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[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nhappened,” and that “[i]f a plaintiff alleges multiple discriminatory acts, each individual act ordinarily triggers a new clock for filing charges alleging that act” (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted)), adopted by 2012 WL 4364492 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2012), affd, 549 Fed.Appx. 15 (2d Cir.2013); Everett v. 357 Corp., 453 Mass. 585, 904 N.E.2d 733, 751 (2009) (finding that a claim for refusal to rehire an employee two years after termination constituted an independent claim that accrued when the request was denied, and noting that “the failure to rehire an employee is considered a discrete, separate act that does not draw other allegedly discriminatory acts into its scope”); cf. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002) (holding that in the first amendment employment context harassing speech must constitute constructive adverse employment action to be actionable", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nhappened,” and that “[i]f a plaintiff alleges multiple discriminatory acts, each individual act ordinarily triggers a new clock for filing charges alleging that act” (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted)), adopted by 2012 WL 4364492 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2012), affd, 549 Fed.Appx. 15 (2d Cir.2013); Everett v. 357 Corp., 453 Mass. 585, 904 N.E.2d 733, 751 (2009) (finding that a claim for refusal to rehire an employee two years after termination constituted an independent claim that accrued when the request was denied, and noting that “the failure to rehire an employee is considered a discrete, separate act that does not draw other allegedly discriminatory acts into its scope”); cf. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002) (holding that a proposed termination is the very type of discrete act identified as separate actionable unlawful employment practices", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nhappened,” and that “[i]f a plaintiff alleges multiple discriminatory acts, each individual act ordinarily triggers a new clock for filing charges alleging that act” (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted)), adopted by 2012 WL 4364492 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2012), affd, 549 Fed.Appx. 15 (2d Cir.2013); Everett v. 357 Corp., 453 Mass. 585, 904 N.E.2d 733, 751 (2009) (finding that a claim for refusal to rehire an employee two years after termination constituted an independent claim that accrued when the request was denied, and noting that “the failure to rehire an employee is considered a discrete, separate act that does not draw other allegedly discriminatory acts into its scope”); cf. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002) (holding in the context of a title yii claim that discrete acts such as termination or refusals to hire are separate retaliatory adverse employment decisions that each constitutes a separate actionable unlawful employment practice ", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nhappened,” and that “[i]f a plaintiff alleges multiple discriminatory acts, each individual act ordinarily triggers a new clock for filing charges alleging that act” (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted)), adopted by 2012 WL 4364492 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2012), affd, 549 Fed.Appx. 15 (2d Cir.2013); Everett v. 357 Corp., 453 Mass. 585, 904 N.E.2d 733, 751 (2009) (finding that a claim for refusal to rehire an employee two years after termination constituted an independent claim that accrued when the request was denied, and noting that “the failure to rehire an employee is considered a discrete, separate act that does not draw other allegedly discriminatory acts into its scope”); cf. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002) (holding that termination is an adverse employment action", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nhappened,” and that “[i]f a plaintiff alleges multiple discriminatory acts, each individual act ordinarily triggers a new clock for filing charges alleging that act” (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted)), adopted by 2012 WL 4364492 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2012), affd, 549 Fed.Appx. 15 (2d Cir.2013); Everett v. 357 Corp., 453 Mass. 585, 904 N.E.2d 733, 751 (2009) (finding that a claim for refusal to rehire an employee two years after termination constituted an independent claim that accrued when the request was denied, and noting that “the failure to rehire an employee is considered a discrete, separate act that does not draw other allegedly discriminatory acts into its scope”); cf. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002) (holding that each incident of discrimination and each retaliatory adverse employment decision constitutes a separate actionable unlawful employment practice for which an administrative charge must be filed" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nisolated investigation reveals relatively little about the conduct of the Air Force as an agency. Given this, and given Major Bux-ton’s strong privacy interests in her personnel files, it is clear that even under the more exacting standard of § 552(b)(6), disclosure of the requested documents would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy. Thus, the requested documents are properly exempt from disclosure under FOIA. III. Because the requested documents are exempt from disclosure under either § 552(b)(6) or § 552(b)(7)(C), and consequently, also under the Privacy Act, plaintiffs motion for summary judgment must be denied and the Air Force’s motion for summary judgment must be granted. An appropriate order will enter. 1 . See Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 827 (D.C.Cir.1973) (holding that the government must provide the party seeking disclosure with a detailed index describing the documents the government claims are exempt from disclosure under foia", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nisolated investigation reveals relatively little about the conduct of the Air Force as an agency. Given this, and given Major Bux-ton’s strong privacy interests in her personnel files, it is clear that even under the more exacting standard of § 552(b)(6), disclosure of the requested documents would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy. Thus, the requested documents are properly exempt from disclosure under FOIA. III. Because the requested documents are exempt from disclosure under either § 552(b)(6) or § 552(b)(7)(C), and consequently, also under the Privacy Act, plaintiffs motion for summary judgment must be denied and the Air Force’s motion for summary judgment must be granted. An appropriate order will enter. 1 . See Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 827 (D.C.Cir.1973) (holding that where an authorized disclosure is voluntarily made to a nonfederal party whether or not that disclosure is denominated confidential the government waives any claim that the information is exempt from disclosure under the deliberative process privilege", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nisolated investigation reveals relatively little about the conduct of the Air Force as an agency. Given this, and given Major Bux-ton’s strong privacy interests in her personnel files, it is clear that even under the more exacting standard of § 552(b)(6), disclosure of the requested documents would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy. Thus, the requested documents are properly exempt from disclosure under FOIA. III. Because the requested documents are exempt from disclosure under either § 552(b)(6) or § 552(b)(7)(C), and consequently, also under the Privacy Act, plaintiffs motion for summary judgment must be denied and the Air Force’s motion for summary judgment must be granted. An appropriate order will enter. 1 . See Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 827 (D.C.Cir.1973) (holding that the disclosure is a public disclosure within the meaning of the fca if the the prior public disclosure contained enough information to enable the government to pursue an investigation against the defendant", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nisolated investigation reveals relatively little about the conduct of the Air Force as an agency. Given this, and given Major Bux-ton’s strong privacy interests in her personnel files, it is clear that even under the more exacting standard of § 552(b)(6), disclosure of the requested documents would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy. Thus, the requested documents are properly exempt from disclosure under FOIA. III. Because the requested documents are exempt from disclosure under either § 552(b)(6) or § 552(b)(7)(C), and consequently, also under the Privacy Act, plaintiffs motion for summary judgment must be denied and the Air Force’s motion for summary judgment must be granted. An appropriate order will enter. 1 . See Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 827 (D.C.Cir.1973) (holding that unauthorized disclosure of documents does not constitute a waiver of the applicable foia exemption", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nisolated investigation reveals relatively little about the conduct of the Air Force as an agency. Given this, and given Major Bux-ton’s strong privacy interests in her personnel files, it is clear that even under the more exacting standard of § 552(b)(6), disclosure of the requested documents would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy. Thus, the requested documents are properly exempt from disclosure under FOIA. III. Because the requested documents are exempt from disclosure under either § 552(b)(6) or § 552(b)(7)(C), and consequently, also under the Privacy Act, plaintiffs motion for summary judgment must be denied and the Air Force’s motion for summary judgment must be granted. An appropriate order will enter. 1 . See Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 827 (D.C.Cir.1973) (holding that foia exemptions are not mandatory bars to disclosure because the purpose of foia is to provide broad disclosure of government documents" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\ndictionary/seek (last visited March 27, 2017). Thus the Secretary’s only clear duty under section 7071(c) is to try to get the IMF to implement best practices for getting whistleblower retaliation claimants access to independent adjudicative bodies. That limited duty 'forecloses this Court from issuing a writ of mandamus compelling the Secretary to “require the IMF to implement whistleblower protections, including the convening of an independent adjudication of [Mr. Nyambal’s] ' complaints.” See SAC, ECF No. 5 at 15 (em phasis added). Accordingly, because this Court lacks the authority to grant a portion of the relief that Mr. Nyambal has requested, he fails to satisfy the redressa-bility prong of the standing inquiry. See Lozansky v. Obama, 841 F.Supp.2d 124, 132-33 (D.D.C. 2012) (holding that plaintiffs lack standing because the court cannot issue the requested writ of mandamus and thus cannot redress the alleged injury", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\ndictionary/seek (last visited March 27, 2017). Thus the Secretary’s only clear duty under section 7071(c) is to try to get the IMF to implement best practices for getting whistleblower retaliation claimants access to independent adjudicative bodies. That limited duty 'forecloses this Court from issuing a writ of mandamus compelling the Secretary to “require the IMF to implement whistleblower protections, including the convening of an independent adjudication of [Mr. Nyambal’s] ' complaints.” See SAC, ECF No. 5 at 15 (em phasis added). Accordingly, because this Court lacks the authority to grant a portion of the relief that Mr. Nyambal has requested, he fails to satisfy the redressa-bility prong of the standing inquiry. See Lozansky v. Obama, 841 F.Supp.2d 124, 132-33 (D.D.C. 2012) (holding that a writ of mandamus will not issue under 1361 unless the defendant is under a clear nondiscretionary duty to perform the act requested", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\ndictionary/seek (last visited March 27, 2017). Thus the Secretary’s only clear duty under section 7071(c) is to try to get the IMF to implement best practices for getting whistleblower retaliation claimants access to independent adjudicative bodies. That limited duty 'forecloses this Court from issuing a writ of mandamus compelling the Secretary to “require the IMF to implement whistleblower protections, including the convening of an independent adjudication of [Mr. Nyambal’s] ' complaints.” See SAC, ECF No. 5 at 15 (em phasis added). Accordingly, because this Court lacks the authority to grant a portion of the relief that Mr. Nyambal has requested, he fails to satisfy the redressa-bility prong of the standing inquiry. See Lozansky v. Obama, 841 F.Supp.2d 124, 132-33 (D.D.C. 2012) (holding standing cannot be waived and may thus be raised at any time", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\ndictionary/seek (last visited March 27, 2017). Thus the Secretary’s only clear duty under section 7071(c) is to try to get the IMF to implement best practices for getting whistleblower retaliation claimants access to independent adjudicative bodies. That limited duty 'forecloses this Court from issuing a writ of mandamus compelling the Secretary to “require the IMF to implement whistleblower protections, including the convening of an independent adjudication of [Mr. Nyambal’s] ' complaints.” See SAC, ECF No. 5 at 15 (em phasis added). Accordingly, because this Court lacks the authority to grant a portion of the relief that Mr. Nyambal has requested, he fails to satisfy the redressa-bility prong of the standing inquiry. See Lozansky v. Obama, 841 F.Supp.2d 124, 132-33 (D.D.C. 2012) (holding that to grant a writ of mandamus a court in the exercise of its discretion must be satisfied that the writ is appropriate under the circumstances", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\ndictionary/seek (last visited March 27, 2017). Thus the Secretary’s only clear duty under section 7071(c) is to try to get the IMF to implement best practices for getting whistleblower retaliation claimants access to independent adjudicative bodies. That limited duty 'forecloses this Court from issuing a writ of mandamus compelling the Secretary to “require the IMF to implement whistleblower protections, including the convening of an independent adjudication of [Mr. Nyambal’s] ' complaints.” See SAC, ECF No. 5 at 15 (em phasis added). Accordingly, because this Court lacks the authority to grant a portion of the relief that Mr. Nyambal has requested, he fails to satisfy the redressa-bility prong of the standing inquiry. See Lozansky v. Obama, 841 F.Supp.2d 124, 132-33 (D.D.C. 2012) (holding public standing doctrine permitted action for emergency writ of mandamus" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfavor because the issue was never raised by either party. Pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 862, the trial court “shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings and the latter contain no prayer for general and equitable relief.” However, Louisiana jurisprudence has held that “[njothing in Article 862 of the Code of Civil Procedure is intended to confer jurisdiction on a court to decide controversies 110which the parties haye not regularly brought before it.” Patrick v. Patrick, 227 So.2d 162, 164 (La. App. 2nd Cir.1969); Cannatella v. City of New Orleans, 612 So.2d 923, 924 (La.App, 4th Cir,1993); Glover v. Med. Ctr. of Baton Rouge, 97-1710 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/29/98), 713 So.2d 1261, 1262 (holding that trial court erred as a matter of law by enforcing contract for purchase of real property that had terminated by its own terms", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfavor because the issue was never raised by either party. Pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 862, the trial court “shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings and the latter contain no prayer for general and equitable relief.” However, Louisiana jurisprudence has held that “[njothing in Article 862 of the Code of Civil Procedure is intended to confer jurisdiction on a court to decide controversies 110which the parties haye not regularly brought before it.” Patrick v. Patrick, 227 So.2d 162, 164 (La. App. 2nd Cir.1969); Cannatella v. City of New Orleans, 612 So.2d 923, 924 (La.App, 4th Cir,1993); Glover v. Med. Ctr. of Baton Rouge, 97-1710 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/29/98), 713 So.2d 1261, 1262 (holding that claim construction is a matter of law for the court to determine", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfavor because the issue was never raised by either party. Pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 862, the trial court “shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings and the latter contain no prayer for general and equitable relief.” However, Louisiana jurisprudence has held that “[njothing in Article 862 of the Code of Civil Procedure is intended to confer jurisdiction on a court to decide controversies 110which the parties haye not regularly brought before it.” Patrick v. Patrick, 227 So.2d 162, 164 (La. App. 2nd Cir.1969); Cannatella v. City of New Orleans, 612 So.2d 923, 924 (La.App, 4th Cir,1993); Glover v. Med. Ctr. of Baton Rouge, 97-1710 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/29/98), 713 So.2d 1261, 1262 (holding that the trial court erred by dismissing the plaintiffs defamation claim", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfavor because the issue was never raised by either party. Pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 862, the trial court “shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings and the latter contain no prayer for general and equitable relief.” However, Louisiana jurisprudence has held that “[njothing in Article 862 of the Code of Civil Procedure is intended to confer jurisdiction on a court to decide controversies 110which the parties haye not regularly brought before it.” Patrick v. Patrick, 227 So.2d 162, 164 (La. App. 2nd Cir.1969); Cannatella v. City of New Orleans, 612 So.2d 923, 924 (La.App, 4th Cir,1993); Glover v. Med. Ctr. of Baton Rouge, 97-1710 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/29/98), 713 So.2d 1261, 1262 (holding that defendants failure to renew their motion for judgment as a matter of law which was denied by the district court when they made it at the close of the evidence limited the relief the appellate court could grant to a new trial", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfavor because the issue was never raised by either party. Pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 862, the trial court “shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings and the latter contain no prayer for general and equitable relief.” However, Louisiana jurisprudence has held that “[njothing in Article 862 of the Code of Civil Procedure is intended to confer jurisdiction on a court to decide controversies 110which the parties haye not regularly brought before it.” Patrick v. Patrick, 227 So.2d 162, 164 (La. App. 2nd Cir.1969); Cannatella v. City of New Orleans, 612 So.2d 923, 924 (La.App, 4th Cir,1993); Glover v. Med. Ctr. of Baton Rouge, 97-1710 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/29/98), 713 So.2d 1261, 1262 (holding the trial court erred as a matter of law in adjudicating a claim for relief that was not demanded by the parties" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nDamon Skaggs pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to manufacture, distribute and possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(A) and 846. Applying the then-mandatory United States Sentencing Guidelines, the district court sentenced Mr. Skaggs to 188 months’ imprisonment — the bottom of the applicable guideline range (188 to 235 months)— and five years’ supervised release. On appeal, the Government conceded that, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 764, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005) (holding federal sentencing guidelines are subject to jury trial requirements of sixth amendment", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nDamon Skaggs pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to manufacture, distribute and possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(A) and 846. Applying the then-mandatory United States Sentencing Guidelines, the district court sentenced Mr. Skaggs to 188 months’ imprisonment — the bottom of the applicable guideline range (188 to 235 months)— and five years’ supervised release. On appeal, the Government conceded that, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 764, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005) (holding guidelines to be only advisory", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nDamon Skaggs pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to manufacture, distribute and possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(A) and 846. Applying the then-mandatory United States Sentencing Guidelines, the district court sentenced Mr. Skaggs to 188 months’ imprisonment — the bottom of the applicable guideline range (188 to 235 months)— and five years’ supervised release. On appeal, the Government conceded that, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 764, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005) (holding that the mandatory nature of the united states sentencing guidelines resulted in violations of the sixth amendment right to a jury trial and rendering the guidelines advisory", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nDamon Skaggs pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to manufacture, distribute and possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(A) and 846. Applying the then-mandatory United States Sentencing Guidelines, the district court sentenced Mr. Skaggs to 188 months’ imprisonment — the bottom of the applicable guideline range (188 to 235 months)— and five years’ supervised release. On appeal, the Government conceded that, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 764, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005) (holding unconstitutional the mandatory application of the federal sentencing guidelines", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nDamon Skaggs pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to manufacture, distribute and possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(A) and 846. Applying the then-mandatory United States Sentencing Guidelines, the district court sentenced Mr. Skaggs to 188 months’ imprisonment — the bottom of the applicable guideline range (188 to 235 months)— and five years’ supervised release. On appeal, the Government conceded that, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 764, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005) (holding that the pennsylvania sentencing guidelines are purely advisory in nature" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nproceed, the parties agreed to seek further guidance from the family court. Husband sought that guidance, and Judge Cate provided it. The pricing scheme Judge Cate established did not conflict with the minimum listing price of $225,300 set by the divorce decree and complied with the goals set out in the parties’ subsequent agreement. In light of Wife’s failed attempt to sell the home for $274,000, a lower initial listing price with small periodic reductions is a reasonable approach to severing this remaining tie between Husband and Wife. Accordingly, the family court did not err. To the extent Wife requests “reimbursement for maintaining the marital property,” this issue is unpreserved because she failed to raise it to the family court. See Chastain, 381 S.C. at 306, 672 S.E.2d at 114 (holding an issue must be raised to and ruled upon by the trial court to be preserved for appellate review", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nproceed, the parties agreed to seek further guidance from the family court. Husband sought that guidance, and Judge Cate provided it. The pricing scheme Judge Cate established did not conflict with the minimum listing price of $225,300 set by the divorce decree and complied with the goals set out in the parties’ subsequent agreement. In light of Wife’s failed attempt to sell the home for $274,000, a lower initial listing price with small periodic reductions is a reasonable approach to severing this remaining tie between Husband and Wife. Accordingly, the family court did not err. To the extent Wife requests “reimbursement for maintaining the marital property,” this issue is unpreserved because she failed to raise it to the family court. See Chastain, 381 S.C. at 306, 672 S.E.2d at 114 (holding that an issue was not preserved for appellate review because appellants trial objection does not comport with the issue he raised on appeal", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nproceed, the parties agreed to seek further guidance from the family court. Husband sought that guidance, and Judge Cate provided it. The pricing scheme Judge Cate established did not conflict with the minimum listing price of $225,300 set by the divorce decree and complied with the goals set out in the parties’ subsequent agreement. In light of Wife’s failed attempt to sell the home for $274,000, a lower initial listing price with small periodic reductions is a reasonable approach to severing this remaining tie between Husband and Wife. Accordingly, the family court did not err. To the extent Wife requests “reimbursement for maintaining the marital property,” this issue is unpreserved because she failed to raise it to the family court. See Chastain, 381 S.C. at 306, 672 S.E.2d at 114 (holding an issue not raised to the family court is not preserved for appellate review", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nproceed, the parties agreed to seek further guidance from the family court. Husband sought that guidance, and Judge Cate provided it. The pricing scheme Judge Cate established did not conflict with the minimum listing price of $225,300 set by the divorce decree and complied with the goals set out in the parties’ subsequent agreement. In light of Wife’s failed attempt to sell the home for $274,000, a lower initial listing price with small periodic reductions is a reasonable approach to severing this remaining tie between Husband and Wife. Accordingly, the family court did not err. To the extent Wife requests “reimbursement for maintaining the marital property,” this issue is unpreserved because she failed to raise it to the family court. See Chastain, 381 S.C. at 306, 672 S.E.2d at 114 (holding that an appellate court cannot consider an issue that was not preserved for appellate review", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nproceed, the parties agreed to seek further guidance from the family court. Husband sought that guidance, and Judge Cate provided it. The pricing scheme Judge Cate established did not conflict with the minimum listing price of $225,300 set by the divorce decree and complied with the goals set out in the parties’ subsequent agreement. In light of Wife’s failed attempt to sell the home for $274,000, a lower initial listing price with small periodic reductions is a reasonable approach to severing this remaining tie between Husband and Wife. Accordingly, the family court did not err. To the extent Wife requests “reimbursement for maintaining the marital property,” this issue is unpreserved because she failed to raise it to the family court. See Chastain, 381 S.C. at 306, 672 S.E.2d at 114 (holding issues not raised to and ruled upon by the trial court are not preserved for appellate review" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nof computer distributed ‘kiddie porn’.” (Press Release dated September 29, 1995, a part of Pit’s Ex. 6.) B. Second, Shasky’s efforts at rehabilitation have been extraordinary. United States v. Barton, 76 F.3d 499, 503 (2d Cir.1996) (stating that “[a]n individual convicted of receiving child pornography may be entitled to a downward departure in light of his or her rehabilitative efforts, provided those efforts are extraordinary,” remanding for further fact finding, and stating that “[i]f the court does find support in the record for its conclusion that Barton’s rehabilitative efforts are extraordinary, reducing Barton’s sentence from a minimum of fifteen months’ imprisonment to probation would not be unreasonable.”) See also United States v. Simpson, 7 F.3d 813, 819-20 (8th Cir.1993) (holding that defendants diminished capacity while grounds for departure from the guidelines sentencing range is not grounds for departure below the minimum sentence set by congress", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nof computer distributed ‘kiddie porn’.” (Press Release dated September 29, 1995, a part of Pit’s Ex. 6.) B. Second, Shasky’s efforts at rehabilitation have been extraordinary. United States v. Barton, 76 F.3d 499, 503 (2d Cir.1996) (stating that “[a]n individual convicted of receiving child pornography may be entitled to a downward departure in light of his or her rehabilitative efforts, provided those efforts are extraordinary,” remanding for further fact finding, and stating that “[i]f the court does find support in the record for its conclusion that Barton’s rehabilitative efforts are extraordinary, reducing Barton’s sentence from a minimum of fifteen months’ imprisonment to probation would not be unreasonable.”) See also United States v. Simpson, 7 F.3d 813, 819-20 (8th Cir.1993) (recognizing that postoffense rehabilitative efforts while normally not grounds for departure may support departure in extraordinary circumstances and noting that the totality of the circumstances may justify a departure where a single circumstance is not alone sufficient", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nof computer distributed ‘kiddie porn’.” (Press Release dated September 29, 1995, a part of Pit’s Ex. 6.) B. Second, Shasky’s efforts at rehabilitation have been extraordinary. United States v. Barton, 76 F.3d 499, 503 (2d Cir.1996) (stating that “[a]n individual convicted of receiving child pornography may be entitled to a downward departure in light of his or her rehabilitative efforts, provided those efforts are extraordinary,” remanding for further fact finding, and stating that “[i]f the court does find support in the record for its conclusion that Barton’s rehabilitative efforts are extraordinary, reducing Barton’s sentence from a minimum of fifteen months’ imprisonment to probation would not be unreasonable.”) See also United States v. Simpson, 7 F.3d 813, 819-20 (8th Cir.1993) (holding that notice must state the specific grounds for the departure", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nof computer distributed ‘kiddie porn’.” (Press Release dated September 29, 1995, a part of Pit’s Ex. 6.) B. Second, Shasky’s efforts at rehabilitation have been extraordinary. United States v. Barton, 76 F.3d 499, 503 (2d Cir.1996) (stating that “[a]n individual convicted of receiving child pornography may be entitled to a downward departure in light of his or her rehabilitative efforts, provided those efforts are extraordinary,” remanding for further fact finding, and stating that “[i]f the court does find support in the record for its conclusion that Barton’s rehabilitative efforts are extraordinary, reducing Barton’s sentence from a minimum of fifteen months’ imprisonment to probation would not be unreasonable.”) See also United States v. Simpson, 7 F.3d 813, 819-20 (8th Cir.1993) (holding in review of a downward departure that an extraordinary reduction must be supported by extraordinary circumstances", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nof computer distributed ‘kiddie porn’.” (Press Release dated September 29, 1995, a part of Pit’s Ex. 6.) B. Second, Shasky’s efforts at rehabilitation have been extraordinary. United States v. Barton, 76 F.3d 499, 503 (2d Cir.1996) (stating that “[a]n individual convicted of receiving child pornography may be entitled to a downward departure in light of his or her rehabilitative efforts, provided those efforts are extraordinary,” remanding for further fact finding, and stating that “[i]f the court does find support in the record for its conclusion that Barton’s rehabilitative efforts are extraordinary, reducing Barton’s sentence from a minimum of fifteen months’ imprisonment to probation would not be unreasonable.”) See also United States v. Simpson, 7 F.3d 813, 819-20 (8th Cir.1993) (holding district court correctly reversed a departure sentence where the trial court failed to provide written reasons for the departure" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nfrom the plaintiffs expert that the cost to replace the items taken from the facility “would have been nearly $300,000.” In addition, the jury cannot be faulted for using replacement cost as the measure of recovery. Evidence of the replacement cost was admitted, and the jurors were simply instructed that, if they determined the plaintiff was entitled to possession of the property, they were also to “determine the value of that property as of the date of trial.” They were not instructed that “value” meant market value, not replacement cost. Under these circumstances, we do not believe the jury’s award of replacement cost at a level proposed by the plaintiffs expert was so far outside the range of evidence as to suggest the jury was motivated by passion. See Schmitt, 170 N.W.2d at 660-61 (holding that to preserve an alleged error in the admission of evidence a timely objection must be made to the introduction of the evidence specific grounds for the objection should be stated and a ruling on the objection must be made by the trial court", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nfrom the plaintiffs expert that the cost to replace the items taken from the facility “would have been nearly $300,000.” In addition, the jury cannot be faulted for using replacement cost as the measure of recovery. Evidence of the replacement cost was admitted, and the jurors were simply instructed that, if they determined the plaintiff was entitled to possession of the property, they were also to “determine the value of that property as of the date of trial.” They were not instructed that “value” meant market value, not replacement cost. Under these circumstances, we do not believe the jury’s award of replacement cost at a level proposed by the plaintiffs expert was so far outside the range of evidence as to suggest the jury was motivated by passion. See Schmitt, 170 N.W.2d at 660-61 (holding that appellate courts determine the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction based on a review of all of the evidence admitted at trial", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nfrom the plaintiffs expert that the cost to replace the items taken from the facility “would have been nearly $300,000.” In addition, the jury cannot be faulted for using replacement cost as the measure of recovery. Evidence of the replacement cost was admitted, and the jurors were simply instructed that, if they determined the plaintiff was entitled to possession of the property, they were also to “determine the value of that property as of the date of trial.” They were not instructed that “value” meant market value, not replacement cost. Under these circumstances, we do not believe the jury’s award of replacement cost at a level proposed by the plaintiffs expert was so far outside the range of evidence as to suggest the jury was motivated by passion. See Schmitt, 170 N.W.2d at 660-61 (holding that the foundational prerequisites are unnecessary where the test result is admitted in evidence without objection when evidence of one of the issues in the case is admitted without objection the party against whom it is offered waives any objection to the evidence and it may be properly considered even if the evidence would have been excluded upon a proper objection", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nfrom the plaintiffs expert that the cost to replace the items taken from the facility “would have been nearly $300,000.” In addition, the jury cannot be faulted for using replacement cost as the measure of recovery. Evidence of the replacement cost was admitted, and the jurors were simply instructed that, if they determined the plaintiff was entitled to possession of the property, they were also to “determine the value of that property as of the date of trial.” They were not instructed that “value” meant market value, not replacement cost. Under these circumstances, we do not believe the jury’s award of replacement cost at a level proposed by the plaintiffs expert was so far outside the range of evidence as to suggest the jury was motivated by passion. See Schmitt, 170 N.W.2d at 660-61 (holding new trial cannot be based on claim of prejudice arising from jurys reliance on evidence admitted without objection", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nfrom the plaintiffs expert that the cost to replace the items taken from the facility “would have been nearly $300,000.” In addition, the jury cannot be faulted for using replacement cost as the measure of recovery. Evidence of the replacement cost was admitted, and the jurors were simply instructed that, if they determined the plaintiff was entitled to possession of the property, they were also to “determine the value of that property as of the date of trial.” They were not instructed that “value” meant market value, not replacement cost. Under these circumstances, we do not believe the jury’s award of replacement cost at a level proposed by the plaintiffs expert was so far outside the range of evidence as to suggest the jury was motivated by passion. See Schmitt, 170 N.W.2d at 660-61 (holding any error in admission of evidence cured when same evidence later admitted without objection" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\ncourt’s determination that Martinez suffered a 5-percent loss of earning capacity was clearly wrong because it was based upon an analysis which took into account Martinez’ preexisting condition. A preexisting condition cannot be considered in the determination of a claimant’s loss of earning capacity. In addition, there is absolutely no evidence on the record that Martinez was previously compensated for a prior loss of earning capacity. Finally, we note that Nebraska’s workers’ compensation statutes do not prohibit a claimant from concurrently receiving statutory benefits for separate injuries arising out of separate accidents, so long as the combined payments do not exceed the maximum weekly rate allowed by statute. See Vega v. Iowa Beef Processors, 264 Neb. 282, 646 N.W.2d 643 (2002) (holding that determination of causation in permanent disability hearing not barred by estoppel because wlhether an industrial accident caused temporary total disability or permanent partial disability are two distinct questions", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\ncourt’s determination that Martinez suffered a 5-percent loss of earning capacity was clearly wrong because it was based upon an analysis which took into account Martinez’ preexisting condition. A preexisting condition cannot be considered in the determination of a claimant’s loss of earning capacity. In addition, there is absolutely no evidence on the record that Martinez was previously compensated for a prior loss of earning capacity. Finally, we note that Nebraska’s workers’ compensation statutes do not prohibit a claimant from concurrently receiving statutory benefits for separate injuries arising out of separate accidents, so long as the combined payments do not exceed the maximum weekly rate allowed by statute. See Vega v. Iowa Beef Processors, 264 Neb. 282, 646 N.W.2d 643 (2002) (holding that workers compensation statutes do not prohibit claimant from receiving permanent partial disability benefits from prior accident concurrently with temporary total disability benefits from subsequent injury", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\ncourt’s determination that Martinez suffered a 5-percent loss of earning capacity was clearly wrong because it was based upon an analysis which took into account Martinez’ preexisting condition. A preexisting condition cannot be considered in the determination of a claimant’s loss of earning capacity. In addition, there is absolutely no evidence on the record that Martinez was previously compensated for a prior loss of earning capacity. Finally, we note that Nebraska’s workers’ compensation statutes do not prohibit a claimant from concurrently receiving statutory benefits for separate injuries arising out of separate accidents, so long as the combined payments do not exceed the maximum weekly rate allowed by statute. See Vega v. Iowa Beef Processors, 264 Neb. 282, 646 N.W.2d 643 (2002) (holding that a totally disabled claimant whose preexisting osteoarthritis was temporarily aggravated by her employment was entitled to temporary total disability benefits but not permanent total disability benefits because there was no causal connection between the temporary aggravation and the permanent disability", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\ncourt’s determination that Martinez suffered a 5-percent loss of earning capacity was clearly wrong because it was based upon an analysis which took into account Martinez’ preexisting condition. A preexisting condition cannot be considered in the determination of a claimant’s loss of earning capacity. In addition, there is absolutely no evidence on the record that Martinez was previously compensated for a prior loss of earning capacity. Finally, we note that Nebraska’s workers’ compensation statutes do not prohibit a claimant from concurrently receiving statutory benefits for separate injuries arising out of separate accidents, so long as the combined payments do not exceed the maximum weekly rate allowed by statute. See Vega v. Iowa Beef Processors, 264 Neb. 282, 646 N.W.2d 643 (2002) (holding that claimant may simultaneously receive unemployment benefits and workers compensation for temporary partial disability where statute only precludes receipt of workers compensation for temporary total or permanent total disability if claimant is receiving unemployment benefits", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\ncourt’s determination that Martinez suffered a 5-percent loss of earning capacity was clearly wrong because it was based upon an analysis which took into account Martinez’ preexisting condition. A preexisting condition cannot be considered in the determination of a claimant’s loss of earning capacity. In addition, there is absolutely no evidence on the record that Martinez was previously compensated for a prior loss of earning capacity. Finally, we note that Nebraska’s workers’ compensation statutes do not prohibit a claimant from concurrently receiving statutory benefits for separate injuries arising out of separate accidents, so long as the combined payments do not exceed the maximum weekly rate allowed by statute. See Vega v. Iowa Beef Processors, 264 Neb. 282, 646 N.W.2d 643 (2002) (holding that disability pension benefits could be offset against both temporary and total permanent disability compensation benefits" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nof the United States, for or relating to any act under color of office or in the performance of his duties.... 28 U.S.C. § 1442. Thus, to invoke the federal officer removal statute, Thornburg must both act under an officer of the United States and have averred a colorable federal defense. See Mesa, 489 U.S. at 133-34, 109 S.Ct. 959. We address each of these requirements in turn. 1. Whether Thornburg “act[s] under” an officer of the United States such that removal under the federal officer removal statute is available to him Bell argues that this Court should remand her claim to state court because, based on this Court’s decision in Cromelin, Thornburg cannot take advantage of the federal officer removal statute and remove the case under § 1442(a)(1). See Cromelin, 177 F.2d at 277 (holding that a section 1983 suit against an officer in his or her official capacity is simply another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nof the United States, for or relating to any act under color of office or in the performance of his duties.... 28 U.S.C. § 1442. Thus, to invoke the federal officer removal statute, Thornburg must both act under an officer of the United States and have averred a colorable federal defense. See Mesa, 489 U.S. at 133-34, 109 S.Ct. 959. We address each of these requirements in turn. 1. Whether Thornburg “act[s] under” an officer of the United States such that removal under the federal officer removal statute is available to him Bell argues that this Court should remand her claim to state court because, based on this Court’s decision in Cromelin, Thornburg cannot take advantage of the federal officer removal statute and remove the case under § 1442(a)(1). See Cromelin, 177 F.2d at 277 (holding that a bankruptcy trustee is an officer of the court appointed by the court directed by the court and paid by the court but is in no sense an agent or employee or officer of the united states", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nof the United States, for or relating to any act under color of office or in the performance of his duties.... 28 U.S.C. § 1442. Thus, to invoke the federal officer removal statute, Thornburg must both act under an officer of the United States and have averred a colorable federal defense. See Mesa, 489 U.S. at 133-34, 109 S.Ct. 959. We address each of these requirements in turn. 1. Whether Thornburg “act[s] under” an officer of the United States such that removal under the federal officer removal statute is available to him Bell argues that this Court should remand her claim to state court because, based on this Court’s decision in Cromelin, Thornburg cannot take advantage of the federal officer removal statute and remove the case under § 1442(a)(1). See Cromelin, 177 F.2d at 277 (holding that when there is no ruling by the states highest court it is the duty of the federal court to determine as best it can what the highest court of the state would decide", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nof the United States, for or relating to any act under color of office or in the performance of his duties.... 28 U.S.C. § 1442. Thus, to invoke the federal officer removal statute, Thornburg must both act under an officer of the United States and have averred a colorable federal defense. See Mesa, 489 U.S. at 133-34, 109 S.Ct. 959. We address each of these requirements in turn. 1. Whether Thornburg “act[s] under” an officer of the United States such that removal under the federal officer removal statute is available to him Bell argues that this Court should remand her claim to state court because, based on this Court’s decision in Cromelin, Thornburg cannot take advantage of the federal officer removal statute and remove the case under § 1442(a)(1). See Cromelin, 177 F.2d at 277 (holding that an officer or employee of the tennessee valley authority was not an officer or employee acting under the authority of the united states or any department or any officer of the government thereof within the meaning of a criminal statute first enacted in 1884", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nof the United States, for or relating to any act under color of office or in the performance of his duties.... 28 U.S.C. § 1442. Thus, to invoke the federal officer removal statute, Thornburg must both act under an officer of the United States and have averred a colorable federal defense. See Mesa, 489 U.S. at 133-34, 109 S.Ct. 959. We address each of these requirements in turn. 1. Whether Thornburg “act[s] under” an officer of the United States such that removal under the federal officer removal statute is available to him Bell argues that this Court should remand her claim to state court because, based on this Court’s decision in Cromelin, Thornburg cannot take advantage of the federal officer removal statute and remove the case under § 1442(a)(1). See Cromelin, 177 F.2d at 277 (recognizing that this court and the united states supreme court have embraced the notion that so long as the sentence imposed is within the maximum limit set by the legislature an appellate court is without power to review the sentence" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nhowever, imposed upon the police the duty to inform the juvenile of that right, and we cannot do so where the statute is silent. Hence, this case is very similar to K.M. v. State, 335 Ark. 85, 983 S.W.2d 93 (1998), where we recently held that a juvenile does not have a right to assert the insanity defense in the adjudication phase of a delinquency proceeding because no such right could be found in the constitution or the juvenile statute. Although we may question the prudence of giving a juvenile a right without imposing a corresponding duty on the police to inform the juvenile of that right, that is a policy decision properly left to the legislature, and not this court. See Norton v. Hinson, 337 Ark. 487, 989 S.W.2d 535 (1999); McDonald v. Pettus, 337 Ark. 265, 989 S.W.2d 9 (1999) (holding that jurisdiction to decide whether a debt belongs to one of the classes that would bring it within the scope of section 523a3b lies exclusively in the bankruptcy courts", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nhowever, imposed upon the police the duty to inform the juvenile of that right, and we cannot do so where the statute is silent. Hence, this case is very similar to K.M. v. State, 335 Ark. 85, 983 S.W.2d 93 (1998), where we recently held that a juvenile does not have a right to assert the insanity defense in the adjudication phase of a delinquency proceeding because no such right could be found in the constitution or the juvenile statute. Although we may question the prudence of giving a juvenile a right without imposing a corresponding duty on the police to inform the juvenile of that right, that is a policy decision properly left to the legislature, and not this court. See Norton v. Hinson, 337 Ark. 487, 989 S.W.2d 535 (1999); McDonald v. Pettus, 337 Ark. 265, 989 S.W.2d 9 (1999) (holding that the decision whether to grant a continuance lies in the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nhowever, imposed upon the police the duty to inform the juvenile of that right, and we cannot do so where the statute is silent. Hence, this case is very similar to K.M. v. State, 335 Ark. 85, 983 S.W.2d 93 (1998), where we recently held that a juvenile does not have a right to assert the insanity defense in the adjudication phase of a delinquency proceeding because no such right could be found in the constitution or the juvenile statute. Although we may question the prudence of giving a juvenile a right without imposing a corresponding duty on the police to inform the juvenile of that right, that is a policy decision properly left to the legislature, and not this court. See Norton v. Hinson, 337 Ark. 487, 989 S.W.2d 535 (1999); McDonald v. Pettus, 337 Ark. 265, 989 S.W.2d 9 (1999) (recognizing that the existence of a copy of a decision in a bill file along with numerous references to a decision of the court of appeals in the legislative history indicated that an amendment was made in response to that decision", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nhowever, imposed upon the police the duty to inform the juvenile of that right, and we cannot do so where the statute is silent. Hence, this case is very similar to K.M. v. State, 335 Ark. 85, 983 S.W.2d 93 (1998), where we recently held that a juvenile does not have a right to assert the insanity defense in the adjudication phase of a delinquency proceeding because no such right could be found in the constitution or the juvenile statute. Although we may question the prudence of giving a juvenile a right without imposing a corresponding duty on the police to inform the juvenile of that right, that is a policy decision properly left to the legislature, and not this court. See Norton v. Hinson, 337 Ark. 487, 989 S.W.2d 535 (1999); McDonald v. Pettus, 337 Ark. 265, 989 S.W.2d 9 (1999) (holding that the determination of public policy lies almost exclusively in the legislative domain and the decision of the general assembly in that regard will not be interfered with by the courts in the absence of palpable error", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nhowever, imposed upon the police the duty to inform the juvenile of that right, and we cannot do so where the statute is silent. Hence, this case is very similar to K.M. v. State, 335 Ark. 85, 983 S.W.2d 93 (1998), where we recently held that a juvenile does not have a right to assert the insanity defense in the adjudication phase of a delinquency proceeding because no such right could be found in the constitution or the juvenile statute. Although we may question the prudence of giving a juvenile a right without imposing a corresponding duty on the police to inform the juvenile of that right, that is a policy decision properly left to the legislature, and not this court. See Norton v. Hinson, 337 Ark. 487, 989 S.W.2d 535 (1999); McDonald v. Pettus, 337 Ark. 265, 989 S.W.2d 9 (1999) (holding that the primary obligation for the disclosure of matters which are essentially in the prosecutorial domain lies with the government" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nviolating the First Amendment. Beyond their general reliance on R.A.V., the defendants are imprecise as to the specifics of their First Amendment contention. Nonetheless, we will briefly explain why the First Amendment does not bar their convictions and sentences on any of the usual grounds: first, the statutes under which the defendants were prosecuted, 18 U.S.C. § 241, 18 U.S.C. § 844(h), and 42 U.S.C. § 3631, are facially valid; second, the statutes are not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad; and, third, the statutes are not unconstitutional as applied in this ease. We will then explain why prosecu-torial comments about the defendants’ racial animus and Klan membership were permissible, and why the district court’s comments on the same subjects at sentencing wer 1 (9th Cir.) (holding 3631 not vague or overbroad", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nviolating the First Amendment. Beyond their general reliance on R.A.V., the defendants are imprecise as to the specifics of their First Amendment contention. Nonetheless, we will briefly explain why the First Amendment does not bar their convictions and sentences on any of the usual grounds: first, the statutes under which the defendants were prosecuted, 18 U.S.C. § 241, 18 U.S.C. § 844(h), and 42 U.S.C. § 3631, are facially valid; second, the statutes are not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad; and, third, the statutes are not unconstitutional as applied in this ease. We will then explain why prosecu-torial comments about the defendants’ racial animus and Klan membership were permissible, and why the district court’s comments on the same subjects at sentencing wer 1 (9th Cir.) (holding that the prohibition against fighting in fla admin code r 33601314 24 was not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nviolating the First Amendment. Beyond their general reliance on R.A.V., the defendants are imprecise as to the specifics of their First Amendment contention. Nonetheless, we will briefly explain why the First Amendment does not bar their convictions and sentences on any of the usual grounds: first, the statutes under which the defendants were prosecuted, 18 U.S.C. § 241, 18 U.S.C. § 844(h), and 42 U.S.C. § 3631, are facially valid; second, the statutes are not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad; and, third, the statutes are not unconstitutional as applied in this ease. We will then explain why prosecu-torial comments about the defendants’ racial animus and Klan membership were permissible, and why the district court’s comments on the same subjects at sentencing wer 1 (9th Cir.) (holding the ordinance as applied to entertainers performing at a sexuallyoriented business is not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nviolating the First Amendment. Beyond their general reliance on R.A.V., the defendants are imprecise as to the specifics of their First Amendment contention. Nonetheless, we will briefly explain why the First Amendment does not bar their convictions and sentences on any of the usual grounds: first, the statutes under which the defendants were prosecuted, 18 U.S.C. § 241, 18 U.S.C. § 844(h), and 42 U.S.C. § 3631, are facially valid; second, the statutes are not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad; and, third, the statutes are not unconstitutional as applied in this ease. We will then explain why prosecu-torial comments about the defendants’ racial animus and Klan membership were permissible, and why the district court’s comments on the same subjects at sentencing wer 1 (9th Cir.) (holding 241 not vague or overbroad", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nviolating the First Amendment. Beyond their general reliance on R.A.V., the defendants are imprecise as to the specifics of their First Amendment contention. Nonetheless, we will briefly explain why the First Amendment does not bar their convictions and sentences on any of the usual grounds: first, the statutes under which the defendants were prosecuted, 18 U.S.C. § 241, 18 U.S.C. § 844(h), and 42 U.S.C. § 3631, are facially valid; second, the statutes are not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad; and, third, the statutes are not unconstitutional as applied in this ease. We will then explain why prosecu-torial comments about the defendants’ racial animus and Klan membership were permissible, and why the district court’s comments on the same subjects at sentencing wer 1 (9th Cir.) (holding 241 and 3631 not vague" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nbecause it was not a manufacturer or seller of a product. The court disagrees. First, a finder of fact may determine that for all intents and purposes Deer Valley manufactured a ski equipment system for Ghionis consisting of skis, bindings and boots. To the extent the system was defective, exposing Ghionis to an unreasonable risk of danger, a strict liability claim , may exist. Second, while no technical “sale” of equipment to Ghionis took place, the court is persuaded that the Utah courts will extend its rulings on strict product liability to apply to lessors of products such as Deer Valley. See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-312 et seq. (implied warranties exist in leased goods); Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-1 et seq. (Consumer protection to leases); Wade v. Jobe, 818 P.2d 1006 (Utah 1991) (recognizing trend in the law to protect consumers including lessees", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nbecause it was not a manufacturer or seller of a product. The court disagrees. First, a finder of fact may determine that for all intents and purposes Deer Valley manufactured a ski equipment system for Ghionis consisting of skis, bindings and boots. To the extent the system was defective, exposing Ghionis to an unreasonable risk of danger, a strict liability claim , may exist. Second, while no technical “sale” of equipment to Ghionis took place, the court is persuaded that the Utah courts will extend its rulings on strict product liability to apply to lessors of products such as Deer Valley. See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-312 et seq. (implied warranties exist in leased goods); Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-1 et seq. (Consumer protection to leases); Wade v. Jobe, 818 P.2d 1006 (Utah 1991) (holding that purpose of statute is to protect unwary consumers", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nbecause it was not a manufacturer or seller of a product. The court disagrees. First, a finder of fact may determine that for all intents and purposes Deer Valley manufactured a ski equipment system for Ghionis consisting of skis, bindings and boots. To the extent the system was defective, exposing Ghionis to an unreasonable risk of danger, a strict liability claim , may exist. Second, while no technical “sale” of equipment to Ghionis took place, the court is persuaded that the Utah courts will extend its rulings on strict product liability to apply to lessors of products such as Deer Valley. See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-312 et seq. (implied warranties exist in leased goods); Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-1 et seq. (Consumer protection to leases); Wade v. Jobe, 818 P.2d 1006 (Utah 1991) (recognizing drug traffickers will commonly possess firearms to protect their product to protect their drugs to protect their cash to protect their life and even to protect their turf alteration in original internal quotation marks omit ted", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nbecause it was not a manufacturer or seller of a product. The court disagrees. First, a finder of fact may determine that for all intents and purposes Deer Valley manufactured a ski equipment system for Ghionis consisting of skis, bindings and boots. To the extent the system was defective, exposing Ghionis to an unreasonable risk of danger, a strict liability claim , may exist. Second, while no technical “sale” of equipment to Ghionis took place, the court is persuaded that the Utah courts will extend its rulings on strict product liability to apply to lessors of products such as Deer Valley. See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-312 et seq. (implied warranties exist in leased goods); Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-1 et seq. (Consumer protection to leases); Wade v. Jobe, 818 P.2d 1006 (Utah 1991) (recognizing the ability of corporations to protect property rights in federal court", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nbecause it was not a manufacturer or seller of a product. The court disagrees. First, a finder of fact may determine that for all intents and purposes Deer Valley manufactured a ski equipment system for Ghionis consisting of skis, bindings and boots. To the extent the system was defective, exposing Ghionis to an unreasonable risk of danger, a strict liability claim , may exist. Second, while no technical “sale” of equipment to Ghionis took place, the court is persuaded that the Utah courts will extend its rulings on strict product liability to apply to lessors of products such as Deer Valley. See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-312 et seq. (implied warranties exist in leased goods); Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-1 et seq. (Consumer protection to leases); Wade v. Jobe, 818 P.2d 1006 (Utah 1991) (holding that a prosecutor has an obligation to protect not only the public interest but the innocent and to safeguard the rights guaranteed to all persons including those who may be guilty" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nreport constitutes an admission of a party-opponent, which is an exception to the hearsay rule. Snizaski counters that she offered the police accident report solely to establish the approximate time of the accident and, therefore, was not an admission of the truth of the substantive statements contained in the report. Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 802 provides that hearsay is not admissible unless some exception applies. “A police report prepared by an officer who is not a witness to the accident is inadmissible hearsay evidence and should not be admitted into evidence. Nor should a party be able to get such a report into evidence in an indirect manner.” Holland v. Zelnick, 329 Pa.Super. 469, 478 A.2d 885, 888 (1984); See Johnson v. Peoples Cab Company, 386 Pa. 513, 126 A.2d 720 (1956) (holding that a statement implying that the defendant was guilty of the crime for which he was on trial was inadmissible hearsay", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nreport constitutes an admission of a party-opponent, which is an exception to the hearsay rule. Snizaski counters that she offered the police accident report solely to establish the approximate time of the accident and, therefore, was not an admission of the truth of the substantive statements contained in the report. Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 802 provides that hearsay is not admissible unless some exception applies. “A police report prepared by an officer who is not a witness to the accident is inadmissible hearsay evidence and should not be admitted into evidence. Nor should a party be able to get such a report into evidence in an indirect manner.” Holland v. Zelnick, 329 Pa.Super. 469, 478 A.2d 885, 888 (1984); See Johnson v. Peoples Cab Company, 386 Pa. 513, 126 A.2d 720 (1956) (holding that a report of a police officer who arrived at an accident scene minutes after a collision which contained a statement that one of the vehicles traveled through a stop sign was inadmissible hearsay evidence", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nreport constitutes an admission of a party-opponent, which is an exception to the hearsay rule. Snizaski counters that she offered the police accident report solely to establish the approximate time of the accident and, therefore, was not an admission of the truth of the substantive statements contained in the report. Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 802 provides that hearsay is not admissible unless some exception applies. “A police report prepared by an officer who is not a witness to the accident is inadmissible hearsay evidence and should not be admitted into evidence. Nor should a party be able to get such a report into evidence in an indirect manner.” Holland v. Zelnick, 329 Pa.Super. 469, 478 A.2d 885, 888 (1984); See Johnson v. Peoples Cab Company, 386 Pa. 513, 126 A.2d 720 (1956) (holding that witness statements in police report inadmissible", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nreport constitutes an admission of a party-opponent, which is an exception to the hearsay rule. Snizaski counters that she offered the police accident report solely to establish the approximate time of the accident and, therefore, was not an admission of the truth of the substantive statements contained in the report. Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 802 provides that hearsay is not admissible unless some exception applies. “A police report prepared by an officer who is not a witness to the accident is inadmissible hearsay evidence and should not be admitted into evidence. Nor should a party be able to get such a report into evidence in an indirect manner.” Holland v. Zelnick, 329 Pa.Super. 469, 478 A.2d 885, 888 (1984); See Johnson v. Peoples Cab Company, 386 Pa. 513, 126 A.2d 720 (1956) (holding that the defendant was guilty of leaving the scene because the injured party and a police officer were present at the scene within a reasonable time after the accident", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nreport constitutes an admission of a party-opponent, which is an exception to the hearsay rule. Snizaski counters that she offered the police accident report solely to establish the approximate time of the accident and, therefore, was not an admission of the truth of the substantive statements contained in the report. Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 802 provides that hearsay is not admissible unless some exception applies. “A police report prepared by an officer who is not a witness to the accident is inadmissible hearsay evidence and should not be admitted into evidence. Nor should a party be able to get such a report into evidence in an indirect manner.” Holland v. Zelnick, 329 Pa.Super. 469, 478 A.2d 885, 888 (1984); See Johnson v. Peoples Cab Company, 386 Pa. 513, 126 A.2d 720 (1956) (holding that hearsay within a police report was inadmissible" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nsubject to court approval are binding before court approval. See In re Frye, 216 B.R. 166, 173-74 (Bankr. E.D.Va.1997). The Frye court explained that those courts that view such agreements as binding reason that contract formation and court approval require different analyses (the court adopted that view). Id. at 173; see also In re United Shipping Co., 1989 WL 12728, at *5 (Bankr.D.Minn. Feb.17, 1989) (“The considerations a court looks at in approving a settlement are entirely different than whether or not there was an agreement at all.”). On the other hand, other courts look to the Code and reason that if “judicial approval [is] necessary to go forward, an agreement could not be binding absent the required approval.” Id.; see also In re Sparks, 190 B.R. 842, 843 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1996) (holding that the bankruptcy court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over counterclaims asserted by the bankruptcy estate against a creditor where the claim is a state law action independent of the federal bankruptcy law and not necessarily resolvable by a ruling on the creditors proof of claim in the bankruptcy emphasis added", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nsubject to court approval are binding before court approval. See In re Frye, 216 B.R. 166, 173-74 (Bankr. E.D.Va.1997). The Frye court explained that those courts that view such agreements as binding reason that contract formation and court approval require different analyses (the court adopted that view). Id. at 173; see also In re United Shipping Co., 1989 WL 12728, at *5 (Bankr.D.Minn. Feb.17, 1989) (“The considerations a court looks at in approving a settlement are entirely different than whether or not there was an agreement at all.”). On the other hand, other courts look to the Code and reason that if “judicial approval [is] necessary to go forward, an agreement could not be binding absent the required approval.” Id.; see also In re Sparks, 190 B.R. 842, 843 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1996) (holding that the creditor did not satisfy the foregoing requirement because it was trying to exercise the avoidance power for itself as a sole creditor not for the benefit of the debtors estate or the creditors as a whole", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nsubject to court approval are binding before court approval. See In re Frye, 216 B.R. 166, 173-74 (Bankr. E.D.Va.1997). The Frye court explained that those courts that view such agreements as binding reason that contract formation and court approval require different analyses (the court adopted that view). Id. at 173; see also In re United Shipping Co., 1989 WL 12728, at *5 (Bankr.D.Minn. Feb.17, 1989) (“The considerations a court looks at in approving a settlement are entirely different than whether or not there was an agreement at all.”). On the other hand, other courts look to the Code and reason that if “judicial approval [is] necessary to go forward, an agreement could not be binding absent the required approval.” Id.; see also In re Sparks, 190 B.R. 842, 843 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1996) (holding creditors lacked standing to file an adversary action asserting the interests of the estate in seeking to prevent a former principal of the debtor from interfering with the chapter 11 reorganization given the lack of showing of the debtors consent and any determination by the bankruptcy court that the suit would be beneficial to the estate and necessary to a fair and efficient resolution of the bankruptcy proceedings", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nsubject to court approval are binding before court approval. See In re Frye, 216 B.R. 166, 173-74 (Bankr. E.D.Va.1997). The Frye court explained that those courts that view such agreements as binding reason that contract formation and court approval require different analyses (the court adopted that view). Id. at 173; see also In re United Shipping Co., 1989 WL 12728, at *5 (Bankr.D.Minn. Feb.17, 1989) (“The considerations a court looks at in approving a settlement are entirely different than whether or not there was an agreement at all.”). On the other hand, other courts look to the Code and reason that if “judicial approval [is] necessary to go forward, an agreement could not be binding absent the required approval.” Id.; see also In re Sparks, 190 B.R. 842, 843 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1996) (recognizing that a court may reverse the pelrbs actions where those actions are arbitrary capricious or an abuse of discretion not supported by substantial evidence on the record taken as a whole or otherwise not in accordance with law", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nsubject to court approval are binding before court approval. See In re Frye, 216 B.R. 166, 173-74 (Bankr. E.D.Va.1997). The Frye court explained that those courts that view such agreements as binding reason that contract formation and court approval require different analyses (the court adopted that view). Id. at 173; see also In re United Shipping Co., 1989 WL 12728, at *5 (Bankr.D.Minn. Feb.17, 1989) (“The considerations a court looks at in approving a settlement are entirely different than whether or not there was an agreement at all.”). On the other hand, other courts look to the Code and reason that if “judicial approval [is] necessary to go forward, an agreement could not be binding absent the required approval.” Id.; see also In re Sparks, 190 B.R. 842, 843 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1996) (holding that contracts are not binding before court approval because the debtorinpossession operates as a fiduciary any actions taken by the debtor are to be in the best interests of the creditor body as a whole for that reason the debtors actions are subject to review by the creditors of the estate and the bankruptcy court" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\n377 S.E.2d at 597. The defendant agreed that he could renew the motion if, as a result of jury voir dire, there was a problem. Id. Because the defendant never renewed the motion, we refused to consider his contention on appeal that the trial court had abused its discretion by failing to grant a change of venue. Id. Although Green did not agree to continue his change of venue motion as did the defendant in Hoke, Green, however, did not object to the circuit court’s decision to take the motion under advisement pending the outcome of voir dire. Consequently, it was incumbent upon Green to renew the motion before the jury was empanelled and sworn, or at least remind the court that it was still pending and that he wanted the court to rule on it. Cf. Lenz, 78, 570 S.E.2d 863, 863-64 (2002) (holding appellant did not waive right to article 3823 instruction in failing to object to introduction of evidence when he raised a fact issue regarding the legality of the seizure of the cocaine", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\n377 S.E.2d at 597. The defendant agreed that he could renew the motion if, as a result of jury voir dire, there was a problem. Id. Because the defendant never renewed the motion, we refused to consider his contention on appeal that the trial court had abused its discretion by failing to grant a change of venue. Id. Although Green did not agree to continue his change of venue motion as did the defendant in Hoke, Green, however, did not object to the circuit court’s decision to take the motion under advisement pending the outcome of voir dire. Consequently, it was incumbent upon Green to renew the motion before the jury was empanelled and sworn, or at least remind the court that it was still pending and that he wanted the court to rule on it. Cf. Lenz, 78, 570 S.E.2d 863, 863-64 (2002) (holding defendant did not expressly or implicitly waive objection raised in motion to strike the evidence when defendant later did not object to a jury instruction covering the same issue", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\n377 S.E.2d at 597. The defendant agreed that he could renew the motion if, as a result of jury voir dire, there was a problem. Id. Because the defendant never renewed the motion, we refused to consider his contention on appeal that the trial court had abused its discretion by failing to grant a change of venue. Id. Although Green did not agree to continue his change of venue motion as did the defendant in Hoke, Green, however, did not object to the circuit court’s decision to take the motion under advisement pending the outcome of voir dire. Consequently, it was incumbent upon Green to renew the motion before the jury was empanelled and sworn, or at least remind the court that it was still pending and that he wanted the court to rule on it. Cf. Lenz, 78, 570 S.E.2d 863, 863-64 (2002) (holding that the trial court need not hold a voluntariness hearing where the defendant did not object and no evidence presented raised the issue", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\n377 S.E.2d at 597. The defendant agreed that he could renew the motion if, as a result of jury voir dire, there was a problem. Id. Because the defendant never renewed the motion, we refused to consider his contention on appeal that the trial court had abused its discretion by failing to grant a change of venue. Id. Although Green did not agree to continue his change of venue motion as did the defendant in Hoke, Green, however, did not object to the circuit court’s decision to take the motion under advisement pending the outcome of voir dire. Consequently, it was incumbent upon Green to renew the motion before the jury was empanelled and sworn, or at least remind the court that it was still pending and that he wanted the court to rule on it. Cf. Lenz, 78, 570 S.E.2d 863, 863-64 (2002) (holding that the defendant could not appeal a jury instruction where he did not object to the challenged instruction but in fact requested it and stated he was satisfied with it", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\n377 S.E.2d at 597. The defendant agreed that he could renew the motion if, as a result of jury voir dire, there was a problem. Id. Because the defendant never renewed the motion, we refused to consider his contention on appeal that the trial court had abused its discretion by failing to grant a change of venue. Id. Although Green did not agree to continue his change of venue motion as did the defendant in Hoke, Green, however, did not object to the circuit court’s decision to take the motion under advisement pending the outcome of voir dire. Consequently, it was incumbent upon Green to renew the motion before the jury was empanelled and sworn, or at least remind the court that it was still pending and that he wanted the court to rule on it. Cf. Lenz, 78, 570 S.E.2d 863, 863-64 (2002) (holding that argument was not preserved where defendant did not file a pretrial motion to suppress and did not object or make a motion to exclude the evidence until his motion to dismiss at the close of all of the evidence" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n“(I)ssue preclusion requires that the party against whom issue preclusion is asserted in the present action was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication.” TLT Const. v. A. Anthony Tappe & Assoc., 48 Mass.App.Ct. 1, 5 (1999). M. and J. filed the application for criminal process against Benoit in the Leominster District Court on February 14, 1997, and thus were plainly parties in the district court adjudication. To establish S. was in privity with M. and J., there “has to be a ‘sufficient legal identity’ between the interest of the person allegedly represented and the prior litigant for the later claim to be precluded.” Mongeau v. Boutelle, 10 Mass.App.Ct. 246, 250 (1980) (citation omitted). See Boyd v. Jamaica Plain Co-Operative Bank, 7 Mass.App.Ct. 153, 158 (1979) (holding that the current party was sufficiently identified with the parties to the prior litigation", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n“(I)ssue preclusion requires that the party against whom issue preclusion is asserted in the present action was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication.” TLT Const. v. A. Anthony Tappe & Assoc., 48 Mass.App.Ct. 1, 5 (1999). M. and J. filed the application for criminal process against Benoit in the Leominster District Court on February 14, 1997, and thus were plainly parties in the district court adjudication. To establish S. was in privity with M. and J., there “has to be a ‘sufficient legal identity’ between the interest of the person allegedly represented and the prior litigant for the later claim to be precluded.” Mongeau v. Boutelle, 10 Mass.App.Ct. 246, 250 (1980) (citation omitted). See Boyd v. Jamaica Plain Co-Operative Bank, 7 Mass.App.Ct. 153, 158 (1979) (holding that prevailing party was entitled to attorneys fees under an option contract which had expired prior to litigation because the parties were litigating their performance under the terms of the contract", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n“(I)ssue preclusion requires that the party against whom issue preclusion is asserted in the present action was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication.” TLT Const. v. A. Anthony Tappe & Assoc., 48 Mass.App.Ct. 1, 5 (1999). M. and J. filed the application for criminal process against Benoit in the Leominster District Court on February 14, 1997, and thus were plainly parties in the district court adjudication. To establish S. was in privity with M. and J., there “has to be a ‘sufficient legal identity’ between the interest of the person allegedly represented and the prior litigant for the later claim to be precluded.” Mongeau v. Boutelle, 10 Mass.App.Ct. 246, 250 (1980) (citation omitted). See Boyd v. Jamaica Plain Co-Operative Bank, 7 Mass.App.Ct. 153, 158 (1979) (holding that the party prevailing on the significant issues in the litigation is the party that should be considered the prevailing party for attorneys fees", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n“(I)ssue preclusion requires that the party against whom issue preclusion is asserted in the present action was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication.” TLT Const. v. A. Anthony Tappe & Assoc., 48 Mass.App.Ct. 1, 5 (1999). M. and J. filed the application for criminal process against Benoit in the Leominster District Court on February 14, 1997, and thus were plainly parties in the district court adjudication. To establish S. was in privity with M. and J., there “has to be a ‘sufficient legal identity’ between the interest of the person allegedly represented and the prior litigant for the later claim to be precluded.” Mongeau v. Boutelle, 10 Mass.App.Ct. 246, 250 (1980) (citation omitted). See Boyd v. Jamaica Plain Co-Operative Bank, 7 Mass.App.Ct. 153, 158 (1979) (holding that a judgment as to the title in a prior litigation was not subject to collateral attack", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n“(I)ssue preclusion requires that the party against whom issue preclusion is asserted in the present action was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication.” TLT Const. v. A. Anthony Tappe & Assoc., 48 Mass.App.Ct. 1, 5 (1999). M. and J. filed the application for criminal process against Benoit in the Leominster District Court on February 14, 1997, and thus were plainly parties in the district court adjudication. To establish S. was in privity with M. and J., there “has to be a ‘sufficient legal identity’ between the interest of the person allegedly represented and the prior litigant for the later claim to be precluded.” Mongeau v. Boutelle, 10 Mass.App.Ct. 246, 250 (1980) (citation omitted). See Boyd v. Jamaica Plain Co-Operative Bank, 7 Mass.App.Ct. 153, 158 (1979) (holding res judicata did not bar current litigation when prior litigation between the parties involved one breach of obligation under a joint venture agreement and instant litigation was based upon a different cause of action from a subsequent interference with the same agreement" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nMalley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344-45, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986); see also Orsatti v. New Jersey State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 483 (3d Cir.1995) (citing Malley and stating that police officer is entitled to qualified immunity where grounds for probable cause stated in warrant application were objectively reasonable). “[T]he standard for determining the reasonableness of an official’s belief in the existence of probable cause is whether a reasonably well-trained officer would have, known that his affidavit failed to establish probable cause and that he therefore should not have applied for the war rant under the conditions.” Orsatti, 71 F.3d at 483 (citing Malley, 475 U.S. at 345, 106 S.Ct. 1092; but see Lippay v. Christos, 996 F.2d 1490, 1500-01 (3d Cir.1993)) (recognizing that a defendant acts with reckless disregard when he displays a high degree of awareness of probable falsity", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nMalley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344-45, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986); see also Orsatti v. New Jersey State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 483 (3d Cir.1995) (citing Malley and stating that police officer is entitled to qualified immunity where grounds for probable cause stated in warrant application were objectively reasonable). “[T]he standard for determining the reasonableness of an official’s belief in the existence of probable cause is whether a reasonably well-trained officer would have, known that his affidavit failed to establish probable cause and that he therefore should not have applied for the war rant under the conditions.” Orsatti, 71 F.3d at 483 (citing Malley, 475 U.S. at 345, 106 S.Ct. 1092; but see Lippay v. Christos, 996 F.2d 1490, 1500-01 (3d Cir.1993)) (holding prison official must have acted with reckless disregard for the inmates safety", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nMalley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344-45, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986); see also Orsatti v. New Jersey State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 483 (3d Cir.1995) (citing Malley and stating that police officer is entitled to qualified immunity where grounds for probable cause stated in warrant application were objectively reasonable). “[T]he standard for determining the reasonableness of an official’s belief in the existence of probable cause is whether a reasonably well-trained officer would have, known that his affidavit failed to establish probable cause and that he therefore should not have applied for the war rant under the conditions.” Orsatti, 71 F.3d at 483 (citing Malley, 475 U.S. at 345, 106 S.Ct. 1092; but see Lippay v. Christos, 996 F.2d 1490, 1500-01 (3d Cir.1993)) (holding that in order to prevail on a 1983 claim for unlawful arrest a plaintiff needed to satisfy the test enunciated in franks v delaware 438 us 154 171 98 sct 2674 57 led2d 667 1978 which requires a showing that the maker of the affidavit either stated a deliberate falsehood or acted with a reckless disregard for the truth proof of negligence or innocent mistake is insufficient a plaintiff must demonstrate that the police officer acted with reckless disregard for the truth as well as prove that the officer made the statements in his affidavits with a high degree of awareness of their probable falsity", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nMalley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344-45, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986); see also Orsatti v. New Jersey State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 483 (3d Cir.1995) (citing Malley and stating that police officer is entitled to qualified immunity where grounds for probable cause stated in warrant application were objectively reasonable). “[T]he standard for determining the reasonableness of an official’s belief in the existence of probable cause is whether a reasonably well-trained officer would have, known that his affidavit failed to establish probable cause and that he therefore should not have applied for the war rant under the conditions.” Orsatti, 71 F.3d at 483 (citing Malley, 475 U.S. at 345, 106 S.Ct. 1092; but see Lippay v. Christos, 996 F.2d 1490, 1500-01 (3d Cir.1993)) (holding that even if information in an affidavit was provided in reckless disregard of the truth appropriate course of action is to sever that information from the affidavit and determine whether sufficient information remained in order for the magistrate to find probable cause", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nMalley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344-45, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986); see also Orsatti v. New Jersey State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 483 (3d Cir.1995) (citing Malley and stating that police officer is entitled to qualified immunity where grounds for probable cause stated in warrant application were objectively reasonable). “[T]he standard for determining the reasonableness of an official’s belief in the existence of probable cause is whether a reasonably well-trained officer would have, known that his affidavit failed to establish probable cause and that he therefore should not have applied for the war rant under the conditions.” Orsatti, 71 F.3d at 483 (citing Malley, 475 U.S. at 345, 106 S.Ct. 1092; but see Lippay v. Christos, 996 F.2d 1490, 1500-01 (3d Cir.1993)) (holding trial courts finding omission of information was not intentional or with reckless disregard for truth was not clearly erroneous" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n. Appellants' own testimony at trial confirms that they experienced various health problems with the dairy herd in 2004, in addition to the unusual fluctuations in milk production which Appellants do not dispute. See supra note 6. We therefore accept the trial court's findings concerning the timing and nature of the property damage sustained by the dairy herd. As the Superior Court admirably noted, it is not the role of an appellate court to reweigh the evidence. 13 . The Superior Court’s discussion of the multiple trigger theory of liability in Consulting Engineers was central to its trigger of coverage analysis in that case, and therefore carries precedential value given this Court’s adoption of that court’s opinion. See Commonwealth v. Tilghman, 543 Pa. 578, 673 A.2d 898, 904 (1996) (holding that notwithstanding the above and beyond language on the disposition form the discussion at resentencing revealed that the trial court understood its obligation to and its intent to give the defendant credit for time served", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n. Appellants' own testimony at trial confirms that they experienced various health problems with the dairy herd in 2004, in addition to the unusual fluctuations in milk production which Appellants do not dispute. See supra note 6. We therefore accept the trial court's findings concerning the timing and nature of the property damage sustained by the dairy herd. As the Superior Court admirably noted, it is not the role of an appellate court to reweigh the evidence. 13 . The Superior Court’s discussion of the multiple trigger theory of liability in Consulting Engineers was central to its trigger of coverage analysis in that case, and therefore carries precedential value given this Court’s adoption of that court’s opinion. See Commonwealth v. Tilghman, 543 Pa. 578, 673 A.2d 898, 904 (1996) (holding where an appellate court affirms trial courts grant of summary judgment on a particular ground the appellate court need not discuss the remaining grounds", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n. Appellants' own testimony at trial confirms that they experienced various health problems with the dairy herd in 2004, in addition to the unusual fluctuations in milk production which Appellants do not dispute. See supra note 6. We therefore accept the trial court's findings concerning the timing and nature of the property damage sustained by the dairy herd. As the Superior Court admirably noted, it is not the role of an appellate court to reweigh the evidence. 13 . The Superior Court’s discussion of the multiple trigger theory of liability in Consulting Engineers was central to its trigger of coverage analysis in that case, and therefore carries precedential value given this Court’s adoption of that court’s opinion. See Commonwealth v. Tilghman, 543 Pa. 578, 673 A.2d 898, 904 (1996) (holding that appellant waived the issue on appeal by not raising it in its opening brief even though the lower courts decision was based on that point", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n. Appellants' own testimony at trial confirms that they experienced various health problems with the dairy herd in 2004, in addition to the unusual fluctuations in milk production which Appellants do not dispute. See supra note 6. We therefore accept the trial court's findings concerning the timing and nature of the property damage sustained by the dairy herd. As the Superior Court admirably noted, it is not the role of an appellate court to reweigh the evidence. 13 . The Superior Court’s discussion of the multiple trigger theory of liability in Consulting Engineers was central to its trigger of coverage analysis in that case, and therefore carries precedential value given this Court’s adoption of that court’s opinion. See Commonwealth v. Tilghman, 543 Pa. 578, 673 A.2d 898, 904 (1996) (holding that the trial court had no jurisdiction to modify its final order more than 30 days after its final judgment", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n. Appellants' own testimony at trial confirms that they experienced various health problems with the dairy herd in 2004, in addition to the unusual fluctuations in milk production which Appellants do not dispute. See supra note 6. We therefore accept the trial court's findings concerning the timing and nature of the property damage sustained by the dairy herd. As the Superior Court admirably noted, it is not the role of an appellate court to reweigh the evidence. 13 . The Superior Court’s discussion of the multiple trigger theory of liability in Consulting Engineers was central to its trigger of coverage analysis in that case, and therefore carries precedential value given this Court’s adoption of that court’s opinion. See Commonwealth v. Tilghman, 543 Pa. 578, 673 A.2d 898, 904 (1996) (holding that when this court per curiam affirms on the basis of the lower courts opinion it not only signals agreement with the result but also with the rationale employed in reaching its final disposition on matters essential to its holding" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nabout a rival anthropologist, are not reasonably interpreted as factual. 9. Made “Some Threat Against the Faculty” {37} The evidence Plaintiff cites for this alleged defamatory statement is Bernstein’s statement that “I believe there was something in there where [Plaintiff] had finished his dissertation or was writing his dissertation and there was some disagreement between he [sic] and his faculty members and there was some threat against the faculty[.]” This may be susceptible to a defamatory meaning, but we hold that it is too vague to be actionable. The nature of the “threat” is unclear and could refer to a threat of violence, a lawsuit, or any other action. As is noted above, such a vague statement is not actionable as defamation. See Andrews, 119 N.M. at 485, 892 P.2d at 618 (holding plaintiffs must plead alleged defamatory statements with precision", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nabout a rival anthropologist, are not reasonably interpreted as factual. 9. Made “Some Threat Against the Faculty” {37} The evidence Plaintiff cites for this alleged defamatory statement is Bernstein’s statement that “I believe there was something in there where [Plaintiff] had finished his dissertation or was writing his dissertation and there was some disagreement between he [sic] and his faculty members and there was some threat against the faculty[.]” This may be susceptible to a defamatory meaning, but we hold that it is too vague to be actionable. The nature of the “threat” is unclear and could refer to a threat of violence, a lawsuit, or any other action. As is noted above, such a vague statement is not actionable as defamation. See Andrews, 119 N.M. at 485, 892 P.2d at 618 (holding that defendant could not be liable for distributing defamatory statements unless it knew or had reason to know of statements", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nabout a rival anthropologist, are not reasonably interpreted as factual. 9. Made “Some Threat Against the Faculty” {37} The evidence Plaintiff cites for this alleged defamatory statement is Bernstein’s statement that “I believe there was something in there where [Plaintiff] had finished his dissertation or was writing his dissertation and there was some disagreement between he [sic] and his faculty members and there was some threat against the faculty[.]” This may be susceptible to a defamatory meaning, but we hold that it is too vague to be actionable. The nature of the “threat” is unclear and could refer to a threat of violence, a lawsuit, or any other action. As is noted above, such a vague statement is not actionable as defamation. See Andrews, 119 N.M. at 485, 892 P.2d at 618 (holding that plaintiffs did not plead fraud where the complaint only alleged a breach of fiduciary duty", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nabout a rival anthropologist, are not reasonably interpreted as factual. 9. Made “Some Threat Against the Faculty” {37} The evidence Plaintiff cites for this alleged defamatory statement is Bernstein’s statement that “I believe there was something in there where [Plaintiff] had finished his dissertation or was writing his dissertation and there was some disagreement between he [sic] and his faculty members and there was some threat against the faculty[.]” This may be susceptible to a defamatory meaning, but we hold that it is too vague to be actionable. The nature of the “threat” is unclear and could refer to a threat of violence, a lawsuit, or any other action. As is noted above, such a vague statement is not actionable as defamation. See Andrews, 119 N.M. at 485, 892 P.2d at 618 (holding statements regarding plaintiffs unsatisfactory job performance not defamatory per se", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nabout a rival anthropologist, are not reasonably interpreted as factual. 9. Made “Some Threat Against the Faculty” {37} The evidence Plaintiff cites for this alleged defamatory statement is Bernstein’s statement that “I believe there was something in there where [Plaintiff] had finished his dissertation or was writing his dissertation and there was some disagreement between he [sic] and his faculty members and there was some threat against the faculty[.]” This may be susceptible to a defamatory meaning, but we hold that it is too vague to be actionable. The nature of the “threat” is unclear and could refer to a threat of violence, a lawsuit, or any other action. As is noted above, such a vague statement is not actionable as defamation. See Andrews, 119 N.M. at 485, 892 P.2d at 618 (holding that statements at issue were protected expressions of opinion because they lacked specificity and precision and the factual implications concerning such statements were unclear" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nand successive petitions under § 2254, as well as of the evolution of habeas law prior to' passage of the AEDPA, we answer this question in the affirmative. Our sister circuits have held that the denial of a first § 2254 petition for procedural default, which default is not overcome by a showing of cause and prejudice, “must be regarded as a determination on the merits in examining whether a subsequent petition is successive.” Bates v. Whitley, 19 F.3d 1066, 1067 (5th Cir.1994); accord Hawkins v. Evans, 64 F.3d 543, 546-47 (10th Cir.1995) (quoting Bates); Howard v. Lems, 905 F.2d 1318, 1322-23 (9th Cir.1990) (dismissal for procedural default, unlike dismissal for failure to exhaust state remedies, is a disposition on the merits); cf. Shaw v. Delo, 971 F.2d 181, 184 (8th Cir.1992) (holding that federal review of claims is barred where those claims have been defaulted in state court pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule unless the petitioner can demonstrate cause and prejudice", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nand successive petitions under § 2254, as well as of the evolution of habeas law prior to' passage of the AEDPA, we answer this question in the affirmative. Our sister circuits have held that the denial of a first § 2254 petition for procedural default, which default is not overcome by a showing of cause and prejudice, “must be regarded as a determination on the merits in examining whether a subsequent petition is successive.” Bates v. Whitley, 19 F.3d 1066, 1067 (5th Cir.1994); accord Hawkins v. Evans, 64 F.3d 543, 546-47 (10th Cir.1995) (quoting Bates); Howard v. Lems, 905 F.2d 1318, 1322-23 (9th Cir.1990) (dismissal for procedural default, unlike dismissal for failure to exhaust state remedies, is a disposition on the merits); cf. Shaw v. Delo, 971 F.2d 181, 184 (8th Cir.1992) (recognizing that proof of extreme delay establishes prejudice", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nand successive petitions under § 2254, as well as of the evolution of habeas law prior to' passage of the AEDPA, we answer this question in the affirmative. Our sister circuits have held that the denial of a first § 2254 petition for procedural default, which default is not overcome by a showing of cause and prejudice, “must be regarded as a determination on the merits in examining whether a subsequent petition is successive.” Bates v. Whitley, 19 F.3d 1066, 1067 (5th Cir.1994); accord Hawkins v. Evans, 64 F.3d 543, 546-47 (10th Cir.1995) (quoting Bates); Howard v. Lems, 905 F.2d 1318, 1322-23 (9th Cir.1990) (dismissal for procedural default, unlike dismissal for failure to exhaust state remedies, is a disposition on the merits); cf. Shaw v. Delo, 971 F.2d 181, 184 (8th Cir.1992) (holding that a district court may review successive or abusive claims but only if petitioner establishes cause and prejudice", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nand successive petitions under § 2254, as well as of the evolution of habeas law prior to' passage of the AEDPA, we answer this question in the affirmative. Our sister circuits have held that the denial of a first § 2254 petition for procedural default, which default is not overcome by a showing of cause and prejudice, “must be regarded as a determination on the merits in examining whether a subsequent petition is successive.” Bates v. Whitley, 19 F.3d 1066, 1067 (5th Cir.1994); accord Hawkins v. Evans, 64 F.3d 543, 546-47 (10th Cir.1995) (quoting Bates); Howard v. Lems, 905 F.2d 1318, 1322-23 (9th Cir.1990) (dismissal for procedural default, unlike dismissal for failure to exhaust state remedies, is a disposition on the merits); cf. Shaw v. Delo, 971 F.2d 181, 184 (8th Cir.1992) (holding that a district court lacks jurisdiction to review a second or successive 2255 motion where the movant failed to obtain authorization to file the motion from this court", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nand successive petitions under § 2254, as well as of the evolution of habeas law prior to' passage of the AEDPA, we answer this question in the affirmative. Our sister circuits have held that the denial of a first § 2254 petition for procedural default, which default is not overcome by a showing of cause and prejudice, “must be regarded as a determination on the merits in examining whether a subsequent petition is successive.” Bates v. Whitley, 19 F.3d 1066, 1067 (5th Cir.1994); accord Hawkins v. Evans, 64 F.3d 543, 546-47 (10th Cir.1995) (quoting Bates); Howard v. Lems, 905 F.2d 1318, 1322-23 (9th Cir.1990) (dismissal for procedural default, unlike dismissal for failure to exhaust state remedies, is a disposition on the merits); cf. Shaw v. Delo, 971 F.2d 181, 184 (8th Cir.1992) (holding that district court has no jurisdiction to decide unauthorized second or successive 2255 claims" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nv. BBC, Inc., 575 F.Supp. 1354, 1357 (S.D.Ohio 1983)). Here, Defendant contracted for employment with an Ohio corporation and performed duties on the corporation’s behalf inside and outside of the state. The status of Defendant as an employee relates directly to the matters at issue in this case. A nexus exists between the business dealings of Defendant and Plaintiff that produced the Agreement and the continuing contractual obligations created by the Agreement. Moreover, Defendant’s breach of the Agreement gives rise to the cause of action. The Sixth Circuit has held that “if the cause of action is for breach of that contract [with an Ohio resident] ... then the cause of action naturally arises from the defendant’s activities in Ohio.” Cole v. Mileti, 133 F.3d 433, 436 (6th Cir.1998) (recognizing that the ohio longarm statute does not extend to the limits of due process and focusing the inquiry on whether defendant established sufficient business contacts with ohio", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nv. BBC, Inc., 575 F.Supp. 1354, 1357 (S.D.Ohio 1983)). Here, Defendant contracted for employment with an Ohio corporation and performed duties on the corporation’s behalf inside and outside of the state. The status of Defendant as an employee relates directly to the matters at issue in this case. A nexus exists between the business dealings of Defendant and Plaintiff that produced the Agreement and the continuing contractual obligations created by the Agreement. Moreover, Defendant’s breach of the Agreement gives rise to the cause of action. The Sixth Circuit has held that “if the cause of action is for breach of that contract [with an Ohio resident] ... then the cause of action naturally arises from the defendant’s activities in Ohio.” Cole v. Mileti, 133 F.3d 433, 436 (6th Cir.1998) (holding that north carolinas longarm statute extends to the limits of due process", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nv. BBC, Inc., 575 F.Supp. 1354, 1357 (S.D.Ohio 1983)). Here, Defendant contracted for employment with an Ohio corporation and performed duties on the corporation’s behalf inside and outside of the state. The status of Defendant as an employee relates directly to the matters at issue in this case. A nexus exists between the business dealings of Defendant and Plaintiff that produced the Agreement and the continuing contractual obligations created by the Agreement. Moreover, Defendant’s breach of the Agreement gives rise to the cause of action. The Sixth Circuit has held that “if the cause of action is for breach of that contract [with an Ohio resident] ... then the cause of action naturally arises from the defendant’s activities in Ohio.” Cole v. Mileti, 133 F.3d 433, 436 (6th Cir.1998) (holding that the defendants contacts with ohio were sufficient to support the exercise of jurisdiction where defendant consciously reached out from texas to ohio to subscribe to compuserve and sold his software over compuserves ohiobased system", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nv. BBC, Inc., 575 F.Supp. 1354, 1357 (S.D.Ohio 1983)). Here, Defendant contracted for employment with an Ohio corporation and performed duties on the corporation’s behalf inside and outside of the state. The status of Defendant as an employee relates directly to the matters at issue in this case. A nexus exists between the business dealings of Defendant and Plaintiff that produced the Agreement and the continuing contractual obligations created by the Agreement. Moreover, Defendant’s breach of the Agreement gives rise to the cause of action. The Sixth Circuit has held that “if the cause of action is for breach of that contract [with an Ohio resident] ... then the cause of action naturally arises from the defendant’s activities in Ohio.” Cole v. Mileti, 133 F.3d 433, 436 (6th Cir.1998) (holding personal jurisdiction did not exist over the londonbased international amateur athletic federation iaaf despite the fact that its member organization in the usa had minimum contacts with ohio where the plaintiffs contract claim did not arise out of iaafs contacts with ohio", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nv. BBC, Inc., 575 F.Supp. 1354, 1357 (S.D.Ohio 1983)). Here, Defendant contracted for employment with an Ohio corporation and performed duties on the corporation’s behalf inside and outside of the state. The status of Defendant as an employee relates directly to the matters at issue in this case. A nexus exists between the business dealings of Defendant and Plaintiff that produced the Agreement and the continuing contractual obligations created by the Agreement. Moreover, Defendant’s breach of the Agreement gives rise to the cause of action. The Sixth Circuit has held that “if the cause of action is for breach of that contract [with an Ohio resident] ... then the cause of action naturally arises from the defendant’s activities in Ohio.” Cole v. Mileti, 133 F.3d 433, 436 (6th Cir.1998) (holding that a maryland court could not exercise jurisdiction over an ohio lawyer when a maryland client initiated five of seven contacts with the lawyer the parties created the attorneyclient relationship in ohio and the attorneyclient relationship involved only events in and the law of ohio" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nF.Supp.3d 700, 703, No. 3:14CV200 (JMM), 2014 WL 5088230, at *2 (M.D.Pa. Oct. 10, 2014) (“we hold that the TCPA can impose Lability directly or vicariously upon any person or entity on whose behalf a third party places a call in violation of § 227(b)(1)(A)”); Bridgeview Health Care Ctr. Ltd. v. Clark, 09 C 5601(MV), 2013 WL 1154206, at *4 (N.D.Ill. Mar. 19, 2013) (“Thus, the TCPA creates a form of vicarious liability making an entity liable when a third party sends unsolicited communications on its behalf in violation of the Act.”) (citing Glen Ellyn Pharmacy v. Promius Pharma, LLC, No. 09-C-2116 (BMM), 2009 WL 2973046, at *3 (N.D.Ill. Sept. 11,2009)); Account. Outsourcing, LLC v. Verizon Wireless, 329 F.Supp.2d 789, 805-06 (M.D.La.2004) (same); but see Mais, 944 F.Supp.2d at 1243-44 (holding that fmla does not impose individual liability", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nF.Supp.3d 700, 703, No. 3:14CV200 (JMM), 2014 WL 5088230, at *2 (M.D.Pa. Oct. 10, 2014) (“we hold that the TCPA can impose Lability directly or vicariously upon any person or entity on whose behalf a third party places a call in violation of § 227(b)(1)(A)”); Bridgeview Health Care Ctr. Ltd. v. Clark, 09 C 5601(MV), 2013 WL 1154206, at *4 (N.D.Ill. Mar. 19, 2013) (“Thus, the TCPA creates a form of vicarious liability making an entity liable when a third party sends unsolicited communications on its behalf in violation of the Act.”) (citing Glen Ellyn Pharmacy v. Promius Pharma, LLC, No. 09-C-2116 (BMM), 2009 WL 2973046, at *3 (N.D.Ill. Sept. 11,2009)); Account. Outsourcing, LLC v. Verizon Wireless, 329 F.Supp.2d 789, 805-06 (M.D.La.2004) (same); but see Mais, 944 F.Supp.2d at 1243-44 (holding that takings claim does not ripen until a permit application is denied", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nF.Supp.3d 700, 703, No. 3:14CV200 (JMM), 2014 WL 5088230, at *2 (M.D.Pa. Oct. 10, 2014) (“we hold that the TCPA can impose Lability directly or vicariously upon any person or entity on whose behalf a third party places a call in violation of § 227(b)(1)(A)”); Bridgeview Health Care Ctr. Ltd. v. Clark, 09 C 5601(MV), 2013 WL 1154206, at *4 (N.D.Ill. Mar. 19, 2013) (“Thus, the TCPA creates a form of vicarious liability making an entity liable when a third party sends unsolicited communications on its behalf in violation of the Act.”) (citing Glen Ellyn Pharmacy v. Promius Pharma, LLC, No. 09-C-2116 (BMM), 2009 WL 2973046, at *3 (N.D.Ill. Sept. 11,2009)); Account. Outsourcing, LLC v. Verizon Wireless, 329 F.Supp.2d 789, 805-06 (M.D.La.2004) (same); but see Mais, 944 F.Supp.2d at 1243-44 (holding that tcpa does not permit vicarious liability", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nF.Supp.3d 700, 703, No. 3:14CV200 (JMM), 2014 WL 5088230, at *2 (M.D.Pa. Oct. 10, 2014) (“we hold that the TCPA can impose Lability directly or vicariously upon any person or entity on whose behalf a third party places a call in violation of § 227(b)(1)(A)”); Bridgeview Health Care Ctr. Ltd. v. Clark, 09 C 5601(MV), 2013 WL 1154206, at *4 (N.D.Ill. Mar. 19, 2013) (“Thus, the TCPA creates a form of vicarious liability making an entity liable when a third party sends unsolicited communications on its behalf in violation of the Act.”) (citing Glen Ellyn Pharmacy v. Promius Pharma, LLC, No. 09-C-2116 (BMM), 2009 WL 2973046, at *3 (N.D.Ill. Sept. 11,2009)); Account. Outsourcing, LLC v. Verizon Wireless, 329 F.Supp.2d 789, 805-06 (M.D.La.2004) (same); but see Mais, 944 F.Supp.2d at 1243-44 (holding that preemption under 1144a does not permit removal if the plaintiffs claim does not fall within the scope of 1132a", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nF.Supp.3d 700, 703, No. 3:14CV200 (JMM), 2014 WL 5088230, at *2 (M.D.Pa. Oct. 10, 2014) (“we hold that the TCPA can impose Lability directly or vicariously upon any person or entity on whose behalf a third party places a call in violation of § 227(b)(1)(A)”); Bridgeview Health Care Ctr. Ltd. v. Clark, 09 C 5601(MV), 2013 WL 1154206, at *4 (N.D.Ill. Mar. 19, 2013) (“Thus, the TCPA creates a form of vicarious liability making an entity liable when a third party sends unsolicited communications on its behalf in violation of the Act.”) (citing Glen Ellyn Pharmacy v. Promius Pharma, LLC, No. 09-C-2116 (BMM), 2009 WL 2973046, at *3 (N.D.Ill. Sept. 11,2009)); Account. Outsourcing, LLC v. Verizon Wireless, 329 F.Supp.2d 789, 805-06 (M.D.La.2004) (same); but see Mais, 944 F.Supp.2d at 1243-44 (holding that 1964c does not permit recovery for personal injuries" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe evidence does not support the application of the exigent circumstances doctrine discussed in Herring. Nonetheless, the intrusion into the motel room was justified by the objective of law enforcement to detain, if not arrest, Wright and Powell for their involvement in the Victim’s murder. See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229, 105 S.Ct. 675, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985) (“[I]f police have a reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable facts, that a person they encounter was involved in or is wanted in connection with a completed felony, then a Terry stop may be made to investigate that suspicion.” (referencing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968))); United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43, 96 S.Ct. 2406, 49 L.Ed.2d 300 (1976) (holding 1983 action lies for warrantless arrest without probable cause", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe evidence does not support the application of the exigent circumstances doctrine discussed in Herring. Nonetheless, the intrusion into the motel room was justified by the objective of law enforcement to detain, if not arrest, Wright and Powell for their involvement in the Victim’s murder. See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229, 105 S.Ct. 675, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985) (“[I]f police have a reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable facts, that a person they encounter was involved in or is wanted in connection with a completed felony, then a Terry stop may be made to investigate that suspicion.” (referencing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968))); United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43, 96 S.Ct. 2406, 49 L.Ed.2d 300 (1976) (holding that probable cause alone justifies a warrantless search or seizure of a vehicle lawfully parked in a public place", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe evidence does not support the application of the exigent circumstances doctrine discussed in Herring. Nonetheless, the intrusion into the motel room was justified by the objective of law enforcement to detain, if not arrest, Wright and Powell for their involvement in the Victim’s murder. See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229, 105 S.Ct. 675, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985) (“[I]f police have a reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable facts, that a person they encounter was involved in or is wanted in connection with a completed felony, then a Terry stop may be made to investigate that suspicion.” (referencing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968))); United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43, 96 S.Ct. 2406, 49 L.Ed.2d 300 (1976) (holding that warrantless arrest based on probable cause did not violate the fourth amendment", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe evidence does not support the application of the exigent circumstances doctrine discussed in Herring. Nonetheless, the intrusion into the motel room was justified by the objective of law enforcement to detain, if not arrest, Wright and Powell for their involvement in the Victim’s murder. See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229, 105 S.Ct. 675, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985) (“[I]f police have a reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable facts, that a person they encounter was involved in or is wanted in connection with a completed felony, then a Terry stop may be made to investigate that suspicion.” (referencing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968))); United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43, 96 S.Ct. 2406, 49 L.Ed.2d 300 (1976) (holding the petitioners act of retreating into her house could not thwart a warrantless arrest when it was set in motion in a public place upon probable cause", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe evidence does not support the application of the exigent circumstances doctrine discussed in Herring. Nonetheless, the intrusion into the motel room was justified by the objective of law enforcement to detain, if not arrest, Wright and Powell for their involvement in the Victim’s murder. See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229, 105 S.Ct. 675, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985) (“[I]f police have a reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable facts, that a person they encounter was involved in or is wanted in connection with a completed felony, then a Terry stop may be made to investigate that suspicion.” (referencing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968))); United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43, 96 S.Ct. 2406, 49 L.Ed.2d 300 (1976) (recognizing the defense of good faith and probable cause in 1983 case involving unconstitutional warrantless arrest" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nis a matter of consent between the parties, and one cannot be required to submit to arbitration a dispute which it has not agreed to submit to arbitration.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the Service Agreement, unlike the APA and Employment Agreements, does not contain a broad arbitration clause in its “Remedies” section; rather, the Service Agreement contemplates arbitration only of disputes regarding the narrow issue of a new compensation arrangement in the event of certain regulatory changes. If the parties intended to arbitrate all disputes arising out of the Service Agreement, they could have easily included the same broad arbitration provision in that agreement. See Alticor, Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 411 F.3d 669, 672 (6th Cir.2005) (holding that the trial court not the arbitrator must decide a challenge to an arbitration provision based on public policy", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nis a matter of consent between the parties, and one cannot be required to submit to arbitration a dispute which it has not agreed to submit to arbitration.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the Service Agreement, unlike the APA and Employment Agreements, does not contain a broad arbitration clause in its “Remedies” section; rather, the Service Agreement contemplates arbitration only of disputes regarding the narrow issue of a new compensation arrangement in the event of certain regulatory changes. If the parties intended to arbitrate all disputes arising out of the Service Agreement, they could have easily included the same broad arbitration provision in that agreement. See Alticor, Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 411 F.3d 669, 672 (6th Cir.2005) (holding that claims against a broker under the securities laws and rico were subject to arbitration pursuant to a provision requiring the arbitration of any dispute relating to the customers accounts", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nis a matter of consent between the parties, and one cannot be required to submit to arbitration a dispute which it has not agreed to submit to arbitration.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the Service Agreement, unlike the APA and Employment Agreements, does not contain a broad arbitration clause in its “Remedies” section; rather, the Service Agreement contemplates arbitration only of disputes regarding the narrow issue of a new compensation arrangement in the event of certain regulatory changes. If the parties intended to arbitrate all disputes arising out of the Service Agreement, they could have easily included the same broad arbitration provision in that agreement. See Alticor, Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 411 F.3d 669, 672 (6th Cir.2005) (holding that a dispute arising out of an insurance policy was not covered by the arbitration provision in the parties separate premium payment agreement because if the party had intended to subject this dispute to the arbitration provision it could easily clearly and unequivocally have done so either by including an arbitration provision in the insurance policy itself or by adding to the above arbitration provision", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nis a matter of consent between the parties, and one cannot be required to submit to arbitration a dispute which it has not agreed to submit to arbitration.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the Service Agreement, unlike the APA and Employment Agreements, does not contain a broad arbitration clause in its “Remedies” section; rather, the Service Agreement contemplates arbitration only of disputes regarding the narrow issue of a new compensation arrangement in the event of certain regulatory changes. If the parties intended to arbitrate all disputes arising out of the Service Agreement, they could have easily included the same broad arbitration provision in that agreement. See Alticor, Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 411 F.3d 669, 672 (6th Cir.2005) (holding that the federal arbitration act requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement and mandates enforcement of an arbitration agreement notwithstanding the presence of other persons who are parties to the underlying dispute but not to the arbitration agreement emphasis added", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nis a matter of consent between the parties, and one cannot be required to submit to arbitration a dispute which it has not agreed to submit to arbitration.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the Service Agreement, unlike the APA and Employment Agreements, does not contain a broad arbitration clause in its “Remedies” section; rather, the Service Agreement contemplates arbitration only of disputes regarding the narrow issue of a new compensation arrangement in the event of certain regulatory changes. If the parties intended to arbitrate all disputes arising out of the Service Agreement, they could have easily included the same broad arbitration provision in that agreement. See Alticor, Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 411 F.3d 669, 672 (6th Cir.2005) (holding that the arbitration provision naming particular arbitration fora superseded the amex constitution closed the amex window and precluded arbitration before aaa who was not named in the arbitration provision" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nwho are in the habit of making such judgments. Yet, the Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit have admonished hearing officers and reviewing courts alike when they substitute personal opinions or judgments as to proper educational policy, and best placements for the disabled student, in the place of the local educators’ expert judgments. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206, 102 S.Ct. 3034; Hartmann, 118 F.3d at 1000-01. These courts have also reminded hearing officers and reviewing courts that school districts are not required to provide a disabled child with the best possible education. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 192, 102 S.Ct. 3034. The result reached here is properly deferential to Jane’s educators’ unanimous determination that the Interlude placement was appropriate. See Hartmann, 118 F.3d at 1001 (holding that whenever the local agency refuses or wrongfully neglects to provide a handicapped child with a free appropriate education that child can be best served on the regional or state level", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nwho are in the habit of making such judgments. Yet, the Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit have admonished hearing officers and reviewing courts alike when they substitute personal opinions or judgments as to proper educational policy, and best placements for the disabled student, in the place of the local educators’ expert judgments. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206, 102 S.Ct. 3034; Hartmann, 118 F.3d at 1000-01. These courts have also reminded hearing officers and reviewing courts that school districts are not required to provide a disabled child with the best possible education. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 192, 102 S.Ct. 3034. The result reached here is properly deferential to Jane’s educators’ unanimous determination that the Interlude placement was appropriate. See Hartmann, 118 F.3d at 1001 (recognizing that a parent can petition for postminority support for a disabled child", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nwho are in the habit of making such judgments. Yet, the Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit have admonished hearing officers and reviewing courts alike when they substitute personal opinions or judgments as to proper educational policy, and best placements for the disabled student, in the place of the local educators’ expert judgments. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206, 102 S.Ct. 3034; Hartmann, 118 F.3d at 1000-01. These courts have also reminded hearing officers and reviewing courts that school districts are not required to provide a disabled child with the best possible education. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 192, 102 S.Ct. 3034. The result reached here is properly deferential to Jane’s educators’ unanimous determination that the Interlude placement was appropriate. See Hartmann, 118 F.3d at 1001 (holding that local educators deserve latitude in determining the iep most appropriate for a disabled child", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nwho are in the habit of making such judgments. Yet, the Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit have admonished hearing officers and reviewing courts alike when they substitute personal opinions or judgments as to proper educational policy, and best placements for the disabled student, in the place of the local educators’ expert judgments. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206, 102 S.Ct. 3034; Hartmann, 118 F.3d at 1000-01. These courts have also reminded hearing officers and reviewing courts that school districts are not required to provide a disabled child with the best possible education. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 192, 102 S.Ct. 3034. The result reached here is properly deferential to Jane’s educators’ unanimous determination that the Interlude placement was appropriate. See Hartmann, 118 F.3d at 1001 (holding that the situs of the alleged tortious conduct is relevant in choosing the most appropriate forum", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nwho are in the habit of making such judgments. Yet, the Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit have admonished hearing officers and reviewing courts alike when they substitute personal opinions or judgments as to proper educational policy, and best placements for the disabled student, in the place of the local educators’ expert judgments. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206, 102 S.Ct. 3034; Hartmann, 118 F.3d at 1000-01. These courts have also reminded hearing officers and reviewing courts that school districts are not required to provide a disabled child with the best possible education. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 192, 102 S.Ct. 3034. The result reached here is properly deferential to Jane’s educators’ unanimous determination that the Interlude placement was appropriate. See Hartmann, 118 F.3d at 1001 (holding that review of nonfinal orders determining child custody in child dependency proceedings is not encompassed by rule 9130a3ciii which permits review of nonfinal orders determining child custody in domestic relations cases" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nof tolling. Id. at 1474. Accordingly, the Court finds that federal law, not state law, governs whether the limitations period in this case was tolled; and § 657-13 does not operate to toll t rom other jurisdictions are sharply divided on this issue. One line of cases holds that mental incompetency may not toll federal statutes of limitations. E.g., Harris v. Ford Motor Co., supra, 635 F.Supp. 1472 (E.D.Mo.1986) (and cases cited therein) (mental incompetency does not toll DelCostello six month period on hybrid claims). However, most of the decisions relied upon in Harris involved claims against the federal government and therefore are called into question by the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Irwin v. Veterans Administration, 498 U.S. 89, 111 S.Ct. 453, 112 L.Ed.2d 435 (1990) (holding that equitable principles apply to child support proceedings", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nof tolling. Id. at 1474. Accordingly, the Court finds that federal law, not state law, governs whether the limitations period in this case was tolled; and § 657-13 does not operate to toll t rom other jurisdictions are sharply divided on this issue. One line of cases holds that mental incompetency may not toll federal statutes of limitations. E.g., Harris v. Ford Motor Co., supra, 635 F.Supp. 1472 (E.D.Mo.1986) (and cases cited therein) (mental incompetency does not toll DelCostello six month period on hybrid claims). However, most of the decisions relied upon in Harris involved claims against the federal government and therefore are called into question by the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Irwin v. Veterans Administration, 498 U.S. 89, 111 S.Ct. 453, 112 L.Ed.2d 435 (1990) (holding tolling principles do not apply because the purpose of the statute of repose is clearly to serve as a cutoff", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nof tolling. Id. at 1474. Accordingly, the Court finds that federal law, not state law, governs whether the limitations period in this case was tolled; and § 657-13 does not operate to toll t rom other jurisdictions are sharply divided on this issue. One line of cases holds that mental incompetency may not toll federal statutes of limitations. E.g., Harris v. Ford Motor Co., supra, 635 F.Supp. 1472 (E.D.Mo.1986) (and cases cited therein) (mental incompetency does not toll DelCostello six month period on hybrid claims). However, most of the decisions relied upon in Harris involved claims against the federal government and therefore are called into question by the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Irwin v. Veterans Administration, 498 U.S. 89, 111 S.Ct. 453, 112 L.Ed.2d 435 (1990) (holding that in statute authorizing suits against united states limits time period in which such suits may be brought united states retains its sovereign immunity as to any suits brought outside of that time period therefore court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over suit against united states that is barred by statute of limitations", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nof tolling. Id. at 1474. Accordingly, the Court finds that federal law, not state law, governs whether the limitations period in this case was tolled; and § 657-13 does not operate to toll t rom other jurisdictions are sharply divided on this issue. One line of cases holds that mental incompetency may not toll federal statutes of limitations. E.g., Harris v. Ford Motor Co., supra, 635 F.Supp. 1472 (E.D.Mo.1986) (and cases cited therein) (mental incompetency does not toll DelCostello six month period on hybrid claims). However, most of the decisions relied upon in Harris involved claims against the federal government and therefore are called into question by the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Irwin v. Veterans Administration, 498 U.S. 89, 111 S.Ct. 453, 112 L.Ed.2d 435 (1990) (holding that we lacked jurisdiction to review the veterans courts determination that equitable tolling did not apply in the case before it", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nof tolling. Id. at 1474. Accordingly, the Court finds that federal law, not state law, governs whether the limitations period in this case was tolled; and § 657-13 does not operate to toll t rom other jurisdictions are sharply divided on this issue. One line of cases holds that mental incompetency may not toll federal statutes of limitations. E.g., Harris v. Ford Motor Co., supra, 635 F.Supp. 1472 (E.D.Mo.1986) (and cases cited therein) (mental incompetency does not toll DelCostello six month period on hybrid claims). However, most of the decisions relied upon in Harris involved claims against the federal government and therefore are called into question by the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Irwin v. Veterans Administration, 498 U.S. 89, 111 S.Ct. 453, 112 L.Ed.2d 435 (1990) (holding that equitable tolling principles apply to suits against the united states in the same manner as they apply to private parties" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nLaw § 3105 and breaches of warranties under N.Y. Insurance Law § 3106,” see Second Am. Compl. ¶ 78, now seeking as relief, not only the right to disclaim coverage for the Heschel incident but also to void the CGL and UMB policies ab initio “based on Adas Yereim’s material non-disclosures.” Id. at pg. 17 (emphasis added). Incredibly, it was not until approximately ten months after the latest date GuideOne learned of the material facts concerning Adas Yereim’s alleged misrepresentations did it finally seek to exercise its claimed right to void its policies. With respect to GuideOne’s right to rescind, only Rip Van Winkle slept longer. Such delay is unreasonable as a matter of law. See Saitta v. New York City Transit Auth. et al., 55 A.D.3d 422, 423, 866 N.Y.S.2d 62, 63 (1st Dep’t 2008) (holding that a five month delay was unreasonable", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nLaw § 3105 and breaches of warranties under N.Y. Insurance Law § 3106,” see Second Am. Compl. ¶ 78, now seeking as relief, not only the right to disclaim coverage for the Heschel incident but also to void the CGL and UMB policies ab initio “based on Adas Yereim’s material non-disclosures.” Id. at pg. 17 (emphasis added). Incredibly, it was not until approximately ten months after the latest date GuideOne learned of the material facts concerning Adas Yereim’s alleged misrepresentations did it finally seek to exercise its claimed right to void its policies. With respect to GuideOne’s right to rescind, only Rip Van Winkle slept longer. Such delay is unreasonable as a matter of law. See Saitta v. New York City Transit Auth. et al., 55 A.D.3d 422, 423, 866 N.Y.S.2d 62, 63 (1st Dep’t 2008) (holding that a five month delay is unreasonable", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nLaw § 3105 and breaches of warranties under N.Y. Insurance Law § 3106,” see Second Am. Compl. ¶ 78, now seeking as relief, not only the right to disclaim coverage for the Heschel incident but also to void the CGL and UMB policies ab initio “based on Adas Yereim’s material non-disclosures.” Id. at pg. 17 (emphasis added). Incredibly, it was not until approximately ten months after the latest date GuideOne learned of the material facts concerning Adas Yereim’s alleged misrepresentations did it finally seek to exercise its claimed right to void its policies. With respect to GuideOne’s right to rescind, only Rip Van Winkle slept longer. Such delay is unreasonable as a matter of law. See Saitta v. New York City Transit Auth. et al., 55 A.D.3d 422, 423, 866 N.Y.S.2d 62, 63 (1st Dep’t 2008) (holding that after learning the information justifying rescission an insurers four month delay in seeking it was unreasonable as a matter of law", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nLaw § 3105 and breaches of warranties under N.Y. Insurance Law § 3106,” see Second Am. Compl. ¶ 78, now seeking as relief, not only the right to disclaim coverage for the Heschel incident but also to void the CGL and UMB policies ab initio “based on Adas Yereim’s material non-disclosures.” Id. at pg. 17 (emphasis added). Incredibly, it was not until approximately ten months after the latest date GuideOne learned of the material facts concerning Adas Yereim’s alleged misrepresentations did it finally seek to exercise its claimed right to void its policies. With respect to GuideOne’s right to rescind, only Rip Van Winkle slept longer. Such delay is unreasonable as a matter of law. See Saitta v. New York City Transit Auth. et al., 55 A.D.3d 422, 423, 866 N.Y.S.2d 62, 63 (1st Dep’t 2008) (holding that a six month delay was unreasonable", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nLaw § 3105 and breaches of warranties under N.Y. Insurance Law § 3106,” see Second Am. Compl. ¶ 78, now seeking as relief, not only the right to disclaim coverage for the Heschel incident but also to void the CGL and UMB policies ab initio “based on Adas Yereim’s material non-disclosures.” Id. at pg. 17 (emphasis added). Incredibly, it was not until approximately ten months after the latest date GuideOne learned of the material facts concerning Adas Yereim’s alleged misrepresentations did it finally seek to exercise its claimed right to void its policies. With respect to GuideOne’s right to rescind, only Rip Van Winkle slept longer. Such delay is unreasonable as a matter of law. See Saitta v. New York City Transit Auth. et al., 55 A.D.3d 422, 423, 866 N.Y.S.2d 62, 63 (1st Dep’t 2008) (holding that a 13 month delay was unreasonable" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nto that before us. See, Mo. Ann. Stat. § 288.040 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1996); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 282-A:14 (1987 & Cum. Supp. 1995); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4141.31 (Anderson 1995); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 61-6-20 (1993); Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-7-303 (Supp. 1995). However, it does not appear that these states have addressed the issue presented by this case. A review of the opinions from states with dissimilar statutes shows that they are split on the issue of whether the receipt of either workers’ compensation or unemployment benefits bars or causes an offset from the receipt of the other. As urged by Porter, some states allow awards of both workers’ compensation and unemployment benefits simultaneously. See, e.g., Levi Strauss & Co. v. Laymance, 38 Ark. App. 55, 828 S.W.2d 356 (1992) (holding that in absence of statute prohibiting recovery claimant may receive workers compensation and unemployment benefits simultaneously", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nto that before us. See, Mo. Ann. Stat. § 288.040 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1996); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 282-A:14 (1987 & Cum. Supp. 1995); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4141.31 (Anderson 1995); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 61-6-20 (1993); Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-7-303 (Supp. 1995). However, it does not appear that these states have addressed the issue presented by this case. A review of the opinions from states with dissimilar statutes shows that they are split on the issue of whether the receipt of either workers’ compensation or unemployment benefits bars or causes an offset from the receipt of the other. As urged by Porter, some states allow awards of both workers’ compensation and unemployment benefits simultaneously. See, e.g., Levi Strauss & Co. v. Laymance, 38 Ark. App. 55, 828 S.W.2d 356 (1992) (holding that a totally disabled claimant whose preexisting osteoarthritis was temporarily aggravated by her employment was entitled to temporary total disability benefits but not permanent total disability benefits because there was no causal connection between the temporary aggravation and the permanent disability", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nto that before us. See, Mo. Ann. Stat. § 288.040 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1996); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 282-A:14 (1987 & Cum. Supp. 1995); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4141.31 (Anderson 1995); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 61-6-20 (1993); Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-7-303 (Supp. 1995). However, it does not appear that these states have addressed the issue presented by this case. A review of the opinions from states with dissimilar statutes shows that they are split on the issue of whether the receipt of either workers’ compensation or unemployment benefits bars or causes an offset from the receipt of the other. As urged by Porter, some states allow awards of both workers’ compensation and unemployment benefits simultaneously. See, e.g., Levi Strauss & Co. v. Laymance, 38 Ark. App. 55, 828 S.W.2d 356 (1992) (holding that workers compensation statutes do not prohibit claimant from receiving permanent partial disability benefits from prior accident concurrently with temporary total disability benefits from subsequent injury", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nto that before us. See, Mo. Ann. Stat. § 288.040 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1996); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 282-A:14 (1987 & Cum. Supp. 1995); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4141.31 (Anderson 1995); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 61-6-20 (1993); Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-7-303 (Supp. 1995). However, it does not appear that these states have addressed the issue presented by this case. A review of the opinions from states with dissimilar statutes shows that they are split on the issue of whether the receipt of either workers’ compensation or unemployment benefits bars or causes an offset from the receipt of the other. As urged by Porter, some states allow awards of both workers’ compensation and unemployment benefits simultaneously. See, e.g., Levi Strauss & Co. v. Laymance, 38 Ark. App. 55, 828 S.W.2d 356 (1992) (holding that disability pension benefits could be offset against both temporary and total permanent disability compensation benefits", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nto that before us. See, Mo. Ann. Stat. § 288.040 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1996); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 282-A:14 (1987 & Cum. Supp. 1995); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4141.31 (Anderson 1995); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 61-6-20 (1993); Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-7-303 (Supp. 1995). However, it does not appear that these states have addressed the issue presented by this case. A review of the opinions from states with dissimilar statutes shows that they are split on the issue of whether the receipt of either workers’ compensation or unemployment benefits bars or causes an offset from the receipt of the other. As urged by Porter, some states allow awards of both workers’ compensation and unemployment benefits simultaneously. See, e.g., Levi Strauss & Co. v. Laymance, 38 Ark. App. 55, 828 S.W.2d 356 (1992) (holding that claimant may simultaneously receive unemployment benefits and workers compensation for temporary partial disability where statute only precludes receipt of workers compensation for temporary total or permanent total disability if claimant is receiving unemployment benefits" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nMillman v. Brinkley, 2004 WL 2284505, at *3 (N.D.Ga. Oct. 1, 2004) (appointing lead plaintiffs on the basis of: (1) continuous ownership of stock by the selected plaintiffs; (2) failure to file a verified complaint by another applicant for lead plaintiff; and (3) the strength of their lawyers' pleadings); Dollens v. Zionts, 2001 WL 1543524, at *5-6 (N.D.Ill. Dec. 4, 2001) (evaluating the plaintiff's financial stake in the defendant-corporation, status as institutional investors, quality of pleadings, and vig-orousness of prosecution). 67 . See Kenney v. Koenig, 426 F.Supp.2d 1175, 1187-88 (D.Colo.2006) (denying plaintiff's request to dismiss without prejudice and with leave to amend); see also West Coast Mgmt. & Capital LLC v. Carrier Access Corp., 914 A.2d 636 (Del.Ch.2006) (holding that a demand for jury trial should be denied if the issues in the original complaint and the amended complaint turn on the same matrix of facts", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nMillman v. Brinkley, 2004 WL 2284505, at *3 (N.D.Ga. Oct. 1, 2004) (appointing lead plaintiffs on the basis of: (1) continuous ownership of stock by the selected plaintiffs; (2) failure to file a verified complaint by another applicant for lead plaintiff; and (3) the strength of their lawyers' pleadings); Dollens v. Zionts, 2001 WL 1543524, at *5-6 (N.D.Ill. Dec. 4, 2001) (evaluating the plaintiff's financial stake in the defendant-corporation, status as institutional investors, quality of pleadings, and vig-orousness of prosecution). 67 . See Kenney v. Koenig, 426 F.Supp.2d 1175, 1187-88 (D.Colo.2006) (denying plaintiff's request to dismiss without prejudice and with leave to amend); see also West Coast Mgmt. & Capital LLC v. Carrier Access Corp., 914 A.2d 636 (Del.Ch.2006) (holding that plaintiffs wishing to inspect books and records for purposes of pleading demand futility in an amended derivative complaint had a proper purpose", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nMillman v. Brinkley, 2004 WL 2284505, at *3 (N.D.Ga. Oct. 1, 2004) (appointing lead plaintiffs on the basis of: (1) continuous ownership of stock by the selected plaintiffs; (2) failure to file a verified complaint by another applicant for lead plaintiff; and (3) the strength of their lawyers' pleadings); Dollens v. Zionts, 2001 WL 1543524, at *5-6 (N.D.Ill. Dec. 4, 2001) (evaluating the plaintiff's financial stake in the defendant-corporation, status as institutional investors, quality of pleadings, and vig-orousness of prosecution). 67 . See Kenney v. Koenig, 426 F.Supp.2d 1175, 1187-88 (D.Colo.2006) (denying plaintiff's request to dismiss without prejudice and with leave to amend); see also West Coast Mgmt. & Capital LLC v. Carrier Access Corp., 914 A.2d 636 (Del.Ch.2006) (holding that if a plaintiff cannot demonstrate he is able to amend his complaint in a manner which would survive dismissal opportunity to replead is rightfully denied", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nMillman v. Brinkley, 2004 WL 2284505, at *3 (N.D.Ga. Oct. 1, 2004) (appointing lead plaintiffs on the basis of: (1) continuous ownership of stock by the selected plaintiffs; (2) failure to file a verified complaint by another applicant for lead plaintiff; and (3) the strength of their lawyers' pleadings); Dollens v. Zionts, 2001 WL 1543524, at *5-6 (N.D.Ill. Dec. 4, 2001) (evaluating the plaintiff's financial stake in the defendant-corporation, status as institutional investors, quality of pleadings, and vig-orousness of prosecution). 67 . See Kenney v. Koenig, 426 F.Supp.2d 1175, 1187-88 (D.Colo.2006) (denying plaintiff's request to dismiss without prejudice and with leave to amend); see also West Coast Mgmt. & Capital LLC v. Carrier Access Corp., 914 A.2d 636 (Del.Ch.2006) (holding that the trial court properly struck the amended complaint when the plaintiff offered no reason to refute the trial courts finding that the new allegations in the amended complaint were based on facts the plaintiff had known since the beginning of the action", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nMillman v. Brinkley, 2004 WL 2284505, at *3 (N.D.Ga. Oct. 1, 2004) (appointing lead plaintiffs on the basis of: (1) continuous ownership of stock by the selected plaintiffs; (2) failure to file a verified complaint by another applicant for lead plaintiff; and (3) the strength of their lawyers' pleadings); Dollens v. Zionts, 2001 WL 1543524, at *5-6 (N.D.Ill. Dec. 4, 2001) (evaluating the plaintiff's financial stake in the defendant-corporation, status as institutional investors, quality of pleadings, and vig-orousness of prosecution). 67 . See Kenney v. Koenig, 426 F.Supp.2d 1175, 1187-88 (D.Colo.2006) (denying plaintiff's request to dismiss without prejudice and with leave to amend); see also West Coast Mgmt. & Capital LLC v. Carrier Access Corp., 914 A.2d 636 (Del.Ch.2006) (holding that plaintiff lacked a proper purpose for bringing a section 220 action because the federal judge in kenney had denied plaintiffs request to replead demand futility in an amended complaint" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n(Doc. 21 at p. 8 n.6 (citing Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1158-59 (10th Cir.2013) (en banc) (Gorsuch, J., concurring)). In Hobby Lobby, three of the eight judges sitting on the en banc court determined the AIA is non-jurisdietional. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1152, 1157-59. Defendants are correct in arguing such a determination is not binding on this Court and does not alter prior Tenth Circuit (and Supreme Court) case law that held the AIA is a jurisdictional bar where it applies. (See Doc. 27 at p. 7.) See, e.g., Jefferson Cnty. v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423, 434, 119 S.Ct. 2069, 144 L.Ed.2d 408 (1999) (describing the AIA as “depriving courts of jurisdiction over [certain] suits”); Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 749, 94 S.Ct. 2038, 40 L.Ed.2d 496 (1974) (holding the fourth circuit did not err in holding that 7421a the aia deprived the district court of jurisdiction", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n(Doc. 21 at p. 8 n.6 (citing Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1158-59 (10th Cir.2013) (en banc) (Gorsuch, J., concurring)). In Hobby Lobby, three of the eight judges sitting on the en banc court determined the AIA is non-jurisdietional. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1152, 1157-59. Defendants are correct in arguing such a determination is not binding on this Court and does not alter prior Tenth Circuit (and Supreme Court) case law that held the AIA is a jurisdictional bar where it applies. (See Doc. 27 at p. 7.) See, e.g., Jefferson Cnty. v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423, 434, 119 S.Ct. 2069, 144 L.Ed.2d 408 (1999) (describing the AIA as “depriving courts of jurisdiction over [certain] suits”); Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 749, 94 S.Ct. 2038, 40 L.Ed.2d 496 (1974) (holding that because the circuit court did not have subjectmatter jurisdiction over the unlawfuldetainer action the district courts unauthorized transfer of the action could not transfer jurisdiction over that action to the circuit court", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n(Doc. 21 at p. 8 n.6 (citing Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1158-59 (10th Cir.2013) (en banc) (Gorsuch, J., concurring)). In Hobby Lobby, three of the eight judges sitting on the en banc court determined the AIA is non-jurisdietional. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1152, 1157-59. Defendants are correct in arguing such a determination is not binding on this Court and does not alter prior Tenth Circuit (and Supreme Court) case law that held the AIA is a jurisdictional bar where it applies. (See Doc. 27 at p. 7.) See, e.g., Jefferson Cnty. v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423, 434, 119 S.Ct. 2069, 144 L.Ed.2d 408 (1999) (describing the AIA as “depriving courts of jurisdiction over [certain] suits”); Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 749, 94 S.Ct. 2038, 40 L.Ed.2d 496 (1974) (holding that trial court did not err", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n(Doc. 21 at p. 8 n.6 (citing Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1158-59 (10th Cir.2013) (en banc) (Gorsuch, J., concurring)). In Hobby Lobby, three of the eight judges sitting on the en banc court determined the AIA is non-jurisdietional. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1152, 1157-59. Defendants are correct in arguing such a determination is not binding on this Court and does not alter prior Tenth Circuit (and Supreme Court) case law that held the AIA is a jurisdictional bar where it applies. (See Doc. 27 at p. 7.) See, e.g., Jefferson Cnty. v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423, 434, 119 S.Ct. 2069, 144 L.Ed.2d 408 (1999) (describing the AIA as “depriving courts of jurisdiction over [certain] suits”); Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 749, 94 S.Ct. 2038, 40 L.Ed.2d 496 (1974) (holding that when the district court improperly purported to transfer to the circuit court an action over which the circuit court lacked subjectmatter jurisdiction the circuit court was without jurisdiction to enter its judgment which was void and dismissing the appeal from that void judgment", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n(Doc. 21 at p. 8 n.6 (citing Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1158-59 (10th Cir.2013) (en banc) (Gorsuch, J., concurring)). In Hobby Lobby, three of the eight judges sitting on the en banc court determined the AIA is non-jurisdietional. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1152, 1157-59. Defendants are correct in arguing such a determination is not binding on this Court and does not alter prior Tenth Circuit (and Supreme Court) case law that held the AIA is a jurisdictional bar where it applies. (See Doc. 27 at p. 7.) See, e.g., Jefferson Cnty. v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423, 434, 119 S.Ct. 2069, 144 L.Ed.2d 408 (1999) (describing the AIA as “depriving courts of jurisdiction over [certain] suits”); Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 749, 94 S.Ct. 2038, 40 L.Ed.2d 496 (1974) (holding that a transfer order issued by a district court in another circuit is reviewable only in the circuit of the transferor district court" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\n2d 353, 361 (1995). The term “wrongfully caused” refers to the point in time in which “the injured person becomes possessed of sufficient information concerning his injury and its cause to put a reasonable person on inquiry to determine whether actionable conduct is involved.” Knox College v. Celotex Corp., 88 Ill. 2d 407, 416 (1981). Historically, the limitations period for bringing a wrongful death action has been regarded as a condition precedent, not modified or affected by the general statute of limitations. Fure v. Sherman Hospital, 64 Ill. App. 3d 259, 264 (1978). However, as plaintiff correctly notes, the discovery rule has been applied to wrongful death actions under certain circumstances. See, e.g., Coleman v. Hinsdale Emergency Medical Corp., 108 Ill. App. 3d 525, 529 (1982) (holding that a failure to include a beneficiary in a wrongful death action is a defect because the wrongful death act restricts plaintiffs to a single action", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\n2d 353, 361 (1995). The term “wrongfully caused” refers to the point in time in which “the injured person becomes possessed of sufficient information concerning his injury and its cause to put a reasonable person on inquiry to determine whether actionable conduct is involved.” Knox College v. Celotex Corp., 88 Ill. 2d 407, 416 (1981). Historically, the limitations period for bringing a wrongful death action has been regarded as a condition precedent, not modified or affected by the general statute of limitations. Fure v. Sherman Hospital, 64 Ill. App. 3d 259, 264 (1978). However, as plaintiff correctly notes, the discovery rule has been applied to wrongful death actions under certain circumstances. See, e.g., Coleman v. Hinsdale Emergency Medical Corp., 108 Ill. App. 3d 525, 529 (1982) (holding that a surviving spouse can bring a wrongful death action based on medical malpractice", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\n2d 353, 361 (1995). The term “wrongfully caused” refers to the point in time in which “the injured person becomes possessed of sufficient information concerning his injury and its cause to put a reasonable person on inquiry to determine whether actionable conduct is involved.” Knox College v. Celotex Corp., 88 Ill. 2d 407, 416 (1981). Historically, the limitations period for bringing a wrongful death action has been regarded as a condition precedent, not modified or affected by the general statute of limitations. Fure v. Sherman Hospital, 64 Ill. App. 3d 259, 264 (1978). However, as plaintiff correctly notes, the discovery rule has been applied to wrongful death actions under certain circumstances. See, e.g., Coleman v. Hinsdale Emergency Medical Corp., 108 Ill. App. 3d 525, 529 (1982) (recognizing cause of action for wrongful death", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\n2d 353, 361 (1995). The term “wrongfully caused” refers to the point in time in which “the injured person becomes possessed of sufficient information concerning his injury and its cause to put a reasonable person on inquiry to determine whether actionable conduct is involved.” Knox College v. Celotex Corp., 88 Ill. 2d 407, 416 (1981). Historically, the limitations period for bringing a wrongful death action has been regarded as a condition precedent, not modified or affected by the general statute of limitations. Fure v. Sherman Hospital, 64 Ill. App. 3d 259, 264 (1978). However, as plaintiff correctly notes, the discovery rule has been applied to wrongful death actions under certain circumstances. See, e.g., Coleman v. Hinsdale Emergency Medical Corp., 108 Ill. App. 3d 525, 529 (1982) (holding that plaintiffs failure to prove decedents death was caused by the wrongful acts of the defendant precludes any recovery of wrongful death damages under mississippis wrongful death statute", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\n2d 353, 361 (1995). The term “wrongfully caused” refers to the point in time in which “the injured person becomes possessed of sufficient information concerning his injury and its cause to put a reasonable person on inquiry to determine whether actionable conduct is involved.” Knox College v. Celotex Corp., 88 Ill. 2d 407, 416 (1981). Historically, the limitations period for bringing a wrongful death action has been regarded as a condition precedent, not modified or affected by the general statute of limitations. Fure v. Sherman Hospital, 64 Ill. App. 3d 259, 264 (1978). However, as plaintiff correctly notes, the discovery rule has been applied to wrongful death actions under certain circumstances. See, e.g., Coleman v. Hinsdale Emergency Medical Corp., 108 Ill. App. 3d 525, 529 (1982) (holding that discovery rule applied to wrongful death action predicated on medical malpractice" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwith the Canadian law governing the dispute.” Both of these concerns are overwrought. As the majority noted, where a foreign defendant is forced to litigate in the United States, “great care and reserve should be exercised before personal jurisdiction is exercised” because of the heightened burden on the defendant. OMI, 149 F.3d at 1096. However, as the Supreme Court noted nearly a half century ago, “modern transportation and communication have made it much less burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in a State where he engages in economic activity.” McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223, 78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957). Since that time, transportation has become even more convenient. See Sculptchair, Inc. v. Century Arts, 94 F.3d 623, 632 (11th Cir.1996) (recognizing that the burden of persuasion for a showing of prejudice was on the defendant", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwith the Canadian law governing the dispute.” Both of these concerns are overwrought. As the majority noted, where a foreign defendant is forced to litigate in the United States, “great care and reserve should be exercised before personal jurisdiction is exercised” because of the heightened burden on the defendant. OMI, 149 F.3d at 1096. However, as the Supreme Court noted nearly a half century ago, “modern transportation and communication have made it much less burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in a State where he engages in economic activity.” McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223, 78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957). Since that time, transportation has become even more convenient. See Sculptchair, Inc. v. Century Arts, 94 F.3d 623, 632 (11th Cir.1996) (holding that the burden is on the plaintiff", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwith the Canadian law governing the dispute.” Both of these concerns are overwrought. As the majority noted, where a foreign defendant is forced to litigate in the United States, “great care and reserve should be exercised before personal jurisdiction is exercised” because of the heightened burden on the defendant. OMI, 149 F.3d at 1096. However, as the Supreme Court noted nearly a half century ago, “modern transportation and communication have made it much less burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in a State where he engages in economic activity.” McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223, 78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957). Since that time, transportation has become even more convenient. See Sculptchair, Inc. v. Century Arts, 94 F.3d 623, 632 (11th Cir.1996) (holding that a robbery defendant was not entitled to a compulsion instruction in the absence of a claim that he or the victim was the target of a specific threat forcing the defendant to participate in the robbery", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwith the Canadian law governing the dispute.” Both of these concerns are overwrought. As the majority noted, where a foreign defendant is forced to litigate in the United States, “great care and reserve should be exercised before personal jurisdiction is exercised” because of the heightened burden on the defendant. OMI, 149 F.3d at 1096. However, as the Supreme Court noted nearly a half century ago, “modern transportation and communication have made it much less burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in a State where he engages in economic activity.” McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223, 78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957). Since that time, transportation has become even more convenient. See Sculptchair, Inc. v. Century Arts, 94 F.3d 623, 632 (11th Cir.1996) (recognizing burden", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwith the Canadian law governing the dispute.” Both of these concerns are overwrought. As the majority noted, where a foreign defendant is forced to litigate in the United States, “great care and reserve should be exercised before personal jurisdiction is exercised” because of the heightened burden on the defendant. OMI, 149 F.3d at 1096. However, as the Supreme Court noted nearly a half century ago, “modern transportation and communication have made it much less burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in a State where he engages in economic activity.” McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223, 78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957). Since that time, transportation has become even more convenient. See Sculptchair, Inc. v. Century Arts, 94 F.3d 623, 632 (11th Cir.1996) (holding the burden of forcing a canadian defendant to litigate in florida was uncompelling" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nto cases brought under the APA, as the test was \"most usefully understood as a gloss on the meaning of § 702.” Clarke, 107 S.Ct. 758 n. 16. The Court did not purport to speak beyond cases brought under the \"generous review provisions\" of the APA, id. (quoting Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 156, 90 S.Ct. at 831), an act to be construed as \"serving a broad remedial purpose.” Id. at 755 (quoting Data Processing). When a court adjudicates a case brought under a specific statutory private right of action it may need to analyze more carefully what actions Congress contemplated in creating that cause of action. Id. (citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975). See also Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 484, 490, 93 L.Ed.2d 427 (1986) (holding that plaintiff seeking injunction under clayton act 16 must allege an injury of the type the antitrust laws were designed to prevent ", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nto cases brought under the APA, as the test was \"most usefully understood as a gloss on the meaning of § 702.” Clarke, 107 S.Ct. 758 n. 16. The Court did not purport to speak beyond cases brought under the \"generous review provisions\" of the APA, id. (quoting Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 156, 90 S.Ct. at 831), an act to be construed as \"serving a broad remedial purpose.” Id. at 755 (quoting Data Processing). When a court adjudicates a case brought under a specific statutory private right of action it may need to analyze more carefully what actions Congress contemplated in creating that cause of action. Id. (citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975). See also Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 484, 490, 93 L.Ed.2d 427 (1986) (holding that plaintiff must show antitrust injury meaning injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and which flows from defendants unlawful acts", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nto cases brought under the APA, as the test was \"most usefully understood as a gloss on the meaning of § 702.” Clarke, 107 S.Ct. 758 n. 16. The Court did not purport to speak beyond cases brought under the \"generous review provisions\" of the APA, id. (quoting Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 156, 90 S.Ct. at 831), an act to be construed as \"serving a broad remedial purpose.” Id. at 755 (quoting Data Processing). When a court adjudicates a case brought under a specific statutory private right of action it may need to analyze more carefully what actions Congress contemplated in creating that cause of action. Id. (citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975). See also Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 484, 490, 93 L.Ed.2d 427 (1986) (holding that a plaintiff must show antitrust injury in order to bring an antitrust lawsuit", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nto cases brought under the APA, as the test was \"most usefully understood as a gloss on the meaning of § 702.” Clarke, 107 S.Ct. 758 n. 16. The Court did not purport to speak beyond cases brought under the \"generous review provisions\" of the APA, id. (quoting Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 156, 90 S.Ct. at 831), an act to be construed as \"serving a broad remedial purpose.” Id. at 755 (quoting Data Processing). When a court adjudicates a case brought under a specific statutory private right of action it may need to analyze more carefully what actions Congress contemplated in creating that cause of action. Id. (citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975). See also Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 484, 490, 93 L.Ed.2d 427 (1986) (holding that the fcc was not given the power to decide antitrust issues and that its actions do not prevent enforcement of the antitrust laws in federal courts", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nto cases brought under the APA, as the test was \"most usefully understood as a gloss on the meaning of § 702.” Clarke, 107 S.Ct. 758 n. 16. The Court did not purport to speak beyond cases brought under the \"generous review provisions\" of the APA, id. (quoting Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 156, 90 S.Ct. at 831), an act to be construed as \"serving a broad remedial purpose.” Id. at 755 (quoting Data Processing). When a court adjudicates a case brought under a specific statutory private right of action it may need to analyze more carefully what actions Congress contemplated in creating that cause of action. Id. (citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975). See also Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 484, 490, 93 L.Ed.2d 427 (1986) (holding that to have standing to bring a 2a robinsonpatman claim a private plaintiff must make some showing of actual injury attributable to something the antitrust laws were designed to prevent" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Fed.R.Evid. 403. Regarding Defendant’s arguments that various statistical calculations should be held inadmissible under Rules 401, 402, or 403, the Court observes that Defendant himself acknowledges that “statistical probabilities are basic to DNA analysis.” Davis, 40 F.3d at 1075. The Court finds that statistical calculations accompanying DNA evidence are relevant and “of consequence,” under Rules 401 and 402. Careful presentation of statistical evidence, with explanations by experts — either the Government’s or Defendant’s — can ensure that the jury is not misled or confused, and that there is no other type of unfair prejudice. See Fed.R.Evid. 403; Chischilly, 30 F.3d at 1158 (recognizing that rule 608b prior bad acts evidence admissible as probative of truthfulness is subject to rule 403 balancing", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Fed.R.Evid. 403. Regarding Defendant’s arguments that various statistical calculations should be held inadmissible under Rules 401, 402, or 403, the Court observes that Defendant himself acknowledges that “statistical probabilities are basic to DNA analysis.” Davis, 40 F.3d at 1075. The Court finds that statistical calculations accompanying DNA evidence are relevant and “of consequence,” under Rules 401 and 402. Careful presentation of statistical evidence, with explanations by experts — either the Government’s or Defendant’s — can ensure that the jury is not misled or confused, and that there is no other type of unfair prejudice. See Fed.R.Evid. 403; Chischilly, 30 F.3d at 1158 (recognizing the possibility but denying relief", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Fed.R.Evid. 403. Regarding Defendant’s arguments that various statistical calculations should be held inadmissible under Rules 401, 402, or 403, the Court observes that Defendant himself acknowledges that “statistical probabilities are basic to DNA analysis.” Davis, 40 F.3d at 1075. The Court finds that statistical calculations accompanying DNA evidence are relevant and “of consequence,” under Rules 401 and 402. Careful presentation of statistical evidence, with explanations by experts — either the Government’s or Defendant’s — can ensure that the jury is not misled or confused, and that there is no other type of unfair prejudice. See Fed.R.Evid. 403; Chischilly, 30 F.3d at 1158 (recognizing possibility of problems but holding there was no rule 403 violation in admitting statistics", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Fed.R.Evid. 403. Regarding Defendant’s arguments that various statistical calculations should be held inadmissible under Rules 401, 402, or 403, the Court observes that Defendant himself acknowledges that “statistical probabilities are basic to DNA analysis.” Davis, 40 F.3d at 1075. The Court finds that statistical calculations accompanying DNA evidence are relevant and “of consequence,” under Rules 401 and 402. Careful presentation of statistical evidence, with explanations by experts — either the Government’s or Defendant’s — can ensure that the jury is not misled or confused, and that there is no other type of unfair prejudice. See Fed.R.Evid. 403; Chischilly, 30 F.3d at 1158 (holding that an error is harmless if there is no reasonable possibility that it contributed to the conviction", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Fed.R.Evid. 403. Regarding Defendant’s arguments that various statistical calculations should be held inadmissible under Rules 401, 402, or 403, the Court observes that Defendant himself acknowledges that “statistical probabilities are basic to DNA analysis.” Davis, 40 F.3d at 1075. The Court finds that statistical calculations accompanying DNA evidence are relevant and “of consequence,” under Rules 401 and 402. Careful presentation of statistical evidence, with explanations by experts — either the Government’s or Defendant’s — can ensure that the jury is not misled or confused, and that there is no other type of unfair prejudice. See Fed.R.Evid. 403; Chischilly, 30 F.3d at 1158 (recognizing rule" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthat the trial court erred in listing McCracken on the verdict form so as to permit the jury to apportion fault between him and Rowell. We agree. Appellants correctly argue that McCracken’s act of committing suicide by jumping in front of a fifty-thousand pound tractor-trailer traveling at seventy miles per hour was an intentional, rather than a negligent, act. See Wyke v. Polk County Sch. Bd., 137 F.3d 1292, 1293 (11th Cir.1998) (affirming the trial court’s refusal to -include the name of a teenage boy who committed suicide on the verdict form because the boy’s suicide constituted an intentional act). Therefore, McCracken’s name should not have been, and should not be, included on the verdict form. See id.; see also Stellas v. Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc., 702 So.2d 232, 233-34 (Fla.1997) (holding that section 319s mandate that the employer is subrogated to the extent of compensation payable does not mean that the sole right to recover from the tortfeasor is in the employer rather the right of action against the tortfeasor remains in the injured employee and suit is to be commenced in his name", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthat the trial court erred in listing McCracken on the verdict form so as to permit the jury to apportion fault between him and Rowell. We agree. Appellants correctly argue that McCracken’s act of committing suicide by jumping in front of a fifty-thousand pound tractor-trailer traveling at seventy miles per hour was an intentional, rather than a negligent, act. See Wyke v. Polk County Sch. Bd., 137 F.3d 1292, 1293 (11th Cir.1998) (affirming the trial court’s refusal to -include the name of a teenage boy who committed suicide on the verdict form because the boy’s suicide constituted an intentional act). Therefore, McCracken’s name should not have been, and should not be, included on the verdict form. See id.; see also Stellas v. Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc., 702 So.2d 232, 233-34 (Fla.1997) (holding that a typographical error on the jury verdict form was harmless error because the trial court polled the jurors after the mistake was discovered to make sure that they understood the verdict that they had entered", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthat the trial court erred in listing McCracken on the verdict form so as to permit the jury to apportion fault between him and Rowell. We agree. Appellants correctly argue that McCracken’s act of committing suicide by jumping in front of a fifty-thousand pound tractor-trailer traveling at seventy miles per hour was an intentional, rather than a negligent, act. See Wyke v. Polk County Sch. Bd., 137 F.3d 1292, 1293 (11th Cir.1998) (affirming the trial court’s refusal to -include the name of a teenage boy who committed suicide on the verdict form because the boy’s suicide constituted an intentional act). Therefore, McCracken’s name should not have been, and should not be, included on the verdict form. See id.; see also Stellas v. Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc., 702 So.2d 232, 233-34 (Fla.1997) (holding that right of one joint tortfeasor to implead a second joint tortfeasor and have the jury apportion the damages according to their relative degrees of fault was not merely a procedural right but a substantive right", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthat the trial court erred in listing McCracken on the verdict form so as to permit the jury to apportion fault between him and Rowell. We agree. Appellants correctly argue that McCracken’s act of committing suicide by jumping in front of a fifty-thousand pound tractor-trailer traveling at seventy miles per hour was an intentional, rather than a negligent, act. See Wyke v. Polk County Sch. Bd., 137 F.3d 1292, 1293 (11th Cir.1998) (affirming the trial court’s refusal to -include the name of a teenage boy who committed suicide on the verdict form because the boy’s suicide constituted an intentional act). Therefore, McCracken’s name should not have been, and should not be, included on the verdict form. See id.; see also Stellas v. Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc., 702 So.2d 232, 233-34 (Fla.1997) (holding that it was error to permit the name of a nonparty intentional tortfeasors name to appear on the verdict form so as to permit the jury to apportion fault between the nonparty and the negligent tortfeasor", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthat the trial court erred in listing McCracken on the verdict form so as to permit the jury to apportion fault between him and Rowell. We agree. Appellants correctly argue that McCracken’s act of committing suicide by jumping in front of a fifty-thousand pound tractor-trailer traveling at seventy miles per hour was an intentional, rather than a negligent, act. See Wyke v. Polk County Sch. Bd., 137 F.3d 1292, 1293 (11th Cir.1998) (affirming the trial court’s refusal to -include the name of a teenage boy who committed suicide on the verdict form because the boy’s suicide constituted an intentional act). Therefore, McCracken’s name should not have been, and should not be, included on the verdict form. See id.; see also Stellas v. Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc., 702 So.2d 232, 233-34 (Fla.1997) (holding that it would be inequitable to allow a town to deny a permit based on a new ordinance after the property owner was denied a permit three times and brought suit to determine the validity of the prior ordinance" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\narising out of the same criminal episode for traveling to meet a minor under section 847.0135(4)(a), Florida Statutes (2013), and unlawful use of a two-way com-njunications device under section 934.215, Florida Statutes (2013), violate double jeopardy. Holt v. State, No. 5D14-3269, 173 So.3d 1079, 2015 WL 4768997 (Fla. 5th DCA Aug. 14, 2015). Furthermore, our sister courts have recently determined that, when the charged conduct arises out of. the same criminal episode, a charge for unlawful use of a two-way communications device under section 934.215 is subsumed within a charge of solicitation under section 847.0135(3) and subsumed within a charge of travelling to meet a minor after solicitation under section 847.0135(4). Hamilton v. State, 163 So.3d 1277, 1279 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (recognizing that an indictment must contain the elements of the offense charged fairly inform a defendant of the charge and enable the defendant to plead double jeopardy as a defense in a future prosecution for the same offense", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\narising out of the same criminal episode for traveling to meet a minor under section 847.0135(4)(a), Florida Statutes (2013), and unlawful use of a two-way com-njunications device under section 934.215, Florida Statutes (2013), violate double jeopardy. Holt v. State, No. 5D14-3269, 173 So.3d 1079, 2015 WL 4768997 (Fla. 5th DCA Aug. 14, 2015). Furthermore, our sister courts have recently determined that, when the charged conduct arises out of. the same criminal episode, a charge for unlawful use of a two-way communications device under section 934.215 is subsumed within a charge of solicitation under section 847.0135(3) and subsumed within a charge of travelling to meet a minor after solicitation under section 847.0135(4). Hamilton v. State, 163 So.3d 1277, 1279 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (holding that two offenses are separate for the purposes of 4a12a1 where all the elements of the first offense occurred before any activity forming the basis of the second offense", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\narising out of the same criminal episode for traveling to meet a minor under section 847.0135(4)(a), Florida Statutes (2013), and unlawful use of a two-way com-njunications device under section 934.215, Florida Statutes (2013), violate double jeopardy. Holt v. State, No. 5D14-3269, 173 So.3d 1079, 2015 WL 4768997 (Fla. 5th DCA Aug. 14, 2015). Furthermore, our sister courts have recently determined that, when the charged conduct arises out of. the same criminal episode, a charge for unlawful use of a two-way communications device under section 934.215 is subsumed within a charge of solicitation under section 847.0135(3) and subsumed within a charge of travelling to meet a minor after solicitation under section 847.0135(4). Hamilton v. State, 163 So.3d 1277, 1279 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (holding that when state charges defendant with both unlawfully using twoway communications device and traveling during same time period state charges single criminal episode regardless of whether evidence could support finding of separate criminal episodes and double jeopardy considerations require that communications charge be subsumed within traveling charge", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\narising out of the same criminal episode for traveling to meet a minor under section 847.0135(4)(a), Florida Statutes (2013), and unlawful use of a two-way com-njunications device under section 934.215, Florida Statutes (2013), violate double jeopardy. Holt v. State, No. 5D14-3269, 173 So.3d 1079, 2015 WL 4768997 (Fla. 5th DCA Aug. 14, 2015). Furthermore, our sister courts have recently determined that, when the charged conduct arises out of. the same criminal episode, a charge for unlawful use of a two-way communications device under section 934.215 is subsumed within a charge of solicitation under section 847.0135(3) and subsumed within a charge of travelling to meet a minor after solicitation under section 847.0135(4). Hamilton v. State, 163 So.3d 1277, 1279 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (holding that the offense of unlawful use of a twoway communications device does not contain any elements that are distinct from the offense of traveling to meet a minor", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\narising out of the same criminal episode for traveling to meet a minor under section 847.0135(4)(a), Florida Statutes (2013), and unlawful use of a two-way com-njunications device under section 934.215, Florida Statutes (2013), violate double jeopardy. Holt v. State, No. 5D14-3269, 173 So.3d 1079, 2015 WL 4768997 (Fla. 5th DCA Aug. 14, 2015). Furthermore, our sister courts have recently determined that, when the charged conduct arises out of. the same criminal episode, a charge for unlawful use of a two-way communications device under section 934.215 is subsumed within a charge of solicitation under section 847.0135(3) and subsumed within a charge of travelling to meet a minor after solicitation under section 847.0135(4). Hamilton v. State, 163 So.3d 1277, 1279 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (holding that for conduct arising out of the same criminal episode the elements for the offense of unlawful use of a twoway communications device are subsumed within the soliciting and traveling offenses" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nis a necessary element of a computer-based corresponding structure. See WMS Gaming, 184 F.3d at 1349. The '930 Patent describes what result the A/D Converter and Microprocessor 24 in combination with the switch 28 accomplish, which is increasing the current to a higher level from the low level initially applied to the data signaling pair. See '930 Patent, fig 1. The' '930 Patent also gives a generalized indication as to the way the control means performs the function, which is detecting a varying level voltage drop across resistors 26 and 30. Id. However, there is insufficient disclosure of the details of a particular algorithm, so that the scope of the control means limitation and where the boundary of infringement and non-infringemen .Supp.2d 512, 518 (E.D.Tex.2006) (Clark, J.) (holding that claims that contradicted the specification were invalid as indefinite", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nis a necessary element of a computer-based corresponding structure. See WMS Gaming, 184 F.3d at 1349. The '930 Patent describes what result the A/D Converter and Microprocessor 24 in combination with the switch 28 accomplish, which is increasing the current to a higher level from the low level initially applied to the data signaling pair. See '930 Patent, fig 1. The' '930 Patent also gives a generalized indication as to the way the control means performs the function, which is detecting a varying level voltage drop across resistors 26 and 30. Id. However, there is insufficient disclosure of the details of a particular algorithm, so that the scope of the control means limitation and where the boundary of infringement and non-infringemen .Supp.2d 512, 518 (E.D.Tex.2006) (Clark, J.) (holding that claim that included control means for automatically operating said valving limitation was indefinite as the specification merely disclosed a diagram with a box labeled control and a stated the invention may be controlled automatically by known differential pressure valving and control equipment", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nis a necessary element of a computer-based corresponding structure. See WMS Gaming, 184 F.3d at 1349. The '930 Patent describes what result the A/D Converter and Microprocessor 24 in combination with the switch 28 accomplish, which is increasing the current to a higher level from the low level initially applied to the data signaling pair. See '930 Patent, fig 1. The' '930 Patent also gives a generalized indication as to the way the control means performs the function, which is detecting a varying level voltage drop across resistors 26 and 30. Id. However, there is insufficient disclosure of the details of a particular algorithm, so that the scope of the control means limitation and where the boundary of infringement and non-infringemen .Supp.2d 512, 518 (E.D.Tex.2006) (Clark, J.) (holding claim that included database editing means for generating and embedding limitation was indefinite where the specification merely restated that software performed the recited function", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nis a necessary element of a computer-based corresponding structure. See WMS Gaming, 184 F.3d at 1349. The '930 Patent describes what result the A/D Converter and Microprocessor 24 in combination with the switch 28 accomplish, which is increasing the current to a higher level from the low level initially applied to the data signaling pair. See '930 Patent, fig 1. The' '930 Patent also gives a generalized indication as to the way the control means performs the function, which is detecting a varying level voltage drop across resistors 26 and 30. Id. However, there is insufficient disclosure of the details of a particular algorithm, so that the scope of the control means limitation and where the boundary of infringement and non-infringemen .Supp.2d 512, 518 (E.D.Tex.2006) (Clark, J.) (holding claim indefinite as the specification did not disclose sufficient structure where disclosure stated one of ordinary skill in the art could program a computer with appropriate programming to perform a control means function", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nis a necessary element of a computer-based corresponding structure. See WMS Gaming, 184 F.3d at 1349. The '930 Patent describes what result the A/D Converter and Microprocessor 24 in combination with the switch 28 accomplish, which is increasing the current to a higher level from the low level initially applied to the data signaling pair. See '930 Patent, fig 1. The' '930 Patent also gives a generalized indication as to the way the control means performs the function, which is detecting a varying level voltage drop across resistors 26 and 30. Id. However, there is insufficient disclosure of the details of a particular algorithm, so that the scope of the control means limitation and where the boundary of infringement and non-infringemen .Supp.2d 512, 518 (E.D.Tex.2006) (Clark, J.) (holding improper reading into claims a limitation appearing only in the specification" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nInc., 94 N.M. 59, 607 P.2d 597 (1980); Sanchez v. Bernalillo County, 57 N.M. 217, 257 P.2d 909 (1953). Moreover, our courts have held that the Workman’s Compensation Act is sui generis. It creates exclusive rights, remedies and procedures. Casias v. Zia Co., 94 N.M. 723, 616 P.2d 436 (1980). In at least one instance, the court refused to create a new cause of action for employer subrogation tangential to the act. Security Insurance Co. of Hartford v. Chapman, 88 N.M. 292, 540 P.2d 222 (1975). The Courts in New Mexico have not hesitated to recognize the existence of new causes of action or to abolish certain common law defenses where public policy or statutory grounds are found to warrant such judicially sanctioned change. F & T Co. v. Woods, 92 N.M. 697, 597 P.2d 745 (1979), (recognizing as viable actions in tort negligent hiring and negligent retention", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nInc., 94 N.M. 59, 607 P.2d 597 (1980); Sanchez v. Bernalillo County, 57 N.M. 217, 257 P.2d 909 (1953). Moreover, our courts have held that the Workman’s Compensation Act is sui generis. It creates exclusive rights, remedies and procedures. Casias v. Zia Co., 94 N.M. 723, 616 P.2d 436 (1980). In at least one instance, the court refused to create a new cause of action for employer subrogation tangential to the act. Security Insurance Co. of Hartford v. Chapman, 88 N.M. 292, 540 P.2d 222 (1975). The Courts in New Mexico have not hesitated to recognize the existence of new causes of action or to abolish certain common law defenses where public policy or statutory grounds are found to warrant such judicially sanctioned change. F & T Co. v. Woods, 92 N.M. 697, 597 P.2d 745 (1979), (recognizing torts of negligent hiring supervision and retention", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nInc., 94 N.M. 59, 607 P.2d 597 (1980); Sanchez v. Bernalillo County, 57 N.M. 217, 257 P.2d 909 (1953). Moreover, our courts have held that the Workman’s Compensation Act is sui generis. It creates exclusive rights, remedies and procedures. Casias v. Zia Co., 94 N.M. 723, 616 P.2d 436 (1980). In at least one instance, the court refused to create a new cause of action for employer subrogation tangential to the act. Security Insurance Co. of Hartford v. Chapman, 88 N.M. 292, 540 P.2d 222 (1975). The Courts in New Mexico have not hesitated to recognize the existence of new causes of action or to abolish certain common law defenses where public policy or statutory grounds are found to warrant such judicially sanctioned change. F & T Co. v. Woods, 92 N.M. 697, 597 P.2d 745 (1979), (holding that a cause of action or negligent hiring training and retention can proceed only if the alleged negligence leads to the commission of one of the torts enumerated in the tort claims act", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nInc., 94 N.M. 59, 607 P.2d 597 (1980); Sanchez v. Bernalillo County, 57 N.M. 217, 257 P.2d 909 (1953). Moreover, our courts have held that the Workman’s Compensation Act is sui generis. It creates exclusive rights, remedies and procedures. Casias v. Zia Co., 94 N.M. 723, 616 P.2d 436 (1980). In at least one instance, the court refused to create a new cause of action for employer subrogation tangential to the act. Security Insurance Co. of Hartford v. Chapman, 88 N.M. 292, 540 P.2d 222 (1975). The Courts in New Mexico have not hesitated to recognize the existence of new causes of action or to abolish certain common law defenses where public policy or statutory grounds are found to warrant such judicially sanctioned change. F & T Co. v. Woods, 92 N.M. 697, 597 P.2d 745 (1979), (holding that a negligent retention claim was properly dismissed when there was no underlying tort upon which it could have been based", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nInc., 94 N.M. 59, 607 P.2d 597 (1980); Sanchez v. Bernalillo County, 57 N.M. 217, 257 P.2d 909 (1953). Moreover, our courts have held that the Workman’s Compensation Act is sui generis. It creates exclusive rights, remedies and procedures. Casias v. Zia Co., 94 N.M. 723, 616 P.2d 436 (1980). In at least one instance, the court refused to create a new cause of action for employer subrogation tangential to the act. Security Insurance Co. of Hartford v. Chapman, 88 N.M. 292, 540 P.2d 222 (1975). The Courts in New Mexico have not hesitated to recognize the existence of new causes of action or to abolish certain common law defenses where public policy or statutory grounds are found to warrant such judicially sanctioned change. F & T Co. v. Woods, 92 N.M. 697, 597 P.2d 745 (1979), (holding that for a plaintiff to recover on claim of negligent hiring the negligent hiring of the employee must have been the proximate cause of the injury at issue" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthe guideline offense level for a drug offense), he was a potential government witness at sentencing, and Cogswell did not know whether Lewis would be called to testify at sentencing. See United States v. McMinn, 103 F.3d 216, 218-19 (1st Cir.1997) (finding enhancement applicable when defendant threatened someone who “remained a prospective government witness” in further proceedings against defendant); see also United States v. Boyd, 574 Fed.Appx. 878, 879-80 (11th Cir.2014) (unpublished) (upholding enhancement where defendant threatened a witness after defendant had pleaded guilty and was awaiting sentencing because defendant “did not know whether [the witness’s] testimony would be used against him at sentencing”); United States v. Rubio, 317 F.3d 1240, 1244-45 (11th Cir.2003) (holding that we are not persuaded by defendants contention that an assault did not take place because he never made physical contact with the weapon in light of the evidence showing that the gun was only inches from defendants outstretched hand and that defendant was actively forcefully and to some degree successfully resisting the officers attempt to arrest him we do not believe in light of our states definition of assault that defendants failure to physically touch the weapon precludes the commission of an assault with the firearm", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthe guideline offense level for a drug offense), he was a potential government witness at sentencing, and Cogswell did not know whether Lewis would be called to testify at sentencing. See United States v. McMinn, 103 F.3d 216, 218-19 (1st Cir.1997) (finding enhancement applicable when defendant threatened someone who “remained a prospective government witness” in further proceedings against defendant); see also United States v. Boyd, 574 Fed.Appx. 878, 879-80 (11th Cir.2014) (unpublished) (upholding enhancement where defendant threatened a witness after defendant had pleaded guilty and was awaiting sentencing because defendant “did not know whether [the witness’s] testimony would be used against him at sentencing”); United States v. Rubio, 317 F.3d 1240, 1244-45 (11th Cir.2003) (holding that an assault that occurred immediately after the employee was discharged was in the course of the employment", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthe guideline offense level for a drug offense), he was a potential government witness at sentencing, and Cogswell did not know whether Lewis would be called to testify at sentencing. See United States v. McMinn, 103 F.3d 216, 218-19 (1st Cir.1997) (finding enhancement applicable when defendant threatened someone who “remained a prospective government witness” in further proceedings against defendant); see also United States v. Boyd, 574 Fed.Appx. 878, 879-80 (11th Cir.2014) (unpublished) (upholding enhancement where defendant threatened a witness after defendant had pleaded guilty and was awaiting sentencing because defendant “did not know whether [the witness’s] testimony would be used against him at sentencing”); United States v. Rubio, 317 F.3d 1240, 1244-45 (11th Cir.2003) (holding that an obstructionofjustice enhancement was appropriate based on the defendants assault on a witness after trial and rejecting the defendants argument that because the assault occurred after trial it could not impact the prosecution of his case", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthe guideline offense level for a drug offense), he was a potential government witness at sentencing, and Cogswell did not know whether Lewis would be called to testify at sentencing. See United States v. McMinn, 103 F.3d 216, 218-19 (1st Cir.1997) (finding enhancement applicable when defendant threatened someone who “remained a prospective government witness” in further proceedings against defendant); see also United States v. Boyd, 574 Fed.Appx. 878, 879-80 (11th Cir.2014) (unpublished) (upholding enhancement where defendant threatened a witness after defendant had pleaded guilty and was awaiting sentencing because defendant “did not know whether [the witness’s] testimony would be used against him at sentencing”); United States v. Rubio, 317 F.3d 1240, 1244-45 (11th Cir.2003) (holding that the trial court in a sexual assault case erred by refusing to allow evidence of prior testimony by the complainant in an unrelated rape prosecution", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthe guideline offense level for a drug offense), he was a potential government witness at sentencing, and Cogswell did not know whether Lewis would be called to testify at sentencing. See United States v. McMinn, 103 F.3d 216, 218-19 (1st Cir.1997) (finding enhancement applicable when defendant threatened someone who “remained a prospective government witness” in further proceedings against defendant); see also United States v. Boyd, 574 Fed.Appx. 878, 879-80 (11th Cir.2014) (unpublished) (upholding enhancement where defendant threatened a witness after defendant had pleaded guilty and was awaiting sentencing because defendant “did not know whether [the witness’s] testimony would be used against him at sentencing”); United States v. Rubio, 317 F.3d 1240, 1244-45 (11th Cir.2003) (holding that consent is not a defense to the charge of second degree assault where the assault occurred in the context of a prison fight between inmates" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\n537 A.2d at 615. In reviewing the appellants’ claim to a legitimate expectation of privacy in the apartment, this Court concluded that: [Wjhile appellants’ counsel’s assertion that the appellants were “invitees” did not constitute evidence, it was confirmatory of the apparent earlier concession by the prosecutor that the appellants were in the apartment at the invitation of the lessee. Moreover, there was an indication ... that on several occasions ... appellant Ricks, used a key to gain entrance, either to the building in which the apartment was located, or into the apartment itse 82, 383 (2002) (stating that “defendant, at best a transient squatter, had no constitutionally-reasonable expectation of privacy.”); Commonwealth v. Cameron, 385 Pa.Super. 492, 561 A.2d 783, 787-88 (1989) (holding that squatter had no standing to challenge search of abandoned apartment which he had occupied solely for the business of packing for distribution for narcotics", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\n537 A.2d at 615. In reviewing the appellants’ claim to a legitimate expectation of privacy in the apartment, this Court concluded that: [Wjhile appellants’ counsel’s assertion that the appellants were “invitees” did not constitute evidence, it was confirmatory of the apparent earlier concession by the prosecutor that the appellants were in the apartment at the invitation of the lessee. Moreover, there was an indication ... that on several occasions ... appellant Ricks, used a key to gain entrance, either to the building in which the apartment was located, or into the apartment itse 82, 383 (2002) (stating that “defendant, at best a transient squatter, had no constitutionally-reasonable expectation of privacy.”); Commonwealth v. Cameron, 385 Pa.Super. 492, 561 A.2d 783, 787-88 (1989) (holding that squatter had no reasonable expectation of privacy and therefore no fourth amendment standing to challenge search of abandoned structure", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\n537 A.2d at 615. In reviewing the appellants’ claim to a legitimate expectation of privacy in the apartment, this Court concluded that: [Wjhile appellants’ counsel’s assertion that the appellants were “invitees” did not constitute evidence, it was confirmatory of the apparent earlier concession by the prosecutor that the appellants were in the apartment at the invitation of the lessee. Moreover, there was an indication ... that on several occasions ... appellant Ricks, used a key to gain entrance, either to the building in which the apartment was located, or into the apartment itse 82, 383 (2002) (stating that “defendant, at best a transient squatter, had no constitutionally-reasonable expectation of privacy.”); Commonwealth v. Cameron, 385 Pa.Super. 492, 561 A.2d 783, 787-88 (1989) (holding that squatter had no standing to challenge search of abandoned house where he was staying", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\n537 A.2d at 615. In reviewing the appellants’ claim to a legitimate expectation of privacy in the apartment, this Court concluded that: [Wjhile appellants’ counsel’s assertion that the appellants were “invitees” did not constitute evidence, it was confirmatory of the apparent earlier concession by the prosecutor that the appellants were in the apartment at the invitation of the lessee. Moreover, there was an indication ... that on several occasions ... appellant Ricks, used a key to gain entrance, either to the building in which the apartment was located, or into the apartment itse 82, 383 (2002) (stating that “defendant, at best a transient squatter, had no constitutionally-reasonable expectation of privacy.”); Commonwealth v. Cameron, 385 Pa.Super. 492, 561 A.2d 783, 787-88 (1989) (holding that squatter had no standing to challenge search of abandoned apartment because hardly more than a fugitive presence would not be one that could be accepted by society", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\n537 A.2d at 615. In reviewing the appellants’ claim to a legitimate expectation of privacy in the apartment, this Court concluded that: [Wjhile appellants’ counsel’s assertion that the appellants were “invitees” did not constitute evidence, it was confirmatory of the apparent earlier concession by the prosecutor that the appellants were in the apartment at the invitation of the lessee. Moreover, there was an indication ... that on several occasions ... appellant Ricks, used a key to gain entrance, either to the building in which the apartment was located, or into the apartment itse 82, 383 (2002) (stating that “defendant, at best a transient squatter, had no constitutionally-reasonable expectation of privacy.”); Commonwealth v. Cameron, 385 Pa.Super. 492, 561 A.2d 783, 787-88 (1989) (holding that passengers lacked any reasonable expectation of privacy and therefore had no standing to challenge the search of the vehicle" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndefendant, it is a stretch to describe the jail mate's inquiries of the defendant as ‘government interrogation.' ”). In the present case, the government never asked Bender to embark on an open-ended fishing expedition in the D.C. Jail to collect incriminating evidence from any inmate he could hook. And as we discuss below, the government did not sanction such a mission implicitly. 13 . Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176, 106 S.Ct. 477, 88 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) (“[Kjnowing exploitation by the State of an opportunity to confront the accused without counsel being present is as much a breach of the State's obligation not to circumvent the right to the assistance of counsel as is the intentional creation of such an opportunity.”). 14 . Cf. Ayers v. Hudson, 623 F.3d 301, 310 (6th Cir.2010) (holding that the sixth amendment is violated when the state obtains incriminating statements by knowingly circumventing the accuseds right to have counsel present in a confrontation between the accused and a state agent", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndefendant, it is a stretch to describe the jail mate's inquiries of the defendant as ‘government interrogation.' ”). In the present case, the government never asked Bender to embark on an open-ended fishing expedition in the D.C. Jail to collect incriminating evidence from any inmate he could hook. And as we discuss below, the government did not sanction such a mission implicitly. 13 . Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176, 106 S.Ct. 477, 88 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) (“[Kjnowing exploitation by the State of an opportunity to confront the accused without counsel being present is as much a breach of the State's obligation not to circumvent the right to the assistance of counsel as is the intentional creation of such an opportunity.”). 14 . Cf. Ayers v. Hudson, 623 F.3d 301, 310 (6th Cir.2010) (holding defendants fifth amendment rights had been violated when his probation was revoked based on his failure to complete a sexual treatment program that required incriminating admissions", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndefendant, it is a stretch to describe the jail mate's inquiries of the defendant as ‘government interrogation.' ”). In the present case, the government never asked Bender to embark on an open-ended fishing expedition in the D.C. Jail to collect incriminating evidence from any inmate he could hook. And as we discuss below, the government did not sanction such a mission implicitly. 13 . Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176, 106 S.Ct. 477, 88 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) (“[Kjnowing exploitation by the State of an opportunity to confront the accused without counsel being present is as much a breach of the State's obligation not to circumvent the right to the assistance of counsel as is the intentional creation of such an opportunity.”). 14 . Cf. Ayers v. Hudson, 623 F.3d 301, 310 (6th Cir.2010) (holding that the state intentionally created a situation likely to induce ayers to make incriminating statements without the assistance of counsel in violation of his sixth amendment rights when it returned hutchinson a police informant to ayers jail pod and he thereafter deliberately elicited incriminating admissions from ayers", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndefendant, it is a stretch to describe the jail mate's inquiries of the defendant as ‘government interrogation.' ”). In the present case, the government never asked Bender to embark on an open-ended fishing expedition in the D.C. Jail to collect incriminating evidence from any inmate he could hook. And as we discuss below, the government did not sanction such a mission implicitly. 13 . Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176, 106 S.Ct. 477, 88 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) (“[Kjnowing exploitation by the State of an opportunity to confront the accused without counsel being present is as much a breach of the State's obligation not to circumvent the right to the assistance of counsel as is the intentional creation of such an opportunity.”). 14 . Cf. Ayers v. Hudson, 623 F.3d 301, 310 (6th Cir.2010) (holding that sixth amendment not violated when defendant makes incriminating statements after indictment to persons who are not related to the government", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndefendant, it is a stretch to describe the jail mate's inquiries of the defendant as ‘government interrogation.' ”). In the present case, the government never asked Bender to embark on an open-ended fishing expedition in the D.C. Jail to collect incriminating evidence from any inmate he could hook. And as we discuss below, the government did not sanction such a mission implicitly. 13 . Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176, 106 S.Ct. 477, 88 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) (“[Kjnowing exploitation by the State of an opportunity to confront the accused without counsel being present is as much a breach of the State's obligation not to circumvent the right to the assistance of counsel as is the intentional creation of such an opportunity.”). 14 . Cf. Ayers v. Hudson, 623 F.3d 301, 310 (6th Cir.2010) (holding that states use of informant to obtain incriminating evidence from defendant about pending charges violated defendants sixth amendment right to counsel notwithstanding that state was also investigating other charges as to which the sixth amendment right to counsel had not attached" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfor an employer’s liability. An employer is directly liable for hostile environment sexual harassment if it knew, or upon reasonably diligent inquiry should have known, of the harassment and failed to take immediate and appropriate corrective action. See Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311, 1316 (11th Cir.1989); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 905 (11th Cir.1982). Under this theory of direct liability, the City can be held liable for its own negligence or recklessness, but not for the conduct of its supervisors or employees. In contrast, an employer is indirectly, or vicariously, liable for the wrongful conduct of its agent, whether or not the employer knew or should have known about the agent’s 6-07 (4th Cir.1989), vacated in part, 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir.1990)(holding that the proper inquiry is whether the individual defendant served in a supervisory position in which he exercised significant control over the plaintiffs hiring firing or conditions of employment and if not whether employer had actual or constructive knowledge of the existence of a hostile work environment and took no prompt and adequate remedial steps", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfor an employer’s liability. An employer is directly liable for hostile environment sexual harassment if it knew, or upon reasonably diligent inquiry should have known, of the harassment and failed to take immediate and appropriate corrective action. See Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311, 1316 (11th Cir.1989); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 905 (11th Cir.1982). Under this theory of direct liability, the City can be held liable for its own negligence or recklessness, but not for the conduct of its supervisors or employees. In contrast, an employer is indirectly, or vicariously, liable for the wrongful conduct of its agent, whether or not the employer knew or should have known about the agent’s 6-07 (4th Cir.1989), vacated in part, 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir.1990)(holding that agent part of title viis definition of employer includes someone who serves in a supervisory position and exercises significant control over hiring firing or conditions of employment", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfor an employer’s liability. An employer is directly liable for hostile environment sexual harassment if it knew, or upon reasonably diligent inquiry should have known, of the harassment and failed to take immediate and appropriate corrective action. See Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311, 1316 (11th Cir.1989); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 905 (11th Cir.1982). Under this theory of direct liability, the City can be held liable for its own negligence or recklessness, but not for the conduct of its supervisors or employees. In contrast, an employer is indirectly, or vicariously, liable for the wrongful conduct of its agent, whether or not the employer knew or should have known about the agent’s 6-07 (4th Cir.1989), vacated in part, 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir.1990)(holding that the plaintiff must prove that management level employees had actual or constructive knowledge about the existence of a sexually hostile environment and failed to take prompt and adequate remedial action", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfor an employer’s liability. An employer is directly liable for hostile environment sexual harassment if it knew, or upon reasonably diligent inquiry should have known, of the harassment and failed to take immediate and appropriate corrective action. See Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311, 1316 (11th Cir.1989); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 905 (11th Cir.1982). Under this theory of direct liability, the City can be held liable for its own negligence or recklessness, but not for the conduct of its supervisors or employees. In contrast, an employer is indirectly, or vicariously, liable for the wrongful conduct of its agent, whether or not the employer knew or should have known about the agent’s 6-07 (4th Cir.1989), vacated in part, 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir.1990)(holding board had jurisdiction when employer had final authority over the essential terms and conditions of employment including wages benefits hiring firing promotion discipline and grievances although employer was subject to various governmentimposed restrictions", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfor an employer’s liability. An employer is directly liable for hostile environment sexual harassment if it knew, or upon reasonably diligent inquiry should have known, of the harassment and failed to take immediate and appropriate corrective action. See Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311, 1316 (11th Cir.1989); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 905 (11th Cir.1982). Under this theory of direct liability, the City can be held liable for its own negligence or recklessness, but not for the conduct of its supervisors or employees. In contrast, an employer is indirectly, or vicariously, liable for the wrongful conduct of its agent, whether or not the employer knew or should have known about the agent’s 6-07 (4th Cir.1989), vacated in part, 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir.1990)(holding that while town counsel had final supervisory authority over the hiring and firing of employees in plaintiffs position it did not have supervisory authority over the mayors constructive discharge of plaintiff" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ncategory of crimes involving moral turpitude rather than acts that are \"base, vile, or depraved.\" Id. 2 . The majority relies on Chen v. Mukasey, 524 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir.2008) and United States v. Macias-Valencia, 510 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir.2007) for the principle that a subsequent panel is not bound by statements in prior decisions relating to an issue that had not been “presented for review,” but neither case supports that principle. In both cases, the prior decision in question had acknowledged that its passing remarks were not precedential. See Chen, 524 F.3d at 1033 (“We acknowledged, however, that [our observation in He v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir.2007) about the potential relief available to the petitioners] was not before us.”); see also Macias-Valencia, 510 F.3d at 1015 (holding that our use of the subjunctive in mentioning an argument in passing suggests that we knew that we were not addressing and that we could not address that argument", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ncategory of crimes involving moral turpitude rather than acts that are \"base, vile, or depraved.\" Id. 2 . The majority relies on Chen v. Mukasey, 524 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir.2008) and United States v. Macias-Valencia, 510 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir.2007) for the principle that a subsequent panel is not bound by statements in prior decisions relating to an issue that had not been “presented for review,” but neither case supports that principle. In both cases, the prior decision in question had acknowledged that its passing remarks were not precedential. See Chen, 524 F.3d at 1033 (“We acknowledged, however, that [our observation in He v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir.2007) about the potential relief available to the petitioners] was not before us.”); see also Macias-Valencia, 510 F.3d at 1015 (holding that where a party does not adequately brief an argument we need not address it on appeal", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ncategory of crimes involving moral turpitude rather than acts that are \"base, vile, or depraved.\" Id. 2 . The majority relies on Chen v. Mukasey, 524 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir.2008) and United States v. Macias-Valencia, 510 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir.2007) for the principle that a subsequent panel is not bound by statements in prior decisions relating to an issue that had not been “presented for review,” but neither case supports that principle. In both cases, the prior decision in question had acknowledged that its passing remarks were not precedential. See Chen, 524 F.3d at 1033 (“We acknowledged, however, that [our observation in He v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir.2007) about the potential relief available to the petitioners] was not before us.”); see also Macias-Valencia, 510 F.3d at 1015 (holding where one argument is dispositive of the appeal we need not address the defendants remaining arguments", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ncategory of crimes involving moral turpitude rather than acts that are \"base, vile, or depraved.\" Id. 2 . The majority relies on Chen v. Mukasey, 524 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir.2008) and United States v. Macias-Valencia, 510 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir.2007) for the principle that a subsequent panel is not bound by statements in prior decisions relating to an issue that had not been “presented for review,” but neither case supports that principle. In both cases, the prior decision in question had acknowledged that its passing remarks were not precedential. See Chen, 524 F.3d at 1033 (“We acknowledged, however, that [our observation in He v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir.2007) about the potential relief available to the petitioners] was not before us.”); see also Macias-Valencia, 510 F.3d at 1015 (recognizing that we may not substitute our judgment for that of the alj ", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ncategory of crimes involving moral turpitude rather than acts that are \"base, vile, or depraved.\" Id. 2 . The majority relies on Chen v. Mukasey, 524 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir.2008) and United States v. Macias-Valencia, 510 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir.2007) for the principle that a subsequent panel is not bound by statements in prior decisions relating to an issue that had not been “presented for review,” but neither case supports that principle. In both cases, the prior decision in question had acknowledged that its passing remarks were not precedential. See Chen, 524 F.3d at 1033 (“We acknowledged, however, that [our observation in He v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir.2007) about the potential relief available to the petitioners] was not before us.”); see also Macias-Valencia, 510 F.3d at 1015 (holding that where one argument is dispositive of the appeal we need not address the defendants other arguments" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\ninto evidence true and accurate copies of the Note and Allonge. Petitioner asserts this evidence “plainly evidences the transfers” of the Note to Petitioner. We cannot agree. Under the UCC, as adopted by North Carolina, “[a]n instrument is transferred when it is delivered by a person other than its issuer for the purpose of giving to the person receiving delivery the right to enforce the instrument.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 25-3-203(a) (2009). Production of an original note at trial does not, in itself, establish that the note was transferred to the party presenting the note with the purpose of giving that party the right to enforce the instrument, as demonstrated in Connolly, 63 N.C. App. at 551, 306 S.E.2d at 125, and Smathers v. Smathers, 34 N.C. App. 724, 726, 239 S.E.2d 637, 638 (1977) (holding that because a mortgage provides the security for the repayment of the note the person having standing to foreclose a note secured by a mortgage may be either the holder of the note or a nonholder in possession of the note who has the rights of a holder", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\ninto evidence true and accurate copies of the Note and Allonge. Petitioner asserts this evidence “plainly evidences the transfers” of the Note to Petitioner. We cannot agree. Under the UCC, as adopted by North Carolina, “[a]n instrument is transferred when it is delivered by a person other than its issuer for the purpose of giving to the person receiving delivery the right to enforce the instrument.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 25-3-203(a) (2009). Production of an original note at trial does not, in itself, establish that the note was transferred to the party presenting the note with the purpose of giving that party the right to enforce the instrument, as demonstrated in Connolly, 63 N.C. App. at 551, 306 S.E.2d at 125, and Smathers v. Smathers, 34 N.C. App. 724, 726, 239 S.E.2d 637, 638 (1977) (holding that creditors could not seek relief from a bankruptcy stay because they were not the real parties in interest and lacked standing as they were not holders of the notes and failed to establish that mers was the holder or had authority to transfer the notes", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\ninto evidence true and accurate copies of the Note and Allonge. Petitioner asserts this evidence “plainly evidences the transfers” of the Note to Petitioner. We cannot agree. Under the UCC, as adopted by North Carolina, “[a]n instrument is transferred when it is delivered by a person other than its issuer for the purpose of giving to the person receiving delivery the right to enforce the instrument.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 25-3-203(a) (2009). Production of an original note at trial does not, in itself, establish that the note was transferred to the party presenting the note with the purpose of giving that party the right to enforce the instrument, as demonstrated in Connolly, 63 N.C. App. at 551, 306 S.E.2d at 125, and Smathers v. Smathers, 34 N.C. App. 724, 726, 239 S.E.2d 637, 638 (1977) (holding that where a promissory note had never been made payable to plaintiff or to bearer nor had it ever been indorsed to plaintiff defendants established that plaintiff was not the owner or holder of the note", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\ninto evidence true and accurate copies of the Note and Allonge. Petitioner asserts this evidence “plainly evidences the transfers” of the Note to Petitioner. We cannot agree. Under the UCC, as adopted by North Carolina, “[a]n instrument is transferred when it is delivered by a person other than its issuer for the purpose of giving to the person receiving delivery the right to enforce the instrument.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 25-3-203(a) (2009). Production of an original note at trial does not, in itself, establish that the note was transferred to the party presenting the note with the purpose of giving that party the right to enforce the instrument, as demonstrated in Connolly, 63 N.C. App. at 551, 306 S.E.2d at 125, and Smathers v. Smathers, 34 N.C. App. 724, 726, 239 S.E.2d 637, 638 (1977) (holding that a promissory note is not enforceable against a party who signed the deed of trust but did not sign the promissory note inasmuch as promissory notes and deeds of trust are separate legal documents with unique purposes", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\ninto evidence true and accurate copies of the Note and Allonge. Petitioner asserts this evidence “plainly evidences the transfers” of the Note to Petitioner. We cannot agree. Under the UCC, as adopted by North Carolina, “[a]n instrument is transferred when it is delivered by a person other than its issuer for the purpose of giving to the person receiving delivery the right to enforce the instrument.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 25-3-203(a) (2009). Production of an original note at trial does not, in itself, establish that the note was transferred to the party presenting the note with the purpose of giving that party the right to enforce the instrument, as demonstrated in Connolly, 63 N.C. App. at 551, 306 S.E.2d at 125, and Smathers v. Smathers, 34 N.C. App. 724, 726, 239 S.E.2d 637, 638 (1977) (holding that despite evidence of voluntary transfer of promissory notes and the plaintiffs possession thereof the plaintiff was not the holder of the note under the ucc as the notes were not drawn issued or indorsed to her to bearer or in blank the plaintiff testified to some of the circumstances under which she obtained possession of the notes but the trial court made no findings of fact with respect thereto" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nRather, the jury was restricted to answering three questions relating to intent, provocation and future dangerousness. Id. The Court found that Penry’s “mitigating evidence of mental retardation and childhood abuse ha[d] relevance to his moral culpability beyond the scope” of the three questions posed to the jury. Id. at 322, 109 S.Ct. 2934. Thus, the jury instructions were unconstitutional because they precluded the jury from acting upon the mitigating evidence Penry introduced. Id. at 319-22, 109 S.Ct. 2934. The Supreme Court noted that, under Lockett and Eddings, the “sentencer must ... be able to consider and give effect to that evidence in imposing sentence.” Id. at 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934; see also Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 797, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001) (Penry IP) (holding that the sentencing procedure was inadequate in failing to allow jury to give mitigating effect to defendants mental retardation and abusive background", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nRather, the jury was restricted to answering three questions relating to intent, provocation and future dangerousness. Id. The Court found that Penry’s “mitigating evidence of mental retardation and childhood abuse ha[d] relevance to his moral culpability beyond the scope” of the three questions posed to the jury. Id. at 322, 109 S.Ct. 2934. Thus, the jury instructions were unconstitutional because they precluded the jury from acting upon the mitigating evidence Penry introduced. Id. at 319-22, 109 S.Ct. 2934. The Supreme Court noted that, under Lockett and Eddings, the “sentencer must ... be able to consider and give effect to that evidence in imposing sentence.” Id. at 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934; see also Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 797, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001) (Penry IP) (holding that the sentencing structure allowed the jury to give mitigating effect to petitioners prison record", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nRather, the jury was restricted to answering three questions relating to intent, provocation and future dangerousness. Id. The Court found that Penry’s “mitigating evidence of mental retardation and childhood abuse ha[d] relevance to his moral culpability beyond the scope” of the three questions posed to the jury. Id. at 322, 109 S.Ct. 2934. Thus, the jury instructions were unconstitutional because they precluded the jury from acting upon the mitigating evidence Penry introduced. Id. at 319-22, 109 S.Ct. 2934. The Supreme Court noted that, under Lockett and Eddings, the “sentencer must ... be able to consider and give effect to that evidence in imposing sentence.” Id. at 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934; see also Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 797, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001) (Penry IP) (holding that the key under pewy i is that the jury be able to consider and give effect to a defendants mitigating evidence in imposing sentence", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nRather, the jury was restricted to answering three questions relating to intent, provocation and future dangerousness. Id. The Court found that Penry’s “mitigating evidence of mental retardation and childhood abuse ha[d] relevance to his moral culpability beyond the scope” of the three questions posed to the jury. Id. at 322, 109 S.Ct. 2934. Thus, the jury instructions were unconstitutional because they precluded the jury from acting upon the mitigating evidence Penry introduced. Id. at 319-22, 109 S.Ct. 2934. The Supreme Court noted that, under Lockett and Eddings, the “sentencer must ... be able to consider and give effect to that evidence in imposing sentence.” Id. at 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934; see also Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 797, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001) (Penry IP) (holding that the trier of fact must be allowed to consider and give effect to all relevant mitigating evidence", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nRather, the jury was restricted to answering three questions relating to intent, provocation and future dangerousness. Id. The Court found that Penry’s “mitigating evidence of mental retardation and childhood abuse ha[d] relevance to his moral culpability beyond the scope” of the three questions posed to the jury. Id. at 322, 109 S.Ct. 2934. Thus, the jury instructions were unconstitutional because they precluded the jury from acting upon the mitigating evidence Penry introduced. Id. at 319-22, 109 S.Ct. 2934. The Supreme Court noted that, under Lockett and Eddings, the “sentencer must ... be able to consider and give effect to that evidence in imposing sentence.” Id. at 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934; see also Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 797, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001) (Penry IP) (holding that a defendants sentence is controlled by the law in effect at the time he committed the offense" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nreasonable regulations, to process for witnesses .... ” State v. Wilcox, 21 S.D. 532, 114 N.W. 687 (1908) (emphasis added). [¶ 17.] Crawford cites Washington v. Texas in support of his argument that his right to compulsory process was violated. 388 U.S. 14, 23, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 1925, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967). In Washington, the United States Supreme Court decided the defendant’s right to compulsory process was denied because the State arbitrarily denied him the right to have a witness testify who had relevant and material testimony. Id. See United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 872-73, 102 S.Ct. 3440, 3449-50, 73 L.Ed.2d 1193 (1982) (the government may not deport witnesses who have material and relevant testimony); Fountaine v. State, 460 So.2d 553, 555 (Fla.App.2d Dist.1984) (holding that the defendants due process rights were violated when the trial judge singled out the only defense witness and indicated to that witness that he expected the witness to he and would personally ensure that the witness was prosecuted for perjury and thereby effectively drove that witness off the stand", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nreasonable regulations, to process for witnesses .... ” State v. Wilcox, 21 S.D. 532, 114 N.W. 687 (1908) (emphasis added). [¶ 17.] Crawford cites Washington v. Texas in support of his argument that his right to compulsory process was violated. 388 U.S. 14, 23, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 1925, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967). In Washington, the United States Supreme Court decided the defendant’s right to compulsory process was denied because the State arbitrarily denied him the right to have a witness testify who had relevant and material testimony. Id. See United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 872-73, 102 S.Ct. 3440, 3449-50, 73 L.Ed.2d 1193 (1982) (the government may not deport witnesses who have material and relevant testimony); Fountaine v. State, 460 So.2d 553, 555 (Fla.App.2d Dist.1984) (holding that despite district courts restriction on crossexamination of government witness concerning the sentencing benefits he would earn through testifying for the government it did not violate defendants confrontation rights because of defense counsels effective impeachment of the government witnesses credibility and sentence reduction", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nreasonable regulations, to process for witnesses .... ” State v. Wilcox, 21 S.D. 532, 114 N.W. 687 (1908) (emphasis added). [¶ 17.] Crawford cites Washington v. Texas in support of his argument that his right to compulsory process was violated. 388 U.S. 14, 23, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 1925, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967). In Washington, the United States Supreme Court decided the defendant’s right to compulsory process was denied because the State arbitrarily denied him the right to have a witness testify who had relevant and material testimony. Id. See United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 872-73, 102 S.Ct. 3440, 3449-50, 73 L.Ed.2d 1193 (1982) (the government may not deport witnesses who have material and relevant testimony); Fountaine v. State, 460 So.2d 553, 555 (Fla.App.2d Dist.1984) (recognizing that informing the jury that testifying witness has agreed to cooperate with the government is a doubleedged sword as the existence of such agreement may suggest either that the witness will testify in accordance with the governments wishes regardless of the truth or that the witness will not he under threat of revocation of the agreement should the witness commit perjury", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nreasonable regulations, to process for witnesses .... ” State v. Wilcox, 21 S.D. 532, 114 N.W. 687 (1908) (emphasis added). [¶ 17.] Crawford cites Washington v. Texas in support of his argument that his right to compulsory process was violated. 388 U.S. 14, 23, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 1925, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967). In Washington, the United States Supreme Court decided the defendant’s right to compulsory process was denied because the State arbitrarily denied him the right to have a witness testify who had relevant and material testimony. Id. See United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 872-73, 102 S.Ct. 3440, 3449-50, 73 L.Ed.2d 1193 (1982) (the government may not deport witnesses who have material and relevant testimony); Fountaine v. State, 460 So.2d 553, 555 (Fla.App.2d Dist.1984) (recognizing the right to compulsory process only requires that the government may not prevent an otherwise willing defense witness from testifying", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nreasonable regulations, to process for witnesses .... ” State v. Wilcox, 21 S.D. 532, 114 N.W. 687 (1908) (emphasis added). [¶ 17.] Crawford cites Washington v. Texas in support of his argument that his right to compulsory process was violated. 388 U.S. 14, 23, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 1925, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967). In Washington, the United States Supreme Court decided the defendant’s right to compulsory process was denied because the State arbitrarily denied him the right to have a witness testify who had relevant and material testimony. Id. See United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 872-73, 102 S.Ct. 3440, 3449-50, 73 L.Ed.2d 1193 (1982) (the government may not deport witnesses who have material and relevant testimony); Fountaine v. State, 460 So.2d 553, 555 (Fla.App.2d Dist.1984) (holding that evidence of a threat to a witness by the defendant is relevant as showing an attempt to prevent a witness from testifying and avoid punishment for the crime" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nImmigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order summarily affirming an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying their application for asylum, withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence. Lolong v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 1173, 1178 (9th Cir.2007). We grant the petition for review and we remand. Because there is no evidence that the BIA reviewed the petitioners’ asylum and withholding claim, as requested by petitioners in their brief to the BIA, pursuant to the disfavored group analysis set forth in Sael v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 922 (9th Cir.2004), we remand to the agency to determine Sael’s application in this case. See INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16-17, 123 S.Ct. 353, 154 L.Ed.2d 272 (2002) (holding that this court must remand to the bia to allow it to address in the first instance an issue that it has not yet considered", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nImmigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order summarily affirming an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying their application for asylum, withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence. Lolong v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 1173, 1178 (9th Cir.2007). We grant the petition for review and we remand. Because there is no evidence that the BIA reviewed the petitioners’ asylum and withholding claim, as requested by petitioners in their brief to the BIA, pursuant to the disfavored group analysis set forth in Sael v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 922 (9th Cir.2004), we remand to the agency to determine Sael’s application in this case. See INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16-17, 123 S.Ct. 353, 154 L.Ed.2d 272 (2002) (holding deference to agency methodology appropriate unless agency failed to address an essential factor", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nImmigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order summarily affirming an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying their application for asylum, withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence. Lolong v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 1173, 1178 (9th Cir.2007). We grant the petition for review and we remand. Because there is no evidence that the BIA reviewed the petitioners’ asylum and withholding claim, as requested by petitioners in their brief to the BIA, pursuant to the disfavored group analysis set forth in Sael v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 922 (9th Cir.2004), we remand to the agency to determine Sael’s application in this case. See INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16-17, 123 S.Ct. 353, 154 L.Ed.2d 272 (2002) (holding that this court has discretion to either address or remand arguments presented to it in the first instance provided it otherwise has jurisdiction over the claim", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nImmigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order summarily affirming an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying their application for asylum, withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence. Lolong v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 1173, 1178 (9th Cir.2007). We grant the petition for review and we remand. Because there is no evidence that the BIA reviewed the petitioners’ asylum and withholding claim, as requested by petitioners in their brief to the BIA, pursuant to the disfavored group analysis set forth in Sael v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 922 (9th Cir.2004), we remand to the agency to determine Sael’s application in this case. See INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16-17, 123 S.Ct. 353, 154 L.Ed.2d 272 (2002) (holding that when an agency has not reached an issue the proper course is to remand to the agency in the first instance to address", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nImmigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order summarily affirming an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying their application for asylum, withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence. Lolong v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 1173, 1178 (9th Cir.2007). We grant the petition for review and we remand. Because there is no evidence that the BIA reviewed the petitioners’ asylum and withholding claim, as requested by petitioners in their brief to the BIA, pursuant to the disfavored group analysis set forth in Sael v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 922 (9th Cir.2004), we remand to the agency to determine Sael’s application in this case. See INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16-17, 123 S.Ct. 353, 154 L.Ed.2d 272 (2002) (holding that a court of appeals should remand a case to an agency for decision of a matter that statutes place primarily in agency hands" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nwe give your treating source’s opinion.”). Dr. DePhillips concluded that Ulloa should be restricted from prolonged sitting or standing and from lifting more than ten pounds. (R. 105-106). Dr. Segura instructed him to keep his trunk straight and not bend forward, twist, or lift more than twenty pounds. (R. 127). These restrictions conflict with the wide range of light work the ALJ found Ulloa capable of performing. However, the ALJ never explained why Dr. DePhillips’ or Dr. Segura’s opinions were not entitled to controlling weight. Because the ALJ failed to explain the weight given to the opinions of Dr. DePhil-lips and Dr. Segura, the ALJ did not build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusion. Therefore, remand is appropriate. See Clifford, 227 F.3d at 870 (holding that where a treating physicians opinion is contradicted by a consulting physician the alj must explain on the record the reasons for rejecting the opinion of the treating physician", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nwe give your treating source’s opinion.”). Dr. DePhillips concluded that Ulloa should be restricted from prolonged sitting or standing and from lifting more than ten pounds. (R. 105-106). Dr. Segura instructed him to keep his trunk straight and not bend forward, twist, or lift more than twenty pounds. (R. 127). These restrictions conflict with the wide range of light work the ALJ found Ulloa capable of performing. However, the ALJ never explained why Dr. DePhillips’ or Dr. Segura’s opinions were not entitled to controlling weight. Because the ALJ failed to explain the weight given to the opinions of Dr. DePhil-lips and Dr. Segura, the ALJ did not build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusion. Therefore, remand is appropriate. See Clifford, 227 F.3d at 870 (holding that failure to provide good reasons to discredit a treating physicians opinion requires remand", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nwe give your treating source’s opinion.”). Dr. DePhillips concluded that Ulloa should be restricted from prolonged sitting or standing and from lifting more than ten pounds. (R. 105-106). Dr. Segura instructed him to keep his trunk straight and not bend forward, twist, or lift more than twenty pounds. (R. 127). These restrictions conflict with the wide range of light work the ALJ found Ulloa capable of performing. However, the ALJ never explained why Dr. DePhillips’ or Dr. Segura’s opinions were not entitled to controlling weight. Because the ALJ failed to explain the weight given to the opinions of Dr. DePhil-lips and Dr. Segura, the ALJ did not build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusion. Therefore, remand is appropriate. See Clifford, 227 F.3d at 870 (holding that remand was not required and that the aljs failure to mention treating physicians opinion was harmless error because the alj adopted the treating physicians recommendations", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nwe give your treating source’s opinion.”). Dr. DePhillips concluded that Ulloa should be restricted from prolonged sitting or standing and from lifting more than ten pounds. (R. 105-106). Dr. Segura instructed him to keep his trunk straight and not bend forward, twist, or lift more than twenty pounds. (R. 127). These restrictions conflict with the wide range of light work the ALJ found Ulloa capable of performing. However, the ALJ never explained why Dr. DePhillips’ or Dr. Segura’s opinions were not entitled to controlling weight. Because the ALJ failed to explain the weight given to the opinions of Dr. DePhil-lips and Dr. Segura, the ALJ did not build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusion. Therefore, remand is appropriate. See Clifford, 227 F.3d at 870 (holding that errors such as failing to provide clear and convincing reasons for discrediting a claimants subjective complaints rejecting a treating physicians opinion in favor of a nontreating physicians opinion without providing clear and convincing reasons and erring in assessing the claimants residual functioning capacity are fundamental", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nwe give your treating source’s opinion.”). Dr. DePhillips concluded that Ulloa should be restricted from prolonged sitting or standing and from lifting more than ten pounds. (R. 105-106). Dr. Segura instructed him to keep his trunk straight and not bend forward, twist, or lift more than twenty pounds. (R. 127). These restrictions conflict with the wide range of light work the ALJ found Ulloa capable of performing. However, the ALJ never explained why Dr. DePhillips’ or Dr. Segura’s opinions were not entitled to controlling weight. Because the ALJ failed to explain the weight given to the opinions of Dr. DePhil-lips and Dr. Segura, the ALJ did not build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusion. Therefore, remand is appropriate. See Clifford, 227 F.3d at 870 (recognizing that failure to provide good reasons for discrediting a treating physicians opinion is grounds for remand" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nspecify a sentence to a term of imprisonment at or near the maximum term authorized.” See 28 U.S.C.A. § 994(h) (West Supp.1992). The career offender scheme of using a defendant’s criminal record in considering both his offense level and his criminal history under the Sentencing Guidelines bears a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose — “to prevent repeat offenders from continuing to victimize society.” John, 936 F.2d at 766-67 n. 2. Consequently, Johns’ due process claim lacks merit. Id.; see also United States v. Erves, 880 F.2d 376, 379 (11th Cir.1989) (rejecting both procedural and substantive due process attacks on sentencing guidelines); United States v. Hawkins, 811 F.2d 210, 217 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 833, 108 S.Ct. 110, 98 L.Ed.2d 69 (1987) (holding that defendants sixth amendment right to trial by a jury was not violated by district courts reliance on his prior convictions for purposes of sentencing under the armed career criminal act", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nspecify a sentence to a term of imprisonment at or near the maximum term authorized.” See 28 U.S.C.A. § 994(h) (West Supp.1992). The career offender scheme of using a defendant’s criminal record in considering both his offense level and his criminal history under the Sentencing Guidelines bears a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose — “to prevent repeat offenders from continuing to victimize society.” John, 936 F.2d at 766-67 n. 2. Consequently, Johns’ due process claim lacks merit. Id.; see also United States v. Erves, 880 F.2d 376, 379 (11th Cir.1989) (rejecting both procedural and substantive due process attacks on sentencing guidelines); United States v. Hawkins, 811 F.2d 210, 217 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 833, 108 S.Ct. 110, 98 L.Ed.2d 69 (1987) (holding that the armed career criminal designation based on prior convictions does not violate the sixth amendment under booker", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nspecify a sentence to a term of imprisonment at or near the maximum term authorized.” See 28 U.S.C.A. § 994(h) (West Supp.1992). The career offender scheme of using a defendant’s criminal record in considering both his offense level and his criminal history under the Sentencing Guidelines bears a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose — “to prevent repeat offenders from continuing to victimize society.” John, 936 F.2d at 766-67 n. 2. Consequently, Johns’ due process claim lacks merit. Id.; see also United States v. Erves, 880 F.2d 376, 379 (11th Cir.1989) (rejecting both procedural and substantive due process attacks on sentencing guidelines); United States v. Hawkins, 811 F.2d 210, 217 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 833, 108 S.Ct. 110, 98 L.Ed.2d 69 (1987) (holding that a conviction for florida armed robbery is a crime of violence under the armed career criminal act", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nspecify a sentence to a term of imprisonment at or near the maximum term authorized.” See 28 U.S.C.A. § 994(h) (West Supp.1992). The career offender scheme of using a defendant’s criminal record in considering both his offense level and his criminal history under the Sentencing Guidelines bears a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose — “to prevent repeat offenders from continuing to victimize society.” John, 936 F.2d at 766-67 n. 2. Consequently, Johns’ due process claim lacks merit. Id.; see also United States v. Erves, 880 F.2d 376, 379 (11th Cir.1989) (rejecting both procedural and substantive due process attacks on sentencing guidelines); United States v. Hawkins, 811 F.2d 210, 217 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 833, 108 S.Ct. 110, 98 L.Ed.2d 69 (1987) (holding sentencing enhancement scheme in armed career criminal amendment to 18 usca 1202a constitutional", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nspecify a sentence to a term of imprisonment at or near the maximum term authorized.” See 28 U.S.C.A. § 994(h) (West Supp.1992). The career offender scheme of using a defendant’s criminal record in considering both his offense level and his criminal history under the Sentencing Guidelines bears a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose — “to prevent repeat offenders from continuing to victimize society.” John, 936 F.2d at 766-67 n. 2. Consequently, Johns’ due process claim lacks merit. Id.; see also United States v. Erves, 880 F.2d 376, 379 (11th Cir.1989) (rejecting both procedural and substantive due process attacks on sentencing guidelines); United States v. Hawkins, 811 F.2d 210, 217 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 833, 108 S.Ct. 110, 98 L.Ed.2d 69 (1987) (holding that application of armed career criminal enhancement falls within exception for prior convictions where facts were undisputed making it unnecessary to engage in further fact finding about a prior conviction" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nSilverman, No. Civ.00-2274 JRT, 2004 WL 2066778, *4 (D.Minn. Aug. 26, 2004) (finding any award of fees was “clearly inappropriate,” because the respondent was “unable to absorb the necessarily minimal expenses for her family in addition to any fee award, [so that] an award of fees would impair significantly her ability to care for her children”); but see Neves v. Neves, 637 F.Supp.2d 322, 345 (W.D.N.C.2009) (concluding that an award of fees and costs was not “clearly inappropriate,” even though the respondent was then unemployed and had no assets in the United States, where he owned a two-story building in Germany that he estimated would rent for about $2,000 per month). After careful consideration of equitable principles and pertinent factors in this case, see Ozaltin, 708 F.3d at 375 (holding that an attorneys fees award is not appealable until the amount of the award is set", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nSilverman, No. Civ.00-2274 JRT, 2004 WL 2066778, *4 (D.Minn. Aug. 26, 2004) (finding any award of fees was “clearly inappropriate,” because the respondent was “unable to absorb the necessarily minimal expenses for her family in addition to any fee award, [so that] an award of fees would impair significantly her ability to care for her children”); but see Neves v. Neves, 637 F.Supp.2d 322, 345 (W.D.N.C.2009) (concluding that an award of fees and costs was not “clearly inappropriate,” even though the respondent was then unemployed and had no assets in the United States, where he owned a two-story building in Germany that he estimated would rent for about $2,000 per month). After careful consideration of equitable principles and pertinent factors in this case, see Ozaltin, 708 F.3d at 375 (holding that an award of attorneys fees under supreme court rule 38 precursor to rule 222 did not preempt an award of attorneys fees to which one is otherwise entitled and thus appellant could seek an award of attorneys fees pursuant to section 1577300 which permits an award of fees for a party prevailing in an action against a state agency", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nSilverman, No. Civ.00-2274 JRT, 2004 WL 2066778, *4 (D.Minn. Aug. 26, 2004) (finding any award of fees was “clearly inappropriate,” because the respondent was “unable to absorb the necessarily minimal expenses for her family in addition to any fee award, [so that] an award of fees would impair significantly her ability to care for her children”); but see Neves v. Neves, 637 F.Supp.2d 322, 345 (W.D.N.C.2009) (concluding that an award of fees and costs was not “clearly inappropriate,” even though the respondent was then unemployed and had no assets in the United States, where he owned a two-story building in Germany that he estimated would rent for about $2,000 per month). After careful consideration of equitable principles and pertinent factors in this case, see Ozaltin, 708 F.3d at 375 (holding proper basis for award of fees", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nSilverman, No. Civ.00-2274 JRT, 2004 WL 2066778, *4 (D.Minn. Aug. 26, 2004) (finding any award of fees was “clearly inappropriate,” because the respondent was “unable to absorb the necessarily minimal expenses for her family in addition to any fee award, [so that] an award of fees would impair significantly her ability to care for her children”); but see Neves v. Neves, 637 F.Supp.2d 322, 345 (W.D.N.C.2009) (concluding that an award of fees and costs was not “clearly inappropriate,” even though the respondent was then unemployed and had no assets in the United States, where he owned a two-story building in Germany that he estimated would rent for about $2,000 per month). After careful consideration of equitable principles and pertinent factors in this case, see Ozaltin, 708 F.3d at 375 (holding that an award for medical expenses is proper when the expenses have been incurred but not paid", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nSilverman, No. Civ.00-2274 JRT, 2004 WL 2066778, *4 (D.Minn. Aug. 26, 2004) (finding any award of fees was “clearly inappropriate,” because the respondent was “unable to absorb the necessarily minimal expenses for her family in addition to any fee award, [so that] an award of fees would impair significantly her ability to care for her children”); but see Neves v. Neves, 637 F.Supp.2d 322, 345 (W.D.N.C.2009) (concluding that an award of fees and costs was not “clearly inappropriate,” even though the respondent was then unemployed and had no assets in the United States, where he owned a two-story building in Germany that he estimated would rent for about $2,000 per month). After careful consideration of equitable principles and pertinent factors in this case, see Ozaltin, 708 F.3d at 375 (recognizing that an award of fees and expenses under the convention and icara involves equitable principles" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\noil transactions do not negate good faith. Regardless of any alleged ulterior motive to the transactions, the Downstream Purchasers were legally bound to pay for the oil purchased from the Debtors on the 20th of the following month pursuant to their respective agreements. Had the oil derivatives market stabilized, the Downstream Purchasers might not have been able to offset or net liabilities against receivables owed to the Debtors because the Debtors would not have defaulted. Instead, the Downstream Purchasers would have been legally obligated to provide payment in full for the oil purchased, and there is nothing in the record to suggest they would not have done so. Similarly, there is no evidence to indicate that these transactions were a sham. See CIT Group, 2012 WL 4603049, at *8 (holding that unequivocal examples of racial animus included instances when plaintiff was instructed to keep his black ass off the phone and was called a black son of a bitch and a black motherfucker", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\noil transactions do not negate good faith. Regardless of any alleged ulterior motive to the transactions, the Downstream Purchasers were legally bound to pay for the oil purchased from the Debtors on the 20th of the following month pursuant to their respective agreements. Had the oil derivatives market stabilized, the Downstream Purchasers might not have been able to offset or net liabilities against receivables owed to the Debtors because the Debtors would not have defaulted. Instead, the Downstream Purchasers would have been legally obligated to provide payment in full for the oil purchased, and there is nothing in the record to suggest they would not have done so. Similarly, there is no evidence to indicate that these transactions were a sham. See CIT Group, 2012 WL 4603049, at *8 (holding that the transaction must be fair and equitable and in good faith", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\noil transactions do not negate good faith. Regardless of any alleged ulterior motive to the transactions, the Downstream Purchasers were legally bound to pay for the oil purchased from the Debtors on the 20th of the following month pursuant to their respective agreements. Had the oil derivatives market stabilized, the Downstream Purchasers might not have been able to offset or net liabilities against receivables owed to the Debtors because the Debtors would not have defaulted. Instead, the Downstream Purchasers would have been legally obligated to provide payment in full for the oil purchased, and there is nothing in the record to suggest they would not have done so. Similarly, there is no evidence to indicate that these transactions were a sham. See CIT Group, 2012 WL 4603049, at *8 (holding that articulable facts sufficient to support a stop included a telephone call that two black males were selling drugs at a particular location discovery of the juvenile at that location with another black male and the juveniles nervous body reflexes", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\noil transactions do not negate good faith. Regardless of any alleged ulterior motive to the transactions, the Downstream Purchasers were legally bound to pay for the oil purchased from the Debtors on the 20th of the following month pursuant to their respective agreements. Had the oil derivatives market stabilized, the Downstream Purchasers might not have been able to offset or net liabilities against receivables owed to the Debtors because the Debtors would not have defaulted. Instead, the Downstream Purchasers would have been legally obligated to provide payment in full for the oil purchased, and there is nothing in the record to suggest they would not have done so. Similarly, there is no evidence to indicate that these transactions were a sham. See CIT Group, 2012 WL 4603049, at *8 (holding that commodities was a good faith purchaser and stating that commodities arrangement was not a sham black diamond delivered coal to commodities and commodities faithfully paid nearly fiftymillion dollars for its purchases until black diamonds bankruptcy", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\noil transactions do not negate good faith. Regardless of any alleged ulterior motive to the transactions, the Downstream Purchasers were legally bound to pay for the oil purchased from the Debtors on the 20th of the following month pursuant to their respective agreements. Had the oil derivatives market stabilized, the Downstream Purchasers might not have been able to offset or net liabilities against receivables owed to the Debtors because the Debtors would not have defaulted. Instead, the Downstream Purchasers would have been legally obligated to provide payment in full for the oil purchased, and there is nothing in the record to suggest they would not have done so. Similarly, there is no evidence to indicate that these transactions were a sham. See CIT Group, 2012 WL 4603049, at *8 (holding that the white defendants association with a black defendant was not sufficient to give them standing to join in the black defendants batson challenge" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nin its discretion may allow the recovery of full costs by or against any party.... Except as otherwise provided by this title, the court may also award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing party as part of the cost. 17 U.S.C. § 505. The Supreme Court has provided a list of non-exclusive factors a court may consider in determining whether either party should receive attorney fees, including, “frivolousness, motivation, objective unreasonableness (both in the factual and legal components of the case) and the need in particular circumstances to advance considerations of compensation and deterrence.” Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 n. 19, 114 S.Ct. 1023, 127 L.Ed.2d 455 (1994) (citing with approval Lieb v. Topstone Industries, Inc., 788 F.2d 151, 156 (3d Cir.1986) (holding rookerfeldman inapplicable where the district court could and did find that the plaintiffs constitutional claims had merit without also finding that the state court erred", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nin its discretion may allow the recovery of full costs by or against any party.... Except as otherwise provided by this title, the court may also award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing party as part of the cost. 17 U.S.C. § 505. The Supreme Court has provided a list of non-exclusive factors a court may consider in determining whether either party should receive attorney fees, including, “frivolousness, motivation, objective unreasonableness (both in the factual and legal components of the case) and the need in particular circumstances to advance considerations of compensation and deterrence.” Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 n. 19, 114 S.Ct. 1023, 127 L.Ed.2d 455 (1994) (citing with approval Lieb v. Topstone Industries, Inc., 788 F.2d 151, 156 (3d Cir.1986) (holding that there would be no exception to american rule on attorney fees for legal malpractice claims", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nin its discretion may allow the recovery of full costs by or against any party.... Except as otherwise provided by this title, the court may also award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing party as part of the cost. 17 U.S.C. § 505. The Supreme Court has provided a list of non-exclusive factors a court may consider in determining whether either party should receive attorney fees, including, “frivolousness, motivation, objective unreasonableness (both in the factual and legal components of the case) and the need in particular circumstances to advance considerations of compensation and deterrence.” Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 n. 19, 114 S.Ct. 1023, 127 L.Ed.2d 455 (1994) (citing with approval Lieb v. Topstone Industries, Inc., 788 F.2d 151, 156 (3d Cir.1986) (holding that district court could impose attorney fees where plaintiffs lawsuit patently had no legal merit", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nin its discretion may allow the recovery of full costs by or against any party.... Except as otherwise provided by this title, the court may also award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing party as part of the cost. 17 U.S.C. § 505. The Supreme Court has provided a list of non-exclusive factors a court may consider in determining whether either party should receive attorney fees, including, “frivolousness, motivation, objective unreasonableness (both in the factual and legal components of the case) and the need in particular circumstances to advance considerations of compensation and deterrence.” Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 n. 19, 114 S.Ct. 1023, 127 L.Ed.2d 455 (1994) (citing with approval Lieb v. Topstone Industries, Inc., 788 F.2d 151, 156 (3d Cir.1986) (holding that the plaintiffs claims for assault and battery were patently without merit since the officers actions under the circumstances were justified", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nin its discretion may allow the recovery of full costs by or against any party.... Except as otherwise provided by this title, the court may also award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing party as part of the cost. 17 U.S.C. § 505. The Supreme Court has provided a list of non-exclusive factors a court may consider in determining whether either party should receive attorney fees, including, “frivolousness, motivation, objective unreasonableness (both in the factual and legal components of the case) and the need in particular circumstances to advance considerations of compensation and deterrence.” Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 n. 19, 114 S.Ct. 1023, 127 L.Ed.2d 455 (1994) (citing with approval Lieb v. Topstone Industries, Inc., 788 F.2d 151, 156 (3d Cir.1986) (holding attorney lacked standing to challenge amount of attorney fees awarded plaintiffs not parties to the appeal" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nAppellant's interpretation of the CDCA unlicensed lenders, like Appellant, would be permitted to charge exorbitant fees, while at the same time lenders licensed under the CDCA are limited to charges of $50 annually. See 7 P.S. § 6217.l.D. The Department and the amici reason that lenders would have no incentive to obtain a license in order to charge higher interest rates, because they could capture that increase by charging high fees, thus rendering the statute useless at protecting the public against usury. 9 . Moreover, this Court has recognized that choice-of-law agreements can be avoided when the terms offend Commonwealth public policy even in disputes between contracting parties. See McIlvaine Trucking, Inc. v. W.C.A.B. (States), 570 Pa. 662, 672-73, 810 A.2d 1280, 1286 (2002) (holding that the trial courts authority to initiate workers compensation benefits before the final adjudication was not divested by the legislature and was consistent with the stated purpose of the workers compensation act", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nAppellant's interpretation of the CDCA unlicensed lenders, like Appellant, would be permitted to charge exorbitant fees, while at the same time lenders licensed under the CDCA are limited to charges of $50 annually. See 7 P.S. § 6217.l.D. The Department and the amici reason that lenders would have no incentive to obtain a license in order to charge higher interest rates, because they could capture that increase by charging high fees, thus rendering the statute useless at protecting the public against usury. 9 . Moreover, this Court has recognized that choice-of-law agreements can be avoided when the terms offend Commonwealth public policy even in disputes between contracting parties. See McIlvaine Trucking, Inc. v. W.C.A.B. (States), 570 Pa. 662, 672-73, 810 A.2d 1280, 1286 (2002) (holding that legislature clearly intended that workers compensation act and unemployment security act be construed together thus prohibiting worker from receiving both unemployment compensation and workers compensation payments for same period", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nAppellant's interpretation of the CDCA unlicensed lenders, like Appellant, would be permitted to charge exorbitant fees, while at the same time lenders licensed under the CDCA are limited to charges of $50 annually. See 7 P.S. § 6217.l.D. The Department and the amici reason that lenders would have no incentive to obtain a license in order to charge higher interest rates, because they could capture that increase by charging high fees, thus rendering the statute useless at protecting the public against usury. 9 . Moreover, this Court has recognized that choice-of-law agreements can be avoided when the terms offend Commonwealth public policy even in disputes between contracting parties. See McIlvaine Trucking, Inc. v. W.C.A.B. (States), 570 Pa. 662, 672-73, 810 A.2d 1280, 1286 (2002) (holding that the parties choiceoflaw agreement as relating to workers compensation was appropriately avoided where it offended state public policy as reflected in express provisions of the pennsylvania workers compensation act", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nAppellant's interpretation of the CDCA unlicensed lenders, like Appellant, would be permitted to charge exorbitant fees, while at the same time lenders licensed under the CDCA are limited to charges of $50 annually. See 7 P.S. § 6217.l.D. The Department and the amici reason that lenders would have no incentive to obtain a license in order to charge higher interest rates, because they could capture that increase by charging high fees, thus rendering the statute useless at protecting the public against usury. 9 . Moreover, this Court has recognized that choice-of-law agreements can be avoided when the terms offend Commonwealth public policy even in disputes between contracting parties. See McIlvaine Trucking, Inc. v. W.C.A.B. (States), 570 Pa. 662, 672-73, 810 A.2d 1280, 1286 (2002) (holding that the provisions of the workers compensation act must be satisfied or the action is not maintainable in the courts", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nAppellant's interpretation of the CDCA unlicensed lenders, like Appellant, would be permitted to charge exorbitant fees, while at the same time lenders licensed under the CDCA are limited to charges of $50 annually. See 7 P.S. § 6217.l.D. The Department and the amici reason that lenders would have no incentive to obtain a license in order to charge higher interest rates, because they could capture that increase by charging high fees, thus rendering the statute useless at protecting the public against usury. 9 . Moreover, this Court has recognized that choice-of-law agreements can be avoided when the terms offend Commonwealth public policy even in disputes between contracting parties. See McIlvaine Trucking, Inc. v. W.C.A.B. (States), 570 Pa. 662, 672-73, 810 A.2d 1280, 1286 (2002) (holding that provisions of section 40115102 are applicable to the determination of the status of truck drivers as employees or independent contractors under the workers compensation act and discussing legislative history indicating intent to apply these provisions both to workers compensation and unemployment compensation matters" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nbecause the notice of appeal mentioned both the district court’s decision to dismiss Plaintiffs action and the district court’s decision denying Plaintiffs Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) motion for relief from that decision, we have jurisdiction to review both of those decisions. See Fed. R.App. P. 3(c)(1)(B). See generally Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972) (construing pro se litigant’s pleadings liberally). In his appellate brief, however, Plaintiff also challenges the district court’s decision to deny his later-filed Fed. R.Civ.P. 60(b) motion for reconsideration. Because Plaintiff never filed a separate notice of appeal from that denial, we have no jurisdiction to consider it. See Bowles v. Russell, — U.S. —, 127 S.Ct. 2360, 2366, 168 L.Ed.2d 96 (2007) (holding that the 30day notice of appeal requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nbecause the notice of appeal mentioned both the district court’s decision to dismiss Plaintiffs action and the district court’s decision denying Plaintiffs Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) motion for relief from that decision, we have jurisdiction to review both of those decisions. See Fed. R.App. P. 3(c)(1)(B). See generally Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972) (construing pro se litigant’s pleadings liberally). In his appellate brief, however, Plaintiff also challenges the district court’s decision to deny his later-filed Fed. R.Civ.P. 60(b) motion for reconsideration. Because Plaintiff never filed a separate notice of appeal from that denial, we have no jurisdiction to consider it. See Bowles v. Russell, — U.S. —, 127 S.Ct. 2360, 2366, 168 L.Ed.2d 96 (2007) (holding timely notice of appeal under fed rapp p 4a is jurisdictional", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nbecause the notice of appeal mentioned both the district court’s decision to dismiss Plaintiffs action and the district court’s decision denying Plaintiffs Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) motion for relief from that decision, we have jurisdiction to review both of those decisions. See Fed. R.App. P. 3(c)(1)(B). See generally Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972) (construing pro se litigant’s pleadings liberally). In his appellate brief, however, Plaintiff also challenges the district court’s decision to deny his later-filed Fed. R.Civ.P. 60(b) motion for reconsideration. Because Plaintiff never filed a separate notice of appeal from that denial, we have no jurisdiction to consider it. See Bowles v. Russell, — U.S. —, 127 S.Ct. 2360, 2366, 168 L.Ed.2d 96 (2007) (holding time for filing notice of appeal under rule 8002 is jurisdictional", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nbecause the notice of appeal mentioned both the district court’s decision to dismiss Plaintiffs action and the district court’s decision denying Plaintiffs Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) motion for relief from that decision, we have jurisdiction to review both of those decisions. See Fed. R.App. P. 3(c)(1)(B). See generally Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972) (construing pro se litigant’s pleadings liberally). In his appellate brief, however, Plaintiff also challenges the district court’s decision to deny his later-filed Fed. R.Civ.P. 60(b) motion for reconsideration. Because Plaintiff never filed a separate notice of appeal from that denial, we have no jurisdiction to consider it. See Bowles v. Russell, — U.S. —, 127 S.Ct. 2360, 2366, 168 L.Ed.2d 96 (2007) (holding that timeliness of filing of notice of appeal is a jurisdictional issue", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nbecause the notice of appeal mentioned both the district court’s decision to dismiss Plaintiffs action and the district court’s decision denying Plaintiffs Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) motion for relief from that decision, we have jurisdiction to review both of those decisions. See Fed. R.App. P. 3(c)(1)(B). See generally Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972) (construing pro se litigant’s pleadings liberally). In his appellate brief, however, Plaintiff also challenges the district court’s decision to deny his later-filed Fed. R.Civ.P. 60(b) motion for reconsideration. Because Plaintiff never filed a separate notice of appeal from that denial, we have no jurisdiction to consider it. See Bowles v. Russell, — U.S. —, 127 S.Ct. 2360, 2366, 168 L.Ed.2d 96 (2007) (holding that the appeal was timely filed because federal rule of appellate procedure 4a provides inmates with sixty days to appeal the denial of a 2255 motion" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nagreement. Where, as here, the Offer Letter specifies benefits payable on discharge, the employee is entitled to those benefits if the termination amounts to a constructive discharge. See Robinson v. Kingston Hosp., 55 A.D.3d 1121, 1122, 866 N.Y.S.2d 387, 388 (3d Dep’t 2008) (observing that, despite plaintiff’s being at-will employee, change in employment terms would entitle her to contractual severance benefits if it amounted to constructive discharge). In rejecting Scott’s claim of constructive discharge and accepting Harris’s claim of resignation, the district court concluded, as a matter of law, that a salary in the reduced amount of $150,000 could not be deemed so abusive as to render continued employment untenable. See Pena v. Brat-tleboro Retreat, 702 F.2d 322, 325 (2d Cir.1983) (holding that plaintiff alleging constructive discharge must prove deliberateness of the employers action and intolerability of the working conditions", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nagreement. Where, as here, the Offer Letter specifies benefits payable on discharge, the employee is entitled to those benefits if the termination amounts to a constructive discharge. See Robinson v. Kingston Hosp., 55 A.D.3d 1121, 1122, 866 N.Y.S.2d 387, 388 (3d Dep’t 2008) (observing that, despite plaintiff’s being at-will employee, change in employment terms would entitle her to contractual severance benefits if it amounted to constructive discharge). In rejecting Scott’s claim of constructive discharge and accepting Harris’s claim of resignation, the district court concluded, as a matter of law, that a salary in the reduced amount of $150,000 could not be deemed so abusive as to render continued employment untenable. See Pena v. Brat-tleboro Retreat, 702 F.2d 322, 325 (2d Cir.1983) (recognizing constructive discharge where employer rather than acting directly deliberately makes employees working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable employee would be forced into involuntary resignation", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nagreement. Where, as here, the Offer Letter specifies benefits payable on discharge, the employee is entitled to those benefits if the termination amounts to a constructive discharge. See Robinson v. Kingston Hosp., 55 A.D.3d 1121, 1122, 866 N.Y.S.2d 387, 388 (3d Dep’t 2008) (observing that, despite plaintiff’s being at-will employee, change in employment terms would entitle her to contractual severance benefits if it amounted to constructive discharge). In rejecting Scott’s claim of constructive discharge and accepting Harris’s claim of resignation, the district court concluded, as a matter of law, that a salary in the reduced amount of $150,000 could not be deemed so abusive as to render continued employment untenable. See Pena v. Brat-tleboro Retreat, 702 F.2d 322, 325 (2d Cir.1983) (recognizing doctrine of constructive discharge under federal civil rights act and national labor relations act where employer knowingly permits working conditions to become so intolerable that a reasonable person subject to them would resign", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nagreement. Where, as here, the Offer Letter specifies benefits payable on discharge, the employee is entitled to those benefits if the termination amounts to a constructive discharge. See Robinson v. Kingston Hosp., 55 A.D.3d 1121, 1122, 866 N.Y.S.2d 387, 388 (3d Dep’t 2008) (observing that, despite plaintiff’s being at-will employee, change in employment terms would entitle her to contractual severance benefits if it amounted to constructive discharge). In rejecting Scott’s claim of constructive discharge and accepting Harris’s claim of resignation, the district court concluded, as a matter of law, that a salary in the reduced amount of $150,000 could not be deemed so abusive as to render continued employment untenable. See Pena v. Brat-tleboro Retreat, 702 F.2d 322, 325 (2d Cir.1983) (holding employee resigned and was not constructively discharged because there was no evidence that employer deliberately created working conditions that led to her resignation", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nagreement. Where, as here, the Offer Letter specifies benefits payable on discharge, the employee is entitled to those benefits if the termination amounts to a constructive discharge. See Robinson v. Kingston Hosp., 55 A.D.3d 1121, 1122, 866 N.Y.S.2d 387, 388 (3d Dep’t 2008) (observing that, despite plaintiff’s being at-will employee, change in employment terms would entitle her to contractual severance benefits if it amounted to constructive discharge). In rejecting Scott’s claim of constructive discharge and accepting Harris’s claim of resignation, the district court concluded, as a matter of law, that a salary in the reduced amount of $150,000 could not be deemed so abusive as to render continued employment untenable. See Pena v. Brat-tleboro Retreat, 702 F.2d 322, 325 (2d Cir.1983) (holding that defendant interfered with plaintiffs right when the employer forced her to choose between resignation and working without leave" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\n624 F.Supp.2d 933 (N.D.Ill.2009). 17 . Smith v. United States, 558 A.2d 312, 319 (D.C.1989). 18 . Sennett argues that there was no probable cause to believe that she was guilty of conspiracy or aiding and abetting because the record does not contain evidence satisfying all the elements of those offenses. This argument fails because \"evidence sufficient to find an individual guilty of an offense is not required to establish probable cause.” Gantt v. Whitaker, 57 Fed.Appx. 141, 148 (4th Cir.2003); see also Porterfield v. Lott, 156 F.3d 563, 569 (4th Cir.1998) (“Probable cause requires more than ‘bare suspicion’ but requires less than evidence necessary to convict.”). And, based on the totality of the facts an 455 (9th Cir.1975)); Panetta v. Crowley, 460 F.3d 388, 398 (2d Cir.2006) (holding police are not required to explore and eliminate every potentially plausible claim of innocence as part of their prearrest investigation", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\n624 F.Supp.2d 933 (N.D.Ill.2009). 17 . Smith v. United States, 558 A.2d 312, 319 (D.C.1989). 18 . Sennett argues that there was no probable cause to believe that she was guilty of conspiracy or aiding and abetting because the record does not contain evidence satisfying all the elements of those offenses. This argument fails because \"evidence sufficient to find an individual guilty of an offense is not required to establish probable cause.” Gantt v. Whitaker, 57 Fed.Appx. 141, 148 (4th Cir.2003); see also Porterfield v. Lott, 156 F.3d 563, 569 (4th Cir.1998) (“Probable cause requires more than ‘bare suspicion’ but requires less than evidence necessary to convict.”). And, based on the totality of the facts an 455 (9th Cir.1975)); Panetta v. Crowley, 460 F.3d 388, 398 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that where arrest was unlawful police officer committed a battery when he touched plaintiff during arrest", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\n624 F.Supp.2d 933 (N.D.Ill.2009). 17 . Smith v. United States, 558 A.2d 312, 319 (D.C.1989). 18 . Sennett argues that there was no probable cause to believe that she was guilty of conspiracy or aiding and abetting because the record does not contain evidence satisfying all the elements of those offenses. This argument fails because \"evidence sufficient to find an individual guilty of an offense is not required to establish probable cause.” Gantt v. Whitaker, 57 Fed.Appx. 141, 148 (4th Cir.2003); see also Porterfield v. Lott, 156 F.3d 563, 569 (4th Cir.1998) (“Probable cause requires more than ‘bare suspicion’ but requires less than evidence necessary to convict.”). And, based on the totality of the facts an 455 (9th Cir.1975)); Panetta v. Crowley, 460 F.3d 388, 398 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that police officer is not required to explore and eliminate all theoretically plausible claims of innocence", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\n624 F.Supp.2d 933 (N.D.Ill.2009). 17 . Smith v. United States, 558 A.2d 312, 319 (D.C.1989). 18 . Sennett argues that there was no probable cause to believe that she was guilty of conspiracy or aiding and abetting because the record does not contain evidence satisfying all the elements of those offenses. This argument fails because \"evidence sufficient to find an individual guilty of an offense is not required to establish probable cause.” Gantt v. Whitaker, 57 Fed.Appx. 141, 148 (4th Cir.2003); see also Porterfield v. Lott, 156 F.3d 563, 569 (4th Cir.1998) (“Probable cause requires more than ‘bare suspicion’ but requires less than evidence necessary to convict.”). And, based on the totality of the facts an 455 (9th Cir.1975)); Panetta v. Crowley, 460 F.3d 388, 398 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that petitioners challenge to jury instructions in light of some new cases did not demonstrate his actual innocence because petitioner only asserts legal innocence not actual innocence", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\n624 F.Supp.2d 933 (N.D.Ill.2009). 17 . Smith v. United States, 558 A.2d 312, 319 (D.C.1989). 18 . Sennett argues that there was no probable cause to believe that she was guilty of conspiracy or aiding and abetting because the record does not contain evidence satisfying all the elements of those offenses. This argument fails because \"evidence sufficient to find an individual guilty of an offense is not required to establish probable cause.” Gantt v. Whitaker, 57 Fed.Appx. 141, 148 (4th Cir.2003); see also Porterfield v. Lott, 156 F.3d 563, 569 (4th Cir.1998) (“Probable cause requires more than ‘bare suspicion’ but requires less than evidence necessary to convict.”). And, based on the totality of the facts an 455 (9th Cir.1975)); Panetta v. Crowley, 460 F.3d 388, 398 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that police officer was not required to eliminate every theoretically plausible claim of innocence before effectuating arrest for animal cruelty" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\n125 (2d Cir.2006), no reasonable fact-finder would have been compelled to credit the explanation he offered, see Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80-81 (2d Cir.2005). These inconsistencies went to the heart of Petitioner’s claim as they related to the medical care he received for his alleged beatings. See Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 135, 141 (2d Cir.2008). Since the only evidence that Petitioner was likely to be persecuted or tortured depended upon his credibility, the adverse credibility determination precludes success on his claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir.2006); Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 523 (2d Cir.2005); cf. Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 184-85 (2d Cir.2004) (holding that the agency may not deny a cat claim solely on the basis of an adverse credibility finding made in the asylum context where the cat claim did not turn upon credibility", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\n125 (2d Cir.2006), no reasonable fact-finder would have been compelled to credit the explanation he offered, see Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80-81 (2d Cir.2005). These inconsistencies went to the heart of Petitioner’s claim as they related to the medical care he received for his alleged beatings. See Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 135, 141 (2d Cir.2008). Since the only evidence that Petitioner was likely to be persecuted or tortured depended upon his credibility, the adverse credibility determination precludes success on his claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir.2006); Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 523 (2d Cir.2005); cf. Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 184-85 (2d Cir.2004) (holding that defeat of asylum claim on credibility grounds does not necessarily preclude relief on a cat claim", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\n125 (2d Cir.2006), no reasonable fact-finder would have been compelled to credit the explanation he offered, see Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80-81 (2d Cir.2005). These inconsistencies went to the heart of Petitioner’s claim as they related to the medical care he received for his alleged beatings. See Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 135, 141 (2d Cir.2008). Since the only evidence that Petitioner was likely to be persecuted or tortured depended upon his credibility, the adverse credibility determination precludes success on his claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir.2006); Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 523 (2d Cir.2005); cf. Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 184-85 (2d Cir.2004) (holding that an adverse credibility determination is sufficient to deny asylum", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\n125 (2d Cir.2006), no reasonable fact-finder would have been compelled to credit the explanation he offered, see Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80-81 (2d Cir.2005). These inconsistencies went to the heart of Petitioner’s claim as they related to the medical care he received for his alleged beatings. See Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 135, 141 (2d Cir.2008). Since the only evidence that Petitioner was likely to be persecuted or tortured depended upon his credibility, the adverse credibility determination precludes success on his claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir.2006); Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 523 (2d Cir.2005); cf. Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 184-85 (2d Cir.2004) (holding it improper to deny cat relief based on adverse credibility finding where objective documentary evidence establishes likelihood of torture", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\n125 (2d Cir.2006), no reasonable fact-finder would have been compelled to credit the explanation he offered, see Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80-81 (2d Cir.2005). These inconsistencies went to the heart of Petitioner’s claim as they related to the medical care he received for his alleged beatings. See Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 135, 141 (2d Cir.2008). Since the only evidence that Petitioner was likely to be persecuted or tortured depended upon his credibility, the adverse credibility determination precludes success on his claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir.2006); Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 523 (2d Cir.2005); cf. Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 184-85 (2d Cir.2004) (holding that a negative credibility finding for the purposes of an asylum claim does not preclude relief under cat where documented country conditions corroborate a claim of torture" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nof a new or different offense to a petition if the motion to amend is made before the adjudicatory hearing begins.” Rule 10-103 committee commentary (emphasis added). Thus, the rule contains no authority to amend the charging document in a delinquency case after commencement of the adjudicatory hearing. {8} The State, however, attempts to rely on the provision in Rule 10-103(F) that permits amendments in order to correct mistakes in the pleadings. This ment. Roman, 1998-NMCA-132, ¶ 12, 125 N.M. 688, 964 P.2d 852. Only amendments that are made to conform to the evidence in support of the charge on which defendant was tried are permissible. Marquez, 1998-NMCA-010, ¶¶ 20-21, 124 N.M. 409, 951 P.2d 1070; but see State v. Lucero, 1998-NMSC-044, ¶¶ 23-25, 126 N.M. 552, 972 P.2d 1143 (holding that indictment for murder in the first degree charges murder by whatever means it may have been committed regardless of the theory of murder presented to the grand jury", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nof a new or different offense to a petition if the motion to amend is made before the adjudicatory hearing begins.” Rule 10-103 committee commentary (emphasis added). Thus, the rule contains no authority to amend the charging document in a delinquency case after commencement of the adjudicatory hearing. {8} The State, however, attempts to rely on the provision in Rule 10-103(F) that permits amendments in order to correct mistakes in the pleadings. This ment. Roman, 1998-NMCA-132, ¶ 12, 125 N.M. 688, 964 P.2d 852. Only amendments that are made to conform to the evidence in support of the charge on which defendant was tried are permissible. Marquez, 1998-NMCA-010, ¶¶ 20-21, 124 N.M. 409, 951 P.2d 1070; but see State v. Lucero, 1998-NMSC-044, ¶¶ 23-25, 126 N.M. 552, 972 P.2d 1143 (holding that whether amendment to capital felonymurder information to add the charge of premeditated and deliberate murder was improper turned on whether there was prejudice or surprise", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nof a new or different offense to a petition if the motion to amend is made before the adjudicatory hearing begins.” Rule 10-103 committee commentary (emphasis added). Thus, the rule contains no authority to amend the charging document in a delinquency case after commencement of the adjudicatory hearing. {8} The State, however, attempts to rely on the provision in Rule 10-103(F) that permits amendments in order to correct mistakes in the pleadings. This ment. Roman, 1998-NMCA-132, ¶ 12, 125 N.M. 688, 964 P.2d 852. Only amendments that are made to conform to the evidence in support of the charge on which defendant was tried are permissible. Marquez, 1998-NMCA-010, ¶¶ 20-21, 124 N.M. 409, 951 P.2d 1070; but see State v. Lucero, 1998-NMSC-044, ¶¶ 23-25, 126 N.M. 552, 972 P.2d 1143 (holding that conspiracy to commit murder is not lesserincluded offense of firstdegree murder", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nof a new or different offense to a petition if the motion to amend is made before the adjudicatory hearing begins.” Rule 10-103 committee commentary (emphasis added). Thus, the rule contains no authority to amend the charging document in a delinquency case after commencement of the adjudicatory hearing. {8} The State, however, attempts to rely on the provision in Rule 10-103(F) that permits amendments in order to correct mistakes in the pleadings. This ment. Roman, 1998-NMCA-132, ¶ 12, 125 N.M. 688, 964 P.2d 852. Only amendments that are made to conform to the evidence in support of the charge on which defendant was tried are permissible. Marquez, 1998-NMCA-010, ¶¶ 20-21, 124 N.M. 409, 951 P.2d 1070; but see State v. Lucero, 1998-NMSC-044, ¶¶ 23-25, 126 N.M. 552, 972 P.2d 1143 (holding different rule applicable for conviction of second degree murder", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nof a new or different offense to a petition if the motion to amend is made before the adjudicatory hearing begins.” Rule 10-103 committee commentary (emphasis added). Thus, the rule contains no authority to amend the charging document in a delinquency case after commencement of the adjudicatory hearing. {8} The State, however, attempts to rely on the provision in Rule 10-103(F) that permits amendments in order to correct mistakes in the pleadings. This ment. Roman, 1998-NMCA-132, ¶ 12, 125 N.M. 688, 964 P.2d 852. Only amendments that are made to conform to the evidence in support of the charge on which defendant was tried are permissible. Marquez, 1998-NMCA-010, ¶¶ 20-21, 124 N.M. 409, 951 P.2d 1070; but see State v. Lucero, 1998-NMSC-044, ¶¶ 23-25, 126 N.M. 552, 972 P.2d 1143 (holding that states pretrial amendment of the original indictment charging defendant with willful and deliberate first degree murder to add an alternative murder theory of depraved mind murder did not add a different offense and therefore did not prejudice the defendant" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nM.R. Evid. 403, see State v. Allen, 2006 ME 21, ¶9 n. 3, 892 A.2d 456, 458-59 (admission of a photograph over a Rule 403 objection); or (3) denying Keene’s oral motion for a change of venue, see State v. Saucier, 2001 ME 107, ¶ 14, 776 A.2d 621, 626 (denial of a motion for a change of venue). Furthermore, the evidence at trial was sufficient to support Keene’s convictions. See State v. Smen, 2006 ME 40, ¶ 7, 895 A.2d 319, 321 (review for sufficiency of the evidence). Finally, although Keene argues that the court was barred under 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1256(3)(B) from imposing consecutive sentences for crimes committed during a single criminal episode, section 1256(3)(B) did not apply because manslaughter is not a specific intent crime. See State v. Horr, 2003 ME 110, ¶ 11, 831 A.2d 407, 411 (holding that unintentional crimes which lack criminal purpose and a specific intent element are excluded from the limitation set out in section 12563b", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nM.R. Evid. 403, see State v. Allen, 2006 ME 21, ¶9 n. 3, 892 A.2d 456, 458-59 (admission of a photograph over a Rule 403 objection); or (3) denying Keene’s oral motion for a change of venue, see State v. Saucier, 2001 ME 107, ¶ 14, 776 A.2d 621, 626 (denial of a motion for a change of venue). Furthermore, the evidence at trial was sufficient to support Keene’s convictions. See State v. Smen, 2006 ME 40, ¶ 7, 895 A.2d 319, 321 (review for sufficiency of the evidence). Finally, although Keene argues that the court was barred under 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1256(3)(B) from imposing consecutive sentences for crimes committed during a single criminal episode, section 1256(3)(B) did not apply because manslaughter is not a specific intent crime. See State v. Horr, 2003 ME 110, ¶ 11, 831 A.2d 407, 411 (holding that under the crimes code conspiracy and the completed substantive offense are separate crimes", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nM.R. Evid. 403, see State v. Allen, 2006 ME 21, ¶9 n. 3, 892 A.2d 456, 458-59 (admission of a photograph over a Rule 403 objection); or (3) denying Keene’s oral motion for a change of venue, see State v. Saucier, 2001 ME 107, ¶ 14, 776 A.2d 621, 626 (denial of a motion for a change of venue). Furthermore, the evidence at trial was sufficient to support Keene’s convictions. See State v. Smen, 2006 ME 40, ¶ 7, 895 A.2d 319, 321 (review for sufficiency of the evidence). Finally, although Keene argues that the court was barred under 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1256(3)(B) from imposing consecutive sentences for crimes committed during a single criminal episode, section 1256(3)(B) did not apply because manslaughter is not a specific intent crime. See State v. Horr, 2003 ME 110, ¶ 11, 831 A.2d 407, 411 (holding intoxication is only a defense to specific intent crimes and not general intent crimes", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nM.R. Evid. 403, see State v. Allen, 2006 ME 21, ¶9 n. 3, 892 A.2d 456, 458-59 (admission of a photograph over a Rule 403 objection); or (3) denying Keene’s oral motion for a change of venue, see State v. Saucier, 2001 ME 107, ¶ 14, 776 A.2d 621, 626 (denial of a motion for a change of venue). Furthermore, the evidence at trial was sufficient to support Keene’s convictions. See State v. Smen, 2006 ME 40, ¶ 7, 895 A.2d 319, 321 (review for sufficiency of the evidence). Finally, although Keene argues that the court was barred under 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1256(3)(B) from imposing consecutive sentences for crimes committed during a single criminal episode, section 1256(3)(B) did not apply because manslaughter is not a specific intent crime. See State v. Horr, 2003 ME 110, ¶ 11, 831 A.2d 407, 411 (holding that to violate a specific intent statute the defendant must act with the purpose of violating the law", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nM.R. Evid. 403, see State v. Allen, 2006 ME 21, ¶9 n. 3, 892 A.2d 456, 458-59 (admission of a photograph over a Rule 403 objection); or (3) denying Keene’s oral motion for a change of venue, see State v. Saucier, 2001 ME 107, ¶ 14, 776 A.2d 621, 626 (denial of a motion for a change of venue). Furthermore, the evidence at trial was sufficient to support Keene’s convictions. See State v. Smen, 2006 ME 40, ¶ 7, 895 A.2d 319, 321 (review for sufficiency of the evidence). Finally, although Keene argues that the court was barred under 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1256(3)(B) from imposing consecutive sentences for crimes committed during a single criminal episode, section 1256(3)(B) did not apply because manslaughter is not a specific intent crime. See State v. Horr, 2003 ME 110, ¶ 11, 831 A.2d 407, 411 (holding that diminished capacity is a defense only to specific intent crimes" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe warrant. Rather, according to the trial court, the express terms of the warrant \"through inadvertence” did not permit as extensive a search as was actually conducted. Thus, it appears the actual basis for the trial court's ruling was that the search exceeded the scope of a valid warrant. 3 . We do not here address the question of whether an appellee may raise an argument in defense of the lower court’s judgment when that argument was not presented in the lower court. We do note, however, that our previous opinions on that question have been somewhat inconsistent. See, e.g., Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs., 752 P.2d 892, 894-95 (Utah 1988) (applying argument raised for first time on appeal to affirm lower court’s decision); American Coal Co. v. Sandstrom, 689 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah 1984) (holding that 1252d1 bars the consideration of bases for relief that were not raised below and of general issues that were not raised below but not of specific subsidiary legal arguments or arguments by extension that were not made below", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe warrant. Rather, according to the trial court, the express terms of the warrant \"through inadvertence” did not permit as extensive a search as was actually conducted. Thus, it appears the actual basis for the trial court's ruling was that the search exceeded the scope of a valid warrant. 3 . We do not here address the question of whether an appellee may raise an argument in defense of the lower court’s judgment when that argument was not presented in the lower court. We do note, however, that our previous opinions on that question have been somewhat inconsistent. See, e.g., Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs., 752 P.2d 892, 894-95 (Utah 1988) (applying argument raised for first time on appeal to affirm lower court’s decision); American Coal Co. v. Sandstrom, 689 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah 1984) (holding that arguments not raised below are waived for appeal", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe warrant. Rather, according to the trial court, the express terms of the warrant \"through inadvertence” did not permit as extensive a search as was actually conducted. Thus, it appears the actual basis for the trial court's ruling was that the search exceeded the scope of a valid warrant. 3 . We do not here address the question of whether an appellee may raise an argument in defense of the lower court’s judgment when that argument was not presented in the lower court. We do note, however, that our previous opinions on that question have been somewhat inconsistent. See, e.g., Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs., 752 P.2d 892, 894-95 (Utah 1988) (applying argument raised for first time on appeal to affirm lower court’s decision); American Coal Co. v. Sandstrom, 689 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah 1984) (holding that petitioners had abandoned arguments not raised below", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe warrant. Rather, according to the trial court, the express terms of the warrant \"through inadvertence” did not permit as extensive a search as was actually conducted. Thus, it appears the actual basis for the trial court's ruling was that the search exceeded the scope of a valid warrant. 3 . We do not here address the question of whether an appellee may raise an argument in defense of the lower court’s judgment when that argument was not presented in the lower court. We do note, however, that our previous opinions on that question have been somewhat inconsistent. See, e.g., Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs., 752 P.2d 892, 894-95 (Utah 1988) (applying argument raised for first time on appeal to affirm lower court’s decision); American Coal Co. v. Sandstrom, 689 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah 1984) (holding that argument offered in defense of decision below had been waived when not raised below", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe warrant. Rather, according to the trial court, the express terms of the warrant \"through inadvertence” did not permit as extensive a search as was actually conducted. Thus, it appears the actual basis for the trial court's ruling was that the search exceeded the scope of a valid warrant. 3 . We do not here address the question of whether an appellee may raise an argument in defense of the lower court’s judgment when that argument was not presented in the lower court. We do note, however, that our previous opinions on that question have been somewhat inconsistent. See, e.g., Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs., 752 P.2d 892, 894-95 (Utah 1988) (applying argument raised for first time on appeal to affirm lower court’s decision); American Coal Co. v. Sandstrom, 689 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah 1984) (holding that an issue not properly preserved below in the district court is generally waived" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\navailable only if the violation of state law “raises federal constitutional problems.” Wilcox v. Ford, 813 F.2d 1140, 1145 n.7 (11th Cir.1987). Thus, whether or not the state court erred under Alabama law in its rulings at Davis’ trial is “largely beside the point” in the court’s analysis. Jammed v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 920 (9th Cir.1991). IV. DISCUSSION Davis seeks habeas corpus relief as to his sentence of death based upon the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Roper, supra, and the court addresses this claim first. Davis also has raised and briefed six constitutional guilt-phase claims attacking the validity of his judgment of conviction which the court will address in the order in which the claims are asserted by Davis. See Clisby v. Jones, 960 F.2d 925, 936 (11th Cir.1992) (holding that district court must resolve all claims for relief premised on alleged constitutional violations which are raised in a petition for writ of habeas corpus whether habeas relief is granted or denied", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\navailable only if the violation of state law “raises federal constitutional problems.” Wilcox v. Ford, 813 F.2d 1140, 1145 n.7 (11th Cir.1987). Thus, whether or not the state court erred under Alabama law in its rulings at Davis’ trial is “largely beside the point” in the court’s analysis. Jammed v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 920 (9th Cir.1991). IV. DISCUSSION Davis seeks habeas corpus relief as to his sentence of death based upon the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Roper, supra, and the court addresses this claim first. Davis also has raised and briefed six constitutional guilt-phase claims attacking the validity of his judgment of conviction which the court will address in the order in which the claims are asserted by Davis. See Clisby v. Jones, 960 F.2d 925, 936 (11th Cir.1992) (holding that managing conservator while in texas to seek return of child by writ of habeas corpus may not be served with civil process and is subject to jurisdiction of court in which habeas corpus is pending and only for purpose of prosecuting writ of habeas corpus", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\navailable only if the violation of state law “raises federal constitutional problems.” Wilcox v. Ford, 813 F.2d 1140, 1145 n.7 (11th Cir.1987). Thus, whether or not the state court erred under Alabama law in its rulings at Davis’ trial is “largely beside the point” in the court’s analysis. Jammed v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 920 (9th Cir.1991). IV. DISCUSSION Davis seeks habeas corpus relief as to his sentence of death based upon the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Roper, supra, and the court addresses this claim first. Davis also has raised and briefed six constitutional guilt-phase claims attacking the validity of his judgment of conviction which the court will address in the order in which the claims are asserted by Davis. See Clisby v. Jones, 960 F.2d 925, 936 (11th Cir.1992) (holding that a petition for review is an adequate substitute for habeas corpus", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\navailable only if the violation of state law “raises federal constitutional problems.” Wilcox v. Ford, 813 F.2d 1140, 1145 n.7 (11th Cir.1987). Thus, whether or not the state court erred under Alabama law in its rulings at Davis’ trial is “largely beside the point” in the court’s analysis. Jammed v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 920 (9th Cir.1991). IV. DISCUSSION Davis seeks habeas corpus relief as to his sentence of death based upon the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Roper, supra, and the court addresses this claim first. Davis also has raised and briefed six constitutional guilt-phase claims attacking the validity of his judgment of conviction which the court will address in the order in which the claims are asserted by Davis. See Clisby v. Jones, 960 F.2d 925, 936 (11th Cir.1992) (holding that federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\navailable only if the violation of state law “raises federal constitutional problems.” Wilcox v. Ford, 813 F.2d 1140, 1145 n.7 (11th Cir.1987). Thus, whether or not the state court erred under Alabama law in its rulings at Davis’ trial is “largely beside the point” in the court’s analysis. Jammed v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 920 (9th Cir.1991). IV. DISCUSSION Davis seeks habeas corpus relief as to his sentence of death based upon the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Roper, supra, and the court addresses this claim first. Davis also has raised and briefed six constitutional guilt-phase claims attacking the validity of his judgment of conviction which the court will address in the order in which the claims are asserted by Davis. See Clisby v. Jones, 960 F.2d 925, 936 (11th Cir.1992) (holding that habeas claim not included in petition and never raised by petitioner before the district court as basis for habeas relief is procedurally defaulted" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nand, given the absence of contrary law in the First Circuit, this Court concludes that the award of $8,000 of Wife’s pension to Husband did not create a dischargeable debt. It is both equitable and in conformance with the clear majority rule, that this Court affirms the Order of the Bankruptcy Court that Husband has a vested property interest in an amount of $8,000 in Wife’s pension fund and that such interest was not a prepetition debt of the Bankruptcy estate. ORDER For the foregoing reasons, the ruling of the Bankruptcy Court is AFFIRMED and this appeal is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. 1 . A vast majority of courts have followed the line of cases holding that an interest in a spouse’s pension awarded prepetition is not a dischargeable debt. Chandler v. Chandler, 805 F.2d 555 (5th Cir.1986) (holding former wifes cause of action accrued at the time of former husbands failure to pay her the portion of his retirement benefits to which she was entitled which was no earlier than the date of his actual retirement", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nand, given the absence of contrary law in the First Circuit, this Court concludes that the award of $8,000 of Wife’s pension to Husband did not create a dischargeable debt. It is both equitable and in conformance with the clear majority rule, that this Court affirms the Order of the Bankruptcy Court that Husband has a vested property interest in an amount of $8,000 in Wife’s pension fund and that such interest was not a prepetition debt of the Bankruptcy estate. ORDER For the foregoing reasons, the ruling of the Bankruptcy Court is AFFIRMED and this appeal is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. 1 . A vast majority of courts have followed the line of cases holding that an interest in a spouse’s pension awarded prepetition is not a dischargeable debt. Chandler v. Chandler, 805 F.2d 555 (5th Cir.1986) (holding that wife had standing to seek disinterment where death of husband occurred prior to entry of decree of divorce", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nand, given the absence of contrary law in the First Circuit, this Court concludes that the award of $8,000 of Wife’s pension to Husband did not create a dischargeable debt. It is both equitable and in conformance with the clear majority rule, that this Court affirms the Order of the Bankruptcy Court that Husband has a vested property interest in an amount of $8,000 in Wife’s pension fund and that such interest was not a prepetition debt of the Bankruptcy estate. ORDER For the foregoing reasons, the ruling of the Bankruptcy Court is AFFIRMED and this appeal is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. 1 . A vast majority of courts have followed the line of cases holding that an interest in a spouse’s pension awarded prepetition is not a dischargeable debt. Chandler v. Chandler, 805 F.2d 555 (5th Cir.1986) (holding that a wife obtained a vested interest in her portion of the retirement benefits as of the date of the divorce decree and any act of the military spouse that unilaterally decreases the nonmilitary spouses vested interest is an impermissible modification of a division of marital property and a violation of the final decree of divorce", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nand, given the absence of contrary law in the First Circuit, this Court concludes that the award of $8,000 of Wife’s pension to Husband did not create a dischargeable debt. It is both equitable and in conformance with the clear majority rule, that this Court affirms the Order of the Bankruptcy Court that Husband has a vested property interest in an amount of $8,000 in Wife’s pension fund and that such interest was not a prepetition debt of the Bankruptcy estate. ORDER For the foregoing reasons, the ruling of the Bankruptcy Court is AFFIRMED and this appeal is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. 1 . A vast majority of courts have followed the line of cases holding that an interest in a spouse’s pension awarded prepetition is not a dischargeable debt. Chandler v. Chandler, 805 F.2d 555 (5th Cir.1986) (recognizing that a divorce decree which obligated the divorcing husband to name the children of his first marriage as the irrevocable beneficiaries of an insurance policy precluded him from naming his new wife as a beneficiary entitled to a portion of the insurance benefits", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nand, given the absence of contrary law in the First Circuit, this Court concludes that the award of $8,000 of Wife’s pension to Husband did not create a dischargeable debt. It is both equitable and in conformance with the clear majority rule, that this Court affirms the Order of the Bankruptcy Court that Husband has a vested property interest in an amount of $8,000 in Wife’s pension fund and that such interest was not a prepetition debt of the Bankruptcy estate. ORDER For the foregoing reasons, the ruling of the Bankruptcy Court is AFFIRMED and this appeal is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. 1 . A vast majority of courts have followed the line of cases holding that an interest in a spouse’s pension awarded prepetition is not a dischargeable debt. Chandler v. Chandler, 805 F.2d 555 (5th Cir.1986) (holding debtor could not discharge that portion of his monthly army retirement benefits awarded to his wife pursuant to a divorce decree" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nthat refusal may be admissible in a subsequent prosecution; (2) if the person refuses to submit to the taking of the specimen, the person’s license to operate a motor vehicle will be automatically suspended, whether or not the person is subsequently prosecuted as a result of the arrest, for not less than 180 days;.... The statute was later amended to also require a warning that \"if the person refuses to submit to the taking of a specimen, the officer may apply for a warrant authorizing a specimen to be taken from the person.” Act of May 23, 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S. ch. 674 § 2011 Tex. Sess. Law serv. 1627 (West). 3 . The fact that Barker’s comments were in response to Appellant’s questions does not by itself render the trooper’s statements non-coercive. See, e.g., Hall, 649 S.W.2d 627 (holding that the issue of the voluntariness of a settlement agreement is waived on appeal if not raised before the board", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nthat refusal may be admissible in a subsequent prosecution; (2) if the person refuses to submit to the taking of the specimen, the person’s license to operate a motor vehicle will be automatically suspended, whether or not the person is subsequently prosecuted as a result of the arrest, for not less than 180 days;.... The statute was later amended to also require a warning that \"if the person refuses to submit to the taking of a specimen, the officer may apply for a warrant authorizing a specimen to be taken from the person.” Act of May 23, 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S. ch. 674 § 2011 Tex. Sess. Law serv. 1627 (West). 3 . The fact that Barker’s comments were in response to Appellant’s questions does not by itself render the trooper’s statements non-coercive. See, e.g., Hall, 649 S.W.2d 627 (holding that because of the factbound nature of the inquiry determination of voluntariness of consent to search is reviewed for clear error", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nthat refusal may be admissible in a subsequent prosecution; (2) if the person refuses to submit to the taking of the specimen, the person’s license to operate a motor vehicle will be automatically suspended, whether or not the person is subsequently prosecuted as a result of the arrest, for not less than 180 days;.... The statute was later amended to also require a warning that \"if the person refuses to submit to the taking of a specimen, the officer may apply for a warrant authorizing a specimen to be taken from the person.” Act of May 23, 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S. ch. 674 § 2011 Tex. Sess. Law serv. 1627 (West). 3 . The fact that Barker’s comments were in response to Appellant’s questions does not by itself render the trooper’s statements non-coercive. See, e.g., Hall, 649 S.W.2d 627 (recognizing that the ultimate question of the voluntariness of consent is one of law", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nthat refusal may be admissible in a subsequent prosecution; (2) if the person refuses to submit to the taking of the specimen, the person’s license to operate a motor vehicle will be automatically suspended, whether or not the person is subsequently prosecuted as a result of the arrest, for not less than 180 days;.... The statute was later amended to also require a warning that \"if the person refuses to submit to the taking of a specimen, the officer may apply for a warrant authorizing a specimen to be taken from the person.” Act of May 23, 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S. ch. 674 § 2011 Tex. Sess. Law serv. 1627 (West). 3 . The fact that Barker’s comments were in response to Appellant’s questions does not by itself render the trooper’s statements non-coercive. See, e.g., Hall, 649 S.W.2d 627 (holding that the evidence raised the issue of voluntariness of consent even though the officers comments were in response to an inquiry by the suspect", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nthat refusal may be admissible in a subsequent prosecution; (2) if the person refuses to submit to the taking of the specimen, the person’s license to operate a motor vehicle will be automatically suspended, whether or not the person is subsequently prosecuted as a result of the arrest, for not less than 180 days;.... The statute was later amended to also require a warning that \"if the person refuses to submit to the taking of a specimen, the officer may apply for a warrant authorizing a specimen to be taken from the person.” Act of May 23, 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S. ch. 674 § 2011 Tex. Sess. Law serv. 1627 (West). 3 . The fact that Barker’s comments were in response to Appellant’s questions does not by itself render the trooper’s statements non-coercive. See, e.g., Hall, 649 S.W.2d 627 (recognizing that consent is an exception to the warrant requirement and that voluntariness of consent depends on the totality of the circumstances" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nand stating that the six tests in Baker v. Carr were “probably listed in descending order of both importance and certainty”). 171 . TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1. 172 . 369 U.S. at 210, 82 S.Ct. 691 (\"The non-justiciability of a political question is primarily a function of the separation of powers.”). 173 . West Orange-Cove I, 107 S.W.3d at 563. 174 . Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 2440, 37 L.Ed.2d 407 (1973). 175 . Nix 2764, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983) (concluding that a challenge to Congress’ power to pass a statute with a one-House veto did not present a political question); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 351-53, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976) (concluding that a political patronage case involving dismissal of employee by 71, 675 (Tex.Civ.App.—Eastland 1976, writ ref. n.r.e.) (holding the exclusion did not violate the equal protection clause of the wyoming constitution or the fourteenth amendment to the united states constitution", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nand stating that the six tests in Baker v. Carr were “probably listed in descending order of both importance and certainty”). 171 . TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1. 172 . 369 U.S. at 210, 82 S.Ct. 691 (\"The non-justiciability of a political question is primarily a function of the separation of powers.”). 173 . West Orange-Cove I, 107 S.W.3d at 563. 174 . Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 2440, 37 L.Ed.2d 407 (1973). 175 . Nix 2764, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983) (concluding that a challenge to Congress’ power to pass a statute with a one-House veto did not present a political question); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 351-53, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976) (concluding that a political patronage case involving dismissal of employee by 71, 675 (Tex.Civ.App.—Eastland 1976, writ ref. n.r.e.) (holding that whether a hospital district included areas not benefitted by any services solely for purpose of raising revenue does not present a justiciable matter under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nand stating that the six tests in Baker v. Carr were “probably listed in descending order of both importance and certainty”). 171 . TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1. 172 . 369 U.S. at 210, 82 S.Ct. 691 (\"The non-justiciability of a political question is primarily a function of the separation of powers.”). 173 . West Orange-Cove I, 107 S.W.3d at 563. 174 . Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 2440, 37 L.Ed.2d 407 (1973). 175 . Nix 2764, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983) (concluding that a challenge to Congress’ power to pass a statute with a one-House veto did not present a political question); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 351-53, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976) (concluding that a political patronage case involving dismissal of employee by 71, 675 (Tex.Civ.App.—Eastland 1976, writ ref. n.r.e.) (holding that racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nand stating that the six tests in Baker v. Carr were “probably listed in descending order of both importance and certainty”). 171 . TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1. 172 . 369 U.S. at 210, 82 S.Ct. 691 (\"The non-justiciability of a political question is primarily a function of the separation of powers.”). 173 . West Orange-Cove I, 107 S.W.3d at 563. 174 . Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 2440, 37 L.Ed.2d 407 (1973). 175 . Nix 2764, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983) (concluding that a challenge to Congress’ power to pass a statute with a one-House veto did not present a political question); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 351-53, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976) (concluding that a political patronage case involving dismissal of employee by 71, 675 (Tex.Civ.App.—Eastland 1976, writ ref. n.r.e.) (holding that neither the due process clause nor the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment require the appointment of counsel on a petition for discretionary review to a state supreme court", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nand stating that the six tests in Baker v. Carr were “probably listed in descending order of both importance and certainty”). 171 . TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1. 172 . 369 U.S. at 210, 82 S.Ct. 691 (\"The non-justiciability of a political question is primarily a function of the separation of powers.”). 173 . West Orange-Cove I, 107 S.W.3d at 563. 174 . Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 2440, 37 L.Ed.2d 407 (1973). 175 . Nix 2764, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983) (concluding that a challenge to Congress’ power to pass a statute with a one-House veto did not present a political question); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 351-53, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976) (concluding that a political patronage case involving dismissal of employee by 71, 675 (Tex.Civ.App.—Eastland 1976, writ ref. n.r.e.) (holding that doctrine does not violate equal protection" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nforming his opinion as to the risk of infection, he assumed that Mr. Jones and Ms. Zhong had sex two to three times per week, contrary to Ms. Zhong’s record testimony that she and Mr. Jones had sex about once a week. Furthermore, the government presented its own expert witness, Harold Margolis, M.D., of the Centers for Disease Control, who disagreed with Dr. Gubbins’s assessment of the risk of infection. Dr. Margolis testified that Mr. Jones had only about a ten per cent, chance of infection over the course of a year. While the fact that the government would have presented an opposing expert is not by itself a' sufficient reason to exclude Dr. Gubbins’s testimony, it was a factor that the District Court properly considered in its assessment. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 580, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (holding that jury must be instructed that value of identification testimony may depend upon the witnesss capacity and opportunity to observe the offender", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nforming his opinion as to the risk of infection, he assumed that Mr. Jones and Ms. Zhong had sex two to three times per week, contrary to Ms. Zhong’s record testimony that she and Mr. Jones had sex about once a week. Furthermore, the government presented its own expert witness, Harold Margolis, M.D., of the Centers for Disease Control, who disagreed with Dr. Gubbins’s assessment of the risk of infection. Dr. Margolis testified that Mr. Jones had only about a ten per cent, chance of infection over the course of a year. While the fact that the government would have presented an opposing expert is not by itself a' sufficient reason to exclude Dr. Gubbins’s testimony, it was a factor that the District Court properly considered in its assessment. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 580, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (recognizing under fre 702 that there is no clear line dividing testimony based on scientific knowledge from testimony based on technical or other specialized knowledge holding that a single flexible test for reliability applies to all expert testimony", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nforming his opinion as to the risk of infection, he assumed that Mr. Jones and Ms. Zhong had sex two to three times per week, contrary to Ms. Zhong’s record testimony that she and Mr. Jones had sex about once a week. Furthermore, the government presented its own expert witness, Harold Margolis, M.D., of the Centers for Disease Control, who disagreed with Dr. Gubbins’s assessment of the risk of infection. Dr. Margolis testified that Mr. Jones had only about a ten per cent, chance of infection over the course of a year. While the fact that the government would have presented an opposing expert is not by itself a' sufficient reason to exclude Dr. Gubbins’s testimony, it was a factor that the District Court properly considered in its assessment. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 580, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (holding that a federal courts inquiry into the reliability of expert testimony is flexible and may depend upon a variety of considerations", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nforming his opinion as to the risk of infection, he assumed that Mr. Jones and Ms. Zhong had sex two to three times per week, contrary to Ms. Zhong’s record testimony that she and Mr. Jones had sex about once a week. Furthermore, the government presented its own expert witness, Harold Margolis, M.D., of the Centers for Disease Control, who disagreed with Dr. Gubbins’s assessment of the risk of infection. Dr. Margolis testified that Mr. Jones had only about a ten per cent, chance of infection over the course of a year. While the fact that the government would have presented an opposing expert is not by itself a' sufficient reason to exclude Dr. Gubbins’s testimony, it was a factor that the District Court properly considered in its assessment. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 580, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (holding that the trial court was not clearly erroneous in accepting expert testimony on the issue of reliability and rank order scoring that happened to include a component reliability estimate", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nforming his opinion as to the risk of infection, he assumed that Mr. Jones and Ms. Zhong had sex two to three times per week, contrary to Ms. Zhong’s record testimony that she and Mr. Jones had sex about once a week. Furthermore, the government presented its own expert witness, Harold Margolis, M.D., of the Centers for Disease Control, who disagreed with Dr. Gubbins’s assessment of the risk of infection. Dr. Margolis testified that Mr. Jones had only about a ten per cent, chance of infection over the course of a year. While the fact that the government would have presented an opposing expert is not by itself a' sufficient reason to exclude Dr. Gubbins’s testimony, it was a factor that the District Court properly considered in its assessment. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 580, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (holding that federal rules of evidence require trial courts to hold hearingsreferred to as daubert hearingsto determine reliability of scientific expert testimony before admission at trial" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\ntouch a minor constituted a violent act, the State could not demonstrate a prima facie case that defendant violated an “express” probation condition, and the VOP conviction cannot stand. See State v. Austin, 165 Vt. at 398, 685 A.2d at 1082. ¶ 17. Our probation condition precedent provides no direct analogy to the case at hand. In prior cases where this Court contemplated violations of the probation condition prohibiting “violent” and “threatening” behavior (here Condition N), we addressed the terms separately, as distinct types of action. The application and interpretation of this condition has generally been challenged in cases where the State alleges that the probationer engaged in threatening behavior that was primarily or exclusively speech. See, e.g., Johnstone, 2013 VT 57, ¶ 17 (holding that defendant had not violated probation condition prohibiting violent or threatening behavior when he was simply mouthing off to his girlfriend and did not intend to put his probation officer in fear of harm", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\ntouch a minor constituted a violent act, the State could not demonstrate a prima facie case that defendant violated an “express” probation condition, and the VOP conviction cannot stand. See State v. Austin, 165 Vt. at 398, 685 A.2d at 1082. ¶ 17. Our probation condition precedent provides no direct analogy to the case at hand. In prior cases where this Court contemplated violations of the probation condition prohibiting “violent” and “threatening” behavior (here Condition N), we addressed the terms separately, as distinct types of action. The application and interpretation of this condition has generally been challenged in cases where the State alleges that the probationer engaged in threatening behavior that was primarily or exclusively speech. See, e.g., Johnstone, 2013 VT 57, ¶ 17 (holding that probation is not a sentence", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\ntouch a minor constituted a violent act, the State could not demonstrate a prima facie case that defendant violated an “express” probation condition, and the VOP conviction cannot stand. See State v. Austin, 165 Vt. at 398, 685 A.2d at 1082. ¶ 17. Our probation condition precedent provides no direct analogy to the case at hand. In prior cases where this Court contemplated violations of the probation condition prohibiting “violent” and “threatening” behavior (here Condition N), we addressed the terms separately, as distinct types of action. The application and interpretation of this condition has generally been challenged in cases where the State alleges that the probationer engaged in threatening behavior that was primarily or exclusively speech. See, e.g., Johnstone, 2013 VT 57, ¶ 17 (holding that it is sufficient grounds to revoke a probation if only one condition of the probation is broken", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\ntouch a minor constituted a violent act, the State could not demonstrate a prima facie case that defendant violated an “express” probation condition, and the VOP conviction cannot stand. See State v. Austin, 165 Vt. at 398, 685 A.2d at 1082. ¶ 17. Our probation condition precedent provides no direct analogy to the case at hand. In prior cases where this Court contemplated violations of the probation condition prohibiting “violent” and “threatening” behavior (here Condition N), we addressed the terms separately, as distinct types of action. The application and interpretation of this condition has generally been challenged in cases where the State alleges that the probationer engaged in threatening behavior that was primarily or exclusively speech. See, e.g., Johnstone, 2013 VT 57, ¶ 17 (holding that a defendant was not constitutionally entitled to counsel at a probation revocation hearing when he admitted to violating the terms of his probation and refused the district courts offer to appoint counsel", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\ntouch a minor constituted a violent act, the State could not demonstrate a prima facie case that defendant violated an “express” probation condition, and the VOP conviction cannot stand. See State v. Austin, 165 Vt. at 398, 685 A.2d at 1082. ¶ 17. Our probation condition precedent provides no direct analogy to the case at hand. In prior cases where this Court contemplated violations of the probation condition prohibiting “violent” and “threatening” behavior (here Condition N), we addressed the terms separately, as distinct types of action. The application and interpretation of this condition has generally been challenged in cases where the State alleges that the probationer engaged in threatening behavior that was primarily or exclusively speech. See, e.g., Johnstone, 2013 VT 57, ¶ 17 (holding that a defendant is not entitled to credit for time served as a condition of probation" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nConst. art.I, art. II. Extraterritorial tax enforcement directly implicates relations between the United States and other sovereign nations. See Attorney General of Canada, 268 F.3d at 114. As the Second Circuit stated: When a foreign nation appears as a plaintiff in our courts seeking enforcement of its revenue laws, the judiciary risks being drawn into issues and disputes of foreign relations policy that are assigned to — and better handled by— the political branches of government. Id.; see also INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425, 119 S.Ct. 1439, 143 L.Ed.2d 590 (1999) (stating that courts are not responsible for political functions affecting foreign relations); Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 740 n. 3, 108 S.Ct. 2117, 100 L.Ed.2d 743 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring) (recognizing rule", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nConst. art.I, art. II. Extraterritorial tax enforcement directly implicates relations between the United States and other sovereign nations. See Attorney General of Canada, 268 F.3d at 114. As the Second Circuit stated: When a foreign nation appears as a plaintiff in our courts seeking enforcement of its revenue laws, the judiciary risks being drawn into issues and disputes of foreign relations policy that are assigned to — and better handled by— the political branches of government. Id.; see also INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425, 119 S.Ct. 1439, 143 L.Ed.2d 590 (1999) (stating that courts are not responsible for political functions affecting foreign relations); Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 740 n. 3, 108 S.Ct. 2117, 100 L.Ed.2d 743 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring) (recognizing continued validity of the modified prospectivity rule of kitto", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nConst. art.I, art. II. Extraterritorial tax enforcement directly implicates relations between the United States and other sovereign nations. See Attorney General of Canada, 268 F.3d at 114. As the Second Circuit stated: When a foreign nation appears as a plaintiff in our courts seeking enforcement of its revenue laws, the judiciary risks being drawn into issues and disputes of foreign relations policy that are assigned to — and better handled by— the political branches of government. Id.; see also INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425, 119 S.Ct. 1439, 143 L.Ed.2d 590 (1999) (stating that courts are not responsible for political functions affecting foreign relations); Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 740 n. 3, 108 S.Ct. 2117, 100 L.Ed.2d 743 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring) (recognizing that udja waives sovereign immunity in suit challenging validity of statute", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nConst. art.I, art. II. Extraterritorial tax enforcement directly implicates relations between the United States and other sovereign nations. See Attorney General of Canada, 268 F.3d at 114. As the Second Circuit stated: When a foreign nation appears as a plaintiff in our courts seeking enforcement of its revenue laws, the judiciary risks being drawn into issues and disputes of foreign relations policy that are assigned to — and better handled by— the political branches of government. Id.; see also INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425, 119 S.Ct. 1439, 143 L.Ed.2d 590 (1999) (stating that courts are not responsible for political functions affecting foreign relations); Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 740 n. 3, 108 S.Ct. 2117, 100 L.Ed.2d 743 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring) (recognizing validity of rule stated in marhal", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nConst. art.I, art. II. Extraterritorial tax enforcement directly implicates relations between the United States and other sovereign nations. See Attorney General of Canada, 268 F.3d at 114. As the Second Circuit stated: When a foreign nation appears as a plaintiff in our courts seeking enforcement of its revenue laws, the judiciary risks being drawn into issues and disputes of foreign relations policy that are assigned to — and better handled by— the political branches of government. Id.; see also INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425, 119 S.Ct. 1439, 143 L.Ed.2d 590 (1999) (stating that courts are not responsible for political functions affecting foreign relations); Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 740 n. 3, 108 S.Ct. 2117, 100 L.Ed.2d 743 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring) (recognizing continued validity of rule barring adjudication of a foreign tax suit" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n.... warrants [the equipment], for a period of six months, from the date of delivery .... ” See Carruthers Out-of-Pocket Expense Aff., Ex. D (“Electric Mobility Limited Warranty”)(emphasis added). The plain language of the Limited Warranty thus implies that the date of the delivery of each Electric Mobility scooter and wheelchair, and not the date of the potentiometer installation, triggers the beginning of the warranty period. Quite plainly, the Defendants’ moving papers themselves demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. The interpretation of the Limited Warranty is a material fact since it is relevant as one factor in determining which damages were reasonably foreseeable to the Defendants. See e.g., Donovan v. Bachstadt, 91 N.J. 434, 444, 453 A.2d 160 (1982)(holding that economic loss rule barred claim for breach of fiduciary duty where plaintiffs claim arose solely as a result of the existence of a contract between the parties", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n.... warrants [the equipment], for a period of six months, from the date of delivery .... ” See Carruthers Out-of-Pocket Expense Aff., Ex. D (“Electric Mobility Limited Warranty”)(emphasis added). The plain language of the Limited Warranty thus implies that the date of the delivery of each Electric Mobility scooter and wheelchair, and not the date of the potentiometer installation, triggers the beginning of the warranty period. Quite plainly, the Defendants’ moving papers themselves demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. The interpretation of the Limited Warranty is a material fact since it is relevant as one factor in determining which damages were reasonably foreseeable to the Defendants. See e.g., Donovan v. Bachstadt, 91 N.J. 434, 444, 453 A.2d 160 (1982)(recognizing that the elements of a claim for breach of contract are 1 existence of a valid contract and 2 breach of the terms of that contract", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n.... warrants [the equipment], for a period of six months, from the date of delivery .... ” See Carruthers Out-of-Pocket Expense Aff., Ex. D (“Electric Mobility Limited Warranty”)(emphasis added). The plain language of the Limited Warranty thus implies that the date of the delivery of each Electric Mobility scooter and wheelchair, and not the date of the potentiometer installation, triggers the beginning of the warranty period. Quite plainly, the Defendants’ moving papers themselves demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. The interpretation of the Limited Warranty is a material fact since it is relevant as one factor in determining which damages were reasonably foreseeable to the Defendants. See e.g., Donovan v. Bachstadt, 91 N.J. 434, 444, 453 A.2d 160 (1982)(holding immaterial breach did not constitute breach of contract", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n.... warrants [the equipment], for a period of six months, from the date of delivery .... ” See Carruthers Out-of-Pocket Expense Aff., Ex. D (“Electric Mobility Limited Warranty”)(emphasis added). The plain language of the Limited Warranty thus implies that the date of the delivery of each Electric Mobility scooter and wheelchair, and not the date of the potentiometer installation, triggers the beginning of the warranty period. Quite plainly, the Defendants’ moving papers themselves demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. The interpretation of the Limited Warranty is a material fact since it is relevant as one factor in determining which damages were reasonably foreseeable to the Defendants. See e.g., Donovan v. Bachstadt, 91 N.J. 434, 444, 453 A.2d 160 (1982)(holding that jurys verdict for the defendant in a breach of contract action did not establish the absence of breach because the jury was instructed that it could find for the defendant if it concluded that the defendant had not breached the contract or if the defendant proved an affirmative defense", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n.... warrants [the equipment], for a period of six months, from the date of delivery .... ” See Carruthers Out-of-Pocket Expense Aff., Ex. D (“Electric Mobility Limited Warranty”)(emphasis added). The plain language of the Limited Warranty thus implies that the date of the delivery of each Electric Mobility scooter and wheelchair, and not the date of the potentiometer installation, triggers the beginning of the warranty period. Quite plainly, the Defendants’ moving papers themselves demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. The interpretation of the Limited Warranty is a material fact since it is relevant as one factor in determining which damages were reasonably foreseeable to the Defendants. See e.g., Donovan v. Bachstadt, 91 N.J. 434, 444, 453 A.2d 160 (1982)(holding that a defendant is not chargeable for loss that he did not have reason to foresee as a probable result of the breach when the contract was made" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nthat the Court should summarily dismiss the Applications. ' In its Amended Application WTC states that, because it was not a retained professional in the bankruptcy case, its “claim [based on the Indenture] would not normally involve the specificity required of fee applications under 11 U.S.C. section 330.” WTC acknowledges, though, that it must provide “meticulous contemporaneous time records ... [which] should reveal sufficient data to enable the Court to make an informed judgment about the specific tasks and hours allotted.” In re Jensen-Farley Pictures, Inc., 47 B.R. 557, 582 (Bankr. D.Utah 1985). Accordingly, WTC and its attorneys reviewed the time records submitted with the original Application and, in its Amended Application, categorized the time bas 1409, 1416 (5th Cir.1992) (holding that the plaintiffs have the burden of proof and persuasion as to the existence of standing", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nthat the Court should summarily dismiss the Applications. ' In its Amended Application WTC states that, because it was not a retained professional in the bankruptcy case, its “claim [based on the Indenture] would not normally involve the specificity required of fee applications under 11 U.S.C. section 330.” WTC acknowledges, though, that it must provide “meticulous contemporaneous time records ... [which] should reveal sufficient data to enable the Court to make an informed judgment about the specific tasks and hours allotted.” In re Jensen-Farley Pictures, Inc., 47 B.R. 557, 582 (Bankr. D.Utah 1985). Accordingly, WTC and its attorneys reviewed the time records submitted with the original Application and, in its Amended Application, categorized the time bas 1409, 1416 (5th Cir.1992) (recognizing that the burden of persuasion for a showing of prejudice was on the defendant", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nthat the Court should summarily dismiss the Applications. ' In its Amended Application WTC states that, because it was not a retained professional in the bankruptcy case, its “claim [based on the Indenture] would not normally involve the specificity required of fee applications under 11 U.S.C. section 330.” WTC acknowledges, though, that it must provide “meticulous contemporaneous time records ... [which] should reveal sufficient data to enable the Court to make an informed judgment about the specific tasks and hours allotted.” In re Jensen-Farley Pictures, Inc., 47 B.R. 557, 582 (Bankr. D.Utah 1985). Accordingly, WTC and its attorneys reviewed the time records submitted with the original Application and, in its Amended Application, categorized the time bas 1409, 1416 (5th Cir.1992) (holding that appellant bears burden of establishing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nthat the Court should summarily dismiss the Applications. ' In its Amended Application WTC states that, because it was not a retained professional in the bankruptcy case, its “claim [based on the Indenture] would not normally involve the specificity required of fee applications under 11 U.S.C. section 330.” WTC acknowledges, though, that it must provide “meticulous contemporaneous time records ... [which] should reveal sufficient data to enable the Court to make an informed judgment about the specific tasks and hours allotted.” In re Jensen-Farley Pictures, Inc., 47 B.R. 557, 582 (Bankr. D.Utah 1985). Accordingly, WTC and its attorneys reviewed the time records submitted with the original Application and, in its Amended Application, categorized the time bas 1409, 1416 (5th Cir.1992) (holding that the burden of persuasion by a preponderance of the evidence remains with the movant", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nthat the Court should summarily dismiss the Applications. ' In its Amended Application WTC states that, because it was not a retained professional in the bankruptcy case, its “claim [based on the Indenture] would not normally involve the specificity required of fee applications under 11 U.S.C. section 330.” WTC acknowledges, though, that it must provide “meticulous contemporaneous time records ... [which] should reveal sufficient data to enable the Court to make an informed judgment about the specific tasks and hours allotted.” In re Jensen-Farley Pictures, Inc., 47 B.R. 557, 582 (Bankr. D.Utah 1985). Accordingly, WTC and its attorneys reviewed the time records submitted with the original Application and, in its Amended Application, categorized the time bas 1409, 1416 (5th Cir.1992) (holding the plaintiff satisfies the burden of a prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\neither that there was an attorney-client relationship between Coffey and TADA members or that the communications sent to TADA members were kept confidential. To invoke the attorney-client privilege, Defendants must show that the asserted holders of the privilege, here the members of the TADA, were or sought to become clients at the time the allegedly privileged communication was made. See Mobil, 149 F.R.D. at 536. The Fifth Circuit has not addressed whether a trade association’s members are necessarily clients of the association’s lawyer and, thus, are permitted to invoke the protections of the attorney-client privilege for communications with the association’s lawyer. Defendants cite cases from other circuits that support such a rule. See Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 294 F.Supp. at 1150 (holding thatcities are not persons within the meaning of 3a9 of pre1975 version of securities exchange act of 1934 which defined person to mean an individual corporation a partnership an association a jointstock company a business trust or an unincorporated organization", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\neither that there was an attorney-client relationship between Coffey and TADA members or that the communications sent to TADA members were kept confidential. To invoke the attorney-client privilege, Defendants must show that the asserted holders of the privilege, here the members of the TADA, were or sought to become clients at the time the allegedly privileged communication was made. See Mobil, 149 F.R.D. at 536. The Fifth Circuit has not addressed whether a trade association’s members are necessarily clients of the association’s lawyer and, thus, are permitted to invoke the protections of the attorney-client privilege for communications with the association’s lawyer. Defendants cite cases from other circuits that support such a rule. See Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 294 F.Supp. at 1150 (holding an attorney is an agent of the client and therefore cannot conspire with the client", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\neither that there was an attorney-client relationship between Coffey and TADA members or that the communications sent to TADA members were kept confidential. To invoke the attorney-client privilege, Defendants must show that the asserted holders of the privilege, here the members of the TADA, were or sought to become clients at the time the allegedly privileged communication was made. See Mobil, 149 F.R.D. at 536. The Fifth Circuit has not addressed whether a trade association’s members are necessarily clients of the association’s lawyer and, thus, are permitted to invoke the protections of the attorney-client privilege for communications with the association’s lawyer. Defendants cite cases from other circuits that support such a rule. See Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 294 F.Supp. at 1150 (holding that undisclosed representation of an association that the arbitrator disclosed he was a member of and the association will be affected by the outcome of the case is evident partiality", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\neither that there was an attorney-client relationship between Coffey and TADA members or that the communications sent to TADA members were kept confidential. To invoke the attorney-client privilege, Defendants must show that the asserted holders of the privilege, here the members of the TADA, were or sought to become clients at the time the allegedly privileged communication was made. See Mobil, 149 F.R.D. at 536. The Fifth Circuit has not addressed whether a trade association’s members are necessarily clients of the association’s lawyer and, thus, are permitted to invoke the protections of the attorney-client privilege for communications with the association’s lawyer. Defendants cite cases from other circuits that support such a rule. See Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 294 F.Supp. at 1150 (holding that even where a client was more sophisticated in business matters than the lawyer himself the lawyer should have assumed the client was relying on the lawyer for the legal aspects of the loan from the client to the lawyer to the same extent that the client would rely on the lawyer for advice were the client making the loan to a third person", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\neither that there was an attorney-client relationship between Coffey and TADA members or that the communications sent to TADA members were kept confidential. To invoke the attorney-client privilege, Defendants must show that the asserted holders of the privilege, here the members of the TADA, were or sought to become clients at the time the allegedly privileged communication was made. See Mobil, 149 F.R.D. at 536. The Fifth Circuit has not addressed whether a trade association’s members are necessarily clients of the association’s lawyer and, thus, are permitted to invoke the protections of the attorney-client privilege for communications with the association’s lawyer. Defendants cite cases from other circuits that support such a rule. See Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 294 F.Supp. at 1150 (holding that each individual member of an unincorporated association is a client of the associations lawyer" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nCounty had a duty to warn the Osborns under the rescue doctrine because Dracobly assured Wiseman he would post flyers, failed to post flyers, and discouraged Wiseman from posting flyers. Id. In other words, it held Mason County had a duty to warn the Osborns because Wiseman relied on its assurances. But that cannot support a duty under the rescue doctrine unless the Osborns reasonably relied on Wiseman. And the Osborns fail to show such reliance. Because Mason County had no duty to warn the Osborns — under the rescue doctrine or any other theory of liability — it is entitled to summary judgment. A. Mason County Had No Statutory Duty To Warn the Osborns ¶8 The Court of Appeals correctly rejected the superior court’s conclusion th 925, 937, 968 P.2d 522, 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 811 (1998) (holding that the government may be an identifiable victim", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nCounty had a duty to warn the Osborns under the rescue doctrine because Dracobly assured Wiseman he would post flyers, failed to post flyers, and discouraged Wiseman from posting flyers. Id. In other words, it held Mason County had a duty to warn the Osborns because Wiseman relied on its assurances. But that cannot support a duty under the rescue doctrine unless the Osborns reasonably relied on Wiseman. And the Osborns fail to show such reliance. Because Mason County had no duty to warn the Osborns — under the rescue doctrine or any other theory of liability — it is entitled to summary judgment. A. Mason County Had No Statutory Duty To Warn the Osborns ¶8 The Court of Appeals correctly rejected the superior court’s conclusion th 925, 937, 968 P.2d 522, 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 811 (1998) (holding public entities have no affirmative duty to warn of the release of an inmate with a violent history unless the inmate makes a specific threat against a specific identifiable victim or group of victims", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nCounty had a duty to warn the Osborns under the rescue doctrine because Dracobly assured Wiseman he would post flyers, failed to post flyers, and discouraged Wiseman from posting flyers. Id. In other words, it held Mason County had a duty to warn the Osborns because Wiseman relied on its assurances. But that cannot support a duty under the rescue doctrine unless the Osborns reasonably relied on Wiseman. And the Osborns fail to show such reliance. Because Mason County had no duty to warn the Osborns — under the rescue doctrine or any other theory of liability — it is entitled to summary judgment. A. Mason County Had No Statutory Duty To Warn the Osborns ¶8 The Court of Appeals correctly rejected the superior court’s conclusion th 925, 937, 968 P.2d 522, 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 811 (1998) (holding all that is required to impose a duty to warn is that the defendant knew or should have known of a specific threat made to harm a specific person", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nCounty had a duty to warn the Osborns under the rescue doctrine because Dracobly assured Wiseman he would post flyers, failed to post flyers, and discouraged Wiseman from posting flyers. Id. In other words, it held Mason County had a duty to warn the Osborns because Wiseman relied on its assurances. But that cannot support a duty under the rescue doctrine unless the Osborns reasonably relied on Wiseman. And the Osborns fail to show such reliance. Because Mason County had no duty to warn the Osborns — under the rescue doctrine or any other theory of liability — it is entitled to summary judgment. A. Mason County Had No Statutory Duty To Warn the Osborns ¶8 The Court of Appeals correctly rejected the superior court’s conclusion th 925, 937, 968 P.2d 522, 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 811 (1998) (holding that specific incidents of a victims conduct are not admissible to show that the victim was the first aggxessor", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nCounty had a duty to warn the Osborns under the rescue doctrine because Dracobly assured Wiseman he would post flyers, failed to post flyers, and discouraged Wiseman from posting flyers. Id. In other words, it held Mason County had a duty to warn the Osborns because Wiseman relied on its assurances. But that cannot support a duty under the rescue doctrine unless the Osborns reasonably relied on Wiseman. And the Osborns fail to show such reliance. Because Mason County had no duty to warn the Osborns — under the rescue doctrine or any other theory of liability — it is entitled to summary judgment. A. Mason County Had No Statutory Duty To Warn the Osborns ¶8 The Court of Appeals correctly rejected the superior court’s conclusion th 925, 937, 968 P.2d 522, 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 811 (1998) (holding that common law duty to warn arises when a person being released from custody has made a specific threat of harm directed at a specific individual" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\n§ 1252(a)(1). Although the jurisdictional statute strips us of jurisdiction over \"any judgment regarding the granting of relief under section ... 1229b,\" 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), we have interpreted that provision to apply only to discretionary aspects of the denial of cancellation of removal. See Mendez-Moranchel v. Ashcroft, 338 F.3d 176, 178 (3d Cir.2003). Satisfaction of the continuous residency requirement is not such a discretionary decision and is thus subject to our review. See Mendez-Reyes v. Att’y Gen., 428 F.3d 187, 189 (3d Cir.2005); Okeke v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 585, 588 n. 4 (3d Cir.2005). 4 . Shah did raise the continuous physical presence issue in his reply brief, but that was insufficient to preserve the issue. See In re Surrick, 338 F.3d 224, 237 (3d Cir.2003) (holding that a partys failure to raise an issue in the opening brief waived the issue even though the party raised the issue in his reply brief", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\n§ 1252(a)(1). Although the jurisdictional statute strips us of jurisdiction over \"any judgment regarding the granting of relief under section ... 1229b,\" 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), we have interpreted that provision to apply only to discretionary aspects of the denial of cancellation of removal. See Mendez-Moranchel v. Ashcroft, 338 F.3d 176, 178 (3d Cir.2003). Satisfaction of the continuous residency requirement is not such a discretionary decision and is thus subject to our review. See Mendez-Reyes v. Att’y Gen., 428 F.3d 187, 189 (3d Cir.2005); Okeke v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 585, 588 n. 4 (3d Cir.2005). 4 . Shah did raise the continuous physical presence issue in his reply brief, but that was insufficient to preserve the issue. See In re Surrick, 338 F.3d 224, 237 (3d Cir.2003) (holding that the petitioners failure to address an issue in the argument portion of his opening brief waived the issue", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\n§ 1252(a)(1). Although the jurisdictional statute strips us of jurisdiction over \"any judgment regarding the granting of relief under section ... 1229b,\" 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), we have interpreted that provision to apply only to discretionary aspects of the denial of cancellation of removal. See Mendez-Moranchel v. Ashcroft, 338 F.3d 176, 178 (3d Cir.2003). Satisfaction of the continuous residency requirement is not such a discretionary decision and is thus subject to our review. See Mendez-Reyes v. Att’y Gen., 428 F.3d 187, 189 (3d Cir.2005); Okeke v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 585, 588 n. 4 (3d Cir.2005). 4 . Shah did raise the continuous physical presence issue in his reply brief, but that was insufficient to preserve the issue. See In re Surrick, 338 F.3d 224, 237 (3d Cir.2003) (holding that issue raised for the first time in reply brief was waived", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\n§ 1252(a)(1). Although the jurisdictional statute strips us of jurisdiction over \"any judgment regarding the granting of relief under section ... 1229b,\" 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), we have interpreted that provision to apply only to discretionary aspects of the denial of cancellation of removal. See Mendez-Moranchel v. Ashcroft, 338 F.3d 176, 178 (3d Cir.2003). Satisfaction of the continuous residency requirement is not such a discretionary decision and is thus subject to our review. See Mendez-Reyes v. Att’y Gen., 428 F.3d 187, 189 (3d Cir.2005); Okeke v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 585, 588 n. 4 (3d Cir.2005). 4 . Shah did raise the continuous physical presence issue in his reply brief, but that was insufficient to preserve the issue. See In re Surrick, 338 F.3d 224, 237 (3d Cir.2003) (holding that the failure to raise an issue in the opening brief waives the issue", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\n§ 1252(a)(1). Although the jurisdictional statute strips us of jurisdiction over \"any judgment regarding the granting of relief under section ... 1229b,\" 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), we have interpreted that provision to apply only to discretionary aspects of the denial of cancellation of removal. See Mendez-Moranchel v. Ashcroft, 338 F.3d 176, 178 (3d Cir.2003). Satisfaction of the continuous residency requirement is not such a discretionary decision and is thus subject to our review. See Mendez-Reyes v. Att’y Gen., 428 F.3d 187, 189 (3d Cir.2005); Okeke v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 585, 588 n. 4 (3d Cir.2005). 4 . Shah did raise the continuous physical presence issue in his reply brief, but that was insufficient to preserve the issue. See In re Surrick, 338 F.3d 224, 237 (3d Cir.2003) (holding that failure to raise an issue in an opening brief waives that issue" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nreasonably trustworthy information would lead a man of reasonable caution and prudence to believe that he will find the instrumentality of a crime or evidence pertaining to a crime.” Moulden v. State, 576 S.W.2d 817, 819 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1978) (quoting Brown v. State, 481 S.W.2d 106, 110 (Tex. Crim.App.1972)). In Parker v. State, the Texas- Court of Criminal Appeals held that “if [an] [ojfficer ... makes a traffic stop and, when the driver rolls down his window, the redolent odor of burnt marihuana wafts out, he may well have probable cause to believe that the person (or persons) inside that small, enclosed area has been or is committing the offense of possession of marihuana.” Parker v. State, 206 S.W.3d 593, 597 n. 11 (Tex.Crim.App.2006) (citing Moulden, 576 S.W.2d at 818 (holding the odor of burnt marihuana standing alone provided peace offieers with the requisite probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of the defendants vehicle", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nreasonably trustworthy information would lead a man of reasonable caution and prudence to believe that he will find the instrumentality of a crime or evidence pertaining to a crime.” Moulden v. State, 576 S.W.2d 817, 819 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1978) (quoting Brown v. State, 481 S.W.2d 106, 110 (Tex. Crim.App.1972)). In Parker v. State, the Texas- Court of Criminal Appeals held that “if [an] [ojfficer ... makes a traffic stop and, when the driver rolls down his window, the redolent odor of burnt marihuana wafts out, he may well have probable cause to believe that the person (or persons) inside that small, enclosed area has been or is committing the offense of possession of marihuana.” Parker v. State, 206 S.W.3d 593, 597 n. 11 (Tex.Crim.App.2006) (citing Moulden, 576 S.W.2d at 818 (holding that alcohol odor provided probable cause to search vehicle for open container and smell of burnt marijuana justified search of entire vehicle for drugs", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nreasonably trustworthy information would lead a man of reasonable caution and prudence to believe that he will find the instrumentality of a crime or evidence pertaining to a crime.” Moulden v. State, 576 S.W.2d 817, 819 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1978) (quoting Brown v. State, 481 S.W.2d 106, 110 (Tex. Crim.App.1972)). In Parker v. State, the Texas- Court of Criminal Appeals held that “if [an] [ojfficer ... makes a traffic stop and, when the driver rolls down his window, the redolent odor of burnt marihuana wafts out, he may well have probable cause to believe that the person (or persons) inside that small, enclosed area has been or is committing the offense of possession of marihuana.” Parker v. State, 206 S.W.3d 593, 597 n. 11 (Tex.Crim.App.2006) (citing Moulden, 576 S.W.2d at 818 (holding the odor of an etherlike substance in combination with other circumstances gave officers probable cause to search a vehicle", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nreasonably trustworthy information would lead a man of reasonable caution and prudence to believe that he will find the instrumentality of a crime or evidence pertaining to a crime.” Moulden v. State, 576 S.W.2d 817, 819 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1978) (quoting Brown v. State, 481 S.W.2d 106, 110 (Tex. Crim.App.1972)). In Parker v. State, the Texas- Court of Criminal Appeals held that “if [an] [ojfficer ... makes a traffic stop and, when the driver rolls down his window, the redolent odor of burnt marihuana wafts out, he may well have probable cause to believe that the person (or persons) inside that small, enclosed area has been or is committing the offense of possession of marihuana.” Parker v. State, 206 S.W.3d 593, 597 n. 11 (Tex.Crim.App.2006) (citing Moulden, 576 S.W.2d at 818 (holding that probable cause alone justifies a warrantless search or seizure of a vehicle lawfully parked in a public place", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nreasonably trustworthy information would lead a man of reasonable caution and prudence to believe that he will find the instrumentality of a crime or evidence pertaining to a crime.” Moulden v. State, 576 S.W.2d 817, 819 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1978) (quoting Brown v. State, 481 S.W.2d 106, 110 (Tex. Crim.App.1972)). In Parker v. State, the Texas- Court of Criminal Appeals held that “if [an] [ojfficer ... makes a traffic stop and, when the driver rolls down his window, the redolent odor of burnt marihuana wafts out, he may well have probable cause to believe that the person (or persons) inside that small, enclosed area has been or is committing the offense of possession of marihuana.” Parker v. State, 206 S.W.3d 593, 597 n. 11 (Tex.Crim.App.2006) (citing Moulden, 576 S.W.2d at 818 (holding that the court of appeals properly concluded that the odor of marijuana emanating from defendants vehicle constituted probable cause to search the vehicle" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\na result of discriminatory and retaliatory animus. The District Court granted summary judgment to NASA, in part because the white co-worker Nurriddin offered as an alleged comparator was not sufficiently similarly situated. Nurriddin IV, 40 F.Supp.3d at 121. Nurriddin claims this was in error, and also spills much ink criticizing the District Court’s alleged reliance on whether he made out a prima facie case. We note that it is unclear whether the District Court believed that a plaintiff must demonstrate that a “similarly situated” employee outside of her protected class received a promotion as part of her prima facie case. See id. at 120 (citing Taylor v. Small, 350 F.3d 1286, 1294 (D.C.Cir.2003)). Such a showing is not required. See Stella v. Mineta, 284 F.3d 135, 146 (D.C.Cir.2002) (recognizing that prior decisions created confusion on this point", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\na result of discriminatory and retaliatory animus. The District Court granted summary judgment to NASA, in part because the white co-worker Nurriddin offered as an alleged comparator was not sufficiently similarly situated. Nurriddin IV, 40 F.Supp.3d at 121. Nurriddin claims this was in error, and also spills much ink criticizing the District Court’s alleged reliance on whether he made out a prima facie case. We note that it is unclear whether the District Court believed that a plaintiff must demonstrate that a “similarly situated” employee outside of her protected class received a promotion as part of her prima facie case. See id. at 120 (citing Taylor v. Small, 350 F.3d 1286, 1294 (D.C.Cir.2003)). Such a showing is not required. See Stella v. Mineta, 284 F.3d 135, 146 (D.C.Cir.2002) (holding that cue review applies only to prior final decisions of agencies of original jurisdiction ros and not to prior decisions of the board", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\na result of discriminatory and retaliatory animus. The District Court granted summary judgment to NASA, in part because the white co-worker Nurriddin offered as an alleged comparator was not sufficiently similarly situated. Nurriddin IV, 40 F.Supp.3d at 121. Nurriddin claims this was in error, and also spills much ink criticizing the District Court’s alleged reliance on whether he made out a prima facie case. We note that it is unclear whether the District Court believed that a plaintiff must demonstrate that a “similarly situated” employee outside of her protected class received a promotion as part of her prima facie case. See id. at 120 (citing Taylor v. Small, 350 F.3d 1286, 1294 (D.C.Cir.2003)). Such a showing is not required. See Stella v. Mineta, 284 F.3d 135, 146 (D.C.Cir.2002) (holding that this courts review of board decisions is limited to final orders or final decisions", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\na result of discriminatory and retaliatory animus. The District Court granted summary judgment to NASA, in part because the white co-worker Nurriddin offered as an alleged comparator was not sufficiently similarly situated. Nurriddin IV, 40 F.Supp.3d at 121. Nurriddin claims this was in error, and also spills much ink criticizing the District Court’s alleged reliance on whether he made out a prima facie case. We note that it is unclear whether the District Court believed that a plaintiff must demonstrate that a “similarly situated” employee outside of her protected class received a promotion as part of her prima facie case. See id. at 120 (citing Taylor v. Small, 350 F.3d 1286, 1294 (D.C.Cir.2003)). Such a showing is not required. See Stella v. Mineta, 284 F.3d 135, 146 (D.C.Cir.2002) (recognizing that this created a cooperative scheme", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\na result of discriminatory and retaliatory animus. The District Court granted summary judgment to NASA, in part because the white co-worker Nurriddin offered as an alleged comparator was not sufficiently similarly situated. Nurriddin IV, 40 F.Supp.3d at 121. Nurriddin claims this was in error, and also spills much ink criticizing the District Court’s alleged reliance on whether he made out a prima facie case. We note that it is unclear whether the District Court believed that a plaintiff must demonstrate that a “similarly situated” employee outside of her protected class received a promotion as part of her prima facie case. See id. at 120 (citing Taylor v. Small, 350 F.3d 1286, 1294 (D.C.Cir.2003)). Such a showing is not required. See Stella v. Mineta, 284 F.3d 135, 146 (D.C.Cir.2002) (recognizing this rule" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe holding in Waugh); Lichter v. Internal Revenue Serv. (In re Lichter), 1999 Bankr.Lexis 1904, *12 (Bankr.D.Md. 1999) (“This court agrees with the majority conclusion as expressed in Waugh.”). See, e.g., In re Steinhaus, 349 B.R. 694, 705 (Bankr.D.Idaho 2006)(“This [c]ourt agrees with [In re] Rowe[, 342 B.R. 341 (Bankr. D.Kan.2006)] that the phrase ‘allowed claim’ in § 521(a)(6) is one of those ‘rare cases.’ There is no logical reason why Congress would differentiate between creditors in asset cases and those in no asset cases, allowing the former but not the latter relief if debtor use a ‘ride through.’ And the Court is unaware of Congress ever articulating any such distinction.”) (internal citation omitted); In re Fibrex, Inc., 270 B.R. 714, 717-18 (Bankr. S.D.Ind.2001) (holding that the court had no authority to order the payment of interim compensation to professionals without the chapter 9 debtors consent because 331 which governs interim payments to professionals is not incorporated into chapter 9", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe holding in Waugh); Lichter v. Internal Revenue Serv. (In re Lichter), 1999 Bankr.Lexis 1904, *12 (Bankr.D.Md. 1999) (“This court agrees with the majority conclusion as expressed in Waugh.”). See, e.g., In re Steinhaus, 349 B.R. 694, 705 (Bankr.D.Idaho 2006)(“This [c]ourt agrees with [In re] Rowe[, 342 B.R. 341 (Bankr. D.Kan.2006)] that the phrase ‘allowed claim’ in § 521(a)(6) is one of those ‘rare cases.’ There is no logical reason why Congress would differentiate between creditors in asset cases and those in no asset cases, allowing the former but not the latter relief if debtor use a ‘ride through.’ And the Court is unaware of Congress ever articulating any such distinction.”) (internal citation omitted); In re Fibrex, Inc., 270 B.R. 714, 717-18 (Bankr. S.D.Ind.2001) (holding that licensor was entitled to administrative expense priority claim where debtor remained in possession postpetition of real property under a license agreement", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe holding in Waugh); Lichter v. Internal Revenue Serv. (In re Lichter), 1999 Bankr.Lexis 1904, *12 (Bankr.D.Md. 1999) (“This court agrees with the majority conclusion as expressed in Waugh.”). See, e.g., In re Steinhaus, 349 B.R. 694, 705 (Bankr.D.Idaho 2006)(“This [c]ourt agrees with [In re] Rowe[, 342 B.R. 341 (Bankr. D.Kan.2006)] that the phrase ‘allowed claim’ in § 521(a)(6) is one of those ‘rare cases.’ There is no logical reason why Congress would differentiate between creditors in asset cases and those in no asset cases, allowing the former but not the latter relief if debtor use a ‘ride through.’ And the Court is unaware of Congress ever articulating any such distinction.”) (internal citation omitted); In re Fibrex, Inc., 270 B.R. 714, 717-18 (Bankr. S.D.Ind.2001) (holding that the estimation provision in 11 usc 502 which governs prepetition claims does not apply to 11 usc 503 which governs administrative claims", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe holding in Waugh); Lichter v. Internal Revenue Serv. (In re Lichter), 1999 Bankr.Lexis 1904, *12 (Bankr.D.Md. 1999) (“This court agrees with the majority conclusion as expressed in Waugh.”). See, e.g., In re Steinhaus, 349 B.R. 694, 705 (Bankr.D.Idaho 2006)(“This [c]ourt agrees with [In re] Rowe[, 342 B.R. 341 (Bankr. D.Kan.2006)] that the phrase ‘allowed claim’ in § 521(a)(6) is one of those ‘rare cases.’ There is no logical reason why Congress would differentiate between creditors in asset cases and those in no asset cases, allowing the former but not the latter relief if debtor use a ‘ride through.’ And the Court is unaware of Congress ever articulating any such distinction.”) (internal citation omitted); In re Fibrex, Inc., 270 B.R. 714, 717-18 (Bankr. S.D.Ind.2001) (holding that interest on postpetition taxes incurred by the debtor during chapter 11 reorganization is an administrative expense", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe holding in Waugh); Lichter v. Internal Revenue Serv. (In re Lichter), 1999 Bankr.Lexis 1904, *12 (Bankr.D.Md. 1999) (“This court agrees with the majority conclusion as expressed in Waugh.”). See, e.g., In re Steinhaus, 349 B.R. 694, 705 (Bankr.D.Idaho 2006)(“This [c]ourt agrees with [In re] Rowe[, 342 B.R. 341 (Bankr. D.Kan.2006)] that the phrase ‘allowed claim’ in § 521(a)(6) is one of those ‘rare cases.’ There is no logical reason why Congress would differentiate between creditors in asset cases and those in no asset cases, allowing the former but not the latter relief if debtor use a ‘ride through.’ And the Court is unaware of Congress ever articulating any such distinction.”) (internal citation omitted); In re Fibrex, Inc., 270 B.R. 714, 717-18 (Bankr. S.D.Ind.2001) (holding that the legislative intent of 11 usc 503b3f does not permit the court to grant administrative expense priority for compensation paid to professionals hired by the committee without the courts approval" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\ncertain third class cities, a person appointed to be the chief of police must have been a member of the police, department. The Union concedes that the City of Terre Haute is a second class city, not a third class city. The fact that Ind.Code § 19 — 1— 29.5-1.5 was enacted after Ind.Code § 19-1-29.5-13 is instructive. “One inference that may be drawn from an amendment adding a provision to a statute is that, in the view of the legislature, the statute as originally drafted did not contain the provision.” Bailey v. Menzie, 505 N.E.2d 126, 128 (Ind.Ct.App.1987)., The Indiana Supreme Court has recognized that, when a statute is ambiguous, we may look to subsequent amendments for evidence of the legislature’s initial intent. See Seymour Nat’l Bank v. State, 422 N.E.2d 1223, 1226 (Ind.1981) (holding that courts must generally give effect to the plain meaning of a statute because that is the best evidence of the legislatures intent", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\ncertain third class cities, a person appointed to be the chief of police must have been a member of the police, department. The Union concedes that the City of Terre Haute is a second class city, not a third class city. The fact that Ind.Code § 19 — 1— 29.5-1.5 was enacted after Ind.Code § 19-1-29.5-13 is instructive. “One inference that may be drawn from an amendment adding a provision to a statute is that, in the view of the legislature, the statute as originally drafted did not contain the provision.” Bailey v. Menzie, 505 N.E.2d 126, 128 (Ind.Ct.App.1987)., The Indiana Supreme Court has recognized that, when a statute is ambiguous, we may look to subsequent amendments for evidence of the legislature’s initial intent. See Seymour Nat’l Bank v. State, 422 N.E.2d 1223, 1226 (Ind.1981) (holding that in cases of ambiguity we may resort to subsequent amendments in order to glean the legislatures intent", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\ncertain third class cities, a person appointed to be the chief of police must have been a member of the police, department. The Union concedes that the City of Terre Haute is a second class city, not a third class city. The fact that Ind.Code § 19 — 1— 29.5-1.5 was enacted after Ind.Code § 19-1-29.5-13 is instructive. “One inference that may be drawn from an amendment adding a provision to a statute is that, in the view of the legislature, the statute as originally drafted did not contain the provision.” Bailey v. Menzie, 505 N.E.2d 126, 128 (Ind.Ct.App.1987)., The Indiana Supreme Court has recognized that, when a statute is ambiguous, we may look to subsequent amendments for evidence of the legislature’s initial intent. See Seymour Nat’l Bank v. State, 422 N.E.2d 1223, 1226 (Ind.1981) (holding that the interpretation of statutory language should be consistent with the legislatures purpose and intent", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\ncertain third class cities, a person appointed to be the chief of police must have been a member of the police, department. The Union concedes that the City of Terre Haute is a second class city, not a third class city. The fact that Ind.Code § 19 — 1— 29.5-1.5 was enacted after Ind.Code § 19-1-29.5-13 is instructive. “One inference that may be drawn from an amendment adding a provision to a statute is that, in the view of the legislature, the statute as originally drafted did not contain the provision.” Bailey v. Menzie, 505 N.E.2d 126, 128 (Ind.Ct.App.1987)., The Indiana Supreme Court has recognized that, when a statute is ambiguous, we may look to subsequent amendments for evidence of the legislature’s initial intent. See Seymour Nat’l Bank v. State, 422 N.E.2d 1223, 1226 (Ind.1981) (holding that 1991 amendments to other aspects of 3910114lai clarified intent of 1988 amendments to statute", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\ncertain third class cities, a person appointed to be the chief of police must have been a member of the police, department. The Union concedes that the City of Terre Haute is a second class city, not a third class city. The fact that Ind.Code § 19 — 1— 29.5-1.5 was enacted after Ind.Code § 19-1-29.5-13 is instructive. “One inference that may be drawn from an amendment adding a provision to a statute is that, in the view of the legislature, the statute as originally drafted did not contain the provision.” Bailey v. Menzie, 505 N.E.2d 126, 128 (Ind.Ct.App.1987)., The Indiana Supreme Court has recognized that, when a statute is ambiguous, we may look to subsequent amendments for evidence of the legislature’s initial intent. See Seymour Nat’l Bank v. State, 422 N.E.2d 1223, 1226 (Ind.1981) (holding legislatures intent is determined from plain and common meaning of words used" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nNinth Circuit held that HCFA’s letter authorizes the continued application of the Boren Amendment standards, see 188 F.3d at 1095, and implicitly concluded that private parties may enforce the HCFA letter in a § 1983 action. We respectfully disagree with the latter conclusion. We have held that a formal regulation cannot by itself give rise to a federal right enforceable under § 1983. See Smith v. Kirk, 821 F.2d 980, 984 (4th Cir.1987); see also King v. Town of Hempstead, 161 F.3d 112, 115 (2d Cir.1998) (per curiam) (noting that the circuits are divided on the question of whether a regulation alone can create a federal right). A policy letter has even less legal stature than a regulation. See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 120 S.Ct. 1655, 1662-63, 146 L.Ed.2d 621 (2000) (holding regulations entitled to chevron deference", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nNinth Circuit held that HCFA’s letter authorizes the continued application of the Boren Amendment standards, see 188 F.3d at 1095, and implicitly concluded that private parties may enforce the HCFA letter in a § 1983 action. We respectfully disagree with the latter conclusion. We have held that a formal regulation cannot by itself give rise to a federal right enforceable under § 1983. See Smith v. Kirk, 821 F.2d 980, 984 (4th Cir.1987); see also King v. Town of Hempstead, 161 F.3d 112, 115 (2d Cir.1998) (per curiam) (noting that the circuits are divided on the question of whether a regulation alone can create a federal right). A policy letter has even less legal stature than a regulation. See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 120 S.Ct. 1655, 1662-63, 146 L.Ed.2d 621 (2000) (holding that deference is warranted only when it appears that congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority and discussing united states v mead corp 533 us 218 22627 121 sct 2164 150 led2d 292 2001 and chevron usa inc v natural res def council inc 467 us 837 84245 104 sct 2778 81 led2d 694 1984", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nNinth Circuit held that HCFA’s letter authorizes the continued application of the Boren Amendment standards, see 188 F.3d at 1095, and implicitly concluded that private parties may enforce the HCFA letter in a § 1983 action. We respectfully disagree with the latter conclusion. We have held that a formal regulation cannot by itself give rise to a federal right enforceable under § 1983. See Smith v. Kirk, 821 F.2d 980, 984 (4th Cir.1987); see also King v. Town of Hempstead, 161 F.3d 112, 115 (2d Cir.1998) (per curiam) (noting that the circuits are divided on the question of whether a regulation alone can create a federal right). A policy letter has even less legal stature than a regulation. See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 120 S.Ct. 1655, 1662-63, 146 L.Ed.2d 621 (2000) (holding that the slidingscale standard for granting preliminary injunctions survives winter v natural resources defense council inc 555 us 7 129 sct 365 172 led2d 249 2008", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nNinth Circuit held that HCFA’s letter authorizes the continued application of the Boren Amendment standards, see 188 F.3d at 1095, and implicitly concluded that private parties may enforce the HCFA letter in a § 1983 action. We respectfully disagree with the latter conclusion. We have held that a formal regulation cannot by itself give rise to a federal right enforceable under § 1983. See Smith v. Kirk, 821 F.2d 980, 984 (4th Cir.1987); see also King v. Town of Hempstead, 161 F.3d 112, 115 (2d Cir.1998) (per curiam) (noting that the circuits are divided on the question of whether a regulation alone can create a federal right). A policy letter has even less legal stature than a regulation. See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 120 S.Ct. 1655, 1662-63, 146 L.Ed.2d 621 (2000) (holding that agency opinion letters and policy statements unlike regulations are not entitled to deference under chevron usa inc v natural res def council inc 467 us 837 104 sct 2778 81 led2d 694 1984", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nNinth Circuit held that HCFA’s letter authorizes the continued application of the Boren Amendment standards, see 188 F.3d at 1095, and implicitly concluded that private parties may enforce the HCFA letter in a § 1983 action. We respectfully disagree with the latter conclusion. We have held that a formal regulation cannot by itself give rise to a federal right enforceable under § 1983. See Smith v. Kirk, 821 F.2d 980, 984 (4th Cir.1987); see also King v. Town of Hempstead, 161 F.3d 112, 115 (2d Cir.1998) (per curiam) (noting that the circuits are divided on the question of whether a regulation alone can create a federal right). A policy letter has even less legal stature than a regulation. See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 120 S.Ct. 1655, 1662-63, 146 L.Ed.2d 621 (2000) (holding that a longstanding agency interpretation was no longer entitled to chevron deference given that the agency had changed its position on the issue" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\ncannot serve as an excuse for a violation of Fed. R. Civ. 45(b)(1). For these reasons, we find that the district court had a reasonable basis to conclude that Butler violated MRPC 8.4(g). C Allegation of Bias Butler also argues that the “court was not even handed” with him by “ignoring the conduct of Kansas counsel” in finding him in violation of Canon 9 and MRPC 8.4(g). For the reasons detailed above, we find that there is a reasonable basis to support the district court’s finding that Butler committed ethical violations. As such, we find no indication of bias by the judge in the record. IV Conclusion We find no basis for Butler’s argument that the district court clearly erred in assessing the evidence, or otherwise abused its discretion. Cooter, 496 U.S. at 405, 110 S.Ct. 2447 (holding that pretext is subject to the clearly erroneous standard", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\ncannot serve as an excuse for a violation of Fed. R. Civ. 45(b)(1). For these reasons, we find that the district court had a reasonable basis to conclude that Butler violated MRPC 8.4(g). C Allegation of Bias Butler also argues that the “court was not even handed” with him by “ignoring the conduct of Kansas counsel” in finding him in violation of Canon 9 and MRPC 8.4(g). For the reasons detailed above, we find that there is a reasonable basis to support the district court’s finding that Butler committed ethical violations. As such, we find no indication of bias by the judge in the record. IV Conclusion We find no basis for Butler’s argument that the district court clearly erred in assessing the evidence, or otherwise abused its discretion. Cooter, 496 U.S. at 405, 110 S.Ct. 2447 (holding trial court did not abuse its discretion by ruling based only on affidavits", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\ncannot serve as an excuse for a violation of Fed. R. Civ. 45(b)(1). For these reasons, we find that the district court had a reasonable basis to conclude that Butler violated MRPC 8.4(g). C Allegation of Bias Butler also argues that the “court was not even handed” with him by “ignoring the conduct of Kansas counsel” in finding him in violation of Canon 9 and MRPC 8.4(g). For the reasons detailed above, we find that there is a reasonable basis to support the district court’s finding that Butler committed ethical violations. As such, we find no indication of bias by the judge in the record. IV Conclusion We find no basis for Butler’s argument that the district court clearly erred in assessing the evidence, or otherwise abused its discretion. Cooter, 496 U.S. at 405, 110 S.Ct. 2447 (holding that a court would abuse its discretion by relying on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\ncannot serve as an excuse for a violation of Fed. R. Civ. 45(b)(1). For these reasons, we find that the district court had a reasonable basis to conclude that Butler violated MRPC 8.4(g). C Allegation of Bias Butler also argues that the “court was not even handed” with him by “ignoring the conduct of Kansas counsel” in finding him in violation of Canon 9 and MRPC 8.4(g). For the reasons detailed above, we find that there is a reasonable basis to support the district court’s finding that Butler committed ethical violations. As such, we find no indication of bias by the judge in the record. IV Conclusion We find no basis for Butler’s argument that the district court clearly erred in assessing the evidence, or otherwise abused its discretion. Cooter, 496 U.S. at 405, 110 S.Ct. 2447 (holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting gangrelated evidence", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\ncannot serve as an excuse for a violation of Fed. R. Civ. 45(b)(1). For these reasons, we find that the district court had a reasonable basis to conclude that Butler violated MRPC 8.4(g). C Allegation of Bias Butler also argues that the “court was not even handed” with him by “ignoring the conduct of Kansas counsel” in finding him in violation of Canon 9 and MRPC 8.4(g). For the reasons detailed above, we find that there is a reasonable basis to support the district court’s finding that Butler committed ethical violations. As such, we find no indication of bias by the judge in the record. IV Conclusion We find no basis for Butler’s argument that the district court clearly erred in assessing the evidence, or otherwise abused its discretion. Cooter, 496 U.S. at 405, 110 S.Ct. 2447 (holding failure to exercise discretion is abuse of discretion" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nbe an incorrect or negligent medical judgment, but that alone does not give rise to deliberate indifference. See White, 897 F.2d at 108-09 (“Mere medical malpractice cannot give rise to a violation of the Eighth Amendment.”); Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197 (“It is well-settled that claims of negligence or medical malpractice, without some more culpable state of mind, do not constitute deliberate indifference.”). Nurse DeLorenzo did not refuse to provide required medical treatment without reason or prevent Mr. Thomas from receiving recommended medical treatment; instead she concluded — consistent with Prison medical policy — that no medical treatment was necessary or even available. This is not deliberate indifference. See Goodrich v. Clinton Cty. Prison, 214 Fed.Appx. 105, 112 (3d Cir.2007) (holding that a difference of medical opinion was insufficient as a matter of law to establish deliberate indifference", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nbe an incorrect or negligent medical judgment, but that alone does not give rise to deliberate indifference. See White, 897 F.2d at 108-09 (“Mere medical malpractice cannot give rise to a violation of the Eighth Amendment.”); Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197 (“It is well-settled that claims of negligence or medical malpractice, without some more culpable state of mind, do not constitute deliberate indifference.”). Nurse DeLorenzo did not refuse to provide required medical treatment without reason or prevent Mr. Thomas from receiving recommended medical treatment; instead she concluded — consistent with Prison medical policy — that no medical treatment was necessary or even available. This is not deliberate indifference. See Goodrich v. Clinton Cty. Prison, 214 Fed.Appx. 105, 112 (3d Cir.2007) (holding that plaintiffs claim that medical providers did not comply with baker act was not subject to medical malpractice statutes ajlthough a medical diagnosis is necessary in order to involuntarily commit a patient the process of complying with the statute does not require medical skill or judgment", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nbe an incorrect or negligent medical judgment, but that alone does not give rise to deliberate indifference. See White, 897 F.2d at 108-09 (“Mere medical malpractice cannot give rise to a violation of the Eighth Amendment.”); Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197 (“It is well-settled that claims of negligence or medical malpractice, without some more culpable state of mind, do not constitute deliberate indifference.”). Nurse DeLorenzo did not refuse to provide required medical treatment without reason or prevent Mr. Thomas from receiving recommended medical treatment; instead she concluded — consistent with Prison medical policy — that no medical treatment was necessary or even available. This is not deliberate indifference. See Goodrich v. Clinton Cty. Prison, 214 Fed.Appx. 105, 112 (3d Cir.2007) (holding that a medical professional clearly indicated an exercise of medical judgment rather than deliberate indifference where the medical professional engaged in a goodfaith clinical assessment of plaintiffs symptoms concluding on several visits that his condition did not warrant medication", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nbe an incorrect or negligent medical judgment, but that alone does not give rise to deliberate indifference. See White, 897 F.2d at 108-09 (“Mere medical malpractice cannot give rise to a violation of the Eighth Amendment.”); Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197 (“It is well-settled that claims of negligence or medical malpractice, without some more culpable state of mind, do not constitute deliberate indifference.”). Nurse DeLorenzo did not refuse to provide required medical treatment without reason or prevent Mr. Thomas from receiving recommended medical treatment; instead she concluded — consistent with Prison medical policy — that no medical treatment was necessary or even available. This is not deliberate indifference. See Goodrich v. Clinton Cty. Prison, 214 Fed.Appx. 105, 112 (3d Cir.2007) (holding that a sentence of incarceration would constitute deliberate indifference to defendants medical needs", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nbe an incorrect or negligent medical judgment, but that alone does not give rise to deliberate indifference. See White, 897 F.2d at 108-09 (“Mere medical malpractice cannot give rise to a violation of the Eighth Amendment.”); Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197 (“It is well-settled that claims of negligence or medical malpractice, without some more culpable state of mind, do not constitute deliberate indifference.”). Nurse DeLorenzo did not refuse to provide required medical treatment without reason or prevent Mr. Thomas from receiving recommended medical treatment; instead she concluded — consistent with Prison medical policy — that no medical treatment was necessary or even available. This is not deliberate indifference. See Goodrich v. Clinton Cty. Prison, 214 Fed.Appx. 105, 112 (3d Cir.2007) (holding that deliberate indifference to a serious medical need establishes an eighth amendment violation" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\n2002) (\"Because it is summary in nature, a Section 225 proceeding is limited to those issues that must necessarily be considered in order to resolve a disputed corporate election process.”); Arbitrium (Cayman Islands) Handels AG v. Johnston, 1997 WL 589030, at *3 (Del.Ch. Sept. 17, 1997) (explaining that a Section 225 proceeding has the limited scope of determining \"the validity of a corporate election or to determine the right of a person to hold a corporate office in the event that such office is claimed by more than one person.” (citation omitted)). 82 . Agranoff v. Miller, 1999 WL 219650, at *17 (Del.Ch. Apr. 12, 1999) (internal citation omitted), aff'd as modified, 737 A.2d 530 (Table), 1999 WL 636634 (Del.1999). 83 . Id. (internal citation omitted); see also Box, 697 A.2d at 398 (holding that section 105 does not afford a private cause of action for 506bbased issues", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\n2002) (\"Because it is summary in nature, a Section 225 proceeding is limited to those issues that must necessarily be considered in order to resolve a disputed corporate election process.”); Arbitrium (Cayman Islands) Handels AG v. Johnston, 1997 WL 589030, at *3 (Del.Ch. Sept. 17, 1997) (explaining that a Section 225 proceeding has the limited scope of determining \"the validity of a corporate election or to determine the right of a person to hold a corporate office in the event that such office is claimed by more than one person.” (citation omitted)). 82 . Agranoff v. Miller, 1999 WL 219650, at *17 (Del.Ch. Apr. 12, 1999) (internal citation omitted), aff'd as modified, 737 A.2d 530 (Table), 1999 WL 636634 (Del.1999). 83 . Id. (internal citation omitted); see also Box, 697 A.2d at 398 (holding that in a subsequent criminal action for driving under the influence collateral estoppel did not apply to issues decided at a prior administrative hearing held pursuant to implied consent statute", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\n2002) (\"Because it is summary in nature, a Section 225 proceeding is limited to those issues that must necessarily be considered in order to resolve a disputed corporate election process.”); Arbitrium (Cayman Islands) Handels AG v. Johnston, 1997 WL 589030, at *3 (Del.Ch. Sept. 17, 1997) (explaining that a Section 225 proceeding has the limited scope of determining \"the validity of a corporate election or to determine the right of a person to hold a corporate office in the event that such office is claimed by more than one person.” (citation omitted)). 82 . Agranoff v. Miller, 1999 WL 219650, at *17 (Del.Ch. Apr. 12, 1999) (internal citation omitted), aff'd as modified, 737 A.2d 530 (Table), 1999 WL 636634 (Del.1999). 83 . Id. (internal citation omitted); see also Box, 697 A.2d at 398 (holding that ineffective assistance of counsel claims should be brought in collateral proceedings not on direct appeal", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\n2002) (\"Because it is summary in nature, a Section 225 proceeding is limited to those issues that must necessarily be considered in order to resolve a disputed corporate election process.”); Arbitrium (Cayman Islands) Handels AG v. Johnston, 1997 WL 589030, at *3 (Del.Ch. Sept. 17, 1997) (explaining that a Section 225 proceeding has the limited scope of determining \"the validity of a corporate election or to determine the right of a person to hold a corporate office in the event that such office is claimed by more than one person.” (citation omitted)). 82 . Agranoff v. Miller, 1999 WL 219650, at *17 (Del.Ch. Apr. 12, 1999) (internal citation omitted), aff'd as modified, 737 A.2d 530 (Table), 1999 WL 636634 (Del.1999). 83 . Id. (internal citation omitted); see also Box, 697 A.2d at 398 (holding that declaratory judgments should not be used as a restraint against criminal action", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\n2002) (\"Because it is summary in nature, a Section 225 proceeding is limited to those issues that must necessarily be considered in order to resolve a disputed corporate election process.”); Arbitrium (Cayman Islands) Handels AG v. Johnston, 1997 WL 589030, at *3 (Del.Ch. Sept. 17, 1997) (explaining that a Section 225 proceeding has the limited scope of determining \"the validity of a corporate election or to determine the right of a person to hold a corporate office in the event that such office is claimed by more than one person.” (citation omitted)). 82 . Agranoff v. Miller, 1999 WL 219650, at *17 (Del.Ch. Apr. 12, 1999) (internal citation omitted), aff'd as modified, 737 A.2d 530 (Table), 1999 WL 636634 (Del.1999). 83 . Id. (internal citation omitted); see also Box, 697 A.2d at 398 (holding that a section 225 action should not be used for trying purely collateral issues" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nsee EEOC v. New York City Health and Hosps. Corp., 1994 WL 68420, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 1994) (EEOC conciliation efforts toll limitations period), Plaintiffs’ one-year period within which to apply for leave to file late notice of claim under § 3813 has nevertheless expired. Discussion, supra, at 573-74. If the one-year statute of limitations was first tolled, as Plaintiffs contend, on June 21, 2004 the date which Plaintiffs filed charges with the EEOC, through January 14, 2007, the date Plaintiffs are presumed to have received their Right to Sue Letters from the EEOC, Sherlock v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., 84 F.3d 522, 525 (2d Cir.1996) (“A presumption exists that an EEOC notice is received three days after its mailing.”); Allen v. Darbey, 2006 WL 2504446, at * 5 (W-D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2006) (recognizing added presumption", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nsee EEOC v. New York City Health and Hosps. Corp., 1994 WL 68420, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 1994) (EEOC conciliation efforts toll limitations period), Plaintiffs’ one-year period within which to apply for leave to file late notice of claim under § 3813 has nevertheless expired. Discussion, supra, at 573-74. If the one-year statute of limitations was first tolled, as Plaintiffs contend, on June 21, 2004 the date which Plaintiffs filed charges with the EEOC, through January 14, 2007, the date Plaintiffs are presumed to have received their Right to Sue Letters from the EEOC, Sherlock v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., 84 F.3d 522, 525 (2d Cir.1996) (“A presumption exists that an EEOC notice is received three days after its mailing.”); Allen v. Darbey, 2006 WL 2504446, at * 5 (W-D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2006) (recognizing a presumption against retroactive legislation", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nsee EEOC v. New York City Health and Hosps. Corp., 1994 WL 68420, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 1994) (EEOC conciliation efforts toll limitations period), Plaintiffs’ one-year period within which to apply for leave to file late notice of claim under § 3813 has nevertheless expired. Discussion, supra, at 573-74. If the one-year statute of limitations was first tolled, as Plaintiffs contend, on June 21, 2004 the date which Plaintiffs filed charges with the EEOC, through January 14, 2007, the date Plaintiffs are presumed to have received their Right to Sue Letters from the EEOC, Sherlock v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., 84 F.3d 522, 525 (2d Cir.1996) (“A presumption exists that an EEOC notice is received three days after its mailing.”); Allen v. Darbey, 2006 WL 2504446, at * 5 (W-D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2006) (recognizing presumption and finding that it was overcome", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nsee EEOC v. New York City Health and Hosps. Corp., 1994 WL 68420, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 1994) (EEOC conciliation efforts toll limitations period), Plaintiffs’ one-year period within which to apply for leave to file late notice of claim under § 3813 has nevertheless expired. Discussion, supra, at 573-74. If the one-year statute of limitations was first tolled, as Plaintiffs contend, on June 21, 2004 the date which Plaintiffs filed charges with the EEOC, through January 14, 2007, the date Plaintiffs are presumed to have received their Right to Sue Letters from the EEOC, Sherlock v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., 84 F.3d 522, 525 (2d Cir.1996) (“A presumption exists that an EEOC notice is received three days after its mailing.”); Allen v. Darbey, 2006 WL 2504446, at * 5 (W-D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2006) (recognizing presumption", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nsee EEOC v. New York City Health and Hosps. Corp., 1994 WL 68420, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 1994) (EEOC conciliation efforts toll limitations period), Plaintiffs’ one-year period within which to apply for leave to file late notice of claim under § 3813 has nevertheless expired. Discussion, supra, at 573-74. If the one-year statute of limitations was first tolled, as Plaintiffs contend, on June 21, 2004 the date which Plaintiffs filed charges with the EEOC, through January 14, 2007, the date Plaintiffs are presumed to have received their Right to Sue Letters from the EEOC, Sherlock v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., 84 F.3d 522, 525 (2d Cir.1996) (“A presumption exists that an EEOC notice is received three days after its mailing.”); Allen v. Darbey, 2006 WL 2504446, at * 5 (W-D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2006) (recognizing a presumption of reasonableness" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthe required analysis to determine whether the exclusionary rule should apply. On appeal, although our review of the available facts might lead us to reach the same ultimate decision to suppress the evidence, we are not in a position to reach out and undertake an analysis that is better left to the District Court in the first instance. See United States v. Master, 614 F.3d 236, 243 (6th Cir.2010) (“While it appears at first blush that suppression might be inappropriate in this case, we will remand to the district court for the purpose of re-examining the facts and balancing the interests as required by Herring.”); United States v. Julius, 610 F.3d 60, 67, 68 (2d Cir.2010) (“[0]n remand, the district court may consider whether the circumstances of this search, considered i 0th Cir.1993) (holding that the government cannot rely upon affidavits not attached to the warrant itself to satisfy the particularity requirement", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthe required analysis to determine whether the exclusionary rule should apply. On appeal, although our review of the available facts might lead us to reach the same ultimate decision to suppress the evidence, we are not in a position to reach out and undertake an analysis that is better left to the District Court in the first instance. See United States v. Master, 614 F.3d 236, 243 (6th Cir.2010) (“While it appears at first blush that suppression might be inappropriate in this case, we will remand to the district court for the purpose of re-examining the facts and balancing the interests as required by Herring.”); United States v. Julius, 610 F.3d 60, 67, 68 (2d Cir.2010) (“[0]n remand, the district court may consider whether the circumstances of this search, considered i 0th Cir.1993) (holding plaintiffs fraud claim failed rule 9b particularity requirement which in turn meant deceptive trade practices claim failed the particularity requirement", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthe required analysis to determine whether the exclusionary rule should apply. On appeal, although our review of the available facts might lead us to reach the same ultimate decision to suppress the evidence, we are not in a position to reach out and undertake an analysis that is better left to the District Court in the first instance. See United States v. Master, 614 F.3d 236, 243 (6th Cir.2010) (“While it appears at first blush that suppression might be inappropriate in this case, we will remand to the district court for the purpose of re-examining the facts and balancing the interests as required by Herring.”); United States v. Julius, 610 F.3d 60, 67, 68 (2d Cir.2010) (“[0]n remand, the district court may consider whether the circumstances of this search, considered i 0th Cir.1993) (holding that a roving wiretap surveillance warrant meets the fourth amendments particularity requirement", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthe required analysis to determine whether the exclusionary rule should apply. On appeal, although our review of the available facts might lead us to reach the same ultimate decision to suppress the evidence, we are not in a position to reach out and undertake an analysis that is better left to the District Court in the first instance. See United States v. Master, 614 F.3d 236, 243 (6th Cir.2010) (“While it appears at first blush that suppression might be inappropriate in this case, we will remand to the district court for the purpose of re-examining the facts and balancing the interests as required by Herring.”); United States v. Julius, 610 F.3d 60, 67, 68 (2d Cir.2010) (“[0]n remand, the district court may consider whether the circumstances of this search, considered i 0th Cir.1993) (holding that an incorporated affidavit did not provide particularity because the government offered no evidence that the affidavit or any copies were ever attached to the warrant or were present at the time of the search", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthe required analysis to determine whether the exclusionary rule should apply. On appeal, although our review of the available facts might lead us to reach the same ultimate decision to suppress the evidence, we are not in a position to reach out and undertake an analysis that is better left to the District Court in the first instance. See United States v. Master, 614 F.3d 236, 243 (6th Cir.2010) (“While it appears at first blush that suppression might be inappropriate in this case, we will remand to the district court for the purpose of re-examining the facts and balancing the interests as required by Herring.”); United States v. Julius, 610 F.3d 60, 67, 68 (2d Cir.2010) (“[0]n remand, the district court may consider whether the circumstances of this search, considered i 0th Cir.1993) (holding that plaintiffs did not satisfy particularity requirement where plaintiffs assertions were based in part on the statements of unnamed former employees" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nrecovery of those litigation expenses. We disagree. “Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy. One petitioning for the writ of mandamus must show ‘(1) a clear legal right ... to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) properly invoked jurisdiction of the court.’ ” Ex parte City of Irondale, 686 So.2d 1127, 1128 (Ala.1996) (quoting Ex parte Johnson, 638 So.2d 772, 773 (Ala.1994)). See also Ex parte Alfab, Inc., 586 So.2d 889, 891 (Ala.1991); and Ex parte Edgar, 543 So.2d 682, 684 (Ala.1989). As discussed above, LaConsay and Wet-zel did attempt to appeal from the probate court’s October 17, 2006, order, but the circuit court dismissed those appeals because the proba pp. 2003) (recognizing a defendants right to appeal when a court fails to award litigation expenses in a condemnation action", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nrecovery of those litigation expenses. We disagree. “Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy. One petitioning for the writ of mandamus must show ‘(1) a clear legal right ... to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) properly invoked jurisdiction of the court.’ ” Ex parte City of Irondale, 686 So.2d 1127, 1128 (Ala.1996) (quoting Ex parte Johnson, 638 So.2d 772, 773 (Ala.1994)). See also Ex parte Alfab, Inc., 586 So.2d 889, 891 (Ala.1991); and Ex parte Edgar, 543 So.2d 682, 684 (Ala.1989). As discussed above, LaConsay and Wet-zel did attempt to appeal from the probate court’s October 17, 2006, order, but the circuit court dismissed those appeals because the proba pp. 2003) (recognizing no right to damages if landowner retains reasonable access to property after a condemnation", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nrecovery of those litigation expenses. We disagree. “Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy. One petitioning for the writ of mandamus must show ‘(1) a clear legal right ... to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) properly invoked jurisdiction of the court.’ ” Ex parte City of Irondale, 686 So.2d 1127, 1128 (Ala.1996) (quoting Ex parte Johnson, 638 So.2d 772, 773 (Ala.1994)). See also Ex parte Alfab, Inc., 586 So.2d 889, 891 (Ala.1991); and Ex parte Edgar, 543 So.2d 682, 684 (Ala.1989). As discussed above, LaConsay and Wet-zel did attempt to appeal from the probate court’s October 17, 2006, order, but the circuit court dismissed those appeals because the proba pp. 2003) (recognizing the right to counsel on appeal", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nrecovery of those litigation expenses. We disagree. “Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy. One petitioning for the writ of mandamus must show ‘(1) a clear legal right ... to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) properly invoked jurisdiction of the court.’ ” Ex parte City of Irondale, 686 So.2d 1127, 1128 (Ala.1996) (quoting Ex parte Johnson, 638 So.2d 772, 773 (Ala.1994)). See also Ex parte Alfab, Inc., 586 So.2d 889, 891 (Ala.1991); and Ex parte Edgar, 543 So.2d 682, 684 (Ala.1989). As discussed above, LaConsay and Wet-zel did attempt to appeal from the probate court’s October 17, 2006, order, but the circuit court dismissed those appeals because the proba pp. 2003) (holding that defendant forfeits right to have issue considered on appeal when he fails to object to misconduct at trial", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nrecovery of those litigation expenses. We disagree. “Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy. One petitioning for the writ of mandamus must show ‘(1) a clear legal right ... to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) properly invoked jurisdiction of the court.’ ” Ex parte City of Irondale, 686 So.2d 1127, 1128 (Ala.1996) (quoting Ex parte Johnson, 638 So.2d 772, 773 (Ala.1994)). See also Ex parte Alfab, Inc., 586 So.2d 889, 891 (Ala.1991); and Ex parte Edgar, 543 So.2d 682, 684 (Ala.1989). As discussed above, LaConsay and Wet-zel did attempt to appeal from the probate court’s October 17, 2006, order, but the circuit court dismissed those appeals because the proba pp. 2003) (holding that there is no right to monetary compensation for a regulatory taking in an inverse condemnation action" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndiversity between adverse parties that arises from a single accident.\" 28 U.S.C. § 1441(e)(1)(A) permits removal of a civil action to a federal district court if \"the action could have been brought in a United States district court under 1369 of this title ....\" 7 . Nor do we, as we affirm the district court's jurisdiction under CAFA. 8 . 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)(B); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1453(a) (“Definitions. — In this section, the terms 'class’, ‘class action’, 'class certification order’, and ‘class member’ shall have the meanings given such terms under section 1332(d)(1).”). 9 . See, e.g., Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653, 658, 666-67, 99 S.Ct. 2529, 61 L.Ed.2d 153 (1979) (citing United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 604-05, 61 S.Ct. 742, 85 L.Ed. 1071 (1941)) (holding that under 28 usc 194 applying to land disputes between a tribe and a white person a state was not a person but observing that there is nevertheless no hard and fast rule of exclusion and much depends on the context the subject matter the legislative history and executive interpretation", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndiversity between adverse parties that arises from a single accident.\" 28 U.S.C. § 1441(e)(1)(A) permits removal of a civil action to a federal district court if \"the action could have been brought in a United States district court under 1369 of this title ....\" 7 . Nor do we, as we affirm the district court's jurisdiction under CAFA. 8 . 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)(B); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1453(a) (“Definitions. — In this section, the terms 'class’, ‘class action’, 'class certification order’, and ‘class member’ shall have the meanings given such terms under section 1332(d)(1).”). 9 . See, e.g., Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653, 658, 666-67, 99 S.Ct. 2529, 61 L.Ed.2d 153 (1979) (citing United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 604-05, 61 S.Ct. 742, 85 L.Ed. 1071 (1941)) (holding that a state agency is not a person subject to suit under federal false claims act", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndiversity between adverse parties that arises from a single accident.\" 28 U.S.C. § 1441(e)(1)(A) permits removal of a civil action to a federal district court if \"the action could have been brought in a United States district court under 1369 of this title ....\" 7 . Nor do we, as we affirm the district court's jurisdiction under CAFA. 8 . 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)(B); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1453(a) (“Definitions. — In this section, the terms 'class’, ‘class action’, 'class certification order’, and ‘class member’ shall have the meanings given such terms under section 1332(d)(1).”). 9 . See, e.g., Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653, 658, 666-67, 99 S.Ct. 2529, 61 L.Ed.2d 153 (1979) (citing United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 604-05, 61 S.Ct. 742, 85 L.Ed. 1071 (1941)) (holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc 1983", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndiversity between adverse parties that arises from a single accident.\" 28 U.S.C. § 1441(e)(1)(A) permits removal of a civil action to a federal district court if \"the action could have been brought in a United States district court under 1369 of this title ....\" 7 . Nor do we, as we affirm the district court's jurisdiction under CAFA. 8 . 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)(B); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1453(a) (“Definitions. — In this section, the terms 'class’, ‘class action’, 'class certification order’, and ‘class member’ shall have the meanings given such terms under section 1332(d)(1).”). 9 . See, e.g., Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653, 658, 666-67, 99 S.Ct. 2529, 61 L.Ed.2d 153 (1979) (citing United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 604-05, 61 S.Ct. 742, 85 L.Ed. 1071 (1941)) (holding that a state is not a person within the meaning of 1983", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndiversity between adverse parties that arises from a single accident.\" 28 U.S.C. § 1441(e)(1)(A) permits removal of a civil action to a federal district court if \"the action could have been brought in a United States district court under 1369 of this title ....\" 7 . Nor do we, as we affirm the district court's jurisdiction under CAFA. 8 . 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)(B); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1453(a) (“Definitions. — In this section, the terms 'class’, ‘class action’, 'class certification order’, and ‘class member’ shall have the meanings given such terms under section 1332(d)(1).”). 9 . See, e.g., Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653, 658, 666-67, 99 S.Ct. 2529, 61 L.Ed.2d 153 (1979) (citing United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 604-05, 61 S.Ct. 742, 85 L.Ed. 1071 (1941)) (holding that a person who cut and removed timber pursuant to the direction of the person in possession of the property but without the written consent of the company holding legal title to the land could be held liable under the gtccs" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nto its property interest in federal Medicaid and Medicare funds and injury to its liberty interest in its reputation. Id. at 1139, 1142. The court found that an informal administrative hearing held prior to the reimbursement ban satisfied due process and that a full evidentiary hearing was not required. Id. at 1145; see also Vencor Nursing Ctrs., L.P. v. Shalala, 63 F.Supp.2d 1, 10-11 (D.D.C.1999) (although nursing facility had a constitutionally-protected interest in not being terminated from the Medicare/Medicaid program, the court denied plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction because plaintiff did not show likelihood of success on the claim that HHS termination procedures violated due process); Pressley Ridge Schools, Inc. v. Stottlemyer, 947 F.Supp. 929, 940 (S.D.W.Va.1997) (holding that a statutory entitlement to payment for reasonable and necessary medical treatment cannot give rise to a property interest until the payments in question have been proven to be reasonable and necessary", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nto its property interest in federal Medicaid and Medicare funds and injury to its liberty interest in its reputation. Id. at 1139, 1142. The court found that an informal administrative hearing held prior to the reimbursement ban satisfied due process and that a full evidentiary hearing was not required. Id. at 1145; see also Vencor Nursing Ctrs., L.P. v. Shalala, 63 F.Supp.2d 1, 10-11 (D.D.C.1999) (although nursing facility had a constitutionally-protected interest in not being terminated from the Medicare/Medicaid program, the court denied plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction because plaintiff did not show likelihood of success on the claim that HHS termination procedures violated due process); Pressley Ridge Schools, Inc. v. Stottlemyer, 947 F.Supp. 929, 940 (S.D.W.Va.1997) (holding the medicaid act permits enforcement under 1983 notwithstanding inclusion of alternative state administrative procedures", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nto its property interest in federal Medicaid and Medicare funds and injury to its liberty interest in its reputation. Id. at 1139, 1142. The court found that an informal administrative hearing held prior to the reimbursement ban satisfied due process and that a full evidentiary hearing was not required. Id. at 1145; see also Vencor Nursing Ctrs., L.P. v. Shalala, 63 F.Supp.2d 1, 10-11 (D.D.C.1999) (although nursing facility had a constitutionally-protected interest in not being terminated from the Medicare/Medicaid program, the court denied plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction because plaintiff did not show likelihood of success on the claim that HHS termination procedures violated due process); Pressley Ridge Schools, Inc. v. Stottlemyer, 947 F.Supp. 929, 940 (S.D.W.Va.1997) (holding that a plaintiff in an erisa denial of benefits case bears the burden of proving her entitlement to contractual benefits", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nto its property interest in federal Medicaid and Medicare funds and injury to its liberty interest in its reputation. Id. at 1139, 1142. The court found that an informal administrative hearing held prior to the reimbursement ban satisfied due process and that a full evidentiary hearing was not required. Id. at 1145; see also Vencor Nursing Ctrs., L.P. v. Shalala, 63 F.Supp.2d 1, 10-11 (D.D.C.1999) (although nursing facility had a constitutionally-protected interest in not being terminated from the Medicare/Medicaid program, the court denied plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction because plaintiff did not show likelihood of success on the claim that HHS termination procedures violated due process); Pressley Ridge Schools, Inc. v. Stottlemyer, 947 F.Supp. 929, 940 (S.D.W.Va.1997) (recognizing entitlement to government benefits and finding that state medicaid agency violated 45523 which only permits temporary withholding of payment when it suspended payments indefinitely", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nto its property interest in federal Medicaid and Medicare funds and injury to its liberty interest in its reputation. Id. at 1139, 1142. The court found that an informal administrative hearing held prior to the reimbursement ban satisfied due process and that a full evidentiary hearing was not required. Id. at 1145; see also Vencor Nursing Ctrs., L.P. v. Shalala, 63 F.Supp.2d 1, 10-11 (D.D.C.1999) (although nursing facility had a constitutionally-protected interest in not being terminated from the Medicare/Medicaid program, the court denied plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction because plaintiff did not show likelihood of success on the claim that HHS termination procedures violated due process); Pressley Ridge Schools, Inc. v. Stottlemyer, 947 F.Supp. 929, 940 (S.D.W.Va.1997) (holding that whether children are legitimate for purposes of entitlement to insurance benefits is determined by state law" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nof public concern is Gardetto’s public support of the three non-incumbent candidates for positions on EWC’s board of trustees. One of the primary functions of a L.Ed.2d 201 (1992). Thus, we hold that Gardetto’s endorsement of the three insurgent candidates for the college’s board positions involves speech on a matter of public concern. Similarly, we hold that Gardetto’s statements criticizing Mason for holding himself out as a “doctor” when he did not have a Ph.D. or other doctoral degree involves speech on a matter of public concern. The integrity, qualifications, and misrepresentations of a highly visible public official, such as the president of a college, obviously impact the social and political life of a commu nity. See Patrick v. Miller, 953 F.2d 1240, 1246-47 (10th Cir.1992) (holding that a city finance directors allegations of discriminatory employment practices in support of black females and perceived illegal budgeting activities were matters of public concern", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nof public concern is Gardetto’s public support of the three non-incumbent candidates for positions on EWC’s board of trustees. One of the primary functions of a L.Ed.2d 201 (1992). Thus, we hold that Gardetto’s endorsement of the three insurgent candidates for the college’s board positions involves speech on a matter of public concern. Similarly, we hold that Gardetto’s statements criticizing Mason for holding himself out as a “doctor” when he did not have a Ph.D. or other doctoral degree involves speech on a matter of public concern. The integrity, qualifications, and misrepresentations of a highly visible public official, such as the president of a college, obviously impact the social and political life of a commu nity. See Patrick v. Miller, 953 F.2d 1240, 1246-47 (10th Cir.1992) (holding that statements made only to supervisor and chief by police officer were matters of public concern", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nof public concern is Gardetto’s public support of the three non-incumbent candidates for positions on EWC’s board of trustees. One of the primary functions of a L.Ed.2d 201 (1992). Thus, we hold that Gardetto’s endorsement of the three insurgent candidates for the college’s board positions involves speech on a matter of public concern. Similarly, we hold that Gardetto’s statements criticizing Mason for holding himself out as a “doctor” when he did not have a Ph.D. or other doctoral degree involves speech on a matter of public concern. The integrity, qualifications, and misrepresentations of a highly visible public official, such as the president of a college, obviously impact the social and political life of a commu nity. See Patrick v. Miller, 953 F.2d 1240, 1246-47 (10th Cir.1992) (holding that issues of prison security public safety and official corruption are matters of public concern", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nof public concern is Gardetto’s public support of the three non-incumbent candidates for positions on EWC’s board of trustees. One of the primary functions of a L.Ed.2d 201 (1992). Thus, we hold that Gardetto’s endorsement of the three insurgent candidates for the college’s board positions involves speech on a matter of public concern. Similarly, we hold that Gardetto’s statements criticizing Mason for holding himself out as a “doctor” when he did not have a Ph.D. or other doctoral degree involves speech on a matter of public concern. The integrity, qualifications, and misrepresentations of a highly visible public official, such as the president of a college, obviously impact the social and political life of a commu nity. See Patrick v. Miller, 953 F.2d 1240, 1246-47 (10th Cir.1992) (holding allegations of wrongdoing by public officials are on the highest order of first amendment concern", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nof public concern is Gardetto’s public support of the three non-incumbent candidates for positions on EWC’s board of trustees. One of the primary functions of a L.Ed.2d 201 (1992). Thus, we hold that Gardetto’s endorsement of the three insurgent candidates for the college’s board positions involves speech on a matter of public concern. Similarly, we hold that Gardetto’s statements criticizing Mason for holding himself out as a “doctor” when he did not have a Ph.D. or other doctoral degree involves speech on a matter of public concern. The integrity, qualifications, and misrepresentations of a highly visible public official, such as the president of a college, obviously impact the social and political life of a commu nity. See Patrick v. Miller, 953 F.2d 1240, 1246-47 (10th Cir.1992) (recognizing a public employees first amendment right to address matters of legitimate public concern" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nhowever, is inapposite to the present case. In contrast to this ease, in Short the Claims Court found jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491, not the Indian Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1505. See Short, 12 Cl.Ct. at 40 (“[Plaintiffs are suing as individuals under 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1982).”). Later, “[i]n 1989, the Claims Court denied the plaintiffs’ claim for group damages under 28 U.S.C. § 1505.” Short v. United States, 50 F.3d 994, 997 (Fed.Cir.1995) (emphasis added) (citing Order at 3-10, S es, 169 Ct.Cl. 1009, 1012-13 (1965) (finding that identification of two scattered families descended from an Indian nation was sufficient to support Claims Commission’s determination that plaintiffs constituted an identifiable group); Thompson v. United States, 122 Ct. Cl. 348, 360 (1952) (holding that tribal courts have jurisdiction to divide trust property in a divorce action when both parties are indians", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nhowever, is inapposite to the present case. In contrast to this ease, in Short the Claims Court found jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491, not the Indian Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1505. See Short, 12 Cl.Ct. at 40 (“[Plaintiffs are suing as individuals under 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1982).”). Later, “[i]n 1989, the Claims Court denied the plaintiffs’ claim for group damages under 28 U.S.C. § 1505.” Short v. United States, 50 F.3d 994, 997 (Fed.Cir.1995) (emphasis added) (citing Order at 3-10, S es, 169 Ct.Cl. 1009, 1012-13 (1965) (finding that identification of two scattered families descended from an Indian nation was sufficient to support Claims Commission’s determination that plaintiffs constituted an identifiable group); Thompson v. United States, 122 Ct. Cl. 348, 360 (1952) (holding that indians of california could bring suit as identifiable group despite lack of formal tribal organization", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nhowever, is inapposite to the present case. In contrast to this ease, in Short the Claims Court found jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491, not the Indian Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1505. See Short, 12 Cl.Ct. at 40 (“[Plaintiffs are suing as individuals under 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1982).”). Later, “[i]n 1989, the Claims Court denied the plaintiffs’ claim for group damages under 28 U.S.C. § 1505.” Short v. United States, 50 F.3d 994, 997 (Fed.Cir.1995) (emphasis added) (citing Order at 3-10, S es, 169 Ct.Cl. 1009, 1012-13 (1965) (finding that identification of two scattered families descended from an Indian nation was sufficient to support Claims Commission’s determination that plaintiffs constituted an identifiable group); Thompson v. United States, 122 Ct. Cl. 348, 360 (1952) (holding that indian tribes lack tribal jurisdiction over crimes committed by nonmember indians within the tribes reservation", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nhowever, is inapposite to the present case. In contrast to this ease, in Short the Claims Court found jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491, not the Indian Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1505. See Short, 12 Cl.Ct. at 40 (“[Plaintiffs are suing as individuals under 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1982).”). Later, “[i]n 1989, the Claims Court denied the plaintiffs’ claim for group damages under 28 U.S.C. § 1505.” Short v. United States, 50 F.3d 994, 997 (Fed.Cir.1995) (emphasis added) (citing Order at 3-10, S es, 169 Ct.Cl. 1009, 1012-13 (1965) (finding that identification of two scattered families descended from an Indian nation was sufficient to support Claims Commission’s determination that plaintiffs constituted an identifiable group); Thompson v. United States, 122 Ct. Cl. 348, 360 (1952) (holding that shareholders had standing to bring derivative suit against the government but not direct suit due to lack of privity", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nhowever, is inapposite to the present case. In contrast to this ease, in Short the Claims Court found jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491, not the Indian Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1505. See Short, 12 Cl.Ct. at 40 (“[Plaintiffs are suing as individuals under 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1982).”). Later, “[i]n 1989, the Claims Court denied the plaintiffs’ claim for group damages under 28 U.S.C. § 1505.” Short v. United States, 50 F.3d 994, 997 (Fed.Cir.1995) (emphasis added) (citing Order at 3-10, S es, 169 Ct.Cl. 1009, 1012-13 (1965) (finding that identification of two scattered families descended from an Indian nation was sufficient to support Claims Commission’s determination that plaintiffs constituted an identifiable group); Thompson v. United States, 122 Ct. Cl. 348, 360 (1952) (holding that indian tribes could only exercise criminal jurisdiction over tribal members and not other indians" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nfrom admitting a criminal defendant’s pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence as substantive evidence of guilt. See Coppola v. Powell, 878 F.2d 1562, 1568 (1st Cir.1989); Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 283-84 (6th Cir.2000); United States ex rel. Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011, 1017-18 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196, 1200-01 (10th Cir. 1991). See also United States v. Caro, 637 F.2d 869, 876 (2d Cir. 1981) (\"[W]e are not confident that Jenkins permits even evidence that a suspect remained silent before he was arrested or taken into custody to be used in the Government's case in chief.”). The D.C. Circuit has stated that “custody” “is the triggering mechanism for the right of pretrial silence under Miranda.” United States v. Moore, 104 F.3d 377, 385 (D.C.Cir.1997) (holding that the government may comment on a defendants prearrest premiranda silence as well as his postarrest pr emiranda silence", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nfrom admitting a criminal defendant’s pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence as substantive evidence of guilt. See Coppola v. Powell, 878 F.2d 1562, 1568 (1st Cir.1989); Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 283-84 (6th Cir.2000); United States ex rel. Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011, 1017-18 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196, 1200-01 (10th Cir. 1991). See also United States v. Caro, 637 F.2d 869, 876 (2d Cir. 1981) (\"[W]e are not confident that Jenkins permits even evidence that a suspect remained silent before he was arrested or taken into custody to be used in the Government's case in chief.”). The D.C. Circuit has stated that “custody” “is the triggering mechanism for the right of pretrial silence under Miranda.” United States v. Moore, 104 F.3d 377, 385 (D.C.Cir.1997) (holding that the defendants postarrest pr emiranda silence was admissible in the governments caseinchief because there was no official compulsion the court qualified its holding stating we do not decide today whether compulsion may exist under any other postarrest pr emiranda circumstances", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nfrom admitting a criminal defendant’s pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence as substantive evidence of guilt. See Coppola v. Powell, 878 F.2d 1562, 1568 (1st Cir.1989); Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 283-84 (6th Cir.2000); United States ex rel. Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011, 1017-18 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196, 1200-01 (10th Cir. 1991). See also United States v. Caro, 637 F.2d 869, 876 (2d Cir. 1981) (\"[W]e are not confident that Jenkins permits even evidence that a suspect remained silent before he was arrested or taken into custody to be used in the Government's case in chief.”). The D.C. Circuit has stated that “custody” “is the triggering mechanism for the right of pretrial silence under Miranda.” United States v. Moore, 104 F.3d 377, 385 (D.C.Cir.1997) (holding that if comment is fairly susceptible of being construed by the jury as a comment on the defendants exercise of his or her right to remain silent it violates the defendants state constitutional right to silence whether comment was introduced in states caseinchief or for impeachment purposes holding that the state may not impeach a defendant with his postarrest or postmiranda silence", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nfrom admitting a criminal defendant’s pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence as substantive evidence of guilt. See Coppola v. Powell, 878 F.2d 1562, 1568 (1st Cir.1989); Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 283-84 (6th Cir.2000); United States ex rel. Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011, 1017-18 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196, 1200-01 (10th Cir. 1991). See also United States v. Caro, 637 F.2d 869, 876 (2d Cir. 1981) (\"[W]e are not confident that Jenkins permits even evidence that a suspect remained silent before he was arrested or taken into custody to be used in the Government's case in chief.”). The D.C. Circuit has stated that “custody” “is the triggering mechanism for the right of pretrial silence under Miranda.” United States v. Moore, 104 F.3d 377, 385 (D.C.Cir.1997) (holding that the admission of a defendants postarrest premiranda silence in the prosecutions caseinchief violates the fifth amendment because the defendant was in custody", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nfrom admitting a criminal defendant’s pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence as substantive evidence of guilt. See Coppola v. Powell, 878 F.2d 1562, 1568 (1st Cir.1989); Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 283-84 (6th Cir.2000); United States ex rel. Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011, 1017-18 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196, 1200-01 (10th Cir. 1991). See also United States v. Caro, 637 F.2d 869, 876 (2d Cir. 1981) (\"[W]e are not confident that Jenkins permits even evidence that a suspect remained silent before he was arrested or taken into custody to be used in the Government's case in chief.”). The D.C. Circuit has stated that “custody” “is the triggering mechanism for the right of pretrial silence under Miranda.” United States v. Moore, 104 F.3d 377, 385 (D.C.Cir.1997) (holding that introduction of defendants premiranda custodial silence is violation of fifth amendment" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nLetter are final orders relating to “aviation duties and powers,” § 46110 preempts the district court from considering these claims. But if they are not final, then the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) bars the district court from hearing the case for lack of jurisdiction. See 5 U.S.C. § 704. The finality requirement comes from two sections in the APA. An “order” is defined as “ ‘the whole or a part of a final disposition ... of an agency in a matter other than rule making.’ ” Air Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 654 F.2d 616, 620 (9th Cir.1981) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 551(6)). The APA only allows judicial review of “final agency actions.” 5 U.S.C. § 704. Thus, if an FAA order is not final, neither we nor the district court have jurisdiction over the case. See Air Cal, 654 F.2d at 622 (holding district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the document before the district court in this instance is not a vehicle for any recognized legal remedy under the rules", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nLetter are final orders relating to “aviation duties and powers,” § 46110 preempts the district court from considering these claims. But if they are not final, then the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) bars the district court from hearing the case for lack of jurisdiction. See 5 U.S.C. § 704. The finality requirement comes from two sections in the APA. An “order” is defined as “ ‘the whole or a part of a final disposition ... of an agency in a matter other than rule making.’ ” Air Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 654 F.2d 616, 620 (9th Cir.1981) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 551(6)). The APA only allows judicial review of “final agency actions.” 5 U.S.C. § 704. Thus, if an FAA order is not final, neither we nor the district court have jurisdiction over the case. See Air Cal, 654 F.2d at 622 (holding that this court lacked preliminary authority to review the district courts jurisdiction because there was no immediately appealable order before the court", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nLetter are final orders relating to “aviation duties and powers,” § 46110 preempts the district court from considering these claims. But if they are not final, then the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) bars the district court from hearing the case for lack of jurisdiction. See 5 U.S.C. § 704. The finality requirement comes from two sections in the APA. An “order” is defined as “ ‘the whole or a part of a final disposition ... of an agency in a matter other than rule making.’ ” Air Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 654 F.2d 616, 620 (9th Cir.1981) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 551(6)). The APA only allows judicial review of “final agency actions.” 5 U.S.C. § 704. Thus, if an FAA order is not final, neither we nor the district court have jurisdiction over the case. See Air Cal, 654 F.2d at 622 (holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction to review state disciplinary proceedings against attorney", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nLetter are final orders relating to “aviation duties and powers,” § 46110 preempts the district court from considering these claims. But if they are not final, then the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) bars the district court from hearing the case for lack of jurisdiction. See 5 U.S.C. § 704. The finality requirement comes from two sections in the APA. An “order” is defined as “ ‘the whole or a part of a final disposition ... of an agency in a matter other than rule making.’ ” Air Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 654 F.2d 616, 620 (9th Cir.1981) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 551(6)). The APA only allows judicial review of “final agency actions.” 5 U.S.C. § 704. Thus, if an FAA order is not final, neither we nor the district court have jurisdiction over the case. See Air Cal, 654 F.2d at 622 (holding that this court lacked jurisdiction under 46110 for lack of finality and that the district court also lacked jurisdiction because the orders were not final and thus not ripe for review", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nLetter are final orders relating to “aviation duties and powers,” § 46110 preempts the district court from considering these claims. But if they are not final, then the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) bars the district court from hearing the case for lack of jurisdiction. See 5 U.S.C. § 704. The finality requirement comes from two sections in the APA. An “order” is defined as “ ‘the whole or a part of a final disposition ... of an agency in a matter other than rule making.’ ” Air Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 654 F.2d 616, 620 (9th Cir.1981) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 551(6)). The APA only allows judicial review of “final agency actions.” 5 U.S.C. § 704. Thus, if an FAA order is not final, neither we nor the district court have jurisdiction over the case. See Air Cal, 654 F.2d at 622 (holding that plaintiffs lacked standing because the case was not ripe for adjudication" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwas sufficiently included in the requested property division, Kelly does not contend that a request for property division is sufficient to provide notice that she sought payment of spousal maintenance following the property division. Outside the default-judgment context, some courts have held that absent special exceptions, a prayer for general relief will support an award of any relief raised by the evidence. See, e.g., Khalaf v. Williams, 814 S.W.2d 854, 858 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ). The relief must also be consistent with the allegations in the petition, however. Id.; Hardin v. Hardin, 161 S.W.3d 14, 24 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.); see Alan Reuber Chevrolet, Inc. v. Grady Chevrolet, Ltd., 287 S.W.3d 877, 885 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2009, no pet.) (holding prayer for general relief does not support award of attorneys fees", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwas sufficiently included in the requested property division, Kelly does not contend that a request for property division is sufficient to provide notice that she sought payment of spousal maintenance following the property division. Outside the default-judgment context, some courts have held that absent special exceptions, a prayer for general relief will support an award of any relief raised by the evidence. See, e.g., Khalaf v. Williams, 814 S.W.2d 854, 858 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ). The relief must also be consistent with the allegations in the petition, however. Id.; Hardin v. Hardin, 161 S.W.3d 14, 24 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.); see Alan Reuber Chevrolet, Inc. v. Grady Chevrolet, Ltd., 287 S.W.3d 877, 885 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2009, no pet.) (holding that a preliminary injunction reversed on appeal does not support an award of attorneys fees", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwas sufficiently included in the requested property division, Kelly does not contend that a request for property division is sufficient to provide notice that she sought payment of spousal maintenance following the property division. Outside the default-judgment context, some courts have held that absent special exceptions, a prayer for general relief will support an award of any relief raised by the evidence. See, e.g., Khalaf v. Williams, 814 S.W.2d 854, 858 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ). The relief must also be consistent with the allegations in the petition, however. Id.; Hardin v. Hardin, 161 S.W.3d 14, 24 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.); see Alan Reuber Chevrolet, Inc. v. Grady Chevrolet, Ltd., 287 S.W.3d 877, 885 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2009, no pet.) (holding prayer for general relief does not support award of commonlaw prejudgment interest as element of damages", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwas sufficiently included in the requested property division, Kelly does not contend that a request for property division is sufficient to provide notice that she sought payment of spousal maintenance following the property division. Outside the default-judgment context, some courts have held that absent special exceptions, a prayer for general relief will support an award of any relief raised by the evidence. See, e.g., Khalaf v. Williams, 814 S.W.2d 854, 858 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ). The relief must also be consistent with the allegations in the petition, however. Id.; Hardin v. Hardin, 161 S.W.3d 14, 24 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.); see Alan Reuber Chevrolet, Inc. v. Grady Chevrolet, Ltd., 287 S.W.3d 877, 885 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2009, no pet.) (holding merely that the evidence was sufficient to support the award of attorneys fees", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwas sufficiently included in the requested property division, Kelly does not contend that a request for property division is sufficient to provide notice that she sought payment of spousal maintenance following the property division. Outside the default-judgment context, some courts have held that absent special exceptions, a prayer for general relief will support an award of any relief raised by the evidence. See, e.g., Khalaf v. Williams, 814 S.W.2d 854, 858 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ). The relief must also be consistent with the allegations in the petition, however. Id.; Hardin v. Hardin, 161 S.W.3d 14, 24 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.); see Alan Reuber Chevrolet, Inc. v. Grady Chevrolet, Ltd., 287 S.W.3d 877, 885 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2009, no pet.) (holding trial court had no authority to award attorneys fees when arbitrator had stated he would not award attorneys fees" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nStates, 286 U.S. 427, 433, 52 S.Ct. 607, 76 L.Ed. 1204 (1932) (noting the presumption that “identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning”). We have not previously decided whether, under this prior version of section 1332(c), a corporation incorporated in the United States also takes the citizenship of its foreign principal place of business. But three out of four of our sister Circuits and two district courts in this Circuit that have confronted this issue have concluded that a domestic corporation with a principal place of business abroad should be treated, for diversity purposes, as a citizen of only the State in which it is incorporated. See MAS Capital, Inc. v. Biodelivery Sciences Int’l, Inc., 524 F.3d 831, 832-33 (7th Cir.2008) (holding that the location of a corporations principal place of business for diversity purposes is the state where the corporation has its headquarters or nerve center", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nStates, 286 U.S. 427, 433, 52 S.Ct. 607, 76 L.Ed. 1204 (1932) (noting the presumption that “identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning”). We have not previously decided whether, under this prior version of section 1332(c), a corporation incorporated in the United States also takes the citizenship of its foreign principal place of business. But three out of four of our sister Circuits and two district courts in this Circuit that have confronted this issue have concluded that a domestic corporation with a principal place of business abroad should be treated, for diversity purposes, as a citizen of only the State in which it is incorporated. See MAS Capital, Inc. v. Biodelivery Sciences Int’l, Inc., 524 F.3d 831, 832-33 (7th Cir.2008) (holding 1332c does not apply to a domestically incorporated corporation with its principal place of business abroad", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nStates, 286 U.S. 427, 433, 52 S.Ct. 607, 76 L.Ed. 1204 (1932) (noting the presumption that “identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning”). We have not previously decided whether, under this prior version of section 1332(c), a corporation incorporated in the United States also takes the citizenship of its foreign principal place of business. But three out of four of our sister Circuits and two district courts in this Circuit that have confronted this issue have concluded that a domestic corporation with a principal place of business abroad should be treated, for diversity purposes, as a citizen of only the State in which it is incorporated. See MAS Capital, Inc. v. Biodelivery Sciences Int’l, Inc., 524 F.3d 831, 832-33 (7th Cir.2008) (holding that if a domestic corporations principal place of business is abroad the foreign principal place of business cannot be considered for diversity jurisdiction purposes", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nStates, 286 U.S. 427, 433, 52 S.Ct. 607, 76 L.Ed. 1204 (1932) (noting the presumption that “identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning”). We have not previously decided whether, under this prior version of section 1332(c), a corporation incorporated in the United States also takes the citizenship of its foreign principal place of business. But three out of four of our sister Circuits and two district courts in this Circuit that have confronted this issue have concluded that a domestic corporation with a principal place of business abroad should be treated, for diversity purposes, as a citizen of only the State in which it is incorporated. See MAS Capital, Inc. v. Biodelivery Sciences Int’l, Inc., 524 F.3d 831, 832-33 (7th Cir.2008) (holding that a corporation is fairly regarded at home and so amenable to personal jurisdiction for suits relating to all of its activities including those outside the forum in its principal place of business and place of incorporation", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nStates, 286 U.S. 427, 433, 52 S.Ct. 607, 76 L.Ed. 1204 (1932) (noting the presumption that “identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning”). We have not previously decided whether, under this prior version of section 1332(c), a corporation incorporated in the United States also takes the citizenship of its foreign principal place of business. But three out of four of our sister Circuits and two district courts in this Circuit that have confronted this issue have concluded that a domestic corporation with a principal place of business abroad should be treated, for diversity purposes, as a citizen of only the State in which it is incorporated. See MAS Capital, Inc. v. Biodelivery Sciences Int’l, Inc., 524 F.3d 831, 832-33 (7th Cir.2008) (holding that for a domestic corporation the foreign principal place of business does not count" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nnot present during the above-referenced proceedings. The speakers are identified based upon representations made by others.” But regardless of the authenticity of this transcript, the Estate submits it for the first time on appeal, and we will not consider evidence that was not presented to the trial court. See Givens v. Ichauway, Inc., 268 Ga. 710, 712 (1) (493 SE2d 148) (1997) (“[A]ppellate courts will review only evidence presented to the trial court before its ruling on the motion. Additional evidence will not be admitted on appeal.” (punctuation omitted)); Meade v. Heimanson, 239 Ga. 177, 180 (236 SE2d 357) (1977) (same); RC Cola Bottling Co. v. Vann, 220 Ga. App. 479, 480(1) (469 SE2d 523) (1996) (same); see also Jones v. O’Day, 303 Ga. App. 159, 162-63 n.4 (692 SE2d 774) (2010) (holding that a claim not raised before the trial court will not be considered for the first time on appeal", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nnot present during the above-referenced proceedings. The speakers are identified based upon representations made by others.” But regardless of the authenticity of this transcript, the Estate submits it for the first time on appeal, and we will not consider evidence that was not presented to the trial court. See Givens v. Ichauway, Inc., 268 Ga. 710, 712 (1) (493 SE2d 148) (1997) (“[A]ppellate courts will review only evidence presented to the trial court before its ruling on the motion. Additional evidence will not be admitted on appeal.” (punctuation omitted)); Meade v. Heimanson, 239 Ga. 177, 180 (236 SE2d 357) (1977) (same); RC Cola Bottling Co. v. Vann, 220 Ga. App. 479, 480(1) (469 SE2d 523) (1996) (same); see also Jones v. O’Day, 303 Ga. App. 159, 162-63 n.4 (692 SE2d 774) (2010) (holding that an issue not presented to the trial court will not be considered on appeal", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nnot present during the above-referenced proceedings. The speakers are identified based upon representations made by others.” But regardless of the authenticity of this transcript, the Estate submits it for the first time on appeal, and we will not consider evidence that was not presented to the trial court. See Givens v. Ichauway, Inc., 268 Ga. 710, 712 (1) (493 SE2d 148) (1997) (“[A]ppellate courts will review only evidence presented to the trial court before its ruling on the motion. Additional evidence will not be admitted on appeal.” (punctuation omitted)); Meade v. Heimanson, 239 Ga. 177, 180 (236 SE2d 357) (1977) (same); RC Cola Bottling Co. v. Vann, 220 Ga. App. 479, 480(1) (469 SE2d 523) (1996) (same); see also Jones v. O’Day, 303 Ga. App. 159, 162-63 n.4 (692 SE2d 774) (2010) (holding that a party may not raise a claim on appeal that was not presented to the trial court", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nnot present during the above-referenced proceedings. The speakers are identified based upon representations made by others.” But regardless of the authenticity of this transcript, the Estate submits it for the first time on appeal, and we will not consider evidence that was not presented to the trial court. See Givens v. Ichauway, Inc., 268 Ga. 710, 712 (1) (493 SE2d 148) (1997) (“[A]ppellate courts will review only evidence presented to the trial court before its ruling on the motion. Additional evidence will not be admitted on appeal.” (punctuation omitted)); Meade v. Heimanson, 239 Ga. 177, 180 (236 SE2d 357) (1977) (same); RC Cola Bottling Co. v. Vann, 220 Ga. App. 479, 480(1) (469 SE2d 523) (1996) (same); see also Jones v. O’Day, 303 Ga. App. 159, 162-63 n.4 (692 SE2d 774) (2010) (holding that complaint on appeal must be the same as that presented in the trial court", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nnot present during the above-referenced proceedings. The speakers are identified based upon representations made by others.” But regardless of the authenticity of this transcript, the Estate submits it for the first time on appeal, and we will not consider evidence that was not presented to the trial court. See Givens v. Ichauway, Inc., 268 Ga. 710, 712 (1) (493 SE2d 148) (1997) (“[A]ppellate courts will review only evidence presented to the trial court before its ruling on the motion. Additional evidence will not be admitted on appeal.” (punctuation omitted)); Meade v. Heimanson, 239 Ga. 177, 180 (236 SE2d 357) (1977) (same); RC Cola Bottling Co. v. Vann, 220 Ga. App. 479, 480(1) (469 SE2d 523) (1996) (same); see also Jones v. O’Day, 303 Ga. App. 159, 162-63 n.4 (692 SE2d 774) (2010) (holding that a deposition that was not presented to the trial court could not be considered on appeal" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nin the equipment; (4) Segundo did not assist Monson in retrieving the equipment from law enforcement; and (5) Segundo did not adequately protect its collateral. But these excuses do not make Monson’s own conduct any less willful or malicious. The collapse of the business did not relieve Monson of the contractual obligations which he entered into or give him carte blanche to make off with equipment he bought with someone else’s money. Demonstrably, Monson knew his actions were wrongful and without just cause. Further, Monson’s behavior falls outside of the sort of reckless or unfortunate but non-malicious acts that this Court have previously held do not rise to the standard of a willful and malicious injury under § 523(a)(6). See In re Walker, 48 F.3d 1161, 1163-65 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that there must be proof of both a willful act and malicious injury to establish nondischargeability under section 523a6", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nin the equipment; (4) Segundo did not assist Monson in retrieving the equipment from law enforcement; and (5) Segundo did not adequately protect its collateral. But these excuses do not make Monson’s own conduct any less willful or malicious. The collapse of the business did not relieve Monson of the contractual obligations which he entered into or give him carte blanche to make off with equipment he bought with someone else’s money. Demonstrably, Monson knew his actions were wrongful and without just cause. Further, Monson’s behavior falls outside of the sort of reckless or unfortunate but non-malicious acts that this Court have previously held do not rise to the standard of a willful and malicious injury under § 523(a)(6). See In re Walker, 48 F.3d 1161, 1163-65 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that the debtors knowing act of failing to obtain workers compensation insurance so that the employer owed an employee a debt after the employee suffered a workplace injury was not the sort of willful and malicious injury required for nondischargeability under 523a6 because it cannot not be said that the employer intended for the employee to suffer a fall or that there was an unbroken chain of events leading from the employers intentional act to the employees physical injury", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nin the equipment; (4) Segundo did not assist Monson in retrieving the equipment from law enforcement; and (5) Segundo did not adequately protect its collateral. But these excuses do not make Monson’s own conduct any less willful or malicious. The collapse of the business did not relieve Monson of the contractual obligations which he entered into or give him carte blanche to make off with equipment he bought with someone else’s money. Demonstrably, Monson knew his actions were wrongful and without just cause. Further, Monson’s behavior falls outside of the sort of reckless or unfortunate but non-malicious acts that this Court have previously held do not rise to the standard of a willful and malicious injury under § 523(a)(6). See In re Walker, 48 F.3d 1161, 1163-65 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that an injury is not within the scope of employment after the employee has left work unless the injury was caused by the employers negligence", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nin the equipment; (4) Segundo did not assist Monson in retrieving the equipment from law enforcement; and (5) Segundo did not adequately protect its collateral. But these excuses do not make Monson’s own conduct any less willful or malicious. The collapse of the business did not relieve Monson of the contractual obligations which he entered into or give him carte blanche to make off with equipment he bought with someone else’s money. Demonstrably, Monson knew his actions were wrongful and without just cause. Further, Monson’s behavior falls outside of the sort of reckless or unfortunate but non-malicious acts that this Court have previously held do not rise to the standard of a willful and malicious injury under § 523(a)(6). See In re Walker, 48 F.3d 1161, 1163-65 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that an employer who commits an intentional tort against his employee cannot claim that the act was accidental so that workers compensation is the employees exclusive remedy", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nin the equipment; (4) Segundo did not assist Monson in retrieving the equipment from law enforcement; and (5) Segundo did not adequately protect its collateral. But these excuses do not make Monson’s own conduct any less willful or malicious. The collapse of the business did not relieve Monson of the contractual obligations which he entered into or give him carte blanche to make off with equipment he bought with someone else’s money. Demonstrably, Monson knew his actions were wrongful and without just cause. Further, Monson’s behavior falls outside of the sort of reckless or unfortunate but non-malicious acts that this Court have previously held do not rise to the standard of a willful and malicious injury under § 523(a)(6). See In re Walker, 48 F.3d 1161, 1163-65 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that when an employee suffers an injury from an unexplained fall while the employee is on the job and performing the duties of his employment that injury is eligible for compensation under the workers compensation act" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nWhile McIntyre appears to have applied strict scrutiny, this Court does not find that the result differs under the exacting scrutiny standard. Simply stated, the inherent worth of speech in terms of its capacity to inform the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, at least in the context of referenda. The Defendants argue that the McIntyre holding is a very “fact-specific” and should yield to the more recent and relevant stream of Supreme Court cases. (Defs.’ Br. Opp. Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. 4-5.) However, the Defendants do not fully develop this argument, and this Court has no obligation to formulate arguments for a party. See Spath v. Hayes Wheels Int’l— Ind., Inc., 211 F.3d 392, 397 (7th Cir.2000); See also, United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1384 (7th Cir.1991) (holding that the seventh circuit has made clear that perfunctory and undeveloped arguments and arguments that are unsupported by pertinent authority are waived even where those arguments raise constitutional issues", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nWhile McIntyre appears to have applied strict scrutiny, this Court does not find that the result differs under the exacting scrutiny standard. Simply stated, the inherent worth of speech in terms of its capacity to inform the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, at least in the context of referenda. The Defendants argue that the McIntyre holding is a very “fact-specific” and should yield to the more recent and relevant stream of Supreme Court cases. (Defs.’ Br. Opp. Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. 4-5.) However, the Defendants do not fully develop this argument, and this Court has no obligation to formulate arguments for a party. See Spath v. Hayes Wheels Int’l— Ind., Inc., 211 F.3d 392, 397 (7th Cir.2000); See also, United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1384 (7th Cir.1991) (holding that arguments not raised in district court are waived", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nWhile McIntyre appears to have applied strict scrutiny, this Court does not find that the result differs under the exacting scrutiny standard. Simply stated, the inherent worth of speech in terms of its capacity to inform the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, at least in the context of referenda. The Defendants argue that the McIntyre holding is a very “fact-specific” and should yield to the more recent and relevant stream of Supreme Court cases. (Defs.’ Br. Opp. Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. 4-5.) However, the Defendants do not fully develop this argument, and this Court has no obligation to formulate arguments for a party. See Spath v. Hayes Wheels Int’l— Ind., Inc., 211 F.3d 392, 397 (7th Cir.2000); See also, United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1384 (7th Cir.1991) (holding that an attorneys arguments are not evidence", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nWhile McIntyre appears to have applied strict scrutiny, this Court does not find that the result differs under the exacting scrutiny standard. Simply stated, the inherent worth of speech in terms of its capacity to inform the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, at least in the context of referenda. The Defendants argue that the McIntyre holding is a very “fact-specific” and should yield to the more recent and relevant stream of Supreme Court cases. (Defs.’ Br. Opp. Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. 4-5.) However, the Defendants do not fully develop this argument, and this Court has no obligation to formulate arguments for a party. See Spath v. Hayes Wheels Int’l— Ind., Inc., 211 F.3d 392, 397 (7th Cir.2000); See also, United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1384 (7th Cir.1991) (holding that claims must put parties on sufficient notice of underlying arguments or arguments are deemed waived", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nWhile McIntyre appears to have applied strict scrutiny, this Court does not find that the result differs under the exacting scrutiny standard. Simply stated, the inherent worth of speech in terms of its capacity to inform the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, at least in the context of referenda. The Defendants argue that the McIntyre holding is a very “fact-specific” and should yield to the more recent and relevant stream of Supreme Court cases. (Defs.’ Br. Opp. Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. 4-5.) However, the Defendants do not fully develop this argument, and this Court has no obligation to formulate arguments for a party. See Spath v. Hayes Wheels Int’l— Ind., Inc., 211 F.3d 392, 397 (7th Cir.2000); See also, United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1384 (7th Cir.1991) (holding that appellate courts will not review undeveloped and unsupported arguments" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nit does not necessarily follow that the threat-of-death enhancement would be grafted onto all crimes covered by § 2B3.1. Furthermore, a reading of the statute under which Jennings was indicted and convicted x-eveals that the threat-of-death enhancement would not be applied in “every conceivable circumstance” under the statute. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) covers not only individuals who take property from a bank “by force and violence, or by intimidation,” as did Jennings, but also those who obtain property from a bank by extortion and those who enter a bank with the intent to commit a felony therein. See 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). Jennings’s contention also does not recognize the fact that one can commit a robbery with force or intimidation without threatening Uves. See Jennette, 295 F.3d at 292 (holding the harmed victim need not be the victim of the offense of conviction", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nit does not necessarily follow that the threat-of-death enhancement would be grafted onto all crimes covered by § 2B3.1. Furthermore, a reading of the statute under which Jennings was indicted and convicted x-eveals that the threat-of-death enhancement would not be applied in “every conceivable circumstance” under the statute. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) covers not only individuals who take property from a bank “by force and violence, or by intimidation,” as did Jennings, but also those who obtain property from a bank by extortion and those who enter a bank with the intent to commit a felony therein. See 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). Jennings’s contention also does not recognize the fact that one can commit a robbery with force or intimidation without threatening Uves. See Jennette, 295 F.3d at 292 (holding that because it is not strictly necessary under the statute for a victim to fear death the guideline enhancement is not coterminous with the basic offense conduct", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nit does not necessarily follow that the threat-of-death enhancement would be grafted onto all crimes covered by § 2B3.1. Furthermore, a reading of the statute under which Jennings was indicted and convicted x-eveals that the threat-of-death enhancement would not be applied in “every conceivable circumstance” under the statute. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) covers not only individuals who take property from a bank “by force and violence, or by intimidation,” as did Jennings, but also those who obtain property from a bank by extortion and those who enter a bank with the intent to commit a felony therein. See 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). Jennings’s contention also does not recognize the fact that one can commit a robbery with force or intimidation without threatening Uves. See Jennette, 295 F.3d at 292 (holding that application of 2a31 is appropriate even when the victim is fictional as an enhancement for a fictitious victim is consistent with the utilitarian purpose of the enhancement", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nit does not necessarily follow that the threat-of-death enhancement would be grafted onto all crimes covered by § 2B3.1. Furthermore, a reading of the statute under which Jennings was indicted and convicted x-eveals that the threat-of-death enhancement would not be applied in “every conceivable circumstance” under the statute. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) covers not only individuals who take property from a bank “by force and violence, or by intimidation,” as did Jennings, but also those who obtain property from a bank by extortion and those who enter a bank with the intent to commit a felony therein. See 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). Jennings’s contention also does not recognize the fact that one can commit a robbery with force or intimidation without threatening Uves. See Jennette, 295 F.3d at 292 (holding that it is not", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nit does not necessarily follow that the threat-of-death enhancement would be grafted onto all crimes covered by § 2B3.1. Furthermore, a reading of the statute under which Jennings was indicted and convicted x-eveals that the threat-of-death enhancement would not be applied in “every conceivable circumstance” under the statute. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) covers not only individuals who take property from a bank “by force and violence, or by intimidation,” as did Jennings, but also those who obtain property from a bank by extortion and those who enter a bank with the intent to commit a felony therein. See 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). Jennings’s contention also does not recognize the fact that one can commit a robbery with force or intimidation without threatening Uves. See Jennette, 295 F.3d at 292 (holding that the district court erred in imposing an enhancement under the 5k20 departure provision where an enhancement under the separate guidelines provision for restraining a victim during the course of an offense would have been appropriate" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nis not sufficient to bar a retrial. Lewis has received one of the remedies that Brady envisions, a new trial. The prosecution’s alleged Brady violations in this case simply do not implicate the Double Jeopardy Clause or otherwise bar his retrial. The district court thus did not err in rejecting Lewis’s double jeopardy claim. CONCLUSION We DISMISS Lewis’s fair warning claim for lack of jurisdiction. Although we have jurisdiction over his double jeopardy claim because it raises a colorable claim, the substance of that double jeopardy claim lacks merit. We therefore AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Lewis’s motion to dismiss with respect to the double jeopardy claim. DISMISSED, in part, and AFFIRMED, in part. 1 . Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) (holding that the prosecutions suppression of evidence material to guilt or punishment violates due process regardless of the prosecutions good or bad faith", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nis not sufficient to bar a retrial. Lewis has received one of the remedies that Brady envisions, a new trial. The prosecution’s alleged Brady violations in this case simply do not implicate the Double Jeopardy Clause or otherwise bar his retrial. The district court thus did not err in rejecting Lewis’s double jeopardy claim. CONCLUSION We DISMISS Lewis’s fair warning claim for lack of jurisdiction. Although we have jurisdiction over his double jeopardy claim because it raises a colorable claim, the substance of that double jeopardy claim lacks merit. We therefore AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Lewis’s motion to dismiss with respect to the double jeopardy claim. DISMISSED, in part, and AFFIRMED, in part. 1 . Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) (holding prosecutions suppression of favorable material evidence violates due process", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nis not sufficient to bar a retrial. Lewis has received one of the remedies that Brady envisions, a new trial. The prosecution’s alleged Brady violations in this case simply do not implicate the Double Jeopardy Clause or otherwise bar his retrial. The district court thus did not err in rejecting Lewis’s double jeopardy claim. CONCLUSION We DISMISS Lewis’s fair warning claim for lack of jurisdiction. Although we have jurisdiction over his double jeopardy claim because it raises a colorable claim, the substance of that double jeopardy claim lacks merit. We therefore AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Lewis’s motion to dismiss with respect to the double jeopardy claim. DISMISSED, in part, and AFFIRMED, in part. 1 . Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) (holding that suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nis not sufficient to bar a retrial. Lewis has received one of the remedies that Brady envisions, a new trial. The prosecution’s alleged Brady violations in this case simply do not implicate the Double Jeopardy Clause or otherwise bar his retrial. The district court thus did not err in rejecting Lewis’s double jeopardy claim. CONCLUSION We DISMISS Lewis’s fair warning claim for lack of jurisdiction. Although we have jurisdiction over his double jeopardy claim because it raises a colorable claim, the substance of that double jeopardy claim lacks merit. We therefore AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Lewis’s motion to dismiss with respect to the double jeopardy claim. DISMISSED, in part, and AFFIRMED, in part. 1 . Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) (holding that suppression of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process when evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nis not sufficient to bar a retrial. Lewis has received one of the remedies that Brady envisions, a new trial. The prosecution’s alleged Brady violations in this case simply do not implicate the Double Jeopardy Clause or otherwise bar his retrial. The district court thus did not err in rejecting Lewis’s double jeopardy claim. CONCLUSION We DISMISS Lewis’s fair warning claim for lack of jurisdiction. Although we have jurisdiction over his double jeopardy claim because it raises a colorable claim, the substance of that double jeopardy claim lacks merit. We therefore AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Lewis’s motion to dismiss with respect to the double jeopardy claim. DISMISSED, in part, and AFFIRMED, in part. 1 . Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) (holding that suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nrights as a tax hen. See 18 U.S.C. § 3613(c); Hosking, 567 F.3d at 335. And whether or not Lestina is in a position to advocate for her husband (who did not try to appear in the district court as an interested party, see United States v. Kollintzas, 501 F.3d 796, 800 (7th Cir.2007)), her argument that the restitution schedule is unfair to her husband rings hollow. Spouses have a general obligation to support each other, see 305 ILCS 5/10-2; Poindexter v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Human Servs., 229 Ill.2d 194, 321 Ill.Dec. 688, 890 N.E.2d 410, 415 (2008), but there is no requirement that each spouse contribute equally — or at all — to the support of the other so long as each is supported, see In re Estate of McGloon, 191 Ill.App.3d 968, 139 Ill.Dec. 53, 548 N.E.2d 438, 440 (1989) (holding that a reservation clause gave a life estate to a spouse pursuant to a deed reserving use of the property to both husband and wife for life even though the husband had no interest in the property", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nrights as a tax hen. See 18 U.S.C. § 3613(c); Hosking, 567 F.3d at 335. And whether or not Lestina is in a position to advocate for her husband (who did not try to appear in the district court as an interested party, see United States v. Kollintzas, 501 F.3d 796, 800 (7th Cir.2007)), her argument that the restitution schedule is unfair to her husband rings hollow. Spouses have a general obligation to support each other, see 305 ILCS 5/10-2; Poindexter v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Human Servs., 229 Ill.2d 194, 321 Ill.Dec. 688, 890 N.E.2d 410, 415 (2008), but there is no requirement that each spouse contribute equally — or at all — to the support of the other so long as each is supported, see In re Estate of McGloon, 191 Ill.App.3d 968, 139 Ill.Dec. 53, 548 N.E.2d 438, 440 (1989) (holding that a husband cannot be required to pay a support award that exceeds his financial ability", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nrights as a tax hen. See 18 U.S.C. § 3613(c); Hosking, 567 F.3d at 335. And whether or not Lestina is in a position to advocate for her husband (who did not try to appear in the district court as an interested party, see United States v. Kollintzas, 501 F.3d 796, 800 (7th Cir.2007)), her argument that the restitution schedule is unfair to her husband rings hollow. Spouses have a general obligation to support each other, see 305 ILCS 5/10-2; Poindexter v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Human Servs., 229 Ill.2d 194, 321 Ill.Dec. 688, 890 N.E.2d 410, 415 (2008), but there is no requirement that each spouse contribute equally — or at all — to the support of the other so long as each is supported, see In re Estate of McGloon, 191 Ill.App.3d 968, 139 Ill.Dec. 53, 548 N.E.2d 438, 440 (1989) (holding a wife liable for necessary medical expenses incurred by her husband under the doctrine even though the wife did not sign as a guarantor and did not request that her husband be admitted nor anticipate that her husband would be admitted", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nrights as a tax hen. See 18 U.S.C. § 3613(c); Hosking, 567 F.3d at 335. And whether or not Lestina is in a position to advocate for her husband (who did not try to appear in the district court as an interested party, see United States v. Kollintzas, 501 F.3d 796, 800 (7th Cir.2007)), her argument that the restitution schedule is unfair to her husband rings hollow. Spouses have a general obligation to support each other, see 305 ILCS 5/10-2; Poindexter v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Human Servs., 229 Ill.2d 194, 321 Ill.Dec. 688, 890 N.E.2d 410, 415 (2008), but there is no requirement that each spouse contribute equally — or at all — to the support of the other so long as each is supported, see In re Estate of McGloon, 191 Ill.App.3d 968, 139 Ill.Dec. 53, 548 N.E.2d 438, 440 (1989) (holding that both husband and wife are obligated to support each other based on relative ability to pay", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nrights as a tax hen. See 18 U.S.C. § 3613(c); Hosking, 567 F.3d at 335. And whether or not Lestina is in a position to advocate for her husband (who did not try to appear in the district court as an interested party, see United States v. Kollintzas, 501 F.3d 796, 800 (7th Cir.2007)), her argument that the restitution schedule is unfair to her husband rings hollow. Spouses have a general obligation to support each other, see 305 ILCS 5/10-2; Poindexter v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Human Servs., 229 Ill.2d 194, 321 Ill.Dec. 688, 890 N.E.2d 410, 415 (2008), but there is no requirement that each spouse contribute equally — or at all — to the support of the other so long as each is supported, see In re Estate of McGloon, 191 Ill.App.3d 968, 139 Ill.Dec. 53, 548 N.E.2d 438, 440 (1989) (recognizing that husband and wife count as separate victims where each sustains part of the actual loss" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ninfluence of sympathy,” because the claim was raised on federal habeas and a ruling for the petitioner would constitute a “new rule” of constitutional law); Boyde v. California, 494 U. S. 370 (1990) (upholding death sentence where jurors reasonably may have believed that they could not consider the defendant’s mitigating evidence regarding his character and background); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U. S. 639 (1990) (affirming placement upon the defendant of the burden to establish mitigating circumstances sufficient to call for leniency). The Court has also refused to hold the death penalty unconstitutional per se for juveniles, see Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U. S. 361 (1989), and the mentally retarded, see Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U. S. 302 (1989). 7 See Arave v. Creech, 507 U. S. 463 (1993) (holding that mentally retarded capital murderers are constitutionally ineligible for death penalty", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ninfluence of sympathy,” because the claim was raised on federal habeas and a ruling for the petitioner would constitute a “new rule” of constitutional law); Boyde v. California, 494 U. S. 370 (1990) (upholding death sentence where jurors reasonably may have believed that they could not consider the defendant’s mitigating evidence regarding his character and background); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U. S. 639 (1990) (affirming placement upon the defendant of the burden to establish mitigating circumstances sufficient to call for leniency). The Court has also refused to hold the death penalty unconstitutional per se for juveniles, see Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U. S. 361 (1989), and the mentally retarded, see Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U. S. 302 (1989). 7 See Arave v. Creech, 507 U. S. 463 (1993) (holding that an idaho statute as interpreted by the idaho supreme court which authorizes the death penalty for those murderers who have displayed utter disregard for human life genuinely narrows the class of deatheligible defendants", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ninfluence of sympathy,” because the claim was raised on federal habeas and a ruling for the petitioner would constitute a “new rule” of constitutional law); Boyde v. California, 494 U. S. 370 (1990) (upholding death sentence where jurors reasonably may have believed that they could not consider the defendant’s mitigating evidence regarding his character and background); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U. S. 639 (1990) (affirming placement upon the defendant of the burden to establish mitigating circumstances sufficient to call for leniency). The Court has also refused to hold the death penalty unconstitutional per se for juveniles, see Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U. S. 361 (1989), and the mentally retarded, see Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U. S. 302 (1989). 7 See Arave v. Creech, 507 U. S. 463 (1993) (holding that leaning towards the death penalty is not the same as an automatic vote for the death penalty", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ninfluence of sympathy,” because the claim was raised on federal habeas and a ruling for the petitioner would constitute a “new rule” of constitutional law); Boyde v. California, 494 U. S. 370 (1990) (upholding death sentence where jurors reasonably may have believed that they could not consider the defendant’s mitigating evidence regarding his character and background); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U. S. 639 (1990) (affirming placement upon the defendant of the burden to establish mitigating circumstances sufficient to call for leniency). The Court has also refused to hold the death penalty unconstitutional per se for juveniles, see Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U. S. 361 (1989), and the mentally retarded, see Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U. S. 302 (1989). 7 See Arave v. Creech, 507 U. S. 463 (1993) (holding that aggravating circumstance of utter disregard for human life was not facially invalid when construed by state supreme court to refer to coldblooded pitiless slayer", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ninfluence of sympathy,” because the claim was raised on federal habeas and a ruling for the petitioner would constitute a “new rule” of constitutional law); Boyde v. California, 494 U. S. 370 (1990) (upholding death sentence where jurors reasonably may have believed that they could not consider the defendant’s mitigating evidence regarding his character and background); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U. S. 639 (1990) (affirming placement upon the defendant of the burden to establish mitigating circumstances sufficient to call for leniency). The Court has also refused to hold the death penalty unconstitutional per se for juveniles, see Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U. S. 361 (1989), and the mentally retarded, see Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U. S. 302 (1989). 7 See Arave v. Creech, 507 U. S. 463 (1993) (holding that the death penalty is unconstitutional as applied to juvenile defendants" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nunfair, or improper means; and (iv) the defendants’ acts injured the relationship.” Scutti Enters., LLC. v. Park Place Entm’t Corp., 322 F.3d 211, 215 (2d Cir.2003). Counterclaim 4 simply recites the elements of a claim for tortious interference with prospective business relations . without alleging facts to support this claim. Importantly, it fails to identify the business relationships and third parties to those relationships on which the claim is based. It fails to set forth any facts regarding the “improper, deceptive, illegal or fraudulent conduct” in which Plaintiff and Counter-Defendants engaged. Such conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a claim. See Advanced Global Tech. LLC v. Sirius Satellite Radio, Inc., 15 Misc.3d 776, 836 N.Y.S.2d 807, 812 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.2007) (holding that plaintiffs conclusory allegations were insufficient to make out prima facie case for mere department status of foreign corporation defendant", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nunfair, or improper means; and (iv) the defendants’ acts injured the relationship.” Scutti Enters., LLC. v. Park Place Entm’t Corp., 322 F.3d 211, 215 (2d Cir.2003). Counterclaim 4 simply recites the elements of a claim for tortious interference with prospective business relations . without alleging facts to support this claim. Importantly, it fails to identify the business relationships and third parties to those relationships on which the claim is based. It fails to set forth any facts regarding the “improper, deceptive, illegal or fraudulent conduct” in which Plaintiff and Counter-Defendants engaged. Such conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a claim. See Advanced Global Tech. LLC v. Sirius Satellite Radio, Inc., 15 Misc.3d 776, 836 N.Y.S.2d 807, 812 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.2007) (holding that plaintiffs allegations that defendant engaged in coercive business practices without justification entirely out of malice and without normal economic selfinterest were conclusory and thus insufficient to state a claim", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nunfair, or improper means; and (iv) the defendants’ acts injured the relationship.” Scutti Enters., LLC. v. Park Place Entm’t Corp., 322 F.3d 211, 215 (2d Cir.2003). Counterclaim 4 simply recites the elements of a claim for tortious interference with prospective business relations . without alleging facts to support this claim. Importantly, it fails to identify the business relationships and third parties to those relationships on which the claim is based. It fails to set forth any facts regarding the “improper, deceptive, illegal or fraudulent conduct” in which Plaintiff and Counter-Defendants engaged. Such conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a claim. See Advanced Global Tech. LLC v. Sirius Satellite Radio, Inc., 15 Misc.3d 776, 836 N.Y.S.2d 807, 812 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.2007) (holding that allegations against nondiverse defendants must be factual not conclusory because conclusory allegations do not state a claim", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nunfair, or improper means; and (iv) the defendants’ acts injured the relationship.” Scutti Enters., LLC. v. Park Place Entm’t Corp., 322 F.3d 211, 215 (2d Cir.2003). Counterclaim 4 simply recites the elements of a claim for tortious interference with prospective business relations . without alleging facts to support this claim. Importantly, it fails to identify the business relationships and third parties to those relationships on which the claim is based. It fails to set forth any facts regarding the “improper, deceptive, illegal or fraudulent conduct” in which Plaintiff and Counter-Defendants engaged. Such conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a claim. See Advanced Global Tech. LLC v. Sirius Satellite Radio, Inc., 15 Misc.3d 776, 836 N.Y.S.2d 807, 812 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.2007) (holding that conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments are insufficient to state a claim on which relief can be based citations omitted", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nunfair, or improper means; and (iv) the defendants’ acts injured the relationship.” Scutti Enters., LLC. v. Park Place Entm’t Corp., 322 F.3d 211, 215 (2d Cir.2003). Counterclaim 4 simply recites the elements of a claim for tortious interference with prospective business relations . without alleging facts to support this claim. Importantly, it fails to identify the business relationships and third parties to those relationships on which the claim is based. It fails to set forth any facts regarding the “improper, deceptive, illegal or fraudulent conduct” in which Plaintiff and Counter-Defendants engaged. Such conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a claim. See Advanced Global Tech. LLC v. Sirius Satellite Radio, Inc., 15 Misc.3d 776, 836 N.Y.S.2d 807, 812 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.2007) (holding that conclusory allegations that defendant used coercive business practices to intentionally interfere with business relations was insufficient to state a claim" ]