made a written statement confessing to a murder. On 7 January 2005 an investigator compiled an arrest record. 7. On 30 September 2005 another investigator issued a formal decision confirming that M.D.’s real name was M.M., the applicant in the present case before the Court. 8. On 12 March 2007 the Verkh-Isetskiy District Court of Yekaterinburg (“the District Court”) convicted the applicant of murder and sentenced him to ten years’ imprisonment. On 6 June 2007 the Sverdlovsk Regional Court (“the Regional Court”) upheld the judgment. 9. In the meantime, on 4 April 2005 the applicant had tested positive for HIV. 10. According to the applicant, on 30 August 2006 (see below) he learnt that in October or November 2005 Z., a deputy district prosecutor, had given G., the sister of the murder victim, access to the file concerning the criminal charges against the applicant. 11. At a hearing on 30 August 2006 the trial court granted G. victim status in the criminal case (see paragraph 36 below). At the same time, the trial court allowed a decision granting G. victim status to be added to the file (a decision apparently taken in late 2005 by an unspecified authority during the criminal investigation – however, see paragraphs 14-15 below). G. was cross-examined at that hearing. She stated that she had had access to the file and had then told D., the applicant’s relative, about his HIV status to prove that the applicant was not a good person. According to the applicant, G. also disclosed his HIV status to some other neighbours. 12. Between September 2006 and 2010 the applicant unsuccessfully sought the institution of criminal proceedings against G. for the disclosure of private information, which was an offence under Article 137 § 1 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 38 below). It appears that the applicant also sought the institution of criminal proceedings against Z. in relation to the disclosure of private information involving the use of an official position and abuse of power (Article 137 § 2 and Article 286 of the Criminal Code; see also paragraph 15 below). 13. A pre-investigation inquiry was carried out for the offence allegedly committed by G. 14. In December 2006 Z., the deputy district prosecutor, wrote to the applicant indicating that G. had not been granted victim status, and that the investigator in charge of the case had not provided her with access to the file during the preliminary investigation. 15. In December 2006 the regional prosecutor’s office informed the applicant that G. had been granted victim status and had studied the case file in August 2006, she had not applied for victim status before that time, and there were no grounds for any pre-investigation inquiry in respect of Z. It is unclear whether the applicant took any further action as regards his criminal complaint against Z. 16. As a result of the inquiry in respect of G., a refusal to institute criminal proceedings was issued. It was then overruled. Further refusals to prosecute were issued on 1 October and 26 November 2007 and on 9 February 2008. 17. On 25 November 2008 the District Court refused to carry out judicial review of the refusal dated 9 February 2008. The Regional Court then considered that the applicant was entitled to judicial review and ordered the District Court to re-examine the issue. In the resumed proceedings, on 13 February 2009 the District Court noted that the applicant no longer wished to pursue the judicial complaint, and discontinued it. 18. In the meantime, on 23 January 2009 an investigator had issued a new refusal to prosecute with reference to the expiry of the two-year time‑limit for prosecution of an offence under Article 137 of the Criminal Code. The investigator heard D., who confirmed that G. had briefly mentioned the applicant’s HIV status. The investigator’s decision indicates that he considered the disclosure of the applicant’s medical data an established fact. 19. On 28 September 2009 the District Court confirmed the refusal to prosecute dated 23 January 2009. The judge noted (apparently with reference to 2007) that for some time the institution of criminal proceedings had been refused because “at the time no written statement could be obtained from [the applicant] in relation to his complaint”. This had prompted the supervising prosecutor to set aside, among other things, the refusals to prosecute dated 1 October and 26 November 2007 and 9 February 2008. The prosecutor had acted promptly by taking decisions on 5 October and 29 December 2007 and on 30 December 2008. Following each decision, law-enforcement officers had taken measures to interview the applicant (apparently by asking staff at his remand centre to interview him), but “no statement had been received from him”. 20. On 17 March 2010 the Regional Court upheld the judgment of 28 September 2009. The appeal court stated that, while the fact of the dissemination of the applicant’s medical data by G. had been established, she could not be prosecuted, owing to the expiry of the time-limit for prosecution. However, those grounds for discontinuing the case were, in a way, in the applicant’s interest, and it remained open to him to bring civil proceedings against her. 21. In May 2010 the applicant brought civil court proceedings against G., seeking compensation for non-pecuniary damage on account of the disclosure of his HIV status to other people. On 13 September 2010 the District Court discontinued the case because the respondent was a foreign national not residing in Russia. Apparently, the applicant did not appeal. 22. The applicant also lodged a claim under the 2010 Compensation Act. A judge rejected it, noting that the Act did not give standing to a criminal complainant with no “victim” status seeking compensation on account of the length of a pre-investigation inquiry. Apparently, the applicant did not appeal. 23. The applicant provided the following account of his conditions of detention. 24. Between 17 January 2005 and July 2007 the applicant was kept in Yekaterinburg Remand Centre no. 66/1. After his arrival he was placed in cell no. 301, which measured 20 square metres and accommodated five people. This cell had no window, and the temperature in the cell was around 2˚C. There was no bed or bedding. The toilet did not work and was not separated from the main area. 25. On 18 January 2005 the applicant was transferred to cell no. 625, which measured 20 square metres and had six beds, but which actually accommodated seventeen people. The toilet was not separated from the main area. 26. From 19 January to 4 April 2005 the applicant was in cell no. 125, which measured 4 or 7 square metres and accommodated four detainees (or up to six people, according to the applicant’s amended description). 27. From 4 April to 18 May 2005 the applicant was kept in cell no. 204, which measured 20 square metres and had six beds, but accommodated twenty-three to twenty-eight people. 28. From 18 May to 2 June 2005 the applicant was in hospital. It appears that the material conditions of his stay there were acceptable. However, between 24 May and 1 June 2005 he was allegedly ill-treated by medical assistants (also people who had been convicted) who, at the instigation of police officers, tried to extract a confession from him. 29. After being returned to the remand centre, the applicant was placed in cell no. 205, which measured 20 square metres and accommodated up to twenty-five people, despite having only sixteen beds. 30. From 11 July 2005 the applicant was in cell no. 117, which measured 4 square metres and accommodated four detainees. 31. Furthermore, the applicant provided a detailed account of the conditions of his detention between July 2005 and July 2007, conditions which were also cramped or unacceptable and where, at times, he was not able to have an individual bed. 32. Between 2005 and 2009 the applicant lodged numerous complaints in relation to his conditions of detention. For instance, on 15 February 2006 the Prisons Department of the Sverdlovsk Region dismissed one of his complaints, whilst indicating that the actual number of detainees in the remand centre exceeded the design capacity of this detention facility. By a letter of 13 March 2006 the administration of the remand centre informed the applicant that the actual capacity of cells was such as to afford each detainee 2.5 square metres of space, which was a temporary measure related to the overpopulation problem. 33. By a letter of 2 October 2008 the Sverdlovsk prosecutor’s office supervising prisons confirmed that the applicant had been afforded between 0.9 and 3.8 square metres of cell space. 34. By a letter of 2 December 2008 the prosecutor’s office of the Sverdlovsk Region informed the applicant that, following an inspection, it could be not confirmed that the cell toilets were not separated from the main area.

5. The applicants are Russian nationals who were born in 1952 and 1954 respectively and live in the town of Belomorsk in the Republic of Karelia. 6. On 1 December 2005 the applicants’ son, Mr M. Lozovoy, was killed in St Petersburg. Criminal proceedings were instituted against a Mr O. on a charge of murder. 7. On 18 January 2006 Ms L., an investigator of the Primorskiy district prosecutor’s office in St Petersburg, asked the head of the Primorskiy district police to identify relatives of the deceased; to establish their place of residence and to summon them to the prosecutor’s office for the purpose of granting them victim status in the criminal case. 8. A week later the applicants’ son was buried under his full name in St Petersburg. A record in a cemetery registration log indicated that the body had been unclaimed. 9. On 30 January 2006 the investigator, having concluded that it was impossible to identify relatives of the deceased, assigned the status of victim in the criminal case to a representative of the municipal authorities. The following day police officials informed the investigator that operative measures undertaken by them to identify Mr M. Lozovoy’s relatives had not produced any results. 10. On 2 February 2006 the applicants contacted Ms L. and informed her of their intention to come to St Petersburg to take part in the criminal proceedings. 11. Despite that notification by the applicants, five days later Ms L. sent the criminal case file to the Primorskiy District Court for trial. 12. Sometime later the applicants were invited to take part in the criminal proceedings in the capacity of victims. 13. On 14 February 2006 the applicants were allowed to exhume their son’s remains. Two days later they buried him in Belomorsk. 14. On 6 June 2006 the Primorskiy District Court found Mr O. guilty of having murdered the applicants’ son and sentenced him to six years’ imprisonment. 15. On the same day, responding to the applicants’ complaints about the authorities’ failure to notify them of their son’s death, the District Court issued an interim decision (частное постановление) in respect of the investigator, Ms L. The decision, sent to the Primorskiy District Prosecutor, in so far as relevant, reads as follows: “Moreover, the [finding] that the investigator, Ms L., did not take sufficient steps to find relatives of the deceased and that measures undertaken [by her] were formalistic in character is not only confirmed by the fact that the decision assigning victim status to [a representative of the municipal authority] had been taken before the information was received from the police officials, but also by the fact that the criminal case-file material contained sufficient information about [the applicants’ son] on the basis of which it was possible to establish the place of residence of his relatives ([there was] an explanation from Mr O. made on 1 December 2005, in which he had given information about the place of residence of [the applicants’ son]; a statement made by Mr O. on 8 December 2005 in which he said that a criminal case against [the applicants’ son] was pending before a court; statements by a witness, Ms A., who asserted that [the deceased’s] mother had occasionally made telephone calls to [the deceased’s] flat; a certificate on [the deceased’s] criminal record from which it is apparent that the Primorskiy district prosecutor’s office of St Petersburg applied a measure of restraint in the form of a written undertaking in respect of [the applicants’ son] in criminal case no. 137755; the material in the above-mentioned criminal case file contains a copy of [the applicants’ son’s] passport; and so forth). It follows that the victims’ rights envisaged by the law in force were substantially violated in the course of the preliminary investigation. Relying on Article 29 § 4 of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure, [the court] rules: - that the violations of criminal procedural law committed during the preliminary investigation in the criminal case should be brought to the attention of the Primorskiy district prosecutor in St Petersburg; - that the Primorskiy District Court of St Petersburg should be informed of the measures taken no later than a month after receipt of the present decision.” 16. In 2007 the applicants lodged an action against the Prosecutor General’s Office and the Ministry of Finance, seeking compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage. Relying on the Primorskiy District Court’s interim decision of 6 June 2006, the applicants argued that as a result of the investigator’s failure to promptly notify them of their son’s death, they had sustained pecuniary damage, having been forced to pay for the exhumation and transport of their son’s remains from St Petersburg to Belomorsk. In addition, they had suffered non-pecuniary damage as they had been unaware of their son’s whereabouts for a long time and had been forced to initiate a search for him; they had been unable to properly say “goodbye” to their son and to provide him with a decent burial; they had been forced to go through a two-week bureaucratic procedure to obtain permission to exhume their son’s remains; and subsequently, after the exhumation, they had been forced to identify his disfigured remains. 17. On 5 February 2008 the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow dismissed the claim, having found that the investigator had not committed any unlawful actions and there had been no final decision by any domestic court establishing otherwise. 18. On 20 May 2008 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment, endorsing the District Court’s reasoning.

6. The applicant was born in 1967 and is currently detained in the Kyiv pre-trial detention centre (“the SIZO”). 7. On 1 June 2017 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of kidnapping. 8. On 2 June 2017 the Pecherskyy District Court of Kyiv (“the District Court”) ordered the applicant’s pre-trial detention. The court agreed with the reasons for the applicant’s detention which had been advanced by the investigator, but did not mention them in its decision. The decision merely stated that the reasons advanced by the investigator were sufficient for the court to conclude that the applicant might try to abscond from justice, obstruct the investigation, and influence the other suspect or witnesses in the proceedings. No further details were provided by the court. On 3 August 2017 the decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal. 9. On 6 June 2017 the applicant was placed in the Kyiv SIZO. 10. In the course of the pre-trial investigation the applicant’s detention was extended a number of times, including on 27 July, 22 and 28 September, and 15 and 29 November 2017. The reasons for extending his detention were the severity of the possible sanction, the need to take additional investigative and procedural steps, and the fact that the existing risks [of the applicant’s absconding or obstructing the criminal proceedings] were still relevant. No further details were provided by the courts. On the last mentioned date the court maintained non-custodial preventive measures in respect of two co-accused. 11. On 13 December 2017 the Kagarlyk Court of Kyiv Region (“the trial court”) committed the applicant for trial. The trial court maintained the custodial preventive measure in respect of the applicant, reiterating, without providing details, the same reasons which had been mentioned at the pre‑trial stage, namely that there was a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the said crime; if released he might attempt to abscond from justice; the statutory penalty for the crime was up to ten years’ imprisonment along with confiscation of all property; and, being a foreign national, he had no permanent place of residence in Ukraine and was unemployed. 12. During the trial the applicant’s detention was again extended a number of times, including on 9 February, 28 March, 24 April, 13 June, 11 September, 7 November 2018 and 11 February 2019. The reasons for extending his detention were similar to those mentioned in paragraphs 8, 10 and 11 above. No further details were provided by the courts. 13. In the decisions taken on 22 September and 13 December 2017, 28 March, 13 June and 11 September 2018, and 7 November and 11 February 2019, the courts also referred to the fact that the applicant was a national of the Russian Federation, and might therefore escape justice abroad as he had not handed in his passport, had no permanent place of residence, no social ties in Ukraine and was unemployed. No further details or reasons for the relevant decision were provided by the courts in that regard. 14. In the course of the proceedings in respect of the extension of his detention, on 28 September and 13 December 2017, 28 March, 24 April, 13 June, 11 September, 7 November 2018, and 11 February 2019 the applicant raised objections. He argued, inter alia, that his state of health was unsatisfactory as he had recently suffered a stroke, that he had a stable family relationship, and that he had not attempted to abscond from justice. 15. In particular, on 13 December 2017, 7 February, 21 March, and 23 April 2018 the applicant applied to the court to change the preventive measure for house arrest. He stated that he suffered from cardiac and neurological conditions and that his state of health required treatment in a specialised medical facility outside the SIZO; that he had a permanent residence permit issued by the Ukrainian authorities; and that he had had a civil partner and two children born in Ukraine. He further stated that a non‑custodial preventive measure had been applied to his two co-accused in the course of the pre-trial investigation, and the fact that they were at liberty had not obstructed the investigation. It appears from the relevant decisions that the courts did not address the above-mentioned arguments. 16. According to the available information, between September and November 2017 an ambulance was called ten times to provide the applicant with urgent treatment or to take him outside the SIZO. Additionally, on hearing days, notably on 13 December 2017, 16 January, 9 February, 24 April and 8 May 2018, he was taken to the trial court by ambulance in view of his poor health. 17. According to the available information, the applicant is currently detained in the Kyiv SIZO pending examination of his case by the trial court. 18. According to the Government, when he was placed in the SIZO (see paragraph 9 above), the applicant did not raise any health complaints. 19. Since 6 July 2017 the applicant has been treated in the SIZO medical unit in connection with, inter alia, ischemic heart disease and second‑stage hypertension. 20. On 3 September 2017 an ambulance took the applicant to the Kyiv Medical Emergency Hospital (“the Emergency Hospital”) where he was diagnosed with a haemorrhagic stroke and third‑stage hypertension. He was provided with urgent treatment. 21. On 8 September 2017 the applicant was discharged from the hospital and returned to the SIZO with medical prescriptions and recommendations for further treatment. His medical condition was assessed as being of medium gravity. 22. On 13 September 2017 the applicant consulted a neurologist and a cardiologist, who prescribed medication in view of his diagnosis (see paragraph 20 above) and recommended further in-patient treatment at a medical facility specialising in neurology. It was also recommended that he undergo a magnetic resonance tomography (“MRT”), massages and rehabilitation exercises. In a further recommendation of 2 October 2017 the neurologist stated that a lack of adequate medical treatment could result in another intracerebral hemorrhage and disability. The neurologist also stated that by 13 September 2017 the applicant had needed further examinations and treatment at a medical facility specialising in neurology, in order to specify the further treatment to be prescribed. 23. In the course of the court hearing on 21 September 2017 the applicant felt unwell. An ambulance transported him to the Emergency Hospital where he consulted a neurosurgeon and a therapist, and underwent a spiral computed tomography (CT) scan of the brain. He was recommended further supervision by a neurologist and sent back to the SIZO. 24. On the same day the District Court ordered the Kyiv SIZO administration to ensure that the applicant underwent an urgent forensic examination. The parties did not inform the Court whether that order had been implemented. 25. On 29 September and 10 October 2017 the applicant consulted a neurologist, who prescribed him medication and massage of the limbs of the left side of the body. 26. On 29 December 2017 the SIZO administration informed the applicant’s defence lawyer that the SIZO had no cardiologist or rehabilitation physician on its staff. An MRT scanner was not available either. Medical treatment for those suffering from cardiac diseases was provided by a therapist. According to the case-file material, an MRT scan was eventually carried out on 15 January 2018 in an outside facility, allegedly at the expense of the applicant’s wife. 27. On 3 January 2018 the applicant’s defence lawyer requested the Kyiv Bureau for Forensic Medical Examinations to carry out a forensic examination with a view to establishing, inter alia, what medical conditions the applicant was suffering from and whether he required medical treatment. 28. In the course the above-mentioned examination the forensic experts studied the applicant’s medical file and examined him in person. In their opinion of 2 February 2018 the forensic experts concluded that the applicant was suffering from cerebrovascular disease, acute stroke (3 September 2017), discirculatory encephalopathy, and third-degree hypertension. From his symptoms at the time of examination it was evident that he had had repeated acute strokes and that further examination and in-patient treatment at a medical facility specialising in neurology were imperative. 29. On 9 February and 6 March 2018 the SIZO administration replied to the defence lawyer’s applications for the applicant’s transfer to a specialised medical facility, informing him that such a transfer would be possible if the relevant documentation confirming the readiness of the medical facility in question to admit the applicant for treatment, were presented. 30. On 8 May 2018 the applicant’s defence lawyer applied to the trial court, seeking the applicant’s transfer to a medical facility specialising in neurology with a view to his further examination and in-patient treatment. On the same day the trial court allowed that application and ordered the applicant’s transfer to a relevant medical facility of the applicant’s choice and at his or his relatives’ expense. 31. On 11 May 2018 the SIZO authorities informed the applicant’s defence lawyer that his client’s transfer for treatment would be possible if he presented relevant documentation confirming the readiness of the medical facility in question to admit the applicant for treatment. The lawyer was further informed that the applicant was being provided with symptomatic treatment at the SIZO. 32. On 4 June 2018 the applicant was transferred to Kyiv City Hospital no. 4 for treatment. A number of tests and examinations were carried out and medication was prescribed. On 22 June 2018 he was discharged and sent back to the SIZO with an insignificant improvement in his health. 33. On 5 July 2018 the applicant was recognised as a person suffering from a category 2 disability. The second category is the intermediary one, the first constituting the severest level of disability and the third the least severe. The applicant was also recommended rehabilitation treatment. 34. The parties did not inform the Court about the treatment the applicant had been provided with after July 2018.

4. The applicant was born in 1952 and lives in Sarajevo. 5. In 1999 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against his employer, the local police, seeking his reinstatement and damages. His claim was eventually rejected. 6. The first-instance judgment was rendered by the Sarajevo Municipal Court on 17 April 2006. 7. The second-instance judgment was rendered by the Sarajevo Cantonal Court on 27 March 2008. 8. The third-instance judgment was rendered by the Supreme Court of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina on 26 January 2010. 9. On 19 April 2010 the applicant filed a constitutional appeal with the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina complaining under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 about the outcome and length of his labour dispute. 10. On 10 April 2013 the Constitutional Court found a breach of the applicant’s right to a trial within a reasonable time and rejected the remainder of the case. It did not award any damages.

5. The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, are similar to those in Association “21 December 1989” and Others v. Romania (nos. 33810/07 and 18817/08, §§ 12-41, 24 May 2011). 6. Between 21 and 27 December 1989 many people including the applicants and/or their close relatives involved in this case took part in the anti-communist demonstrations in Bucharest, Timișoara, Brașov, Reșița and Craiova which led to the fall of the communist regime. They were injured or killed by gunfire during the demonstrations. 7. In 1990 following the overthrow of the communist regime, the military prosecutor’s office opened investigations into the armed crackdown on the demonstrations. The main criminal investigation into the use of violence, particularly against civilian demonstrators, during the events of December 1989 in Bucharest and other cities has been contained in file no. 97/P/1990 (current number 11/P/2014). 8. In a number of cases concerning events in Bucharest and Craiova, the prosecutor decided not to initiate a criminal investigation or to discontinue the proceedings. Those decisions were taken between 1990 and 2007. It results from the documents submitted by the parties that, after the adoption of those decisions, the prosecutor continued to examine the circumstances of these cases in the main criminal investigation – object of file no. 97/P/1990 (current number 11/P/2014). 9. To date, the main criminal investigation appears to be still ongoing. The most important procedural steps were summarised in Association “21 December 1989” and Others (cited above, §§ 12-41) and Alecu and Others v. Romania, nos. 56838/08 and 80 others, §§ 7-13, 27 January 2015. Subsequent developments are as follows. 10. Following the entry into force of the new Code of Criminal Procedure in February 2014, jurisdiction over the case was relinquished in favour of the military prosecutor’s office. 11. On 14 October 2015 the prosecutor’s office closed the investigation, finding that the applicants’ complaints were partly statute-barred, partly subject to an amnesty and partly ill-founded. It also found that some of the facts which had been investigated could not be classified as criminal offences and that some of them were res judicata. The parties have not submitted any information on whether there was an appeal against that decision (see Ecaterina Mirea and Others v. Romania, nos. 43626/13 and 69 others, § 15, 12 April 2016). However, from the information available on the prosecutor’s office website, the investigation is still ongoing and must have therefore been reopened.

5. The applicant was born in 1986 and lives in Krasnodar. 6. On 4 November 2003 the applicant, who was 16 years old at the time, and his brother were stopped by Krasnogvardeyskiy district police officers Ch. and Kh. at a petrol station in the village of Bolshesidorovskoye in the Adygeya Republic. The applicant submitted that the events had taken place in the context of tense relations between his family and those police officers. 7. He described the events as follows. He and his brother were pushing their broken motorcycle to take it to a friend for repairs. They were verbally insulted by Ch. and Kh. Ch. then sat on the motorcycle and asked them to push it. Following their refusal, the brothers were subjected to physical violence. Kh. seized the applicant by his neck, knocked him down and started strangling him. He hit the applicant’s head against the ground several times, dragged the applicant to a police car without releasing his grasp around his neck, hit his head against the car, punched him in the face and pushed him into the car. The applicant’s and his brother’s requests that their parents be informed or that they be taken home because the applicant felt unwell were disregarded by the police officers. The officers drove to the garage of a local collective farm and then to the Krasnogvardeyskiy district administration, where the applicant’s father found the applicant and his brother and took them home. 8. According to an administrative-offence record drawn up by Officer Kh., at 2 p.m. on 4 November 2003 the applicant’s brother was apprehended for driving a motorcycle without a driving licence. The applicant’s brother noted his disagreement, stating in the record that he had not been driving the motorcycle but had been pushing it. 9. According to an administrative-offence record drawn up by Officer Ch., at 3 p.m. on 4 November 2003 the applicant used obscene language in a public place, namely the petrol station in Bolshesidorovskoye. Therefore, the applicant’s father committed an administrative offence by failing to properly bring up the applicant. Relying on the police officer’s record, the Committee on Minors at the Krasnogvardeyskiy district administration subsequently found the applicant’s father guilty of that administrative offence. The Krasnogvardeyskiy District Court, however, granted the applicant’s father’s appeal against that decision, finding that the decision, the administrative-offence record and other material lacked any evidence of the applicant’s father’s failure to properly raise the applicant, and that, on the contrary, all his children had been well cared for, had studied hard at school, and the family was well thought of. The applicant was heard by the court and denied having used obscene language. The court quashed the decision and terminated the administrative proceedings against the applicant’s father (judgment of 5 January 2004). 10. At 5.45 p.m. on 4 November 2003 the applicant was examined by a surgeon at the Krasnogvardeyskiy District Hospital, who recorded three abrasions on his neck which were 3 to 10 cm long, and a contusion to his right elbow. 11. On the same day the applicant’s mother complained to the Krasnogvardeyskiy district prosecutor’s office that the applicant had been subjected to ill-treatment by the police officers. 12. On 5 November 2003 a forensic medical expert from the Adygeya Republic Forensic Medical Bureau examined the applicant at the request of an investigator of the prosecutor’s office. The expert recorded abrasions on the applicant’s neck which were 7 and 12 cm long, a bruise on his right elbow measuring 5 by 4 cm, and a bruise on his lip. The expert concluded that the injuries could have been inflicted on the previous day, by fingernails as regards the abrasions on the neck, and by a hard blunt object as regards the bruises. 13. On 6 November 2003 the applicant was examined by doctors at the Krasnogvardeyskiy District Polyclinic. He complained of a headache, dizziness, pain in his throat and pain when swallowing, pain in his neck area, lips, left eyebrow and right elbow. The doctors recorded oedema of both lips with bruises, oedema in the area of the left eyebrow and right elbow, and oedema, abrasions and bruises in the area of the neck. They diagnosed him with multiple contusions of the face, neck, larynx and laryngeal cartilages. Following an X-ray examination he was further diagnosed with a fracture of both branches of the hyoid bone. 14. In an additional opinion of 2 December 2003 the forensic medical expert stated that the fracture of the branches of the hyoid bone, the oedema and the abrasions on the neck could have been caused on 4 November 2003 by pressure from fingers, and had resulted in harm to the applicant’s health lasting up to twenty-one days, that is, minor harm to his health. 15. Investigators of the Krasnogvardeyskiy district prosecutor’s office refused to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers for lack of the elements of a crime in their actions. The investigators’ refusals (dated 13 November 2003, 21 November 2003, 28 December 2003, 7 February 2004, 27 April 2004, 6 June 2005, and 3 November 2005) were annulled by their superiors at the prosecutor’s office, because the pre-investigation inquiry, on which the refusals were based, was considered incomplete. 16. In the refusal of 7 February 2004 O., an investigator, found that the applicant’s injuries had been the result of the use of physical force by Officers Ch. and Kh. in order to apprehend the applicant, who had “disobeyed their commands and attempted to escape”. The investigator held that no criminal proceedings should be brought against the police officers for lack of the elements of a crime in their actions under Article 115 of the Criminal Code (minor harm to health), intent – which was lacking in their actions – being one of those elements. Nor did the investigator consider that there was sufficient information indicating the elements of a crime in the police officers’ actions under Article 286 § 1 of the Criminal Code (abuse of authority). 17. In a decision of 27 February 2004, setting aside the refusal of 7 February 2004, a senior prosecutor from the Adygeya Republic prosecutor’s office held that, in the course of an additional inquiry, the investigator should establish exactly what each of the police officers had done when restraining the applicant and placing him in their car, in particular if the injury had been inflicted by seizing the applicant by his neck. The prosecutor also held that it was necessary to give a legal assessment of the question whether there had been any need to apprehend the applicant, who was minor, on account of his swearing. The prosecutor noted that the relevant administrative proceedings had been brought against the applicant’s father, and no statements concerning those events had been taken from the applicant. 18. In the most recent refusal of 29 November 2005 the defects identified by the prosecutor were not rectified. O., the investigator, maintained his findings made in the decision of 7 February 2004, stating that the applicant’s allegations had not been confirmed by the results of the pre‑investigation inquiry. 19. The investigator relied on the police officers’ explanations that at 2 p.m. on 4 November 2003 the applicant’s brother had disobeyed their command to stop a motorcycle without a registration plate which he had been driving. The applicant had been sitting on the passenger’s seat. After the police officers had finally managed to stop the motorcycle at the petrol station, the applicant’s brother had refused to produce his driving licence. The police officers had been drawing up an administrative-offence record when the applicant had started walking away, swearing at them. They had “restrained him in order to prevent his escape”. 20. The investigator referred to explanations by Sh. that he had seen the police stopping the motorcycle at the petrol station, that he had been invited to act as an attesting witness and sign a record of the motorcycle’s seizure which the police had drawn up on the spot, and that the applicant’s brother had refused to sign the record and receive a copy of it. 21. The investigator’s decision also referred to statements by other third parties, in particular B., who worked at the petrol station and stated that he had seen the applicant falling onto the tarmac himself, resisting the police officers taking him to their car and trying to escape. B. stated that the police officers had not beaten up or strangled the applicant, but had “restrained him”. The applicant’s mother’s complaint that B. had given false statements was dismissed by an investigator of the Krasnogvardeyskiy district prosecutor’s office on the grounds that false explanations given in the framework of a pre-investigation inquiry, as opposed to false statements given in the course of a criminal investigation, were not punishable as a criminal offence (decision of 10 January 2004). 22. On 23 September 2005 the applicant’s mother lodged an application (жалоба) with the Krasnogvardeyskiy District Court (“the District Court”). She complained that on 27 April 2004 the Krasnogvardeyskiy district prosecutor’s office had refused to institute criminal proceedings against Officers Ch. and Kh. Its decision had been unfounded and on 3 May 2005 it had been set aside by the Prosecutor General’s Office. Since then she had not been informed of any new decision. She argued that the police officers’ actions, as a result of which the applicant had sustained serious bodily injuries, had been unlawful, and that criminal proceedings should be instituted against them. 23. On 26 September 2005 the District Court decided that the application fell to be examined under the rules of civil procedure, and gave the applicant’s mother a time-limit for complying with those rules, in particular in relation to paying a court fee. The applicant’s mother requested that her application be examined under the rules of criminal procedure, notably Article 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“the CCrP”). On 7 December 2005 the District Court discontinued the civil proceedings and decided to examine the application under Article 125 of the CCrP. 24. In its decision of 16 December 2005 the District Court examined the investigator’s decision of 29 November 2005 and endorsed the investigator’s conclusions that the police officers had acted lawfully. It also noted that the applicant, no longer a minor, should have applied to court himself. For those reasons, it rejected the application. 25. The applicant’s mother appealed against the decision, seeking, inter alia, to declare the refusal to institute criminal proceedings of 29 November 2005 unlawful and unfounded. On 31 January 2006 the Adygeya Republic Supreme Court quashed the decision, noting that the District Court should not have examined the application, as the applicant’s mother had lacked authority to act on the applicant’s behalf, and should not have examined the lawfulness of the police officers’ actions in its review under Article 125 of the CCrP (which concerned the lawfulness of investigators’ decisions). Since the District Court had not examined whether the refusal to institute criminal proceedings of 29 November 2005 was lawful and well-founded, the Adygeya Republic Supreme Court could not deal with that issue on appeal. 26. On 8 February 2006 the District Court held that the application did not fall to be examined under Article 125 of the CCrP and discontinued the proceedings. On 21 March 2006 the Adygeya Republic Supreme Court upheld that decision upon an appeal by the applicant’s mother, reiterating that she had lacked authority to act on the applicant’s behalf and that the lawfulness of the police officers’ actions could not be reviewed under Article 125 of the CCrP. It further stated that in her application she had not formulated a complaint that the refusal to institute criminal proceedings was unlawful or unfounded.

4. The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Klaipėda. 5. On 2 July 2013 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of possession of drugs with intention to distribute. On 9 July 2013 the applicant was brought to Šiauliai Remand Prison and was held there until 31 May 2016. In judgment of 23 December 2015 the applicant was sentenced to four years imprisonment by the Klaipėda District Court. Following an appeal by the applicant, the judgment became final on 25 May 2016. The applicant was then transferred to Alytus Correctional Facility and after serving his sentence was released on 30 June 2017. 6. In April 2014 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Šiauliai Regional Administrative Court about his conditions of detention in Šiauliai Remand Prison. He complained of: overcrowding; of there being no partition wall between toilets and cells; of insufficient ventilation; of insufficient time in the open air; of insufficient time for showering; of the presence of cockroaches; of inmates smoking in the cells; of no long-stay or short visits; of the fact that he had not been allowed to go home; of the low energy value of the food provided; of the prohibition on receiving food from relatives and friends; and of the prohibition on having his own blanket and a music player. 7. On 27 June 2014 the Šiauliai Regional Administrative Court held that for 135 days the applicant had been housed in cell no. 53, and the personal space available to him had varied between 1.87 and 3.12 sq. m. This had been a clear violation of domestic norms. For eighty-seven days the applicant had been held in cell no. 50, where the personal space available to him had varied between 1.86 and 4.65 sq. m, and it had come close to a violation of domestic norms. The court further held that the presence of toilets in the applicant’s cell had not corresponded to the requirements of domestic law, that the lighting had been insufficient and the temperature had been too low, and that the food provided had had insufficient energy value. The court noted that inmates could buy food and other necessities in the shops of the facility. The applicant’s other complaints were dismissed as unsubstantiated. As regards the prohibition on having his own blanket and a music player, the court held that the use of personal blankets was not allowed in accordance with domestic norms. As for music players, inmates could use television sets, computers, computer-game devices, discs that could not be rewritten, other memory cards of up to 4GB and bedding (except for a pillow, a mattress and a blanket) that could be given to them by their spouses, partners or close relatives. As regards long-stay and short visits, the court held that remand prisoners did not have a right to long-stay visits but he had a right to short visits of up to two hours. The applicant asked for a long-stay visit but on 20 January 2014 the prosecutor decided not to allow him such a visit. The court also held that inmates could be allowed to go home for up to five days in the event of the death or serious illness of a spouse, partner or close relative, or in the event of a natural disaster that had caused serious pecuniary damage to the inmate, his or her spouse, partner or close relatives. However, in his request of 31 January 2014 the applicant did not indicate any of those circumstances. As a result, the applicant was awarded 1,200 Lithuanian litai (LTL – approximately 348 euros (EUR)) in compensation for inadequate material conditions of detention for 222 days during the period between 9 July 2013 and 3 April 2014. 8. The applicant appealed, and on 11 February 2015 the Supreme Administrative Court held that it was impossible to calculate for how many days the applicant had had sufficient personal space at his disposal, and decided to hold that for 245 days the applicant had not had sufficient personal space, and that this had been a breach of Article 3 of the Convention. The court thus decided to increase the compensation to EUR 1,500. 9. In October 2014 the applicant lodged a new complaint concerning his material conditions in Šiauliai Remand Prison. He complained of overcrowding, low temperature, dampness, insufficient lighting, prisoners smoking in the cells, that his partner had not been able to pay him a long‑stay visit and that he had not been allowed to “take holidays”. It appears that the applicant had asked the prison management to allow him to receive a long-stay visit from his spouse and his sister on 28 April 2014. 10. On 5 December 2014 the Šiauliai Regional Administrative Court held that during the period between 4 April and 5 October 2014 – for 176 days – the applicant had had insufficient cell space. As regards long-stay visits, the court agreed with Šiauliai Remand Prison and stated that the applicant had not been entitled to them under domestic law; he could have had short visits but, however, he had never asked for them. The court accepted the argument of the Šiauliai Remand Prison that remand detainees had been held in prisons or correctional facilities for short periods of time and they were not in a similar situation to convicted inmates. The court awarded the applicant EUR 869 in compensation for the material conditions of his detention. 11. The applicant appealed, and on 21 September 2015 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the first-instance decision in its entirety.

5. The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Bor. 6. The proceedings began on 30 March 1992 when the applicant brought a lawsuit against third persons concerning the execution of a contract. 7. On 19 June 1997 the first-instance court accepted the applicant’s claim. 8. On 30 October 1997 the appeal court quashed the decision on legal costs, remitted that issue to the first-instance court for a retrial and upheld the remainder of the first-instance judgment. 9. The first-instance court subsequently rendered three decisions on the costs of the proceedings on 23 July 1998, 19 February 1999 and 3 March 2000. All of these decisions were quashed on appeal. 10. On 5 February 2013 the first-instance court rendered a fourth decision on the issue of legal costs awarding the applicant approximately 2,000 euros (EUR). 11. According to the information on the file, the proceedings are currently pending before the second-instance court. 12. On 13 March 2013 the Constitutional Court found a violation of the applicant’s right to a hearing within a reasonable time and awarded him EUR 300 for the non-pecuniary damage suffered in this regard. Furthermore, the Constitutional Court ordered the applicant’s proceedings to be expedited.

5. The applicant was born in 1982 and lives in Cadiz. 6. On 2 March 2009 the Hamburg District Court, after having served a summons on the applicant to appear at the address that he had at that time in Hamburg, convicted the applicant of assault and sentenced him to forty day‑fines of 25 euros (EUR) each and allowed him to pay his fine in instalments in the light of his economic situation. The District Court had, at the applicant’s request, authorised Mr Arif – at that time still a law student – to act as defence counsel under Article 138 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 19 below). 7. The applicant and the public prosecutor lodged appeals. The prosecutor’s appeal was directed merely against the sentencing. Thereafter, the applicant moved to Spain to work as a chef in a hotel and communicated his new address to the court. 8. On 24 April 2009 the Hamburg Regional Court withdrew the authorisation of Mr Arif to act as defence counsel, while at the same time rejecting the application lodged by Mr Arif for the applicant to be released from the obligation to appear in person at the appeal hearing. This decision was served on the applicant in Spain. 9. Also on 24 April 2009 the Regional Court fixed the date for the oral hearing of the applicant’s appeal to 9.10 a.m. on 13 May 2009. It decided to serve the summons on the applicant via public notification because the applicant had moved abroad. The summons was displayed on the court’s noticeboard from 27 April until 12 May 2009. 10. On 12 May 2009 Mr Arif learned by telephone of the Court of Appeal’s decision of that same day to overturn the Regional Court’s decision in respect of his authorisation to act as counsel for the applicant and of the appeal hearing having been scheduled for the next morning. He applied by fax for the hearing to be adjourned, citing the fact that he was going to be out of town the next day. He furthermore asked that documents from the case file – in particular the public prosecutor’s appeal – be sent to him. The presiding judge ordered that a copy of that appeal and of the decision to serve the summons of the applicant by public notification be sent to the applicant’s lawyer. This proved impossible, as the lawyer’s fax machine had no receiving function. The lawyer was offered access to the file at the courthouse the following day at 8 a.m. (that is to say immediately before the hearing), which he declined, stating that he would be out of town. 11. On 13 May 2009 the Regional Court refused, in a separate decision, an application lodged by the applicant’s lawyer for the appeal hearing to be adjourned. It stated that the lawyer had waived his right to be summoned within the respective time-limit because he had known about the date of the appeal hearing (as evidenced by his fax of the previous day), and that the properly summoned applicant had failed to appear without providing any reason. Simultaneously, the Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal without an assessment of the merits, in accordance with Article 329 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 19 below), because he had not appeared at the appeal hearing (without any sufficient excuse, and despite having been summoned), nor had he been represented by a lawyer in a permissible manner. 12. On 10 March 2010 the Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s application for the restoration of the status quo ante. It found that the requirements for the serving of a summons by means of public notification, as set out in Article 40 §§ 2 and 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 19 below), had been met. The applicant’s lawyer had waived his right to be summoned, and his application for an adjournment had not relied on the failure to comply with the time-limit for serving a summons but had rather invoked scheduling problems, which he had not described in greater detail. 13. On 15 April 2010 the Court of Appeal upheld that decision. It considered that the applicant had been properly summoned to the appeal hearing because the requirements for service by public notification, as set out in Article 40 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, had been met. The summons to attend the hearing before the District Court had been served on the applicant’s previous address in Germany and he had lodged the appeal in question. As regards his interest in having the District Court’s judgment reviewed, it had been his responsibility to ensure that it was possible for the summons to appear at the appeal hearing to be served in Germany. As a result of his move to Spain it had not been possible to serve the summons at his previous address in Hamburg. It had thus been acceptable for the summons to be served by public notification. There had been neither an obligation to undertake an attempt to serve the summons at the applicant’s new address abroad prior to serving it via public notification nor one to notify him at that address that the summons had been served by public notification. The applicant had also not specifically authorised (under the first sentence of Article 145a § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure) his lawyer to receive summonses (see paragraph 19 below). Moreover, the applicant had not convincingly shown that he had been prevented through no fault of his own from appearing at the appeal hearing, as required by Article 44 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 19 below), because the applicant’s lawyer had not provided an affidavit to support his claim that he had advised the applicant, on 12 May 2009, that the latter did not need to attend the hearing because he had not been summoned. As his appearance in person had been ordered (see paragraph 8 above), it had not been possible to carry out the appeal hearing in his absence. 14. On 16 July 2010 the Court of Appeal rejected an appeal on points of law lodged by the applicant against the Regional Court’s judgment of 13 May 2009 as ill-founded, finding that the review of the Regional Court’s judgment had not revealed any legal errors that had been detrimental to the applicant. 15. On 16 November 2010 the Federal Constitutional Court declined to consider a constitutional complaint lodged by the applicant, without providing reasons (no. 2 BvR 2147/10). The decision was served on the applicant’s lawyer on 10 December 2010. 16. Following communication of the case and unsuccessful friendly settlement negotiations, on 8 July 2016 the Government informed the Court of their intention to resolve the issue raised by the application. They produced a unilateral declaration, in which they acknowledged violations of Article 6 §§ 1 and/or 3 (c), as well as Article 6 § 3 (b) and (c) of the Convention and offered to pay the applicant a sum to cover any pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage together with any costs and expenses. The Government requested that the Court strike out the application in accordance with Article 37 § 1 of the Convention. 17. By a letter to the Court of 30 August 2016 the applicant indicated that he was not satisfied with the terms of the unilateral declaration. The aim he pursued with the present application was a reopening of the criminal proceedings against him and a subsequent acquittal. He argued that, under domestic law, such a reopening could not be achieved if the Court struck the case out of its list, but required a judgment finding a violation. Furthermore, the compensation offered was insufficient. 18. By a submission of 14 October 2016 the Government confirmed that there was – and in fact, there still is – no case-law of the domestic courts regarding whether Article 359 no. 6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides for the reopening of criminal proceedings following a judgment of the Court finding a violation (see paragraph 19 below), also applies to violations acknowledged by the Government by way of a unilateral declaration. This question was for the domestic courts to assess. They acknowledged that the provision had, in practice, been construed narrowly.

6. The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in İzmir. 7. On 21 March 2007 the applicant attended celebrations for the festival of Newroz in Buca, a district of the city of İzmir, as one of the moderators. While she was hosting the event, the applicant addressed the crowd in Kurdish and invited them to observe a minute’s silence in memory of “Newroz martyrs” and martyrs for freedom and democracy. 8. On 10 April 2007 the İzmir Assize Court issued a warrant for the applicant’s arrest and a search of her residence. 9. On 11 April 2007 she was arrested at her house. 10. On 12 April 2007 the applicant was brought before the public prosecutor and the investigating judge. In her statements to the public prosecutor and the judge, she maintained that she had attended the Newroz celebrations as a moderator and that she had not shouted any illegal slogans. She stated that she had called for a minute’s silence in memory of revolutionary martyrs. The investigating judge remanded the applicant in custody following her questioning. 11. On 24 April 2007 the public prosecutor instituted criminal proceedings before the İzmir Assize Court against the applicant and seven other individuals, charging them under section 7(2) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713) with disseminating propaganda in favour of an illegal organisation and, under Article 215 of the Criminal Code, praising a crime or a criminal. Subsequently the criminal proceedings commenced before the İzmir Assize Court. 12. On 13 August 2007, at the end of the first hearing in the trial, the first‑instance court ordered the applicant’s release. 13. On 10 September 2008 the İzmir Assize Court convicted the applicant under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713 of disseminating propaganda in favour of an illegal organisation and sentenced her to one year’s imprisonment. The court observed that the applicant had made a speech in Kurdish, that a man had translated her words into Turkish at the end of her speech, and that according to the translation she had uttered the following sentences: “Welcome. I wish you a happy Newroz. We thank those who enabled us to be where we are today. I invite you to stand to observe a moment of silence in memory of Newroz martyrs, martyrs for freedom and democracy, and those who enabled us to be where we are today.” 14. The Assize Court further noted that following the applicant’s speech the crowd had made a “V” sign and that during the speeches made by the other speakers, the crowd had chanted slogans in favour of the PKK and its leader. According to the court, the Newroz celebrations had turned into a propaganda event in favour of the PKK and the speakers had chanted slogans and had incited the crowd to chant slogans. The court also observed that during the celebrations, symbols and banners of the PKK had been carried by the crowd. The court found that the speakers had provoked the crowd and had as a result committed the offence of disseminating propaganda in favour of a terrorist organisation. The court considered that in view of the applicant’s conviction under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713 it was unnecessary to deliver a decision in respect of the charges under Article 215 of the Criminal Code. 15. On 21 September 2010 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the İzmir Assize Court. 16. Between 13 January and 22 June 2012 the applicant served her prison sentence. On 22 June 2012 the Diyarbakır Assize Court ordered her conditional release.

4. The applicant was born in 1930 and lives in Vilnius. 5. On 29 December 2001 the applicant’s husband asked the national authorities to restore his property rights to a house and a plot of land in Vilnius which had belonged to his grandfather before nationalisation. On 28 February 2002 the applicant’s husband specified his initial request and asked to have the plot of land restored in natura to him if possible, or to provide him with another plot of land in Vilnius. 6. The property rights of the applicant’s husband were restored to some premises (a storehouse) in Vilnius in 2003 and it was decided to pay him monetary compensation for the other premises that had not been returned to him in natura. 7. On 10 April 2003 the Vilnius County Administration informed the Vilnius Municipality that the property rights of the applicant’s husband would be restored to 0.1638 hectares of land for residential purposes. 8. On 11 June 2003 the Vilnius Municipality informed the Vilnius County Administration that a plot of land of 0.1007 hectares had been formed near the buildings owned by the applicant’s husband. 9. In November 2003 the Vilnius City First District Court established as a legal fact that the grandmother of the applicant’s husband had owned a plot of land in Vilnius measuring 362 square “fathoms” (sieksnis – 1 fathom equals 1.82 m). 10. On 12 March 2004 the Vilnius County Administration informed the Vilnius Municipality that the property rights of the applicant’s husband would be restored and that he was a candidate to receive a plot of land measuring 0.1638 hectares in natura. In July 2004 the Vilnius County Administration issued a document stating that the applicant’s husband had a right to a plot of land of 0.1638 hectares. 11. In August 2006 the authorities replied to the applicant husband’s letter asking why only a plot of land of 0.1007 hectares instead of 0.1638 hectares had been formed near the house, and stated that the plot of land 0.1007 hectares where the premises had been situated, would be divided for several co-owners of the premises and the rest of the land would be returned to the applicant’s husband by the means he chose. 12. On 16 May 2007 the applicant’s husband died and the applicant became his heir. 13. On 27 March 2009 the applicant’s son, as the representative of the applicant, asked the authorities to restore the property rights of his father to the plot of land of 0.1171 hectares by paying compensation in securities. 14. On 9 April 2009 the property rights of the applicant’s husband were restored in natura to 0.0467 hectares of land and it was provided that compensation of approximately 1,642 euros (EUR) would be paid in securities for the remaining 0.1181 hectares of land. On 24 July 2009 this decision was changed and it was decided to restore the applicant’s husband’s property rights to a plot of land of 0.0362 hectares in natura and to pay compensation in securities for the plot of land of 0.1286 hectares, amounting to approximately EUR 1,788. 15. In October 2009 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court, claiming that the compensation in securities, established by the national authorities, was unjust, and asking to have the value of the plot of land measuring 0.1286 hectares recalculated. In February 2010 the applicant applied to have the administrative proceedings suspended and to have the matter of calculation of compensation referred to the Constitutional Court. 16. On 10 February 2010 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court held that the Vilnius County Administration had calculated the compensation in accordance with the methodology approved by the Government (see paragraph 33 below). However, the calculation of the municipality provided that the market value of the plot was approximately EUR 786,029 and the market value of the plot as calculated by the Centre of Registers was approximately EUR 750,313. The court stated that in comparison with these numbers, the value of the plot of land provided by the Vilnius County Administration (see paragraph 14 above) was 327.5 times lower, and it could not conform to the principle of equal value. Moreover, in accordance with the methodology approved by the Government, the calculation was the same for plots of land in the city centre and outside the city. The court thus decided to suspend the administrative proceedings and to refer the matter to the Constitutional Court. 17. In April 2013 the National Land Service informed the applicant that the relevant laws had been changed and that she could change the form of restoration of the property rights to 0.1286 hectares of land. Instead of securities she could choose one of the following: to be assigned a new plot of land of equivalent value to the one held previously; to have the liabilities to the State legally voided; to be assigned a new plot of land for individual construction; to receive monetary compensation. It appears that the applicant did not reply to this letter. 18. On 30 September 2013 the applicant was included on the list of persons to receive a plot of land for construction of an individual house. 19. After the matter had been resolved by the Constitutional Court (see paragraph 35 below), the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court rejected the applicant’s claim on 4 November 2013. The court analysed the domestic regulation regarding the calculation of the value of the land and observed that this matter had been referred to the Constitutional Court, which held that the methodology approved by the Government setting down the principles of calculation of the value of the land was in accordance with the law. The Vilnius Regional Administrative Court also held that the Law on the Restoration of Citizens’ Ownership Rights to Existing Real Property had been changed and persons could, before 1 July 2013, choose other means to restore their property rights than by payment of securities. If no other means were chosen, the property rights had to be restored by paying monetary compensation. The court further observed that the authorities had suggested the applicant choose other means to have her property rights restored (see paragraph 17 above), and that in September 2013 it had been decided to include the applicant on the list of persons to receive a plot of land for construction of an individual house. The decision the applicant complained of, that is to say the calculation of the compensation to be paid in securities, had not been of legal importance to the applicant because the Law on the Restoration of Citizens’ Ownership Rights to Existing Real Property had been changed and it had become impossible to restore the property rights in securities. The decision to restore the applicant’s property rights by paying her compensation in securities had to be changed to monetary compensation. Because the applicant had been included on the list of persons to receive a new plot of land for individual construction, she could use another way to restore her property rights. 20. The applicant appealed. On 29 May 2014 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the first-instance decision. The court also emphasised the argument of the Constitutional Court that, in calculating the compensation, it was justified to pay heed not only to the market value of the property but also to its value at the time of nationalisation and to the changes in the quality and the value of property. The Supreme Administrative Court also held that the applicant had complained about the length of the court proceedings. The court held that the applicant had lodged the complaint on 4 November 2009; it had been accepted by the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court on 17 November 2009. On 10 February 2010 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court had decided to apply to the Constitutional Court, which had adopted its decision on 11 September 2013. The proceedings in the administrative case had recommenced on 16 September 2013 and the decision had been adopted on 4 November 2013. Given the complexity of the case and referral of the matter to the Constitutional Court, the length of proceedings had not breached the reasonable time requirement. 21. On 11 November 2014 the National Land Service informed the applicant’s son, as the applicant’s representative, that on 1 November 2014 it had become possible to restore the property rights by receiving a plot of forest of equal value. The applicant was asked to express her wish before 1 March 2015. It appears that she never replied to this letter.

4. The applicant was born in 1972 and is detained in Orsk. 5. Late in the evening on 19 December a resident of Orsk, Mr Sh. was killed in his home. Suspicion fell on the applicant. 6. The circumstances surrounding the applicant’s arrest and questioning are partly disputed, and therefore each version is given below. 7. On 23 December 2004 two operatives of the town anti-narcotics brigade, First Lieutenants Kh. and U., were waiting in ambush near the applicant’s hiding place. When the applicant appeared, they approached him. Kh. noticed bruises under the applicant’s eye and on a lip. The officers introduced themselves, and asked the applicant to follow them. In reply, the applicant (who was drunk) cursed and shouted that as an ex‑commando he would easily overpower the officers. He hit Kh. in the chest, and then tried to flee. The operatives used sambo (a martial art) to tackle him, and took him in handcuffs to Sovietsky police station (Советский РОВД г. Орска). 8. At the station the applicant was shown into room 31 for an “explanatory conversation” (разъяснительная беседа) with Captain Shch. in order to clarify the circumstances of the crime. 9. According to one source, Shch. noticed that the applicant had a black eye and asked about its origin. The applicant explained that he had had a fight with a neighbour. According to another source, Shch. noticed no injuries on the applicant. 10. During the conversation, which was respectful, the applicant decided to confess because, as he said, he would be unable to live with a heavy heart. The applicant told that on 19 December he had been drinking with Sh., that Sh. had angered him, and that he had twice punched him on the nose. At 5.55 p.m. Shch. recorded the confession (явка с повинной). The applicant signed it and was handed over to Investigator Po. at Oktyabrsky police station. 11. At 5 p.m. Investigator Po. opened a criminal investigation into Sh.’s murder. Once in front of the investigator, the applicant said that he had confessed at Sovietsky police station and wrote another confession. This time he added that after he had punched Sh., Sh. had collapsed to the floor and fallen asleep. The applicant noted that he was confessing without psychological or physical coercion. 12. At 7.12 p.m. the investigator formally detained the applicant as a suspect. The applicant agreed with the detention order and made no remarks. The investigator told the applicant’s partner about the detention. 13. The investigator also commissioned a forensic examination to find out, in particular, if the applicant’s hands were injured. 14. According to one source, in the morning of, or, according to another source, at 2–3 p.m. on 23 December 2004 the applicant was arrested by three officers, two young fair-haired ones, and an older one wearing a moustache. They put a gun to the applicant’s head and drove him to Sovietsky police station. 15. At the station the applicant was shown into a room on the third floor. The officers started to punch and kick him on the sides, buttocks, and ears, urging him to incriminate himself. The beatings left him bleeding with a burst eardrum, a black eye, split lips, and several chipped teeth. On seeing the futility of the beatings, the officers turned to torture. They tied the applicant into a painful position called “the swallow” (“ласточка”), in which hands and legs are fastened together behind the back, and four times suffocated him with a gas-mask filled with ammonia. After six hours, already after dark, the applicant capitulated and penned a dictated confession. He was handed over to Investigator Po. at Oktyabrsky police station. 16. Once in front of the investigator, the applicant complained to him of the torture. In response, the investigator commissioned a forensic examination of the applicant, but for some reason omitted to record the applicant’s complaint. 17. Later the same day, a forensic doctor examined the applicant. The applicant told the doctor that he and Sh. had struck each other in the face and that the police had tortured him. To his description of torture he added slaps on his right hand. The doctor established the following injuries: bruises on the left eye and cheekbone caused by a blunt object three to five days before, and bruises on the upper lip and damage to the two upper front teeth caused by blunt objects no more than one day before. The right hand was not injured. 18. Another report made on the same day established that the applicant was moderately intoxicated as a result of alcohol. 19. At 1.30 a.m. on 24 December 2004 the applicant was transferred to the temporary-detention centre (ИВС) of Orsk. On admission, the duty officer noticed a bruise under the applicant’s left eye. 20. At 12–1 p.m. on 24 December 2004, the applicant (aided by counsel) re-appeared before Investigator Po. The investigator formally interviewed the applicant first as a suspect, and then as the accused. Both times the applicant declined to testify and made no other remarks. 21. On 25 December 2004 the applicant appeared before a judge of the Oktyabrsky District Court of Orsk. The judge ordered that the applicant be detained on remand. The applicant agreed to be detained and made no other remarks. 22. In February 2005 Po. opened a criminal investigation into the theft of electronic devices from Sh.’s home. He joined the two investigations, and on 21 February 2005 interviewed the applicant as the accused. The applicant (aided by counsel) declined to testify and made no other remarks. 23. On 10 March 2005 the applicant complained to the Orenburg Region public prosecutor of torture. 24. On 21 March 2005 the applicant went on hunger strike in protest against the lack of a reply. 25. On 28 March 2005 the complaint was referred to the prosecutor of the Sovietsky district of Orsk for a pre-investigation inquiry (доследственная проверка). 26. The inquiry into the applicant’s allegation of torture was entrusted to Investigator Pa. of the Oktyabrsky district prosecutor’s office. 27. In his turn, Pa. asked the head of the unit in which the applicant’s alleged assailants served to hold an internal inquiry (служебная проверка). Officers Kh., U., and Shch. wrote out their versions of the applicant’s arrest and interview at Sovietsky police station. The head of the unit issued three almost identical performance reviews for the officers, saying, among other compliments, that each of them could “inspire others to confessional conversation” (обладает умением располагать людей к доверительной беседе). The internal inquiry concluded that the applicant had not been ill‑treated. 28. In addition, Pa. interviewed the applicant (assisted by counsel) and Investigator Po. 29. On 15 April 2005 Pa. decided not to institute criminal proceedings. Based on the gathered evidence, he concluded that the applicant had been injured before he had been brought to Sovietsky police station, and thus the officers had no case to answer. At the same time, the investigator decided not to prosecute the applicant for falsely accusing the officers because he had been honestly mistaken that they had wronged him. 30. On 26 April 2005 the Oktyabriskiy District Court of Orsk found the applicant guilty of murder and theft. The court established that the applicant had beaten Sh. to death while they had been drinking in Sh.’s flat and had stolen some home electronic equipment on his way out. 31. At the trial the applicant pleaded not guilty. He said that on the night of the murder he had been drinking elsewhere and that he had been tortured into falsely incriminating himself as proven by the injuries on his body. 32. The court dismissed this defence, noting that the forensic report suggested that the applicant had been injured before his arrest, and that the pre-investigation inquiry had cleared the officers of any misconduct. 33. The court sentenced the applicant to eleven years’ imprisonment. 34. On 2 June 2005 the Orenburg Regional Court upheld this sentence. 35. In January 2008 the applicant’s representative, Mr Kiryukhin applied for judicial review of the decision not to institute criminal proceedings against the operatives. He alleged that Pa.’s inquiry had been superficial because he had failed to have the officers undergo a lie-detector test. 36. On 25 January 2008 the Sovietsky District Court ruled that for pre‑investigation inquiries a lie-detector test was not mandatory and upheld the investigator’s findings. 37. The applicant appealed, pleading that he himself would be prepared to undergo a lie-detector test to prove his accusations, that the court had blindly sided with the operatives, that in 2006 or 2007 U. had been convicted for torturing others and of forging official records, and that the court had ignored the case-law of the Strasbourg Court. 38. On 26 February 2008 the Orenburg Regional Court upheld the decision of 25 January 2008 without answering the argument about U.’s conviction.

4. The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Moscow. He is a former FSB (Russian security service) officer. 5. On 19 May 2004 the Military Court of the Moscow Circuit found the applicant guilty of the disclosure of State secrets and the illegal possession of ammunition and sentenced him to four years’ imprisonment. 6. On 13 September 2004 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the applicant’s conviction on appeal. 7. According to the Government, on 26 May 2005 the Federal Penitentiary Service of the Russian Federation (the “FSIN”) decided that the applicant should serve his sentence in correctional settlement facility (колония-поселение) no. IK-13 in Nizhniy Tagil, Sverdlovsk Region, located approximately 1,800 km away from his family home in Moscow. The Government did not submit a copy of this decision. 8. On 19 August 2005 the Tagilstroyevskiy District Court of Nizhniy Tagil ordered the applicant’s release on parole. The court heard a representative of the prison administration and the prosecutor, who considered the applicant’s release on parole to be possible. The prosecutor did not appeal and on 29 August 2005 the relevant decision became final. On 30 August 2005 the applicant was released. 9. On 31 August 2005 the prosecutor asked the District Court to reinstate the requisite time-limit to permit him to appeal against the decision of 19 August 2005, noting that he had received a copy thereof only five days after its delivery. 10. On 1 September 2005 the District Court reinstated a time-limit for the prosecutor’s appeal. The court relied on the relevant provision of the rules of criminal procedure which provided for such reinstatement if there had been a delay of at least five days before a party to the proceedings had received a copy of the impugned decision. 11. On 16 September 2005 the Sverdlovsk Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the decision of 1 September 2005 and quashed the decision of 19 August 2005, remitting the matter for fresh consideration. 12. On 18 September 2005 a group of police officers broke arrested the applicant in his flat in Moscow. 13. On 21 September 2005 the applicant was transported back to correctional settlement facility no. IK-13 and was placed in a disciplinary cell. 14. On 24 November 2005 the District Court re-examined the applicant’s application for parole and dismissed it. 15. On 15 March 2006 the Regional Court upheld the decision of 24 November 2005 on appeal. 16. Upon arrival at the facility on 28 July 2005 the applicant was placed in cell no. 8 in the disciplinary block. On 9 August 2005 he was transferred to one of the dormitories. He was released from the facility on 30 August 2005. 17. Following his arrest on 18 September 2005, the applicant was taken back to the facility on 22 September 2005. Upon arrival, he was again placed in cell no. 8 in the disciplinary block. On 30 September 2005 he was transferred to one of the dormitories. 18. According to the Government, cell no. 8 measured 8 sq. m and was equipped with four sleeping places. From 28 July to 8 August 2005 the applicant was detained in the cell alone and from 8 to 9 August 2005 two other inmates were held together with the applicant. The cell was equipped with both natural and artificial ventilation. 19. At all times the applicant was provided with an individual sleeping place and bed sheets. He was allowed two hours’ exercise per day in a specially designated area. 20. The cell had windows with opening vents. The metal bars on the windows did not prevent daylight from entering the cell. The electric light in the cell was on constantly and at night low-voltage bulbs were used to maintain lighting. The cell had central heating and a cold water supply system. There was a tank with boiled potable water. A 110 cm high brick wall and a plywood door separated the toilet from the living area of the cell. The distance between the toilet and the dining table/nearest sleeping place was at least 1.5 m. Hygiene and food provision both met the statutory standards. 21. According to the applicant and statements from other inmates submitted by the applicant, cell no. 8 measured 2.5 m by 3.5 m and housed between 3 and 7 inmates. A large part of the cell was occupied by a cupboard where mattresses and pillows were stored during the daytime. No bed linen was provided. There was no toilet paper, soap or detergent for cleaning the toilet. There was no place to keep personal belongings. The cell was infested with mice and woodlice. The electric light was permanently on. 22. In the summer, the cell was very hot and humid and the ventilation did not work. The electric lighting was insufficient. There was no drinking water available. The only source of water was a tap above the toilet, which was a hole in the floor. The tap water was used for “flushing” away faeces, washing and drinking. It was of very poor quality. The toilet was not separated from the living area of the cell. Once a week the inmates received a basin of hot water for washing their clothes. 23. From 6 a.m. to 10 p.m. the bunk beds were folded up and attached to the wall. The inmates could only stand or squat, or sit on a narrow ledge which ran along the edge of the cell in order to let their feet rest. 24. The inmates did not receive newspapers. Nor was there a radio in the cell. Food was of very poor quality and scarce. The daily outdoor exercise lasted between fifteen and forty minutes. 25. On an unspecified date the applicant complained to the prosecutor, alleging that detaining him in such a disciplinary cell was in contravention of the applicable laws. 26. On 22 November 2005 the prosecutor dismissed the complaint. He advised the applicant that at the material time the facility did not have a quarantine area in which newly arrived convicts could be placed for the purpose of medical checks. He further informed the applicant that, following a report by the prosecutor, the administration had made the necessary arrangements to set up a proper quarantine area in the facility. Lastly, the prosecutor explained that the applicant was entitled to contest the prosecutor’s findings in a court or before a superior prosecutor.

6. The first applicant was born in 1984 and the second applicant in 2009. 7. A had a relationship with C and in 2009 their daughter, B, was born. The family lived together at the house of C’s parents until January 2014 when A and B moved out. B continued to see C regularly and spend two to three nights a week at the house he shared with his parents. 8. According to A, on an unspecified date in June 2014 B, then four and a half years old, was playing with her genitals in front of A and told her that she had been playing like that with her father, C, every evening before going to bed. 9. On 11 June 2014 A called “the Brave Telephone”, a children’s helpline, which advised her to contact the Polyclinic for the Protection of Children in X (hereinafter “the Polyclinic”). On the same evening, A took B to C’s house and left her there to spend the night with her father. 10. The following day A called the Polyclinic and scheduled an appointment for B for 20 June 2014. It is unknown which information A gave the Polyclinic at that time. 11. The next day, A and B travelled to another town to visit A’s family. According to A, on 14 June 2014 when B was with her maternal aunt, she asked her to “touch [herself] down there” and told the aunt that “daddy has been playing with [her] so as to touch [her] on the genitals with his hands, which [she] told [her] paternal grandparents and [her] grandfather shouted at [her] father”. B also told her aunt that C had been singing a song to her about a bunny. The aunt considered the lyrics of the song as having erotic content. 12. On 16 June 2014 A went to the Y Police Station to report that C had been sexually abusing their child, B, at the time aged four and a half. A was interviewed by a police officer. According to the police report, A said that about two and half years previously she had found her daughter naked from the waist to the knees in a bed with her partner, C, who was asleep. C’s face had been close to the child’s genitals. A had woken him up and asked him why B was naked. C had replied that she had probably taken her clothes off while he had been asleep. Since there had been no other suspicious signs in B or C’s behaviour at the time, A had not taken any action. However, in the spring of 2014, when A, B, and A’s sister had been out in public, B had suddenly grabbed a woman she did not know by her genitals. Around then C had been taking care of B most of the time. Also, on 14 June 2014 A had left B with her aunt, A’s sister. When A had returned after about an hour, her sister had told her that B had said that C had been “touching [her] down there”, and that she had heard B singing some songs about “a bunny entering a hole”. B had said that she had told her paternal grandparents all this, and that her grandfather had “yelled at daddy not to do things like that anymore”. 13. According to A, she did not receive any assistance from the police and was only told to contact the Polyclinic, which she had already done (see paragraph 10 above). 14. On the same day the police interviewed D and E, A’s siblings. D confirmed A’s allegations, and said that she had recorded some of B’s behaviour and statements on her mobile telephone. E said that one day mid-June 2014 B had started to behave aggressively towards him, had wanted to kiss him on the mouth and had tried to touch his genitals. He had told D about it. 15. On the same day, C’s father reported to the Y Welfare Centre that A had been “emotionally and physically abusing B”, in that she was frequently shouting at B, hitting and insulting her. 16. On 17 June 2014 the police interviewed a paediatrician who had treated B. She said that A had approached her the previous day very upset and had wanted to discuss the possible sexual abuse of B by her father, C. The doctor said that C had been taking care of B most of the time, and that when she had needed medical assistance, he had been the one who had brought B to see her. The doctor described B as a communicative, bright and intelligent child and said that she had not noticed any signs of any kind of abuse. 17. On the same day the police interviewed two teachers in the kindergarten B had been attending. They both described B as a normal, communicative child. Neither of them had noticed any signs of abuse. 18. On the same day A reported the alleged sexual abuse of B by C to the Y Social Welfare Centre (hereinafter “the Centre”). She gave the Centre details on the alleged abuse and informed them that she had already made an appointment at the Polyclinic. A report was drawn up and on the same day forwarded to the Y Police. On 18 June 2014 the Centre contacted the Polyclinic inquiring about the exact date of their appointment with A and B. 19. On 20 June 2014 B was seen by a multidisciplinary team at the Polyclinic. According to A, when she arrived at the Polyclinic she found that C was also there. She was surprised since she had not been informed that he would be present. According to her, both she and C were constantly present during the interviews with B, except for maybe five minutes. According to the Government, the first applicant and C were “processed” at the Polyclinic but were not present during the interviews with B. 20. According to the Government, on 23 June 2014 the Y Police Department requested the Polyclinic to urgently deliver to them its findings concerning B. 21. On 2 July 2014, as instructed by the Polyclinic, B was examined by a gynaecologist. Both her parents were there, but neither of them were present during the examination. No signs of sexual penetration or a fresh or older injury were observed. 22. On 4 July 2014 a multidisciplinary team from the Polyclinic issued a report on B. According to that report, during the assessment B was seen by a social worker, a paediatrician, a psychologist and a psychiatrist. The report does not state the dates she was seen by any of the specialists. The relevant parts of that report read as follows: “Assessment and opinion of the social worker The girl came to the [interview with] the social worker accompanied by her parents ... During the interview with the parents, the girl entered the [interview] room several times. She accepts to stay alone, but on several occasions she exits the room and asks that her mother join her. During the conversation... she says that “dad touched her [vagina]” and that mum “told her to say that”, no other information can be obtained ... Assessment and opinion of the paediatrician ... sexual organ externally female, clean, no irritations or change of colour... Appointment arranged with ... gynaecologist ... for 30 June 2014. Assessment and opinion of the psychologist The girl comes accompanied by her parents ... At this point the girls is separated from her parents and remains alone with the interviewer but several times exits the room checking on her parents, which she also does when parents were in the room while she was outside in the hallway with a companion ... As her reason for coming she says that her mother had told her that her father “had done something bad, was touching her [vagina]”, which is why “her mum is protecting her from her father, so that she does not go close to him”. She provides no further details ... In conclusion ... [the girl] is growing up in a family with separating parents, she witnesses their broken down relationship, and is exposed to negative attributes of the other parent by the mother, which creates a pressure on the girl ... During the conversation she says that the reason for her coming was inadequate behaviour by the father, but she has difficulties providing details. No signs confirming such behaviour are observed through psychological assessment ... Assessment and opinion of the psychiatrist ... The girl states that she lives with her mother, that her father used to be very good, but now he is very bad and rude to her, she claims that he “touched her [vagina]”. The girl talks about the father’s alleged actions spontaneously, without any discomfort ... Later on, we get the information that her mother told her to say so ... Psychiatric profile: ... established verbal communication, says she had been sexually abused by the father, but without discomfort or adequate affections ... Psychiatric assessment does not show signs clearly showing sexual abuse (affectionate inadequacy), but it is not possible to exclude inducement of the girl, which constitutes a risk of emotional abuse. Opinion of the multidisciplinary team The girl has been included into the multidisciplinary assessment as instructed by the relevant Centre and police, for suspicions of abuse by the father... During the examination, the girl did not show clear signs of being sexually abused. The girl did not describe contextually characteristic situations and her affective response did not correspond to the verbally expressed content. There are elements which indicate pressure by the mother and the possibility of inducement cannot be excluded, which presents a risk of emotional abuse. The assessment of the father’s possible inappropriate behaviour is aggravated by the family climate of fighting, the relationship between the parents, the heteroamnestic information obtained, the different information given by the parents, as well as the mother being overwhelmed by her own experience and mistrust towards the girl’s father. ... It is recommended that the girl receives supportive supervision over her further development. [It is also recommended] that the parents take part in counselling and that assistance be provided to the family through supervision of parental care to ensure the girl grows up in a safe and stable environment.” 23. On 15 July 2014 C instituted court proceedings against A seeking custody of B. 24. On 6 August 2014 the police sent a special report to the Z State Attorney’s Office containing all the interviews are reports gathered by them up to that point. 25. On 11 August 2014 the Y police interviewed C. He denied any sexual abuse of B and alleged that A had been physically punishing her, about which he had lodged a criminal complaint. 26. On the same day, the police requested the Y Welfare Centre to urgently send the family anamnesis and all available information on A and C’s family. 27. On 13 August 2014 the Y Municipal Court issued an interim measure allowing A to “exercise all parental rights” over B, owing to the allegations of sexual abuse against C. 28. On the same day, the Centre inquired with the Polyclinic whether B had been included in any supportive follow-up treatments further to her multidisciplinary assessment. 29. On 20 August 2014 the Y police interviewed C’s parents, aunt and brother-in-law. The parents had not witnessed any incidents of C sexually abusing B, but both described incidents of A physically abusing B. The aunt and brother-in-law had heard from A about the alleged sexual abuse of B by C, but had not witnessed any incidents of that kind. 30. On 22 August 2014 the Y police confiscated a USB stick from C. 31. On 25 August 2014 A’s mother approached the Y police and expressed her concerns about a meeting between B and C ordered by the Y Social Welfare Centre for 28 August 2014. She said that at the mention of the meeting with C, B had thrown herself to the ground and started crying and being aggressive towards her toys, pets and relatives. She also described B’s overtly sexual behaviour. 32. On 27 August 2014 the Y Welfare Centre applied a “supervision of parental care” child-protection measure in respect of both A and C. 33. On 2 September 2014 the Y police provided the Z State Attorney’s Office with another special report on the actions taken following A’s criminal complaint. 34. On 5 September 2014 the Y Welfare Centre sent its report on A, B and C to the Y Municipal Court. It suggested that for the time being care of B be granted to A. 35. On 19 September 2014 the Y Municipal Court awarded custody of B to A and ordered that contact between C and B take place between 4 and 6 p.m. every Tuesday. 36. On 6 October 2014 the Y police interviewed B’s babysitter, who described incidents of sexual behaviour by B. On the same day, the police provided the Z State Attorney’s Office with another special report on the actions taken following A’s criminal complaint. 37. On 10 October 2014 A requested the Z State Attorney’s Office to hear further witnesses in the case. 38. On 30 October 2014 the State Attorney’s Office ordered that B be seen by a defectologist and that, along with the relevant social welfare centre, the results of the child-protection measure be assessed (see paragraph 32 above) with a view to protecting B’s best interest. 39. On 14 November 2014 the State Attorney’s Office requested Polyclinic A.B.R., where B was being treated, to submit its assessment on whether B was being abused by either of her parents, with a view to her criminal protection. 40. On 17 November 2014 A submitted to the State Attorney’s Office a report dated 10 November 2014 issued by a psychiatrist Z.K, employed with Clinic P, where A had taken B for another assessment. The relevant part of that report reads as follows: “... In the drawing of her family, the father is described as mean and doing things that he should not. She says that the father took her clothes off and pinched her behind and genitals on three occasions, that she told him not to do it, but he had always replied that he did not care. She also says that daddy used to kiss her on the mouth but has stopped doing it. She says that she has not had similar experiences with anyone else. The mother says that the girl behaves in an overtly sexual manner, tries to kiss other people on the mouth (her nannies, mother and uncle). The mother says that the girl wants to touch other people on the behind, inserts her fingers in her underwear and then into other people’s mouths and that she had inserted her finger into her cat’s rectum. The girl denies remembering any of this. ... During examination the girl attempted to make inappropriate contact with the doctor writing the report. She stopped playing with toys and approached him from behind, tried to hold his upper arm and leant her head against it. This behaviour is regarded as inappropriate in the current situation. Recommendations It is advised that the girl continue psychotherapeutic counselling currently being performed at ... Polyclinic A.B.R. Given the overall context and ongoing court proceedings, I recommend issuance of regular documents, cooperation with both parents as seen fit by the psychotherapist in charge of the child. In order to determine the forensic issues, in light of the complicated status of the girl and the overall circumstances of the ‘case’, it would be necessary to obtain an expert opinion, which could sufficiently determine the psychiatric and psychological characteristics of both parents and their causal link with the behaviour of the child or possible manipulation of the child. There is no professional need for ... double psychotherapy by two psychotherapists ...” 41. On 17 November 2014 A’s lawyer asked the Z State Attorney’s Office to commission a forensic expert report on B. 42. In reply to the State Attorney’s Office letter of 14 November 2014, on 3 December 2014 the A.B.R. Polyclinic submitted its psychological assessment and opinion dated 1 December 2014 and drawn up by psychologist Z.G. The relevant part of that report, reads as follows: “1. The child expresses a lack of distance and erotic closeness with people she does not know. On the basis of her playing and drawings and the information given by both parents, it could be concluded that the child expresses a premature interest in sexuality which is repeated constantly, so it cannot be seen as behaviour appropriate for [the child’s] age, but as behaviour which indicates [the existence of] trauma. 2. It is clear that the child is emotionally and socially neglected because of the severe conflict between the parents over a longer period. The neglect is so severe that both parents are responsible for it. It is difficult to tell to what extent and in what way such a parental approach has contributed to the observed behaviour of the child, that is to say her premature and intense interest in sexuality and her sexual behaviour. 3. I therefore consider that the child, apart from being educationally and emotionally neglected, has also been exposed to inappropriate content and/or conduct by an adult with sexual connotations. 4. At the time of examination the child was not testable, so the projective techniques which could better explain the parents’ influence on the observed behaviour could not have been applied. 5. Before deciding which parent is better placed to have custody of the child, an assessment of [their] capability should be carried out. 6. The child should certainly [receive] intensive treatment so as to diminish or remove the obstacles from the emotional and social sphere.” 43. On the same day a senior expert consultant of the Z State Attorney’s Office issued a report on the applicants’ case, the relevant part of which reads as follows: “... on her mother’s initiative, the girl has been examined at various psychological and psychiatric institutions, so one gets the impression that the mother visits various experts and institutions in order to support her accusations and when she does not obtain confirmation of her accusations, she goes to another institution. The girl has hence been treated by the Social Welfare Centre, the Polyclinic, Clinic P and is now treated in Polyclinic A.B.R. It transpires from the examinations and opinions of all institutions that the girl behaves in an inappropriately sexualised manner, but they do not establish that such behaviour would be due to sexual abuse by the father. The Polyclinic established that there had been no signs clearly indicating a sexual trauma because the girl did not describe contextually characteristic situations and her affectionate [behaviour] is not in line with verbally described content. On the other hand, [the Polyclinic] did note elements indicating the mother’s pressure due to which inducement of the girl could not be excluded, which is a form of emotional abuse. ... Generally it can be concluded that the relationship between former spouses is very disturbed and that the child was left to nannies and has not bonded with either of the parents. Although the child shows erotic behaviour inappropriate for her age, her inducement by the mother is so obvious as well as her taking of the child to various institutions and psychiatrists, that no credibility can any longer be given to the child’s statements. Through her behaviour, the mother is pushing the girl even more to regression and emotional trauma, and although she has been warned about this, she ignores the experts. One gets the impression that she contacts institutions until she receives confirmation for her accusations. When experts point out her failures, she becomes verbally aggressive. On the other hand, the father distances himself, he is anxious and depressed and actually participates in the education only passively, sets no boundaries for the girl who has no distance in respect of him and acts appropriately considering her age in a given situation. To sum up, the behaviour of both parents and their severely disturbed relationship and conflicts which break down on the girl and continue through institutions, severely endanger the child’s further emotional, cognitive and social development, and regression is observed already at this stage and is continuing negatively. I consider both parents responsible for such a state of the girl. I consider that both parents should be included in psychotherapy, which has already been suggested to them, but neither of them has thus far joined any expert treatment nor has asked for help; what is important is that the girl is being taken to various experts, from institution to institution so that she already feels at home there and adapts her behaviour, so no credible statement can any longer be obtained from her. ...” 44. On 31 December 2014 the Z State Attorney’s Office informed A and her lawyer that the case had been closed. The relevant part of the letter sent to them reads: “... after careful assessment of the ... documentation ..., even though it has been concluded with certainty that child B shows erotic behaviour inappropriate for her age, no facts or circumstances have been established which would clearly indicate that the cause of this behaviour is sexual abuse of child B by the suspect C. Since in this case reasonable suspicion has not been established that C has sexually abused child B, or that his behaviour amounted to any other criminal act liable to State-assisted prosecution, there is therefore no basis for the State Attorney’s Office to process [the case] further.” 45. On 30 January 2015 the Z State Attorney’s Office issued a formal decision not to prosecute. The decision describes in detail all the evidence gathered. The relevant part of its conclusion reads: “On the basis of the allegations contained in the criminal complaint, the documentation obtained during the enquiry and [that] submitted by the complainant ... it has been established that there were no signs of either old or fresh injuries on child B’s body and genitals ... that child B shows a premature interest in sexuality and erotic behaviour inappropriate for her age, and that both parents should receive appropriate [psychotherapy]. The fact that child B shows a premature interest in sexuality and erotic behaviour inappropriate for her age has been established in interviews with complainant A, [the child’s maternal grandmother, A’s siblings] D and E, and by the opinions given by experts of various institutions ... However, even though the A.B.R. Polyclinic’s report ... shows that the child was exposed to inappropriate content and/or conduct by an adult with sexual connotations, the fact is that none of the four institutions which had previously treated the child, including the A.B.R. Polyclinic, has established that the cause of this erotic behaviour ... is sexual abuse by her father C. The report by the Polyclinic’s multidisciplinary team ... indicates that there are no clear signs of sexual abuse. On the other hand, elements showing pressure by the mother were present. This could not exclude the possibility of the girl’s inducement ... which represents emotional abuse. Furthermore, elements of pressure by the mother on the child were observed by other experts ... It has been established that the conduct of the mother, who is well informed about the manner in which sexually abused children are treated and monitored, led the child to give statements which were often contradictory or untrue, which is why it is no longer possible to obtain a truthful statement from the child.” The decision then concludes that, taking into account all the facts and circumstances, it was not possible to conclude that C had committed any criminal offence liable to State-assisted prosecution. A was also informed that she could lodge a request for an investigation with a competent county court’s investigating judge within eight days. 46. A complied with the instruction on 26 February 2015 by submitting a request to an investigating judge of the Z County Court seeking an investigation into the allegations of sexual abuse of B by her father. 47. A also lodged a constitutional complaint against the decision of the Z State Attorney’s Office of 30 January 2015. It was declared inadmissible by the Constitutional Court on 28 April 2015 on the ground that the impugned decision did not amount to an act by which “a competent court has decided on the merits about a right or an obligation of the applicant or a criminal charge against her”. 48. On 30 October 2015 an investigation judge of the Z County Court dismissed A’s request for an investigation (see paragraph 46 above) on the grounds that the requirement of a reasonable suspicion against C had not been met. A’s appeal against that decision was dismissed by a three-judge panel of the same court on 8 December 2015. 49. On 27 August 2014 the Centre ordered three measures to protect the rights of B: supervision of parental care of both parents, supervision of personal contact between B and C and providing expert assistance and support with parental care. 50. The measure of supervision of parental care was implemented in respect of both parents for the period 30 August 2014 to 29 February 2016. A psychologist was assigned to observe the manner in which parental care was carried out and she gave expert advice to the parents on how to minimise the tension between them. Monthly reports were submitted to the Centre. 51. The measure of supervision of personal contact between B and C was implemented on 2 September 2016. The supervisor assigned submits monthly reports to the Centre. 52. The measure of expert assistance was implemented in respect of both parents on 30 September 2016. A pedagogical expert was appointed to assist A with her parental care of B. 53. The documents submitted by the parties show the following. 54. B continues to be seen by a psychiatrist. 55. On 28 August 2014 a meeting was held at the Centre with a psychologist to inform the parents about the measure of supervision of parental care. It was agreed that the psychologist would see the mother once every two weeks and that the father would also see B every second week in the presence of the psychologist. Reports of the psychologist show that these meetings have been held regularly. 56. The psychologist also made contact with and consulted the psychiatrist treating B, the relevant professionals from the kindergarten and school attended by B and the psychologist treating C. 57. On 13 August 2014 the Z Municipal Court ordered contact between B and C every Tuesday afternoon for two hours, under the supervision of a social worker. It appears that this order has been complied with. 58. A attended counselling for single parents on her own initiative. 59. Detailed reports were submitted to the Centre after every meeting with each of the parents, on contact between B and C and members of his family and on meetings with B. The reports show that B and C have a good relationship and that A insists on not communicating with C. 60. Several sets of proceedings concerning the custody of B and contact rights of C were pending before the national authorities at the material time. 61. On 7 May 2018 a municipal court awarded C custody of B, finding it in the child’s best interest to live with her father. 62. Sexual abuse of a child under fifteen years of age (Article 158), satisfaction of lust in front of a child (Article 160) and the introduction of children to pornography (Article 164) are all offences under the Criminal Code (Kazneni zakon, Official Gazette nos. 125/2011 and 144/2012). B Code of Criminal Procedure 63. The relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Zakon o kaznenom postupku, Official Gazette no. 152/2008, 76/2009, 80/2011, 121/2011, 91/2012, 143/2012, 56/2013 and 145/2013) at the material time provided as follows: Article 2 “(1) Criminal proceedings shall be instituted and conducted at the request of a qualified prosecutor only. ... (2) In respect of criminal offences subject to public prosecution the qualified prosecutor shall be the State Attorney and in respect of criminal offences to be prosecuted privately the qualified prosecutor shall be a private prosecutor. (3) Unless otherwise provided by law, the State Attorney shall undertake a criminal prosecution where there is a reasonable suspicion that an identified person has committed a criminal offence subject to public prosecution and where there are no legal impediments to the prosecution of that person. (4) Where the State Attorney finds that there are no grounds to institute or conduct criminal proceedings, the injured party as a subsidiary prosecutor may take his place under the conditions prescribed by this Act.” Article 44 “(1) A child victim of a criminal offence ... has the right to: 4. exclusion of the public [from proceedings] ...” Article 205 “(1) [A criminal] report shall be filed with the relevant State Attorney in writing, orally or by other means. ... (3) If the report was filed with the court, the police authority or a State Attorney lacking jurisdiction, they shall receive it and immediately forward it to the State Attorney having jurisdiction ...” Article 207 “(2) The police shall notify the State Attorney about all inquiries into criminal offences immediately, and not later than 24 hours from the moment the action was conducted ... ... (4) On the basis of conducted inquiries, the police shall ... compose a criminal complaint or a report about the conducted inquiries, stating all the evidence which it gathered ... (5) Should the police subsequently learn about new facts [or] evidence ... it shall collect the necessary information and inform the State Attorney about it immediately ...” Article 285 “(1) The following persons are not obliged to give evidence as witnesses: ... 4. a child who, owing to his or her age and emotional development, is unable to understand the meaning of the right not to give evidence as a witness cannot be heard as a witness, but the information obtained from him or her through experts, relatives or other persons who have been in contact with the child may serve as evidence. ...” 64. Section 4 of the Act on Protection from Domestic Violence (Zakon o zaštiti od nasilja u obitelji, Official Gazette no. 116/2003), defines domestic violence as follows: “... every use of physical force or psychological pressure against the integrity of a person; every other behaviour of a family member which can cause or potentially cause physical or psychological pain; causing feelings of fear or being personally endangered or feeling of offended dignity; physical attack regardless of whether or not it results in physical injury, verbal assaults, insults, cursing, name-calling and other forms of severe disturbance, sexual harassment; spying and all other forms of disturbing; illegal isolation or restriction of the freedom of movement or communication with third persons; damage or destruction of property or attempts to do so.” 65. The relevant provisions of the Family Act (Obiteljski zakon, Official Gazette no. 103/2015) provide: Section 127 “(1) Parents have a duty and responsibility to protect the rights and welfare of their child. (2) In the cases prescribed by this Act other family members also have the duty and responsibility referred to in paragraph 1 of this section. (3) Measures to protect the rights and welfare of a child are applied in respect of the parents. (4) Measures which may be taken by a social welfare centre to protect the rights and welfare of a child may also be applied in respect of persons who care for a child on a daily basis.” Section 128 “When determining the appropriate measure to protect the rights and welfare of a child, the body conducting the procedure shall ensure that a measure is applied which restricts as little as possible a parent’s right to care for the child where it is possible to protect the rights and welfare of the child by such a measure.” Section 131 “Measures to protect the rights and welfare of a child shall be ordered on the basis of an expert assessment if it has been established that there has been an infringement of the child’s rights or welfare or that the child’s rights or welfare are at risk.” Section 134 “A social welfare centre may apply [the following measures] to protect the rights and welfare of a child: 66. The National Strategy for the Rights of Children in the Republic of Croatia for the period 2014 to 2020 (Nacionalna strategija za prava djece u Republici Hrvatskoj) was adopted in September 2014 by the Croatian Government. Four main aims were identified: ensuring that services in various areas were adapted to children (such as justice, health care, social welfare, education, sport and culture), eliminating all forms of violence against children, ensuring that the rights of children in vulnerable situations are respected and ensuring the active participation of children. 67. The Protocol on Procedures in Domestic Violence Cases (Protokol o postupanju u slučaju nasilja u obitelji – hereinafter “Protocol 1”) was issued in 2008 by the Ministry of Family, Homeland War Veterans and Intergenerational Solidarity. It relies on the definition of domestic violence, as stated in the Act on Protection against Domestic Violence Act (see paragraph 64 above). 68. As regards the duties of the police, Protocol 1 provides that when the police receive information in any way and from anyone about an instance of domestic violence, an officer must interview the victim in separate premises without the alleged perpetrator being present. If the victim or witness of domestic violence is a child, specially trained officers must carry out all tasks. 69. As regards the duties of social welfare centres, Protocol 1 provides that such centres are obliged to provide help to the victims of domestic violence in obtaining legal aid, encourage the victim to seek appropriate counselling, and assess whether the best interests of a child victim of domestic violence require that a special guardian be appointed so that his or her rights are completely protected in criminal or minor offences proceedings. 70. The Protocol on Conduct in Cases of Sexual Violence (Protokol o postupanju u slučaju seksualnog nasilja – hereinafter “Protocol 2”) was adopted by the Croatian Government on 4 September 2014. It provides that all actions by the police, save for urgent measures, are to be carried out by officers specially trained in sexual violence cases and that the police must inform the victim of the possibility of obtaining expert help for the protection of his or her physical and psychological well-being. The police are obliged to immediately inform a State attorney’s office of the information gathered. 71. As regards the duties of social welfare centres, Protocol 2 provides that centres are obliged to provide victims with help in obtaining legal aid, as well as counselling and psychosocial support. 72. The Protocol on Conduct in Cases of Ill-treatment and Neglect of Children (Protokol o postupanju u slučaju zlostavljanja i zanemarivanja djece – hereinafter “Protocol 3”) was adopted by the Croatian Government in November 2014. 73. Protocol 3 provides that the best interests of a child have primary importance in all matters covered by it. The procedures followed should be efficient in order to ensure that the child is given prompt and co-ordinated protection from further ill-treatment, including sexual abuse, or neglect, as well as provided appropriate support. All procedures conducted by State bodies are to be carried out by experts in the relevant fields. 74. A social welfare centre should appoint a special guardian for the child if its experts assess that his or her interests are in conflict with those of the parent. It should also instruct the parent to seek counselling or involve the child in appropriate forms of psychosocial help, rehabilitation programmes and other forms or expert help and support. The social welfare centre is also obliged to provide information to the parent about any pending procedures, activities planned and their possible consequences and the rights of the child. It must also co-operate with other bodies and institutions involved and organise consultation meetings so as to ensure a coordinated approach in order to provide the child with appropriate help, support and treatment with the aim of protecting him or her from further trauma, and to prevent repeated interviews or examinations. 75. Medical institutions are obliged to ensure cooperation through a multi-disciplinary team approach in order to avoid repetition of the traumatic experience. 76. Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council (2012/29/EU) of 25 October 2012 establishes minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime. The relevant part of the Directive, which was to be implemented into the national laws of the European Union Member States by 16 November 2015, provides as follows: Article 1Objectives “2. Member States shall ensure that in the application of this Directive, where the victim is a child, the child’s best interests shall be a primary consideration and shall be assessed on an individual basis. A child-sensitive approach, taking due account of the child’s age, maturity, views, needs and concerns, shall prevail. The child and the holder of parental responsibility or other legal representative, if any, shall be informed of any measures or rights specifically focused on the child.” Article 19 “A person should be considered to be a victim regardless of whether an offender is identified, apprehended, prosecuted or convicted and regardless of the familial relationship between them ...” Article 20 – Right to protection of victims during criminal investigations “Without prejudice to the rights of the defence and in accordance with rules of judicial discretion, Member States shall ensure that during criminal investigations: (a) interviews of victims are conducted without unjustified delay after the complaint with regard to a criminal offence has been made to the competent authority; (b) the number of interviews of victims is kept to a minimum and interviews are carried out only where strictly necessary for the purposes of the criminal investigation; ... (d) medical examinations are kept to a minimum and are carried out only where strictly necessary for the purposes of the criminal proceedings.” Article 22Individual assessment of victims to identify specific protection needs “4. For the purposes of this Directive, child victims shall be presumed to have specific protection needs due to their vulnerability to secondary and repeat victimisation, to intimidation and to retaliation. To determine whether and to what extent they would benefit from special measures as provided for under Articles 23 and 24, child victims shall be subject to an individual assessment as provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article.” Article 24Right to protection of child victims during criminal proceedings “1. In addition to the measures provided for in Article 23, Member States shall ensure that where the victim is a child: (a) in criminal investigations, all interviews with the child victim may be audiovisually recorded and such recorded interviews may be used as evidence in criminal proceedings; (b) in criminal investigations and proceedings, in accordance with the role of victims in the relevant criminal justice system, competent authorities appoint a special representative for child victims where, according to national law, the holders of parental responsibility are precluded from representing the child victim as a result of a conflict of interest between them and the child victim, or where the child victim is unaccompanied or separated from the family; (c) where the child victim has the right to a lawyer, he or she has the right to legal advice and representation, in his or her own name, in proceedings where there is, or there could be, a conflict of interest between the child victim and the holders of parental responsibility. The procedural rules for the audiovisual recordings referred to in point (a) of the first subparagraph and the use thereof shall be determined by national law.” 77. The relevant provisions of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which came into force on 2 September 1990, read as follows: Article 3 “1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration. ... Article 19 1. States Parties shall take all appropriate legislative, administrative, social and educational measures to protect the child from all forms of physical or mental violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, maltreatment or exploitation, including sexual abuse, while in the care of parent(s), legal guardian(s) or any other person who has the care of the child. 2. Such protective measures should, as appropriate, include effective procedures for the establishment of social programmes to provide necessary support for the child and for those who have the care of the child, as well as for other forms of prevention and for identification, reporting, referral, investigation, treatment and follow-up of instances of child maltreatment described heretofore, and, as appropriate, for judicial involvement. Article 34 States Parties undertake to protect the child from all forms of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse. For these purposes, States Parties shall in particular take all appropriate national, bilateral and multilateral measures to prevent: (a) The inducement or coercion of a child to engage in any unlawful sexual activity; (b) The exploitative use of children in prostitution or other unlawful sexual practices; (c) The exploitative use of children in pornographic performances and materials.” 78. This Convention obliges its parties to take the necessary legislative or other measures to prevent all forms of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse of children and to criminalise certain intentional conduct. It was adopted in Lanzarote on 25 October 2007 and entered into force on 1 July 2010. As regards Croatia, it was ratified on 21 September 2011 and came into force on 1 January 2012. The relevant parts read: Article 4 – Principles “Each Party shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to prevent all forms of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse of children and to protect children.” Article 14 – Assistance to victims “1. Each Party shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to assist victims, in the short and long term, in their physical and psycho-social recovery. Measures taken pursuant to this paragraph shall take due account of the child’s views, needs and concerns. ... 4. Each Party shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to ensure that the persons who are close to the victim may benefit, where appropriate, from therapeutic assistance, notably emergency psychological care.” Chapter VI – Substantive criminal lawArticle 18 – Sexual abuse “1. Each Party shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to ensure that the following intentional conduct is criminalised: a. engaging in sexual activities with a child who, according to the relevant provisions of national law, has not reached the legal age for sexual activities; ...” Chapter VII – Investigation, prosecution and procedural lawArticle 30 – Principles “1. Each Party shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to ensure that investigations and criminal proceedings are carried out in the best interests and respecting the rights of the child. 2. Each Party shall adopt a protective approach towards victims, ensuring that the investigations and criminal proceedings do not aggravate the trauma experienced by the child and that the criminal justice response is followed by assistance, where appropriate. 3. Each Party shall ensure that the investigations and criminal proceedings are treated as priority and carried out without any unjustified delay. ...” Article 31 – General measures of protection “1. Each Party shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to protect the rights and interests of victims, including their special needs as witnesses, at all stages of investigations and criminal proceedings, in particular by: a. informing them of their rights and the services at their disposal and, unless they do not wish to receive such information, the follow-up given to their complaint, the charges, the general progress of the investigation or proceedings, and their role therein as well as the outcome of their cases; ... d. providing them with appropriate support services so that their rights and interests are duly presented and taken into account; ... g. ensuring that contact between victims and perpetrators within court and law enforcement agency premises is avoided, unless the competent authorities establish otherwise in the best interests of the child or when the investigations or proceedings require such contact. ... 4. Each Party shall provide for the possibility for the judicial authorities to appoint a special representative for the victim when, by internal law, he or she may have the status of a party to the criminal proceedings and where the holders of parental responsibility are precluded from representing the child in such proceedings as a result of a conflict of interest between them and the victim. ...” Article 34 – Investigations “1. Each Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to ensure that persons, units or services in charge of investigations are specialised in the field of combating sexual exploitation and sexual abuse of children or that persons are trained for this purpose. Such units or services shall have adequate financial resources. ...” Article 35 – Interviews with the child “1. Each Party shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to ensure that: a. interviews with the child take place without unjustified delay after the facts have been reported to the competent authorities; b. interviews with the child take place, where necessary, in premises designed or adapted for this purpose; c. interviews with the child are carried out by professionals trained for this purpose; d. the same persons, if possible and where appropriate, conduct all interviews with the child; e. the number of interviews is as limited as possible and in so far as strictly necessary for the purpose of criminal proceedings; f. the child may be accompanied by his or her legal representative or, where appropriate, an adult of his or her choice, unless a reasoned decision has been made to the contrary in respect of that person. 2. Each Party shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to ensure that all interviews with the victim or, where appropriate, those with a child witness, may be videotaped and that these videotaped interviews may be accepted as evidence during the court proceedings, according to the rules provided by its internal law. ...” 79. The relevant part of the Explanatory Report to the Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse reads as follows: Article 31 – General measures of protection “... 227. Paragraph 4 makes provision for the situation in cases of sexual abuse within the family, in which the holders of parental responsibility, while responsible for defending the child’s interests, are involved in some way in the proceedings in which the child is a victim (where there is a “conflict of interest”). In such cases, this provision makes it possible for the child to be represented in judicial proceedings by a special representative appointed by the judicial authorities. This may be the case when, for example, the holders of parental responsibility are the perpetrators or joint perpetrators of the offence, or the nature of their relationship with the perpetrator is such that they cannot be expected to defend the interests of the child victim with impartiality. ...” Article 35 – Interviews with the child “236. This provision concerns interviews with the child both during investigations and during trial proceedings. ... The main purpose of the provision is the same as that described more generally in connection with Article 30: to safeguard the interests of the child and ensure that he or she is not further traumatised by the interviews. ... 237. In order to achieve these objectives, Article 35 lays down a set of rules designed to limit the number of successive interviews with children, which force them to relive the events they have suffered, and enable them to be interviewed by the same people, who have been trained for the purpose, in suitable premises and a setting that is reassuring... 238. Paragraph 2, provides that interviews with a child victim or, where appropriate, those with a child witness, may be videotaped for use as evidence during the criminal proceedings. The main objective of this provision is to protect children against the risk of being further traumatised. The videotaped interview can serve multiple purposes, including medical examination and therapeutic services, thus facilitating the aim of limiting the number of interviews as far as possible. It reflects practices successfully developed over the last few years in numerous countries. ...” 80. Committee of the Parties to the Council of Europe Convention on the protection of children against sexual exploitation and sexual abuse (Lanzarote Committee) adopted a 1st implementation report on the protection of children on sexual abuse in the circle of trust on 4 December 2015. The relevant parts of that report read as follows: “III. BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD AND CHILD FRIENDLY CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 77. Child sexual abuse is typically a very intimate and secretive act... A child’s ability and willingness to report their victimisation plays a crucial role in legal and therapeutic intervention. It represents the most valuable source of information and it is on this that the whole case may rest. 78. In this respect it is crucial to avoid the negative consequences which result from inappropriate and repetitive interviewing techniques and adverse facilities where these interviews may take place. To guarantee the rights and best interests of child victims of sexual abuse, authorities need to recognize that they have to act collectively, not just as a government or a judicial system, but all together as a society. Acting collectively means implementing measures to protect children, which are not confined to individual actions... but which are truly child-focused and comprehensive with regard to prevention, intervention and rehabilitation. An interdisciplinary and multi-agency approach delivered by all the different entities in society whose responsibility is to carry out these tasks is therefore paramount. ... III.5 Article 31 § 4: Appointment by the judicial authorities of a special representative for the victim to avoid a conflict of interest between the holders of parental responsibility and the victim 125. Considering that the level of family support is one of the most important predictors of the degree to which the child can adjust following his or her disclosure, family support can be heavily disrupted when the alleged perpetrator is part of the child’s family environment. In Belgium and Croatia the non-offending parent will often be appointed as special representative if this is in the child’s best interest. However, although this option can provide valuable emotional support for the child’s future wellbeing, it may also create a conflict of interests with the child, especially if the non-offending parent is involved emotionally. ...” 81. The Convention was adopted in Istanbul on 11 May 2011 and entered into force on 1 August 2014. It was signed by Croatia on 22 January 2013, ratified on 12 June 2018 and came into force on 1 October 2018. The relevant part reads: Chapter IV – Protection and supportArticle 18 – General obligations “1. Parties shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to protect all victims from any further acts of violence. 2. Parties shall take the necessary legislative or other measures, in accordance with internal law, to ensure that there are appropriate mechanisms to provide for effective co‐operation between all relevant state agencies, including the judiciary, public prosecutors, law enforcement agencies, local and regional authorities as well as non‐governmental organisations and other relevant organisations and entities, in protecting and supporting victims and witnesses of all forms of violence covered by the scope of this Convention, including by referring to general and specialist support services as detailed in Articles 20 and 22 of this Convention. 3. Parties shall ensure that measures taken pursuant to this chapter shall: – be based on a gendered understanding of violence against women and domestic violence and shall focus on the human rights and safety of the victim; – be based on an integrated approach which takes into account the relationship between victims, perpetrators, children and their wider social environment; – aim at avoiding secondary victimisation; ... – allow, where appropriate, for a range of protection and support services to be located on the same premises; – address the specific needs of vulnerable persons, including child victims, and be made available to them. 5. Parties shall take the appropriate measures to provide consular and other protection and support to their nationals and other victims entitled to such protection in accordance with their obligations under international law.” Article 19 – Information “Parties shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to ensure that victims receive adequate and timely information on available support services and legal measures in a language they understand.” Chapter VI – Investigation, prosecution, procedural law and protective measuresArticle 49 – General obligations “1. Parties shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to ensure that investigations and judicial proceedings in relation to all forms of violence covered by the scope of this Convention are carried out without undue delay while taking into consideration the rights of the victim during all stages of the criminal proceedings. ...” Article 50 – Immediate response, prevention and protection “1. Parties shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to ensure that the responsible law enforcement agencies respond to all forms of violence covered by the scope of this Convention promptly and appropriately by offering adequate and immediate protection to victims. ...” Article 56 – Measures of protection “... 2. A child victim and child witness of violence against women and domestic violence shall be afforded, where appropriate, special protection measures taking into account the best interests of the child.” 82. The relevant part of the Recommendation Rec (2006) 8 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on assistance to crime victims, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 14 June 2006 at the 967th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies, reads as follows: 1. Definitions “1.3. Secondary victimisation means victimisation that occurs not as a direct result of the criminal act but through the response of institutions and individuals to the victim.” 2. Principles “2.1. States should ensure the effective recognition of, and respect for, the rights of victims with regard to their human rights; they should, in particular, respect the security, dignity, private and family life of victims and recognise the negative effects of crime on victims. 2.3. The granting of these services and measures should not depend on the identification, arrest, prosecution or conviction of the perpetrator of the criminal act.” 3.4. States should ensure that victims who are particularly vulnerable, either through their personal characteristics or through the circumstances of the crime, can benefit from special measures best suited to their situation.” 10. ProtectionProtection of physical and psychological integrity “10.1. States should ensure, at all stages of the procedure, the protection of the victim’s physical and psychological integrity. Particular protection may be necessary for victims who could be required to provide testimony. 10.2. Specific protection measures should be taken for victims at risk of intimidation, reprisals or repeat victimisation.” 14. Co-ordination and co-operation “14.1. Each state should develop and maintain co-ordinated strategies to promote and protect the rights and interests of victims. 14.2. To this end, each state should ensure, both nationally and locally, that: – all agencies involved in criminal justice, social provision and health care, in the statutory, private and voluntary sectors, work together to ensure a co-ordinated response to victims; ...” 83. Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on child friendly justice were adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 17 November 2010. The relevant part reads: “B. Best interests of the child 1. Member states should guarantee the effective implementation of the right of children to have their best interests be a primary consideration in all matters involving or affecting them. 2. In assessing the best interests of the involved or affected children: a. their views and opinions should be given due weight; b. all other rights of the child, such as the right to dignity, liberty and equal treatment should be respected at all times; c. a comprehensive approach should be adopted by all relevant authorities so as to take due account of all interests at stake, including psychological and physical well-being and legal, social and economic interests of the child. 3. The best interests of all children involved in the same procedure or case should be separately assessed and balanced with a view to reconciling possible conflicting interests of the children. 4. While the judicial authorities have the ultimate competence and responsibility for making the final decisions, member states should make, where necessary, concerted efforts to establish multidisciplinary approaches with the objective of assessing the best interests of children in procedures involving them. 1. Children should be treated with care, sensitivity, fairness and respect throughout any procedure or case, with special attention for their personal situation, well-being and specific needs, and with full respect for their physical and psychological integrity. This treatment should be given to them, in whichever way they have come into contact with judicial or non-judicial proceedings or other interventions, and regardless of their legal status and capacity in any procedure or case. 37. Children should have the right to their own legal counsel and representation, in their own name, in proceedings where there is, or could be, a conflict of interest between the child and the parents or other involved parties. ... 42. In cases where there are conflicting interests between parents and children, the competent authority should appoint either a guardian ad litem or another independent representative to represent the views and interests of the child. 43. Adequate representation and the right to be represented independently from the parents should be guaranteed, especially in proceedings where the parents, members of the family or caregivers are the alleged offenders. 68. Direct contact, confrontation or interaction between a child victim or witness with alleged perpetrators should, as far as possible, be avoided unless at the request of the child victim.

4. The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Dmitrovgrad. 5. Between 2012 and 2014 the applicant lodged numerous complaints with the local police department concerning the allegedly unauthorised use of the plot of land near the block of flats where her family resided. She also alleged that there had been a number of assassination attempts planned against her. 6. On 15 January 2014 the head of the inter-municipal police department forwarded the following letter to the Psychiatric and Narcological Service: “Following receipt of numerous complaints, the [police department] asks you to examine (check) [the applicant] ... at her place of residence. Her behaviour is inappropriate. She constantly talks about conspiracies against her. Complaints lodged by residents and entrepreneurs about her aggressive behaviour have grown in number. [The applicant] might cause harm to others.” 7. On 28 and 29 January 2014 a psychiatrist, Sav., questioned the applicant’s neighbours, asking them if they had observed any strange behaviour on the applicant’s part. 8. On 30 January 2014 a psychiatrist visited the applicant at her place of residence. 9. On 31 January 2014 the psychiatrist informed the police that the applicant did not have any psychiatric disorders. 10. On 12 March 2014, in response to the applicant’s complaint, the Dimitrovgrad Town Court found the psychiatrist’s actions unlawful. The court established that, contrary to the applicable legislation, the psychiatrist had failed to obtain the applicant’s consent to a psychiatric examination and that the applicant had objected to such an examination. 11. On 17 March 2014 the applicant asked the court to find the police’s decision to have her assessed by the psychiatrist unlawful. She considered that the decision had been arbitrary and that it had amounted to an unjustified interference with her private life. 12. On 29 April 2014 the Town Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint. The court found that the actions of the police had had a basis in law. The court interpreted the letter of 15 January 2014 issued by the police department as a request for information from the psychiatrist as to whether the applicant suffered from any mental illness. It further reasoned that the police had not asked the psychiatric service to examine the applicant. In 2012 the police had received numerous complaints from the applicant, who had alleged that she had been persecuted by unknown persons, and complaints from owners and employees of concession stands alleging that the applicant had destroyed their property and had disrupted their activities by making scenes. The police had conducted an inquiry, which did not confirm the applicant’s allegations. Accordingly, the police had decided to obtain information about the applicant’s mental condition. Lastly, the court reasoned that the fact that, in response to the police’s request for information, the psychiatric service had examined the applicant unlawfully had no bearing on the lawfulness of the police’s actions. 13. On 22 July 2014 the Ulyanovsk Regional Court upheld the judgment of 29 April 2014 on appeal. 14. On 17 December 2014 the Regional Court refused to grant the applicant leave to lodge a cassation appeal. 15. On 26 March 2015 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation issued a similar decision in response to the applicant’s application to lodge a cassation appeal.

7. The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Apeldoorn. 8. In a judgment of 29 October 2008, the Zutphen Regional Court (rechtbank) convicted the applicant of the transportation of 2,800 grams of heroin and of seven counts of people trafficking (mensensmokkel) as defined in Article 197a of the Criminal Code (Wetboek van Strafrecht), committed jointly with other perpetrators. It sentenced him to a partially suspended term of 40 months’ imprisonment. 9. Both the applicant and the prosecution appealed against the Regional Court’s judgment. 10. On 19 July 2011 the Arnhem Court of Appeal (gerechtshof) gave its judgment, upholding the conviction for the offence of transporting heroin and also of four counts of people trafficking, and acquitting him on the three other counts. It sentenced him to 40 months’ imprisonment less the time spent in pre-trial detention. Based on the evidence submitted, the Court of Appeal found established that the applicant and his co-perpetrators had, for purposes of financial gain, between 10 November 2006 and 17 January 2007 facilitated the unauthorised residence of a total of 20 Iraqi migrants in the Netherlands, Germany and Denmark. 11. The applicant lodged an appeal in cassation (cassatie), the scope of which is limited to procedural conformity and points of law, with the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad). In his written grounds of appeal of 8 August 2013, the applicant raised, inter alia, a complaint regarding the four counts of people trafficking of which he had been convicted by the Court of Appeal. The applicant contended that the Court of Appeal had convicted him of facilitation of unauthorised “residence”, as defined in Article 197a § 2 of the Criminal Code, whereas the evidence relied on by the Court of Appeal to uphold that conviction did not prove that the Iraqi migrants had had “residence” in the Netherlands, Germany or Denmark. Instead, the evidence demonstrated that the applicant had organised and financed the Iraqi migrants’ transportation to Denmark via the Netherlands and Germany, which had been intercepted on each occasion in Germany. As the migrants’ stay in the Netherlands and Germany had only been brief and transitory, and given that they had never even entered Denmark, there was, according to the applicant, no proof of “residence” in those countries. In that regard, the applicant referred to European Union law, namely Council Directive 2002/90/EG of 28 November 2002 defining the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence (hereinafter “the Directive”) and Council Framework Decision 2002/946/JBZ of 28 November 2002 on the strengthening of the penal framework to prevent the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence (hereinafter “the Framework Decision”). Submitting that Article 197a of the Criminal Code had been amended in order to implement the Directive, the applicant argued that the notion of the facilitation of unauthorised “residence” within the meaning of Article 197a § 2 should be understood as entailing a long-term stay, to be distinguished from “transit” or “entry” as defined in the first paragraph of Article 197a, which had been added to Article 197a when the Directive was implemented. The applicant’s grounds of appeal in cassation did not include a request that the Supreme Court put a question to the CJEU for the purpose of obtaining a preliminary ruling. 12. In his advisory opinion of 10 December 2013, the Advocate General (advocaat-generaal) to the Supreme Court expressed his view that the applicant’s appeal should be dismissed with the exception of the first of the grounds of the appeal, which pertained to the length of the proceedings: the duration of the cassation proceedings had exceeded a reasonable time within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, for which a reduction of sentence was to be applied. With regard to the applicant’s complaint that the evidence did not show that there had been any “residence” of the migrants in the countries at issue, the Advocate General was of the opinion that Article 197a § 2 of the Criminal Code called for a broad interpretation of “residence”, as had been the case prior to the implementation of the Directive and the Framework Decision. Since that implementation was intended to broaden the scope of Article 197a of the Criminal Code, the second paragraph of that provision retained its broad meaning of “residence”, thereby encompassing “transit”. The separate penalisation in the first paragraph of Article 197a of the facilitation of unauthorised “transit and entry” did not change the broad scope of paragraph 2. The Advocate General thus concluded that the applicant’s complaint in this matter should be dismissed. 13. On 24 December 2013, the applicant submitted written comments in reply to the Advocate General’s advisory opinion (a so-called “Borgers letter”[1]) in which he made a tentative request for questions to be referred to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling about the interpretation of “residence”, “entry” and “transit” within the context of the Directive and whether the Directive contained minimum rules or constituted a general framework of terms, if the Supreme Court were to concur with the Advocate General. 14. On 4 March 2014 the Supreme Court gave its judgment, which read: “[the applicant’s counsel] have submitted written grounds of appeal. That document is annexed to this judgment, of which it is a component part. The Advocate General [...] has advised that the impugned judgment be quashed − but only as regards the prison sentence imposed, reducing it due to the violation of the right to adjudication within a reasonable time − and that the remainder of the appeal be dismissed. Counsel [for the applicant] have submitted a written reply.” 15. The Supreme Court went on to hold that the applicant’s complaint that the cassation proceedings had exceeded a reasonable time within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention was well-founded and that the sentence imposed on the applicant should be reduced as a consequence thereof. The Supreme Court further considered: “4. Assessment of the remaining grievances The grievances cannot lead to cassation [of the impugned judgment] (de middelen kunnen niet to cassatie leiden). Based on section 81 (1) of the Judiciary (Organisation) Act (Wet op de rechterlijke organisatie), this requires no further reasoning as the grievances do not give rise to the need for a determination of legal issues in the interests of legal uniformity or legal development.” 16. The Supreme Court thus quashed the Court of Appeal’s judgment as regards the imposed sentence, reduced the sentence to 34 months’ imprisonment, and dismissed the remainder of the grounds of appeal. No further appeal lay against the Supreme Court’s judgment. 17. Section 80a of the Judiciary (Organisation) Act entered into force on 1 July 2012. It provides as follows (references to other domestic legislation omitted): “1. The Supreme Court may, after having taken cognisance of the advisory opinion of the Procurator General (gehoord de procureur-generaal), declare an appeal in cassation inadmissible if the complaints raised do not justify an examination in cassation proceedings (de aangevoerde klachten geen behandeling in cassatie rechtvaardigen), because the appellant party obviously has insufficient interest in the cassation appeal (klaarblijkelijk onvoldoende belang heeft bij het cassatieberoep) or because the complaints obviously cannot succeed (klaarblijkelijk niet tot cassatie kunnen leiden). 2. The Supreme Court shall not take a decision as referred to in the first paragraph without first having taken cognisance of: a. [in civil cases:] the summons or request [introducing the cassation appeal] ... and the memorandum in reply (conclusie van antwoord) or the statement of defence (verweerschrift), if submitted; b. [in criminal cases:] the written statement of the grounds of the cassation appeal (de schriftuur, houdende de middelen van cassatie) ...; or, as the case may be, c. [in tax cases:] the written statement introducing the cassation appeal (het beroepschrift waarbij beroep in cassatie wordt ingesteld) ... and the statement of defence, if submitted. 3. The cassation appeal shall be considered and decided by three members of a multi-judge Chamber (meervoudige kamer), one of whom shall act as president. 4. If the Supreme Court applies the first paragraph, it may, in stating the grounds for its decision, limit itself to that finding.” 18. Section 81 of the Judiciary (Organisation) Act reads: “1. If the Supreme Court considers that a complaint does not constitute grounds for overturning the impugned judgment and does not give rise to the need for a determination of legal issues in the interests of legal uniformity and legal development, it may, in giving reasons for its decision on such complaint, limit itself to that finding. 2. The appeal in cassation shall be considered and determined by three members of a multi-judge Chamber (meervoudige kamer), one of whom shall act as president.” 19. In a judgment of 11 September 2012 (ECLI:NL:HR:2012:BX0129) the Supreme Court clarified its understanding of sections 80a and 81 of the Judiciary (Organisation) Act as applicable in criminal cases, which reads, as far as relevant to the present case: “2.1.2. The explanatory memorandum (memorie van toelichting) to the Bill that led to this Act (Parliamentary Documents, Lower House of Parliament (Kamerstukken II) 2010/11, 32 576, no. 3), includes the following: ‘1. Introduction Aim pursued by the Bill This Bill aims to strengthen the role of the cassation procedure (versterking van de cassatierechtspraak) by establishing different and new requirements for lawyers who act as representatives before the Supreme Court and by introducing the possibility for the Supreme Court to declare inadmissible a cassation appeal at the beginning of the procedure. The Bill is intended to enable the Supreme Court to concentrate on its core tasks as a court of cassation. The adequate execution of these core tasks is under pressure as a result of cassation appeals being lodged in cases that do not lend themselves to a review in cassation, and because certain issues about which it would be desirable for the Supreme Court itself to pronounce do not reach the Supreme Court in time or at all. The establishment of quality requirements for counsel is aimed at ensuring that cassation appeals are accompanied by statements of grounds of appeal that are of decent quality. ... Accelerated inadmissibility Another measure [in addition to establishing new quality requirements for legal representatives] is the introduction of a mechanism for disposing of cases that goes beyond that of the current section 81 of the Judiciary (Organisation) Act. Section 81 of the Judiciary (Organisation) Act enables the Supreme Court to limit the reasoning of the rejection of a cassation grievance to the finding that the complaint raised therein “does not constitute grounds for overturning the impugned judgment and does not give rise to the need to determine legal issues in the interests of legal uniformity and legal development”. Section 81 of the Judiciary (Organisation) Act has in recent years played an important part in keeping the workload of the Supreme Court manageable. The Supreme Court now applies this provision in approximately half of its cases. However, the limits of its application are discernible. Moreover, section 81 is applied only at the end of cassation proceedings and, (invariably, in civil and criminal cases) after an advisory opinion from the Procurator General. However, the possibility of rejecting cases that have no prospect of success at an earlier stage of the proceedings and in a simple manner would constitute a considerable alleviation for the parties to the proceedings and the Supreme Court alike. ... Pursuant to Article 118 § 2 of the Constitution (Grondwet), the Supreme Court is charged, in the cases and within the limits prescribed by law, with overturning judicial decisions that are contrary to the law (de cassatie van uitspraken wegens schending van het recht). The Bill explicitly does not seek to change the Supreme Court’s task. Nor does [the Bill] involve a leave-to-appeal system in which a court has to give prior permission before a legal remedy can be used. The freedom of parties to lodge cassation appeals remains unimpaired. What is new is the latitude given to the Supreme Court to declare an appeal inadmissible on the (substantive) finding that the grounds of appeal submitted do not justify a detailed review in cassation proceedings (geen nadere beoordeling in cassatie rechtvaardigen). The appeal may, for instance, be manifestly ill-founded (klaarblijkelijke ongegrondheid), because the impugned ruling rests on two grounds, each of which is capable of supporting the decision by itself but only one of which is challenged, or there may be a lack of interest, for example because a ground for the appeal, although well-founded, cannot, after the overturning of the impugned ruling, lead to an outcome other than the one to which that ruling had led.’ ... 2.2.2. Section 80a of the Judiciary (Organisation) Act does, however, bring about a change in cases in which an omission hitherto necessitated the overturning of the impugned ruling, even though the person bringing the cassation appeal did not actually have a sufficient interest − deserving to be respected in law (niet voldoende in rechte te respecteren belang) − in such an overturning and a possible rehearing after remittal or referral of the case. In this context, it is to be noted that the mere possibility – regardless of the reason for which the appeal is considered well-founded – that in that situation a different, and possibly more advantageous, ruling could be given (for example, a reduction of sentence pursuant to the length of the proceedings before and after remittal or referral of the case, or in relation to changed personal circumstances) cannot be considered an interest that deserves to be upheld in law in cassation proceedings. ... Consequences for the content of the statement of grounds of appeal in cassation and the ‘Borgers letter’ 2.6.1. Pursuant to the second paragraph of section 80a of the Judiciary (Organisation) Act the Supreme Court will not issue a decision of the kind referred to in the first paragraph without first having taken cognisance of the written statement of grounds of appeal in cassation ... If the ‘selection at the gate’ (selectie aan de poort) which the legislature has introduced by way of section 80a of the Judiciary (Organisation) Act is to achieve its intended aim, then the lawyer who acts as legal representative, or the public prosecution service as the case may be, can reasonably be expected – in the words of the explanatory memorandum – to submit ‘statements of grounds of appeal ... that are of decent quality’. ... 2.6.3. Section 80a of the Judiciary (Organisation) Act provides that in the cases referred to therein, the Supreme Court may declare the cassation appeal inadmissible after having heard the Procurator General. It must be presumed that the Procurator General will express his point of view as to the applicability of section 80a of the Judiciary (Organisation) Act on a hearing day set by the judge in charge of the Supreme Court’s list of cases (rolraadsheer) and also that if the Procurator General is of the opinion that the case lends itself to the application of section 80a of the Judiciary (Organisation) Act, he will express this point of view in writing. In that case, counsel for the person by whom or on whose behalf the appeal has been lodged may respond in writing to that point of view within a period of two weeks thereafter.” 20. In its judgment of 26 May 2015 (ECLI:NL:HR:2015:1332) the Supreme Court explained its practice as regards the application of sections 80a and 81 of the Judiciary (Organisation) Act in relation to a request for referral to the CJEU made in that case. It held, as far as relevant to the present case: “2.1. The Supreme Court finds that the complaints raised do not justify an examination in cassation proceedings because the appellant party obviously has insufficient interest in the cassation appeal or because the complaints obviously cannot succeed. The Supreme Court will therefore – based on section 80a of the Judiciary (Organisation) Act and after having taken cognisance of the advisory opinion of the Procurator General − declare the appeal in cassation inadmissible. 2.2.1. It is inherent therein (daarin ligt besloten) that the request contained in the written grounds of appeal to put a preliminary question to the Court of Justice of the European Union cannot be granted (voor inwilliging vatbaar). The reasons are as follows. 2.2.2. A judgment in which the appeal in cassation is declared inadmissible or dismissed by application of and with reference to section 80a or 81 of the Judiciary (Organisation) Act contains an abridged reasoning of that decision. Furthermore, such a judgment contains the conclusion that no issues arise that justify an examination in cassation proceedings or give rise to the need for a determination of issues in the interests of legal uniformity, legal development or legal protection. Since preliminary questions within the meaning of Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union concern the interpretation of Community law and are issues of law (rechtsvragen), it is inherent in such a judgment that there is no need to put preliminary questions. The judgment also implies that the case in question concerns one of the situations where there is no need for such referral of preliminary questions, namely when the preliminary question raised is not relevant for the resolution of the dispute or can be answered in the light of the case-law of the Court of Justice [of the European Union] or that no reasonable doubt exists as to the manner in which the question concerning the rules of Community law was to be resolved.” 21. Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”)[2] provides as follows: “The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning: (a) the interpretation of the Treaties; (b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the Union ...; Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member State, that court or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give judgment, request the Court to give a ruling thereon. Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal of a Member State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, that court or tribunal shall bring the matter before the Court.” 22. On 25 November 2016, the CJEU published its (updated) Recommendations to national courts and tribunals in relation to the initiation of preliminary ruling proceedings (2016/C 439/01), which reads, as far as relevant to the present case: “3. The jurisdiction of the Court to give a preliminary ruling on the interpretation or validity of EU law is exercised exclusively on the initiative of the national courts and tribunals, whether or not the parties to the main proceedings have expressed the wish that a question be referred to the Court. In so far as it is called upon to assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, it is for the national court or tribunal before which a dispute has been brought – and for that court or tribunal alone – to determine, in the light of the particular circumstances of each case, both the need for a request for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court.” Relevant case-law of the CJEU 23. In the case of S.r.l. CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo S.p.a. v. Ministry of Health (C-283/81, ECLI:EU:C:1982:335), the CJEU received a request from the Italian Court of Cassation for a preliminary ruling. This request concerned the question as to whether the third paragraph of Article 177 of the EEC Treaty[3] laid down an obligation to refer a matter which precluded the national court from determining whether the question raised was justified, or whether it made that obligation conditional on the prior finding of a reasonable interpretative doubt. 24. In its judgment of 6 October 1982 the CJEU explained, firstly, as follows: “... 6. The second paragraph of that article [current Article 267] provides that any court or tribunal of a Member State may, if it considers that a decision on a question of interpretation is necessary to enable it to give judgment, request the Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon. The third paragraph of that article provides that, where a question of interpretation is raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal of a Member State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, that court or tribunal shall bring the matter before the Court of Justice. 7. That obligation to refer a matter to the Court of Justice is based on cooperation, established with a view to ensuring the proper application and uniform interpretation of Community law in all the Member States, between national courts, in their capacity as courts responsible for the application of Community law, and the Court of Justice. More particularly, the third paragraph of Article [267] seeks to prevent the occurrence within the Community of divergences in judicial decisions on questions of Community law. The scope of that obligation must therefore be assessed, in view of those objectives, by reference to the powers of the national courts, on the one hand, and those of the Court of Justice, on the other, where such a question of interpretation is raised within the meaning of Article [267]. 8. In this connection, it is necessary to define the meaning for the purposes of Community law of the expression ‘where any such question is raised’ in order to determine the circumstances in which a national court or tribunal against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law is obliged to bring a matter before the Court of Justice. 9. In this regard, it must in the first place be pointed out that Article [267] does not constitute a means of redress available to the parties to a case pending before a national court or tribunal. Therefore the mere fact that a party contends that the dispute gives rise to a question concerning the interpretation of Community law does not mean that the court or tribunal concerned is compelled to consider that a question has been raised within the meaning of Article [267]. ...” 25. The CJEU went on to observe that courts or tribunals against whose decisions there was no judicial remedy had the same discretion as any other national court or tribunal to ascertain “whether a decision on a question of Community law [was] necessary to enable them to give judgment”. It concluded that they were not obliged to refer a question of interpretation of Community law raised before them in the following situations: (1) where the question was not relevant, in the sense that the answer to the question, regardless of what it might be, could in no way affect the outcome of the case; (2) where the question was materially identical to a question which had already been the subject of a preliminary ruling in a similar case, or where previous decisions of the Court had already dealt with the point of law in question, irrespective of the nature of the proceedings which led to those decisions, even though the questions at issue were not strictly identical; or (3) where the correct application of Community law was so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt as to the manner in which the question raised was to be resolved (bearing in mind that before it came to this conclusion the national court or tribunal had to be convinced that the matter was equally obvious to the courts of the other member States and to the Court of Justice, and only if those conditions were satisfied could the national court or tribunal refrain from submitting the question to the Court of Justice and take upon itself the responsibility for resolving it). 26. The judgment then concluded as follows (point 21): “... the third paragraph of Article [267] of the [Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union] is to be interpreted as meaning that a court or tribunal against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law is required, where a question of Community law is raised before it, to comply with its obligation to bring the matter before the Court [of Justice], unless it has established that the question raised is irrelevant or that the Community provision in question has already been interpreted by the Court or that the correct application of Community law is so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt. The existence of such a possibility must be assessed in the light of the specific characteristics of Community law, the particular difficulties to which its interpretation gives rise and the risk of divergences in judicial decisions within the Community.” 27. In the case of György Katz v. István Roland Sós (C-404/07, ECLI:EU:C:2008:553), the CJEU delivered its judgment on 9 October 2008 which, as far as relevant to the present case, reads: “37. [...] It is for the national court, not the parties to the main proceedings, to bring a matter before the Court of Justice. The right to determine the questions to be put to the Court thus devolves on the national court alone and the parties may not change their tenor [...].” 28. In its judgment of 9 November 2010 in the case of VB Pénzügyi Lízing Zrt. v. Ference Schneider (C-137/08, ECLI:EU:C:2010:659), the CJEU stated, as far as relevant to the present case: “28. [...] the system established by Article 267 TFEU with a view to ensuring that European Union law is interpreted uniformly throughout the Member States instituted direct cooperation between the Court of Justice and the national courts by means of a procedure which is completely independent of any initiative by the parties [...].” 29. In the case of Lucio Cesare Aquino v. Belgische Staat (C-3/16, ECLI:EU:C:2017:209), the CJEU gave judgment on 15 March 2017, stating, as far as relevant to the present case: “43. It follows from the relationship between the second and third paragraphs of Article 267 TFEU that the courts referred to in the third paragraph have the same discretion as all other national courts as to whether a decision on a question of EU law is necessary to enable them to give judgment. They are not therefore obliged to refer a question of the interpretation of EU law raised before them if the question is not relevant, that is to say, if the answer to that question, whatever it may be, cannot have any effect on the outcome of the case [...]. 44. Consequently, if in accordance with the procedural rules of the Member State concerned, the pleas in law raised before a court referred to in the third paragraph of Article 267 TFEU must be declared inadmissible, a request for a preliminary ruling cannot be regarded as necessary and relevant for that court to be able to give judgment.”

5. The applicants were born in 1976, 1972, 1976, 1970 and 1976 respectively. They are currently detained in Turkey. 6. The applicants were secondary school teachers in a private chain of schools in Moldova called Orizont, which has been in operation since 1993. 7. Mr Yasin Ozdil had lived in Moldova since 2015 with his wife and their two minor children. Mr Mujdat Celebi had lived in Moldova since 2014 with his wife and their three minor children. Mr Riza Dogan had lived in Moldova since 1993 with his wife and their two minor children, who are Moldovan citizens. Mr Sedat Hasan Karacaoglu had lived in Moldova since 1998 with his wife. Mr Mehmet Feridun Tufekci had lived in Moldova since 1993 together with his Moldovan wife and their two minor children, who are Moldovan citizens. All the applicants had valid residence permits for Moldova. 8. During the night of 15 to 16 July 2016 a group of members of the Turkish armed forces calling themselves the “Peace at Home Council” attempted to carry out a military coup aimed at overthrowing the democratically elected parliament, government and President of Turkey. The day after the attempted military coup, the national authorities blamed the network linked to Fetullah Gülen, a Turkish citizen living in Pennsylvania (United States of America) and considered to be the leader of a terrorist organisation known as FETÖ/PDY (“Gülenist Terror Organisation/Parallel State Structure”). Several criminal investigations were subsequently initiated by the appropriate prosecuting authorities in relation to suspected members of that organisation. In connection with the above events, the Turkish ambassador to Moldova accused the Orizont schools of ties to that movement and accused the teachers in those schools of terrorism. 9. In May 2017 the Turkish Prime Minister visited Moldova and requested from his Moldovan counterpart the shutdown of the Orizont schools. 10. On 31 March 2018 the principal of the Chişinău-based Orizont secondary school was arrested at Chişinău Airport and questioned for seven hours by the Moldovan secret service concerning allegations of supporting terrorist organisations. A criminal investigation was initiated against him and the preventive measure of a bar on leaving the country for ten days was imposed. 11. In connection with the above events, on 6 April 2018 all the applicants applied to the Moldovan Bureau for Migration and Asylum (“the BMA”) for asylum. They sought to obtain refugee status in Moldova because they feared reprisals in their country of origin, Turkey, on the grounds of their political views. 12. On 10 April 2018 the charges against the principal of the Chişinău Orizont secondary school were dropped and the investigation was discontinued. On 5 May 2018 the applicants wrote to the competent authorities in Moldova and asked for information on whether there were any pending criminal investigations concerning them. In a letter dated 13 June 2018 the prosecutor’s office specialising in organised crime wrote to the applicants, stating that there were no pending criminal investigations involving them. A similar letter was received by the applicants on 31 July 2018 from the anti-corruption prosecutor’s office. 13. On 6 September 2018 in the morning, seven teachers from the Orizont schools – among them the applicants – were arrested in their homes or on their way to work by individuals wearing plain clothes and taken to an unknown destination. Later in the day the Moldovan secret service issued several statements concerning a large anti-terrorist operation which had taken place that day, during which seven foreign nationals suspected of ties to an Islamist organisation had been arrested and removed from Moldova in cooperation with secret services from other countries. 14. On the same day the Turkish media reported that the Turkish secret service had conducted a successful operation in Moldova, during which seven members of the Fethullah Gülen movement had been arrested. 15. On 6 September 2018 some of the members of the applicants’ families, their colleagues from the schools and human rights defenders spent the day at the airport in the hope of stopping the applicants’ deportation to Turkey. They expected the applicants to be taken to Turkey by the scheduled flight leaving later in the day. 16. The fate of the applicants, and even whether they were still in Moldova, remained unknown to their families for several weeks. The Moldovan authorities refrained from communicating any information about them either to their families or to the press. 17. It appeared later that on the very morning of their arrest the applicants were taken directly to Chişinău Airport, where an aeroplane chartered for that purpose was waiting for them and took them immediately to Turkey. 18. On 7 September 2018, the head of the BMA, O.P., stated in an interview that the authority had not been involved in the case of the seven Orizont teachers and that the procedure for declaring them undesirable and removing them from Moldova had not been carried out by the BMA. 19. Several days after the applicants’ arrest, their families received letters from the BMA containing decisions dated 4 September 2018 in which the applicants’ applications for asylum were rejected. The decisions contained a thorough analysis of the manner in which the Gülen movement followers had been treated in Turkey and concluded that the applicants’ fear of reprisals at the hands of the Turkish authorities were justified. In particular, the BMA found that the Turkish authorities had committed acts of harassment, threatening, arbitrary detentions and other serious human rights violations in respect of opposition leaders and members of the Gülen movement. The BMA concluded that the applicants fulfilled the legal requirements to be granted asylum in Moldova. Nevertheless, their applications were rejected on the basis of a classified note received from the Moldovan secret service, according to which the applicants presented a threat to national security. The decisions did not give any details as to the content of the note, not even the date on which it had been issued. The applicants were given fifteen days to leave the country and they were entitled to challenge the decisions within thirty days. The letters accompanying the decisions were posted on 7 and 10 September 2018 and were signed by the head of the BMA, O.P. 20. Several days after the applicants’ arrest and transfer to Turkey their families also received from the BMA decisions dated 5 September 2018, banning the applicants from entering Moldovan territory for a period of five years and ordering their expulsion under supervision from Moldova by the BMA in accordance with section 58 of the Status of Aliens Act (see paragraph 27 below). The letters accompanying the decisions were also signed by the head of the BMA, O.P. 21. On different dates in September and October 2018 the applicants’ representative, who had received powers of attorney from their wives, contested the above decisions in court. However, their actions were dismissed on the grounds that the powers of attorney had not been signed by the applicants themselves. The court decisions were challenged before the hierarchically superior court but without any success. 22. On 15 October 2018 the European Parliament made public a report on the implementation of the EU Association Agreement with Moldova (2017/2281(INI)). In its report, the European Parliament issued a statement in which it expressed itself in the following terms on the manner in which the applicants had been transferred from Turkey: “29. Strongly condemns the recent extradition/abduction of Turkish citizens to Turkey due to their alleged links to the Gülen movement, in violation of the rule of law and basic human rights; urges the Moldovan authorities to ensure that any extradition requests coming from third countries are processed in a transparent manner while following judicial procedures fully in line with European principles and standards...” 23. Amnesty International also made a statement in relation to the deportation of the seven Orizont teachers to Turkey. On 6 September 2018 the organisation’s director for Eastern Europe and Central Asia made the following statement in relation to the applicants’ transfer to Turkey: “The Moldovan authorities didn’t just violate these individuals’ rights once by deporting them - they put them on a fast-track to further human rights violations such as an unfair trial. ... The latest arrests in Moldova follow the pattern of political reprisals against Turkish nationals living abroad by the increasingly repressive government of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. ... Forcible return of those seeking protection in Moldova is a flagrant violation of Moldova’s international human rights obligations. The state authorities must immediately hold to account those responsible for the arbitrary detention and expulsion of the Turkish nationals.”

4. The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Istanbul. 5. On 20 January 2009 the applicant was arrested and taken into custody. 6. On 22 January 2009 the Edirne Magistrates’ Court placed the applicant in detention on remand on suspicion of forming an organised criminal organisation to commit offences and illegal possession of firearms contrary to Article 13 § 1 of Law no. 6136. 7. On 3 July 2009 the Edirne public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment with the Edirne Assize Court charging the applicant with membership of an organised criminal organisation as well as fraud and robbery. 8. On 8 July 2009 the Edirne Assize Court held that it had no jurisdiction and referred the case file to the Istanbul Assize Court. The court also ordered the continuation of the applicant’s detention. 9. On 12 August 2009 the 9th Chamber of the Istanbul Assize Court held a preparatory hearing and ordered the continuation of the applicant’s detention. 10. On 29 December 2009 the first hearing was held before the 9th Chamber of the Istanbul Assize Court. 11. On 4 May 2010 the Istanbul Assize Court held another hearing and decided to prolong the applicant’s detention on remand. The applicant was present at this hearing. 12. The applicant filed an objection against this decision. On 25 May 2010 his objection was dismissed by the 10th Chamber of the Istanbul Assize Court without holding an oral hearing. 13. By decisions dated 30 June 2010 and 8 July 2010 the 9th Chamber of the Istanbul Assize Court rejected the applicant’s requests for release without holding an oral hearing. 14. On 30 September 2010 the 9th Chamber of the Istanbul Assize Court held the third hearing in the proceedings and again prolonged the applicant’s detention. The applicant was present at this hearing. 15. On 11 October 2011 the 9th Chamber of the Istanbul Assize held the seventh hearing in the proceedings and released the applicant from detention on remand. 16. At the time when he present application was lodged with the Court, the proceedings against the applicant were still pending before the first‑instance court. The parties did not submit any further information concerning the outcome of the proceedings.

5. The applicant was born in 1975 and lives in Chişinău. 6. The applicant had a dispute with H. over ownership of a house. He brought a claim against H. seeking acknowledgement of his property rights, as his father’s heir, and H.’s eviction from the house. H. lodged a counterclaim, seeking acknowledgement of her property rights to the house as she had built it. 7. On 20 December 2007 the Buiucani District Court dismissed H.’s counterclaim and allowed the applicant’s claim in full. H. lodged an appeal. On 20 May 2008 the Chișinău Court of Appeal upheld the earlier judgment and dismissed H.’s appeal. H. did not attend the appellate hearing, even though the summons had been repeatedly sent to the address she had provided in her appeal. A registered letter was returned with a note stating that H. did not live at the address indicated by her. The judgment became final after the expiry of the two-month time-limit for lodging an appeal on points of law. 8. On 11 May 2009 H. lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court of Justice, stating that she had only learned of the judgment of 20 May 2008 on 23 April 2009. In her application, she indicated the same address as in the proceedings before the Court of Appeal. The applicant asked the Supreme Court of Justice to dismiss the appeal as being lodged outside the legal time-limit. He submitted that since it had been H. who had lodged the appeal with the Chişinău Court of Appeal, it had been her duty to enquire about the progress of the proceedings and not to wait for a year before doing so. 9. On 16 October 2009 the Supreme Court of Justice allowed H.’s appeal on points of law, quashed the previous judgments and delivered a new judgment on the merits of the case dividing the disputed house into equal shares between the applicant and H. The court argued that the appeal had not been lodged outside the time-limit because H. had not attended the hearing before the Court of Appeal and there was nothing in the file to suggest that that court had informed her of the availability of the full judgment. The court concluded that without any evidence of the date when H. had learned of the judgment, her appeal was considered to have been submitted on time. The judgment was final.

5. The applicant was born in 1979 and before his conviction lived in Izhevsk. 6. According to the applicant, on 18 February 2005 the police carried out a search of the applicant’s flat in connection with the murder of a law‑enforcement officer, which took place during the night of 7-8 February 2005. 7. On 3 March and 10 March 2005 the police interviewed the applicant, in the presence of the applicant’s lawyer, about the circumstances of the murder case under investigation. No suspicions were raised against the applicant. 8. At 6 p.m. on 22 March 2005 the applicant was apprehended on the street in Izhevsk and taken to the Ustinovskiy district police station of Izhevsk (Устиновский РОВД г. Ижевска – “Izhevsk police station”). He was allegedly beaten and coerced into confessing to having committed the murder and to signing a record of his surrender and confession (явка с повинной). 9. According to that record, at 9.50 p.m. on 22 March 2005 in office no. 312 at Izhevsk police station, a police officer, M., obtained from the applicant a confession to the crime, in accordance with Article 142 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation. In particular, the record stated that at the beginning of February 2005 the applicant had been drinking alcoholic beverages in the company of a certain S. after work. At an unspecified time after midnight he left S.’s flat. On his way home he entered a nearby house to urinate. There he saw a man who made a rude remark about the applicant’s behaviour. The man was also drunk. They began to fight, in the course of which the applicant hit the man several times on the head with a knife handle, and also punched and kicked him. The latter fell down the stairs. When the applicant left the man was still lying on the ground floor. The record further stated that the confession had been handwritten by the applicant himself without any coercion on the part of police officers, and that the applicant had been informed of Article 51 of the Constitution (the right not to give self-incriminating statements), which he had understood. 10. The applicant furthermore wrote a similarly worded confession addressed to the Prosecutor of the Republic of Udmurtiya. 11. At 00.05 a.m. on 23 March 2005 a record of the applicant’s arrest was drawn up. He was formally assigned the status of a criminal suspect and was informed of all his rights, including the right to remain silent, the right to a lawyer and the right not to incriminate himself. The record contained the applicant’s handwritten note to the effect that he accepted his arrest, as he had committed a murder on 8 February 2005. The record further contains the applicant’s request for access to his lawyer. 12. Later on the same day, 23 March 2005, the applicant was provided with a legal-aid lawyer and questioned as a suspect. During the questioning the applicant retracted his confession, asserting that it had been given as a result of coercion and in the absence of a lawyer. He consistently repudiated his confession throughout the ensuing proceedings. 13. On 23 March 2005 the applicant was made to undergo a forensic medical examination, which revealed no injuries on his body aside from a scar on the edge of his hairline dating back two to three months (forensic medical examination report no. 2672). 14. On 27 March 2005 the applicant was remanded in custody and transferred to the Izhevsk SIZO-1 remand prison. 15. On 29 March 2005 charges of murder were brought against the applicant. 16. On 22 April 2005 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Ustinovskiy district prosecutor’s office of Izhevsk, alleging that he had been ill-treated. 17. On 27 May 2005 an investigator from the Ustinovskiy district prosecutor’s office issued a decision not to initiate criminal proceedings against the police officers who had allegedly ill-treated the applicant. 18. On 25 July 2005 the criminal case against the applicant was submitted to the Supreme Court of the Republic of Udmurtiya for trial. 19. On 22 August 2005 the trial against the applicant commenced. 20. Before the court the applicant denied committing the murder and reaffirmed that his confession had been given under pressure from police officers and in the absence of his lawyer. 21. On 19 December 2005 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Udmurtiya convicted the applicant of murder and sentenced him to twelve years’ imprisonment. The court based the conviction on the following evidence: - statements by a police officer, M., who had been involved in the investigation and who had submitted that (i) in the course of the investigation it had been determined that the murder had been committed by the applicant; and (ii) the latter had been apprehended and brought to Izhevsk police station, where he had voluntarily confessed to having committed the murder of G. and had written a statement of surrender and confession (явка с повинной), describing the details of the committed crime; no violence had been exerted on the applicant; - statements by a police officer, N., involved in the investigation of the murder, who submitted that (i) in the course of the investigation it had been determined that the crime had been committed by the applicant; (ii) in March 2005 the latter had been brought to the police station, where he had confessed to the murder; and (iii) a statement of surrender and confession had been drawn up in which the applicant had described in detail the circumstances under which he had committed the murder; - statements by a police officer, O., who submitted that (i) on 8 February 2005 he had participated in the inspection of the scene of the murder of G.; (ii) it had been established that the applicant had been involved in the crime; (iii) in March 2005 the applicant had been brought to Izhevsk police station, where he had confessed to the murder (his confession had been recorded in the statement of surrender and confession); and (iv) no violence had been applied to the applicant. - a statement by a police officer, S., who had participated in the inspection of the crime scene on 8 February 2005 – he submitted that (i) during the check it had been established that a man nicknamed “Gunya” [the applicant] could have committed the crime; (ii) the applicant had been apprehended by the police; (iii) the applicant had been interrogated at about 9 p.m. on 22 March 2005 by M., O., P. and himself; (iv) in the course of the interrogation the applicant had confessed to having committed the murder; and (v) no violence had been applied to him; - statements by a police officer, Nam., who submitted that he had learned from police officer M. that the applicant had confessed to having committed the murder of G.; The above statements were found to be confirmed by the applicant’s statement of surrender and confession of 22 March 2005 and by statements by independent witnesses in the case, specifically: - statements by an anonymous witness, “Akulov”, to whom the applicant had supposedly confided about the murder on 8 February 2005; during the trial “Akulov” had been placed in a separate room, and questions from the parties had been asked through a court bailiff; the parties had heard the witness’s answers by means of a radio communication device with acoustic shielding; - statements by a witness, M., who had been detained together with the applicant at Izhevsk police station during the night of 22-23 March 2005, and whom the applicant had supposedly told about his having committed the murder of a police officer; - statements by a witness, S., who submitted that (i) he had worked with the applicant as a painter and decorator since 2003; (ii) they had been drinking alcoholic beverages after work on 7 February 2005 until 10 p.m., after which they had each gone home; (iii) the following morning at 8 a.m. he had picked the applicant up and gone to work with him; (iv) he had found out about the murder of G. on the evening of 8 February 2005 from a certain M. and later from the police; (v) the applicant had had his right arm in plaster since January 2005, which had not prevented him from working; (vi) that the applicant had had a folding knife, which he had lost in January 2005; and (vii) that the applicant had been nicknamed “Gunya”; - statements by a witness, Ts., the applicant’s colleague and neighbour, who submitted that (i) he had been drinking alcoholic beverages with the applicant and S. until 10 p.m. on 7 February 2005, following which he had left while the applicant and S. had stayed on; (ii) he had found about the murder on 8 February 2005 from the police; (iii) he had known that the applicant was suspected of that murder; - statements by other witnesses with no interest in the outcome of the case; - the applicant’s handwritten statement of 22 March 2005 addressed to the Ustinovskiy district prosecutor’s office describing the circumstances of the murder; - the record of the applicant’s arrest, in which the applicant noted that he accepted his arrest, as he had committed a murder; - records of forensic biological examinations, which did not exclude the possibility that the traces of blood on the applicant’s coat could have been the victim’s; the conclusions of those forensic biological examinations were confirmed by the record of the crime-scene examination and the record of the forensic medical examination of the victim’s corpse; - records of forensic chemical examinations of the fibres discovered at the crime scene, the origin of which could not be excluded as being from the clothes worn by the applicant at the time of the murder; - the record of the forensic medical examination, which concluded that the applicant’s having a plastered right arm did not exclude the possibility of him administering active purposeful actions with that arm; - the record of the applicant’s forensic psychiatric examination. 22. The court dismissed the applicant’s allegation that his confession had been obtained through ill-treatment, referring to the statements made by the police officers and to expert report no. 2672, which had not recorded any injuries on the applicant’s body. 23. The applicant appealed against the conviction. In his statement of appeal he submitted, in particular, that his confession was inadmissible evidence, as it had been obtained under duress and in the absence of a lawyer. 24. On 14 June 2006 the Supreme Court of Russia dismissed the appeal. It endorsed in full the trial court’s decision concerning the admissibility of the statement of the applicant’s surrender and confession. The Supreme Court held, in particular, that the law did not require the presence of a lawyer at the moment of giving a confession. 25. On 4 July 2006 the applicant was transferred to correctional colony IK-8 of the Republic of Udmurtiya to serve his sentence. 26. On 19 August 2006 the applicant was transferred to the IZ-16/2 remand centre of Kazan with ankle-joint oedema, skin erosion and fever. 27. On 30 August 2006 the applicant was transferred to the surgical unit of that facility for medical treatment. 28. On 25 October 2006 the applicant was transferred to penal institution LIU-19 of the Republic of Mordoviya (a medical penal establishment designed for the treatment and detention of drug addicts, alcoholics, and HIV- and tuberculosis-infected prisoners), where he underwent compulsory treatment for drug addiction until 21 November 2008. 29. According to the applicant, there had been a high percentage of HIV‑positive detainees in the facility, some of whom had worked with the applicant at the facility’s sewing workshop. The applicant believed, therefore, that he had faced a serious risk of contamination via the working utensils (for example, scissors and sewing needles).

4. The first, second and third applicants were born in 1971, 1947 and 1954 respectively, and live in Budapest. 5. The second and third applicants, as well as the legal predecessors of the first and third applicant (Ms Róbertné Hidas and Ms Miklósné Kecskés) and other persons were co-owners of a plot of land of 4,847 sq. m (land registry title no. 223591) in District XXII of Budapest. They also co‑owned a neighbouring plot of land of 423 sq. m (land registry title no. 223592). 6. On 19 January 1998 the Budapest District XXII Mayor’s Office (hereafter “the local authority”) ordered the partition of plot no. 223591 into two plots measuring 1,519 sq. m and 3,328 sq. m. In the same decision, it requisitioned (lejegyzés) the plot of 1,519 sq. m for the purpose of constructing a local public road and awarded compensation of 5,511,000 Hungarian forints (HUF – approximately 25,000 European Currency Units (ECU) (the predecessor to the euro) at the material time), to be distributed among the owners in proportion to their ownership shares. 7. At the same time, the local authority also partitioned plot no. 223592 and requisitioned a part of that land with an area of 123 sq. m in exchange for compensation of HUF 376,200 (approximately ECU 1,700). 8. The decisions were served on the first applicant’s legal predecessor, the second applicant, the third applicant and the third applicant’s legal predecessor, among other persons. They appealed against it. 9. On 6 March 1998 the Budapest Public Administration Office (Budapest Főváros Közigazgatási Hivatala) upheld the first-instance decisions, which thus became final. 10. On 25 March 1998 the local authority entered into possession of the requisitioned plots of land and paid the compensation to the applicants, who only provisionally accepted the sum, while reserving their right to bring court proceedings against the requisition orders. 11. On 13 April 1998 some of the above-mentioned owners challenged the administrative decisions in court. The legal predecessor of the first applicant and the second applicant himself were parties to the proceedings, but not the third applicant or his legal predecessor. 12. On 16 March 2005, following two remittals ordered by the Budapest Court of Appeal, the Budapest High Court delivered a first-instance judgment and dismissed the claim. 13. On 30 November 2005 the Budapest Court of Appeal overturned the first-instance judgment and ordered new administrative proceedings. It held that the local authority’s decision had been tainted by a procedural irregularity, in that the local authority’s notary (who had adopted the decision of 19 January 1998) should have abstained from taking a decision in a case in which the local authority employing him had been one of the interested parties. 14. Accordingly, the Budapest District XI Mayor’s Office was appointed to conduct new first-instance administrative proceedings. On 7 February 2008 it adopted a decision identical to that of 19 January 1998 (see paragraph 7 above). 15. On 2 July 2008 the decision was upheld on appeal by the Public Administration Office of Budapest, with an amendment that the compensation figures should be increased by accrued interest. 16. On 27 August 2008 the first applicant challenged the new administrative decision in court. The second and third applicants intervened (beavatkozó) in the proceedings in support of the first applicant. 17. On 11 March 2010 the Budapest High Court found for the applicants, quashed the administrative decision because it had been adopted on the basis of a legal provision previously annulled by the Constitutional Court, and ordered new proceedings. 18. On 10 January 2015 the Budapest Government Office (Budapest Főváros Kormányhivatala) adopted a new administrative decision, with the same content as before, but on different legal grounds. 19. On 9 February 2015 the applicants brought court proceedings against that decision. 20. On 19 April 2016 the Budapest Administrative and Labour Court delivered its judgment. It dismissed the applicants’ action as far as the requisition’s lawfulness was concerned but quashed the administrative decision as regards the compensation amount. It held that the compensation amount should be set at such sum as reflected by an assessment of the value of the properties as at 2015 and that the assessment should be carried out in accordance with the provisions of Government Decree no. 58/2015 (III.24). The government decree in question contained a table for the purposes of calculating social security pensions. In that table, different multiplication factors were associated with different years (from 1950 onwards), making it thus possible to calculate the current value of salaries and incomes received during previous employment. 21. On 14 June 2017 the Kúria quashed the final judgment and remitted the case to the Budapest Administrative and Labour Court for the recalculation of the compensation amount. It held that the method of assessing the valuations applied in the first-instance judgment could not be used in the context of the case; instead, the amount to be paid should be calculated by an expert on the basis of the properties’ market values on 10 January 2015, from which the compensation already received in 1998 (see paragraph 10 above) should be deducted. 22. Throughout the court proceedings, the Land Registry has retained a record of the dispute (perfeljegyzés). 23. The public road contemplated by the local authority’s requisition order of 1998 (see paragraph 7 above) has yet to be constructed. At the date of the latest information available to the Court (2 October 2018), the proceedings concerning the amount of compensation due to the applicants were still pending before the domestic courts.

4. The applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Batman. At the time of the events giving rise to the present application, he was the head of the Batman branch of the People’s Democratic Party (DEHAP) and subsequently the Party for a Democratic Society (DTP). 5. On unspecified dates in 2005 and 2006 the Batman public prosecutor’s office initiated at least four criminal investigations against the applicant. On 18 October 2005, 6 December 2005, 1 February 2006 and 23 March 2006 the applicant made statements before the Batman public prosecutor in relation to his attendance at a number of public meetings. 6. In particular, when he was questioned on 18 October 2005 the applicant was asked about his participation in an event commemorating a number of deceased members of the PKK (Kurdish Workers’ Party, an illegal armed organisation) held on 22 August 2005. The applicant responded that he had become aware of that event when demonstrators had started to march to the cemetery where the deceased were buried. As he was the head of the Batman branch of DEHAP, he had attended the march in order to keep the demonstrators under control and to prevent any possible disturbances in the town. 7. When questioned on 6 December 2005, the applicant stated that on 17 August 2005 he had been the head of the DEHAP branch in Batman and that he had not praised the leader of the PKK in his speech. The applicant added that although Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK, was in prison, he was regarded as a political actor by the local population. The applicant’s intention had been to express that social fact and he was against any kind of violence. When the public prosecutor reminded him of the violent acts of the PKK, the applicant once again stated that he was against violence regardless of whom it emanated from. 8. On 1 February 2006 the Batman public prosecutor asked the applicant why he had referred to the PKK leader as “Esteemed/Mr (Sayın) Öcalan” during one of his speeches. The applicant responded that he had used the word “Sayın” as a matter of courtesy. He stated that he had not intended to disseminate propaganda in favour of the PKK or to praise a criminal. 9. Lastly, on 23 March 2006 the applicant was questioned by the Batman public prosecutor in the context of a criminal investigation opened against him on suspicion of membership of the PKK. He stated that he had participated in several demonstrations and readings of press statements in his capacity as the head of the Batman branch of DEHAP and the DTP, and that he had not committed any offence during those events. He denied the veracity of the allegation that those public meetings had been organised in accordance with the instructions of the PKK. When he was asked about a sentence condemning both the death of Turkish soldiers and PKK members which he had uttered during a speech, the applicant stated that he would utter that sentence again without hesitation. He also stated that the petition campaign entitled “I accept Abdullah Öcalan as a political actor” had not been started upon the instructions of the PKK. He accepted that he had demanded an end to the solitary confinement of Abdullah Öcalan and addressed the latter as “Esteemed/Mr (Sayın) Öcalan”. However, he denied the allegation that he had had the intention of disseminating propaganda in favour the PKK. The applicant contended that he had attended the demonstrations and meetings in question in order to control the crowds and to prevent any possible disturbances. Lastly, he claimed that his aim was to contribute to peace and democracy. 10. On 23 March 2006 the applicant was brought before the Batman Magistrates’ Court and questioned in respect of his involvement in a demonstration held on 16 February 2006 in Batman. He submitted that he had attended the demonstration with a view to preventing violence, since he was the head of the DTP at the material time. The court ordered the applicant’s remand in custody. 11. On 24 March 2006 the Batman public prosecutor decided to transfer the investigation to the Diyarbakır public prosecutor’s office, holding that the offence which the applicant had committed, namely membership of a terrorist organisation and carrying out membership activities, was not within his office’s jurisdiction. 12. On 26 April 2006 the Diyarbakır public prosecutor filed an indictment with the Diyarbakır Assize Court, charging the applicant and a certain M.G., under Article 220 § 8 of the Criminal Code, with disseminating propaganda in favour of the PKK on ten occasions. In the indictment the public prosecutor listed a total of ten marches and demonstrations which the applicant had attended. He noted that during those marches and demonstrations, demonstrators had chanted slogans and carried banners praising the PKK and its leader, Abdullah Öcalan, and that the applicant had made speeches in Kurdish at nine of those ten assemblies. 13. On 30 May 2006 the Diyarbakır Assize Court held the first hearing on the merits of the case. During the hearing, the applicant contended that he was the head of the Batman branch of the DTP. Although he had participated in the public meetings indicated in the indictment, he had not chanted any slogans or carried banners containing illegal expressions. He further submitted that he had not directed demonstrators to commit any illegal acts. The applicant stressed that in general he attended such public meetings at the request of the security forces, since the latter asked him to be present in order to prevent any possible clashes between themselves and the demonstrators. 14. During the second hearing held on 18 July 2006 the public prosecutor submitted his observations on the merits of the case. The public prosecutor contended that the applicant had attended various illegal public meetings between 19 February 2005 and 16 February 2006 and that he had made speeches in which he had praised the PKK and its leader. The public prosecutor alleged that those events had been organised either in line with the policies of the PKK or under its instructions with a view to supporting that organisation. Taking into account the intensity, variety and continuity of the applicant’s activities, the public prosecutor considered that the applicant’s acts constituted knowingly and willingly aiding the PKK. He then asked the Assize Court to convict the applicant under Articles 220 § 7 and 314 § 2 of the Criminal Code of membership of the PKK. 15. On 26 September 2006 the Diyarbakır Assize Court held the fourth and the last hearing in the case and convicted the applicant and his co‑accused of membership of an illegal organisation under Article 314 § 2 of the Criminal Code on the basis of Articles 220 § 7 and 314 § 3 of the same Code, finding it established that the applicant had knowingly and willingly aided the PKK. The applicant was sentenced to six years and three months’ imprisonment. The judgment of the Assize Court, insofar as relevant, reads as follows: “In the indictment dated 26 April 2006 it was alleged that Abdulcelil İmret had committed the following acts: 1. Attendance at the reading out of a press statement and an illegal march held on 19 February 2005 in the Mem-u Zin Park in Batman during which the demonstrators chanted slogans in favour of the PKK and Abdullah Öcalan; 2. Attendance at the event commemorating a deceased PKK member held in the Batman cemetery on 31 March 2005, making a speech in Kurdish and making participants say prayers in Kurdish; 3. Attendance at the reading out of a press statement at the Batman branch of DEHAP on 16 August 2005 regarding the petition campaign entitled “I accept Abdullah Öcalan as a political actor”; 4. Attendance at the illegal demonstration held on 22 August 2005 to commemorate seven members of the PKK killed by the security forces in an armed clash which had occurred in Batman; 5. Attendance at the demonstration organised by DEHAP and held on 9 November 2005, during which the demonstrators chanted illegal slogans, and making a speech in Kurdish addressed to the press and the demonstrators; 6. Attendance at the demonstration held on 16 November 2005 during which the demonstrators chanted slogans in favour of the PKK and Abdullah Öcalan and carried banners, and making a speech in Kurdish addressed to the press and the demonstrators; 7. Attendance at the demonstration held on 30 November 2005 protesting against the attempts to close down ROJ TV, the alleged solitary confinement of Abdullah Öcalan and the statement by Deniz Baykal, the leader of the CHP (People’s Republican Party) regarding the events that had occurred in Yüksekova during which the demonstrators chanted slogans in favour of Abdullah Öcalan, and making a speech in Kurdish addressed to the press and the demonstrators; 8. Attendance at the reading out of a press statement and at a march held on 21 December 2005 protesting against the solitary confinement of Abdullah Öcalan, during which the demonstrators chanted illegal slogans and carried banners, and making a speech in Kurdish addressed to the press and the demonstrators; 9. Attendance at the march and the reading out of a press statement held on 8 February 2006 in Batman, during which illegal slogans were chanted, and making a speech in Kurdish; 10. Attendance at the illegal demonstration and the reading out of a press statement held on 16 February 2006 close to the DTP Batman branch, during which illegal slogans were chanted and banners were carried, and making a speech in Kurdish; ... In his defence submissions Abdulcelil İmret stated that he had participated in the demonstrations and the reading out of press statements mentioned in the indictment but that he had neither chanted slogans nor carried banners. He stated that he had not directed demonstrators to chant slogans or to carry banners. Abdulcelil İmret submitted that he had attended those meetings at the request of the security forces and that the latter had asked him to warn the crowds not to resist them and to work with them with a view to preventing possible disturbances. ... The file contains police reports, photographs and video recordings of the events which the accused attended and the speeches he made. On the basis of the evidence in the file, it has been understood that during all the demonstrations and marches held in Batman which Abdulcelil İmret attended, slogans in favour Abdullah Öcalan were chanted and the demonstrators carried banners. It has also been understood that the speeches made by the accused praised Abdullah Öcalan. It is established that the accused attended the public meetings in question and organised them. Although the accused submitted that their aim had been to prevent clashes between the demonstrators and the security forces and [that they] had not had the intention of disseminating propaganda in favour of the PKK when they had participated in the demonstrations and marches in question, taking into account the content of the case file and their acts during those meetings, their defence submissions have been found to be baseless. As a result of the trial and in the light of the evidence, It has been established that Abdulcelil İmret worked as the head of the Batman branch of DEHAP and that subsequent to the closure of DEHAP he was the head of the Batman branch of the DTP. He attended ten marches and demonstrations held between 19 February 2005 and 16 February 2006, organised by the above-mentioned political parties. Illegal slogans were chanted and illegal banners were carried during those meetings. In some of those meetings, Abdulcelil İmret read press statements containing expressions praising Abdullah Öcalan. All of the marches and demonstrations in question were illegal within the meaning of section 23/b of the Marches and Demonstrations Act (Law no. 2911). ... It has been established that all of those marches and demonstrations were organised in line with the ‘Democratic Political Struggle’ strategy adopted by the PKK recently; that the media broadcasts in line with the PKK’s strategies had announced those marches and demonstrations prior to them, and that the same media organs had used those demonstrations as propaganda materials after they had been held. Abdulcelil İmret and M.G. organised several illegal demonstrations in line with the PKK’s instructions and during those demonstrations they addressed the demonstrators who chanted slogans and carried banners containing expressions in favour of the PKK and Abdullah Öcalan. In their speeches the accused praised the PKK’s leader. Taking into account the continuity and nature of their acts, it is considered that those acts went beyond the offence of dissemination of propaganda in favour of a [terrorist] organisation and amounted to the offence proscribed by Article 220 § 7 of the Criminal Code, that is to say, ‘knowingly and willingly aiding an illegal organisation without being in the hierarchical structure’. Therefore, it has been decided to convict the accused under Article 314 § 2 of the Criminal Code. ...” 16. On 13 April 2010 the Court of Cassation upheld the first-instance judgment. 17. By Law no. 6352, which entered into force on 5 July 2012, paragraph 7 of Article 220 of the Criminal Code was amended. The applicant applied to the Diyarbakır Assize Court requesting it to examine whether the amended version of that provision could be considered to be in his favour and, if so, whether the execution of his sentence could be suspended. He added that he was currently serving his prison sentence. 18. On 16 August 2012 the Diyarbakır Assize Court decided to reduce the applicant’s sentence to five years, two months and fifteen days’ imprisonment. The court rejected the applicant’s request to have the execution of his sentence suspended.

5. The applicant was born in 1970 and lives in Chișinău. 6. The applicant has been involved in numerous protests against alleged acts of corruption and abuse committed by police officers, prosecutors and judges. He was himself the victim of police abuse, ill-treatment and prosecutorial inaction (see Mătăsaru and Saviţchi v. Moldova, no. 38281/08, 2 November 2010). Each year during the professional holiday of the prosecutors or the police he stages protests involving live animals, toilets, caricatures and masks. 7. On 29 January 2013, the professional holiday of prosecutors in Moldova, the applicant conducted a one person demonstration in front of the Prosecutor General’s Office. According to him, the aim of the protest was to draw public attention to the corruption and the control exercised by politicians over the Prosecutor General’s Office. At 10 a.m. he started his protest by installing two large wooden sculptures on the stairs of the Prosecutor General’s Office. The first sculpture represented an erect penis with a picture of the face of a high-ranking politician attached to its head. The sculpture had a white collar and a tie and measured two metres. The second sculpture represented a large vulva with pictures of several high‑ranking prosecutors between the labia. The applicant also inflated balloons in the form of male genitals and attached them to the nearby trees. 8. The demonstration was observed from the beginning by several police officers and numerous journalists approached to interview the applicant. At 11 a.m. a police van approached, the sculptures were removed by police officers and the applicant was taken to a police station. 9. Later the applicant was charged with the criminal offence of hooliganism. The criminal investigation was conducted by a department of the Prosecutor General’s Office whose head’s picture had been attached to the sculpture of the vulva. 10. On 2 March 2015 the Râșcani District Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to two years’ imprisonment. The sentence was suspended for a period of three years. In deciding on the sanction to be applied, the court took into consideration the fact that the applicant had previously been sanctioned with fines for similar deeds and that those sanctions had proved to be inefficient. The court considered that the applicant’s deeds had been immoral because he had exposed obscene sculptures in a public place where they could be seen by anyone, including by children. The court based its findings on the statements of several prosecution witnesses who had stated that they had disliked the sculptures exposed by the applicant and had considered them to be indecent and obscene. The court also stated that assimilating public officials with genitals went beyond the acceptable limits of criticism in a democratic society and was therefore not an act protected under Article 10 of the Convention. Moreover, the accusations meant to be made by the applicant by means of his protest against the officials concerned lacked a factual basis and had been contrary to the principle of presumption of innocence. 11. The applicant appealed against the above decision arguing, inter alia, that it ran contrary to his rights guaranteed by Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention. 12. On 2 November 2015 the Chișinău Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal. 13. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court of Justice in which he reiterated his position that his conviction had been contrary to the provisions of the Convention and stated that the sculptures had represented a form of artistic expression which was to be protected under Article 10 of the Convention. He reiterated that his protest had been against the corruption within the Prosecutor General’s Office and among high-ranking politicians, a phenomenon which was universally known and did not need to be proved. He also argued that the sculptures exposed by him could not be considered obscene. In any event, at the time of his protest, children were normally at schools and kindergartens. The fact that some of the prosecution witnesses disliked what they saw was not sufficient to hold him responsible for a criminal offence. The applicant admitted that the form of the protest chosen by him had been striking, however he considered this manner of protesting as the only way possible to make himself heard in a society which was oversaturated with subjects of discussion. The applicant finally submitted that the sanction applied to him had been disproportionately harsh and that it had had a chilling effect on him. He pointed to the fact that the first-instance court had admitted to having pursued the goal of discouraging his future involvement in protests. By the application of a suspended sentence, he had in fact been forced to abstain from organising further protests for a period of three years or risk being imprisoned. 14. On 20 April 2016 the Supreme Court of Justice dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law and upheld the judgments of the lower courts. The decision was notified to the applicant on 19 May 2016.

5. The applicant company is a limited liability company and is the owner of the Greek television channel ALPHA. 6. On 24 January 2002, ALPHA broadcast a television show named “Jungle” (Ζούγκλα) in which three videos that had been filmed with a hidden camera were broadcast. In the first video, A.C., then a member of the Hellenic Parliament and chairman of the inter-party committee on electronic gambling, was shown entering a gambling arcade and playing on two machines. The second video showed a meeting between A.C. and associates of the television host of “Jungle”, M.T., during which the first video was shown to A.C. The third video showed a meeting between A.C. and M.T. in the latter’s office. On 27 January 2002 the videos were shown again during a television show named “Yellow Press” (Κίτρινος Τύπος) presented by the same television host. 7. On 23 May 2002 the National Radio and Television Council (Εθνικό Συμβούλιο Ραδιοτηλεόρασης), following an invitation to the applicant company, held a hearing in which the applicant company was represented by its attorneys. As can be seen from the minutes of the meeting, the applicant company’s attorneys acknowledged the use of hidden camera in the above-mentioned incidents. They argued that such use had been justified owing to A.C. being a public figure and that it had served the public interest, as proven by the fact that the report had resulted in A.C.’s being dismissed from the parliamentary group of the political party for which he had been elected as parliamentary deputy. In their view, that had been the result not only of A.C.’s gambling activities, but also of the fact that he had tried to negotiate with the applicant company’s reporters to present the incident differently. The applicant company’s attorneys further argued that the use of a hidden camera had been exceptional and had been resorted to following the receipt of information that could not have been verified otherwise, as nobody would have believed the journalists’ allegations if they had reported on the issue without broadcasting the images. It can also be seen from the minutes that the members of the National Radio and Television Council expressed their disagreement regarding the use of a hidden camera, arguing that if anyone were able to use a hidden camera by claiming that there was an overriding public interest in doing so, then all citizens – especially if they were public figures – would be exposed to the possibility of being subject to pressure and extortion. They furthermore stressed that nobody would ever forbid journalists to report on a certain issue; however the means used raised an issue, as the use of hidden camera could be accepted only in respect of a national security issue or for the prevention of a serious crime or other similar situations. They also noted that there were two separate issues in the instant case; on the one hand the use of a hidden camera and on the other hand the entrapment of A.C. 8. By its decision 214/162/23.05.2002, the National Radio and Television Council ordered the applicant company to pay one hundred thousand (100,000) euros (EUR) for each of the two television shows during which the above-mentioned videos were shown, as well as to broadcast on three days in a row on its main news show the content of that decision. The decision included a short description of the three videos, a citation of the relevant legislation, and the conclusion that the use of hidden camera in that case had not been in accordance with the relevant law. It further stated that the sanctions had been imposed following an assessment of the gravity of the offence, of the number of viewers of the two television shows, of the size of the investment that had been made by the applicant company and the fact that the television channel had been repeatedly fined in the past for the same offence. 9. On 10 June 2002 the decision of the National Radio and Television Council was communicated to the Minister of Press and Media, who, after examining its legality, issued decision no 3156/E/11.02.2003 confirming its content. 10. On 4 April 2003 the applicant company lodged an application for annulment (αίτηση ακύρωσης) against the decisions of the National Radio and Television Council and the Minister of Press and Media with the Supreme Administrative Court (Συμβούλιο της Επικρατείας) on the grounds that the above-mentioned decision had violated Articles 9, 15 § 1 and 25 of the Greek Constitution, as well as Article 10 of the Convention. A.C. lodged a third-party intervention requesting from the Supreme Administrative Court to dismiss the application for annulment. On 23 January 2006 the President of the Supreme Administrative Court referred the case to the Plenary Supreme Administrative Court owing to its high importance. 11. The hearing before the Plenary Supreme Administrative Court took place on 2 June 2006. By its judgment no. 1213/2010, published on 16 April 2010 and finalised on 21 May 2010 (δημοσίευση και καθαρογραφή), the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the application for annulment. 12. In its legal assessment, the majority of the Supreme Administrative Court firstly referred to the constitutional provisions providing the right to impart and receive information, and then emphasised that this right is subject to limitations whose legitimate aim is the protection of the rights of others and the observance of the rule of law on condition that those limitations are proportionate. It additionally referred to the Court’s case-law in respect of Article 10 and on Article 8, with specific reference to case-law concerning the protection of a person’s image (see Von Hannover v. Germany, no. 59320/00, ECHR 2004‑VI; Schüssel v. Austria (dec.), no. 42409/98, 21 February 2002; and Sciacca v. Italy, no. 50774/99, ECHR 2005‑I). It continued by noting that under Article 15 of the Constitution the State has the legal duty to exercise control over the radio and television in order to ensure respect for human values and that sanctions imposed by the National Radio and Television Council served that purpose. 13. The Supreme Administrative Court laid down the conditions under which it is legitimate to broadcast an image that has been filmed with the method of hidden camera, by making a distinction between reporting on specific news, whose exclusive or main source is an image of a specific person recorded by secret means, and the broadcasting of the relevant, secretly recorded image. According to that reasoning, recording by secret means an image which has as its main or only subject a specific person constitutes in principle a violation of that person’s right to his own image, which is protected by Articles 9 § 1 of the Constitution and 8 § 1 of the Convention, as a specific aspect of the right to respect for one’s private life. Consequently, the broadcasting on television of news whose exclusive or main source is an image of a specific person recorded by secret means cannot, in principle, be considered as constituting the legitimate exercise of the right to impart information, given that the disseminated news has been received under circumstances which constitute a violation of an individual’s right to his own image. Nevertheless, in certain cases it may be considered justified to broadcast such news, on account of its contribution to a debate of general interest and taking into account the secretly recorded person’s position or standing. However, even when broadcasting of the news is considered a legitimate exercise of the right to impart information, this does not automatically render legitimate the broadcasting of the relevant, secretly recorded images, as that constitutes a much more intense [έντονος] limitation of the constitutionally protected right of that person to his own image than the simple transmission of news. In the domestic court’s view, broadcasting of a secretly recorded image can only be justified if the legitimate (for the reasons mentioned above) broadcasting of such news is completely impossible or particularly difficult without broadcasting the image that was recorded by hidden means and which constitutes the source of the news. 14. By applying the above-mentioned principles to the circumstances of the case, the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the applicant company’s argument that it had legitimately transmitted the news concerning A.C. in view of A.C.’s capacity as a public figure. The domestic court stressed that from the text of the decision and from the minutes of the meeting of the National Radio and Television Council it derived that the sanction was imposed to the applicant company solely and exclusively on account of the broadcast of the images that had been recorded by hidden means and not on account of the transmission of the news, whose source had been the secretly recorded images. As far as the broadcasting of the images was concerned, the applicant company had not disputed that the images had been recorded by secret means and had not claimed that broadcasting of the news was absolutely impossible or extremely difficult without broadcasting the relevant images. Therefore, the applicant company’s allegation that it had broadcast the impugned images for reasons of journalistic interest and of public interest was dismissed. 15. On the basis of the above-mentioned reasoning, the Supreme Administrative Court ruled that the decision of the National Radio and Television Council had been fully reasoned and dismissed the applicant company’s application for annulment. 16. A concurring, more specific (ειδικότερη) opinion was joined to the majority opinion; the seven judges considered that the recording of a person without his knowledge and the use of it for the broadcasting of news constituted a direct violation of that person’s right to dignity as it reduces him to an instrument for others to achieving goals that are irrelevant to him. Given that, pursuant to Articles 2 § 1, 15 § 2 and 25 § 1 of the Constitution, the protection of human dignity is absolute, the broadcasting of such news is always forbidden, irrespective of whether such a broadcast includes the image in question. For those reasons, the judges who supported this opinion considered that the application for annulment should be dismissed. 17. In addition, there were two dissenting opinions. According to the first one, in view of the fact that the National Radio and Television Council had considered that the broadcasting of news that had been recorded by secret means had constituted a legitimate exercise of the right to impart information, the same considerations should be extended to the broadcasting of the relevant image. The reason for this was the special nature of television, in comparison with the other media, owing to which the broadcasting of the image went hand-in-hand with broadcasting the news itself. Therefore, the application for annulment should have been allowed, given that the National Radio and Television Council’s decision had been based solely on the fact that the image of A.C. had been recorded by hidden means, without considering whether broadcasting news whose source was the above images constituted a legitimate exercise of the right to impart information. 18. Lastly, according to the other dissenting opinion, no constitutional provision justified the absolute protection of an image (as was held by the majority). A person’s right to his own image was susceptible to limitations that varied according to that person’s position and the space in which the recording in question had taken place. For individuals, protection against the recording of their image without their consent was absolute, irrespective of whether it took place in a public or private space, unless the recording was not directed to them or the recording of the image took place with a view to the prevention of crimes in public space. For public figures, however, protection was less absolute. In particular, public figures, such as politicians, were exposed to publicity and sometimes they even pursued it. As a result, there was a legitimate expectation on the part of the media and of the public to impart and receive information regarding their public activities. For these persons, there was an absolute protection of their image in their private space and in public spaces in which they shared private or family moments. When, however, public figures were in public spaces but not under the conditions described above, or acted in a way that was of interest to the public (such as in cases in which they engaged in behaviour contrary to what their public role entailed or contrary to the image they projected towards the public), then the right to receive and impart information could justify the recording of that person without his consent and the broadcasting of the relevant images by the media. In this regard, the dissenting judges argued that it would be inconceivable to equate radio with television, as they did not operate on the same way; therefore, it would not be possible for a television show to simply announce the news without broadcasting the relevant images, as would be the case on the radio. In respect of legitimately recorded images, when there is a balance between transparency and the right to receive information on the one hand and the protection of a person’s image on the other hand, the presumption should be that the recorded image could be broadcast without consent. In view of the above, the four judges considered that the application for annulment should be allowed, taking into account especially the fact that A.C. was a public figure, that the recording of his image had taken place in a public space (that is to say in a gambling arcade), and that the broadcasting of the relevant images had served the purpose of informing the public of behaviour on the part of a member of Parliament that did not meet the requirements of his position. Therefore, the television channel’s decision to broadcast the image as a part of the television shows, which otherwise could be considered unfounded or even defamatory, had not breached the proportionality principle.

5. The applicant was born in 1966 and is detained. 6. In early August 2009 preliminary proceedings were initiated against the applicant based on the suspicion that he had committed violent acts against his spouse, R.K. On 6 August 2009 R.K. was examined at the request of the public prosecutor’s office by the investigating judge, W., after the latter had decided, at the suggestion of the public prosecutor’s office, to exclude the applicant from the hearing under Article 168c § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, since there was a risk, given the nature of the reported offences, that R.K. would not testify or would not tell the truth in the applicant’s presence. 7. On 7 August 2009 the investigating judge, at the request of the public prosecutor’s office, issued an arrest warrant for the applicant and also assigned counsel to him. 8. On 25 September 2009 the applicant was arrested and detained on remand. On 15 October 2009 the Arnsberg Regional Court assigned a lawyer of his choice as his counsel. 9. On 3 May 2010 the Arnsberg Regional Court opened the main proceedings against the applicant. R.K., who was also summoned to appear on that date, informed the court that she did not wish to give evidence. 10. At the hearing of 28 May 2010, the investigating judge was examined on the evidence he had obtained from his examination of R.K. on 6 August 2009. The Regional Court rejected an objection by the applicant’s counsel on the grounds that it was permissible to examine the investigating judge even if the applicant’s rights under Article 6 § 3 (d) of the Convention had been breached by R.K.’s examination. Only when adjudicating the case could it be decided whether the investigating judge’s statements could be admitted as evidence or not, which, in line with the Court’s case-law, would depend on whether it had been corroborated by other significant factors independent of that evidence. 11. At that same hearing, Officers Ra. and Rü. were examined as witnesses with regard to the description of events given to them by R.K. when they had arrived at M.’s home on 2 August 2009 (see paragraphs 27‑28 below). The applicant’s counsel objected to the use of the evidence obtained from the examination of these two witnesses on the grounds that “the depicted facts cannot be separated chronologically and sequentially”. 12. At the hearing of 10 June 2010, R.K. stated that she did not consent to the use of the evidence which she had provided to the investigating judge, to Officers Ra. and Rü. and to the court-appointed medical expert; nor did she consent to the use of the results of the medical examination. 13. On 28 June 2010 the Regional Court convicted the applicant on four counts of dangerous assault, one of these in concurrence with coercion, as well as of maliciously inflicting bodily injury in concurrence with attempted coercion, of coercion and of wilful driving without a licence. The Regional Court sentenced the applicant to six years and six months’ imprisonment. In addition, it ordered his subsequent preventive detention, finding that the applicant had a dissocial personality disorder and that there was a very high likelihood that he would commit similar offences in the future. 14. In the 1990s, the applicant was convicted several times of, inter alia, several different counts of assault against his respective partners at different times. He met his third wife, R.K., in the summer of 2008. Their relationship was from the outset marked by the applicant’s violent behaviour towards R.K., which escalated in July 2009. 15. On 31 July 2009 in their marital home the applicant asked R.K. about her past sex life. He then beat her on different parts of her body and kicked her. Following this he asked her to go to the basement and, while going there, stubbed out a cigarette on her neck. When they arrived in the basement, he asked her to write a letter to the wife of a former lover of hers and to confess to adultery. When R.K. refused, he delivered several blows all over her body, including her head and face, and also beat her with a wooden hiking pole. R.K. then promised to write the letter. The following evening the applicant asked her again to write the letter and delivered blows with his fist, primarily to her head. After having left R.K. alone in the living room, the applicant later returned with a mattress and demanded that she undress and to lie down on her stomach. He then beat her with a thin rope on her back, before forcing her to carry out sexual acts on herself. 16. On the morning of 2 August 2009, R.K. started to write the said letter by hand. When reading the draft, the applicant was angry about its content. R.K. stated that she would write it again. The applicant delivered blows with his fist, mostly to her head, and also beat her with his shoes on the back of her head. He then stubbed out a cigarette on her left breast. R.K. tried to run away but fell down in the hallway. The applicant then choked her so that she could not breathe. In unknown circumstances, R.K. managed to escape and ran into the street in panic, crying for help. 17. There, she ran into S. and Ke., the latter telling her to go to the home of the M. family. She ran over and rang the bell. M. opened the door and let her in. Ke. [probably S., see paragraphs 24 and 26 below] went to the house of the Sch. family and called the police from there. During that call, Mr and Ms Sch. went outside and saw the applicant leave the home and drive off. They reported the number plate of the car to Ke. [S., see above], who passed it on to the police. Inside the house, M.’s mother gave R.K. a towel, which she put on the back of her head, from where she was visibly bleeding. A few minutes later two police officers, Ra. and Rü., arrived. 18. On that same day, R.K. was admitted to a women’s shelter. She showed the counsellor there, N., several marks of injury on her head and other parts of her body and described the bodily harm and coercion to which the applicant had subjected her in the period from 31 July to 2 August 2009. 19. The investigating judge, W., stated that he had questioned R.K. for some two hours on 6 August 2009 at the request of the public prosecutor’s office (see paragraph 6 above). She had described a multitude of acts of domestic violence in the course of the marriage, which had increased over time, and repeatedly stated that she loved the applicant, which was why she had not come forward before. The violence between 31 July and 2 August 2009 had constituted an escalation and had been too much for her, rendering their living together impossible, which was why she was now ready to testify against the applicant. She had described the events of between 31 July and 2 August 2009 as several acts of torment stretched out over the whole weekend with some breaks in between. He had asked her about every single incident, to which she had given definite and detailed accounts of each, including beatings with a rope, a wooden hiking pole and shoes, as well as being forced to carry out sexual acts on herself. Her account had been consistent and she had not been evasive, maintaining eye contact throughout. She had repeatedly stated that the applicant had beaten her between 31 July and 2 August 2009 in connection with a letter which the applicant had wanted her to write to the wife of a former lover of hers; she had started to write that letter by hand. (b) Subsequent actions of R.K. 20. R.K. later retracted her statements as reported by the investigating judge and made voluntary disclosures on 2 December 2009 and on 20 April 2010 to the police for having wrongfully incriminated the applicant, claiming that he had not been at home between 31 July and 2 August 2009 and that a third person had injured her. On 23 April 2010 R.K. submitted a written statement to the Regional Court retracting the voluntary disclosures of 2 December 2009 and 20 April 2010. (c) The applicant’s statements 21. The only statement the applicant made during the trial was to confirm that he did not have a driving licence. He did not comment on the remainder of the charges against him. (d) Further evidence 22. N., the women’s shelter’s counsellor, testified that she had received a copy of the police report and had discussed the report and the events with R.K. when she had been admitted to the shelter on 2 August 2009 in a severely traumatised state. R.K.’s statements had been consistent with the police report. She had provided a detailed account of all the incidents that had taken place between 31 July 2009 and 2 August 2009, and had consistently named the applicant as the perpetrator. That same evening, she had also showed her her injuries, in particular bleeding head wounds, burn marks on her left breast and neck, and several bruises and weals on her back. N. had discussed the violent events with R.K. up until the former’s examination before the Regional Court. Throughout these discussions, R.K.’s account had been consistent. 23. Re.K., R.K.’s son, who had been born in 1997, stated that on 2 August 2009 he had been in his room from where he had heard the applicant and R.K. having an argument and screaming. He had later learned that his mother had been at a neighbour’s home, where he had met her together with the police officers. His mother had been pressing a cloth against her head. He had then gone to the hospital together with her. He had not seen what had happened in the house and had, overall, not noticed much of the events that had occurred that weekend. 24. S., a witness, said that he had been at a local sports meeting with another witness, Ke., on 2 August 2009. At around midday, when they had been walking in the direction of the village, R.K. had run towards them on G. Street, shouting “Help! Help! My husband is going to kill me!” R.K. had been so shocked and disturbed that she had not been able to speak clearly. S. had advised her to go to the home of the M. family. He himself had then gone to the home of the Sch. family to call the police. While he had been on the phone to the police, Ms Sch. told him that the applicant had driven off. Ms Sch. had then given the registration number to S., who passed it on to the police. When S. had gone back outside, he had met Re.K., who had been shaking, and had asked him about R.K. He had then led the police to the house of the M. family. When the door had opened, he had seen R.K. sitting on the stairs, with a bloody cloth pressed on her head. The police then took charge and he left the scene. 25. M., a witness, stated that one Sunday, the doorbell rang. R.K. was standing outside, shouting “My husband, my husband! He’s out to get me. He mustn’t see me.” R.K., who had been terrified, immediately entered the house and sat down on the stairs. She had been bleeding from her head. Later, the police had arrived and called an ambulance. M.’s mother added that she had given R.K. a towel for her bleeding head wound and that R.K. had repeatedly expressed fear of her husband. She had never seen a woman so terrified before, which had overwhelmed her so much that she had not asked R.K. about what had happened. 26. Ms Sch., a witness, testified that S. had rung her door bell on 2 August 2009. S. had told her that he had had to call the police as it had seemed that the applicant had harmed his wife. She had then gone outside her house and looked towards the applicant’s house located only a few metres away. She had observed the applicant leaving his house and driving off. She had told that to S., who had asked her to spell out the car’s number plate, which she had done. Mr Sch. made similar statements. 27. Officers Ra. and Rü. explained that they had been patrolling together on 31 July 2009 when they had received the call to drive to the village B., where a woman had run out of a house screaming and had been hiding at a neighbour’s residence. Several persons had been present when they had arrived at the scene, informing them that R.K. had been at the house of the M. family. When they had gone there, they had found R.K. in shock, pressing a cloth to the back of her head. When Ra. had asked her what had happened, she had stated that her husband had beaten her. R.K. had then given additional evidence, which was later discarded (see paragraph 34 below). She had had a bleeding wound on the back of her head and visible facial bruising. In the beginning, she had been shaking so much that it had not been possible to question her. 28. A draft letter to the wife of a former lover of hers, in which R.K. stated that she wanted to clear up her life and that adultery was a sin, was read out before the Regional Court. Officer Ra. had stated that R.K., after having made her statement to the police and having been examined in hospital, had asked to be admitted to a women’s shelter. She had requested that they stop by the marital home beforehand and for the police officers to accompany her. Besides taking some of her belongings, she had given the letter to Ra. and asked him to keep it. Ra. had included the letter in the case file. 29. Another letter by R.K. of 26 September 2009, addressed to the applicant, was read out before the Regional Court, in which she described examples of acts committed by him from 31 July 2009 onwards, reporting the assaults, humiliations and sexual acts to which she had submitted for fear of receiving even more blows. 30. The Regional Court relied, inter alia, on the testimony R.K. had given at her examination by the investigating judge. It considered that the applicant had rightly been barred from attending that hearing. However, since Article 6 § 3 (d) of the Convention guaranteed the applicant’s right to examine or have examined witnesses against him, defence counsel should have been appointed for the applicant so that the latter could examine R.K. at that hearing. Yet, the mere fact that neither the applicant nor his counsel had had the opportunity to cross-examine R.K. did not automatically constitute a breach of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (d) of the Convention. It was decisive whether the proceedings in their entirety, including the manner in which evidence had been taken and assessed, had been fair. Where the lack of an opportunity to cross-examine a witness had been a result of procedural errors imputable on the judiciary, as in the present case, the Court found a breach of the Convention where the conviction had been based to a decisive extent on the evidence of the untested witness. A conviction could thus only be based on untested evidence where it was corroborated by other significant factors independent of that evidence. In the present case, the applicant’s conviction could be based on R.K.’s statements as reported by the investigating judge, for they were corroborated by other significant factors independent of them. 31. In this regard, the Regional Court referred to R.K.’s letter of 26 September 2009, in which she had described examples of acts committed by the applicant from 31 July 2009 onwards, reporting the assaults, humiliations and sexual acts to which she had submitted for fear of receiving even more blows (see paragraph 29 above). Her statement that the applicant had struck her in order to make her compose a letter to the wife of a former lover of hers had been corroborated by the draft letter with the content she had described which she had given to Ra. (see paragraph 28 above). Both letters had been admitted as evidence, as a witness’s written statements could be admitted even in a case where he or she lawfully refused to give evidence at trial. 32. Moreover, witness N. of the women’s shelter in which R.K. had sought refuge had, on the day of R.K.’s admission to the shelter, observed wounds in the head area, some of which had been bleeding, and burn marks on R.K.’s left breast and neck as well as various bruises and weals on her back which R.K. had shown her. During her stay in the shelter, R.K. had repeatedly described to N. the details of the applicant’s violent acts (see paragraph 22 above). 33. Re.K., R.K.’s son, who was in the marital home on 2 August 2009, stated that he had heard the applicant and R.K. having an argument and screaming (see paragraph 23 above). Other witnesses reported that R.K. had run into the street in panic that day, with a bleeding wound on the back of her head, and had subsequently sought refuge with the M. family until the police had arrived, while the applicant had been seen leaving the house and driving off following that (see paragraphs 24-27 above). Therefore, the Regional Court was convinced that R.K.’s subsequent voluntary disclosures, in which she had mainly claimed that the applicant had not been at home and which she had subsequently retracted (see paragraph 20 above), had not been truthful. 34. R.K.’s initial statements to Officers Ra. and Rü., as reported by them (see paragraph 27 above), were possible to admit as evidence despite R.K. subsequently invoking her right to remain silent, as they were to be qualified as a “spontaneous utterance”. At the same time, the Regional Court did not take into account the additional evidence given to the police by R.K. (see paragraph 27 above), as the police had not been sure at which point they had informed her of her right to remain silent. 35. On 29 June 2010 the applicant, represented by counsel, lodged an appeal on points of law against the judgment. He argued that evidence obtained in breach of the right of confrontation enshrined in Article 6 § 3 (d) of the Convention must never be admitted, regardless of its importance. The importance of the untested evidence in relation to the other evidence used by the court must not be decisive. Nor did it matter whether the court of first instance had undertaken a particularly careful examination of the evidence of the untested witness, as the breach of the right of confrontation could not be counterbalanced. Furthermore, in the light of R.K.’s subsequent invocation of her right to remain silent, the Regional Court had wrongly admitted the evidence given by the police officers Ra. and Rü. R.K.’s statements to the police officers had not been a “spontaneous utterance”, as the latter had been called to the scene because a woman had run out of a house screaming and had been hiding at a neighbour’s house and had, on arrival, asked her what had happened (see paragraph 27 above). 36. In a written submission of 8 November 2010 the Federal Public Prosecutor General argued that the examination of the investigating judge, resulting in the use of the untested evidence given by R.K., had not rendered the proceedings unfair. The evidence given by R.K. to the investigating judge had been corroborated by other significant factors independent of her evidence. Moreover, the Regional Court had counterbalanced the limitation of the applicant’s defence rights through a particularly careful and critical assessment of the evidentiary value of that testimony. 37. On 16 December 2010 the Federal Court of Justice dismissed the appeal as ill-founded, finding that the review of the Regional Court’s judgment had not revealed any legal errors that had been detrimental to the applicant. 38. On 11 January 2011 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court. He argued that his right of confrontation had been infringed when the investigation judge had examined R.K. without him or his counsel having had the opportunity to be present and to question her. It had been unlawful to admit her testimony, as reported by the investigating judge, as evidence and to use it to convict him. It was not sufficient to take the violation of his right of confrontation into consideration as part of the evidentiary assessment by attaching less evidentiary value to the untested testimony and by requiring that it be corroborated by other significant pieces of evidence. Similarly, it was unlawful to admit as evidence the statements of the two police officers, as R.K.’s statement, which they reported, was not a “spontaneous utterance”. 39. In a written submission of 22 August 2011 the Federal Public Prosecutor General argued that the Regional Court had sufficiently taken the Court’s case-law on Article 6 § 3 (d) of the Convention into account. 40. On 4 April 2012 the Federal Constitutional Court refused to admit the constitutional complaint for adjudication, without providing reasons.

5. The applicant was born in 1992 and lives in Tver. 6. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7. On 7 May 2009 the applicant and his classmate A. were arrested on suspicion of causing grievous bodily injuries to a boy from their school. They confessed to their deeds. The applicant was initially released under parental supervision, whilst A. was remanded in custody. The following day they retracted their confessions. 8. On 16 November 2009, after the investigator had reclassified their actions as a more serious offence, the Zavolzhskiy District Court in Tver ordered the applicant’s placement in custody, citing the gravity of the charges and the fact that he had recanted. The District Court interpreted the latter element as amounting to the risk of an obstruction of justice. On 11 December 2009 the Tver Regional Court upheld the detention order on appeal, finding as follows: “[The fact that the defendant] has a permanent place of residence, lives with his family, is studying in high school and does not have a criminal record does not provide a basis for rejecting unconditionally the investigator’s application [for a detention order] in the light of the extreme gravity of the charges.” 9. On 12 January 2010 the District Court extended the authorised detention period, pointing out that the applicant “had changed his attitude to the committed offence from an outright acknowledgement to a downright denial”. In the court’s opinion, that implied that the applicant might interfere with justice if released. The District Court also added that the custodial measure was necessary “to secure the enforcement of the conviction”. On 3 February 2010 the Regional Court upheld the District Court’s assessment on appeal, in particular its finding that a non-custodial measure would not be sufficient to secure the enforcement of the conviction. 10. On 20 January 2010 the investigator in charge of the applicant’s case refused the parents’ request for leave to visit their son, reasoning as follows: “The investigation appointed Mr V. Smirnov, the father of Mr A. Smirnov, as the legal representative of the underage defendant. However, the investigation considers that Mr V. Smirnov is using all means to interfere with the criminal proceedings because of his vested interests; he has not responded when summonsed by the investigator or court, and is causing all kinds of delays in the proceedings. The investigation considers that this kind of conduct on the part of Mr V. Smirnov may have a negative influence of the defendant Mr A. Smirnov, as well as interfering with the establishment of the truth in the criminal case.” 11. On 25 January 2010 the supervising prosecutor rejected a complaint from the applicant’s father about the investigator’s decision, recalling that the granting of leave to visit a detainee was at the investigator’s discretion rather than being a legal obligation and that the arguments for refusing leave were “persuasive and well-justified”. 12. On 3 February 2010 the District Court issued a further extension order, holding that the applicant had been charged with a particularly serious offence and that the circumstances warranting the application of a custodial measure still obtained. On 19 February 2010 the Regional Court upheld the order on appeal. 13. The final extension order of 11 March 2010 referred to the gravity of the charges against both co-defendants, without distinguishing between their individual situations. 14. By a judgment of 25 March 2010, the Regional Court found the applicant and his co-defendant guilty of attempted murder and sentenced each of them to five years’ imprisonment. On 9 June 2010 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the conviction. 15. Between November 2009 and July 2010 the applicant’s parents visited him in prison a total of sixteen times. All visits were carried out under the supervision of a warden while the applicant was separated from his parents by a glass partition.

8. The applicant was born in 1944 and lives in Viana do Castelo (Portugal). 9. The applicant is a lawyer by training and an auditor by profession. From 1993 onwards, he was no longer authorised to practise as a lawyer. By a decision of the Bar Council of 24 September 1993, the applicant was suspended from the roll, as the exercise of the profession of lawyer was considered to be incompatible with his practising as an auditor. This decision was published in the Official Gazette in June 2000. When the applicant ceased his activity as an auditor in April 2016, he continued to be suspended from the Bar Council’s roll until at least the end of 2016 as the result of a disciplinary sanction imposed on him for having practised as a lawyer while not being authorised to do so. 10. On 28 February 2008, in the context of a set of civil proceedings in which he was nevertheless acting as a lawyer, the applicant criticised the decisions taken by the judge hearing the case, saying that they were not worthy of a judge and that a judge could not lie or omit the truth in the exercise of his functions. The judge in question filed a complaint for insult with the public prosecutor’s office. It is not clear from the material before the Court on what basis the applicant was acting as a lawyer in the context of those proceedings given the suspension from the roll referred to above. 11. On 10 February 2010 the public prosecutor’s office at the Baixo‑Vouga District Court filed the prosecution’s submissions against the applicant on a charge of insulting a judge. As the applicant had not instructed a lawyer, the public prosecutor’s office appointed counsel on the basis of Article 64 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP) to conduct the applicant’s defence. 12. On 12 March 2010 the applicant lodged a request with the Baixo‑Vouga Criminal Investigation Court for the opening of adversarial investigation proceedings (abertura de instrução; see paragraph 39 below). He also sought leave to replace his officially appointed defence counsel and represent himself. 13. In an order of 7 September 2010 the court agreed to open the investigation but dismissed the request for officially appointed defence counsel to be replaced and for the applicant to conduct his own defence. It held that the applicant was not entitled to act in the proceedings without the assistance of defence counsel. The court held that under the provisions of Portuguese law, in particular Article 32 of the Constitution and Articles 64 § 3 and 287 § 4 of the CCP (see paragraphs 28, 33 and 40 below), the defendant had the right to be represented by independent counsel, a right which would not be made effective if self-representation were to be allowed. Referring to the Constitutional Court’s case-law on the subject, the court found that a defendant who was a lawyer could therefore not act in proceedings as his own counsel. 14. The applicant lodged an appeal with the Coimbra Court of Appeal against the order of 7 September 2010, challenging the decision not to allow him to represent himself in the criminal proceedings. 15. On 21 December 2010 the Coimbra Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal. It considered the appeal to be admissible despite the fact that it had been lodged by the applicant in person, as it concerned the very issue whether the applicant, as the defendant, was entitled to conduct his own defence. The Court of Appeal stressed that Portuguese law on criminal procedure did not allow the procedural status of defendant to be combined with that of defence counsel in the same proceedings. It required that the defendant be assisted by defence counsel at the hearing before the investigating judge and at the trial in all cases where the proceedings concerned could give rise to a custodial sentence or a public-safety detention order. This reflected the premise that the accused would be better defended when the defence was conducted by a legal professional trained in advocacy. The latter, unencumbered by the emotional burden weighing on a defendant, could provide a lucid, dispassionate and effective defence. The law on criminal procedure was thus intended not to place limits on the defence’s action, but to support the proper defence of the accused. 16. On 11 May 2012 the Constitutional Court decided that it was not necessary to adjudicate on the constitutional appeal lodged by the applicant in person, in which he had complained about the lower courts’ refusal to grant him leave to represent himself. The Constitutional Court found that the appeal had been neither signed nor endorsed by court-appointed defence counsel. The latter had not replied to the Constitutional Court’s query of 11 April 2012 as to whether she endorsed the constitutional appeal signed by the applicant himself. 17. On 20 September 2012 the Baixo-Vouga investigating judge held a hearing (debate instrutório), of which the applicant had been notified in person. The judge had previously refused to adjourn the hearing at the applicant’s request, finding that the Court of Appeal had already given a final ruling on the applicant’s application to represent himself. The applicant failed to attend the hearing, at which his court-appointed counsel was present. The investigating judge confirmed the charge against the applicant and referred the case for trial (despacho de pronúncia) before the Baixo-Vouga Criminal Court. 18. On 12 December 2013 the Baixo-Vouga Criminal Court, following a hearing which the applicant again did not attend but at which his court‑ appointed defence lawyer was present, found the applicant guilty of aggravated insult (see paragraph 50 below) and ordered him to pay 140 day‑fines of nine euros (EUR) each as well as the costs of the proceedings. 19. The applicant, who at no point requested legal aid to cover the cost of his trial, court-appointed counsel or counsel of his own choosing, was ordered, in particular, to pay costs amounting to EUR 150 for his representation by court-appointed counsel. He did not pay these costs and the execution of the cost order was later discontinued for lack of assets which could be seized. 20. In an order dated 1 May 2014 the Baixo-Vouga Criminal Court rejected an appeal by the applicant against the judgment as inadmissible, on the ground that the appeal had not been signed by court-appointed defence counsel or by a lawyer instructed by the applicant. It confirmed that, as had previously been decided in a final decision, the applicant, as the defendant, did not have the right to represent himself in the proceedings. 21. By an order dated 18 November 2014 the Porto Court of Appeal, acting through its President, dismissed a complaint lodged by the applicant in person against the order of the Baixo-Vouga Criminal Court. 22. The Court of Appeal reiterated that, according to Portuguese law and well-established case-law, defendants in criminal proceedings, even if they were themselves lawyers, could not represent themselves but had to be assisted by defence counsel. It stressed that, as had also been argued by the General Council of the Bar Association in Opinion No. E-21/97 (see paragraphs 59-60 below), the provision of a criminal defence constituted a public-order interest. Therefore, the right to a defence could not be waived, even if this meant imposing a defence lawyer on the accused. Moreover, in adversarial proceedings the powers vested by law in the defence were incompatible in many situations with the position of the defendant. This was also clearly the case at the trial, taking into account, for example, the places to be occupied in the courtroom, the wearing of a gown and the cross-examination of witnesses. 23. The Court of Appeal noted that the Constitutional Court had repeatedly confirmed, in particular in judgments nos. 578/2001 and 196/2007 (see paragraphs 52-55 below), that this interpretation and the corresponding legislation – including Article 64 § 1 (d) of the CCP, which stipulates that only defence counsel can lodge appeals (see paragraph 33 below) – was in keeping with the Constitution. Likewise, this approach was not in breach of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) or of the Convention. In Portugal, the accused had an array of procedural rights which went beyond the minimum standards guaranteed by these international instruments. 24. The Court of Appeal explained that Portuguese law on criminal procedure granted accused persons ample opportunity to defend themselves in person. The defendant had a very comprehensive right to intervene in person at any time in the proceedings in order to make requests, offer points of clarification, reply, explain or submit statements (see, in particular, Articles 61 § 1 (b), 98 § 1, 272 § 1, 292 § 2, 332, 341(a) and 343 §§ 1 and 2 of the CCP; paragraphs 30, 42 and 44 below). He also had the right to be the last person to address the court, immediately following the pleadings and before delivery of the judgment (see Article 361 § 1 of the CCP, paragraph 45 below). There was a distinction between, and a dual safeguard emanating from, the mandatory instruction of a lawyer to ensure the accused’s “technical” defence and the possibility for the accused to be present and to intervene in the proceedings. 25. Lastly, the Court of Appeal noted that, having no valid reasons to depart from an interpretation rooted in case-law and legal literature, Portugal had not amended its law in this regard either before or after the Views adopted in 2006 by the United Nations Human Rights Committee (see paragraphs 63 et seq. below). 26. As the applicant had not appointed counsel following his application to have the order of 18 November 2014 quashed, the Baixo-Vouga Criminal Court’s judgment of 12 December 2013 became final on 6 January 2015. 27. According to the material before the Court, the applicant did not call into question the qualifications or quality of the court-appointed lawyer at any stage in the proceedings before the domestic courts.

5. The applicant was born in 1987 and lives in Perm. 6. On 9 April 2007 at about 11 p.m. the applicant was stopped by the police and taken to the Dzerzhinskiy District Department of the Interior of the town of Perm (Дзержинский РОВД г. Перми – “the police station”) for an identity check. 7. After the applicant’s identity was established the applicant was informed that he was wanted on suspicion of having committed a crime. 8. On 10 April 2007 at 1 a.m. the applicant was placed in the cell for administrative detainees at the police station. At 9 a.m. he was handed over to a police officer, P. According to the applicant, P. subjected him to ill‑treatment by administering several blows to his chest, abdomen and face. 9. Subsequently the applicant was interrogated by an investigator, B., in the presence of N. (the head of the police station), P., and Zh. (another police officer), as a witness in criminal case no. 1470 instituted on 8 March 2007 under Article 161 § 2 of the Criminal Code (robbery). After his questioning the applicant was released. 10. Immediately after his release on 10 April 2007 the applicant complained at the police station of having been beaten by P. 11. On the same day the applicant went to a traumatology centre, where he was diagnosed with bruising on the left side of his forehead. 12. On 11 April 2007 the applicant complained of the beatings to the prosecutor’s office. He was made to undergo an expert examination, which revealed the following injuries: bruises on the left side of his forehead, at the outer corner of his left eye and on the left side of his neck, and an abrasion behind his left ear. The expert concluded that the above-mentioned injuries could have been caused by his being hit by a hard blunt object(s) or by that object being drawn across the applicant’s skin, possibly at the time and under the circumstances indicated by the applicant. 13. On 9 June 2007 the investigator of the Dzerzhinskiy district prosecutor’s office of the town of Perm decided not to institute criminal proceedings against P., in the absence of any indication that a criminal act had been committed. Having questioned the applicant and others involved in the incident and having examined the medical evidence, the investigator found that there were no objective data confirming that the injuries had been inflicted by the police officer. The investigator noted, in particular, the discrepancies between the applicant’s description of the alleged beatings and the injuries that he had actually sustained. 14. On 27 June 2007 the applicant challenged the above-mentioned decision before the court. 15. On 2 July 2007 the Dzerzhinskiy District Court of Perm (“the District Court”) declined to examine the applicant’s challenge. 16. Following an appeal by the applicant, on 24 July 2007 the Perm Regional Court (“the Regional Court”) quashed the decision of 2 July 2007. 17. On 24 August 2007 the District Court held that the decision of 9 June 2007 not to institute criminal proceedings against P. had been unlawful and unjustified. The court held that the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment had been substantiated by medical evidence. 18. On 20 September 2007 the Regional Court quashed the judgment of 24 August 2007 (since it had been delivered in the absence of P.), and remitted the matter for fresh examination by a different bench. 19. On 9 October 2007 the District Court held that the decision of 9 June 2007 not to institute criminal proceedings against P. had been unlawful and unjustified. The court pointed out that the decision in question had been based on the submissions of the police officers, without due assessment of the fact that the applicant, who had had no bodily injuries prior to his arrest by the police (as confirmed by I., A. and Pan.), had been diagnosed as having such injuries immediately after his release from the police station. 20. On 13 November 2007 the Regional Court quashed the judgment of 9 October 2007 on appeal and remitted the matter for fresh examination by a different bench. 21. On 29 November 2007 the District Court again held that the decision of 9 June 2007 not to institute criminal proceedings against P. had been unlawful and unjustified. The court’s reasoning was similar to that in respect of the judgment of 9 October 2007. 22. Following an appeal by the district prosecutor on 20 December 2007 the Regional Court quashed the judgment of 29 November 2007 on appeal and referred the matter again for fresh examination by a different bench. 23. On 30 January 2008 the District Court dismissed the applicant’s claim. The court found that the investigator had rightly come to the conclusion that there had been no objective information confirming the applicant’s allegation of ill-treatment by the police officer, P., and that the above-mentioned conclusion had been reached on the basis of comprehensive evidence. 24. Following an appeal by the applicant, on 19 February 2008 the Regional Court upheld the above-mentioned judgment on appeal.

10. The applicants live in Stobreč (application no. 37685/10) and Split (application no. 22768/12). Their names and dates of birth are set out in the Appendix. 11. The legislation of the former Yugoslavia, in particular section 29 of the 1980 Basic Property Act (see paragraph 53 below), prohibited the acquisition of ownership of socially owned property[1] by adverse possession (dosjelost). 12. When incorporating the 1980 Basic Property Act into the Croatian legal system on 8 October 1991, Parliament repealed the above-mentioned provision (see paragraph 54 below). 13. Subsequently, the new Property Act of 1996, which entered into force on 1 January 1997, provided in section 388(4) that the period prior to 8 October 1991 was to be included in calculating the time-limit necessary for acquiring ownership by adverse possession of socially owned immovable property (see paragraph 56 below). 14. Following several petitions for an abstract constitutional review (prijedlog za ocjenu ustavnosti) submitted by former owners of properties that had been appropriated under the socialist regime, on 8 July 1999 the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) accepted the initiative and decided to institute proceedings to review the constitutionality of section 388(4) of the 1996 Property Act. 15. In a decision of 17 November 1999 the Constitutional Court invalidated with ex nunc effect section 388(4) of the 1996 Property Act. It held that the impugned provision had retroactive effect resulting in adverse consequences for the rights of third parties (primarily those who, under the restitution legislation, were entitled to the restitution of property appropriated during the Communist regime) and was therefore unconstitutional (for the relevant part of the Constitutional Court’s decision see Trgo v. Croatia, no. 35298/04, § 17, 11 June 2009). The Constitutional Court’s decision came into effect on 14 December 1999 when it was published in the Official Gazette. 16. On 19 April 2002 the applicants brought a civil action in the Split Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Splitu) against Split Township (Grad Split – hereinafter “the respondent authority”) seeking a declaration of their ownership of five plots of land and registration in their names in the land register. They submitted that the property at issue, even though it had been recorded in the land register in the name of Stobreč Municipality as the legal predecessor of Split Township, had been in their possession and the possession of their predecessors for more than seventy years. Given that the statutory period for acquiring ownership by adverse possession had elapsed, the applicants claimed to have acquired ownership of the land. Their statement of claim (tužba) read as follows: “Plots of land nos. 866/91 (...), 866/117 (...), 866/136 (...) and 866/175 ... are registered in the name of the Stobreč Municipality. EVIDENCE: Extract from the land register. However, the plaintiffs and their legal predecessors have been holding the above-mentioned immovable property in their possession for more than 70 years, and thereby acquired the ownership of that immovable property. EVIDENCE: Extract from the cadastre, testimony of the witness N.P., parties’ testimonies and other evidence, if needed. (a) [...] (b) Plot no. 866/136 belongs to the plaintiffs Mladen Radomilja and Frane Radomilja in two equal parts; (c) Plot no. 866/175 belongs to the plaintiff Ivan Brčić in its entirety. EVIDENCE: See above For these reasons it is proposed that the court, after having conducted the proceedings, adopt the following Judgment 1. It is [hereby] established that the plaintiffs are the owners and co-owners, respectively, of the [following] immovable property ... and therefore: (a) [...] (b) Plot no. 866/136 Mladen Radomilja and Frane Radomilja in two equal parts; (c) Plot no. 866/175 Ivan Brčić in its entirety 2. The plaintiffs are, on the basis of this judgment, entitled to seek and obtain registration in their name of the right of ownership and co-ownership, respectively, of the immovable property listed in point 1 of this judgment in the land register, as well as concurrent deletion of that right as registered to date in the name of the respondent authority’s legal predecessor, the Stobreč Municipality. 17. By a judgment of 20 September 2004 the Municipal Court ruled in favour of the applicants. It held that they had proved that they and their predecessors had had continuous and exclusive possession of the land in question since at least 1912 and in good faith. Furthermore, it held that the statutory period for acquiring ownership by adverse possession at the relevant time had been twenty years. Consequently, in the applicants’ case that period had elapsed in 1932. The relevant part of that judgment reads: “In the statement of claim it is submitted ... that the plaintiffs and their predecessors had been in possession of the immovable property [in question] for more than 70 years and that they had thereby acquired ownership of that property by adverse possession. ... The plaintiffs base their claim on ... adverse possession. [E]ven if they do not expressly state it, the facts alleged in their statement of claim suggest that they maintain that the requirements for acquiring ownership by adverse possession had been met before 6 April 1941. This means that it was necessary to establish whether the requirements prescribed by the ... laws and other regulations in force at the time were met. ... In the opinion of this court, because of changed economic and social circumstances, the time-limits for acquiring title to property by adverse possession prescribed by ... laws and other regulations in force on 6 April 1941 do not correspond to the principle of protection of legitimate interests of individuals, long-term possessors in good faith, or to the principle of legal certainty. [The court] therefore considers that the period of 20 years is required and sufficient to acquire ownership of immovable property by adverse possession.” 18. In its appeal the respondent authority emphasised that the applicants could not have become the owners of the property in question because prior to 8 October 1991 it had been prohibited to acquire ownership of socially owned property by adverse possession, and that the lifting of that prohibition had not had retroactive effect (see paragraphs 11-15 above). In their reply the applicants responded that it was undisputed that they had been in exclusive possession of the property since the beginning of the twentieth century and thus for more than thirty years even before 6 April 1941. 19. In a judgment of 17 May 2007 the Split County Court (Županijski sud u Splitu) reversed the first-instance judgment and dismissed the applicants’ action. It held that the Municipal Court had established the facts correctly (continuous and exclusive possession of the land in good faith since 1912) but had erred in its application of the substantive law. It established, firstly, that the land in question had been in social ownership on 8 October 1991 and that under the relevant legislation it had not been possible to acquire ownership of socially owned property by adverse possession before that date unless the statutory requirements for doing so had been met by 6 April 1941 (see paragraphs 48, 53-54, 57 and 59-60 below). However, those requirements had not been met in the applicants’ case. That was so because under Article 1472 of the 1811 Civil Code (which was applicable in Croatia from 1852 until 1980, see paragraphs 47-49 and 51 below) immovable property owned by municipal authorities could be acquired by adverse possession only after forty years. However, having regard to the factual findings of the first-instance court, according to which the applicants and their predecessors had possessed the land at issue since 1912 (see paragraph 17 above), that time-limit had not expired before 6 April 1941. The relevant part of that judgment reads: “In calculating the time-limit for acquiring by adverse possession immovable property socially owned on 8 October 1991, the period ... before 8 October 1991 is not to be taken into account because before that date section 29 of the Act on Basic Ownership Relations Act expressly prohibited acquiring ownership of socially owned property by adverse possession. Even though [that] provision was repealed by section 3 of the Act on the Incorporation of the Basic Ownership Relations Act, it is because of that prior express statutory prohibition that the time elapsed before that date cannot be taken into account in calculating the time-limit necessary for acquiring ownership by adverse possession of immovable property socially owned on 8 October 1991, unless [that] time-limit had elapsed before 6 April 1941 under the regulations in force at the time.” 20. The applicants then, on 23 July 2007, lodged a constitutional complaint against the second-instance judgment alleging infringements of their constitutional rights to equality before the law, equality before the courts and fair procedure. In their constitutional complaint they stated, inter alia: “... according to the findings in the contested judgment the plaintiffs ... have been in continuous exclusive possession from 1912 until the present day in good faith. ... The case therefore concerns [such] possession in the period of 90 years before the bringing of the civil action. ... In the instant case the court did not apply the cited provisions even though the plaintiffs’ predecessors had possessed [the property in question] since at least the beginning of the twentieth century and their possession had been continuous until the bringing of the civil action and lasts until the present day. ... If the view that the property in question was socially owned on 8 October 1991 is to be accepted, even though in the land register it was not registered as such in accordance with the [relevant regulations concerning registration of the property in the State and social ownership], then it was, in accordance with the cited statutory provisions, necessary to take into account the entire period of possession until the bringing of the civil action, except [the period] between 6 April 1941 and 8 October 1991.” 21. In a decision of 30 September 2009 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicants’ constitutional complaint and on 19 November 2009 it served its decision on their representative. The relevant part of that decision reads: “Only those facts on the existence of which depends the assessment of a violation of a constitutional right are relevant for the Constitutional Court. In the civil proceedings ... it was established that ... the complainants ... had been in continuous exclusive possession of the disputed property since at least 1912 and in good faith. ... In the reasoning of its judgment the second-instance court notes that the case concerns immovable property which was socially owned on 8 October 1991 and that, in calculating the time-limit necessary for acquiring ownership by adverse possession of [such] property, the time which elapsed before that date cannot be taken into account. In the examination of the constitutional complaint ... one has to take note of the fact that section 388(4) of the 1996 Property Act was invalidated by the Constitutional Court’s decision of [17 November 1999] ... [I]n that decision the Constitutional Court held that possessing socially owned property in the period before 8 October 1991 cannot be taken into account in calculating the time-limit for acquiring ownership by adverse possession. Given that the time-limit for acquiring ownership of property socially owned on 8 October 1991, did not run in the period between 6 April 1941 and 8 October 1991 (which view the Constitutional Court expressed in the decision U‑III‑1595/2006 of 5 February 2009), the court finds that the legal views expressed in the contested judgment of the County Court are based on a constitutionally acceptable interpretation and application of the relevant substantive law.” 22. On 25 May 1993, 21 February 1996 and 20 July 1999 respectively, the applicants bought three plots of land from various individuals. However, the plots were recorded in the land register in the name of Stobreč Municipality as the legal predecessor of Split Township. 23. On 4 April 2002 the applicants brought a civil action in the Split Municipal Court against Split Township, seeking a declaration of their ownership of the three plots of land and registration in their names in the land register. They submitted that the property at issue, even though it had been recorded in the land register in the name of Stobreč Municipality as the legal predecessor of Split Township, had been in the possession of their legal predecessors for more than 100 years. Given that the statutory period for acquiring ownership by adverse possession had elapsed in respect of their legal predecessors, the applicants claimed that by buying the land from them they had validly acquired ownership. Their statement of claim read as follows: “The plaintiffs together, each in one half, bought from R.K. and M.K. ... the plots of land no. 866/34 (...) ... from T.F. ... the plot of land no. 866/59 (...), ... and from M.S. ... the plot of land no. 866/35 (...) ... EVIDENCE: [The three sale and purchase agreements between the plaintiffs and the above mentioned individuals] The plaintiffs immediately, upon the conclusion of the above sale and purchase agreements entered into possession of all the immovable property listed above. They remained in possession of it until the present day. After the [relevant tax authority ordered them to pay tax] they paid it. EVIDENCE: Tax payment receipt Witness testimonies of R.K., M.K., T.F., and M.S. ... All the above-mentioned immovable property is registered in the land register in the name of the Stobreč Municipality even though the vendors in the enclosed [sale purchase] agreements and their legal predecessors have been in possession of that immovable property for more than 100 years, which means that they acquired ownership of that immovable property by adverse possession. EVIDENCE: Extract from the land register; Witness testimonies of R.K., M.K., T.F., and M.S., ... ; and other evidence, if needed. Given that the vendors were non-registered owners of the above-mentioned immovable property, they have by the sale purchase agreements transferred their right of ownership to the plaintiffs as buyers. [In this way] the plaintiffs, through their legal predecessors, acquired ownership of the plots nos. 866/34 (...), 866/59 (...) and 866/35 (...) ... EVIDENCE: See above. For these reasons it is proposed that the court adopt the following Judgment 1. It is [hereby] established that the plaintiffs Jakov Jakeljić and Ivica Jakeljić are the co-owners, each in one half, of the plots nos. 866/34, 866/59 and 866/35 ... 2. The respondent authority shall within 15 days, on pain of enforcement, provide the plaintiffs with the document containing clausula intabulandi necessary to record the right of ownership in the land register and delete that right as registered to date in the name of the respondent authority’s legal predecessor, the Stobreč Municipality. Otherwise, this judgment shall replace [such document]. 3. The respondent authority shall, within 15 days, on pain of enforcement, reimburse the plaintiffs for the costs of these proceedings.” 24. In the response to the applicants’ action the respondent authority submitted that the property in question had been in social ownership and that, having regard to the Constitutional Court’s decision invalidating section 388(4) of the 1996 Property Act (see paragraph 15 above), the fact of possessing socially owned property before 8 October 1991 could not be taken into account in calculating the time-limit for adverse possession. The applicants replied that the Constitutional Court’s decision to which the respondent authority had referred was of no relevance for the resolution of the dispute. 25. In a judgment of 19 December 2002 the Municipal Court ruled in favour of the applicants. However, following an appeal lodged by the respondent authority, that judgment was quashed on 2 March 2006 by the Osijek County Court (Županijski sud u Osijeku) on procedural grounds. 26. In the resumed proceedings, by a judgment of 1 June 2007, the Split Municipal Court again ruled in favour of the applicants. It established, firstly, that the land in question had been in social ownership on 8 October 1991 and that under the relevant legislation it had not been possible to acquire ownership of socially owned property by adverse possession before that date unless the statutory requirements for doing so had been met by 6 April 1941 (see paragraphs 48, 52 and 59-60 below). It found, however, that the applicants had proved that their predecessors had had continuous and exclusive possession of the three plots of land in good faith for more than forty years before 6 April 1941, and had continued to do so until they had sold them to the applicants (see paragraph 22 above). The applicants’ predecessors had therefore, under Article 1472 of the 1811 Civil Code (applicable in Croatia from 1852 until 1980, see paragraphs 47-49 and 51 below), acquired ownership of the land by adverse possession even before that date. The relevant part of that judgment reads as follows: “In the response to the action the respondent denied the claim because the property in question had been [in] social ownership and because, pursuant to the Constitutional Court’s decision invalidating section 388(4) of the [1996 Property Act], possessing socially owned property in the period before 8 October 1991 cannot be taken into account in calculating the time-limit for acquiring title to property by adverse possession. ... Given that the action was brought in 2002, that in the land register the right of ownership is registered in the name of the Stobreč Municipality, that section 388(4) of the [1996 Property Act] was invalidated by the Constitutional Court’s decision of 17 November 1999 – which means that the fact of possessing socially owned property in the period before 8 October 1991 cannot be taken into account in calculating the time necessary for adverse possession – ... the plaintiffs and their predecessors could not have acquired ownership before 1991 unless they manage to prove that they had acquired [it] by adverse possession before 6 April 1941. The plaintiffs’ action evidently relies precisely on that. Therefore, since [for the court] it is beyond dispute that the plot in question had been socially owned on 8 October 1991 ... in order to determine whether it had been acquired by adverse possession it had to be established whether the plaintiffs’ legal predecessors had been in possession of certain quality of the disputed property before 6 April 1941 and thus for the period prescribed for adverse possession by the rules applicable at the time.” 27. In their appeal the respondent authority emphasised that the applicants could not have become the owners of the property in question because prior to 8 October 1991 it had been prohibited to acquire ownership of socially owned property by adverse possession unless the ownership had been acquired in that manner before 6 April 1941. The respondent authority claimed that the lifting of that prohibition had not had retroactive effect (see paragraphs 11-15 above). In their reply the applicants retorted that it was undisputed that they had been in exclusive and continuous possession of the property in good faith for more than a hundred years and that they had in any event acquired ownership thereof by adverse possession, having possessed it for more than forty years before 6 April 1941. 28. In a judgment of 29 May 2008 the Split County Court (Županijski sud u Splitu) reversed the first-instance judgment and dismissed the applicants’ action. It found that the applicants’ predecessors had only been in possession of the land in question (continuously and in good faith) since 1912. The forty-year time-limit for acquiring ownership by adverse possession set out in Article 1472 of the 1811 Civil Code had not therefore expired by 6 April 1941 (see paragraph 51 below). In the subsequent period between 6 April 1941 and 8 October 1991 the relevant legislation had prohibited the acquisition of ownership of socially owned property by adverse possession (see paragraph 11 above and paragraphs 52-53 below). This had discontinued the running of the statutory time-limits. The time which had elapsed before 6 April 1941 had therefore not continued to run after 8 October 1991 – it had actually started to run again. The relevant part of that judgment reads: “In calculating the time-limit for acquiring by adverse possession immovable property socially owned on 8 October 1991, the period ... before 8 October 1991 is not to be taken into account because before that date section 29 of the Basic Ownership Relations Act expressly prohibited acquiring ownership of socially owned property by adverse possession. Even though [that] provision was repealed by section 3 of the Incorporation of the Basic Ownership Relations Act, it is because of that prior express statutory prohibition that the time which elapsed before that date cannot be taken into account in calculating the time-limit necessary for acquiring ownership by adverse possession of immovable property socially owned on 8 October 1991, unless [that] time-limit had elapsed before 6 April 1941 under the regulations in force at the time.” 29. The applicants then, on 1 August 2008, lodged a constitutional complaint against the second-instance judgment, alleging violations of their constitutional rights to equality before the law, equality before the courts and fair procedure. In their constitutional complaint they, inter alia, stated: “Therefore, from the legal and factual situation where, as in the instant case, the plaintiffs have, themselves and through their predecessors, indisputably been in possession in good faith of the property in question for more than 100 years, and viewing such situation in the light of Croatian law in force, ... it follows that it is necessary to ... quash the contested judgment and remit the case ... If the view that the property in question was socially owned on 8 October 1991 is to be accepted, even though in the land register it was not registered as such in accordance with the [relevant regulations concerning registration of the property in the State and social ownership], then it was, in accordance with the cited statutory provisions, necessary to take into account the entire period of possession until the bringing of the civil action, except [the period] between 6 April 1941 and 8 October 1991. ... by not taking into account the entire period of possession of the property at issue before the bringing of the civil action the court misapplied the substantive law and thereby violated constitutional rights relied on by the plaintiffs.” 30. In a decision of 15 September 2011, the Constitutional Court dismissed their constitutional complaint and on 4 October 2011 it served its decision on their representative. The relevant part of that decision reads: “Only those facts on the existence of which depends the assessment of a violation of a constitutional right are relevant for the Constitutional Court. In the civil proceedings ... it was established that ... the complainants ... had been in continuous exclusive possession of the disputed property since at least 1912 and in good faith. ... In the reasoning of its judgment the second-instance court notes that the case concerns immovable property which was socially owned on 8 October 1991 and that in calculating the time-limit necessary for acquiring ownership by adverse possession of [such] property the time which elapsed before that date cannot be taken into account. In the examination of the constitutional complaint ... the Constitutional Court notes that section 388(4) of the 1996 Property Act was invalidated by the Constitutional Court’s decision of [17 November 1999] ... [I]n that decision the Constitutional Court held that possessing socially owned property in the period before 8 October 1991 could not be taken into account in calculating the time-limit for acquiring ownership by adverse possession. Given that the time-limit for acquiring ownership of property socially owned on 8 October 1991 did not run in the period between 6 April 1941 and 8 October 1991 (which view the Constitutional Court expressed in decision U‑III‑1595/2006 of 5 February 2009), the court finds that the legal views expressed in the contested judgment of the County Court are based on a constitutionally acceptable interpretation and application of the relevant substantive law.” 31. In the proceedings before the Chamber the applicants complained that the Split County Court judgments in their cases were in breach of their rights guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention and Article 14 of the Convention. 32. The relevant part of the application forms in both cases reads as follows: “III. STATEMENT OF THE ALLEGED VIOLATION(S) OF THE CONVENTION AND/OR PROTOCOLS AND OF RELEVANT ARGUMENTS The applicants consider that ... the Split County Court by dismissing the applicants’ action, and the Constitutional Court by dismissing the applicants’ constitutional complaint violated, i.e. breached their rights provided by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereafter ‘the Convention’), in particular those included in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, which guarantees the protection of the right of property, and the rights provided by Article 14 of the Convention because the applicants’ are being discriminated and thereby placed in a disadvantageous position compared to other Croatian nationals because in almost the same, i.e. in terms of substantive law and factual background compatible, cases the same court, the Split County Court, has been adopting judgments allowing registration of the right of ownership [in respect of the land] in the immediate vicinity of that of the applicants, to those who make such requests on the basis of undisturbed possession of hundred years. ... 33. In the application form in the Jakeljić case (no. 22768/12) the applicants also added: “Before that court the applicants’ representative had lodged the application in the ... [case of Radomilja and Others], which the Court has registered under no. 37685/10. It is therefore suggested to consult that case-file and its enclosures. Before the Croatian courts in substantially similar cases final judgments were adopted from which it follows that the courts have been granting the claims of those in possession of the land adjacent to that of the applicants, and have been declaring those possessors the owners of that immovable property on the basis of adverse possession that is, undisturbed possession of 20 years , which [period] elapsed by 6 April 1941, and so in accordance with the opinion [expressed at] extended plenary session of the Federal Supreme Court of Yugoslavia of 4 April 1960. Therefore, [such] different treatment by the courts placed the applicants in an unequal position, which caused them enormous damage.” 34. On 23 May 2014 and 25 June 2015 respectively, notice of the complaints concerning the alleged violation of their property rights was given to the Government and the remainder of the applications was declared inadmissible pursuant to Rule 54 § 3 of the Rules of Court (see paragraph 4 above). The question communicated to the parties in both cases referred to the Court’s judgment in the Trgo case (see Trgo v. Croatia, no. 35298/04, 11 June 2009) and read as follows: “Was the refusal of the domestic courts to acknowledge the applicants’ ownership of five/three plots of land they claim to have acquired by adverse possession, in violation of their right to peaceful enjoyment of their possessions, guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention (see Trgo v. Croatia, no. 35298/04, 11 June 2009)?” 35. In their observations of 6 October 2014 (in the case of Radomilja and Others) and 20 October 2015 (in the Jakeljić case) the Government argued, inter alia, that the cases had to be distinguished from the Trgo case. In particular, they submitted that, unlike the situation in Trgo, in the instant cases the applicants had instituted civil proceedings after the Constitutional Court had invalidated the 1996 version of section 388(4) of the 1996 Property Act (see paragraphs 15-16 and 23 above and paragraph 56 below). Accordingly, the applicants could not have had legitimate expectations that the said provision would be applied in their case and that their claim to be declared the owners of the property in question would be granted (see Radomilja and Others, cited above, § 43, and Jakeljić, cited above, § 37). The relevant part of their observations in both cases reads: “... at the time of bringing the civil action, and pursuant to domestic law, the applicants could not have had a legitimate expectation that they would see their claim upheld on the basis of the repealed section 388(4) of the Property Act. That is to say, at the time when the applicants brought their civil action in the Split Municipal Court, neither the provisions of the then valid Property Act, nor the case law of the highest courts of justice in the Republic of Croatia, had provided for the possibility of including the period in question in the time-limit for adverse possession. ... ... in the Trgo case, the applicant brought a civil action in 1997 to determine the right of ownership due to the expiry of the time-limit for adverse possession. Then (at the time the civil action was brought), the provision of the Property Act that dictated the inclusion of the period from 6 April 1941 to 8 October 1991 in the time-limit for adverse possession was still in force. During these civil proceedings, the Constitutional Court adopted the decision repealing the stated provision of the Property Act, and the applicant lost his case in the end for this reason. Furthermore, the Court noted in that case that repealing a particular legal provision had an ex nunc effect, but that this rule was not applied in the ongoing proceedings. Therefore, the Court concluded that the applicant should not have to suffer the negative consequences of correcting the legislator’s mistake, since the applicant had reasonably relied on legislation that was valid at the time when he initiated the proceedings. Therefore, the Court acknowledged that the applicant in that case had legitimate expectations, and consequently the right of ownership, within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. However, the situation in the present case is completely different. This is because of the described legislative activity after the decision of the Constitutional Court, but also because of the previously described consistent case-law. Therefore, the applicants in this case, at the time of bringing their civil action in the Split Municipal Court, could not have had any legitimate expectations that the court would acknowledge the time period from 6 April 1941 to 8 October 1991 as being included in the time-limit for adverse possession, and that they would gain recognition of the right of ownership on that basis. Furthermore, the Government deem that the attitude of the applicants themselves before the domestic bodies, as well as the applicants’ constitutional complaint, clearly show that they did not even have such expectations. The Government primarily point out that it was disputed before the ordinary courts (i) whether the applicants and their predecessors had been possessors in good faith and fair possessors, (ii) how long the applicants and their legal predecessors had been in possession of the disputed real property before 6 April 1941, and (iii) whether the legal time-limit for adverse possession had expired before 6 April 1941. At no time was it disputed between the parties in the proceedings whether the possession of the real property in the time period from 6 April 1941 to 8 October 1991 should be included in the time-limit for adverse possession. Furthermore, the applicants expressly claimed before the domestic court that their civil action was based on the fact that the time-limit for adverse possession had expired before 6 April 1941 ... The fact that the applicants themselves did not dispute this is also shown by their constitutional complaint. ... this constitutional complaint shows that the applicants did not believe that this time period should be included in the time-limit for adverse possession in their case, but that it was necessary to include in that time-limit the period during which their legal predecessors had owned the disputed real property before 6 April 1941, and to add the length of possession after 8 October 1991 to that time period. Finally, the Government observe that, even in their application to the Court, the applicants did not refer to the fact that the domestic courts had miscalculated the time-limit for adverse possession, with regard to the period from 6 April 1941 to 8 October 1991. The Government additionally observe that the time required for adverse possession of socially-owned real property according to the provisions of the General Civil Code was indisputably 40 years. The applicants did not claim at any time before the domestic courts or the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia that the time required for adverse possession had been shorter. Precisely to the contrary, the applicants argued their constitutional complaint before the Constitutional Court by claiming that the requirement of expiry of the time-limit of 40 years was met, because the time before 6 April 1941 should be added to the time after 8 October 1991, which according to their claims amounted to 41 years (see ... the applicants’ constitutional complaint). In conclusion, it is entirely obvious in this case that the applicants did not ‘rely reasonably on a legislative provision that was later repealed’, but they tried to argue and prove that they met the requirements for adverse possession, in accordance with the legal provisions that were in force at the time the civil action was brought and in accordance with the case-law related to that legislation. Therefore, this case was about hope in the acknowledgement of the right of ownership, which cannot be considered ‘possessions’ within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see Kopecky v. Slovakia, Grand Chamber judgment of 28 September 2004, § 35). Following the above, the Government deem that the applicants’ application is manifestly ill-founded and should be dismissed under Article 35, paragraph 3 of the Convention.” (b) The applicants’ observations in reply 36. The applicants, in their observations in reply of 3 November 2014 (in the case of Radomilja and Others) and 30 November 2015 (in the Jakeljić case), submitted that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention was applicable because their claims to be declared the owners of the land in question had a sufficient basis in national law, specifically (see Radomilja and Others, cited above, § 45, and Jakeljić, cited above, § 39): - in both cases, in the interpretation adopted at the extended plenary session of the Federal Supreme Court of Yugoslavia of 4 April 1960, which was still being applied by the Croatian Supreme Court in cases similar to theirs (see paragraphs 58-60 below), and - in the Jakeljić case, also in Article 1472 of the 1811 Civil Code (see paragraph 51 below). According to that interpretation by the Supreme Court a person would have acquired ownership of immovable property by adverse possession after being in possession thereof in good faith for twenty years (see paragraphs 58-60 below). 37. For the applicants in the case of Radomilja and Others, the issue was whether the period for acquiring ownership by adverse possession had in their case expired before 6 April 1941 or not. The above-mentioned interpretation requiring twenty years of possession in good faith (see the preceding paragraph and paragraphs 58-60 below), coupled with the factual findings of the domestic courts that they and their predecessors had possessed the land in question since 1912 (see paragraphs 17 and 19 and 26-28 above), suggested that it had. They could have therefore legitimately expected that their claim to be declared the owners of that land would be granted. Yet, the Split County Court and the Constitutional Court had misapplied domestic law and dismissed their claim by holding that a period of forty years had been necessary to acquire ownership by adverse possession (see Radomilja and Others, cited above, § 46). 38. The applicants in Radomilja and Others also contested the factual findings of the domestic courts by arguing that those courts had misinterpreted the witness statement from which they had arrived at the conclusion that the applicants and their predecessors had possessed the land in question since 1912 (see paragraphs 17 and 19 above). In fact, the evidence suggested that they had been in possession of that land since 1900 (ibid., § 47). 39. In Jakeljić the applicants submitted that the Split Municipal Court had established that their predecessors had been in continuous and exclusive possession of the land in question in good faith for more than forty years before 6 April 1941 (see paragraph 26 above). Yet, the Split County Court, while stating that the Municipal Court had established the facts correctly, had somehow distorted those factual findings by holding that the applicants’ predecessors had actually only been in possession since 1912 (see paragraph 28 above). Had it correctly understood those factual findings, the County Court would have reached the same conclusion as to the law as the Municipal Court, namely that the applicants’ predecessors had, under Article 1472 of the 1811 Civil Code (see paragraph 51 below), acquired ownership of the land by adverse possession before 6 April 1941 (see Jakeljić, § 40). 40. In the alternative, the applicants in Jakeljić argued that even if their predecessors had possessed the land in question since 1912, they should have acquired it by adverse possession before 6 April 1941 based on the above-mentioned interpretation requiring twenty years of possession in good faith (see paragraph 36 above and paragraph 58 below). The applicants, who had bought the land in question from their predecessors, could therefore have legitimately expected that their claim to be declared owners of that land would be granted. However, the Split County Court and the Constitutional Court had misapplied domestic law and dismissed their claim, holding that a period of forty years had been necessary to acquire ownership by adverse possession (ibid., § 41). Those courts had also wrongly applied the relevant domestic law by refusing to add up the period before 6 April 1941 and that after 8 October 1991 when holding that in between these two periods the running of the statutory time-limit for acquiring ownership by adverse possession had been discontinued (see paragraph 28 above). 41. In view of those arguments (see paragraphs 36-40 above), the applicants in both cases submitted that the Court’s findings in the Trgo case were not relevant in their cases (see Radomilja and Others, § 48). In particular, in their reply to the Government’s observations they stated as follows (ibid.): “... the Court has specified that the case of Trgo v. Croatia is relevant case-law [; this] case does not have the same factual and legal background as the present [one]. In particular, the Trgo case was about acknowledging ownership acquired by adverse possession in the period between 6 April 1941 and 8 October 1991, whereas the applicants herein do not claim that said period should, nor do they have any expectations that the said period would, be taken into account in calculating the time-limit for acquiring ownership by adverse possession given that they acquired the ownership [of the land in question by adverse possession] regardless [of that period] The Trgo case therefore cannot be regarded as relevant case-law in the present case.” 42. The applicants in their observations in both cases cited section 388(4) of the 1996 Property Act, as amended by the 2001 Amendment (hereinafter referred to as “the 2001 version of section 388(4)”). They also made the following statements in relation to the issue whether they had legitimate expectations: “During the domestic proceedings it was established beyond dispute that the applicants had been in possession of [the land in question] since the early 20th century until the present day, and that all this time they had been in peaceful and uninterrupted possession. Furthermore, the applicants believe that on the basis of more than a hundred years of peaceful possession they have a property interest, for which there is a sufficient basis in national law to be regarded as a ‘possession’ protected by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Thus, the legitimate expectation of the applicants is based on a reasonable [and] justified reliance on the relevant statutory provisions, on the basis of which they have ex lege acquired ownership by the lapse of time necessary for [acquiring ownership by] adverse possession. ... ... the Government argued that the applicants at the time they brought their civil action could not have had legitimate expectation that their claim would be granted on the basis of invalidated section 388(4) of the 1996 Property Act – which provision allowed the period between 6 April 1941 and 8 October 1991 to be taken into account in calculating the time-limit for acquiring ownership by adverse possession – because that provision had been invalidated at the time of bringing of the civil action. It is submitted, first of all, that the applicants’ complaints primarily concern the fact that the second-instance court, in contrast to the first-instance court, did not acknowledge the legal consequences [produced], that is [the right of] ownership which the applicants had acquired, before 6 April 1941. ... Besides, from the Government submissions on the merits it follows that they do not comment on the fact ..., ... which is one of the grounds of this application, that in accordance with the [case-law of the] domestic courts the time-period necessary for acquiring ownership of immovable property in social ownership by adverse possession is 20 years, which has to elapse by 6 April 1941. ... However, if the view that the [land in question] was socially-owned on 8 October 1991 is to be accepted, even though in the land register it was not registered as such in accordance with the [relevant regulations concerning registration of the property in the State and social ownership], then it was, in accordance with the cited statutory provisions, necessary to take into account the entire period of possession until the bringing of the civil action, except [the period] between 6 April 1941 and 8 October 1991. ... ... even if one accepts the factual findings of the domestic courts ... that is, that the applicants and their predecessors have been in possession of the [land] in question since 1912 ... they possessed [it] for 29 years before 6 April 1941 and for 11 years [in the period] from 8 October 1991 until the bringing of their civil action. This period of [altogether] 40 years is under the relevant provisions of the [1811 Civil Code, 1980 Basic Property Act and the 1996 Property Act] sufficient for acquiring ownership of the [land] in question. ... ... in the present case the applicant’s predecessors ... have possessed [the land in question] as [if they have been the] owners since before 1900 ... [T]hey have possessed [the land] in that way before 6 April 1941, between 6 April 1941 and 8 October 1991 and after 8 October 1991 until the present day. They have therefore maintained uninterrupted possession on which grounds they should have, on the basis of the relevant legislation, acquired ownership by adverse possession. What is important to emphasise is ... that no one has ever acquired any rights in respect of the [land in question] nor has anyone except the applicants themselves claimed any rights in respect of [that land]. ... The Government’s argument that the applicants’ could not have had legitimate expectations that their claim would be granted on the basis of invalidated section 388(4) of the 1996 Property Act is entirely misplaced because the applicants do not ask the period between 6 April 1941 and 8 October 1991 to be taken into account in calculating the time-limit for acquiring ownership by adverse possession. It is submitted, first of all, that the applicants have never relied on section 388(4) of the 1996 Property Act nor do they in their application rely on it. [That is so] because that they have, regardless of that time-period, acquired the right of ownership on several grounds and so before 6 April 1941 as well as after 8 October 1991, or until the time they brought the[ir] civil action. ... The applicants have therefore at the time they brought the[ir] civil action, in accordance with the relevant statutory provisions which were in force at the time of brining the civil action and in accordance with the relevant case-law, acquired the ownership by adverse possession and so without taking into account the time period between 6 April 1941 and 8 October 1991. If that view is not to be accepted, they have definitely acquired ownership by taking into account the period after 8 October 1991 in which period they have retained uninterrupted peaceful possession of [the land in question] until the present day. ... ... in accordance with the relevant statutory provisions, case-law and above stated facts it is beyond any doubt that the applicants acquired ownership by adverse possession ... In line with the above it is suggested that the Court refuse the Government’s objections regarding applicability of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 ... and deliver a judgment finding a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and enable the applicants to enjoy their right of ownership.” (c) The Government’s comments on the applicants’ observations 43. The Government in their comments of 15 January 2015 (in the case of Radomilja and Others) and of 4 January 2016 (in the Jakeljić case) first reiterated their arguments as to why the applicants had not had legitimate expectations to become the owners of the land in question. In support of their arguments the Government emphasised that in their reply the applicants admitted that section 388(4) of the 1996 Property Act (see paragraphs 56-57 below) as well as the Constitutional Court’s decision of 17 November 1999 (see paragraph 15 above) had no significance in their cases and expressly argued that the cases had a factual and legal background different from the Trgo case (see Radomilja and Others, cited above, § 44, and Jakeljić, cited above, § 38). 44. In their comments in the Jakeljić case the Government also replied to the applicants’ arguments that the time necessary to acquire ownership by adverse possession had been twenty rather than forty years (see paragraphs 36 and 40 above). In particular, the Government submitted that the applicants had: “... introduced the complaint on the allegedly inconsistent domestic practice [concerning the time required for adverse possession] only in these proceedings before the Court, in contravention of the principle of subsidiarity. If the applicants considered that their rights were violated by different legal views of domestic courts that were applied in their case, as opposed to other similar cases, they should have brought these complaints to the attention of the Constitutional Court. However, the applicants failed to do so.” 45. As regards the applicants’ arguments as to why Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention was nevertheless applicable (see paragraphs 36-40 and 42 above), the Government submitted that they concerned questions of fact and the application of domestic law, which under the Convention were not the Court’s task to examine (see Radomilja and Others, cited above, § 44, and Jakeljić, cited above, § 38).

4. The applicant, S.S. Yeniköy Konut Yapı Kooperatifi, is a housing construction cooperative under Turkish law operating in İzmir. 5. In 1993, a third party cooperative bought a plot of land measuring 12,000 square metres and the title deed of the land was registered in its name. In 1995, construction works started on the land in question. 6. In 2000, the forest administration initiated proceedings before the Menderes Civil Court of First Instance for the annulment of the title deed to the land, alleging that it was part of the public forest area. In the meantime, the third party cooperative had merged with the applicant cooperative and the land had been registered in the Land Registry in the name of the latter. 7. On 26 December 2002 the Menderes Civil Court of First Instance ordered that 9,322 square metres of the land be registered in the name of the Treasury as it was part of the public forest area. It also ordered that the buildings constructed on this part of the land be demolished. 8. Subsequently, the applicant brought a case before the Menderes Civil Court of First Instance and sought pecuniary damages from the Treasury under Article 1007 of the Civil Code which provided for the State’s responsibility for any damage resulting from the keeping of the land registry records. 9. On 4 February 2005 the Menderes Civil Court of First Instance awarded 138,917,600,000 Turkish Liras (TRL – approximately 81,716 euros (EUR) at the time) to the applicant. 10. On 7 February 2006 the Fourth Civil Division of the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of the Menderes Civil Court of First Instance on the ground that there was no illegal act or action on the part of the land registry officials that might have had a causal link with the applicant’s loss. 11. On 6 July 2006 the applicant submitted a further petition to the Menderes Civil Court of First Instance and indicated that there was a decision of the First Civil Division of the Court of Cassation which was in contradiction with the decision of the Fourth Civil Division. In this context, the applicant alleged that its case should be accepted according to that decision of the First Civil Division issued on 7 May 2002 and numbered E.2002/3549 K.2002/5807. 12. On 20 October 2006 the Menderes Civil Court of First Instance followed the decision of the Fourth Civil Division of the Court of Cassation and dismissed the applicant’s claim. 13. The applicant appealed. Reiterating its allegations and referring to the decision of the First Civil Division of the Court of Cassation of 7 May 2002, it repeated its compensation request. 14. On 1 May 2007 the applicant’s appeal was rejected by the Fourth Civil Division of the Court of Cassation. This decision became final. 15. In their decisions, neither the Menderes Civil Court of First Instance nor the Fourth Civil Division of the Court of Cassation expressed any reason about why they had reached a different conclusion from the First Civil Division of the Court of Cassation.

5. The applicant company is engaged in the cultivation of mussels in Castlemaine harbour in Co. Kerry, one of several sites in Ireland where this commercial activity is exercised. Its business involves fishing for mussel seed (i.e. immature mussels) within the harbour each year and transporting them for cultivation in another part of the harbour. It has conducted this activity at Castlemaine harbour since the late 1970s. 6. In Ireland, mussel seed fishing takes place during the summer period, the exact dates being determined each year by statutory instrument. This activity is subject to obtaining the relevant leases, licences, authorisations and permits (see under “Relevant domestic law” below). The competent authority in this respect is the Minister for Agriculture, Food and the Marine (hereinafter “the Minister”, and “the Department” for the corresponding Government Department). In order to engage in this activity, operators must be in possession of an aquaculture licence, which has a validity of ten years. A sea-fishing boat licence is required, and the boat used must be entered in the Register of Fishing Boats. Operators must also hold an authorisation to fish for mussel seed, issued annually by the Minister (see under “Relevant domestic law” below). 7. Subsequent to the facts giving rise to this application, an additional requirement was introduced pursuant to EU law. Where mussel fishing is carried out in an environmentally protected area, a “Natura permit” must also be obtained (see paragraph 20 below). 8. According to the Government, a total of 41 authorisations were issued in 2008 to Irish sea-fishing boats to fish for mussel seed, four of which operated in Castlemaine harbour on behalf of six mussel aquaculture operators. 9. In 1993, the competent authorities published a notice in the national press announcing the intention to classify twelve sites, including Castlemaine harbour, as a special protection area (SPA) within the meaning of the domestic legislation transposing Council Directive 79/409/EEC of 2 April 1979 on the conservation of wild birds (“the Birds Directive”, OJ 1979 L 103, p. 1). The notice indicated that it was not envisaged that this would change the usage of the sites concerned. The harbour’s SPA classification took effect in 1994. The applicant company continued its activities each year, obtaining the necessary licences and permits. 10. In 2000, the domestic authorities designated Castlemaine harbour a special area of conservation (SAC) within the meaning of the domestic legislation transposing Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora (“the Habitats Directive”, OJ 1992 L 206, p. 7). As it was now subject to the two EU directives, it had the status of a “Natura 2000” site. 11. Dating back to the late 1990s, the European Commission was of the view that Ireland and several other then EC Member States were not fulfilling their obligations under EC environmental law, and specifically in relation to the two directives referred to above (references hereafter will generally be to EU and not EC law). Between 11 November 1998 and 18 April 2002, it addressed to the Irish authorities four letters of formal notice warning that Ireland had failed to correctly transpose and apply those two directives. Following three reasoned opinions issued in October 2001 and July 2003, the Commission brought infringement proceedings against Ireland in September 2004, pursuant to Article 226 EC (now Article 258 TFEU). It sought a declaration that Ireland had failed to fulfil its obligations under several provisions of the directives, namely Articles 4(1), (2) and (4), and 10 of the Birds Directive, and Article 6(2) to (4) of the Habitats Directive. One specific aspect of these proceedings concerned the authorisation of aquaculture in protected areas without the requisite prior assessment of the environmental impact of such activities. 12. On 13 December 2007 the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter “the CJEU”) delivered its judgment in Commission v. Ireland (C‑418/04, EU:C:2007:780), declaring that Ireland had failed to fulfil its obligations under the aforementioned directives in a number of respects. It held, insofar as relevant to the present case: “236. ... [R]egarding the aquaculture programmes, the Commission relies, essentially, on the Review of the Aquaculture Licensing System in Ireland carried out in 2000 by BirdWatch Ireland as the basis for its view that Ireland has systematically failed to carry out a proper assessment of those projects situated in SPAs or likely to have effects on SPAs, contrary to Article 6(3) and (4) of the Habitats Directive. In that context, it emphasises the importance of a prior assessment for the purpose of weighing the implications of a project with the conservation objectives fixed for the SPA concerned. 237. The Court notes that that study covered 271 authorisations for aquaculture programmes issued by the Department of Communications, Marine and Natural Resources during the period from June 1998 to December 1999 and 46 applications yet to be decided on. Moreover, 72 licences and nine pending applications concerned aquaculture programmes situated inside or near an SPA. The authorisations issued concern, in 84% of the activities authorised in SPAs, oyster and clam farms. 238. It should also be borne in mind that, under the first sentence of Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive, any plan or project not directly connected with or necessary to the management of the site is to be made subject to an appropriate assessment of its implications for the site in view of the site’s conservation objectives if it cannot be excluded, on the basis of objective information, that it will have a significant effect on that site, either individually or in combination with other plans or projects (Case C‑127/02 Waddenvereniging and Vogelbeschermingsvereniging [2004] ECR I‑7405, paragraph 45). 239. The study carried out by BirdWatch Ireland refers to a number of potential negative effects of shellfish farming, including the loss of feeding areas and disturbances caused by increased human activity and states that, even when an aquaculture programme is inside an SPA, very little protection is provided for bird habitats. Ireland, for its part, does not allege that no aquaculture programmes have any effects on SPAs. 240. It follows that the authorisation procedure ought to have included an appropriate assessment of the implications of each specific project. It is clear that Ireland merely stated, without offering further explanation, that the Irish scheme for authorising mollusc farms, including the provisions on consultation, does in fact provide for detailed consideration of all aspects of an aquaculture development project before a decision is taken on authorisation. 241. Accordingly, the Court finds that Ireland fails to ensure systematically that aquaculture programmes likely to have a significant effect on SPAs, either individually or in combination with other projects, are made subject to an appropriate prior assessment. 242. This finding is supported by the fact that Ireland has not put forward any specific scientific studies showing that a prior, detailed ornithological study was carried out, in order to challenge the failure to fulfil obligations alleged by the Commission. 243. Under Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive, an appropriate assessment of the implications for the site concerned of the plan or project implies that, prior to its approval, all aspects of the plan or project which can, by themselves or in combination with other plans or projects, affect the site’s conservation objectives must be identified in the light of the best scientific knowledge in the field. The competent national authorities are to authorise an activity on the protected site only if they have made certain that it will not adversely affect the integrity of that site. That is the case where no reasonable scientific doubt remains as to the absence of such effects (see Waddenvereniging and Vogelbeschermingsvereniging, paragraph 61).” 13. At or around the same time, the CJEU found that the Netherlands, France, Finland, Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal had similarly violated their EU obligations. 14. In view of the judgment, the Minister considered that it was not legally possible to permit commercial activity in the sites concerned until the necessary assessments had been completed. Accordingly, when granting authorisation for mussel seed fishing for the period 9 June to 1 July 2008, he prohibited it in 24 locations around the Irish coast, including Castlemaine harbour (Statutory Instrument No. 176 of 2008, adopted on 6 June 2008). The applicant company was informed of the situation by an official of the Department on 6 June 2008. It wrote to the Taoiseach (Prime Minister) that same day to underline the threat to the livelihood of those affected. It recalled the terms of the notice published in 1993 (see paragraph 9 above), and explained that it had just purchased a new boat at a cost of 1 million euros. The applicant company received a reply from the Department dated 2 July 2008. This explained that baseline data for the area had to be gathered in order to perform the assessment required by the Habitats Directive, as interpreted by the CJEU. It indicated that Castlemaine harbour had been given priority for the exercise and that work had already begun to collect the necessary data. It added that the authorities would be seeking the agreement of the European Commission to allow aquaculture to resume on an interim basis. 15. The following month the applicant company was issued an authorisation to fish for mussel seed in the harbour, with a starting date of 23 August 2008. The authorisation was subject to a number of conditions, including that it did not allow the holder to fish for mussel seed in an area or areas where this activity had been prohibited. On that same date, the temporary prohibition on mussel seed fishing at Castlemaine harbour, and at 21 other locations around the State, was maintained in force by Statutory Instrument No. 347 of 2008. The temporary prohibition only applied to mussel seed fishing; it did not prevent the harvesting of mussels previously fished and laid on farms for cultivation. 16. The applicant company wrote to the Department on 28 August 2008, warning that the supply of mussel seed in the harbour was being consumed by predators and that it would hold the Department responsible for all losses incurred. It requested a satisfactory resolution within ten days, failing which it would take advice about legal action. 17. On 3 October 2008, following successful negotiations between the Department and the Commission (see further below), the Minister issued Statutory Instrument No. 395 of 2008 removing Castlemaine harbour from the list of locations where mussel seed fishing was prohibited. The applicant company was therefore able to commence mussel seed fishing on the date the instrument came into operation, namely 5 October 2008. By that stage, however, natural predators had decimated the mussel seed. Since mussels need two years to grow to maturity, the financial consequences of the temporary prohibition on mussel seed fishing in Castlemaine harbour in 2008 were only felt in 2010. That year, the applicant had no mussels for sale, representing a loss of profit that it estimated at 289,599 euros. 18. According to the applicant company, there was no viable replacement for local mussel seed. Previous attempts to bring in mussel seed from other sites had not proved successful due to the high mortality of the seed and to the transport costs involved. It argued that it was therefore wholly dependent on the use of local resources. The applicant company further explained that if there had been any forewarning of the restriction on mussel seed fishing in 2008, it would not have made such a major investment in a new boat purchased in May of that year. 19. In 2009, the harbour was opened for mussel seed fishing from 30 April to 14 May, and from 15 September to 23 December. The applicant company was able to gather the usual amount of mussel seed. 20. In August 2009, in accordance with EU law, the Minister introduced an additional requirement for fishing in SACs or SPAs, a fisheries Natura permit. 21. In 2010, the periods authorised for mussel seed fishing in the harbour were from 29 April to 25 May, and from 30 August to 2 December. The applicant company was not able to operate during the first period, as it had not yet obtained such a fisheries Natura permit. When it eventually recommenced fishing at the end of August, the mussel seed had once again been depleted by predators, although the applicant company acquired some tonnage. It estimated its loss of profits for that year at 119,941 euros. 22. The Government provided the following explanations of the action taken following the CJEU judgment, which the applicant company did not dispute. They indicated that even before the delivery of the CJEU’s judgment they had commenced a process to determine how fisheries should be assessed in compliance with the relevant EU directives. Following that judgment, the Department immediately began the process of ensuring compliance with EU law in the fisheries sector. This process involved the domestic bodies with responsibilities for fisheries (Bord Iascaigh Mhara – BIM), marine research (Marine Institute) and nature conservation (National Parks and Wildlife Service – NPWS). Within one month of the judgment being handed down, BIM prepared a paper in January 2008 on the distribution of bi-valve (dredge) fisheries with the potential to lead to disturbance or significant disturbance of habitat, including the fishing of mussels. 23. At a meeting in February 2008 between the NPWS and the EU Commission, the latter underlined the need to comply with the judgment by conducting the requisite assessments for aquaculture, and in so doing addressing the cumulative effects of other activities that could adversely affect Natura 2000 sites. While the Commission recognised the need for some flexibility, and the small scale of much of Irish aquaculture, it considered that the onus was on Ireland to initiate a robust, proportionate and scientific process. 24. In April 2008, the relevant domestic bodies agreed on the need for an alternative approach to assess inshore fisheries on an interim basis, pending the collection of baseline data allowing the appropriate assessment required by EU law. To this end, a series of steps was proposed. The following month, BIM prepared a working document on fisheries in Natura 2000 sites, which included a case study of Castlemaine harbour. The study considered that the consequences of mussel seed fishing on the site were negligible. According to the applicant company, this assessment was consistent with that set out in a draft consultation document which had previously been prepared in 2000 by the Government Department with responsibility for heritage, of which the NPWS was then part. 25. On 30 July 2008 Ireland sent to the Commission its official response to the CJEU judgment. It acknowledged that assessments were required in relation to fisheries, and that the necessary baseline data had to be collected at the sites in question. The response also indicated that the Irish authorities would seek the Commission’s approval for an interim approach. 26. In early September 2008, the Marine Institute submitted to the Department a finalised study entitled “Fisheries in Natura 2000”. The Department was hopeful that the Commission would tolerate an interim approach to the activities in Castlemaine harbour, where the situation was time critical. The same month, the NPWS warned that in the absence of sufficient funding and staff it could not provide the necessary assurances to the Commission. It informed the Department that the assessments available to date were not adequate, and that the Commission shared this view. Additional studies were needed. The Commission’s stance was that it was prepared to give its temporary agreement to fishing at Castlemaine harbour if the additional studies were submitted and if Ireland gave an undertaking to meet the terms of the judgment over a three-year period. 27. On 2 October 2008 the NPWS sent to the Commission an interim assessment of mussel seed fishing in Castlemaine harbour, indicating that on the basis of its assessment this activity was not likely to have a significant impact on the site. The Commission agreed that, on the basis of this interim assessment, fishing could be allowed in the harbour for 2008 only, on condition that Ireland submit more detailed assessment procedures with a view to allowing fishing there in future. The Commission sought confirmation that there was an adequate basis in domestic law to ensure fishing activities remained in compliance with the directives. It requested amendments to certain aspects of the assessment, and it also requested a monitoring report. From that point it was considered legally possible to open Castlemaine harbour. The Minister signed the Statutory Instrument (No. 395 of 2009) the next day, 3 October 2008, allowing mussel seed fishing to recommence on 5 October 2008 (see paragraph 17 above). 28. In late 2008 and early 2009 the Commission maintained its robust stance, requiring a long-term plan to achieve compliance in order for the interim approach to continue. The NPWS indicated the likelihood of a negative assessment due to a decline in several bird populations, and pointed to the need for additional surveys of the site. 29. In January 2009 the Irish authorities assured the Commission of its commitment to a verifiable three-year plan to achieve compliance with the directives as regards fisheries and aquaculture. They indicated an allocation of 2 million euros over the period 2009-2010 for a wide-ranging exercise to collect baseline data. In March 2009, Ireland submitted its “roadmap to compliance” with the judgment to the Commission. The latter approved an interim approach to assessment, based on best available data and the collection of limited additional data in the time available, and subject to stringent management and control arrangements. 30. There was further engagement between the Irish authorities and the Commission during 2009 and 2010 regarding compliance with the CJEU judgment and the relevant directives. Public consultation was also required in relation to the regulatory changes that had to be made. 31. The appropriate assessment of Castlemaine harbour was completed in April 2011 by the Marine Institute. Running to over 130 pages, it assessed the effects on the site of the different types of aquaculture carried out there and concluded that there was no reason to anticipate any environmental disturbance from mussel fishing. This was one of multiple assessments which the respondent State had to undertake in light of the CJEU judgment. 32. Along with another local company, which was not directly involved in the cultivation of mussels but was a downstream retailer and exporter, the applicant company instituted proceedings in the High Court in February 2009 against the State. It relied on a series of grounds, notably breach of legitimate expectation, operational negligence and breach of the constitutional right to earn a livelihood. 33. In view of the State’s delay in delivering a defence to the claim, the applicant company brought a motion for judgment in default of defence, which was heard and concluded on 13 July 2009. The State delivered its defence on 6 August 2009. 34. In October 2009 the applicant company sought discovery of documents on a voluntary basis. It then applied to the Master of the High Court, on 14 December 2009, for an order of discovery, pursuing the matter before him in April, May and July 2010. The Master gave his ruling on 7 July 2010, which the applicant company appealed against to the High Court. It was granted an order of discovery on 18 October 2010, directing the State to provide a variety of documents within eight weeks. The State swore an affidavit of discovery on 7 January 2011. It swore a supplemental affidavit of discovery the following year, on 17 October 2012. 35. The applicant company issued an amended statement of claim on 19 August 2011, which referred to the restrictions applied in 2009 and 2010 as well. 36. On 1 September 2011 the applicant company set the action down for trial and certified it ready for hearing. Over the following months there were some exchanges of correspondence between the applicant company’s solicitor and the Chief State Solicitor in relation to the hearing of the action. On 9 May 2012 the applicant company requested a hearing date. 37. The hearing took place over eight days in November 2012. Judgment was given on 31 May 2013. 38. The High Court ruled in favour of the plaintiffs. The trial judge accepted their evidence that it would not have been viable for the applicant company to purchase mussel seed from operators based in other locations. He first found that there had been a breach of legitimate expectation, stating: “[T]here was a representation made to the plaintiffs in both the government notice and the newspaper notice of 1993. There was comfort given. What happened from then onwards, the annual allocation of seed collection authorisations and the constant refurbishing of the plaintiffs business gave rise to a pattern of events where the plaintiffs had good reason to rely upon the comfort given to them that there would not be a summary closure of their business without some good scientific reasons or without some consultation process before doing so.” 39. The High Court also found that there had been “operational negligence” due to the failure of the authorities to carry out the necessary scientific tests or monitoring that would have provided the data required by EU law. It considered that the failure to undertake these steps was a mistake of law by the Minister, which led to the denial of the applicant company’s access to the harbour for a period in 2008, causing financial loss. The trial judge accepted the evidence presented by the applicant company that it would have been possible to conduct the requisite analysis within two months. Had that been done, there would not have been any disruption of the applicant company’s activities. 40. The applicant company claimed compensation for lost profits caused by the restrictions in 2008 and 2010, which it estimated at 289,599 euros and 119,941 euros respectively, making a total claim of 409,450 euros. The State challenged both the basis for the applicant company’s calculations and the quantum of damages sought. The High Court decided that the applicant company’s claim should be reduced by roughly one third. This resulted in an award of 275,000 euros for its losses over the two years in question. It awarded the other local company 125,000 euros. 41. The State appealed both on the issues of liability and the quantum of damages awarded. It filed its notice of appeal with the Supreme Court on 16 July 2013. The applicant company brought a cross appeal in relation to the estimation of damages. A stay issue was ultimately resolved by the Supreme Court on 4 October 2013. On 21 July 2014 the State certified that the appeal was ready for hearing. The appeal was granted priority by the Chief Justice on 31 July 2014. The hearing took place on 29-30 April 2015, and judgment was given on 22 February 2016. 42. The Supreme Court was unanimous in overturning the High Court’s ruling on legitimate expectation. Addressing this issue, Clarke J, with whom the other members of the court agreed, stated: “10.7 ... [T]he only representation which it can be said was expressly made by the Minister ... was to the effect that “it is not envisaged” that there would be any restriction on traditional activities. That statement was made in April 1993, and was in the context both of developing European environmental legislation and also in the context of the process leading to the identification of areas within Ireland which would be designated for the purposes of that European legislation. It could not be said to amount to a clear commitment on the part of the Minister that there could never be any adverse consequences. What the consequences were going to be of the designation of an area for European environmental purposes was a matter of European law. 10.8 As events unfolded, it became clear that the Minister did not have the legal authority, as a matter of European law, to allow for the uninterrupted continuance of traditional activities in protected areas unless and until an appropriate assessment had been carried out. ... The Minister could give no greater assurance than that, in the then view of the Minister, it was not envisaged that there would be problems for traditional activities. ... 10.10 Next, reliance is placed on the fact that, as found by the trial judge, the ongoing activities of [the applicant company] were carried out to the knowledge of the Minister and on the basis of annual legal measures put in place by the Minister which facilitated the so-called opening of the harbour. However ... the fact that there may have been an error in the past cannot create a legitimate expectation that that error will be continued into the future. The fact that the Minister was mistaken in his view that traditional activities, of which the Minister undoubtedly knew, could continue provided that the Minister put in place the appropriate legal measures, and was also in error about the fact that those legal measures could be put in place in conformity with European law without carrying out an appropriate assessment, cannot create a legitimate expectation to the effect that that situation would continue. 10.11 While there undoubtedly was significant expenditure, and while the incurrence of expenditure on foot of a representation may form part of the Court’s assessment in determining whether it would be appropriate to allow a public authority to resile from a representation made, expenditure will not be relevant if there was no legitimate expectation in the first place. 10.12 ... As interpreted by the [CJEU], a permission for activity in a protected area can only be given when there is an appropriate assessment. An appropriate assessment requires that, on a scientific assessment, risk be excluded. The Minister was required, therefore, as a matter of European law, to be concerned not with unproven risk but rather with proven absence of risk.” 43. On the issue of operational negligence, three of the five judges upheld the State’s appeal. Two members of the majority gave judgment. 44. MacMenamin J observed that strong policy considerations arose in the case. The question of how to afford redress to individuals who had suffered the detrimental effects of wrongful actions by the executive was a legitimate concern. Yet changes in the law of negligence and reformulations of State liability must be carefully and incrementally approached with a clear view as to their long-term consequences. While there undoubtedly was a strong public interest in ensuring a proper balance between private and public rights and duties, there was a stronger public interest in ensuring that government can actually function, and that administrators were not impeded in making decisions through fear of a morass of litigation. The courts should not become a form of surrogate unelected government, second guessing prima facie lawful government actions in areas of discretion that did not raise questions of exceeding statutory powers. Reviewing the established domestic jurisprudence, he concluded that operational negligence had not been accepted in Irish law. He considered that in the present case the High Court had identified a tort with such broad headings lasting over so many years that it was questionable whether there was a justiciable controversy at all. It was impossible to say whether it was a tort committed by act or by omission. It was unclear at what point in time the Minister had acted wrongfully in relation to the plaintiffs. It might be said that, by allowing aquaculture to continue prior to 2008, the Minister had actually had regard to the applicant company’s interests, even at the cost of failed adherence to EU law. He further observed: “36. There then arises a further unavoidable question, that is, whether, if the Minister had, in fact, acted between 2000 and 2008, the respondents would inevitably have incurred significant losses, by a similar necessary suspension of activity in Castlemaine Harbour, as occurred from 2008 onwards, in order to obtain appropriate baseline data? If the detailed surveys complained of were necessary to establish the baseline, one is only left to speculate as to how these surveys could have been carried out without exactly the same or similar cessation of activity in the harbour, albeit in earlier years.” 45. He then referred to the legislative complexity of the situation, which involved provisions of EU law, as well as primary and secondary domestic legislation, and to the complexity of the situation that the State faced in the aftermath of the infringement judgment of the CJEU. It was not just and reasonable to impose liability in the circumstances of the case. He did not consider that the Minister had owed a duty of care to the plaintiffs in 2008. The Minister had been aware of their situation, but also of the situation of other businesses in other parts of the country which had been placed in the same predicament. Nearly 150 Natura 2000 surveys had to be carried out in the period 2008-2010. It could not be said that the duty to the plaintiffs outweighed the duty to comply with EU law. Identifying the appropriate standard of care was problematic too. A further conceptual difficulty lay in the idea of imposing liability on the State for acts that were carried out by valid legal instruments for the purpose of implementing a legal duty. MacMenamin J also pointed out that the tort as found in the judgment under appeal did not derive from a Francovich breach of EU law (C-6/90 and C‑9/90, EU:C:1991:428) but rather from the damage allegedly caused by the implementation of EU law after a breach thereof was identified by the CJEU. The fallacy in the case was to seek to isolate some private duty owed to the plaintiffs by the Minister from his overarching public duty to comply with and implement EU environmental law. 46. Charleton J, concurring, noted that under Article 6 of the Habitats Directive, the Minister had no discretion at all. He underlined three salient facts. First, many of the approximately 140 sites designated under the Habitats and Birds Directives were places of commercial activity of some sort. Following the ruling of the CJEU, emergency measures had to be taken to allow economic operators some latitude for the continuation of even limited business activity within the sites. This was done essentially by Irish public servants negotiating with the Commission. There were about forty sea-based sites, including Castlemaine harbour. Second, the State had not given a firm undertaking that the new environmental classification of Castlemaine harbour would not affect the applicant company’s activities. Third, the closing and opening of the harbour was done by valid statutory instruments. He considered that this ruled out any question of liability in negligence. 47. He then referred to the primary legislation governing fishing, the main objective of which was the conservation and rational management of the national fish reserves. This point was central to where any duty of care might lie. The starting point in the tort analysis had to be whether the Minister had owed a duty of care to the applicant company. There was a need for caution in holding that the public authorities owed a duty of care in particular circumstances, since it could greatly hinder their normal functioning. There were other means to deal with improper conduct by a public body, such as judicial review and the tort of misfeasance in public office. He reiterated that the authorities had not had any choice; the Minister had acted as prescribed by EU law. At most, it might be said that there was some choice to be made about whether to give priority to some of the affected sites over the others. Yet it was hard to argue that Castlemaine harbour was more deserving than the other locations. Concentrating resources on some sites would have left operators in other sites waiting longer. The State had instead adopted a strategy of vigorous negotiation with the Commission to attempt to salvage whatever could be recovered for the benefit of users of all of the sites concerned. 48. The concept of operational negligence had not yet been accepted as part of domestic law. It would mean a lack of certainty in the law, and make public decision-making subsidiary to the views of experts at several removes from the pressures of government. It would mean arrogating broader functions to the courts than provided for in the Constitution. The Minister had exercised powers based on statute and each decision had been correctly expressed through a statutory instrument. Given the general conservationist aims of the primary legislation, there was no statutory duty in favour of the applicant company. There was no discretion vested in the Minister to exempt any economic actor from EU rules. There was no duty of care towards the applicant company that could found an action in negligence. Instead, the duty of care was towards the wider community, expressed as the protection of the environment. 49. Writing for the minority, Clarke J considered that the High Court judgment, insofar as it concerned negligence, should be upheld as regards the events of 2008. Concerning the events of 2010, he noted that the applicant company had not provided evidence allowing a causal link to be established between the alleged failure on the part of the Minister and its inability to conduct its business that year. It therefore had no cause of action against the State in this respect. 50. Applying the relevant principles to the case, Clarke J clarified that there could not have been a duty on the Minister in 2008 to refrain from closing the harbour until an appropriate assessment had been carried out, as this would have been contrary to EU law. To the extent the harbour could be opened, this was only permissible in accordance with the interim measures agreed with the Commission. The real question was therefore: “15.4 ... In the light of developments in European law, did the Minister owe a duty of care to those who, to his knowledge (and up to then with his permission), were carrying out activities in protected areas, to ensure that he had appropriate survey(s) and other scientific evidence available to enable a decision to be made for the purposes of considering whether to permit the continuance of traditional activities and, should appropriate evidence be found to be present, to allow those activities to be authorised?” 51. He considered that on the facts of the case the necessary elements of foreseeability and proximity were present. The Minister was well aware of the activities taking place in Castlemaine harbour. He was also aware, in light of the statement published in 1993, that there was a potential issue that might arise in relation to such activities. Therefore, the Minister had been fully aware that any failure to place himself in a position to make a sustainable decision about the continuance of traditional activities in the sites concerned could have a significant effect on those involved in them. A private party in an analogous position would undoubtedly have been held to have a duty of care towards such persons. He further noted that it must have been clear to the Minister for some time prior to the CJEU judgment that there was a risk that the position taken by the Commission would be upheld over that of the State. In that eventuality, there would be an immediate problem due to the absence of the necessary scientific data for the appropriate assessment to be made, leading to at least the temporary interruption of the activities of the applicant company and others operating in protected areas. These formed a small and defined group of persons that, to a large extent, were actually known to the Minister and the Department. 52. As to the presence of any countervailing policy factor, he reiterated that the case did not concern matters of policy, discretion or adjudication. It did not touch upon the allocation of resources or the making of statutory decisions. It was about the purported duty of the Minister to take reasonable steps to ensure that he would be in a proper position to make a decision under European law and any relevant Irish measures. He clarified that he did not necessarily disagree with the view of MacMenamin J that no specific duty of care on the Minister had arisen in the period after the CJEU judgment. At that stage, the authorities had found themselves on the back foot, with many decisions to be made about the allocation of the resources needed to conduct appropriate assessments at the sites concerned. But the actions and decisions in 2008 and later were not relevant to the duty of care as he had defined it: “15.31 ... [T]he Minister got it wrong by failing to put in place measures to secure the appropriate scientific data to enable an appropriate assessment to be carried out long after it had become clear, by reason of the position adopted by the Commission, that there was, to put it at its mildest, a significant doubt as to whether the Minister’s position was correct. ... 15.33 ... [I]t seems to me that the duty of care which I suggest should be held to lie on the Minister does not derive from any balancing exercise at all and does not involve any aspect of the undoubted over-arching public duty which the Minister was obliged to perform. Against what can it be said that the Minister was balancing when he decided not to assemble the necessary scientific information and data (despite the Commission’s reasoned opinion) prior to the decision of the ECJ? What over-arching public duty would have been in any way impaired by the collection of such data? There is no evidence to suggest that the failure to assemble the necessary data was based on any decision involving policy, discretion or adjudication.” 53. Finally, he did not agree with the majority that the applicant company’s business would have been interrupted in any event if the Habitats Directive had been correctly implemented at an earlier point in time. According to Clarke J, the evidence accepted by the High Court was that the necessary data could have been collected and analysed in a relatively short period of time, avoiding any interruption of the applicant company’s usual activities. There was thus a causal link between the failure to assemble the relevant data and conduct the assessment at an earlier point in time, and the interruption of the applicant company’s activities in 2008. 54. In relation to damages, Clarke J noted that there were many points of disagreement between the applicant company and the State over the manner in which the former’s losses should be properly assessed. He considered that the difficulties with the evidence and the figures would have made it impossible for the Supreme Court to conduct a fair and just calculation. Had the State’s appeal been rejected, the proper course would have been to remit the question of damages to the High Court for reassessment.

5. The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Tuzla. 6. By judgment of the Mostar Municipal Court of 18 June 2009, which became final on 16 December 2010, company R. was ordered to reinstate the applicant in his previous employment, as well as to pay him a total amount of 16,314 convertible marks (BAM)[1], together with default interest calculated from 20 March 2007 until final payment. The respondent company was further ordered to pay the applicant BAM 2,641 in respect of legal costs, together with default interest calculated from 18 June 2009 until final payment. Lastly, the respondent company was ordered to cover all pension-related contributions in respect of the applicant between 1 January 2003 and 17 January 2007. 7. On 17 October 2011 the Municipal Court issued a writ of execution (rješenje o izvršenju) in this regard. 8. On 23 February 2012, upon the applicant’s request, the Municipal Court amended its decision of 17 October 2011 by changing the object of enforcement. 9. On 16 January 2012 the Municipal Court requested the respondent to indicate why it had not reinstated the applicant. On 23 January 2012 it fined the respondent in this connection. 10. On 1 February 2013 the Municipal Court joined the enforcement proceedings in the applicant’s case with an earlier enforcement procedure against the respondent. 11. On 25 June 2014 the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina found a violation of the applicant’s right to enforcement within a reasonable time, and ordered the Municipal Court to urgently finalise the enforcement proceedings. The Constitutional Court considered this to be sufficient just satisfaction and rejected the applicant’s claim for non-pecuniary damage. The decision of the Constitutional Court was served on the applicant on 15 August 2014. 12. On 18 March 2015 the Municipal Court ordered the sale of the respondent’s property. On 27 April 2015 it transferred the respondent’s real estate to company H., the highest ranked judgment creditor. The applicant did not lodge an appeal against this decision. 13. On 29 March 2016 the Mostar Cantonal Court quashed the decision of the Municipal Court of 27 April 2015 and remitted the case for reconsideration. 14. According to the latest information provided by the parties on 28 July 2017, on that date the enforcement proceedings in the applicant’s case were still pending.

4. The applicant lives in Kutina. 5. From 1 January 2001 the applicant concluded several consecutive fixed-duration contracts of employment with the company C.N.S. Ltd. concerning the same post. The contracts were for a continuous period which in total amounted to over seven years and seven months. 6. On 5 June 2009 the applicant’s employer returned the applicant’s employment registration book to him, without any written or oral notification, showing that his employment had been terminated. 7. On 20 July 2009 the applicant brought a civil action before the Ivanić Grad Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Ivanić Gradu). He asked it to recognise that he had concluded an open-ended contract of employment, given that he had been in continuous employment with his employer for over three years, which was the time-limit for fixed-term employment contracts under the Labour Act. He also asked the Municipal Court to establish that his employment had not been terminated and to order his reinstatement. 8. On 22 January 2010 the Ivanić Grad Municipal Court dismissed the applicant’s claim as time-barred. 9. Upon an appeal by the applicant, on 16 February 2011 the Velika Gorica County Court (Županijski sud u Velikoj Gorici) quashed the first‑instance decision and remitted the case for fresh consideration. It held that the first-instance court should have declared the applicant’s claims inadmissible as time-barred, without examining it on the merits. 10. In the fresh proceedings, the Ivanić Grad Municipal Court on 6 May 2011 declared the applicant’s action inadmissible as having been lodged outside the prescribed time-limit. The first-instance court, relying on section 133 of the Labour Act, held that the applicant and his employer had concluded a fixed-term contract lasting until 31 May 2009 and that the applicant must have known that his contract would end on that day. He had not concluded a new contract of employment with his employer and he had therefore been obliged to lodge an application for the protection of his rights with his employer within the fifteen-day time-limit, starting from 1 June 2009. However, he had failed to do so and consequently his claim had been lodged out of time. Rejecting the applicant’s argument, the first‑instance court also held that the defendant company had not been obliged to adopt a formal decision on terminating his employment or to send him any other kind of notification, given that he must have known that his contract would come to an end on 31 May 2009. 11. On 12 May 2011 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Velika Gorica County Court. 12. On 26 July 2011 the Velika Gorica County Court upheld the first‑instance decision. 13. On 14 November 2011 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law (revizija) with the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske), which was dismissed as ill-founded on 25 September 2012. The Supreme Court also held that the applicant had failed to seek the protection of his rights in respect of his employer within the deadlines prescribed by section 133 of the Labour Act. Accordingly, his claim had been lodged out of time. 14. On 14 March 2013 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske). He complained that the courts had wrongly declared his claim inadmissible because it had been of a declaratory nature and as such had not been subject to deadlines. He relied on a decision by the Velika Gorica County Court of 16 January 2013 in the case of a colleague of his, who for the same reasons as the applicant had also sought to have the court recognise that he had concluded an open-ended contract of employment. In that decision the Velika Gorica County Court, in accordance with instructions given in the Supreme Court’s decision no. Revr-1697/11 of 6 June 2012, had dismissed the defendant’s (the employer’s) objection that the claim was time-barred. Namely, the Supreme Court had held that the claim had been of a declaratory nature and as such was not subject to deadlines. 15. On 6 May 2013 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s constitutional complaint as manifestly ill-founded.

5. The applicant was born in 1931 and lives in Utena. 6. The historical background is summarised in Vasiliauskas v. Lithuania [GC], no. 35343/05, §§ 11-14, ECHR 2015. 7. Adolfas Ramanauskas, code name “Vanagas” (hereinafter – also A.R. “Vanagas”), was born in 1918 in the United States of America. In 1921 his family returned to Lithuania. He was a teacher. 8. As established by the domestic courts, A.R. “Vanagas” became a participant in the armed resistance against the Soviet occupation, a Lithuanian partisan, on 25 June 1945. Initially, he led a partisan squad, later he became a commander of a partisan battalion, then commander of a brigade, and from October 1948 he was the commander of the south Lithuania region. In 1949 an all-partisan organisation, the Movement of the Struggle for the Freedom of Lithuania (Lietuvos laisvės kovos sajūdis (“LLKS”)) was formed. On 16 February 1949 the organisation adopted a declaration stating that the LLKS Council was “the highest political authority of the nation, leading the nation’s political and military struggle for freedom”. That year, in the assembly of partisan commanders of the whole of Lithuania, A.R. “Vanagas” was appointed first deputy of the Chairman of the Presidium of the LLKS (Lietuvos laisvės kovos sajūdžio tarybos prezidiumo pirmininko pavaduotojas). Later that year he was also elected commander in chief of the defence forces of the LLKS. In 1951 A.R. “Vanagas” became chairman of the LLKS Council. 9. In 1956 he was captured and tortured, and in 1957 sentenced to death and shot (see also paragraphs 20-31 below). 10. After restoration of Lithuania’s independence in 1990, by a ruling of 19 March 1991 A.R. “Vanagas” was rehabilitated by the Supreme Court. 11. In 1997 “Vanagas” was posthumously recognised as a participant in the armed resistance to the Soviet occupation and granted volunteer serviceman status. 12. In 1998 and 1999 he posthumously received the military rank of brigadier general, and was granted the State decorations. 13. On 16 October 2003 the Seimas granted to A.R. “Vanagas”, as a person who had signed the declaration of the LLKS of 16 February 1949, the status of signatory to the act of independence of Lithuania. 14. The Seimas, inter alia, having regard to the fact that on 6 March 2018 it was 100 years since the birth of A.R. “Vanagas”, emphasising the importance of the partisan movement fighting against the Soviet occupation, seeking to give due respect to that historic personality for the Lithuanian nation, proclaimed the year 2018 as the year of Adolfas Ramanauskas “Vanagas”. 15. On 20 November 2018 the Seimas also declared the leader of the partisans A.R. “Vanagas” the head of the Lithuanian State which had fought the Soviet occupation. His remains were discovered the same year and he received State funeral. 16. Birutė Mažeikaitė, code name “Vanda” (hereinafter – also B.M. “Vanda”), was born in 1924. From 1945 she was a liaison person (ryšininkė) of the partisans of the Dainava Region, and was later a partisan in that region. She was A.R. “Vanagas” wife. 17. In 1956 she was captured, and in 1957 sentenced to deportation (see also paragraphs 20-32 below). 18. She was rehabilitated on 18 September 1989 by the Supreme Court of the Lithuanian SSR. 19. In 1998 B.M. “Vanda” was recognised as a participant in the armed resistance to the Soviet occupation. 20. As established by the domestic courts, for two years from March 1950 the applicant had studied at the Lithuanian SSR (hereinafter – the LSSR) Ministry of State Security (MGB) School in Vilnius. Upon graduation from that establishment in 1952, he was granted the military rank of officer-lieutenant, and joined the 2-N Board of the LSSR MGB, the main function of which was the fight against the national resistance movement. In particular, the division where the applicant worked was tasked with carrying out surveillance of the members and leadership of the Lithuanian underground movement. From 1952 the applicant was also a member of the USSR Communist Party. 21. At the time of arrest of A.R. “Vanagas” and B.B. “Vanda” in 1956, the applicant was a senior operative officer at the KGB (successor to the MGB; see paragraph 24 of the Supreme Court’s ruling in paragraph 51 below and paragraph 54 below), and had the rank of senior lieutenant. 22. According to a report of 18 October 1956 by the Chairman of the KGB of the Lithuanian SSR to the Chairman of the KGB of the USSR, which was relied on during the criminal proceedings against the applicant, from 1945 A.R. “Vanagas” had been an active participant in the “bourgeois” “national underground”. The report also noted the role of A.R. “Vanagas” in the LLKS, where he had eventually been declared the chief commander of the defence forces and had been granted the military rank of general (also see paragraph 8 above). Notwithstanding the fact that A.R. “Vanagas” had been in hiding with his wife B.M. “Vanda”, he retained that rank until the day of his capture. 23. The report also stated that following the plan for “liquidating the remaining banditry in the Republic (banditizmo likučių Respublikoje likvidavimas)” set by the KGB of the USSR, “particular attention” and “paramount importance” had been given to the search for and capture of A.R. “Vanagas”. The report noted that in 1950-53 some of the “bandit gangs” had been liquidated. Nonetheless, A.R. “Vanagas” and his wife had succeeded in avoiding capture by moving within Lithuanian territory. A special operative group from among the qualified Chekists of the KGB was therefore established to work continuously in the search for A.R. “Vanagas”. In 1956 alone, a total of thirty agents were recruited to pursue A.R. “Vanagas” and his family. Places where it was possible A.R. “Vanagas” and his wife would show up in the towns of Kaunas and Merkinė were covered by reliable and qualified agents; in other places where he might also appear active measures, including cooperation with the armed forces of the Ministry of the Interior, were employed so that A.R. “Vanagas” could not set up a new hideout. 24. The report also stated that on 11 October 1956 one of the agents, “Ž”, alerted the security services that A.R. “Vanagas” and his wife B.M. “Vanda” would be staying at his home in Kaunas overnight. The same day operation was then planned for their capture. 25. The plan specified that two detention groups were composed to effect the seizure: the first group, consisting of six operative agents and led by mayor J.O., was to be in a car approximately 200 metres from “Ž”‘s house in Kampo Street; the second group, consisting of six operative agents and led by mayor N.D., was to be in another car in Algirdo Street, approximately 300 metres from that house. As later established by the trial court, the applicant was included in the second detention group (see paragraph 38 below). Radio contact between the two detention groups and surveillance of the house as well as surrounding objects (railway tracks, bridges, and so on) was to be assured. The plan also stipulated that either group could arrest A.R. “Vanagas” and B.M. “Vanda”; it only depended which street they chose to walk into. The plan also stipulated that further instructions to the agents who were to take part in that operation would be given by the deputies to the LSSR KGB Chairman. 26. According to the KGB documents, on 12 October 1956 at about 8.30 a.m., A.R. “Vanagas” and B.M. “Vanda” left “Ž”‘s house in Kaunas. They walked on to Kampas Street, where they were seized by the KGB officers. They were carrying two pistols and two seals inscribed “LLKS Presidium” and “LLKS Military Headquarters (LLKS ginkluotųjų pajėgų štabas)”, forged passports, and other documents. After the arrest, A.R. “Vanagas” and B.M. “Vanda” were transported to Vilnius, where at about 2 p.m. they were detained in the prison of the KGB of the Lithuanian SSR in Vilnius. 27. On 15 October 1956 the head of the KGB of the Lithuanian SSR wrote a special report to the Chairman of the LSSR Communist Party to the effect that now that A.R. “Vanagas” had been captured “the liquidation of the commanders of Lithuania’s bourgeois nationalist banditry formations was complete”. 28. The report of 18 October 1956 (see paragraph 22 above) also concluded that “having arrested the last leader of the Lithuanian nationalist underground [A.]R., the liquidation of the former heads of the Lithuanian bourgeois nationalist banditry formations was totally completed”. 29. As detailed in a medical report of 15 October 1956 by the doctors at the KGB hospital in Vilnius, A.R. “Vanagas” was taken to that hospital at 4:30 p.m. on 12 October 1956 in a particularly grave condition. He was unconscious, his blood pressure was barely felt; he had muscle tremors. Upon medical examination it was established that A.R. “Vanagas” had six stab wounds to his right eye socket, wounds in his stomach, a wide wound from a tearing on his scrotum; both his testicles were gone. He was given a blood transfusion and thus stabilised, and he was operated on. The doctors noted that if his health allowed A.R. “Vanagas” could be interrogated after two or three weeks. 30. In the KGB decision of 13 October 1956 on the detention of “Vanagas” it was, inter alia, stated that by nationality he was Lithuanian, and he also belonged to “Lithuanian bourgeois nationalists”. The decision underlined the specific, active and leading role of A.R. “Vanagas” in the partisan movement. The decision also noted that in 1946-47 A.R. “Vanagas” took an active part in the publication of the anti-Soviet newspapers Bell of Freedom (Laisvės varpas) and Voice of Freedom (Laisvės balsas). 31. On 24-25 September 1957 the Supreme Court of the Lithuanian SSR found A.R. “Vanagas” guilty of counter-revolutionary crime and treason against the “Motherland” and sentenced to death. He was shot on 29 November 1957 in Vilnius. 32. By a decision of the Supreme Court of the LSSR of 8 May 1957, B.M. “Vanda” was sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment. She was deported to the Soviet Gulags in Kemerovo region, in Siberia, in what is now the Russian Federation. 33. After Lithuania regained its independence, on 13 June 2014 the applicant was charged with being an accessory to genocide, in accordance with Articles 24 § 6 and 99 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 58 below), for having taken part in the operation of 11-12 October 1956 during which A.R. “Vanagas” was captured, and subsequently tortured, sentenced to death and executed, and B.M. “Vanda” was captured and afterwards sentenced to deportation. The prosecutor noted that both partisans were members of the “Lithuanian armed resistance to the Soviet occupation” and members of a “separate national-ethnic-political group”. (b) The trial court’s judgment 34. By a judgment of 12 March 2015 the Kaunas Regional Court found the applicant guilty of being an accessory to genocide under Article 99 of the Lithuanian Criminal Code. It held that on 11 and 12 October 1956 the applicant had taken part in an operation during which one of the most prominent leaders of the Lithuanian partisans, who was also the chairman of the all-partisan organisation, the Movement of the Struggle for the Freedom of Lithuania, A.R. “Vanagas”, was captured together with his wife, B.M. “Vanda”, who was also a partisan. Afterwards, A.R. “Vanagas” was detained in a KGB prison, tortured nearly to death, sentenced, and executed (see paragraphs 29 and 31 above); B.M. “Vanda” was sentenced to deportation (see paragraph 32 above). 35. Referring at length to the Lithuanian Constitutional Court ruling of 18 March 2014 (see paragraph 59 below; other relevant extracts from that ruling are reproduced in Vasiliauskas, cited above, §§ 56-63), the trial court pointed out that, in cases where the intention was to exterminate part of a protected group, that part should be sufficiently significant to have an impact on the survival of the entire protected group (see paragraph 59 below). The trial court underlined that Lithuanian partisans were also representatives of the Lithuanian nation (lietuvių tauta), and therefore representatives of a national group. It noted that Soviet genocide had been perpetrated precisely in accordance with the inhabitants’ “national” criterion. In the case at hand, given their background, to which the court also gave particular consideration (see paragraphs 8 and 16 above), A.R. “Vanagas” and B.M. “Vanda”, as active participants in the resistance to the Soviet occupation, “had been important for the survival of the entire national group (the Lithuanian nation), defined by ethnic characteristics, given that armed resistance to the occupation obstructed the Soviet occupation authorities in carrying out deportations or taking other repressive measures against Lithuanian civilians”. Relying on the aforementioned Constitutional Court ruling, the trial court also noted that the applicant “had served in the MGB/KGB unit, the main task of which was the elimination of part of Lithuania’s population – members of the armed resistance to the Soviet occupation, belonging to a separate national-ethnic-political group, and which had an impact on the survival of the national-ethnic group”. 36. The trial court held that by having taken part in the aforesaid operation the applicant had committed genocide of Lithuanian partisans, who constituted a “national‑ethnic‑political group”. Article 99 of the Criminal Code could thus be applied retroactively. The court also noted that four of the protected groups listed in that Article (national, ethnic, racial and religious) coincided with those protected under international law norms. 37. On the facts of the case the trial court also rejected the applicant’s arguments that he could not be held liable for the fate of A.R. “Vanagas” and B.M. “Vanda” since he had not personally arrested them, nor had he been involved in the sentencing of A.R. “Vanagas” or the deportation of B.M. “Vanda”. The court noted that from 1952 the applicant had worked as an operational agent of the MGB. Furthermore, on 12 October 1956 he had been not a simple member of that repressive organisation, but an officer of senior rank. Accordingly, “he perfectly well understood one of the core goals of that repressive structure of that period in occupied Lithuania – to finally physically eliminate the members of the organised Lithuanian national resistance to the Soviet occupation – Lithuanian partisans, their contacts and supporters”. Moreover, the applicant had served in the MGB/KGB voluntarily, and had not been forced by anyone. From his earlier experience in that service “he had clearly known that such a high-ranking participant in the Lithuanian national resistance to the occupational regime as A.R. “Vanagas” and his spouse B.M. “Vanda” without doubt would be physically eliminated or deported, since this was the practice of the repressive structures in Lithuania at that time, and was applied not only to those representing resistance to the occupying Soviet regime, but even to those individuals who had nothing to do with the resistance”. 38. The trial court also noted that the applicant had taken part in the impugned “particularly professionally organised and very much clandestine” operation for the capture of A.R. “Vanagas” and his spouse B.M. “Vanda” of his own free will. Although the applicant did not apprehend them personally, he took actions which assisted in their arrest. It was also clear that apart from the members of the group that personally arrested A.R. “Vanagas” and B.M. “Vanda”, other individuals, including the applicant, also took actions which aided the arrest. Without those other persons’ participation in the operation – such as those who had betrayed the two partisans, and those who had followed them and blocked neighbouring streets, yards or bridges so that they could not escape, the arrest would not have been successful. Furthermore, according to the archive materials, the applicant was a member of the reserve group for the arrest, whose role according to the plan was analogous to the role of those who actually had arrested A.R. “Vanagas” and B.M. “Vanda”. It was only because A.R. “Vanagas” and B.M. “Vanda” chose to walk on to the street where the applicant’s arrest group was not positioned that meant it was the first arrest group which captured the two partisans (see paragraph 25 above). Accordingly, the applicant’s role in that operation had still been an important one. 39. In that context the trial court also rejected the applicant’s line of defence that he had not even been present in the operation in Kaunas, because he had already arrived at the KGB headquarters in Vilnius, where all the participants in that operation had gathered in its wake, in service uniform instead of plain clothes, and that he had therefore been excluded from taking part in that operation. The trial court pointed out that every action in a repressive organisation such as the KGB was painstakingly regulated and documented. Had the applicant in reality arrived in service uniform, this would have been evaluated as a gross breach of his duties and, without a doubt, would have been recorded in the KGB documents. On the contrary, after the operation the KGB placed even more confidence in him, and he was entrusted with the guard of A.R. “Vanagas” at the KGB hospital and visiting him in prison, a right which was not vouchsafed to other participants in that operation. 40. Having taken into account the applicant’s advanced age and the fact that the crime had been committed more than fifty years previously, the trial court considered that the minimum sanction – deprivation of liberty in a correctional home for a period of five years – was appropriate. The court noted that although the applicant’s health was weak, it was not so fragile that he could not serve a sentence involving deprivation of liberty. He began serving the sentence. (c) The Court of Appeal 41. On 10 July 2015 the Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal by the applicant and upheld his conviction for genocide under Article 99 of the Criminal Code. Relying on the Constitutional Court ruling of 18 March 2014, the Court of Appeal emphasised the Lithuanian partisans’ role during the Lithuanian inhabitants’ resistance to the Soviet occupation. It underscored that the Lithuanian partisans had been significant for the survival of the entire national group (the Lithuanian nation) defined by ethnic characteristics, given that the partisans obstructed the Soviet repressive structures designed to facilitate deportation and other forms of persecution of civilians in Lithuania. The partisans accordingly fell within a “separate national-ethnic-political group”. 42. The Court of Appeal also underlined that both A.R. “Vanagas” and B.M. “Vanda” had been active participants in the resistance to the Soviet occupation. In fact, A.R. “Vanagas” had been one of its leaders (the court referred to his service history, see paragraphs 8–15 above, and Lithuanian legislation as to the status of volunteer soldiers). Accordingly, the repressive structures’ actions against them could be considered as targeted against a “significant part of a national-ethnic-political group”. This was also proved by the fact that their capture had been declared by the KGB as the end of the “liquidation of former bourgeois nationalist banditry formations” (see paragraphs 27 and 28 above). Although the active resistance ended in 1953, A.R. “Vanagas” and B.M. “Vanda” were searched for by the Soviet authorities even after this. The domestic court paid attention to documents from the relevant time which showed that a particular commitment was made to ensuring the capture of A.R. “Vanagas” in pursuance of the plan for liquidation of the Lithuanian partisans. In his testimony the applicant confessed that at the time he was aware of A.R. “Vanagas”, that the latter was leader of the partisan movement, and that he was in hiding. Accordingly, the mere fact that A.R. “Vanagas” and B.M. “Vanda” had succeeded in hiding from repression, not only during the partisan war but until their capture in 1956, was not an impediment to qualifying the applicant’s actions as genocide. 43. As to the applicant’s guilt, the appellate court also found that he, having studied at the MGB school and joined that service of his own free will, understood at the time the special goal of the Soviet totalitarian policy, which was to physically exterminate those participating in the Lithuanian national resistance to the Soviet occupation regime – the Lithuanian partisans − “so that the basis of the Lithuanian civil nation (pilietinė tauta) would be destroyed”. Accordingly, when briefed on 11 October 1956 about the operation for the arrest of A.R. “Vanagas” and B.M. “Vanda”, the applicant must have understood the danger of his actions, comprehended what was the intended result of that operation, and sought that outcome (the death and deportation of those arrested). In that context, the fact that A.R. “Vanagas” and B.M. “Vanda” were not killed during the operation in which they were captured did not refute the special aim of exterminating the “national-ethnic-political group”, namely the Lithuanian partisans. Nor had that aim been negated by the fact that afterwards the applicant was not responsible for deciding the means, namely issuing a death sentence or a sentence of deprivation of liberty, by which that goal would be achieved. 44. The Court of Appeal also rejected the applicant’s claim that during the impugned operation he had been at the KGB headquarters in Kaunas and had not been in the street where the operation took place, and thus had not taken part in the operation for the capture of A.R. “Vanagas” and B.M. “Vanda”. This was proved by the archive documents, a witness statement, and the applicant’s own testimony given during the pre-trial investigation. Lastly, the Court of Appeal rejected the applicant’s argument that, when arrested on 12 October 1956, A.R. “Vanagas” had attempted to commit suicide. The injuries, such as those noted in the medical expert report (see paragraph 29 above), could not have been self-inflicted. (d) The Supreme Court 45. At the applicant’s request, on 18 January 2016 the Supreme Court suspended the execution of his sentence and ordered that he be released from the correctional home until the merits of his appeal on points of law had been examined by the Supreme Court. 46. By a final ruling of 12 April 2016, the Supreme Court, sitting in a plenary session formation (plenarinė sesija) of seventeen judges, upheld the lower courts’ decisions as regards the applicant being guilty of genocide. However, it amended the lower courts’ decisions by reducing the applicant’s sentence to five months’ deprivation of liberty, which meant that by that time he had already served his sentence. 47. Relying, among other sources, on the Court’s judgment in Vasiliauskas (cited above), the Supreme Court firstly established that in 1956, at the time of commission of the act by the applicant, genocide was recognised as a crime under international law. Given the applicant’s background in MGB/KGB, the international legal instruments prohibiting genocide (as well as complicity in committing genocide) and providing for criminal liability for genocide must have been known to him. (i) Regarding the elements of the crime of genocide and the application of Article 99 of the Criminal Code 48. As to the definition of genocide in Lithuanian law and its compatibility with the principle of rule of law, the Supreme Court recapitulated: “11. When defining the crime of genocide in Article 99 of the Criminal Code, in addition to national, ethnic, racial and religious groups, social and political groups, that is, the two groups which were not provided for when defining the crime of genocide under the universally recognised norms of international law have been included. The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania has pointed out in the Ruling of 18 March 2014 that ‘<...> the inclusion of social and political groups into the definition of genocide in Article 99 of the Criminal Code <...> was determined by a concrete legal and historical context – the international crimes committed by the occupation regimes in the Republic of Lithuania’. The Constitutional Court, inter alia, concluded that the legal regulation established in Article 99 of the Criminal Code and a broader interpretation of the crime of genocide does not conflict with the Constitution. On the other hand, the Constitutional Court has held that paragraph 3 of Article 3 of the Criminal Code ..., in so far as this paragraph establishes the legal regulation under which a person may be brought to trial under Article 99 of the Criminal Code for the actions aimed at physically destroying, in whole or in part, the persons belonging to any social or political group, where such actions had been committed prior to the time when liability was established in the Criminal Code for the genocide of persons belonging to any social or political group (thus, the establishment of the retroactive effect of Article 99 of the Criminal Code for the actions which are classified as genocide only under the norms of national law) was in conflict with Article 31 §4 of the Constitution and the constitutional principle of a State under the rule of law.” 49. The Supreme Court also gave particular consideration to the Court’s judgment in Vasiliauskas (cited above), and held: “12. In the context of the cassation case at issue, the judgment rendered by the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights on 20 October 2015, after the decisions disputed in the given proceedings, in the case Vasiliauskas v. Lithuania (application no. 35343/05) is relevant. The Court held that there has been a violation of Article 7 (nullum crimen sine lege) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms by the conviction of the applicant under Article 99 of the Criminal Code for the genocide of a political group of the Lithuanian population – participation in the killing of two Lithuanian partisans in 1953. The Court, inter alia, found that in 1953 international treaty law did not include a ‘political group’ in the definition of genocide, nor could it be established with sufficient clarity that customary international law provided for a broader definition of genocide than that set out in Article II of the 1948 Genocide Convention (Vasiliauskas v. Lithuania, § 178). In examining whether the interpretation of the actions of V. Vasiliauskas provided by the Lithuanian courts in the case of the applicant V. Vasiliauskas conformed to the concept of the notion of genocide as it stood in 1953, the Court, inter alia, noted that authorities have discretion to interpret the definition of genocide more broadly than that contained in the 1948 Genocide Convention. However, such discretion does not permit domestic tribunals to convict persons accused under that broader definition retrospectively. Considering the fact that in 1953 political groups were excluded from the definition of genocide under international law, the [Court] held that the prosecutors were precluded from retroactively charging, and the domestic courts from retroactively convicting, the applicant of genocide of Lithuanian partisans, as members of a political group. It also follows from the judgment of the [Court] in the case of Vasiliauskas v. Lithuania that the Grand Chamber held that the Lithuanian courts had failed to adequately substantiate their conclusions in the judgments rendered in the criminal case of V. Vasiliauskas that the Lithuanian partisans constituted a significant part of the national group, that is, a group protected under Article II of the Genocide Convention.” 50. On the question of attribution of A.R. “Vanagas” and B.M. “Vanda” to a significant part of a “separate national-ethnic-political group”, and the twofold concept of the nation, the Supreme Court held: “13. It has been mentioned that in the criminal case at issue S.D. has been convicted of aiding representatives of the Soviet occupational power to commit genocidal acts against A.R. and B.M. as ‘members of a distinct national-ethnic-political group, namely one engaging in armed resistance to the Soviet occupation’. The appellate court noted that Lithuanian partisans – members of the armed resistance to the occupational power – are attributed to a ‘separate national-ethnic-political group’ and assessed the unlawful actions directed against A.R. and B.M. by the repressive structures of the occupational power as directed towards a significant ‘part of the national-ethnic-political group’. Thus, the courts described partisans as a national- ethnic-political group. According to the law, where at least one element of a national or ethnic or political group (or a part thereof) under extermination is identified, that is a sufficient basis (also in the presence of other constitutive elements of genocide) to apply Article 99 of the Criminal Code. The above-referred characteristics of a group (or a part thereof) exterminated by genocide have an autonomous alternative meaning of a constitutive element of corpus delicti. Thus, S.D. has been convicted of aiding in the commission of genocide against the persons belonging to the national, ethnic and political group. A political group is not on the list of groups protected by the Genocide Convention. However, that does not make the application of criminal liability to S.D. for genocide unjustified. Criminal actions directed at the extermination of persons belonging to any group protected under the Convention are deemed to be genocide. The courts have held that A.R. and B.M., as members of the resistance to the Soviet occupation who belonged to a political group, were also members of the groups of individuals protected under the Genocide Convention – a national and an ethnic group – therefore, where genocide against any of these groups is discovered, this constitutes a basis for the application of criminal liability. It should be noted that the factual circumstance identified by the courts, namely the affiliation of A.R. and B.M. to a political group, Lithuanian partisans, is relevant in disclosing the essence of the criminal offence and historically may not be assessed separately from the assessment of a national and ethnic group as a characteristic.” “18. It should be noted in the context of the case at issue that the definition of a national and an ethnic group should be linked with the concept of a nation, the understanding whereof is twofold ... The first meaning is related to the notion of ethnicity or an ethnic group, and means a historically developed community – an ethnic nation with common ethnic, cultural characteristics (origin, language, self-awareness, territory, ethnopsychology, traditions, and so on). Thus, an ethnic group is a community of persons with a common origin, language, culture, and self-identity. The other meaning of a nation pertains to the notion of nation (Latin natio) or a modern nation to which, as a formation, the attributes of statehood, nationalism and citizenship are characteristic. Therefore, a nation may be defined as a community of people historically formed on the basis of a common language, territory, socioeconomic life, culture and national self-identity, with a common national, political and economic perspective. Thus, a national group means a historically developed community of people belonging to a certain nation, formed on the basis of language, territory, socioeconomic life, culture, national self-identity and other common characteristics. Individuals belonging to both a national and an ethnic group may be interrelated, and a complete delimitation of such groups as a separate formation in the crime of genocide is not always possible.” 51. As to the international legal and historical context in 1940-56 and the national resistance to the Soviet repression the Supreme Court expounded: “20. In the context of the proceedings at issue, it is highly important to consider the international legal and historical circumstances of the period between 1940 and 1956, as well as the scope (massive scale) of the national resistance to the occupying power and the scale of repression of the Soviet occupying power against the Lithuanian population. 21. As is generally known, on 15 June 1940 an act of aggression was carried out by the USSR against the Republic of Lithuania, namely the invasion of the Soviet armed forces into the territory of the Republic of Lithuania and the occupation of the territory of the Republic of Lithuania. Continuing its aggression, the USSR carried out the annexation of the territory of the Republic of Lithuania on 3 August 1940. In June 1941 the Republic of Lithuania was occupied by the German Reich: the latter occupation began on 22 June 1941 when Germany attacked the Soviet Union and ended in 1944–45 after the USSR had reoccupied the territory of the Republic of Lithuania. The second Soviet occupation continued until 11 March 1990, when the independence of the Republic of Lithuania was restored. 22. After the Soviet Union occupied Lithuania, its residents suffered mass acts of repression that violated fundamental human rights to life, health, freedom and dignity... [The Supreme Court then cited passages from the ruling of 18 March 2014 of the Constitutional Court about the scale of repressions, see Vasiliauskas, cited above, § 62]. 23. The occupants used the most brutal methods of fighting: they destroyed the farmsteads of partisan families and their supporters with mortar fire, publicly disfigured dead bodies in public squares of towns and villages, and arranged provocations by hitmen agents ... Repression was also applied against the families of participants in the resistance and their supporters: their property (farms) was confiscated, and their families were exiled en masse. On the basis of resolutions of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the largest deportations of Lithuanians were carried out in 1948-51. The first two deportations (in May 1948 and March-April 1949) were officially directed against the families of known partisans and persons in hiding, partisans who had been killed, and convicted persons, also against the participants in the resistance: in May 1948 more than 40,000 residents (around 11,000 families) were deported from Lithuania, and in March–April 1949 more than 32,000 people (around 10,000 families)... 24. The main bodies of the Soviet occupational power that carried out repressive acts in the suppression of the Lithuanian national resistance against occupants from 1944 were the relevant structures of the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs and the People’s Commissariat for State Security (NKVD and NKGB) of the LSSR; from 1946, the people’s commissariats were renamed ministries (the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and the Ministry of State Security (MGB)), which became from 1954 the State Security Department of the LSSR (KGB), there were also internal security units of the USSR NKVD-MVD-MGB, special “extermination” squads (stribai) and other repressive bodies. By the Law of 16 July 1998 “On the Assessment of the USSR State Security Committee (NKVD, NKGB, MGB, KGB) and the Current Activities of the Staff Members of this Organisation”, the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania recognised the NKVD, NKGB, MGB, KGB as a criminal organisation which had committed war crimes, genocide, acts of repression, terror and political persecution in the Republic of Lithuania occupied by the USSR. 25. The annihilation of the participants in the armed national resistance, namely Lithuanian partisans, their connections and supporters, by the occupying power and its repressive bodies, was systematic, consistent, based on a clear methodology and instructions. It has been mentioned that the acts of repression were directed against the most active and advanced part of the Lithuanian nation as a national, ethnic group. Such extermination had the clear aim of influencing the demographic changes of the Lithuanian nation and its very survival, as well as at facilitating the sovietisation of the occupied Lithuania. The extermination of the resistance participants not only meant the elimination of obstacles to the objectives of the occupying regime; it also had another purpose, namely to intimidate the residents of Lithuania by showing what destiny awaited those who refused to obey the occupying power. It should be noted that Resolution No 1481 of 25 January 2006 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe ‘On the Need for International Condemnation of Crimes of Totalitarian Communist Regimes’ stated that the communist regimes justified massive violations of human rights and crimes against them in the name of the class struggle theory and the principle of dictatorship of the proletariat; they legitimised the elimination of people who were considered harmful to the construction of a new society and as such enemies of the regime, and a vast number of victims in every country concerned were its ethnic residents.” 52. As to the partisans’ role specifically, the Supreme Court stated: “26. When the Soviet Union occupied Lithuania for the second time, tens of thousands of Lithuanian residents joined the struggle against the occupants. In 1944-45, about 30,000 armed men joined forces in the forests. ... The majority chose armed struggle consciously and were committed to fighting until the restoration of an independent Lithuanian State... Partisan groups regulated their activities with statutes and rules. Those who joined the partisans took an oath. Partisans wore military uniforms with distinctive signs. The ten years of resistance, also known as the Lithuanian War or the resistance or partisan war, is exceptional in the history of Lithuania from several aspects: its duration (almost ten years), universality (during the entire period there were at least 50,000 active members of the armed resistance and about 100,000 others who participated in the resistance as members of underground organisations and supporters), and the unequal balance of power which was unfavourable to the Lithuanian partisans .... On 10-20 February 1949 an assembly of Lithuania’s partisan commanders took place; this brought together the units of the anti-Soviet resistance into one organisation, namely the Movement of the Struggle for the Freedom of Lithuania (LLKS). This organisation, under the leadership of General Jonas Žemaitis–Vytautas, adopted military-political documents proclaiming the LLKS as the organisation which was leading the political and military liberation struggle of the nation and represented the ideals of independent Lithuania in the occupied country. During the assembly, on 16 February 1949, a political declaration was adopted, whereby the restoration of the independent parliamentary Republic of Lithuania was declared the final goal of the partisan movement’s struggle. 27. According to the laws of the Republic of Lithuania ... ‘[d]uring the occupation period, the LLKS Council [was] the supreme political body of the nation, in charge of the political and military fight for the liberation of the nation’)... 29. People of different status participated in the national armed resistance, mostly Lithuanians by nationality; they were united by a common goal, namely to restore the independence of Lithuania. The resistance was supported and the occupation was also resisted in other ways by a large part of the Lithuanian nation. As mentioned, according to the data available not less than 50,000 people participated actively in the armed resistance that lasted for a decade, and the whole resistance movement involved around 100,000 residents of Lithuania, as members of underground organisations and supporters; around 20,000 Lithuanian partisans and their supporters were killed in total during the resistance. It should be noted that according to the data of the Department of Statistics of Lithuania, in 1945 the population of Lithuania was 2.5 million ..., and there were approximately 2.3 million residents in 1951 .... Although the numbers who participated in the resistance and suffered from the repression are undoubtedly high, they should be considered not only by “quantitative” criterion but also in the context of the overall scale of the repression, including massive deportations of civilians. It has been mentioned that the acts of repression by the Soviet power were also directed against the family members of partisans and their connections and supporters, who were also incarcerated, deported or killed: [in this way,] it was also aimed at the extermination of a large part of the Lithuanian nation, a national, ethnic group. Thus, the total number of victim participants in the resistance – Lithuanian partisans, their connections and supporters, who were killed or suffered repression of other kinds, is significant both in absolute terms and considering the size of the total population of Lithuania at that time. 30. It has been mentioned that armed participants in the resistance, Lithuanian partisans, who had the support of Lithuanian residents, were putting into practice the right of the nation to self-defence against occupation and aggression. The armed resistance obstructed the Soviet occupational structures in carrying out their deportations, exiles, and other repressive measures against Lithuanian civilians. In this way the participants in the resistance not only really sought to ensure the survival of the nation (by defending it) but also embodied that survival. The leadership of Lithuanian partisans was the supreme political and military power, represented abroad by the Supreme Committee for the Liberation of Lithuania (Preamble of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the Status of Participants in Resistance against the Occupations of 1940-90 ....” 53. Regarding the role of A.R. “Vanagas” and B.M. “Vanda” in the national resistance movement, the Supreme Court reiterated the lower courts’ findings of fact (see paragraph 8 above). It also held: “31. ... The courts established in the proceedings that A.R. and B.M. were active participants in the armed resistance against the Soviet occupation, and A.R. was also one of the leaders of this resistance. Lithuanian partisans, as a separate political group, were significant for the survival of the entire national group (the Lithuanian nation), which is defined by ethnic features. Attention should be drawn to the fact that A.R. was persecuted, and his destruction was sought, not only because of his membership of the partisan movement but also as the chairman of the political power of the occupied State: the Presidium of the LLKS Council. The evidence in the case file confirms that large forces of the LSSR MGB (KGB) were allocated for that purpose: a permanent operational group for the search for A.R. was formed, more than forty agents were deployed, much organisational work was undertaken, and the search continued for several years. It should also be noted that after the detention of A.R. and his wife B.M. it was reported to the leadership of the LSSR MGB (KGB) that the detention of A.R. had completed the ‘liquidation of Lithuanian ‘bourgeois nationalist’ (bandit) leaders’. 32. In the light of the circumstances described, it should be held that the participants in the resistance to occupation, namely Lithuanian partisans, their connections and supporters, – were a significant part of the Lithuanian nation, as a national, ethnic group. This part of the national and ethnic group had an essential impact on the survival of the Lithuanian nation, and was highly important for the protection and defence of Lithuanian national identity, culture and national self-awareness. This [description] conforms to the characteristics of the above-described group protected under Article II of the Genocide Convention: extermination of members of this group should be assessed as genocide under both international law and the Criminal Code. Therefore, the conclusions of the courts, that A.R. and B.M., as Lithuanian partisans, were members of the national and ethnic group protected under the Genocide Convention and targeted by the actions of the institutions of the occupational power that sought to exterminate part of this group, should be upheld.” (ii) As to the applicant being guilty of genocide 54. Regarding the applicant’s conviction for genocide, the Supreme Court found it established that by 1956, when the crime was committed, the applicant had already been working for the MGB, which he had joined “consciously and voluntarily”, for four years. Before that, he had completed the Vilnius School of MGB Operational Staff Training, where he studied for two years. It was noteworthy that the applicant had studied at the security service school and started his service in the security structure during the period when the national resistance movement against the occupying power was active. He was not an ordinary officer: from 1952 he was a member of the USSR Communist party, and after graduating from the MGB school he was granted the rank of officer-lieutenant. The applicant worked at the Lithuanian MGB/KGB 2-N board, the main function of which was the fight against the national resistance movement. It was also noteworthy that the division where the applicant had worked carried out surveillance of the members and leadership of the Lithuanian national underground movement. Furthermore, at the time of the arrest of A.R. “Vanagas” and B.M. “Vanda” in 1956 the applicant was already a senior operative officer in the KGB. He had the rank of senior lieutenant. As could be seen from his service record, he was directly “involved in combat operations with regard to national underground (banditry)”. It had also been established that the applicant was aware of the actions of a repressive nature being conducted against the partisans; he knew about A.R. “Vanagas” as the leader of the partisans and about his being in hiding from the Soviet authorities. He was also briefed about the purpose of the operation aimed at the capture of A.R. “Vanagas”. 55. In the light of the foregoing, the Supreme Court held that the applicant understood one of the essential operational goals of the LSSR MGB, namely to destroy physically the members of the organised movement of the Lithuanian national resistance to the Soviet regime, that is Lithuanian partisans, their connections and supporters, as a part of the Lithuanian national-ethnic group; he approved of those goals and took part in their implementation during the secret operation in which the Lithuanian partisans A.R. “Vanagas” and B.M. “Vanda” were captured. He was also aware of the torture, killing or deportation threatening them after the detention. Thus, the participation of the applicant in the detention operation was inseparable from the goal of the LSSR MGB/KGB to destroy Lithuanian partisans as part of a national-ethnic group. Attention should be drawn to the fact that, in fact, it was officers of the board of the LSSR KGB, where the applicant had served, who took of A.R. “Vanagas” and B.M. “Vanda” into detention, which only confirmed the fact that the applicant was not a person who was in the detention group accidentally. 56. Lastly, the Supreme Court noted that the fact that the applicant had taken part in an operation in 1956, after active armed resistance to the Soviet occupation had ended [as noted by the Constitutional Court, such active armed resistance took place between 1944 and 1953], had no bearing on the classification of his actions as genocide. Actions could qualify as genocide even if they had not been committed during one single period. In the applicant’s case, it was paramount that his and the KGB’s actions had been prompted by one single goal, namely to physically exterminate all or part of the members of a protected group. The case-file documents showed that the Soviet authorities’ goal of completely eliminating the leadership and members of the national resistance had remained in place even after the period of their active resistance was over. In this connection it was also pertinent that A.R. “Vanagas” had been one of the leaders of the national resistance, that more than forty KGB agents had been involved in the efforts to capture him, and that it was only after several years of searching that the KGB had succeeded in apprehending him. After that operation the KGB had declared that with the capture of A.R. “Vanagas” “the liquidation of the Lithuanian bourgeois nationalists’ leaders” had been terminated. Accordingly, the applicant’s actions also conformed to the subjective elements of corpus delicti of genocide.

6. The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Focşani. 7. At the material time the applicant was a local correspondent for the national daily newspaper România liberă. The applicant’s articles covered various fields, including investigations into the activities of the armed forces and the police. 8. In the summer of 2004 secret documents were leaked, accidentally or deliberately, from the Romanian unit of an international military base in Afghanistan. The leak consisted mostly of copies of documents produced by the Romanian unit and classified as secret. The documents referred to the military operations of the Romanian troops at the said base in 2002 and 2003, such as operations orders or military maps. Copies of secret documents produced for the use of the Romanian unit by a military unit belonging to another country were also leaked. 9. In March 2005 three Romanian journalists, including O.O., who was working for România liberă, were kidnapped by a terrorist group in Iraq. Their release in May 2005 was negotiated by the Romanian State and an investigation was immediately started by the Romanian authorities. The following year the media extensively reported on this case and the role played by the authorities. 10. On 31 January 2006 O.O., together with other journalists, participated in a television show on a national channel. They criticised the authorities’ negligence in allowing leaks of secret sensitive military information and mentioned the existence of a compact disc (“CD”) with secret documents belonging to a Romanian military unit in Afghanistan. When the host of the show questioned the authenticity of the information on the CD, O.O. showed his computer to the camera. Some of the documents, including several military maps with the positions of the Romanian troops, were thus made visible to the public. 11. The journalists speculated as to whether such information could have reached terrorists too and demanded an investigation in order to establish whether the leaks had been voluntary. O.O. also said that although at that stage, the information no longer posed a threat to the lives of Romanian soldiers, it could have more serious implications in connection with the conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq. 12. During the show it was mentioned that the newspapers România liberă and Ziua had received the secret information in question but had decided not to publish it, fearing possible damage to national security. 13. On 7 February 2006 the national daily newspapers, România liberă and Ziua, published articles drawing attention to the fact that confidential information which could threaten national security had been leaked from a military unit under the authority of the Ministry of Defence. 14. On 8 February 2006 O.O. participated in a radio show together with the chairman and vice-chairman of the Defence Commission of the Romanian Senate, the director of Ziua and an investigative journalist from a national newspaper. The show followed a day of discussions and explanations about the leak of secret documents given by the Minister of Defence, the Chief of the Armed Forces and the head of the Information Department of the Army before the Defence Commission of the Senate. When asked how they had obtained the documents in question, O.O. refused to disclose his source, while the director of Ziua stated that he had received them anonymously. The chairman of the Defence Commission mentioned that the security of classified information had been one of the main chapters in Romania’s negotiations for joining NATO. He emphasised the importance of the Ministry of Defence undertaking a thorough investigation in connection with the leak, which put into play Romania’s credibility as a member of NATO. 15. On 3 March 2006 the Minister of Defence held a press conference during which he announced that an internal inquiry into the leak of classified information had been finalised and that seventy-nine members of the army were being punished with disciplinary sanctions. Further investigations were being conducted by the prosecutors with respect to two other members of the army. The minister also confirmed the fact that he had been informed about the leak by the Romanian Intelligence Service (Serviciul Român de Informaţii) in October 2005 and that the specialised army departments had immediately started preliminary verifications. 16. On 7 February 2006 the prosecutor’s office attached to the High Court of Cassation and Justice opened of its own motion an investigation on the basis of the articles published the same day in România liberă and Ziua (see paragraph 13 above). At the same time, the Ministry of Defence informed the same prosecutor’s office about the leak of information from within its structures. 17. Shortly afterwards the prosecutor decided to institute criminal proceedings against the applicant and four other people (P.I. – a former member of the armed forces, O.S. – a journalist, E.G. and I.M.) for disclosing classified information on national security under Article 169 of the Criminal Code, and for the gathering and sharing of secret or confidential information under Article 19(1) of Law no. 51/1991 on national security. 18. Authorisations had been issued for the interception of telephone calls made from the phone numbers belonging to E.G., I.M. and P.I., as well as for the surveillance of E.G. and I.M. and the ambient recording of their discussions. As a result, transcripts of discussions between the applicant and E.G. and I.M. had been included in the investigation file. 19. At 4.30 p.m. on 16 February 2006, after his house had been searched by the police and the hard drive of his computer seized, the applicant was taken into police custody. 20. On 17 February 2006 the applicant’s pre-trial detention was authorised by a judge for a period of ten days. An appeal lodged by the applicant against the measure was allowed and he was released on 18 February 2006. 21. The prosecutor established that at the beginning of July 2005 O.S., a journalist specialised in military issues, working for local newspapers in Focşani, had received on a CD a copy of the secret military documents leaked in 2004. At that time, three people, including P.I., had been in possession of the above-mentioned documents. On 2 July 2005 O.S. had met the applicant and had given him a copy of the CD. 22. A list of the applicant’s telephone calls showed that on 4 July 2005 he had called the head of the public relations department of the Romanian Armed Forces. In the following months, both the applicant and O.S. had discussed the content of the CD with other journalists and on several occasions with employees of the Romanian Armed Forces and of the Romanian Intelligence Service. 23. The investigation further established that by the end of 2005 the applicant had shown the content of the CD to a few people and had given a copy of the CD to E.G. and I.M., who the applicant believed were former members of the police. Furthermore, in January 2006 O.O. (see paragraph 10 above) went to Focşani and met the applicant and O.S., who showed him the documents. 24. In a statement given before the prosecutor on 16 February 2006, the applicant said that he could not remember having discussed the secret documents with O.O. He also said that as soon as he had found out about the information in question, he became interested in it as a journalist. Because there were doubts about the authenticity of the documents, he had had to contact a number of people in order to verify the information. It was in that context that he had discussed and shown the said documents to E.G. and I.M., who had let him believe they had connections with high-ranking politicians. He acknowledged that he might have told some of his friends that he had seen secret documents in order to be given more credit as an investigative journalist. 25. On 2 July 2007 the head of the Romanian Armed Forces informed the chief prosecutor of the prosecutor’s office attached to the High Court of Cassation and Justice that the documents which formed the object of the investigation and which had been issued by the Romanian army, and had been compromised by their publication in the media, had been de-classified. 26. On 15 August 2007 the prosecutor’s office attached to the High Court of Cassation and Justice decided that “by receiving (obtaining) from O.S. a CD that he [had] watched three times; by saving on the hard drive of his computer the information classified as State secret and work secret and by giving the CD to I.M. and E.G., outside the legal framework set forth by the provisions of Law no. 182/2002 and Government Decision no. 585/2002”, the applicant had committed, in a continuous form, the crime proscribed by Article 19(1) of Law no. 51/1991. The prosecutor decided, however, not to indict the applicant but to sanction him with an administrative fine of 800 Romanian lei (ROL) (approximately 240 euros (EUR)). The applicant was further ordered to pay part of the judicial costs incurred in the investigation in the amount of ROL 1,912 (EUR 572). The prosecutor also ordered the confiscation of the hard drive seized from the applicant on 16 February 2006. 27. The prosecutor’s decision was based on the Romanian legal framework on classified information, which was held to include Law no. 182/2002 on the protection of classified information, Government Decision no. 585/2002 approving national standards for the protection of classified information, Government Decision no. 781/2002 on the protection of professional secrets and Law no. 51/1991 on national security. The decision further mentioned that the applicant had received the secret military information and had proceeded to verify its nature and importance. He had further shared the information with other people. From the elements in the file, the prosecutor concluded that the purpose of the applicant’s actions was just to make himself more visible as an investigative journalist and not to serve the public interest. Noting that the protection of classified information was an obligation incumbent only on authorised personnel, the prosecutor nevertheless considered that information concerning national defence was classified and could not be of public interest, as provided for by Article 12(1)(a) of Law no. 544/2001 on access to public information. As a result, although anyone unauthorised in the field of national defence – such as a journalist – was not bound by a duty to protect this type of information, he or she did not have the right to disclose it to the public. 28. In view of the above, the prosecutor considered that the applicant had acted with intent to disclose classified information outside the above-mentioned legal framework. However, the prosecutor considered that the crimes committed by the applicant and the other four suspects were not serious enough to require the pursuit of the criminal investigation. In this connection, the prosecutor noted firstly that the information in dispute was not likely to endanger national security but only to harm the interests of the Romanian State and its armed forces. In addition, the information was outdated and hence was no longer likely to endanger the Romanian military structures in Afghanistan. The information in question had already been “compromised” (disclosed by a member of the armed forces to a civilian) as early as the summer of 2004, with no measures having been taken by the institution concerned. The prosecutor also mentioned that the actions undertaken by O.S and the applicant in order to gather information concerning the content, nature and importance of the secret documents in question, by contacting active or reserve members of the armed forces or other journalists were part of the working methods of investigative journalists and did not necessarily present a danger for society. 29. The applicant complained against that decision to the superior prosecutor, who rejected the complaint as ill-founded on 6 November 2007. 30. On 3 December 2007 the applicant complained against the prosecutors’ decisions before the Bucharest Court of Appeal. He submitted that he had been wrongfully found guilty of the crime proscribed by Article 19(1) of Law no. 51/1991. In his opinion, that Article, as well as the entire law, imposed obligations only on people authorised to work with secret information. He contended that he had not made any steps to gather military secrets but had merely passively received information that was already in the public domain. Invoking Article 10 of the Convention, the applicant submitted that the Court had already decided that once information concerning national security had entered the public domain, it was difficult to justify the imposition of sanctions for its publication. He therefore urged the court to acknowledge that his actions could not be regarded as crimes. 31. On 5 February 2008 the Bucharest Court of Appeal rejected the applicant’s complaint as ill-founded. The court held that the facts established during the investigation had led to the conclusion that the applicant had secretly transmitted the CD containing secret information to other people he knew, avoiding handing it over to the competent authorities of the Ministry of Defence or the Romanian Intelligence Service. The court further held: “The accused’s capacity as a journalist cannot exonerate him from the commission of this crime because anyone who finds out about secret military information does not have the right to publish it since this might endanger the lives of soldiers, officers in the conflict environment. But the applicant, by the means described above, covertly shared the secret information, which could have reached people interested in putting military structures in danger. The accused did not even wish to use his profession in order to bring to the public’s knowledge the leak of information, as he failed to ask the newspaper for which he worked to make public the breach of state secrets in the military (obviously the military secret information could not have been published). The freedom of the press invoked by the accused cannot give a journalist the right to make public, to unofficial people, secret military information, because this may endanger the right to safety of certain military structures.” 32. The applicant was ordered to pay court fees in the amount of ROL 50 (EUR 13). 33. The applicant appealed against that judgment. He alleged that the information in dispute had already been in the public domain at the time it had been brought to his attention. He submitted that the prosecutor’s decision had breached his freedom of expression in an attempt to cover up an embarrassing situation for the authorities, who had allowed the information to be leaked to the public. 34. On 23 March 2009 the High Court of Cassation and Justice rejected the applicant’s complaint with final effect. The court held that Article 19 of Law 51/1991 applied to anyone who gathered and shared secret information outside the legal framework. It further held that the applicant had not contested the fact that he had come into possession of secret information which he had then shared with other people outside the legal framework. Moreover, he had done this with direct intent. Considering that the information in question had not been in the public domain, the court held that journalists coming into possession of such information must submit it to the competent authorities and were allowed by law to share with the public only the failure of the institution concerned to protect its confidentiality. Having failed to act in that way, the applicant had committed the crime proscribed by Article 19(1) of Law no. 51/1991. The court concluded that the prosecutor had correctly considered that the crime had not, however, attained the degree of seriousness to require criminal sanctions. 35. The applicant was ordered to pay court fees of ROL 200 (EUR 47).

4. The applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Antalya. 5. The applicant is a teacher in a high school. At the material time he was a member of the local branch of the trade union of Education and Science Workers (Eğitim ve Bilim Emekçileri Sendikası). 6. In May 2009, disciplinary proceedings were instituted against the applicant for putting up a notice encouraging the participation in a press statement published by his Union on the notice board that was set aside for that particular purpose in their office, and for distributing it in one of the common areas at school. 7. On 30 September 2009 the District Directorate of National Education imposed a disciplinary sanction in the form of a reprimand on him, for putting up and distributing notices produced by the trade union, of which he was a member, under Article 125 of the Law no. 657 on Civil Servants. 8. On 6 October 2009 the applicant objected to this decision and requested its annulment. 9. On 15 October 2009 the Disciplinary Board of the Kepez district governor dismissed the applicant’s objection considering that the contested decision was in accordance with law and there were no grounds for its annulment.

6. The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Batman. 7. The applicant is the owner of a property in the Toptancılar Sitesi area of Batman, which has mainly been used as an industrial park since 2002. Toptancılar Sitesi is located in close proximity to the Tüpraş Batman Oil Refinery (“Tüpraş Refinery” or “Tüpraş”), which was a State-owned enterprise until its privatisation in 2005, and to an oil storage and supply facility run by the Ministry of Defence (Milli Savunma Bakanlığı Akaryakıt İkmal ve NATO POL Tesisleri – hereinafter “ANT”). It appears that there are also a number of private petrol stations in the vicinity. 8. On 3 May 2004 a large underground explosion took place in Toptancılar Sitesi, which resulted in three deaths and many injuries. The explosion and ensuing fire also damaged many properties in the vicinity, including that of the applicant. 9. A number of administrative commissions were established in the aftermath of the incident in order to determine the cause of the explosion and the damage caused by it, as well as to secure the area of the explosion. Further information regarding the work undertaken by those commissions, and other entities, is outlined below. 10. The fact-finding commission established by the Batman governor’s office consisted of, among others, the governor, deputy governor and mayor of Batman, the director of the Batman Security Directorate, the director of the local office of the Ministry of Public Works and Settlement, the directors of the Tüpraş Refinery and the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (Türkiye Petrolleri Anonim Ortaklığı – hereinafter “TPAO”) and the presidents of the local chambers of architects, mechanical engineers and geological engineers. It appears that the preliminary investigations led by the fact‑finding commission, with the assistance of experts, established that the explosion had been caused by an underground oil leak, although the source of the leak could not be identified. 11. On 27 May 2004 the fact-finding commission decided that some of the businesses in Toptancılar Sitesi should be evacuated in view of the risk of further explosions. It is not clear from the information in the case file whether the applicant’s property was amongst those evacuated at the relevant time. 12. There is no further information in the case file as to any other action taken by the fact-finding commission. 13. The Batman governor’s office established a damage assessment commission, with a view to ascertaining the damage sustained in the area as a result of the explosion. Following the inspections performed, the commission established six heavily damaged, ten moderately damaged and thirty-one slightly damaged businesses, and two slightly damaged residences in the area. The owners of those properties were declared “disaster victims”. The applicant’s property was not amongst those identified as damaged by the commission. The owners of the damaged properties were provided with some rent allowance and other assistance. 14. The Commission for the Discharge of Chemicals of an Unknown Origin measured the levels of underground gas in the area and, where high levels of gas were detected, arranged for it to be discharged through pipes. 15. A technical commission was set up on an unspecified date to determine the source and extent of the oil leak, and to make proposals for cleaning up the area affected. The commission consisted of representatives from the Batman municipality, the Tüpraş Refinery and academia, as well as from the local chambers of architects and engineers of various disciplines. In its report dated 14 June 2004 the commission stated that the explosion had occurred as a result of the compression of petroleum products that had leaked into the underground water. 16. Under the supervision of the commission, a number of shafts were drilled to extract the leaked oil. However, the commission stated in the aforementioned report that despite its continuous efforts, it had not made any progress in cleaning up the leak, given the magnitude of the problem, and its lack of sufficient means and expertise. It had however discovered that the contamination was concentrated outside the walls surrounding the Tüpraş Refinery and that no leakage had been observed around the ANT pipeline. 17. The members of the technical commission, with the exception of the Tüpraş representative, also stated in the same report that while they had not been able to establish the source of the leak conclusively, their investigation suggested that the leak may have originated from the Tüpraş Refinery. It is not clear whether and when this report was made public. 18. Upon the instruction of the Prime Minister’s Office, which had deemed the aforementioned report of the technical commission to be insufficient, another commission was established under the coordination of the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources for the purposes of ascertaining the cause of the explosion. The commission was made up of, among others, academics, engineers and representatives from various ministries, the Tüpraş Refinery and TPAO. 19. According to its interim report dated 11 October 2004, the studies it had carried out in Toptancılar Sitesi showed that the explosion of 3 May 2004 had been the result of an environmental pollution phenomenon that was much more complex than initially estimated. The management of this unprecedented environmental crisis required the utmost care, expertise, information and interpretational skills. The pollutant at issue was a mixture of crude oil and various petroleum products and, according to its estimations, there were between 500 and 2,000 tonnes of such material above groundwater. Technical limitations prevented the determination of the source of the leak with absolute certainty. However, the interpretation of the available data suggested that pollution of such great magnitude could only have been caused over a long period by a facility with a high capacity of petroleum refining and storage in the vicinity, which pointed to the Tüpraş Refinery (a conclusion which was challenged by Tüpraş and TPAO representatives). The report also stressed, however, the absence of conclusive evidence to back up this assumption. It added that once responsibility for the leak was determined with certainty by the national courts, all claims for damages could be directed against the party responsible. 20. In the same report, the commission recommended the involvement of the State Water Board (Devlet Su İşleri – “DSİ”) in the operation carried out in the area to establish the source of the leak. It also recommended the closure of the Toptancılar Sitesi area to housing and commercial activity until the underground oil leak was cleaned by professional experts, given the risk of further explosions and fire posed by the leak. It is not clear whether and when this report was made public. 21. In accordance with the proposal in the above interim report, on 17 August 2005 the Local Environment Board of the Batman governor’s office decided that no business or occupation permits should be granted in the area designated as the “red zone”, which consisted of an area of 200 x 300 metres where the contamination was at its highest, until the underground clean-up operation in the area was completed. 22. Following receipt of the interim report mentioned above, the Prime Minister’s Office instructed the establishment of a high-level commission to take, or recommend, more concrete steps to tackle the environmental disaster at issue and determine its causes. There is no information in the case file as regards its composition. 23. In January 2005 the commission invited the Tüpraş Refinery and ANT to carry out tests on their pipelines to determine whether the oil leak at issue had originated from them and, if so, to take the necessary precautions. It appears from the information in the case file that neither Tüpraş nor ANT assumed responsibility for the leak. 24. In January 2005 the high-level commission also took some decisions regarding the underground clean-up operation that had to be undertaken in the contaminated area. Accordingly, it invited the Batman governor’s office, which was tasked with coordinating the decontamination operation, to issue a call for tenders for the clean-up operation. There is, however, no further information in the case file as to whether the Batman governor’s office initiated the tender process or took any other steps to get the clean-up operation underway. 25. According to a report dated 12 May 2004 prepared by experts from Tüpraş, pressure tests conducted on the ANT pipeline suggested the possibility of a leak in that pipeline. They referred in this connection to some reports which indicated that the ANT pipeline had been damaged during excavation work carried out in September 2002. The experts further noted that water wells drilled along the ANT pipeline in previous years had revealed the presence of petrol in the underground water. Wells drilled in the vicinity of Tüpraş petrol tanks after the explosion to disclose any leaks originating from those tanks on the other hand had not yielded any results. 26. It was also noted in the same report that before its reconstruction as an industrial park, the Toptancılar Sitesi area had been used for the trade and storage of petroleum products, as well as for the repair of tankers, which may have played a role in the contamination of the area. 27. On 17 May 2004 Tüpraş issued a press release mainly recapitulating the claims made in the above report. It was indicated in the press release that although no leaks had been detected around its petrol tanks, a couple of wells drilled elsewhere on the refinery grounds had revealed the existence of a mixture of water and oil flowing towards the refinery from an outside source. It was also stressed that the levels of oil in the tanks were monitored electronically and that, therefore, any leaks of such substantial amounts would not have gone unnoticed. 28. In February 2005 DSİ submitted to the Batman governor’s office a report which found that the oil leak had heavily contaminated an area of 1 sq. km around the Toptancılar Sitesi area. It was estimated that the leak had been ongoing for a very long time and that it involved some four to six thousand tonnes of phenol. 29. According to a report prepared by the petrol analysis laboratory of the Middle East Technical University (Ortadoğu Teknik Üniversitesi – hereinafter “ODTÜ”) on 15 October 2004, the product that had caused the explosion was a refined petroleum product that did not exist in nature as such and, therefore, it must have originated from another source. It was not, however, possible to speculate that the petroleum had leaked from the Tüpraş Refinery. 30. In a report issued on 16 June 2005, experts from the Dokuz Eylül University in İzmir stated, inter alia, that the oil leak at issue had, in all likelihood, emanated from Tüpraş. They added that the difficulties faced in identifying the source or sources of the leak probably resulted from technical limitations. 31. According to information obtained from the Municipality of Batman on 13 September 2017, the restrictions on business and occupation permits imposed by the Local Environment Board of the Batman governor’s office on 17 August 2005 in the so-called “red zone” (see paragraph 21 above) were still in force, as no progress had been made in cleaning up the underground oil leak. 32. Soon after the explosion, the Batman public prosecutor’s office initiated an investigation into the incident. 33. On 31 December 2004 it filed a bill of indictment with the Batman Assize Court against a number of serving Tüpraş executives in connection with the explosion, accusing them under Article 383 § 2 of the former Turkish Criminal Code (Law no. 765) of causing unintentionally (by carelessness, negligence or inexperience) an explosion that resulted in death, injury and damage. The public prosecutor relied as evidence on the commission reports mentioned in paragraphs 10 to 24 above. 34. Sixty-four people, including the relatives of the victims who had lost their lives as a result of the explosion, as well as others who had sustained bodily or financial harm, joined the criminal proceedings as civil parties (müdahil). The applicant was not amongst them. 35. At the first hearing held on 28 January 2005, a representative of the victims claimed that even if the oil leak which had caused the explosion had originated from the ANT pipeline, Tüpraş, as the supplier of the oil into that pipeline, remained responsible for the explosion. They nevertheless requested the judicial authorities also to prosecute the relevant officials from the ANT who were in charge of the oil pipeline. The Batman Assize Court decided that the lawyer’s request concerning the ANT officials would be taken into consideration on receipt of expert reports on the source of the leak. 36. The Tüpraş executives mainly made the following arguments in their defence statements. (i) There were several oil pipelines, oil storage facilities and petrol stations in the area apart from the Tüpraş Refinery, the largest being the ANT facilities. The oil pipeline between ANT and Tüpraş, which had been used since 1972 to transfer F-46 military oil, had been inoperative since 1992, and a report prepared in 2002 attested that the pipeline had been empty at the time. However, the studies conducted on the pipeline after the explosion showed not only that there had been F-57 military oil in the pipeline, which had not been supplied by Tüpraş, but also that the pipeline had been damaged. (ii) According to its modus operandi, the ownership of both oil pipelines and the product supplied by Tüpraş belonged to the purchaser, and Tüpraş was not accountable for any damage or loss arising from a damaged pipeline. (iii) The wells drilled around the Tüpraş storage tanks had not revealed any oil leaks, which ruled out the possibility that the leak had originated from the refinery. (iv) The petroleum extracted from the various wells drilled in Toptancılar Sitesi had been analysed in the ODTÜ laboratory, and the results of the analysis showed that the sample product was not amongst those produced at the Tüpraş Batman Refinery. (v) Petroleum production consisted of only 5.95 % of the total production of the Tüpraş Refinery, and the remaining capacity was mainly devoted to the production of diesel fuel, asphalt, fuel-oil, solvents, residual oil and naphtha. In these circumstances, it was illogical to claim that the leak allegedly originating from the Tüpraş Refinery consisted only of the 5.95 % of its production, and that none of the remaining products, which made up the bulk of its production, had leaked. (vi) All product lines at the Tüpraş Refinery were above ground and consistently monitored. 37. The victims contested the defendants’ claim that the 2002 report concerning the ANT pipeline indicated that the pipeline had been empty. They also claimed that the analysis conducted at the ODTÜ laboratory was not decisive, as the laboratory had checked the samples obtained from the wells only against the current products of the Tüpraş Refinery. That analysis did not necessarily take into account the changes over time in the refinery’s production or the changes sustained by the products underground, considering that the leak had been ongoing for a long time. 38. On 31 July 2006, at the request of the Batman Assize Court, three professors from ODTÜ submitted an expert report on the source of the leak. Relying on all the information in the case file, including the commission reports noted in paragraphs 10 to 24 above, the experts made the following findings. (i) The studies carried out so far were inadequate to determine the source of the leak. For instance, although wells had been drilled outside the surrounding walls of the Tüpraş Refinery, which had revealed a significant amount of petroleum above groundwater, no drilling had been carried out on the other side of the walls. Without drilling wells in the appropriate key locations, it would not be possible to determine whether the leak had originated from a damaged pipeline or from the refinery. (ii) Various construction works and excavations carried out in the Toptancılar Sitesi area over the years had revealed the presence of petroleum under the ground long before the explosion. Therefore, the fact that there was an oil leak had been known for many years, including, most probably, by the State authorities, although it was not possible to pinpoint when the leak had started. (iii) The suspected corporations should normally have the technical means and manpower to detect any leaks originating from their facilities and take the necessary precautions. However, where leaks arose from breaches of pipelines or other equipment by malicious individuals for the purposes of theft, then these institutions could not be expected to uncover such incidents by their own efforts alone. Since the leak in question involved a highly valuable economic commodity, it seemed highly improbable that the institutions would not take any action to stop such a leak after taking notice of it. 39. On 7 November 2006 three other experts, all of whom were engineers who worked as work safety inspectors, issued a second report. They noted in the report that the studies undertaken thus far had not been able to reveal the source or sources of the leak. The view that the Tüpraş Refinery was responsible for the incident had not been based on sufficient evidence. Hard evidence would be required to impute responsibility to persons or corporations and no conclusions could be reached on the basis of mere presumptions. 40. On 1 May 2008 the Batman Assize Court delivered its judgment on the case. It held that while its proximity to the site of the explosion suggested that Tüpraş was responsible for the explosion, it was not possible to determine whether any of the individual suspects should bear liability for it, particularly given that the leak had been ongoing for a considerable amount of time and that the suspects would surely have taken action had they been aware of the leak. The Assize Court accordingly acquitted the Tüpraş executives. 41. On 17 January 2012 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of the first-instance court and discontinued the proceedings as prosecution of the offence in question had become time-barred. 42. On different dates in 2004 a number of property owners in Toptancılar Sitesi brought compensation proceedings against both the Tüpraş Refinery and ANT before the Batman Civil Court of First Instance (“the Batman Civil Court”) in respect of the damage they had sustained as a result of the explosion in question. In the course of one of those sets of proceedings (case no. 2004/963 E.), the Batman Civil Court ordered an expert report from three university professors to determine the source of the leak. 43. On 3 March 2006 the experts submitted their report to the Batman Civil Court. The following findings were made in the report: (i) the product that had leaked underground was gasoline; (ii) it was highly likely that the contamination had been caused by an underground accumulation of gasoline that had leaked from one or more sources over a long period; (iii) given the location and movement of the underground contamination slick and the ground water flow direction, the source of the leak must have been in the south, where the Tüpraş facilities were located; they stated that any leak originating from the ANT pipeline would have generated a contamination slick in a northwesterly/northerly direction alongside the pipeline, which had not been the case; this left the Tüpraş Refinery as the only plausible source of the leak. (iv) In addition to their legal responsibility arising from the failure to detect and prevent the leak in a timely manner, the State authorities were responsible on account of their negligence in authorising the establishment of residences and businesses in such close proximity to the refinery despite the apparent dangers it posed. 44. The Batman Civil Court admitted that report into another case file concerning the same incident (case no. 2004/966 E.) and, relying on the findings in that report, on 21 July 2006 it decided that the Tüpraş Refinery was solely responsible for the leak. It dismissed the claims against ANT. 45. The judgment of the Batman Civil Court, which was the first occasion on which the Tüpraş Refinery was publicly confirmed as the source of the leak by a court of law, was upheld by the Court of Cassation on 30 January 2007. A request made by Tüpraş for rectification of that decision was rejected on 18 June 2007. 46. On 16 November 2006 the applicant brought an action for compensation against Tüpraş before the Batman Civil Court. He requested a total of 10,000 Turkish liras (TRY) for the depreciation of the value of his property after the explosion and for his loss of rental income for the following eighteen months, reserving his right to increase those claims. The applicant argued in his petition that following the explosion, Toptancılar Sitesi had been declared a hazardous area by the Batman governor’s office and had accordingly been evacuated, which had significantly reduced the value of his property. He had also been deprived of his rental income for the next year and a half. Moreover, since the necessary steps had not been taken to clean the oil leak, the area was still at risk of further explosions. The applicant also stated that the responsibility of Tüpraş for the explosion had been established by the expert reports submitted to the Batman Civil Court in another case (see paragraphs 44 and 45 above). 47. In its response dated 19 December 2006, Tüpraş claimed firstly that the applicant’s claims had become time-barred, as he had failed to lodge his action within one year of the date of the explosion. It also claimed, inter alia, that: (i) given the proximity of the site of the explosion to the Tüpraş facilities, many wells had been dug around the Tüpraş oil tanks to locate the source of the leak; however, none of those wells had revealed any oil leaks; on the other hand, wells dug around the perimeter of the Refinery had revealed the presence of oil that had leaked from elsewhere towards the Refinery; (ii) the scientific analysis of the samples obtained from the site of the explosion showed that the leaked material had not been produced by Tüpraş; (iii) the expert reports submitted to the criminal case file found that Tüpraş could not be held liable for the explosion; (iv) although the pipeline between Tüpraş and ANT had officially been out of use since 1992, it had been noted after the explosion that the pipeline in question had actually been full of oil; moreover, the pressure tests carried out subsequently showed that the pipeline had been punctured and was leaking oil; (v) the complaints arising from the security measures taken in Toptancılar Sitesi after the explosion, such as the ceasing of commercial activity and the denial of occupation licences, were outside the competence of Tüpraş. 48. On 28 February 2007 the applicant brought another action against Tüpraş in respect of the structural damage that his property had sustained as a result of the explosion, and requested TRY 6,000 as compensation. He reserved his right to subsequently increase his claim. The applicant stressed in his petition that the sole responsibility of Tüpraş for the explosion had now been definitively established, as the judgment delivered by the Batman Civil Court against Tüpraş in case no. 2004/966 E. had been upheld by the Court of Cassation (see paragraphs 44 and 45 above). The Batman Civil Court joined the case to the one that the applicant had previously brought in November 2006. 49. The Batman Civil Court ordered an expert report to determine the extent of the applicant’s damage. The experts carried out an on-site inspection at the applicant’s property on 7 March 2007, and reported their findings on 12 March 2007. They mainly noted the following: (i) the impact of the explosion had been equivalent to that of an earthquake with a magnitude of 9 on the Richter scale; (ii) the applicant’s property, which was used as business premises, had been mostly repaired by the time of the on-site inspection and commercial activity had resumed; some cracks were nevertheless visible on the walls; (iii) the infrastructure of the building, including water, electricity and telephone connections and the sewer system, had had to be repaired as a result of the damage sustained in the basement; (iv) leaving aside the estimated wear and tear of the property since its construction, the structural damage was noted to be TRY 13,278.36; (v) given the magnitude of the explosion, it was inevitable that the walls and structural joists of the property would sustain cracks; moreover, the explosion had considerably slowed down real estate sales in the area; having regard to these factors, it was estimated that the applicant’s property had lost 50 % of its value, corresponding to TRY 66,483.25; (vi) a drop of 60 to 70 % had been noted in the rental income of property owners in Toptancılar Sitesi subsequent to the explosion; in these circumstances, the applicant’s loss of rental income for the eighteen months following the explosion was calculated to be TRY 5,400. 50. In the light of the findings in the expert report, on 22 March 2007 the applicant applied to the Batman Civil Court to increase his original claims in line with the amounts calculated by the experts. 51. On 18 April 2007 the Batman Civil Court allowed the applicant’s compensation claim in so far as it concerned the depreciation of the value of his property and the structural damage it had sustained as a result of the explosion, but rejected the claims concerning a loss of rental income for lack of sufficient evidence. The Civil Court held in its decision that both the original claims and the subsequent request to increase those original claims had been brought within the one-year time-limit set out in Article 60 § 1 of the former Code of Obligations, bearing in mind that the relevant time-limit would only start running when both the damage and the tortfeasor responsible for that damage became known to the victim. It stressed in this regard that the identity of the tortfeasor at issue had only been “known” once the judgment in case no. 2004/966 E., which had established Tüpraş as solely responsible for the explosion, had been upheld by the Court of Cassation, and the request for rectification of that Court of Cassation decision was still pending. 52. On 26 October 2007 Tüpraş appealed against that judgment. In its appeal, it mainly repeated its time-limit objections and contested the findings in the expert report of 12 March 2007 that had formed the basis of the first-instance court’s judgment. The company also stressed that it had been held responsible for the explosion without any objective and tangible proof. Bearing in mind that 132 similar civil actions had been brought against its refinery in connection with the explosion of May 2004, it now risked paying damages of over TRY 10 to 12 million, plus interest and court fees. 53. On 18 February 2008 the 4th Chamber of the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of the first-instance court, holding that the time-limit for bringing an action under Article 60 § 1 of the former Code of Obligations, which had started running on the date of the explosion, had expired by the time that the applicant had brought his claims. The Court of Cassation held in this connection that the explosion at issue had taken place on 3 May 2004 and that, soon after that date, some of the property owners in Toptancılar Sitesi had brought compensation claims against Tüpraş. Since the applicant was also a property owner in Toptancılar Sitesi, he should have formed an opinion regarding the responsibility of Tüpraş for the explosion on the date of its occurrence. The Court of Cassation stated that venturing a guess as to the identity of the tortfeasor, within the bounds of possibility, was sufficient to bring an action; it was not necessary to have the tortfeasor established with certainty. The applicant’s claim that he had brought the action subsequent to the establishment of the tortfeasor as Tüpraş in a case brought earlier by other property owners could not stop the running of the time-limit from the date of the explosion. The Court of Cassation further stated that although criminal proceedings had also been brought against Tüpraş executives in connection with the explosion in question, the longer prescription period applicable to the criminal offence at issue could not apply to the civil compensation claim brought against Tüpraş within the meaning of Article 60 § 2 of the former Code of Obligations. That was because, where a civil claim brought against a company for offences committed by its employees was concerned, the longer time-limit provided in the Criminal Code applied in the civil proceedings only for offences under Article 465 of the Criminal Code. Since the charges brought against the Tüpraş executives did not concern one of the offences under Article 465, the civil claim against Tüpraş should have been brought within the aforementioned one-year time-limit. 54. On 12 May 2008 the applicant’s representative requested rectification of the decision of the Court of Cassation. He mainly made the following arguments: (i) the Court of Cassation’s ruling that merely guessing, or being in a position to guess, the tortfeasor was sufficient to trigger the Article 60 § 1 time‑limit ran counter to the doctrine and settled practice of the Court of Cassation on the issue, which unambiguously required certain and exact knowledge of the tortfeasor before the time-limit could start running; the applicant relied in this connection on a judgment of the Joint Civil Chambers of the Court of Cassation dated 22 November 1974, as well as to some articles drafted by legal scholars and practitioners dating as far back as 1992; (ii) the studies conducted in the aftermath of the explosion showed that the explosion had not been a simple accident, but had involved very complex elements; bearing in mind that it had taken even the experts in the field almost one year of scientific studies to establish the exact cause of the explosion, and another year after that to identify its source, a simple layman such as him could not be expected to have known the tortfeasor on the very day that the explosion took place; (iii) in these circumstances, he had only acquired the requisite knowledge of the tortfeasor upon the finalisation of case no. 2004/966 E; (iv) it was well established in the legal doctrine, as well as in the Court of Cassation judgments, that where “continuing damage” was concerned, the time-limit would only start running when the damage at issue came to an end; bearing in mind the risk of further explosions at Toptancılar Sitesi on account of the leak, his damage had not come to an end. 55. On 25 September 2008 the 4th Chamber of the Court of Cassation dismissed that request without providing any reasoning. 56. On 19 December 2008 the Batman Civil Court delivered a judgment in line with the quashing decision of the Court of Cassation and dismissed the applicant’s claims for having become time‑barred. 57. On 10 March 2009 the applicant appealed against that judgment. In his appeal, he mainly reiterated the arguments noted in paragraph 54 above. He also stated that the 7th Chamber of the Court of Cassation had ruled in many cases concerning the same explosion that for the purposes of the time‑limit rule set out in Article 60 § 1, the requisite knowledge of the tortfeasor could not be considered to have been acquired before the respective actions had been brought (see the cases noted in paragraph 68 below). The 7th and 4th Chambers of the Court of Cassation had, therefore, delivered contradictory judgments on the same legal issue concerning identical facts. 58. On 28 May 2009 the 4th Chamber of the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the first-instance court without responding to any of the applicant’s claims. 59. On an unspecified date the applicant requested rectification of the Court of Cassation’s decision. He highlighted, inter alia, the absence of any evidence in the case file to suggest that he had learned the identity of the tortfeasor prior to its establishment by the Batman Civil Court in case no. 2004/966 E. 60. On 22 October 2009 the 4th Chamber of the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicant’s rectification request.