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[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndenial of the early retirees' claims. MATTHEWS, Justice, not participating. 1 . AS 39.35.150(a) (1977). 2 . Id. 3 . Former AS 39.35.150 (1974). 4 . Former AS 39.35.150(a) (1974) (emphasis added). 5 . Former AS 39.35.150(b) (1974). 6 . Former AS 39.35.680(1) (1960). The definition now appears in AS 39.35.680(2) and is substantively the same, but has been retitled \"actuarial adjustment.\" 7 . The State of Alaska Public Employees Retirement System Board adopted this interpretation in its November 1980 decision, In the Matter of the Appeal of Walter L. Kubley. 8 . Hammond v. Hoffbeck, 627 P.2d 1052, 1056-57 (Alaska 1981); see also Sheffield v. Alaska Pub. Employees' Ass'n, Inc., 732 P.2d 1083, 1085 (Alaska 1987). 9 . Hammond, 627 P.2d at 1056, 1057; see also Sheffield, 732 P.2d at 1085 (holding that the state cannot make changes to the retirement system that will diminish a members benefits without providing an offsetting advantage", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndenial of the early retirees' claims. MATTHEWS, Justice, not participating. 1 . AS 39.35.150(a) (1977). 2 . Id. 3 . Former AS 39.35.150 (1974). 4 . Former AS 39.35.150(a) (1974) (emphasis added). 5 . Former AS 39.35.150(b) (1974). 6 . Former AS 39.35.680(1) (1960). The definition now appears in AS 39.35.680(2) and is substantively the same, but has been retitled \"actuarial adjustment.\" 7 . The State of Alaska Public Employees Retirement System Board adopted this interpretation in its November 1980 decision, In the Matter of the Appeal of Walter L. Kubley. 8 . Hammond v. Hoffbeck, 627 P.2d 1052, 1056-57 (Alaska 1981); see also Sheffield v. Alaska Pub. Employees' Ass'n, Inc., 732 P.2d 1083, 1085 (Alaska 1987). 9 . Hammond, 627 P.2d at 1056, 1057; see also Sheffield, 732 P.2d at 1085 (holding in postamendment case that offsetting social security retirement benefits against permanent total disability payments rationally related to reducing wagereplacement benefits for retired workers", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndenial of the early retirees' claims. MATTHEWS, Justice, not participating. 1 . AS 39.35.150(a) (1977). 2 . Id. 3 . Former AS 39.35.150 (1974). 4 . Former AS 39.35.150(a) (1974) (emphasis added). 5 . Former AS 39.35.150(b) (1974). 6 . Former AS 39.35.680(1) (1960). The definition now appears in AS 39.35.680(2) and is substantively the same, but has been retitled \"actuarial adjustment.\" 7 . The State of Alaska Public Employees Retirement System Board adopted this interpretation in its November 1980 decision, In the Matter of the Appeal of Walter L. Kubley. 8 . Hammond v. Hoffbeck, 627 P.2d 1052, 1056-57 (Alaska 1981); see also Sheffield v. Alaska Pub. Employees' Ass'n, Inc., 732 P.2d 1083, 1085 (Alaska 1987). 9 . Hammond, 627 P.2d at 1056, 1057; see also Sheffield, 732 P.2d at 1085 (holding that an employees claim for breach of a letter agreement was preempted by erisa where the agreement did not specify the amount or other terms of the employees retirement benefits and the court would have to refer to the employers erisagoverned retirement plan to determine the employees retirement benefits and calculate the damages claimed", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndenial of the early retirees' claims. MATTHEWS, Justice, not participating. 1 . AS 39.35.150(a) (1977). 2 . Id. 3 . Former AS 39.35.150 (1974). 4 . Former AS 39.35.150(a) (1974) (emphasis added). 5 . Former AS 39.35.150(b) (1974). 6 . Former AS 39.35.680(1) (1960). The definition now appears in AS 39.35.680(2) and is substantively the same, but has been retitled \"actuarial adjustment.\" 7 . The State of Alaska Public Employees Retirement System Board adopted this interpretation in its November 1980 decision, In the Matter of the Appeal of Walter L. Kubley. 8 . Hammond v. Hoffbeck, 627 P.2d 1052, 1056-57 (Alaska 1981); see also Sheffield v. Alaska Pub. Employees' Ass'n, Inc., 732 P.2d 1083, 1085 (Alaska 1987). 9 . Hammond, 627 P.2d at 1056, 1057; see also Sheffield, 732 P.2d at 1085 (holding that retirement benefits are accrued benefits under erisa", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndenial of the early retirees' claims. MATTHEWS, Justice, not participating. 1 . AS 39.35.150(a) (1977). 2 . Id. 3 . Former AS 39.35.150 (1974). 4 . Former AS 39.35.150(a) (1974) (emphasis added). 5 . Former AS 39.35.150(b) (1974). 6 . Former AS 39.35.680(1) (1960). The definition now appears in AS 39.35.680(2) and is substantively the same, but has been retitled \"actuarial adjustment.\" 7 . The State of Alaska Public Employees Retirement System Board adopted this interpretation in its November 1980 decision, In the Matter of the Appeal of Walter L. Kubley. 8 . Hammond v. Hoffbeck, 627 P.2d 1052, 1056-57 (Alaska 1981); see also Sheffield v. Alaska Pub. Employees' Ass'n, Inc., 732 P.2d 1083, 1085 (Alaska 1987). 9 . Hammond, 627 P.2d at 1056, 1057; see also Sheffield, 732 P.2d at 1085 (holding that military retirement benefits are current pay and thus significantly different than other retirement benefits" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nage at the time (Gibbs Dep. at 18), it is possible that he was merely relating his own experiences about his ability to heal post-injury. See MacDonald v. United Parcel Serv., 430 Fed.Appx. 453, 460 (6th Cir.2011) (“MacDonald testified that Bowen told him to ‘move your old ass’ during the contentious events of January 25, 2007, but Bowen is only three years younger than MacDonald, so even viewed in the light most favorable to MacDonald, this statement does little for him.”). And the comment was accompanied by Ilardi’s advice that exercise would be good for Gibbs’ healing. (Id. at 37.) In this context, the comment does not require the conclusion that Ilardi harbored discriminatory feelings towards workers over fifty. Cf. Phelps v. Yale Sec., Inc., 986 F.2d 1020, 1025-26 (6th Cir.1993) (holding that the defendants comment that the plaintiffs upcoming fiftyfifth birthday was a cause for concern was too ambiguous to give rise to an inference of age discrimination and therefore was not direct evidence", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nage at the time (Gibbs Dep. at 18), it is possible that he was merely relating his own experiences about his ability to heal post-injury. See MacDonald v. United Parcel Serv., 430 Fed.Appx. 453, 460 (6th Cir.2011) (“MacDonald testified that Bowen told him to ‘move your old ass’ during the contentious events of January 25, 2007, but Bowen is only three years younger than MacDonald, so even viewed in the light most favorable to MacDonald, this statement does little for him.”). And the comment was accompanied by Ilardi’s advice that exercise would be good for Gibbs’ healing. (Id. at 37.) In this context, the comment does not require the conclusion that Ilardi harbored discriminatory feelings towards workers over fifty. Cf. Phelps v. Yale Sec., Inc., 986 F.2d 1020, 1025-26 (6th Cir.1993) (holding that a prima facie case for discrimination requires the plaintiff to show that 1 he belongs to the protected age group 2 his job performance was satisfactory 3 adverse employment action was taken against him in 4 circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination ", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nage at the time (Gibbs Dep. at 18), it is possible that he was merely relating his own experiences about his ability to heal post-injury. See MacDonald v. United Parcel Serv., 430 Fed.Appx. 453, 460 (6th Cir.2011) (“MacDonald testified that Bowen told him to ‘move your old ass’ during the contentious events of January 25, 2007, but Bowen is only three years younger than MacDonald, so even viewed in the light most favorable to MacDonald, this statement does little for him.”). And the comment was accompanied by Ilardi’s advice that exercise would be good for Gibbs’ healing. (Id. at 37.) In this context, the comment does not require the conclusion that Ilardi harbored discriminatory feelings towards workers over fifty. Cf. Phelps v. Yale Sec., Inc., 986 F.2d 1020, 1025-26 (6th Cir.1993) (holding that the hiring and firing of an employee by the same actor within a period of a few years gives rise to an inference that age discrimination was not the motive behind the termination", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nage at the time (Gibbs Dep. at 18), it is possible that he was merely relating his own experiences about his ability to heal post-injury. See MacDonald v. United Parcel Serv., 430 Fed.Appx. 453, 460 (6th Cir.2011) (“MacDonald testified that Bowen told him to ‘move your old ass’ during the contentious events of January 25, 2007, but Bowen is only three years younger than MacDonald, so even viewed in the light most favorable to MacDonald, this statement does little for him.”). And the comment was accompanied by Ilardi’s advice that exercise would be good for Gibbs’ healing. (Id. at 37.) In this context, the comment does not require the conclusion that Ilardi harbored discriminatory feelings towards workers over fifty. Cf. Phelps v. Yale Sec., Inc., 986 F.2d 1020, 1025-26 (6th Cir.1993) (holding that a statement of fact relating to the plaintiffs age was not direct evidence of age discrimination because the relevance of the comment is provided by inference", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nage at the time (Gibbs Dep. at 18), it is possible that he was merely relating his own experiences about his ability to heal post-injury. See MacDonald v. United Parcel Serv., 430 Fed.Appx. 453, 460 (6th Cir.2011) (“MacDonald testified that Bowen told him to ‘move your old ass’ during the contentious events of January 25, 2007, but Bowen is only three years younger than MacDonald, so even viewed in the light most favorable to MacDonald, this statement does little for him.”). And the comment was accompanied by Ilardi’s advice that exercise would be good for Gibbs’ healing. (Id. at 37.) In this context, the comment does not require the conclusion that Ilardi harbored discriminatory feelings towards workers over fifty. Cf. Phelps v. Yale Sec., Inc., 986 F.2d 1020, 1025-26 (6th Cir.1993) (holding in age discrimination case that plaintiffs dismissal did not give rise to an inference of discrimination when job was subsequently offered to an older individual" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nprotest pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1515(b). Pl.’s Opp’n at 4. However, such a request cannot cure a timing defect in the underlying protest. For Plaintiff’s claim to be within the Court’s jurisdiction, the referenced protest must first be filed in accordance with 19 U.S.C. § 1514. As Plaintiff’s protest was untimely, Plaintiff’s subsequent request for accelerated disposition could not revive it. The Court therefore holds that the protest dated February 6, 1995, was untimely and improperly filed. Moreover, Plaintiff’s subsequent acts failed to cure or amend its original protest. Because Plaintiff failed to file a valid protest, Customs’ decisions are final and this Court lacks jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a). New Zealand Lamb Co. v. United States, 40 F.3d 377, 380 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding that refusal by customs officials to reliquidate entries became final and conclusive upon the importer when it failed to file a protest within the previously mandated sixtyday limitations period", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nprotest pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1515(b). Pl.’s Opp’n at 4. However, such a request cannot cure a timing defect in the underlying protest. For Plaintiff’s claim to be within the Court’s jurisdiction, the referenced protest must first be filed in accordance with 19 U.S.C. § 1514. As Plaintiff’s protest was untimely, Plaintiff’s subsequent request for accelerated disposition could not revive it. The Court therefore holds that the protest dated February 6, 1995, was untimely and improperly filed. Moreover, Plaintiff’s subsequent acts failed to cure or amend its original protest. Because Plaintiff failed to file a valid protest, Customs’ decisions are final and this Court lacks jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a). New Zealand Lamb Co. v. United States, 40 F.3d 377, 380 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding that the ninetyday time period under the federal rule is not triggered unless a formal suggestion of death is made on the record regardless of whether the parties have knowledge of a partys death and that mere reference to a partys death in court proceedings or pleadings is not sufficient to trigger the limitations period for filing a motion for substitution", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nprotest pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1515(b). Pl.’s Opp’n at 4. However, such a request cannot cure a timing defect in the underlying protest. For Plaintiff’s claim to be within the Court’s jurisdiction, the referenced protest must first be filed in accordance with 19 U.S.C. § 1514. As Plaintiff’s protest was untimely, Plaintiff’s subsequent request for accelerated disposition could not revive it. The Court therefore holds that the protest dated February 6, 1995, was untimely and improperly filed. Moreover, Plaintiff’s subsequent acts failed to cure or amend its original protest. Because Plaintiff failed to file a valid protest, Customs’ decisions are final and this Court lacks jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a). New Zealand Lamb Co. v. United States, 40 F.3d 377, 380 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding that although the jurisdiction limitation also works to make decisions final and conclusive upon the government unless it acts to revise them within the limitations period there was no such decision that triggered the ninetyday period and consequently a failure to invoke jurisdiction", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nprotest pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1515(b). Pl.’s Opp’n at 4. However, such a request cannot cure a timing defect in the underlying protest. For Plaintiff’s claim to be within the Court’s jurisdiction, the referenced protest must first be filed in accordance with 19 U.S.C. § 1514. As Plaintiff’s protest was untimely, Plaintiff’s subsequent request for accelerated disposition could not revive it. The Court therefore holds that the protest dated February 6, 1995, was untimely and improperly filed. Moreover, Plaintiff’s subsequent acts failed to cure or amend its original protest. Because Plaintiff failed to file a valid protest, Customs’ decisions are final and this Court lacks jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a). New Zealand Lamb Co. v. United States, 40 F.3d 377, 380 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding that the charge was timely when filed within the statute of limitations period even though served after the period", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nprotest pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1515(b). Pl.’s Opp’n at 4. However, such a request cannot cure a timing defect in the underlying protest. For Plaintiff’s claim to be within the Court’s jurisdiction, the referenced protest must first be filed in accordance with 19 U.S.C. § 1514. As Plaintiff’s protest was untimely, Plaintiff’s subsequent request for accelerated disposition could not revive it. The Court therefore holds that the protest dated February 6, 1995, was untimely and improperly filed. Moreover, Plaintiff’s subsequent acts failed to cure or amend its original protest. Because Plaintiff failed to file a valid protest, Customs’ decisions are final and this Court lacks jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a). New Zealand Lamb Co. v. United States, 40 F.3d 377, 380 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding that the courts jurisdiction is limited to the appeal of final board decisions that are adverse to the claimant" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nS.Ct. 1362. Indeed, the Supreme Court stated in a decision five years before Garner that “the focus of the ex post facto inquiry is not on whether a legislative change produces some ambiguous sort of ‘disadvantage,’ ... but on whether any such change ... increases the penalty by which a crime is punishable.” California Dep’t of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 506 n. 3, 115 S.Ct. 1597, 131 L.Ed.2d 588 (1995). This approach has been taken by a number of other courts in the wake of Garner as well. See, e.g., Henderson, 260 F.3d at 1217 (“[Petitioner] could still prevail upon a showing that ... a ty for the proposition that parole guidelines cannot be considered “laws” for purpose of the Ex Post Facto Clause). But see Fletcher v. District of Columbia, 391 F.3d 250, 251 (D.C.Cir.2004) (holding that the federal parole guidelines at issue were not laws within meaning of ex post facto clause", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nS.Ct. 1362. Indeed, the Supreme Court stated in a decision five years before Garner that “the focus of the ex post facto inquiry is not on whether a legislative change produces some ambiguous sort of ‘disadvantage,’ ... but on whether any such change ... increases the penalty by which a crime is punishable.” California Dep’t of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 506 n. 3, 115 S.Ct. 1597, 131 L.Ed.2d 588 (1995). This approach has been taken by a number of other courts in the wake of Garner as well. See, e.g., Henderson, 260 F.3d at 1217 (“[Petitioner] could still prevail upon a showing that ... a ty for the proposition that parole guidelines cannot be considered “laws” for purpose of the Ex Post Facto Clause). But see Fletcher v. District of Columbia, 391 F.3d 250, 251 (D.C.Cir.2004) (holding that the ex post facto clause has no application to deportation", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nS.Ct. 1362. Indeed, the Supreme Court stated in a decision five years before Garner that “the focus of the ex post facto inquiry is not on whether a legislative change produces some ambiguous sort of ‘disadvantage,’ ... but on whether any such change ... increases the penalty by which a crime is punishable.” California Dep’t of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 506 n. 3, 115 S.Ct. 1597, 131 L.Ed.2d 588 (1995). This approach has been taken by a number of other courts in the wake of Garner as well. See, e.g., Henderson, 260 F.3d at 1217 (“[Petitioner] could still prevail upon a showing that ... a ty for the proposition that parole guidelines cannot be considered “laws” for purpose of the Ex Post Facto Clause). But see Fletcher v. District of Columbia, 391 F.3d 250, 251 (D.C.Cir.2004) (holding that parole guidelines are subject to the ex post facto clause", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nS.Ct. 1362. Indeed, the Supreme Court stated in a decision five years before Garner that “the focus of the ex post facto inquiry is not on whether a legislative change produces some ambiguous sort of ‘disadvantage,’ ... but on whether any such change ... increases the penalty by which a crime is punishable.” California Dep’t of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 506 n. 3, 115 S.Ct. 1597, 131 L.Ed.2d 588 (1995). This approach has been taken by a number of other courts in the wake of Garner as well. See, e.g., Henderson, 260 F.3d at 1217 (“[Petitioner] could still prevail upon a showing that ... a ty for the proposition that parole guidelines cannot be considered “laws” for purpose of the Ex Post Facto Clause). But see Fletcher v. District of Columbia, 391 F.3d 250, 251 (D.C.Cir.2004) (holding that use of the guidelines in effect at time of sentencing does not violate ex post facto clause after booker", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nS.Ct. 1362. Indeed, the Supreme Court stated in a decision five years before Garner that “the focus of the ex post facto inquiry is not on whether a legislative change produces some ambiguous sort of ‘disadvantage,’ ... but on whether any such change ... increases the penalty by which a crime is punishable.” California Dep’t of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 506 n. 3, 115 S.Ct. 1597, 131 L.Ed.2d 588 (1995). This approach has been taken by a number of other courts in the wake of Garner as well. See, e.g., Henderson, 260 F.3d at 1217 (“[Petitioner] could still prevail upon a showing that ... a ty for the proposition that parole guidelines cannot be considered “laws” for purpose of the Ex Post Facto Clause). But see Fletcher v. District of Columbia, 391 F.3d 250, 251 (D.C.Cir.2004) (holding that the supreme courts ex post facto precedents do not clearly establish that amended section 29336 violates the ex post facto clause" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992), or unless the IJ ignored probative evidence, an important possible inference or otherwise failed to make a reasoned analysis of the evidence before her as a whole, Apouviepseakoda v. Gonzales, 475 F.3d 881, 890 (7th Cir.2007); Hanaj v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 694, 700 (7th Cir.2006); Iao v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 530, 533 (7th Cir.2005). To show that he is entitled to asylum, withholding of removal or CAT relief, Adekpe must show at a minimum that he is unable or unwilling to return to Togo because of persecution or a'well-founded fear of persecution on account of a political opinion, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42)(A) & 1158(b)(1)(A) (discussing asylum); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 424-25,104 S.Ct. 2489, 81 L.Ed.2d 321 (1984) (holding that the standard for withholding of removal is a showing that it is more likely than not that a petitioner will face persecution upon her return", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992), or unless the IJ ignored probative evidence, an important possible inference or otherwise failed to make a reasoned analysis of the evidence before her as a whole, Apouviepseakoda v. Gonzales, 475 F.3d 881, 890 (7th Cir.2007); Hanaj v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 694, 700 (7th Cir.2006); Iao v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 530, 533 (7th Cir.2005). To show that he is entitled to asylum, withholding of removal or CAT relief, Adekpe must show at a minimum that he is unable or unwilling to return to Togo because of persecution or a'well-founded fear of persecution on account of a political opinion, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42)(A) & 1158(b)(1)(A) (discussing asylum); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 424-25,104 S.Ct. 2489, 81 L.Ed.2d 321 (1984) (holding that an applicant who fails to satisfy the lower standard of proof for asylum necessarily fails to satisfy the more stringent standard for withholding of removal", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992), or unless the IJ ignored probative evidence, an important possible inference or otherwise failed to make a reasoned analysis of the evidence before her as a whole, Apouviepseakoda v. Gonzales, 475 F.3d 881, 890 (7th Cir.2007); Hanaj v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 694, 700 (7th Cir.2006); Iao v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 530, 533 (7th Cir.2005). To show that he is entitled to asylum, withholding of removal or CAT relief, Adekpe must show at a minimum that he is unable or unwilling to return to Togo because of persecution or a'well-founded fear of persecution on account of a political opinion, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42)(A) & 1158(b)(1)(A) (discussing asylum); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 424-25,104 S.Ct. 2489, 81 L.Ed.2d 321 (1984) (holding that the clear probability standard for withholding of removal is higher than the standard for asylum which requires only a reasonable possibility of persecution", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992), or unless the IJ ignored probative evidence, an important possible inference or otherwise failed to make a reasoned analysis of the evidence before her as a whole, Apouviepseakoda v. Gonzales, 475 F.3d 881, 890 (7th Cir.2007); Hanaj v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 694, 700 (7th Cir.2006); Iao v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 530, 533 (7th Cir.2005). To show that he is entitled to asylum, withholding of removal or CAT relief, Adekpe must show at a minimum that he is unable or unwilling to return to Togo because of persecution or a'well-founded fear of persecution on account of a political opinion, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42)(A) & 1158(b)(1)(A) (discussing asylum); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 424-25,104 S.Ct. 2489, 81 L.Ed.2d 321 (1984) (holding that the standard for withholding of removal is more demanding than the standard for asylum", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992), or unless the IJ ignored probative evidence, an important possible inference or otherwise failed to make a reasoned analysis of the evidence before her as a whole, Apouviepseakoda v. Gonzales, 475 F.3d 881, 890 (7th Cir.2007); Hanaj v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 694, 700 (7th Cir.2006); Iao v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 530, 533 (7th Cir.2005). To show that he is entitled to asylum, withholding of removal or CAT relief, Adekpe must show at a minimum that he is unable or unwilling to return to Togo because of persecution or a'well-founded fear of persecution on account of a political opinion, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42)(A) & 1158(b)(1)(A) (discussing asylum); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 424-25,104 S.Ct. 2489, 81 L.Ed.2d 321 (1984) (holding that the asylum standard for past persecution or wellfounded fear of future persecution is lower than the clear probability standard to show eligibility for withholding of removal" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nhe feared that he would be harmed if returned to Cóte d’Ivoire because of his former involvement with t that military forces continued to look for him or have any interest in harming him after 2005, or that former UDPCI members continued to face harm. Thus, given that Attobra did not provide any objective evidence that authorities in Cote d’Ivoire continued to look for him or have any interest in him, the agency reasonably concluded that Attobra failed to establish the requisite objective likelihood of future harm. See Jian Xing Huang v. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir.2005) (finding that a fear of future persecution is not objectively reasonable if it lacks “solid support” in the record and is merely “speculative at best”); Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 135, 142 (2d Cir.2008) (holding that to establish asylum eligibility based on future persecution an applicant must show that he or she subjectively fears persecution and that this fear is objectively reasonable", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nhe feared that he would be harmed if returned to Cóte d’Ivoire because of his former involvement with t that military forces continued to look for him or have any interest in harming him after 2005, or that former UDPCI members continued to face harm. Thus, given that Attobra did not provide any objective evidence that authorities in Cote d’Ivoire continued to look for him or have any interest in him, the agency reasonably concluded that Attobra failed to establish the requisite objective likelihood of future harm. See Jian Xing Huang v. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir.2005) (finding that a fear of future persecution is not objectively reasonable if it lacks “solid support” in the record and is merely “speculative at best”); Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 135, 142 (2d Cir.2008) (holding that a showing of past persecution creates a rebuttable presumption of future persecution", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nhe feared that he would be harmed if returned to Cóte d’Ivoire because of his former involvement with t that military forces continued to look for him or have any interest in harming him after 2005, or that former UDPCI members continued to face harm. Thus, given that Attobra did not provide any objective evidence that authorities in Cote d’Ivoire continued to look for him or have any interest in him, the agency reasonably concluded that Attobra failed to establish the requisite objective likelihood of future harm. See Jian Xing Huang v. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir.2005) (finding that a fear of future persecution is not objectively reasonable if it lacks “solid support” in the record and is merely “speculative at best”); Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 135, 142 (2d Cir.2008) (holding that absent past persecution an alien can demonstrate eligibility for asylum based on a wellfounded fear of future persecution by demonstrating that he or she subjectively fears persecution and that this fear is objectively reasonable", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nhe feared that he would be harmed if returned to Cóte d’Ivoire because of his former involvement with t that military forces continued to look for him or have any interest in harming him after 2005, or that former UDPCI members continued to face harm. Thus, given that Attobra did not provide any objective evidence that authorities in Cote d’Ivoire continued to look for him or have any interest in him, the agency reasonably concluded that Attobra failed to establish the requisite objective likelihood of future harm. See Jian Xing Huang v. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir.2005) (finding that a fear of future persecution is not objectively reasonable if it lacks “solid support” in the record and is merely “speculative at best”); Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 135, 142 (2d Cir.2008) (holding that absent a pattern of persecution linked to the applicant persecution of family members is insufficient to demonstrate a wellfounded fear of persecution", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nhe feared that he would be harmed if returned to Cóte d’Ivoire because of his former involvement with t that military forces continued to look for him or have any interest in harming him after 2005, or that former UDPCI members continued to face harm. Thus, given that Attobra did not provide any objective evidence that authorities in Cote d’Ivoire continued to look for him or have any interest in him, the agency reasonably concluded that Attobra failed to establish the requisite objective likelihood of future harm. See Jian Xing Huang v. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir.2005) (finding that a fear of future persecution is not objectively reasonable if it lacks “solid support” in the record and is merely “speculative at best”); Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 135, 142 (2d Cir.2008) (holding that to show an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution an applicant must establish that he would be singled out for persecution or that there was a pattern or practice of persecution of similarlysituated individuals" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nconstitute ineffective assistance of counsel); Boag v. Raines, 769 F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir.1985) (same). Valdez next argues that his appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to challenge the district court’s sentence enhancements under U.S.S.G. §§ 2D1.1(b)(1) (firearm possession) and 3B1.1 (leader/organizer). However, the record overwhelmingly supports a finding that Valdez was a leader and/or organizer of the conspiracy, thereby qualifying him for an enhancement under § 3B1.1. And according to the testimony of a co-conspirator, Valdez possessed a firearm during the commission of the conspiracy and it was not “clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense.” § 2D1.1 cmt. n. 3; see also United States v. Willard, 919 F.2d 606, 609 (9th Cir.1990) (holding that the court cannot examine the underlying merits of the claims in determining whether to certify a class", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nconstitute ineffective assistance of counsel); Boag v. Raines, 769 F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir.1985) (same). Valdez next argues that his appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to challenge the district court’s sentence enhancements under U.S.S.G. §§ 2D1.1(b)(1) (firearm possession) and 3B1.1 (leader/organizer). However, the record overwhelmingly supports a finding that Valdez was a leader and/or organizer of the conspiracy, thereby qualifying him for an enhancement under § 3B1.1. And according to the testimony of a co-conspirator, Valdez possessed a firearm during the commission of the conspiracy and it was not “clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense.” § 2D1.1 cmt. n. 3; see also United States v. Willard, 919 F.2d 606, 609 (9th Cir.1990) (holding that a trial court has a duty to examine the entire record including all physical documentary evidence in order to reach an equitable result", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nconstitute ineffective assistance of counsel); Boag v. Raines, 769 F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir.1985) (same). Valdez next argues that his appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to challenge the district court’s sentence enhancements under U.S.S.G. §§ 2D1.1(b)(1) (firearm possession) and 3B1.1 (leader/organizer). However, the record overwhelmingly supports a finding that Valdez was a leader and/or organizer of the conspiracy, thereby qualifying him for an enhancement under § 3B1.1. And according to the testimony of a co-conspirator, Valdez possessed a firearm during the commission of the conspiracy and it was not “clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense.” § 2D1.1 cmt. n. 3; see also United States v. Willard, 919 F.2d 606, 609 (9th Cir.1990) (holding that the trial court must examine the entire course of criminal conduct in determining possession", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nconstitute ineffective assistance of counsel); Boag v. Raines, 769 F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir.1985) (same). Valdez next argues that his appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to challenge the district court’s sentence enhancements under U.S.S.G. §§ 2D1.1(b)(1) (firearm possession) and 3B1.1 (leader/organizer). However, the record overwhelmingly supports a finding that Valdez was a leader and/or organizer of the conspiracy, thereby qualifying him for an enhancement under § 3B1.1. And according to the testimony of a co-conspirator, Valdez possessed a firearm during the commission of the conspiracy and it was not “clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense.” § 2D1.1 cmt. n. 3; see also United States v. Willard, 919 F.2d 606, 609 (9th Cir.1990) (holding that for purposes of determining whether complete diversity exists a court must examine the plaintiffs pleading as of the time of the petition for removai", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nconstitute ineffective assistance of counsel); Boag v. Raines, 769 F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir.1985) (same). Valdez next argues that his appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to challenge the district court’s sentence enhancements under U.S.S.G. §§ 2D1.1(b)(1) (firearm possession) and 3B1.1 (leader/organizer). However, the record overwhelmingly supports a finding that Valdez was a leader and/or organizer of the conspiracy, thereby qualifying him for an enhancement under § 3B1.1. And according to the testimony of a co-conspirator, Valdez possessed a firearm during the commission of the conspiracy and it was not “clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense.” § 2D1.1 cmt. n. 3; see also United States v. Willard, 919 F.2d 606, 609 (9th Cir.1990) (holding that court must examine and consider the entire writing in an effort to harmonize and give effect to all the provisions of the contract so that none will be rendered meaningless" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nBahl from perusing a collection of Playboy magazines, but it may not. This condition may prohibit Bahl from attending a Karen Finley performance, but it may not. ¶56 The lawfulness of these examples depends solely on the subjective belief of the particular person charged with monitoring Bahl’s community custody. The danger is that prohibiting “sexually explicit” or “erotic” material ultimately translates into prohibiting whatever the community custody officer finds personally titillating. United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 266 (3d Cir. 2001). Erotica, like art, is found in the eye of the beholder; yet enforcement of the law cannot be predicated on the subjective belief of the enforcer. Cf. Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614, 91 S. Ct. 1686, 29 L. Ed. 2d 214 (1971) (holding unconstitutional a sexual harassment statute prohibiting conduct that alarmed or seriously annoyed the victim", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nBahl from perusing a collection of Playboy magazines, but it may not. This condition may prohibit Bahl from attending a Karen Finley performance, but it may not. ¶56 The lawfulness of these examples depends solely on the subjective belief of the particular person charged with monitoring Bahl’s community custody. The danger is that prohibiting “sexually explicit” or “erotic” material ultimately translates into prohibiting whatever the community custody officer finds personally titillating. United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 266 (3d Cir. 2001). Erotica, like art, is found in the eye of the beholder; yet enforcement of the law cannot be predicated on the subjective belief of the enforcer. Cf. Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614, 91 S. Ct. 1686, 29 L. Ed. 2d 214 (1971) (holding that attorney disciplinary rule was unconstitutionally vague as applied", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nBahl from perusing a collection of Playboy magazines, but it may not. This condition may prohibit Bahl from attending a Karen Finley performance, but it may not. ¶56 The lawfulness of these examples depends solely on the subjective belief of the particular person charged with monitoring Bahl’s community custody. The danger is that prohibiting “sexually explicit” or “erotic” material ultimately translates into prohibiting whatever the community custody officer finds personally titillating. United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 266 (3d Cir. 2001). Erotica, like art, is found in the eye of the beholder; yet enforcement of the law cannot be predicated on the subjective belief of the enforcer. Cf. Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614, 91 S. Ct. 1686, 29 L. Ed. 2d 214 (1971) (holding an ordinance was unconstitutionally vague for prohibiting conduct entirely dependent upon whether or not a policeman is annoyed", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nBahl from perusing a collection of Playboy magazines, but it may not. This condition may prohibit Bahl from attending a Karen Finley performance, but it may not. ¶56 The lawfulness of these examples depends solely on the subjective belief of the particular person charged with monitoring Bahl’s community custody. The danger is that prohibiting “sexually explicit” or “erotic” material ultimately translates into prohibiting whatever the community custody officer finds personally titillating. United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 266 (3d Cir. 2001). Erotica, like art, is found in the eye of the beholder; yet enforcement of the law cannot be predicated on the subjective belief of the enforcer. Cf. Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614, 91 S. Ct. 1686, 29 L. Ed. 2d 214 (1971) (holding factor b is not unconstitutionally vague", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nBahl from perusing a collection of Playboy magazines, but it may not. This condition may prohibit Bahl from attending a Karen Finley performance, but it may not. ¶56 The lawfulness of these examples depends solely on the subjective belief of the particular person charged with monitoring Bahl’s community custody. The danger is that prohibiting “sexually explicit” or “erotic” material ultimately translates into prohibiting whatever the community custody officer finds personally titillating. United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 266 (3d Cir. 2001). Erotica, like art, is found in the eye of the beholder; yet enforcement of the law cannot be predicated on the subjective belief of the enforcer. Cf. Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614, 91 S. Ct. 1686, 29 L. Ed. 2d 214 (1971) (holding that essentially equivalent is unconstitutionally vague" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthat Rutherford was not prejudiced by the District’s lack of notice because he received all of the benefits he otherwise would have received had the leave been designated. Defi’s Mem. Supp. 31; Dunn Dep. 37 (Dunn stated that while Rutherford was not given FMLA forms, he “was given all the rights and benefits as if [he] had been.”) This argument misses the mark in addressing Rutherford’s real concern: that he was not returned to work once he had proven himself fit to do so. Pl.’s Mem. 32. Simply put, the District’s failure to follow the FMLA notice rules, and thereby prolonging Rutherford’s reinstatement process, prejudiced Rutherford because it kept him from returning to work despite the fact that he wanted to, was fit to do so, and was entitled to do so. Cf. Ridings, 537 F.3d at 762 (holding that an employer was justified in demoting plaintiff after she returned from maternity leave because plaintiff could not rebut the employers evidence that she was having performance problems before she went on leave and that additional performance problems were discovered while she was on leave", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthat Rutherford was not prejudiced by the District’s lack of notice because he received all of the benefits he otherwise would have received had the leave been designated. Defi’s Mem. Supp. 31; Dunn Dep. 37 (Dunn stated that while Rutherford was not given FMLA forms, he “was given all the rights and benefits as if [he] had been.”) This argument misses the mark in addressing Rutherford’s real concern: that he was not returned to work once he had proven himself fit to do so. Pl.’s Mem. 32. Simply put, the District’s failure to follow the FMLA notice rules, and thereby prolonging Rutherford’s reinstatement process, prejudiced Rutherford because it kept him from returning to work despite the fact that he wanted to, was fit to do so, and was entitled to do so. Cf. Ridings, 537 F.3d at 762 (holding in the only seventh circuit case addressing prejudice in the context of failure to notice that an employee was not prejudiced because she benefitted from a reduced schedule of leave for more than a yeara schedule she wanted to keep", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthat Rutherford was not prejudiced by the District’s lack of notice because he received all of the benefits he otherwise would have received had the leave been designated. Defi’s Mem. Supp. 31; Dunn Dep. 37 (Dunn stated that while Rutherford was not given FMLA forms, he “was given all the rights and benefits as if [he] had been.”) This argument misses the mark in addressing Rutherford’s real concern: that he was not returned to work once he had proven himself fit to do so. Pl.’s Mem. 32. Simply put, the District’s failure to follow the FMLA notice rules, and thereby prolonging Rutherford’s reinstatement process, prejudiced Rutherford because it kept him from returning to work despite the fact that he wanted to, was fit to do so, and was entitled to do so. Cf. Ridings, 537 F.3d at 762 (holding that defendants decision to change the office schedule without allowing plaintiff leave to alter his personal schedule did not constitute an adverse action although plaintiff alleged that because of the schedule revisions he was forced to come in two hours early for his shift a mere inconvenience is not sufficiently adverse to sustain a prima facie case", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthat Rutherford was not prejudiced by the District’s lack of notice because he received all of the benefits he otherwise would have received had the leave been designated. Defi’s Mem. Supp. 31; Dunn Dep. 37 (Dunn stated that while Rutherford was not given FMLA forms, he “was given all the rights and benefits as if [he] had been.”) This argument misses the mark in addressing Rutherford’s real concern: that he was not returned to work once he had proven himself fit to do so. Pl.’s Mem. 32. Simply put, the District’s failure to follow the FMLA notice rules, and thereby prolonging Rutherford’s reinstatement process, prejudiced Rutherford because it kept him from returning to work despite the fact that he wanted to, was fit to do so, and was entitled to do so. Cf. Ridings, 537 F.3d at 762 (holding that a change in work schedule and request that an employee perform two additional tasks did not rise to the level of an adverse employment action", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthat Rutherford was not prejudiced by the District’s lack of notice because he received all of the benefits he otherwise would have received had the leave been designated. Defi’s Mem. Supp. 31; Dunn Dep. 37 (Dunn stated that while Rutherford was not given FMLA forms, he “was given all the rights and benefits as if [he] had been.”) This argument misses the mark in addressing Rutherford’s real concern: that he was not returned to work once he had proven himself fit to do so. Pl.’s Mem. 32. Simply put, the District’s failure to follow the FMLA notice rules, and thereby prolonging Rutherford’s reinstatement process, prejudiced Rutherford because it kept him from returning to work despite the fact that he wanted to, was fit to do so, and was entitled to do so. Cf. Ridings, 537 F.3d at 762 (holding that defendant adequately indicated to officers that she sought assistance of counsel when she stated that she wanted to call her lawyer and officer testified that request was unambiguous" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nclaim is the Agreement, Plaintiffs have not identified any other contract to which these allegations could refer. Plaintiffs argue that their claims relate to disclosures on HighBeam’s website, not in the Agreement. However, as already mentioned, Plaintiffs admit that some disclosures were made in the Agreement. (Id. ¶ 46(f).) Even if this were not the case, the First Circuit’s decision in Huffington defeats Plaintiffs’ argument. In Huffington, the plaintiff argued that his tort and statutory fraudulent misrepresentation claims did not relate to his contract with the defendant because the misrepresentations “would be actionable regardless of whether the parties executed a contract.” 637 F.3d at 22. However, as the First Circu . A. 97-12283-RGS, 1998 WL 518187 (D.Mass. Aug. 5, 1998) (holding that the forum selection clause at issue encompassed both contract and tort claims", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nclaim is the Agreement, Plaintiffs have not identified any other contract to which these allegations could refer. Plaintiffs argue that their claims relate to disclosures on HighBeam’s website, not in the Agreement. However, as already mentioned, Plaintiffs admit that some disclosures were made in the Agreement. (Id. ¶ 46(f).) Even if this were not the case, the First Circuit’s decision in Huffington defeats Plaintiffs’ argument. In Huffington, the plaintiff argued that his tort and statutory fraudulent misrepresentation claims did not relate to his contract with the defendant because the misrepresentations “would be actionable regardless of whether the parties executed a contract.” 637 F.3d at 22. However, as the First Circu . A. 97-12283-RGS, 1998 WL 518187 (D.Mass. Aug. 5, 1998) (holding that a permissive forum selection clause containing a waiver of any claims of forum non conveniens amounts to a mandatory forum selection clause at least where the plaintiff chose the designated forum", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nclaim is the Agreement, Plaintiffs have not identified any other contract to which these allegations could refer. Plaintiffs argue that their claims relate to disclosures on HighBeam’s website, not in the Agreement. However, as already mentioned, Plaintiffs admit that some disclosures were made in the Agreement. (Id. ¶ 46(f).) Even if this were not the case, the First Circuit’s decision in Huffington defeats Plaintiffs’ argument. In Huffington, the plaintiff argued that his tort and statutory fraudulent misrepresentation claims did not relate to his contract with the defendant because the misrepresentations “would be actionable regardless of whether the parties executed a contract.” 637 F.3d at 22. However, as the First Circu . A. 97-12283-RGS, 1998 WL 518187 (D.Mass. Aug. 5, 1998) (holding that a forum selection clause was not enforceable against defendants that were not parties to the contract", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nclaim is the Agreement, Plaintiffs have not identified any other contract to which these allegations could refer. Plaintiffs argue that their claims relate to disclosures on HighBeam’s website, not in the Agreement. However, as already mentioned, Plaintiffs admit that some disclosures were made in the Agreement. (Id. ¶ 46(f).) Even if this were not the case, the First Circuit’s decision in Huffington defeats Plaintiffs’ argument. In Huffington, the plaintiff argued that his tort and statutory fraudulent misrepresentation claims did not relate to his contract with the defendant because the misrepresentations “would be actionable regardless of whether the parties executed a contract.” 637 F.3d at 22. However, as the First Circu . A. 97-12283-RGS, 1998 WL 518187 (D.Mass. Aug. 5, 1998) (holding that claims were not related to a license agreement which contained a forum selection clause in part because the bulk of the claims were against a defendant who was not a party to the agreement for breaches of employment contracts which did not contain forum selection clauses and for disclosure of trade secrets", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nclaim is the Agreement, Plaintiffs have not identified any other contract to which these allegations could refer. Plaintiffs argue that their claims relate to disclosures on HighBeam’s website, not in the Agreement. However, as already mentioned, Plaintiffs admit that some disclosures were made in the Agreement. (Id. ¶ 46(f).) Even if this were not the case, the First Circuit’s decision in Huffington defeats Plaintiffs’ argument. In Huffington, the plaintiff argued that his tort and statutory fraudulent misrepresentation claims did not relate to his contract with the defendant because the misrepresentations “would be actionable regardless of whether the parties executed a contract.” 637 F.3d at 22. However, as the First Circu . A. 97-12283-RGS, 1998 WL 518187 (D.Mass. Aug. 5, 1998) (holding enforceable forum selection clauses in arbitration agreements" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nso, the Court noted Congress’s recognition of this principle in enacting the McCarran-Ferguson Act. The earlier cases cited in Todd Shipyards included Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 17 S.Ct. 427, 41 L.Ed. 832 (1897), St. Louis Cotton Compress Co. v. Arkansas, 260 U.S. 346, 43 S.Ct. 125, 67 L.Ed. 297 (1922), and Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 58 S.Ct. 436, 82 L.Ed. 673 (1938). 5 . Indeed, the Commissioner apparently has conceded that no Florida court would have personal jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ German affiliates in a case arising under the German insurance contracts now at issue. See Transcript of Summary Judgment Hearing (document 38) at 56. 6 . See, e.g., John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178, 57 S.Ct. 129, 81 L.Ed. 106 (1936) (holding that under georgia law a holder of a master insurance policy is an agent of the insurance company and not the insurer", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nso, the Court noted Congress’s recognition of this principle in enacting the McCarran-Ferguson Act. The earlier cases cited in Todd Shipyards included Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 17 S.Ct. 427, 41 L.Ed. 832 (1897), St. Louis Cotton Compress Co. v. Arkansas, 260 U.S. 346, 43 S.Ct. 125, 67 L.Ed. 297 (1922), and Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 58 S.Ct. 436, 82 L.Ed. 673 (1938). 5 . Indeed, the Commissioner apparently has conceded that no Florida court would have personal jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ German affiliates in a case arising under the German insurance contracts now at issue. See Transcript of Summary Judgment Hearing (document 38) at 56. 6 . See, e.g., John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178, 57 S.Ct. 129, 81 L.Ed. 106 (1936) (holding change of beneficiary effective where city employee listed a new beneficiary for his group life insurance policy in an employee personal data form next to the words designated beneficiary even though this did not comply with the policy terms", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nso, the Court noted Congress’s recognition of this principle in enacting the McCarran-Ferguson Act. The earlier cases cited in Todd Shipyards included Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 17 S.Ct. 427, 41 L.Ed. 832 (1897), St. Louis Cotton Compress Co. v. Arkansas, 260 U.S. 346, 43 S.Ct. 125, 67 L.Ed. 297 (1922), and Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 58 S.Ct. 436, 82 L.Ed. 673 (1938). 5 . Indeed, the Commissioner apparently has conceded that no Florida court would have personal jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ German affiliates in a case arising under the German insurance contracts now at issue. See Transcript of Summary Judgment Hearing (document 38) at 56. 6 . See, e.g., John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178, 57 S.Ct. 129, 81 L.Ed. 106 (1936) (holding a georgia law requiring a plaintiff in a direct action against an insurance company to attach a copy of the insurance policy to his complaint inapplicable because it conflicts with rule 8", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nso, the Court noted Congress’s recognition of this principle in enacting the McCarran-Ferguson Act. The earlier cases cited in Todd Shipyards included Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 17 S.Ct. 427, 41 L.Ed. 832 (1897), St. Louis Cotton Compress Co. v. Arkansas, 260 U.S. 346, 43 S.Ct. 125, 67 L.Ed. 297 (1922), and Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 58 S.Ct. 436, 82 L.Ed. 673 (1938). 5 . Indeed, the Commissioner apparently has conceded that no Florida court would have personal jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ German affiliates in a case arising under the German insurance contracts now at issue. See Transcript of Summary Judgment Hearing (document 38) at 56. 6 . See, e.g., John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178, 57 S.Ct. 129, 81 L.Ed. 106 (1936) (holding that insureds widow as beneficiary of life insurance policy had standing as an injured person under the insurance code", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nso, the Court noted Congress’s recognition of this principle in enacting the McCarran-Ferguson Act. The earlier cases cited in Todd Shipyards included Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 17 S.Ct. 427, 41 L.Ed. 832 (1897), St. Louis Cotton Compress Co. v. Arkansas, 260 U.S. 346, 43 S.Ct. 125, 67 L.Ed. 297 (1922), and Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 58 S.Ct. 436, 82 L.Ed. 673 (1938). 5 . Indeed, the Commissioner apparently has conceded that no Florida court would have personal jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ German affiliates in a case arising under the German insurance contracts now at issue. See Transcript of Summary Judgment Hearing (document 38) at 56. 6 . See, e.g., John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178, 57 S.Ct. 129, 81 L.Ed. 106 (1936) (holding that application of georgia law to dispute arising under life insurance policy issued by massachusetts insurer to new york resident violated due process clause where only georgia contact was that beneficiary moved there" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nto Complete Discovery. 2 . PL’s Compl. 120. 3 . Officer Synder is a police officer with the Philadelphia Police Department who was a deputized Federal Officer with the FBI at the time of the events giving rise to this suit. 4 . Def.’s Mots. to Compel Ex. B at 3. 5 . Pl.’s Dep. at 117. 6 . Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. at 8. 7 . In her Response to the Motion, Robinson states: \"Upon information and belief, it appears as if the government is maintaining the position that [Robinson] is permitted to testify to any and all matters relating to her conversations with the FBI.\" Pl.'s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. at 8. 8 . Def.’s Mots, to Compel Ex. B at 3. 9 . Fed.R.Civ.P. 45(a)(1)(C). 10 . Vt. Agency of Nat’l Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 780, 120 S.Ct. 1858, 146 L.Ed.2d 836 (2000) (holding that the provisions of the false claims act allowing suit imposing liability on any person who presented false claims to the federal government did not allow suits against state governments", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nto Complete Discovery. 2 . PL’s Compl. 120. 3 . Officer Synder is a police officer with the Philadelphia Police Department who was a deputized Federal Officer with the FBI at the time of the events giving rise to this suit. 4 . Def.’s Mots. to Compel Ex. B at 3. 5 . Pl.’s Dep. at 117. 6 . Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. at 8. 7 . In her Response to the Motion, Robinson states: \"Upon information and belief, it appears as if the government is maintaining the position that [Robinson] is permitted to testify to any and all matters relating to her conversations with the FBI.\" Pl.'s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. at 8. 8 . Def.’s Mots, to Compel Ex. B at 3. 9 . Fed.R.Civ.P. 45(a)(1)(C). 10 . Vt. Agency of Nat’l Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 780, 120 S.Ct. 1858, 146 L.Ed.2d 836 (2000) (holding that a state or agency is not a person subject to qui tam liability under the false claims act", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nto Complete Discovery. 2 . PL’s Compl. 120. 3 . Officer Synder is a police officer with the Philadelphia Police Department who was a deputized Federal Officer with the FBI at the time of the events giving rise to this suit. 4 . Def.’s Mots. to Compel Ex. B at 3. 5 . Pl.’s Dep. at 117. 6 . Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. at 8. 7 . In her Response to the Motion, Robinson states: \"Upon information and belief, it appears as if the government is maintaining the position that [Robinson] is permitted to testify to any and all matters relating to her conversations with the FBI.\" Pl.'s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. at 8. 8 . Def.’s Mots, to Compel Ex. B at 3. 9 . Fed.R.Civ.P. 45(a)(1)(C). 10 . Vt. Agency of Nat’l Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 780, 120 S.Ct. 1858, 146 L.Ed.2d 836 (2000) (holding that standing of a qui tam plaintiff under the false claims act requires an injury to the united states", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nto Complete Discovery. 2 . PL’s Compl. 120. 3 . Officer Synder is a police officer with the Philadelphia Police Department who was a deputized Federal Officer with the FBI at the time of the events giving rise to this suit. 4 . Def.’s Mots. to Compel Ex. B at 3. 5 . Pl.’s Dep. at 117. 6 . Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. at 8. 7 . In her Response to the Motion, Robinson states: \"Upon information and belief, it appears as if the government is maintaining the position that [Robinson] is permitted to testify to any and all matters relating to her conversations with the FBI.\" Pl.'s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. at 8. 8 . Def.’s Mots, to Compel Ex. B at 3. 9 . Fed.R.Civ.P. 45(a)(1)(C). 10 . Vt. Agency of Nat’l Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 780, 120 S.Ct. 1858, 146 L.Ed.2d 836 (2000) (holding that a state agency is not a person subject to suit under federal false claims act", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nto Complete Discovery. 2 . PL’s Compl. 120. 3 . Officer Synder is a police officer with the Philadelphia Police Department who was a deputized Federal Officer with the FBI at the time of the events giving rise to this suit. 4 . Def.’s Mots. to Compel Ex. B at 3. 5 . Pl.’s Dep. at 117. 6 . Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. at 8. 7 . In her Response to the Motion, Robinson states: \"Upon information and belief, it appears as if the government is maintaining the position that [Robinson] is permitted to testify to any and all matters relating to her conversations with the FBI.\" Pl.'s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. at 8. 8 . Def.’s Mots, to Compel Ex. B at 3. 9 . Fed.R.Civ.P. 45(a)(1)(C). 10 . Vt. Agency of Nat’l Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 780, 120 S.Ct. 1858, 146 L.Ed.2d 836 (2000) (holding that the fca effectively assigns the governments claims to qui tam plaintiffs who then may sue based upon an injury to the federal treasury" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nAllah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir.2000) (internal quotations omitted). A motion to dismiss may only be granted where the allegations fail to state any claim upon which relief can be granted. See Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir.1997). Dismissal is warranted “if it is certain that no relief can be granted under any set of facts which could be proved.” Klein v. General Nutrition Cos., Inc., 186 F.3d s Brennan and its progeny too broadly. Specifically, Hartford asserts that where a dispute centers on whether a particular policy provision is contrary to a constitutional, legislative or administrative mandate, the controversy may be subject to judicial review. See, e.g., Warner v. Continental/CNA Ins. Cos., 455 Pa.Super. 295, 688 A.2d 177, 181 (1996) (holding that where a contract containing an arbitration clause is challenged as unconscionable those disputes should first be resolved by an arbitrator", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nAllah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir.2000) (internal quotations omitted). A motion to dismiss may only be granted where the allegations fail to state any claim upon which relief can be granted. See Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir.1997). Dismissal is warranted “if it is certain that no relief can be granted under any set of facts which could be proved.” Klein v. General Nutrition Cos., Inc., 186 F.3d s Brennan and its progeny too broadly. Specifically, Hartford asserts that where a dispute centers on whether a particular policy provision is contrary to a constitutional, legislative or administrative mandate, the controversy may be subject to judicial review. See, e.g., Warner v. Continental/CNA Ins. Cos., 455 Pa.Super. 295, 688 A.2d 177, 181 (1996) (recognizing general rule", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nAllah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir.2000) (internal quotations omitted). A motion to dismiss may only be granted where the allegations fail to state any claim upon which relief can be granted. See Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir.1997). Dismissal is warranted “if it is certain that no relief can be granted under any set of facts which could be proved.” Klein v. General Nutrition Cos., Inc., 186 F.3d s Brennan and its progeny too broadly. Specifically, Hartford asserts that where a dispute centers on whether a particular policy provision is contrary to a constitutional, legislative or administrative mandate, the controversy may be subject to judicial review. See, e.g., Warner v. Continental/CNA Ins. Cos., 455 Pa.Super. 295, 688 A.2d 177, 181 (1996) (recognizing exception to general rule that disputes arising under contract with valid arbitration clause are referred to arbitrator", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nAllah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir.2000) (internal quotations omitted). A motion to dismiss may only be granted where the allegations fail to state any claim upon which relief can be granted. See Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir.1997). Dismissal is warranted “if it is certain that no relief can be granted under any set of facts which could be proved.” Klein v. General Nutrition Cos., Inc., 186 F.3d s Brennan and its progeny too broadly. Specifically, Hartford asserts that where a dispute centers on whether a particular policy provision is contrary to a constitutional, legislative or administrative mandate, the controversy may be subject to judicial review. See, e.g., Warner v. Continental/CNA Ins. Cos., 455 Pa.Super. 295, 688 A.2d 177, 181 (1996) (holding that an arbitrator not a federal or state court will resolve questions concerning validity in the first instance when parties agree to arbitrate all disputes arising under their contract", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nAllah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir.2000) (internal quotations omitted). A motion to dismiss may only be granted where the allegations fail to state any claim upon which relief can be granted. See Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir.1997). Dismissal is warranted “if it is certain that no relief can be granted under any set of facts which could be proved.” Klein v. General Nutrition Cos., Inc., 186 F.3d s Brennan and its progeny too broadly. Specifically, Hartford asserts that where a dispute centers on whether a particular policy provision is contrary to a constitutional, legislative or administrative mandate, the controversy may be subject to judicial review. See, e.g., Warner v. Continental/CNA Ins. Cos., 455 Pa.Super. 295, 688 A.2d 177, 181 (1996) (holding defenses concerning the contract as a whole must be referred to ah arbitrator while defenses to the arbitration provision itself are considered by the court" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nsimilar to those presented here, involving an infant delivered by emergency caesarean section at 23-weeks’ gestation that received lifesaving resuscitation contrary to the parents’ wishes. The infant survived but later suffered a brain hemorrhage, a common complication of premature birth, which resulted in severe and permanent disabilities. In rejecting the parents’ informed consent claim, the court in Miller, id. at 769, concluded that even though the parents were present in the delivery room, “there was simply no time to obtain their consent to treatment . . . without jeopardizing [the infant’s] life” because the infant might survive with treatment but would likely die if treatment were postponed. See also Montalvo v. Borkovec, 2002 WI App 147, 256 Wis. 2d 472, 647 N.W.2d 413, 420 (holding unconstitutional defendants sentence of death based upon the holding in roper supra and remanding for the montgomery circuit court to set aside the defendants death sentence and to sentence him to the only other sentence available life in the penitentiary without the possibility of parole", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nsimilar to those presented here, involving an infant delivered by emergency caesarean section at 23-weeks’ gestation that received lifesaving resuscitation contrary to the parents’ wishes. The infant survived but later suffered a brain hemorrhage, a common complication of premature birth, which resulted in severe and permanent disabilities. In rejecting the parents’ informed consent claim, the court in Miller, id. at 769, concluded that even though the parents were present in the delivery room, “there was simply no time to obtain their consent to treatment . . . without jeopardizing [the infant’s] life” because the infant might survive with treatment but would likely die if treatment were postponed. See also Montalvo v. Borkovec, 2002 WI App 147, 256 Wis. 2d 472, 647 N.W.2d 413, 420 (holding that the informed consent doctrine does not apply in the context of emergency treatment provided to a neonate following a caesarean procedure because the failure to treat would be tantamount to a death sentence", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nsimilar to those presented here, involving an infant delivered by emergency caesarean section at 23-weeks’ gestation that received lifesaving resuscitation contrary to the parents’ wishes. The infant survived but later suffered a brain hemorrhage, a common complication of premature birth, which resulted in severe and permanent disabilities. In rejecting the parents’ informed consent claim, the court in Miller, id. at 769, concluded that even though the parents were present in the delivery room, “there was simply no time to obtain their consent to treatment . . . without jeopardizing [the infant’s] life” because the infant might survive with treatment but would likely die if treatment were postponed. See also Montalvo v. Borkovec, 2002 WI App 147, 256 Wis. 2d 472, 647 N.W.2d 413, 420 (holding that the doctrine does not apply in such circumstancesi", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nsimilar to those presented here, involving an infant delivered by emergency caesarean section at 23-weeks’ gestation that received lifesaving resuscitation contrary to the parents’ wishes. The infant survived but later suffered a brain hemorrhage, a common complication of premature birth, which resulted in severe and permanent disabilities. In rejecting the parents’ informed consent claim, the court in Miller, id. at 769, concluded that even though the parents were present in the delivery room, “there was simply no time to obtain their consent to treatment . . . without jeopardizing [the infant’s] life” because the infant might survive with treatment but would likely die if treatment were postponed. See also Montalvo v. Borkovec, 2002 WI App 147, 256 Wis. 2d 472, 647 N.W.2d 413, 420 (holding in case where plaintiff sought damages resulting from the defendants failure to pay the accidental death benefit claims she filed following death of her husband transfer to south carolina was warranted because with the exception of plaintiffs relocation to the state of west virginia following the death of the decedent the cause of action bears virtually no relation to the forum chosen by the plaintiff", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nsimilar to those presented here, involving an infant delivered by emergency caesarean section at 23-weeks’ gestation that received lifesaving resuscitation contrary to the parents’ wishes. The infant survived but later suffered a brain hemorrhage, a common complication of premature birth, which resulted in severe and permanent disabilities. In rejecting the parents’ informed consent claim, the court in Miller, id. at 769, concluded that even though the parents were present in the delivery room, “there was simply no time to obtain their consent to treatment . . . without jeopardizing [the infant’s] life” because the infant might survive with treatment but would likely die if treatment were postponed. See also Montalvo v. Borkovec, 2002 WI App 147, 256 Wis. 2d 472, 647 N.W.2d 413, 420 (holding that even if the court were to apply the apex doctrine the doctrine would not preclude the deposition of two corporate executives in that case" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nand parties to a criminal prosecution may be privy to the information derived from the blood sample, O.R.S. § 181.085(2), and the State may not analyze'the samples to discover genetic predispositions to physical or mental conditions. The absence of any individualized suspicion that persons subject to blood sampling have committed criminal offenses other than their original offenses of conviction does not render Chapter 669 unconstitutional. Rather, the evenhandedness of Oregon’s statute contributes to its reasonableness. “An essential purpose of a warrant requirement is to protect privacy interests by assuring citizens subject to a search or seizure that such intrusions are not the random or arbitrary acts of government agents.” Skinner, 489 U.S. at 621-22, 109 S.Ct. at 1415-16 (holding that a warrant was not required in part because in light of the standardized nature of the tests and the minimal discretion vested in those charged with administering the program there are virtually no facts for a neutral magistrate to evaluate", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nand parties to a criminal prosecution may be privy to the information derived from the blood sample, O.R.S. § 181.085(2), and the State may not analyze'the samples to discover genetic predispositions to physical or mental conditions. The absence of any individualized suspicion that persons subject to blood sampling have committed criminal offenses other than their original offenses of conviction does not render Chapter 669 unconstitutional. Rather, the evenhandedness of Oregon’s statute contributes to its reasonableness. “An essential purpose of a warrant requirement is to protect privacy interests by assuring citizens subject to a search or seizure that such intrusions are not the random or arbitrary acts of government agents.” Skinner, 489 U.S. at 621-22, 109 S.Ct. at 1415-16 (holding that a contract for the installation and implementation of a complex computer system did not constitute a consumer purchase covered by the njcfa and noting that the contract did not provide for simply the installation of a standardized computer software program but rather the design of a custommade program to satisfy the plaintiffs unique needs and the defendants active participation in implementation of this program", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nand parties to a criminal prosecution may be privy to the information derived from the blood sample, O.R.S. § 181.085(2), and the State may not analyze'the samples to discover genetic predispositions to physical or mental conditions. The absence of any individualized suspicion that persons subject to blood sampling have committed criminal offenses other than their original offenses of conviction does not render Chapter 669 unconstitutional. Rather, the evenhandedness of Oregon’s statute contributes to its reasonableness. “An essential purpose of a warrant requirement is to protect privacy interests by assuring citizens subject to a search or seizure that such intrusions are not the random or arbitrary acts of government agents.” Skinner, 489 U.S. at 621-22, 109 S.Ct. at 1415-16 (holding that an alien had no wellfounded fear of persecution for resisting chinas coercive population control program in part because he was not charged with a crime and there was no warrant issued for his arrest", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nand parties to a criminal prosecution may be privy to the information derived from the blood sample, O.R.S. § 181.085(2), and the State may not analyze'the samples to discover genetic predispositions to physical or mental conditions. The absence of any individualized suspicion that persons subject to blood sampling have committed criminal offenses other than their original offenses of conviction does not render Chapter 669 unconstitutional. Rather, the evenhandedness of Oregon’s statute contributes to its reasonableness. “An essential purpose of a warrant requirement is to protect privacy interests by assuring citizens subject to a search or seizure that such intrusions are not the random or arbitrary acts of government agents.” Skinner, 489 U.S. at 621-22, 109 S.Ct. at 1415-16 (holding that nature and occasion of offenses are facts inherent in convictions and those facts need not be alleged in indictment or submitted to jury", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nand parties to a criminal prosecution may be privy to the information derived from the blood sample, O.R.S. § 181.085(2), and the State may not analyze'the samples to discover genetic predispositions to physical or mental conditions. The absence of any individualized suspicion that persons subject to blood sampling have committed criminal offenses other than their original offenses of conviction does not render Chapter 669 unconstitutional. Rather, the evenhandedness of Oregon’s statute contributes to its reasonableness. “An essential purpose of a warrant requirement is to protect privacy interests by assuring citizens subject to a search or seizure that such intrusions are not the random or arbitrary acts of government agents.” Skinner, 489 U.S. at 621-22, 109 S.Ct. at 1415-16 (holding that the nature and occasion of prior offenses are facts inherent in the convictions which government is not required to allege in the indictment or prove beyond a reasonable doubt" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\n(1993). In § 2254 proceedings, the federal court must assess the prejudicial impact of a constitutional error in a state-court criminal proceeding under Brecht’s more forgiving “substantial and injurious effect” standard, whether or not the state appellate court recognized the error and reviewed it for harmlessness under the “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” standard set forth in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824,17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 127 S.Ct. 2321, 2328, 168 L.Ed.2d 16 (2007). The Brecht harmless error analysis also applies to habeas review of a sentencing error. The test is whether such error had a “substantial and injurious effect” on the sentence. Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141, 145-47, 119 S.Ct. 500, 142 L.Ed.2d 521 (1998) (holding that states improper use of defendants postmiranda silence was error but did not warrant habeas relief unless error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the jurys verdict", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\n(1993). In § 2254 proceedings, the federal court must assess the prejudicial impact of a constitutional error in a state-court criminal proceeding under Brecht’s more forgiving “substantial and injurious effect” standard, whether or not the state appellate court recognized the error and reviewed it for harmlessness under the “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” standard set forth in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824,17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 127 S.Ct. 2321, 2328, 168 L.Ed.2d 16 (2007). The Brecht harmless error analysis also applies to habeas review of a sentencing error. The test is whether such error had a “substantial and injurious effect” on the sentence. Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141, 145-47, 119 S.Ct. 500, 142 L.Ed.2d 521 (1998) (holding that a substantial right is affected when the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jurys verdict", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\n(1993). In § 2254 proceedings, the federal court must assess the prejudicial impact of a constitutional error in a state-court criminal proceeding under Brecht’s more forgiving “substantial and injurious effect” standard, whether or not the state appellate court recognized the error and reviewed it for harmlessness under the “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” standard set forth in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824,17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 127 S.Ct. 2321, 2328, 168 L.Ed.2d 16 (2007). The Brecht harmless error analysis also applies to habeas review of a sentencing error. The test is whether such error had a “substantial and injurious effect” on the sentence. Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141, 145-47, 119 S.Ct. 500, 142 L.Ed.2d 521 (1998) (holding that an error must have a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict to entitle a petitioner to habeas relief", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\n(1993). In § 2254 proceedings, the federal court must assess the prejudicial impact of a constitutional error in a state-court criminal proceeding under Brecht’s more forgiving “substantial and injurious effect” standard, whether or not the state appellate court recognized the error and reviewed it for harmlessness under the “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” standard set forth in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824,17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 127 S.Ct. 2321, 2328, 168 L.Ed.2d 16 (2007). The Brecht harmless error analysis also applies to habeas review of a sentencing error. The test is whether such error had a “substantial and injurious effect” on the sentence. Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141, 145-47, 119 S.Ct. 500, 142 L.Ed.2d 521 (1998) (holding that mental health evidence could be mitigating at the penalty phase even though it is insufficient to establish a legal defense to conviction in the guilty phase", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\n(1993). In § 2254 proceedings, the federal court must assess the prejudicial impact of a constitutional error in a state-court criminal proceeding under Brecht’s more forgiving “substantial and injurious effect” standard, whether or not the state appellate court recognized the error and reviewed it for harmlessness under the “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” standard set forth in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824,17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 127 S.Ct. 2321, 2328, 168 L.Ed.2d 16 (2007). The Brecht harmless error analysis also applies to habeas review of a sentencing error. The test is whether such error had a “substantial and injurious effect” on the sentence. Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141, 145-47, 119 S.Ct. 500, 142 L.Ed.2d 521 (1998) (holding that for habeas relief to be granted based on constitutional error in capital penalty phase error must have had substantial and injurious effect on the jurys verdict in the penalty phase" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe parties supplement their briefs following the Court's decision in that case. 3 Scull argues that the State forfeited its right to argue that the good-faith exception applies because it did not raise the issue before the circuit court. We disagree. First, we may affirm a circuit court's decision on any grounds. See State v. Milashoski, 159 Wis. 2d 99, 108-09, 464 N.W.2d 21 (Ct. App. 1990). Second, the good-faith exception never came up before the circuit court because the circuit court ruled on the issue prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Jardines and concluded that the dog sniff was not a search. Therefore, the circuit court did not need to explore the contours of the exclusionary rule in this case. 4 See United States v. Brock, 417 F.3d 692, 696 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that a drug sniff outside defendants locked bedroom door was not a fourth amendment search because it detected only the presence of contraband and did not provide any information about lawful activity over which the defen dant had a legitimate expectation of privacy", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe parties supplement their briefs following the Court's decision in that case. 3 Scull argues that the State forfeited its right to argue that the good-faith exception applies because it did not raise the issue before the circuit court. We disagree. First, we may affirm a circuit court's decision on any grounds. See State v. Milashoski, 159 Wis. 2d 99, 108-09, 464 N.W.2d 21 (Ct. App. 1990). Second, the good-faith exception never came up before the circuit court because the circuit court ruled on the issue prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Jardines and concluded that the dog sniff was not a search. Therefore, the circuit court did not need to explore the contours of the exclusionary rule in this case. 4 See United States v. Brock, 417 F.3d 692, 696 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that a dog sniff during a legitimate traffic stop does not constitute a search because there is no expectation of privacy in contraband and a dog sniff does not violate any privacy interest", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe parties supplement their briefs following the Court's decision in that case. 3 Scull argues that the State forfeited its right to argue that the good-faith exception applies because it did not raise the issue before the circuit court. We disagree. First, we may affirm a circuit court's decision on any grounds. See State v. Milashoski, 159 Wis. 2d 99, 108-09, 464 N.W.2d 21 (Ct. App. 1990). Second, the good-faith exception never came up before the circuit court because the circuit court ruled on the issue prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Jardines and concluded that the dog sniff was not a search. Therefore, the circuit court did not need to explore the contours of the exclusionary rule in this case. 4 See United States v. Brock, 417 F.3d 692, 696 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that a dog sniff of the area outside the door of a hotel room is not a search under the fourth amendment or the texas constitution because the dogs sniff does not explore the details of the hotel room and the sniff reveals nothing about the room other than the presence of cocaine in which there is no legitimate privacy interest", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe parties supplement their briefs following the Court's decision in that case. 3 Scull argues that the State forfeited its right to argue that the good-faith exception applies because it did not raise the issue before the circuit court. We disagree. First, we may affirm a circuit court's decision on any grounds. See State v. Milashoski, 159 Wis. 2d 99, 108-09, 464 N.W.2d 21 (Ct. App. 1990). Second, the good-faith exception never came up before the circuit court because the circuit court ruled on the issue prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Jardines and concluded that the dog sniff was not a search. Therefore, the circuit court did not need to explore the contours of the exclusionary rule in this case. 4 See United States v. Brock, 417 F.3d 692, 696 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding a dog sniff outside the defendants front door was not a fourth amendment search", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe parties supplement their briefs following the Court's decision in that case. 3 Scull argues that the State forfeited its right to argue that the good-faith exception applies because it did not raise the issue before the circuit court. We disagree. First, we may affirm a circuit court's decision on any grounds. See State v. Milashoski, 159 Wis. 2d 99, 108-09, 464 N.W.2d 21 (Ct. App. 1990). Second, the good-faith exception never came up before the circuit court because the circuit court ruled on the issue prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Jardines and concluded that the dog sniff was not a search. Therefore, the circuit court did not need to explore the contours of the exclusionary rule in this case. 4 See United States v. Brock, 417 F.3d 692, 696 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that a drug sniff outside the front door of the defendants residence was not a fourth amendment search because the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy at the entrance to property that is open to the public including the front porch" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nmay bring an action on the contract if the parties to the agreement intended to benefit the non-party, provided that the benefit claimed is a direct and not merely an incidental benefit of the contract. E.B. Roberts Constr. Co. v. Concrete Contractors, Inc., 704 P.2d 859, 865 (Colo.1985). While the intent to benefit the non-party need not be expressly recited in the contract, the intent must be apparent from the terms of the agreement, the surrounding circumstances, or both. Id. In this case, Parrish was only one of many health care providers from which Progressive’s insureds could have chosen for treatment of injuries resulting from automobile accidents covered by that policy. See Kelly Health Care, Inc. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, Inc., 226 Va. 376, 309 S.E.2d 305, 307 (1983) (holding that an incidental beneficiary does not have standing to sue for breach of a contract", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nmay bring an action on the contract if the parties to the agreement intended to benefit the non-party, provided that the benefit claimed is a direct and not merely an incidental benefit of the contract. E.B. Roberts Constr. Co. v. Concrete Contractors, Inc., 704 P.2d 859, 865 (Colo.1985). While the intent to benefit the non-party need not be expressly recited in the contract, the intent must be apparent from the terms of the agreement, the surrounding circumstances, or both. Id. In this case, Parrish was only one of many health care providers from which Progressive’s insureds could have chosen for treatment of injuries resulting from automobile accidents covered by that policy. See Kelly Health Care, Inc. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, Inc., 226 Va. 376, 309 S.E.2d 305, 307 (1983) (holding that health care providers could pursuant to 1983 enforce the boren amendment to the medicaid act", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nmay bring an action on the contract if the parties to the agreement intended to benefit the non-party, provided that the benefit claimed is a direct and not merely an incidental benefit of the contract. E.B. Roberts Constr. Co. v. Concrete Contractors, Inc., 704 P.2d 859, 865 (Colo.1985). While the intent to benefit the non-party need not be expressly recited in the contract, the intent must be apparent from the terms of the agreement, the surrounding circumstances, or both. Id. In this case, Parrish was only one of many health care providers from which Progressive’s insureds could have chosen for treatment of injuries resulting from automobile accidents covered by that policy. See Kelly Health Care, Inc. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, Inc., 226 Va. 376, 309 S.E.2d 305, 307 (1983) (holding that boren amendment created substantive federal right enforceable by health care providers to reasonable and adequate rates", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nmay bring an action on the contract if the parties to the agreement intended to benefit the non-party, provided that the benefit claimed is a direct and not merely an incidental benefit of the contract. E.B. Roberts Constr. Co. v. Concrete Contractors, Inc., 704 P.2d 859, 865 (Colo.1985). While the intent to benefit the non-party need not be expressly recited in the contract, the intent must be apparent from the terms of the agreement, the surrounding circumstances, or both. Id. In this case, Parrish was only one of many health care providers from which Progressive’s insureds could have chosen for treatment of injuries resulting from automobile accidents covered by that policy. See Kelly Health Care, Inc. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, Inc., 226 Va. 376, 309 S.E.2d 305, 307 (1983) (holding that even though certain corporate formalities had not been complied with in the execution of the subject contract the corporation had knowledge of the existence of the contract and treated it as a valid and binding contract and thus ratified the contract by accepting the benefits thereunder", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nmay bring an action on the contract if the parties to the agreement intended to benefit the non-party, provided that the benefit claimed is a direct and not merely an incidental benefit of the contract. E.B. Roberts Constr. Co. v. Concrete Contractors, Inc., 704 P.2d 859, 865 (Colo.1985). While the intent to benefit the non-party need not be expressly recited in the contract, the intent must be apparent from the terms of the agreement, the surrounding circumstances, or both. Id. In this case, Parrish was only one of many health care providers from which Progressive’s insureds could have chosen for treatment of injuries resulting from automobile accidents covered by that policy. See Kelly Health Care, Inc. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, Inc., 226 Va. 376, 309 S.E.2d 305, 307 (1983) (holding that member of a large class of health care providers available to the insured was only a potential and incidental beneficiary of the contract and thus not entitled to recover thereunder" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat they made a fraudulent statement in the October letter when they said that “the congregation of [the Church] has been working on the ‘Ball Field’ at [the Park], without pay, since April 2013” because “work performed by members of the Church congregation had ceased in May 2013.” (Compl. ¶ 92.) The next paragraph of the Complaint, however, belies this assertion of falsity because it acknowledges that the October letter also informed the Town that the Church’s work at the Park “had stopped.” (Id. ¶ 93,). In other words, the October letter stated that the Church had worked on the soccer field, but this work had ended. Thus, the Complaint does not adequately explain why the October letter was fraudulent. Compare Houraney v. Burton & Assocs., P.C., 701 F.Supp.2d 258, 262 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding that plaintiff failed to establish pretext where plaintiff was terminated after the employer conducted an investigation into a subordinates allegations of misconduct on the part of the plaintiff and believed the allegations to be true even though plaintiff presented evidence in the lawsuit that the allegations may have been false", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat they made a fraudulent statement in the October letter when they said that “the congregation of [the Church] has been working on the ‘Ball Field’ at [the Park], without pay, since April 2013” because “work performed by members of the Church congregation had ceased in May 2013.” (Compl. ¶ 92.) The next paragraph of the Complaint, however, belies this assertion of falsity because it acknowledges that the October letter also informed the Town that the Church’s work at the Park “had stopped.” (Id. ¶ 93,). In other words, the October letter stated that the Church had worked on the soccer field, but this work had ended. Thus, the Complaint does not adequately explain why the October letter was fraudulent. Compare Houraney v. Burton & Assocs., P.C., 701 F.Supp.2d 258, 262 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding that a prior inconsistent statement was admissible and the defendant failed to ask for a limiting instruction that the jury could not use the statement as substantive evidence", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat they made a fraudulent statement in the October letter when they said that “the congregation of [the Church] has been working on the ‘Ball Field’ at [the Park], without pay, since April 2013” because “work performed by members of the Church congregation had ceased in May 2013.” (Compl. ¶ 92.) The next paragraph of the Complaint, however, belies this assertion of falsity because it acknowledges that the October letter also informed the Town that the Church’s work at the Park “had stopped.” (Id. ¶ 93,). In other words, the October letter stated that the Church had worked on the soccer field, but this work had ended. Thus, the Complaint does not adequately explain why the October letter was fraudulent. Compare Houraney v. Burton & Assocs., P.C., 701 F.Supp.2d 258, 262 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding that failure to explain allegations and possible consequences mandated reversal", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat they made a fraudulent statement in the October letter when they said that “the congregation of [the Church] has been working on the ‘Ball Field’ at [the Park], without pay, since April 2013” because “work performed by members of the Church congregation had ceased in May 2013.” (Compl. ¶ 92.) The next paragraph of the Complaint, however, belies this assertion of falsity because it acknowledges that the October letter also informed the Town that the Church’s work at the Park “had stopped.” (Id. ¶ 93,). In other words, the October letter stated that the Church had worked on the soccer field, but this work had ended. Thus, the Complaint does not adequately explain why the October letter was fraudulent. Compare Houraney v. Burton & Assocs., P.C., 701 F.Supp.2d 258, 262 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding that fundamental error occurred and reversal was required when trial court failed to explain allegations or to explain adequately future use of adjudication record", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat they made a fraudulent statement in the October letter when they said that “the congregation of [the Church] has been working on the ‘Ball Field’ at [the Park], without pay, since April 2013” because “work performed by members of the Church congregation had ceased in May 2013.” (Compl. ¶ 92.) The next paragraph of the Complaint, however, belies this assertion of falsity because it acknowledges that the October letter also informed the Town that the Church’s work at the Park “had stopped.” (Id. ¶ 93,). In other words, the October letter stated that the Church had worked on the soccer field, but this work had ended. Thus, the Complaint does not adequately explain why the October letter was fraudulent. Compare Houraney v. Burton & Assocs., P.C., 701 F.Supp.2d 258, 262 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding that plaintiff failed to explain why statement was fraudulent where it was not necessarily inconsistent with plain tiffs factual allegations" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nhave changed the jury’s decision to impose a death sentence. See Gissendaner, 272 Ga. at 713-714 (10) (b) (reviewing alleged impropriety that was not objected to at trial solely for the purpose of determining if a death sentence was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor in violation of OCGA § 17-10-35 (c) (D). 9. In addition to his claim above regarding unsworn and allegedly false testimony, Martin argues that the trial court erred by permitting victim impact testimony that was improper in other ways. Because Martin failed to both raise objections and obtain rulings on them regarding any of the allegedly objectionable statements, he has forfeited his right to appeal under ordinary appellate review standards. See Smith, 287 Ga. at 30 (3) (holding that appellants failure to obtain a ruling at the trial level even on a constitutional issue precluded review on appeal", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nhave changed the jury’s decision to impose a death sentence. See Gissendaner, 272 Ga. at 713-714 (10) (b) (reviewing alleged impropriety that was not objected to at trial solely for the purpose of determining if a death sentence was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor in violation of OCGA § 17-10-35 (c) (D). 9. In addition to his claim above regarding unsworn and allegedly false testimony, Martin argues that the trial court erred by permitting victim impact testimony that was improper in other ways. Because Martin failed to both raise objections and obtain rulings on them regarding any of the allegedly objectionable statements, he has forfeited his right to appeal under ordinary appellate review standards. See Smith, 287 Ga. at 30 (3) (holding that the supreme court will not address an argument on appeal if a party has failed to obtain a ruling below", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nhave changed the jury’s decision to impose a death sentence. See Gissendaner, 272 Ga. at 713-714 (10) (b) (reviewing alleged impropriety that was not objected to at trial solely for the purpose of determining if a death sentence was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor in violation of OCGA § 17-10-35 (c) (D). 9. In addition to his claim above regarding unsworn and allegedly false testimony, Martin argues that the trial court erred by permitting victim impact testimony that was improper in other ways. Because Martin failed to both raise objections and obtain rulings on them regarding any of the allegedly objectionable statements, he has forfeited his right to appeal under ordinary appellate review standards. See Smith, 287 Ga. at 30 (3) (holding that a party may not raise a claim on appeal that was not presented to the trial court", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nhave changed the jury’s decision to impose a death sentence. See Gissendaner, 272 Ga. at 713-714 (10) (b) (reviewing alleged impropriety that was not objected to at trial solely for the purpose of determining if a death sentence was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor in violation of OCGA § 17-10-35 (c) (D). 9. In addition to his claim above regarding unsworn and allegedly false testimony, Martin argues that the trial court erred by permitting victim impact testimony that was improper in other ways. Because Martin failed to both raise objections and obtain rulings on them regarding any of the allegedly objectionable statements, he has forfeited his right to appeal under ordinary appellate review standards. See Smith, 287 Ga. at 30 (3) (holding that a party must obtain a distinct ruling on an issue in order to raise it on appeal", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nhave changed the jury’s decision to impose a death sentence. See Gissendaner, 272 Ga. at 713-714 (10) (b) (reviewing alleged impropriety that was not objected to at trial solely for the purpose of determining if a death sentence was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor in violation of OCGA § 17-10-35 (c) (D). 9. In addition to his claim above regarding unsworn and allegedly false testimony, Martin argues that the trial court erred by permitting victim impact testimony that was improper in other ways. Because Martin failed to both raise objections and obtain rulings on them regarding any of the allegedly objectionable statements, he has forfeited his right to appeal under ordinary appellate review standards. See Smith, 287 Ga. at 30 (3) (holding that a party may not raise an issue for the first time on appeal" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthat district court’s claim-by-claim description of the frivolous nature of the plaintiffs’ complaint demonstrated clearly that their “widespread charges of racial discrimination [were leveled] without any regard for the truth ... in order to harass and embarrass the personnel at Fort Bragg”). The third and fourth instances of bad faith were predicated on the district court’s belief that both David and Samuel Sprafldn had offered testimony that “simply was not credible.” We have no doubt that when a party has materially perjured himself, this, standing alone, is sufficient grounds for finding bad faith. See Chambers, 501 U.S. at 46, 111 S.Ct. at 2133 (noting that the “inherent power extends to a full range of litigation abuses); see also Perichak, 715 F.2d at 84-85 & n. 9 (3d Cir.1983) (holding that even if defendants knew that the company had inventory problems that fact standing alone does not show that defendants knew that the statements in their prospectus or other representations were materially false or misleading at the time the material statements were made", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthat district court’s claim-by-claim description of the frivolous nature of the plaintiffs’ complaint demonstrated clearly that their “widespread charges of racial discrimination [were leveled] without any regard for the truth ... in order to harass and embarrass the personnel at Fort Bragg”). The third and fourth instances of bad faith were predicated on the district court’s belief that both David and Samuel Sprafldn had offered testimony that “simply was not credible.” We have no doubt that when a party has materially perjured himself, this, standing alone, is sufficient grounds for finding bad faith. See Chambers, 501 U.S. at 46, 111 S.Ct. at 2133 (noting that the “inherent power extends to a full range of litigation abuses); see also Perichak, 715 F.2d at 84-85 & n. 9 (3d Cir.1983) (holding that the defendants materially false statements made under oath are having been critical to the success of his case alone enough to support a finding of bad faith", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthat district court’s claim-by-claim description of the frivolous nature of the plaintiffs’ complaint demonstrated clearly that their “widespread charges of racial discrimination [were leveled] without any regard for the truth ... in order to harass and embarrass the personnel at Fort Bragg”). The third and fourth instances of bad faith were predicated on the district court’s belief that both David and Samuel Sprafldn had offered testimony that “simply was not credible.” We have no doubt that when a party has materially perjured himself, this, standing alone, is sufficient grounds for finding bad faith. See Chambers, 501 U.S. at 46, 111 S.Ct. at 2133 (noting that the “inherent power extends to a full range of litigation abuses); see also Perichak, 715 F.2d at 84-85 & n. 9 (3d Cir.1983) (holding that in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary a defendant is bound by statements made under oath during his plea colloquy", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthat district court’s claim-by-claim description of the frivolous nature of the plaintiffs’ complaint demonstrated clearly that their “widespread charges of racial discrimination [were leveled] without any regard for the truth ... in order to harass and embarrass the personnel at Fort Bragg”). The third and fourth instances of bad faith were predicated on the district court’s belief that both David and Samuel Sprafldn had offered testimony that “simply was not credible.” We have no doubt that when a party has materially perjured himself, this, standing alone, is sufficient grounds for finding bad faith. See Chambers, 501 U.S. at 46, 111 S.Ct. at 2133 (noting that the “inherent power extends to a full range of litigation abuses); see also Perichak, 715 F.2d at 84-85 & n. 9 (3d Cir.1983) (recognizing that the sixth circuit has folded the absence of bad faith in under the inadvertence prong made the determination of whether there was evidence of a motive or intention to conceal the potential claim critical to a finding of bad faith and has held that in a particular case numerous attempts by the plaintiffs to cure an initial omission provided evidence that the omission was inadvertent not intentional", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthat district court’s claim-by-claim description of the frivolous nature of the plaintiffs’ complaint demonstrated clearly that their “widespread charges of racial discrimination [were leveled] without any regard for the truth ... in order to harass and embarrass the personnel at Fort Bragg”). The third and fourth instances of bad faith were predicated on the district court’s belief that both David and Samuel Sprafldn had offered testimony that “simply was not credible.” We have no doubt that when a party has materially perjured himself, this, standing alone, is sufficient grounds for finding bad faith. See Chambers, 501 U.S. at 46, 111 S.Ct. at 2133 (noting that the “inherent power extends to a full range of litigation abuses); see also Perichak, 715 F.2d at 84-85 & n. 9 (3d Cir.1983) (holding that a bad faith claim is a tort" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthird factor is satisfied because Argentina will be unable to obtain effective review in a United States court of the Discovery Order through a later appeal of a final judgment. Because the Discovery Order grants NML discovery respecting foreign assets, any future attachment or collection proceeding would be conducted in a foreign court. Argentina would have no further opportunity to challenge the Discovery Order in this or any other United States court. Moreover, depending on the laws of the jurisdictions where any attachable property is located, NML may be able to levy Argentina’s foreign assets directly, without instituting a separate proceeding, rendering the Discovery Order unreviewable by any court. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Ruggiero, 994 F.2d 1221, 1225 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that an order was interlocutory in nature despite the trial courts certification of the order as a final appealable judgment", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthird factor is satisfied because Argentina will be unable to obtain effective review in a United States court of the Discovery Order through a later appeal of a final judgment. Because the Discovery Order grants NML discovery respecting foreign assets, any future attachment or collection proceeding would be conducted in a foreign court. Argentina would have no further opportunity to challenge the Discovery Order in this or any other United States court. Moreover, depending on the laws of the jurisdictions where any attachable property is located, NML may be able to levy Argentina’s foreign assets directly, without instituting a separate proceeding, rendering the Discovery Order unreviewable by any court. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Ruggiero, 994 F.2d 1221, 1225 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that an order compelling arbitration in an independent proceeding is appealable as a final order because in that context the order compelling arbitration resolves the sole issue before the court", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthird factor is satisfied because Argentina will be unable to obtain effective review in a United States court of the Discovery Order through a later appeal of a final judgment. Because the Discovery Order grants NML discovery respecting foreign assets, any future attachment or collection proceeding would be conducted in a foreign court. Argentina would have no further opportunity to challenge the Discovery Order in this or any other United States court. Moreover, depending on the laws of the jurisdictions where any attachable property is located, NML may be able to levy Argentina’s foreign assets directly, without instituting a separate proceeding, rendering the Discovery Order unreviewable by any court. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Ruggiero, 994 F.2d 1221, 1225 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that where an adversary proceeding continues the order is no more a final decision than an order denying summary judgment or denying a request for additional discovery the litigation proceeds and the issue will be reviewed if it turns out to make a difference to an order that is independently appealable", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthird factor is satisfied because Argentina will be unable to obtain effective review in a United States court of the Discovery Order through a later appeal of a final judgment. Because the Discovery Order grants NML discovery respecting foreign assets, any future attachment or collection proceeding would be conducted in a foreign court. Argentina would have no further opportunity to challenge the Discovery Order in this or any other United States court. Moreover, depending on the laws of the jurisdictions where any attachable property is located, NML may be able to levy Argentina’s foreign assets directly, without instituting a separate proceeding, rendering the Discovery Order unreviewable by any court. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Ruggiero, 994 F.2d 1221, 1225 (7th Cir.1993) (recognizing that an order denying a motion to modify a family court order where the motion is based on changed factual or legal circumstances is appealable as a special order after final judgment", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthird factor is satisfied because Argentina will be unable to obtain effective review in a United States court of the Discovery Order through a later appeal of a final judgment. Because the Discovery Order grants NML discovery respecting foreign assets, any future attachment or collection proceeding would be conducted in a foreign court. Argentina would have no further opportunity to challenge the Discovery Order in this or any other United States court. Moreover, depending on the laws of the jurisdictions where any attachable property is located, NML may be able to levy Argentina’s foreign assets directly, without instituting a separate proceeding, rendering the Discovery Order unreviewable by any court. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Ruggiero, 994 F.2d 1221, 1225 (7th Cir.1993) (recognizing that an order granting discovery may be a final appealable order where the sole object of a postjudgment proceeding is discovery of the judgment debtors assets and the assets discovered may then be levied without a court order" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nbank account. Asked about that during his deposition, Fisher testified that he did so in part because he was concerned about possible garnishment for child support that he later learned had already been collected out of a tax refund. Despite Fisher’s abandonment of his bank account during this period, the bankruptcy court specifically found that the transfers to Brennan both before and after November 2002 were in fact used to pay the debtor’s share of the ongoing expenses of maintaining them combined household. It was not clear error for the bankruptcy court to conclude that these monetary transfers were not made with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any of Fisher’s creditors. See Bennett & Kahnveiler Assocs. v. Rainer (In re Rainer), 132 B.R. 728, 733 (N.D.Ill.1991) (holding that actual intent to defraud is not necessary to finding of constructive fraud", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nbank account. Asked about that during his deposition, Fisher testified that he did so in part because he was concerned about possible garnishment for child support that he later learned had already been collected out of a tax refund. Despite Fisher’s abandonment of his bank account during this period, the bankruptcy court specifically found that the transfers to Brennan both before and after November 2002 were in fact used to pay the debtor’s share of the ongoing expenses of maintaining them combined household. It was not clear error for the bankruptcy court to conclude that these monetary transfers were not made with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any of Fisher’s creditors. See Bennett & Kahnveiler Assocs. v. Rainer (In re Rainer), 132 B.R. 728, 733 (N.D.Ill.1991) (holding that 506a does not require or permit a reduction in the creditors secured claim to account for purely hypothetical costs of sale of chapter 13 debtors residence", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nbank account. Asked about that during his deposition, Fisher testified that he did so in part because he was concerned about possible garnishment for child support that he later learned had already been collected out of a tax refund. Despite Fisher’s abandonment of his bank account during this period, the bankruptcy court specifically found that the transfers to Brennan both before and after November 2002 were in fact used to pay the debtor’s share of the ongoing expenses of maintaining them combined household. It was not clear error for the bankruptcy court to conclude that these monetary transfers were not made with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any of Fisher’s creditors. See Bennett & Kahnveiler Assocs. v. Rainer (In re Rainer), 132 B.R. 728, 733 (N.D.Ill.1991) (holding that the statute requires actual intent to hinder delay or defraud creditors or the trustee constructive intent to defraud does not suffice", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nbank account. Asked about that during his deposition, Fisher testified that he did so in part because he was concerned about possible garnishment for child support that he later learned had already been collected out of a tax refund. Despite Fisher’s abandonment of his bank account during this period, the bankruptcy court specifically found that the transfers to Brennan both before and after November 2002 were in fact used to pay the debtor’s share of the ongoing expenses of maintaining them combined household. It was not clear error for the bankruptcy court to conclude that these monetary transfers were not made with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any of Fisher’s creditors. See Bennett & Kahnveiler Assocs. v. Rainer (In re Rainer), 132 B.R. 728, 733 (N.D.Ill.1991) (holding that although there was evidence the defendant transferred or caused to be transferred more money to the debtor than the debtor transferred to the defendant there was legally sufficient evidence to support the jurys finding of actual fraud under section 24005a1 and b because the badges of fraud showed the debtors intent to hinder delay or defraud creditors", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nbank account. Asked about that during his deposition, Fisher testified that he did so in part because he was concerned about possible garnishment for child support that he later learned had already been collected out of a tax refund. Despite Fisher’s abandonment of his bank account during this period, the bankruptcy court specifically found that the transfers to Brennan both before and after November 2002 were in fact used to pay the debtor’s share of the ongoing expenses of maintaining them combined household. It was not clear error for the bankruptcy court to conclude that these monetary transfers were not made with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any of Fisher’s creditors. See Bennett & Kahnveiler Assocs. v. Rainer (In re Rainer), 132 B.R. 728, 733 (N.D.Ill.1991) (holding that debtors depositing of funds into spouses separate account did not establish actual intent to hinder delay or defraud creditors for purposes of denial of discharge under chapter 7" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nof Green to section 693 of the Probate Code, the trial court could dispense with further proceedings and sua sponte appoint a guardian. In other words, if section 692 grants to a trial judge the power to conduct a preliminary trial and dismiss the proceeding if the applicant fails to prove incapacity, then section 693 must surely permit the same court to appoint a guardian if incapacity is established in that same pretrial hearing. Given this result and its supposed validity, we again wonder why the legislature enacted section 643 if the trial court has the power to sua sponte grant final relief prior to a jury trial. But, because the legislature enacted section 643, the latter must be given meaning. See Holt v. F.F. Enterprises, 990 S.W.2d 756 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1998, pet. denied) (holding that each provision of a statute must be afforded meaning when possible", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nof Green to section 693 of the Probate Code, the trial court could dispense with further proceedings and sua sponte appoint a guardian. In other words, if section 692 grants to a trial judge the power to conduct a preliminary trial and dismiss the proceeding if the applicant fails to prove incapacity, then section 693 must surely permit the same court to appoint a guardian if incapacity is established in that same pretrial hearing. Given this result and its supposed validity, we again wonder why the legislature enacted section 643 if the trial court has the power to sua sponte grant final relief prior to a jury trial. But, because the legislature enacted section 643, the latter must be given meaning. See Holt v. F.F. Enterprises, 990 S.W.2d 756 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1998, pet. denied) (holding that effect must be given if possible to every clause and word of a statute", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nof Green to section 693 of the Probate Code, the trial court could dispense with further proceedings and sua sponte appoint a guardian. In other words, if section 692 grants to a trial judge the power to conduct a preliminary trial and dismiss the proceeding if the applicant fails to prove incapacity, then section 693 must surely permit the same court to appoint a guardian if incapacity is established in that same pretrial hearing. Given this result and its supposed validity, we again wonder why the legislature enacted section 643 if the trial court has the power to sua sponte grant final relief prior to a jury trial. But, because the legislature enacted section 643, the latter must be given meaning. See Holt v. F.F. Enterprises, 990 S.W.2d 756 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1998, pet. denied) (holding that a statute should where possible be construed according to its plain meaning and as a whole giving meaning to all its parts", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nof Green to section 693 of the Probate Code, the trial court could dispense with further proceedings and sua sponte appoint a guardian. In other words, if section 692 grants to a trial judge the power to conduct a preliminary trial and dismiss the proceeding if the applicant fails to prove incapacity, then section 693 must surely permit the same court to appoint a guardian if incapacity is established in that same pretrial hearing. Given this result and its supposed validity, we again wonder why the legislature enacted section 643 if the trial court has the power to sua sponte grant final relief prior to a jury trial. But, because the legislature enacted section 643, the latter must be given meaning. See Holt v. F.F. Enterprises, 990 S.W.2d 756 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1998, pet. denied) (holding that an appellate court must give a statute its clear and plain meaning when the statute is unambiguous", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nof Green to section 693 of the Probate Code, the trial court could dispense with further proceedings and sua sponte appoint a guardian. In other words, if section 692 grants to a trial judge the power to conduct a preliminary trial and dismiss the proceeding if the applicant fails to prove incapacity, then section 693 must surely permit the same court to appoint a guardian if incapacity is established in that same pretrial hearing. Given this result and its supposed validity, we again wonder why the legislature enacted section 643 if the trial court has the power to sua sponte grant final relief prior to a jury trial. But, because the legislature enacted section 643, the latter must be given meaning. See Holt v. F.F. Enterprises, 990 S.W.2d 756 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1998, pet. denied) (holding that each element required under the act must be included in the written notice and each element must be sufficiently clear and accurate " ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nCourt rejects the debtor’s argument that the reimbursement debt is invalid. B. Constitutional Defenses 1. Ex Post Facto First, the debtor argues that the retroactive application of the 1990 ASO is an ex post facto law in violation of the Constitution. This argument is flawed because the Ex Post Facto Clause applies only to criminal cases or punitive legislation. See, e.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531, 74 S.Ct. 737, 98 L.Ed. 911 (1954); Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 590, 33 S.Ct. 607, 57 L.Ed. 978 (1913); Huffman v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 530, 172 S.E.2d 788, 789 (1970) (“[T]he constitutional prohibition against an ex post facto law applies to criminal proceedings and not to civil proceedings.”); see also Rainey v. City of Norfolk, 14 Va.App. 968, 421 S.E.2d 210, 213 (1992) (holding that parole guidelines are subject to the ex post facto clause", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nCourt rejects the debtor’s argument that the reimbursement debt is invalid. B. Constitutional Defenses 1. Ex Post Facto First, the debtor argues that the retroactive application of the 1990 ASO is an ex post facto law in violation of the Constitution. This argument is flawed because the Ex Post Facto Clause applies only to criminal cases or punitive legislation. See, e.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531, 74 S.Ct. 737, 98 L.Ed. 911 (1954); Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 590, 33 S.Ct. 607, 57 L.Ed. 978 (1913); Huffman v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 530, 172 S.E.2d 788, 789 (1970) (“[T]he constitutional prohibition against an ex post facto law applies to criminal proceedings and not to civil proceedings.”); see also Rainey v. City of Norfolk, 14 Va.App. 968, 421 S.E.2d 210, 213 (1992) (holding that because of its civil nature section 881 is not subject to the ex post facto clause", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nCourt rejects the debtor’s argument that the reimbursement debt is invalid. B. Constitutional Defenses 1. Ex Post Facto First, the debtor argues that the retroactive application of the 1990 ASO is an ex post facto law in violation of the Constitution. This argument is flawed because the Ex Post Facto Clause applies only to criminal cases or punitive legislation. See, e.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531, 74 S.Ct. 737, 98 L.Ed. 911 (1954); Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 590, 33 S.Ct. 607, 57 L.Ed. 978 (1913); Huffman v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 530, 172 S.E.2d 788, 789 (1970) (“[T]he constitutional prohibition against an ex post facto law applies to criminal proceedings and not to civil proceedings.”); see also Rainey v. City of Norfolk, 14 Va.App. 968, 421 S.E.2d 210, 213 (1992) (holding that the ex post facto clause did not apply because the civil contempt citation was not punitive", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nCourt rejects the debtor’s argument that the reimbursement debt is invalid. B. Constitutional Defenses 1. Ex Post Facto First, the debtor argues that the retroactive application of the 1990 ASO is an ex post facto law in violation of the Constitution. This argument is flawed because the Ex Post Facto Clause applies only to criminal cases or punitive legislation. See, e.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531, 74 S.Ct. 737, 98 L.Ed. 911 (1954); Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 590, 33 S.Ct. 607, 57 L.Ed. 978 (1913); Huffman v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 530, 172 S.E.2d 788, 789 (1970) (“[T]he constitutional prohibition against an ex post facto law applies to criminal proceedings and not to civil proceedings.”); see also Rainey v. City of Norfolk, 14 Va.App. 968, 421 S.E.2d 210, 213 (1992) (holding that the ex post facto clause has no application to deportation", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nCourt rejects the debtor’s argument that the reimbursement debt is invalid. B. Constitutional Defenses 1. Ex Post Facto First, the debtor argues that the retroactive application of the 1990 ASO is an ex post facto law in violation of the Constitution. This argument is flawed because the Ex Post Facto Clause applies only to criminal cases or punitive legislation. See, e.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531, 74 S.Ct. 737, 98 L.Ed. 911 (1954); Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 590, 33 S.Ct. 607, 57 L.Ed. 978 (1913); Huffman v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 530, 172 S.E.2d 788, 789 (1970) (“[T]he constitutional prohibition against an ex post facto law applies to criminal proceedings and not to civil proceedings.”); see also Rainey v. City of Norfolk, 14 Va.App. 968, 421 S.E.2d 210, 213 (1992) (holding that the supreme courts ex post facto precedents do not clearly establish that amended section 29336 violates the ex post facto clause" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nis shown by motive of partiality, prejudice or oppres sion, or is induced by corruption. State v. Loewe, 756 S.W.2d 177, 184 (Mo.App.1988). Similarly, a sentencing court has great discretion in applying Section 558.046. Section 558.046 states “the sentencing court may reduce any term of sentence or probation pronounced by the court or a term of conditional release or parole pronounced by the state board of probation and parole ...” The use of the word “may” is indicative of the amount of discretion a sentencing court has in regards to sentence reduction. Under the current statute, the sentencing court is not even required to consider sentence reduction, but has a right to do so. See State v. Simmons, 660 S.W.2d 319, 320 (Mo.App.1983); Benson v. State, 504 S.W.2d 74, 76 (Mo.1974) (holding that the trial court is required to enter sentencing order for probation violation that reflects the trial courts oral pronouncement that gives the defendant prison credit for time served on a split sentence prior to sentencing", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nis shown by motive of partiality, prejudice or oppres sion, or is induced by corruption. State v. Loewe, 756 S.W.2d 177, 184 (Mo.App.1988). Similarly, a sentencing court has great discretion in applying Section 558.046. Section 558.046 states “the sentencing court may reduce any term of sentence or probation pronounced by the court or a term of conditional release or parole pronounced by the state board of probation and parole ...” The use of the word “may” is indicative of the amount of discretion a sentencing court has in regards to sentence reduction. Under the current statute, the sentencing court is not even required to consider sentence reduction, but has a right to do so. See State v. Simmons, 660 S.W.2d 319, 320 (Mo.App.1983); Benson v. State, 504 S.W.2d 74, 76 (Mo.1974) (holding that probation is not a sentence", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nis shown by motive of partiality, prejudice or oppres sion, or is induced by corruption. State v. Loewe, 756 S.W.2d 177, 184 (Mo.App.1988). Similarly, a sentencing court has great discretion in applying Section 558.046. Section 558.046 states “the sentencing court may reduce any term of sentence or probation pronounced by the court or a term of conditional release or parole pronounced by the state board of probation and parole ...” The use of the word “may” is indicative of the amount of discretion a sentencing court has in regards to sentence reduction. Under the current statute, the sentencing court is not even required to consider sentence reduction, but has a right to do so. See State v. Simmons, 660 S.W.2d 319, 320 (Mo.App.1983); Benson v. State, 504 S.W.2d 74, 76 (Mo.1974) (holding a sentencing court is not required to grant probation", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nis shown by motive of partiality, prejudice or oppres sion, or is induced by corruption. State v. Loewe, 756 S.W.2d 177, 184 (Mo.App.1988). Similarly, a sentencing court has great discretion in applying Section 558.046. Section 558.046 states “the sentencing court may reduce any term of sentence or probation pronounced by the court or a term of conditional release or parole pronounced by the state board of probation and parole ...” The use of the word “may” is indicative of the amount of discretion a sentencing court has in regards to sentence reduction. Under the current statute, the sentencing court is not even required to consider sentence reduction, but has a right to do so. See State v. Simmons, 660 S.W.2d 319, 320 (Mo.App.1983); Benson v. State, 504 S.W.2d 74, 76 (Mo.1974) (holding that revocation of probation is merely an extension of a sentencing proceeding", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nis shown by motive of partiality, prejudice or oppres sion, or is induced by corruption. State v. Loewe, 756 S.W.2d 177, 184 (Mo.App.1988). Similarly, a sentencing court has great discretion in applying Section 558.046. Section 558.046 states “the sentencing court may reduce any term of sentence or probation pronounced by the court or a term of conditional release or parole pronounced by the state board of probation and parole ...” The use of the word “may” is indicative of the amount of discretion a sentencing court has in regards to sentence reduction. Under the current statute, the sentencing court is not even required to consider sentence reduction, but has a right to do so. See State v. Simmons, 660 S.W.2d 319, 320 (Mo.App.1983); Benson v. State, 504 S.W.2d 74, 76 (Mo.1974) (holding that upon revocation of probation a court must grant credit for time served on probation and community control towards any newly imposed term of imprisonment and probation so that the total period of control probation and imprisonment does not exceed the statutory maximum" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nand intent of the Zoning Procedure Ordinance. Finally, the Court acknowledges that the Appeals Board heard neighbor testimony that the proposed use would be incompatible with the neighborhood. However, to the extent the Board relied on this testimony to support its finding of lack of compatibility, the Board failed to identify how the testimony factually substantiated its conclusion that the proposed unusual use “would not be compatible with the area and its development.” Moreover, the neighbor testimony, while sincere, was largely opinion based and, therefore, lacked sufficient factual content to support the Appeals Board’s decision. Cellular Tel. Co. v. Town of Oyster Bay, 166 F.3d 490, 493 (2d Cir.1999); City of Apopka v. Orange County, 299 So.2d 657, 659 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974) (holding that the findings of fact conclusions of law and decision signed by the school board president constituted the decision of the board", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nand intent of the Zoning Procedure Ordinance. Finally, the Court acknowledges that the Appeals Board heard neighbor testimony that the proposed use would be incompatible with the neighborhood. However, to the extent the Board relied on this testimony to support its finding of lack of compatibility, the Board failed to identify how the testimony factually substantiated its conclusion that the proposed unusual use “would not be compatible with the area and its development.” Moreover, the neighbor testimony, while sincere, was largely opinion based and, therefore, lacked sufficient factual content to support the Appeals Board’s decision. Cellular Tel. Co. v. Town of Oyster Bay, 166 F.3d 490, 493 (2d Cir.1999); City of Apopka v. Orange County, 299 So.2d 657, 659 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974) (holding that public hearings should not be held for the purpose of polling the neighborhood but to present facts to assist a board with its decision", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nand intent of the Zoning Procedure Ordinance. Finally, the Court acknowledges that the Appeals Board heard neighbor testimony that the proposed use would be incompatible with the neighborhood. However, to the extent the Board relied on this testimony to support its finding of lack of compatibility, the Board failed to identify how the testimony factually substantiated its conclusion that the proposed unusual use “would not be compatible with the area and its development.” Moreover, the neighbor testimony, while sincere, was largely opinion based and, therefore, lacked sufficient factual content to support the Appeals Board’s decision. Cellular Tel. Co. v. Town of Oyster Bay, 166 F.3d 490, 493 (2d Cir.1999); City of Apopka v. Orange County, 299 So.2d 657, 659 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974) (holding that a reviewing court is not to substitute its decision for that of the board", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nand intent of the Zoning Procedure Ordinance. Finally, the Court acknowledges that the Appeals Board heard neighbor testimony that the proposed use would be incompatible with the neighborhood. However, to the extent the Board relied on this testimony to support its finding of lack of compatibility, the Board failed to identify how the testimony factually substantiated its conclusion that the proposed unusual use “would not be compatible with the area and its development.” Moreover, the neighbor testimony, while sincere, was largely opinion based and, therefore, lacked sufficient factual content to support the Appeals Board’s decision. Cellular Tel. Co. v. Town of Oyster Bay, 166 F.3d 490, 493 (2d Cir.1999); City of Apopka v. Orange County, 299 So.2d 657, 659 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974) (holding where secretary breached the duty to assist veteran in ensuring examination report was as complete and thorough as possible remand was required to enable the board to assist claimant in developing the facts of his case", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nand intent of the Zoning Procedure Ordinance. Finally, the Court acknowledges that the Appeals Board heard neighbor testimony that the proposed use would be incompatible with the neighborhood. However, to the extent the Board relied on this testimony to support its finding of lack of compatibility, the Board failed to identify how the testimony factually substantiated its conclusion that the proposed unusual use “would not be compatible with the area and its development.” Moreover, the neighbor testimony, while sincere, was largely opinion based and, therefore, lacked sufficient factual content to support the Appeals Board’s decision. Cellular Tel. Co. v. Town of Oyster Bay, 166 F.3d 490, 493 (2d Cir.1999); City of Apopka v. Orange County, 299 So.2d 657, 659 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974) (holding due process requires that 1 the board be presented with a full statement of the facts and all supporting data bearing upon the disputes and 2 the parties may be heard either in person by counsel or by other representatives and the board shall give due notice of all hearings to the employee " ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat the veteran “may win or lose on the facts of her case without regard to the Veterans Court’s interpretation of [statute].... ” Myore, 323 F.3d at 1352. That is to say, a failure to present sufficient evidence may have mooted the issue regardless of the Veterans Court’s interpretation of the statute, but that was not enough to establish a substantial risk that the Veterans Court’s interpretation would evade review. However, in both Adams, 256 F.3d at 1321 and Stevens v. Principi, 289 F.3d 814, 817 (Fed.Cir.2002), we held that the third Williams factor was satisfied because “the question of the authority of the Veterans Court to order a remand might not survive a remand, and, therefore, constituted an appealable final decision.” Myore, 323 F.3d at 1353. See also Winn, 110 F.3d at 57 (holding that the denial of a motion to remand is interlocutory and not immediately appealable", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat the veteran “may win or lose on the facts of her case without regard to the Veterans Court’s interpretation of [statute].... ” Myore, 323 F.3d at 1352. That is to say, a failure to present sufficient evidence may have mooted the issue regardless of the Veterans Court’s interpretation of the statute, but that was not enough to establish a substantial risk that the Veterans Court’s interpretation would evade review. However, in both Adams, 256 F.3d at 1321 and Stevens v. Principi, 289 F.3d 814, 817 (Fed.Cir.2002), we held that the third Williams factor was satisfied because “the question of the authority of the Veterans Court to order a remand might not survive a remand, and, therefore, constituted an appealable final decision.” Myore, 323 F.3d at 1353. See also Winn, 110 F.3d at 57 (holding that a remand need not be ordered despite legal errors if remand would be futile", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat the veteran “may win or lose on the facts of her case without regard to the Veterans Court’s interpretation of [statute].... ” Myore, 323 F.3d at 1352. That is to say, a failure to present sufficient evidence may have mooted the issue regardless of the Veterans Court’s interpretation of the statute, but that was not enough to establish a substantial risk that the Veterans Court’s interpretation would evade review. However, in both Adams, 256 F.3d at 1321 and Stevens v. Principi, 289 F.3d 814, 817 (Fed.Cir.2002), we held that the third Williams factor was satisfied because “the question of the authority of the Veterans Court to order a remand might not survive a remand, and, therefore, constituted an appealable final decision.” Myore, 323 F.3d at 1353. See also Winn, 110 F.3d at 57 (holding that a district courts remand order effectively invalidating certain regulations of the secretary of health and human services was an immediately appealable order", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat the veteran “may win or lose on the facts of her case without regard to the Veterans Court’s interpretation of [statute].... ” Myore, 323 F.3d at 1352. That is to say, a failure to present sufficient evidence may have mooted the issue regardless of the Veterans Court’s interpretation of the statute, but that was not enough to establish a substantial risk that the Veterans Court’s interpretation would evade review. However, in both Adams, 256 F.3d at 1321 and Stevens v. Principi, 289 F.3d 814, 817 (Fed.Cir.2002), we held that the third Williams factor was satisfied because “the question of the authority of the Veterans Court to order a remand might not survive a remand, and, therefore, constituted an appealable final decision.” Myore, 323 F.3d at 1353. See also Winn, 110 F.3d at 57 (holding that a remand is appealable only when the remand disposes of an important legal issue that would be effectively unreviewable at a later stage of litigation", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat the veteran “may win or lose on the facts of her case without regard to the Veterans Court’s interpretation of [statute].... ” Myore, 323 F.3d at 1352. That is to say, a failure to present sufficient evidence may have mooted the issue regardless of the Veterans Court’s interpretation of the statute, but that was not enough to establish a substantial risk that the Veterans Court’s interpretation would evade review. However, in both Adams, 256 F.3d at 1321 and Stevens v. Principi, 289 F.3d 814, 817 (Fed.Cir.2002), we held that the third Williams factor was satisfied because “the question of the authority of the Veterans Court to order a remand might not survive a remand, and, therefore, constituted an appealable final decision.” Myore, 323 F.3d at 1353. See also Winn, 110 F.3d at 57 (holding that the fourth circuit has jurisdiction to review a district courts sua sponte remand order even when that remand order is styled as a remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction if the order was in fact based on the procedural insufficiency of the notice of removal" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nofficers may be removed before the end of their statutorily defined term. See Parsons v. United States, 167 U.S. 324, 339, 32 Ct.Cl. 626, 17 S.Ct. 880, 42 L.Ed. 185 (1897) (“[W]e must construe this act as providing absolutely for the expiration of the term of office at the end of four years, and not as giving a term that shall last, at all events, for that time .... ”); Pievsky v. Ridge, 98 F.3d 730, 734 (3d Cir.1996) (“It is a long-standing rule in the federal courts that a fixed term merely provides a time for the term to end.”). Furthermore, reading section 581(b) as mandating a five-year term renders section 581(c) meaningless, a construction we will not adopt. See Food & Drug Admin, v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 177, 120 S.Ct. 1291, 146 L.Ed.2d 121 (2000) (holding that a statute should where possible be construed according to its plain meaning and as a whole giving meaning to all its parts", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nofficers may be removed before the end of their statutorily defined term. See Parsons v. United States, 167 U.S. 324, 339, 32 Ct.Cl. 626, 17 S.Ct. 880, 42 L.Ed. 185 (1897) (“[W]e must construe this act as providing absolutely for the expiration of the term of office at the end of four years, and not as giving a term that shall last, at all events, for that time .... ”); Pievsky v. Ridge, 98 F.3d 730, 734 (3d Cir.1996) (“It is a long-standing rule in the federal courts that a fixed term merely provides a time for the term to end.”). Furthermore, reading section 581(b) as mandating a five-year term renders section 581(c) meaningless, a construction we will not adopt. See Food & Drug Admin, v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 177, 120 S.Ct. 1291, 146 L.Ed.2d 121 (2000) (holding that statutes dealing with same subject matter should be construed with reference to each other as parts of one system", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nofficers may be removed before the end of their statutorily defined term. See Parsons v. United States, 167 U.S. 324, 339, 32 Ct.Cl. 626, 17 S.Ct. 880, 42 L.Ed. 185 (1897) (“[W]e must construe this act as providing absolutely for the expiration of the term of office at the end of four years, and not as giving a term that shall last, at all events, for that time .... ”); Pievsky v. Ridge, 98 F.3d 730, 734 (3d Cir.1996) (“It is a long-standing rule in the federal courts that a fixed term merely provides a time for the term to end.”). Furthermore, reading section 581(b) as mandating a five-year term renders section 581(c) meaningless, a construction we will not adopt. See Food & Drug Admin, v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 177, 120 S.Ct. 1291, 146 L.Ed.2d 121 (2000) (holding that all parts of the same statute dealing with the same subject are to be construed together as a whole and individual expressions be accorded only that meaning which other modifying provisions and the clear intent and purpose of the act will permit internal citations omitted", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nofficers may be removed before the end of their statutorily defined term. See Parsons v. United States, 167 U.S. 324, 339, 32 Ct.Cl. 626, 17 S.Ct. 880, 42 L.Ed. 185 (1897) (“[W]e must construe this act as providing absolutely for the expiration of the term of office at the end of four years, and not as giving a term that shall last, at all events, for that time .... ”); Pievsky v. Ridge, 98 F.3d 730, 734 (3d Cir.1996) (“It is a long-standing rule in the federal courts that a fixed term merely provides a time for the term to end.”). Furthermore, reading section 581(b) as mandating a five-year term renders section 581(c) meaningless, a construction we will not adopt. See Food & Drug Admin, v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 177, 120 S.Ct. 1291, 146 L.Ed.2d 121 (2000) (holding that a statute should not be construed so as to invalidate other parts of the same statute", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nofficers may be removed before the end of their statutorily defined term. See Parsons v. United States, 167 U.S. 324, 339, 32 Ct.Cl. 626, 17 S.Ct. 880, 42 L.Ed. 185 (1897) (“[W]e must construe this act as providing absolutely for the expiration of the term of office at the end of four years, and not as giving a term that shall last, at all events, for that time .... ”); Pievsky v. Ridge, 98 F.3d 730, 734 (3d Cir.1996) (“It is a long-standing rule in the federal courts that a fixed term merely provides a time for the term to end.”). Furthermore, reading section 581(b) as mandating a five-year term renders section 581(c) meaningless, a construction we will not adopt. See Food & Drug Admin, v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 177, 120 S.Ct. 1291, 146 L.Ed.2d 121 (2000) (holding that the issues specified in the coa may be construed in light of the pleadings and other parts of the record" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nfor the exercise of his judgment or discretion ... unless he is guilty of a willful or malicious wrong.” Elwood v. County of Rice, 423 N.W.2d 671, 677 (Minn.1988) (quotation omitted). The purpose of the official-immunity doctrine is to protect public officials “from the fear of personal liability that might deter independent action and impair effective performance of their duties.” Id. at 678. To determine whether Deputy Sass and Officer Hargrove are protected by official immunity we must therefore identify the specific conduct at issue and then decide whether the conduct is a discretionary or ministerial act. See Anderson v. Anoka Hennepin Indep. Sch. Dist. 11, 678 N.W.2d 651, 656 (Minn.2004) (noting importance of identifying spe noka Police Dep’t, 700 N.W.2d 502, 508 (Minn.App.2005) (holding that officers release of police dog to assist in arrest was discretionary act", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nfor the exercise of his judgment or discretion ... unless he is guilty of a willful or malicious wrong.” Elwood v. County of Rice, 423 N.W.2d 671, 677 (Minn.1988) (quotation omitted). The purpose of the official-immunity doctrine is to protect public officials “from the fear of personal liability that might deter independent action and impair effective performance of their duties.” Id. at 678. To determine whether Deputy Sass and Officer Hargrove are protected by official immunity we must therefore identify the specific conduct at issue and then decide whether the conduct is a discretionary or ministerial act. See Anderson v. Anoka Hennepin Indep. Sch. Dist. 11, 678 N.W.2d 651, 656 (Minn.2004) (noting importance of identifying spe noka Police Dep’t, 700 N.W.2d 502, 508 (Minn.App.2005) (recognizing that police officers may use reasonable force to make a lawful arrest", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nfor the exercise of his judgment or discretion ... unless he is guilty of a willful or malicious wrong.” Elwood v. County of Rice, 423 N.W.2d 671, 677 (Minn.1988) (quotation omitted). The purpose of the official-immunity doctrine is to protect public officials “from the fear of personal liability that might deter independent action and impair effective performance of their duties.” Id. at 678. To determine whether Deputy Sass and Officer Hargrove are protected by official immunity we must therefore identify the specific conduct at issue and then decide whether the conduct is a discretionary or ministerial act. See Anderson v. Anoka Hennepin Indep. Sch. Dist. 11, 678 N.W.2d 651, 656 (Minn.2004) (noting importance of identifying spe noka Police Dep’t, 700 N.W.2d 502, 508 (Minn.App.2005) (holding that deputies use of a police dog is subject to excessive force analysis", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nfor the exercise of his judgment or discretion ... unless he is guilty of a willful or malicious wrong.” Elwood v. County of Rice, 423 N.W.2d 671, 677 (Minn.1988) (quotation omitted). The purpose of the official-immunity doctrine is to protect public officials “from the fear of personal liability that might deter independent action and impair effective performance of their duties.” Id. at 678. To determine whether Deputy Sass and Officer Hargrove are protected by official immunity we must therefore identify the specific conduct at issue and then decide whether the conduct is a discretionary or ministerial act. See Anderson v. Anoka Hennepin Indep. Sch. Dist. 11, 678 N.W.2d 651, 656 (Minn.2004) (noting importance of identifying spe noka Police Dep’t, 700 N.W.2d 502, 508 (Minn.App.2005) (holding officer was performing discretionary act in deciding when and how to arrest suspect", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nfor the exercise of his judgment or discretion ... unless he is guilty of a willful or malicious wrong.” Elwood v. County of Rice, 423 N.W.2d 671, 677 (Minn.1988) (quotation omitted). The purpose of the official-immunity doctrine is to protect public officials “from the fear of personal liability that might deter independent action and impair effective performance of their duties.” Id. at 678. To determine whether Deputy Sass and Officer Hargrove are protected by official immunity we must therefore identify the specific conduct at issue and then decide whether the conduct is a discretionary or ministerial act. See Anderson v. Anoka Hennepin Indep. Sch. Dist. 11, 678 N.W.2d 651, 656 (Minn.2004) (noting importance of identifying spe noka Police Dep’t, 700 N.W.2d 502, 508 (Minn.App.2005) (holding district courts finding of consent was not clearly erroneous when the defendant consented after officers told him they could get a drug dog even though the defendant knew the dog would alert" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nnot a party to these state court eminent domain proceedings, and there is also no indication that he was in privity with any of the property owners involved in those proceedings. Without such a relationship, neither claim nor issue preclusion applies to plaintiffs claims before this court. F. ROOKER-FELDMAN Defendant CCRA also argues that all of plaintiffs claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. In certain circumstances, where a federal suit follows a state suit, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits a federal district court from exercising jurisdiction over the later-filed federal action. See Great Western Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 163-64 (3rd Cir.2010); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust, Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923) (holding that after removal of diversity case to federal court the federal court may grant summary judgment notwithstanding earlier denial of summary judgment motion by state court", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nnot a party to these state court eminent domain proceedings, and there is also no indication that he was in privity with any of the property owners involved in those proceedings. Without such a relationship, neither claim nor issue preclusion applies to plaintiffs claims before this court. F. ROOKER-FELDMAN Defendant CCRA also argues that all of plaintiffs claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. In certain circumstances, where a federal suit follows a state suit, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits a federal district court from exercising jurisdiction over the later-filed federal action. See Great Western Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 163-64 (3rd Cir.2010); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust, Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923) (holding that no federal court other than the supreme court may entertain a proceeding to reverse or modify a judgment of a state court", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nnot a party to these state court eminent domain proceedings, and there is also no indication that he was in privity with any of the property owners involved in those proceedings. Without such a relationship, neither claim nor issue preclusion applies to plaintiffs claims before this court. F. ROOKER-FELDMAN Defendant CCRA also argues that all of plaintiffs claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. In certain circumstances, where a federal suit follows a state suit, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits a federal district court from exercising jurisdiction over the later-filed federal action. See Great Western Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 163-64 (3rd Cir.2010); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust, Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923) (holding that the court of appeals may not reverse a trial courts judgment in the absence of properly assigned error", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nnot a party to these state court eminent domain proceedings, and there is also no indication that he was in privity with any of the property owners involved in those proceedings. Without such a relationship, neither claim nor issue preclusion applies to plaintiffs claims before this court. F. ROOKER-FELDMAN Defendant CCRA also argues that all of plaintiffs claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. In certain circumstances, where a federal suit follows a state suit, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits a federal district court from exercising jurisdiction over the later-filed federal action. See Great Western Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 163-64 (3rd Cir.2010); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust, Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923) (holding that state court could not have unreasonably applied federal law if no clear supreme court precedent existed", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nnot a party to these state court eminent domain proceedings, and there is also no indication that he was in privity with any of the property owners involved in those proceedings. Without such a relationship, neither claim nor issue preclusion applies to plaintiffs claims before this court. F. ROOKER-FELDMAN Defendant CCRA also argues that all of plaintiffs claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. In certain circumstances, where a federal suit follows a state suit, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits a federal district court from exercising jurisdiction over the later-filed federal action. See Great Western Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 163-64 (3rd Cir.2010); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust, Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923) (holding that a federal court litigant who is forced into state court under pullman may reserve a right to return to federal court in that the plaintiff can preserve the right to the federal forum for federal claims by informing the state court of his or her intention to return following litigation of the state claims in the state court" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nin the case of an automobile accident that appears partially attributable to the presence of foliage obscuring a stop sign, the settling parties could release the persons responsible for the foliage by including terminology like “and the owners, occupiers, and any other persons responsible for the upkeep or maintenance of the premises on which the shrubs that obscured Releasee’s view of the stop sign were growing.” We recognize that general release clauses without specific identifying terminology have been used extensively and have been relied on as full and final settlement of all claims. Our ruling today shall, therefore, apply only prospectively, except that we will also apply it to this case and to all other cases in which the issue is preserved. Cf. Alsup, 461 N.E.2d at 364-65 (holding that terms identifying persons in a manner that the parties to the release would know who was to be benefitted sufficient under specific identity rule", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nin the case of an automobile accident that appears partially attributable to the presence of foliage obscuring a stop sign, the settling parties could release the persons responsible for the foliage by including terminology like “and the owners, occupiers, and any other persons responsible for the upkeep or maintenance of the premises on which the shrubs that obscured Releasee’s view of the stop sign were growing.” We recognize that general release clauses without specific identifying terminology have been used extensively and have been relied on as full and final settlement of all claims. Our ruling today shall, therefore, apply only prospectively, except that we will also apply it to this case and to all other cases in which the issue is preserved. Cf. Alsup, 461 N.E.2d at 364-65 (recognizing this as the general rule", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nin the case of an automobile accident that appears partially attributable to the presence of foliage obscuring a stop sign, the settling parties could release the persons responsible for the foliage by including terminology like “and the owners, occupiers, and any other persons responsible for the upkeep or maintenance of the premises on which the shrubs that obscured Releasee’s view of the stop sign were growing.” We recognize that general release clauses without specific identifying terminology have been used extensively and have been relied on as full and final settlement of all claims. Our ruling today shall, therefore, apply only prospectively, except that we will also apply it to this case and to all other cases in which the issue is preserved. Cf. Alsup, 461 N.E.2d at 364-65 (holding that because of widespread use of and reliance on general language specific identity rule would apply prospectively only", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nin the case of an automobile accident that appears partially attributable to the presence of foliage obscuring a stop sign, the settling parties could release the persons responsible for the foliage by including terminology like “and the owners, occupiers, and any other persons responsible for the upkeep or maintenance of the premises on which the shrubs that obscured Releasee’s view of the stop sign were growing.” We recognize that general release clauses without specific identifying terminology have been used extensively and have been relied on as full and final settlement of all claims. Our ruling today shall, therefore, apply only prospectively, except that we will also apply it to this case and to all other cases in which the issue is preserved. Cf. Alsup, 461 N.E.2d at 364-65 (holding that specific statutes create exceptions to general statutes therefore if a provision of a specific statute is inconsistent with one in a general statute on the same subject the specific statute controls", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nin the case of an automobile accident that appears partially attributable to the presence of foliage obscuring a stop sign, the settling parties could release the persons responsible for the foliage by including terminology like “and the owners, occupiers, and any other persons responsible for the upkeep or maintenance of the premises on which the shrubs that obscured Releasee’s view of the stop sign were growing.” We recognize that general release clauses without specific identifying terminology have been used extensively and have been relied on as full and final settlement of all claims. Our ruling today shall, therefore, apply only prospectively, except that we will also apply it to this case and to all other cases in which the issue is preserved. Cf. Alsup, 461 N.E.2d at 364-65 (recognizing general rule" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe custody arrangement in this matter, and we affirm that order. In addition, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it found Colleen in contempt and ordered her to pay attorney fees. 1 94 Nev. 79, 575 P.2d 585 (1978). 2 Rust v. Clark Cty. School District, 103 Nev. 686, 688, 747 P.2d 1380, 1382 (1987); see also Smith v. Emery, 109 Nev. 737, 740, 856 P.2d 1386, 1388 (1993); Huneycutt, 94 Nev. at 80, 575 P.2d at 585. 3 Rust, 103 Nev. at 688-89, 747 P.2d at 1382. 4 Kantor v. Kantor, 116 Nev. 886, 895, 8 P.3d 825, 830 (2000) (citing Bongiovi v. Bongiovi, 94 Nev. 321, 579 P.2d 1246 (1978)). 5 94 Nev. 79, 575 P.2d 585. Other courts have reached similar conclusions in child custody matters. See, e.g., Daniel v. Daniel, 42 P.3d 863, 867 n.6 (Okla. 2001) (holding that temporary order amounted to order modifying custody of children because language changed custody for an indefinite period", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe custody arrangement in this matter, and we affirm that order. In addition, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it found Colleen in contempt and ordered her to pay attorney fees. 1 94 Nev. 79, 575 P.2d 585 (1978). 2 Rust v. Clark Cty. School District, 103 Nev. 686, 688, 747 P.2d 1380, 1382 (1987); see also Smith v. Emery, 109 Nev. 737, 740, 856 P.2d 1386, 1388 (1993); Huneycutt, 94 Nev. at 80, 575 P.2d at 585. 3 Rust, 103 Nev. at 688-89, 747 P.2d at 1382. 4 Kantor v. Kantor, 116 Nev. 886, 895, 8 P.3d 825, 830 (2000) (citing Bongiovi v. Bongiovi, 94 Nev. 321, 579 P.2d 1246 (1978)). 5 94 Nev. 79, 575 P.2d 585. Other courts have reached similar conclusions in child custody matters. See, e.g., Daniel v. Daniel, 42 P.3d 863, 867 n.6 (Okla. 2001) (holding that the lower court should have entered a final order on custody", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe custody arrangement in this matter, and we affirm that order. In addition, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it found Colleen in contempt and ordered her to pay attorney fees. 1 94 Nev. 79, 575 P.2d 585 (1978). 2 Rust v. Clark Cty. School District, 103 Nev. 686, 688, 747 P.2d 1380, 1382 (1987); see also Smith v. Emery, 109 Nev. 737, 740, 856 P.2d 1386, 1388 (1993); Huneycutt, 94 Nev. at 80, 575 P.2d at 585. 3 Rust, 103 Nev. at 688-89, 747 P.2d at 1382. 4 Kantor v. Kantor, 116 Nev. 886, 895, 8 P.3d 825, 830 (2000) (citing Bongiovi v. Bongiovi, 94 Nev. 321, 579 P.2d 1246 (1978)). 5 94 Nev. 79, 575 P.2d 585. Other courts have reached similar conclusions in child custody matters. See, e.g., Daniel v. Daniel, 42 P.3d 863, 867 n.6 (Okla. 2001) (recognizing that an appeal does not divest the lower court from making a provisional or temporary custody order during the appeals pendency", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe custody arrangement in this matter, and we affirm that order. In addition, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it found Colleen in contempt and ordered her to pay attorney fees. 1 94 Nev. 79, 575 P.2d 585 (1978). 2 Rust v. Clark Cty. School District, 103 Nev. 686, 688, 747 P.2d 1380, 1382 (1987); see also Smith v. Emery, 109 Nev. 737, 740, 856 P.2d 1386, 1388 (1993); Huneycutt, 94 Nev. at 80, 575 P.2d at 585. 3 Rust, 103 Nev. at 688-89, 747 P.2d at 1382. 4 Kantor v. Kantor, 116 Nev. 886, 895, 8 P.3d 825, 830 (2000) (citing Bongiovi v. Bongiovi, 94 Nev. 321, 579 P.2d 1246 (1978)). 5 94 Nev. 79, 575 P.2d 585. Other courts have reached similar conclusions in child custody matters. See, e.g., Daniel v. Daniel, 42 P.3d 863, 867 n.6 (Okla. 2001) (holding that the pendency of a petitioners federal habeas corpus petition does not divest a trial court of jurisdiction to address a pcra petition", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe custody arrangement in this matter, and we affirm that order. In addition, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it found Colleen in contempt and ordered her to pay attorney fees. 1 94 Nev. 79, 575 P.2d 585 (1978). 2 Rust v. Clark Cty. School District, 103 Nev. 686, 688, 747 P.2d 1380, 1382 (1987); see also Smith v. Emery, 109 Nev. 737, 740, 856 P.2d 1386, 1388 (1993); Huneycutt, 94 Nev. at 80, 575 P.2d at 585. 3 Rust, 103 Nev. at 688-89, 747 P.2d at 1382. 4 Kantor v. Kantor, 116 Nev. 886, 895, 8 P.3d 825, 830 (2000) (citing Bongiovi v. Bongiovi, 94 Nev. 321, 579 P.2d 1246 (1978)). 5 94 Nev. 79, 575 P.2d 585. Other courts have reached similar conclusions in child custody matters. See, e.g., Daniel v. Daniel, 42 P.3d 863, 867 n.6 (Okla. 2001) (holding that since district court of appeal properly found that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to rule on a 3850 motion during the pendency of a direct appeal the district court of appeal should have vacated the order rather than affirming on the merits" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nto “plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged); GlenFed, 42 F.3d at 1546^17 (observing that where no heightened pleading standard is required, a plaintiff need not plead fraudulent intent with particularity). Under these requirements, Allstate has adequately alleged a violation of §§ 25400 and 25500. According to Allstate, Stern willfully participated in the conveyance of misleading information to investors through its involvement in investigating, drafting, and reviewing the data set forth in the Official Statements. Given that role, Stern had a duty to disclose any known information necessary to prevent the Official Statements from being false or misleading. See Howard, 228 F.3d at 1061 (holding a defendant may be convicted of mail fraud if he knowingly and willfully participates in a fraudulent scheme created and set in motion by others", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nto “plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged); GlenFed, 42 F.3d at 1546^17 (observing that where no heightened pleading standard is required, a plaintiff need not plead fraudulent intent with particularity). Under these requirements, Allstate has adequately alleged a violation of §§ 25400 and 25500. According to Allstate, Stern willfully participated in the conveyance of misleading information to investors through its involvement in investigating, drafting, and reviewing the data set forth in the Official Statements. Given that role, Stern had a duty to disclose any known information necessary to prevent the Official Statements from being false or misleading. See Howard, 228 F.3d at 1061 (holding that no judgment can be rendered against defendant who cannot be held liable", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nto “plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged); GlenFed, 42 F.3d at 1546^17 (observing that where no heightened pleading standard is required, a plaintiff need not plead fraudulent intent with particularity). Under these requirements, Allstate has adequately alleged a violation of §§ 25400 and 25500. According to Allstate, Stern willfully participated in the conveyance of misleading information to investors through its involvement in investigating, drafting, and reviewing the data set forth in the Official Statements. Given that role, Stern had a duty to disclose any known information necessary to prevent the Official Statements from being false or misleading. See Howard, 228 F.3d at 1061 (holding that a person violates the bank fraud statute when he knowingly executes a scheme to obtain money from a financial institution by means of false or fraudulent representations if a defendant knowingly provided materially false information in order to induce the loan the crime is complete and it is irrelevant whether or not he intended to repay or was capable of repaying it", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nto “plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged); GlenFed, 42 F.3d at 1546^17 (observing that where no heightened pleading standard is required, a plaintiff need not plead fraudulent intent with particularity). Under these requirements, Allstate has adequately alleged a violation of §§ 25400 and 25500. According to Allstate, Stern willfully participated in the conveyance of misleading information to investors through its involvement in investigating, drafting, and reviewing the data set forth in the Official Statements. Given that role, Stern had a duty to disclose any known information necessary to prevent the Official Statements from being false or misleading. See Howard, 228 F.3d at 1061 (holding that a defendant can be held liable when it knowingly participates in the creation of a false or misleading statement", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nto “plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged); GlenFed, 42 F.3d at 1546^17 (observing that where no heightened pleading standard is required, a plaintiff need not plead fraudulent intent with particularity). Under these requirements, Allstate has adequately alleged a violation of §§ 25400 and 25500. According to Allstate, Stern willfully participated in the conveyance of misleading information to investors through its involvement in investigating, drafting, and reviewing the data set forth in the Official Statements. Given that role, Stern had a duty to disclose any known information necessary to prevent the Official Statements from being false or misleading. See Howard, 228 F.3d at 1061 (holding that the elements of a claim under 3729a2 are 1 that the defendant made used or caused to be made or used a record or statement to get a claim against the united states paid or approved 2 the record or statement and the claim were false or fraudulent and 3 the defendant knew that the record or statement and the claim were false or fraudulent emphasis added" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nrights of a contracting entity and the United States regarding any contract executed pursuant to Federal reclamation law. The United States, when a party to any suit, shall be deemed to have waived any right to plead that it is not amenable thereto by reason of its sovereignty, and shall be subject to judgments, orders, and decrees of the court having jurisdiction, and may obtain review thereof, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances. 43 U.S.C. § 390uu. We conclude that this statutory provision waives sovereign immunity in this case, where appellants are seeking injunctive and declaratory relief under the Westlands and San Benito contracts. Accord Sumner Peck Ranch, Inc. v. Bureau of Reclamation, 823 F.Supp. 715, 748 (E.D.Cal.1993) (holding that 390uu waives sovereign immunity from contract claims for injunctive relief and specific performance", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nrights of a contracting entity and the United States regarding any contract executed pursuant to Federal reclamation law. The United States, when a party to any suit, shall be deemed to have waived any right to plead that it is not amenable thereto by reason of its sovereignty, and shall be subject to judgments, orders, and decrees of the court having jurisdiction, and may obtain review thereof, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances. 43 U.S.C. § 390uu. We conclude that this statutory provision waives sovereign immunity in this case, where appellants are seeking injunctive and declaratory relief under the Westlands and San Benito contracts. Accord Sumner Peck Ranch, Inc. v. Bureau of Reclamation, 823 F.Supp. 715, 748 (E.D.Cal.1993) (holding that plaintiffs claim was not barred by sovereign immunity because he sought specific relief against a government official", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nrights of a contracting entity and the United States regarding any contract executed pursuant to Federal reclamation law. The United States, when a party to any suit, shall be deemed to have waived any right to plead that it is not amenable thereto by reason of its sovereignty, and shall be subject to judgments, orders, and decrees of the court having jurisdiction, and may obtain review thereof, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances. 43 U.S.C. § 390uu. We conclude that this statutory provision waives sovereign immunity in this case, where appellants are seeking injunctive and declaratory relief under the Westlands and San Benito contracts. Accord Sumner Peck Ranch, Inc. v. Bureau of Reclamation, 823 F.Supp. 715, 748 (E.D.Cal.1993) (holding that immunity from suit precluded claim for breach of contract for sale of county property and request for specific performance of contract", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nrights of a contracting entity and the United States regarding any contract executed pursuant to Federal reclamation law. The United States, when a party to any suit, shall be deemed to have waived any right to plead that it is not amenable thereto by reason of its sovereignty, and shall be subject to judgments, orders, and decrees of the court having jurisdiction, and may obtain review thereof, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances. 43 U.S.C. § 390uu. We conclude that this statutory provision waives sovereign immunity in this case, where appellants are seeking injunctive and declaratory relief under the Westlands and San Benito contracts. Accord Sumner Peck Ranch, Inc. v. Bureau of Reclamation, 823 F.Supp. 715, 748 (E.D.Cal.1993) (holding that the tucker acts waiver of sovereign immunity for contract claims does not extend to claims for contracts implied in law", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nrights of a contracting entity and the United States regarding any contract executed pursuant to Federal reclamation law. The United States, when a party to any suit, shall be deemed to have waived any right to plead that it is not amenable thereto by reason of its sovereignty, and shall be subject to judgments, orders, and decrees of the court having jurisdiction, and may obtain review thereof, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances. 43 U.S.C. § 390uu. We conclude that this statutory provision waives sovereign immunity in this case, where appellants are seeking injunctive and declaratory relief under the Westlands and San Benito contracts. Accord Sumner Peck Ranch, Inc. v. Bureau of Reclamation, 823 F.Supp. 715, 748 (E.D.Cal.1993) (holding city waives immunity by entering into contract" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nerror in the trial court’s exercise of discretion. This assignment of error is without merit. II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN THE MANNER IN WHICH THE JURY WAS SELECTED ¶ 7. Robinson assigns error to the trial court’s method of jury selection. Robinson’s only claim rests on a vague recitation of Rule 4.05(2) of the Uniform Rules of Circuit and County Court without any additional argument or citation to authority in support thereof. Robinson maintains a full panel of accepted jurors was not tendered to him after the State exercised its first round in the jury selection. Robinson is incorrect and misinterprets the selection procedure outlined in URCCC 4.05(2). Under URCCC 4.05(2) a full panel of jurors, meaning twelve, are tendered by the State after electing to exer , 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991) (holding that generally an unsworn statement by counsel is not evidence in the context of a batson hearing", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nerror in the trial court’s exercise of discretion. This assignment of error is without merit. II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN THE MANNER IN WHICH THE JURY WAS SELECTED ¶ 7. Robinson assigns error to the trial court’s method of jury selection. Robinson’s only claim rests on a vague recitation of Rule 4.05(2) of the Uniform Rules of Circuit and County Court without any additional argument or citation to authority in support thereof. Robinson maintains a full panel of accepted jurors was not tendered to him after the State exercised its first round in the jury selection. Robinson is incorrect and misinterprets the selection procedure outlined in URCCC 4.05(2). Under URCCC 4.05(2) a full panel of jurors, meaning twelve, are tendered by the State after electing to exer , 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991) (holding that evidence of the same name and that the former conviction was in same city and same court as the present case and the fact that the defendant did not offer any testimony to rebut the prima facie evidence of identity was sufficient to establish identity", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nerror in the trial court’s exercise of discretion. This assignment of error is without merit. II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN THE MANNER IN WHICH THE JURY WAS SELECTED ¶ 7. Robinson assigns error to the trial court’s method of jury selection. Robinson’s only claim rests on a vague recitation of Rule 4.05(2) of the Uniform Rules of Circuit and County Court without any additional argument or citation to authority in support thereof. Robinson maintains a full panel of accepted jurors was not tendered to him after the State exercised its first round in the jury selection. Robinson is incorrect and misinterprets the selection procedure outlined in URCCC 4.05(2). Under URCCC 4.05(2) a full panel of jurors, meaning twelve, are tendered by the State after electing to exer , 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991) (holding that probation does not constitute a sentence", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nerror in the trial court’s exercise of discretion. This assignment of error is without merit. II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN THE MANNER IN WHICH THE JURY WAS SELECTED ¶ 7. Robinson assigns error to the trial court’s method of jury selection. Robinson’s only claim rests on a vague recitation of Rule 4.05(2) of the Uniform Rules of Circuit and County Court without any additional argument or citation to authority in support thereof. Robinson maintains a full panel of accepted jurors was not tendered to him after the State exercised its first round in the jury selection. Robinson is incorrect and misinterprets the selection procedure outlined in URCCC 4.05(2). Under URCCC 4.05(2) a full panel of jurors, meaning twelve, are tendered by the State after electing to exer , 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991) (holding that a defendants confirmation of a psrs findings does not waive a challenge on appeal where there is no conceivable strategic reason for not objecting to a sentence at a higher offense level", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nerror in the trial court’s exercise of discretion. This assignment of error is without merit. II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN THE MANNER IN WHICH THE JURY WAS SELECTED ¶ 7. Robinson assigns error to the trial court’s method of jury selection. Robinson’s only claim rests on a vague recitation of Rule 4.05(2) of the Uniform Rules of Circuit and County Court without any additional argument or citation to authority in support thereof. Robinson maintains a full panel of accepted jurors was not tendered to him after the State exercised its first round in the jury selection. Robinson is incorrect and misinterprets the selection procedure outlined in URCCC 4.05(2). Under URCCC 4.05(2) a full panel of jurors, meaning twelve, are tendered by the State after electing to exer , 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991) (holding that racial identity between the objecting defendant and the excluded jurors does not constitute a relevant precondition for a batson challenge" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\n(\"If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”). 11 . This circuit has already determined that the ninety-day statutory deadline for filing a motion to reopen may be tolled. See Riley v. INS, 310 F.3d 1253, 1257-58 (10th Cir.2002). Accordingly, it is not a jurisdictional limit and should not be raised sua sponte. Other circuits are in accord. See Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1190-93 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc); Iavorski v. INS, 232 F.3d 124, 130-34 (2d Cir.2000). My colleagues apparently assume that the filing deadline contained in § 1229a(c)(6)(B) is similarly not a jurisdictional restriction. Cf. Pervaiz v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 488, 490 (7th Cir.2005) (holding that an aliens departure based on an in absentia removal order does not necessarily deprive an ij of jurisdiction to decide a motion to reopen", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\n(\"If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”). 11 . This circuit has already determined that the ninety-day statutory deadline for filing a motion to reopen may be tolled. See Riley v. INS, 310 F.3d 1253, 1257-58 (10th Cir.2002). Accordingly, it is not a jurisdictional limit and should not be raised sua sponte. Other circuits are in accord. See Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1190-93 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc); Iavorski v. INS, 232 F.3d 124, 130-34 (2d Cir.2000). My colleagues apparently assume that the filing deadline contained in § 1229a(c)(6)(B) is similarly not a jurisdictional restriction. Cf. Pervaiz v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 488, 490 (7th Cir.2005) (recognizing that orders denying motions to reopen are treated as final orders of removal", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\n(\"If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”). 11 . This circuit has already determined that the ninety-day statutory deadline for filing a motion to reopen may be tolled. See Riley v. INS, 310 F.3d 1253, 1257-58 (10th Cir.2002). Accordingly, it is not a jurisdictional limit and should not be raised sua sponte. Other circuits are in accord. See Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1190-93 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc); Iavorski v. INS, 232 F.3d 124, 130-34 (2d Cir.2000). My colleagues apparently assume that the filing deadline contained in § 1229a(c)(6)(B) is similarly not a jurisdictional restriction. Cf. Pervaiz v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 488, 490 (7th Cir.2005) (holding that the 180day filing deadline is jurisdictional and mandatory", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\n(\"If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”). 11 . This circuit has already determined that the ninety-day statutory deadline for filing a motion to reopen may be tolled. See Riley v. INS, 310 F.3d 1253, 1257-58 (10th Cir.2002). Accordingly, it is not a jurisdictional limit and should not be raised sua sponte. Other circuits are in accord. See Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1190-93 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc); Iavorski v. INS, 232 F.3d 124, 130-34 (2d Cir.2000). My colleagues apparently assume that the filing deadline contained in § 1229a(c)(6)(B) is similarly not a jurisdictional restriction. Cf. Pervaiz v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 488, 490 (7th Cir.2005) (holding that the 180day filing deadline applicable to motions to reopen from removal orders filed in absentia is not jurisdictional", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\n(\"If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”). 11 . This circuit has already determined that the ninety-day statutory deadline for filing a motion to reopen may be tolled. See Riley v. INS, 310 F.3d 1253, 1257-58 (10th Cir.2002). Accordingly, it is not a jurisdictional limit and should not be raised sua sponte. Other circuits are in accord. See Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1190-93 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc); Iavorski v. INS, 232 F.3d 124, 130-34 (2d Cir.2000). My colleagues apparently assume that the filing deadline contained in § 1229a(c)(6)(B) is similarly not a jurisdictional restriction. Cf. Pervaiz v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 488, 490 (7th Cir.2005) (holding that district court had no authority to reopen appeal period when motion was filed beyond 180day limit" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthe statutory policy of “furthering the successful pi-osecution of meritorious claims” was best served by a rule that “creates an incentive to retain counsel in every such case.” Id. at 438, 111 S.Ct. 1435. Permitting a fee award to a pro se litigant, even one who is a lawyer, would instead “create a disincentive to employ counsel.” Id. Accordingly the Supreme Court held that pro se lawyers did not fall within the scope of the fee-shifting provision. Although Kay was decided pursuant to section 1988, its reasoning is not confined to that statute. Indeed, both this Court and other “courts of appeals have [since Kay] denied attorney’s fees to pro se attorneys under a variety of fee-shifting statutes .... ” Zucker v. Westinghouse Elec., 374 F.3d 221, 228-29 (3d Cir.2004); see id. at 229 (holding that attorneys fee award in a common fund case must be reasonable under the circumstances", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthe statutory policy of “furthering the successful pi-osecution of meritorious claims” was best served by a rule that “creates an incentive to retain counsel in every such case.” Id. at 438, 111 S.Ct. 1435. Permitting a fee award to a pro se litigant, even one who is a lawyer, would instead “create a disincentive to employ counsel.” Id. Accordingly the Supreme Court held that pro se lawyers did not fall within the scope of the fee-shifting provision. Although Kay was decided pursuant to section 1988, its reasoning is not confined to that statute. Indeed, both this Court and other “courts of appeals have [since Kay] denied attorney’s fees to pro se attorneys under a variety of fee-shifting statutes .... ” Zucker v. Westinghouse Elec., 374 F.3d 221, 228-29 (3d Cir.2004); see id. at 229 (holding attorneys fees not available to pro se attorney litigant in a federal freedom of information act action", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthe statutory policy of “furthering the successful pi-osecution of meritorious claims” was best served by a rule that “creates an incentive to retain counsel in every such case.” Id. at 438, 111 S.Ct. 1435. Permitting a fee award to a pro se litigant, even one who is a lawyer, would instead “create a disincentive to employ counsel.” Id. Accordingly the Supreme Court held that pro se lawyers did not fall within the scope of the fee-shifting provision. Although Kay was decided pursuant to section 1988, its reasoning is not confined to that statute. Indeed, both this Court and other “courts of appeals have [since Kay] denied attorney’s fees to pro se attorneys under a variety of fee-shifting statutes .... ” Zucker v. Westinghouse Elec., 374 F.3d 221, 228-29 (3d Cir.2004); see id. at 229 (holding that attorney fees awarded under the common fund doctrine do not constitute part of a plaintiffs claim against the defendant and cannot be considered for amountincontroversy purposes", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthe statutory policy of “furthering the successful pi-osecution of meritorious claims” was best served by a rule that “creates an incentive to retain counsel in every such case.” Id. at 438, 111 S.Ct. 1435. Permitting a fee award to a pro se litigant, even one who is a lawyer, would instead “create a disincentive to employ counsel.” Id. Accordingly the Supreme Court held that pro se lawyers did not fall within the scope of the fee-shifting provision. Although Kay was decided pursuant to section 1988, its reasoning is not confined to that statute. Indeed, both this Court and other “courts of appeals have [since Kay] denied attorney’s fees to pro se attorneys under a variety of fee-shifting statutes .... ” Zucker v. Westinghouse Elec., 374 F.3d 221, 228-29 (3d Cir.2004); see id. at 229 (holding that a pro se litigant who is an attorney is not entitled to fees under 1988", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthe statutory policy of “furthering the successful pi-osecution of meritorious claims” was best served by a rule that “creates an incentive to retain counsel in every such case.” Id. at 438, 111 S.Ct. 1435. Permitting a fee award to a pro se litigant, even one who is a lawyer, would instead “create a disincentive to employ counsel.” Id. Accordingly the Supreme Court held that pro se lawyers did not fall within the scope of the fee-shifting provision. Although Kay was decided pursuant to section 1988, its reasoning is not confined to that statute. Indeed, both this Court and other “courts of appeals have [since Kay] denied attorney’s fees to pro se attorneys under a variety of fee-shifting statutes .... ” Zucker v. Westinghouse Elec., 374 F.3d 221, 228-29 (3d Cir.2004); see id. at 229 (holding that a shareholderobjector who represents himself as a pro se lawyer is not entitled to attorneys fees under the common fund doctrine" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\n“use of the knife as a weapon” was not justified by his explanation and his “use of the knife ... was clearly a use of the knife as a potential weapon.” There is evidence to support these findings. [¶ 19.] When Amundson opened the door to allow the agents to enter his apartment, he unquestionably possessed a knife. That possession constitutes using the knife as a potential weapon. Amundson attempts to justify his use of the knife, in this manner by asserting that he was uncertain who was at the door and that he was “scared.” However, Amundson had a reasonable alternative to using the knife as a potential weapon. For example, he could have insisted on identification before he opened the door or left the knife in the kitchen. See United States v. Lomax, 87 F.3d 959, 962 (8th Cir.1996) (holding that the trial court was not entitled to impose a threeyear mandatory minimum sentence on a defendant convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon where the jury verdict did not specifically find actual possession", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\n“use of the knife as a weapon” was not justified by his explanation and his “use of the knife ... was clearly a use of the knife as a potential weapon.” There is evidence to support these findings. [¶ 19.] When Amundson opened the door to allow the agents to enter his apartment, he unquestionably possessed a knife. That possession constitutes using the knife as a potential weapon. Amundson attempts to justify his use of the knife, in this manner by asserting that he was uncertain who was at the door and that he was “scared.” However, Amundson had a reasonable alternative to using the knife as a potential weapon. For example, he could have insisted on identification before he opened the door or left the knife in the kitchen. See United States v. Lomax, 87 F.3d 959, 962 (8th Cir.1996) (holding the defendant was a convicted felon within the purview of the federal statute prohibiting the receiving and possession of firearms by a convicted felon where the defendants prior conviction was based on an idaho state probated sentence", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\n“use of the knife as a weapon” was not justified by his explanation and his “use of the knife ... was clearly a use of the knife as a potential weapon.” There is evidence to support these findings. [¶ 19.] When Amundson opened the door to allow the agents to enter his apartment, he unquestionably possessed a knife. That possession constitutes using the knife as a potential weapon. Amundson attempts to justify his use of the knife, in this manner by asserting that he was uncertain who was at the door and that he was “scared.” However, Amundson had a reasonable alternative to using the knife as a potential weapon. For example, he could have insisted on identification before he opened the door or left the knife in the kitchen. See United States v. Lomax, 87 F.3d 959, 962 (8th Cir.1996) (holding that the enhancement applied where the defendant possessed a firearm in connection with possessing methamphetamine", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\n“use of the knife as a weapon” was not justified by his explanation and his “use of the knife ... was clearly a use of the knife as a potential weapon.” There is evidence to support these findings. [¶ 19.] When Amundson opened the door to allow the agents to enter his apartment, he unquestionably possessed a knife. That possession constitutes using the knife as a potential weapon. Amundson attempts to justify his use of the knife, in this manner by asserting that he was uncertain who was at the door and that he was “scared.” However, Amundson had a reasonable alternative to using the knife as a potential weapon. For example, he could have insisted on identification before he opened the door or left the knife in the kitchen. See United States v. Lomax, 87 F.3d 959, 962 (8th Cir.1996) (holding that the defendant a convicted felon was not legally justified in possessing a firearm because potentially effective legal options existed", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\n“use of the knife as a weapon” was not justified by his explanation and his “use of the knife ... was clearly a use of the knife as a potential weapon.” There is evidence to support these findings. [¶ 19.] When Amundson opened the door to allow the agents to enter his apartment, he unquestionably possessed a knife. That possession constitutes using the knife as a potential weapon. Amundson attempts to justify his use of the knife, in this manner by asserting that he was uncertain who was at the door and that he was “scared.” However, Amundson had a reasonable alternative to using the knife as a potential weapon. For example, he could have insisted on identification before he opened the door or left the knife in the kitchen. See United States v. Lomax, 87 F.3d 959, 962 (8th Cir.1996) (holding that dual convictions of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and possession of ammunition by a convicted felon violated double jeopardy" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nv. Government of the United States Virgin Islands, 299 F.3d 207 (3d Cir.2002), we rejected the “manifest error” standard and the proposition that the Ap pellate Division should be treated “as if it were a local appellate or supreme court.” Id. at 211-12; see also Saludes v. Ramos, 744 F.2d 992, 993-94 (3d Cir.1984) (rejecting deferential standard of review for Appellate Division decision). In reaching this conclusion, we emphasized that the District Court of the Virgin Islands “is essentially a federal creature, and not an insular appellate court.” BA Properties, 299 F.3d at 212. We also indicated in BA Properties that the Virgin Islands Supreme Court, once it was established by the Virgin Islands Legislature, would possess an authoritative voice on matters of Virgin Islands law. Id. (recognizing the virgin islands legislature as the sovereign author of local jurisdictional law including section 39c even before passage of the 1984 amendments to the revised organic act sometimes referred to as the virgin islands constitution", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nv. Government of the United States Virgin Islands, 299 F.3d 207 (3d Cir.2002), we rejected the “manifest error” standard and the proposition that the Ap pellate Division should be treated “as if it were a local appellate or supreme court.” Id. at 211-12; see also Saludes v. Ramos, 744 F.2d 992, 993-94 (3d Cir.1984) (rejecting deferential standard of review for Appellate Division decision). In reaching this conclusion, we emphasized that the District Court of the Virgin Islands “is essentially a federal creature, and not an insular appellate court.” BA Properties, 299 F.3d at 212. We also indicated in BA Properties that the Virgin Islands Supreme Court, once it was established by the Virgin Islands Legislature, would possess an authoritative voice on matters of Virgin Islands law. Id. (recognizing that any attributes of sovereignty the virgin islands has derive from the revised organic act", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nv. Government of the United States Virgin Islands, 299 F.3d 207 (3d Cir.2002), we rejected the “manifest error” standard and the proposition that the Ap pellate Division should be treated “as if it were a local appellate or supreme court.” Id. at 211-12; see also Saludes v. Ramos, 744 F.2d 992, 993-94 (3d Cir.1984) (rejecting deferential standard of review for Appellate Division decision). In reaching this conclusion, we emphasized that the District Court of the Virgin Islands “is essentially a federal creature, and not an insular appellate court.” BA Properties, 299 F.3d at 212. We also indicated in BA Properties that the Virgin Islands Supreme Court, once it was established by the Virgin Islands Legislature, would possess an authoritative voice on matters of Virgin Islands law. Id. (recognizing that virgin islands supreme court would essentially have the final word on the interpretation of local virgin islands law", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nv. Government of the United States Virgin Islands, 299 F.3d 207 (3d Cir.2002), we rejected the “manifest error” standard and the proposition that the Ap pellate Division should be treated “as if it were a local appellate or supreme court.” Id. at 211-12; see also Saludes v. Ramos, 744 F.2d 992, 993-94 (3d Cir.1984) (rejecting deferential standard of review for Appellate Division decision). In reaching this conclusion, we emphasized that the District Court of the Virgin Islands “is essentially a federal creature, and not an insular appellate court.” BA Properties, 299 F.3d at 212. We also indicated in BA Properties that the Virgin Islands Supreme Court, once it was established by the Virgin Islands Legislature, would possess an authoritative voice on matters of Virgin Islands law. Id. (holding that court is bound by prior panels interpretation of supreme court decision", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nv. Government of the United States Virgin Islands, 299 F.3d 207 (3d Cir.2002), we rejected the “manifest error” standard and the proposition that the Ap pellate Division should be treated “as if it were a local appellate or supreme court.” Id. at 211-12; see also Saludes v. Ramos, 744 F.2d 992, 993-94 (3d Cir.1984) (rejecting deferential standard of review for Appellate Division decision). In reaching this conclusion, we emphasized that the District Court of the Virgin Islands “is essentially a federal creature, and not an insular appellate court.” BA Properties, 299 F.3d at 212. We also indicated in BA Properties that the Virgin Islands Supreme Court, once it was established by the Virgin Islands Legislature, would possess an authoritative voice on matters of Virgin Islands law. Id. (holding that circuit court should defer to supreme courts interpretation of the act" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nremedies before suing the employer.’ ” Id. at 236, 20 OBR 290, 485 N.E.2d 757, quoting Anderson v. Alpha Portland Industries, Inc. (C.A.8, 1984), 727 F.2d 177, 185. The Tenth District noted that retirees come within one of several exceptions to the general rule that employees must attempt to use contract-grievance procedures. The reasons for this exception include that the union does not owe a duty of fair representation to persons who ax*e not members of the collective-bargaining unit and the possibility of potential conflicts of interest between retirees and active employees. Id. {¶ 32} Rutledge has been followed in a number of subsequent decisions. See, e.g., Featherstone v. Columbus City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (Mar. 30, 1999), Franklin App. No. 98AP-889, 1999 WL 177561, *3 (holding that trial court properly granted motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because plaintiff had failed to exhaust remedies available through exclusive grievance procedure", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nremedies before suing the employer.’ ” Id. at 236, 20 OBR 290, 485 N.E.2d 757, quoting Anderson v. Alpha Portland Industries, Inc. (C.A.8, 1984), 727 F.2d 177, 185. The Tenth District noted that retirees come within one of several exceptions to the general rule that employees must attempt to use contract-grievance procedures. The reasons for this exception include that the union does not owe a duty of fair representation to persons who ax*e not members of the collective-bargaining unit and the possibility of potential conflicts of interest between retirees and active employees. Id. {¶ 32} Rutledge has been followed in a number of subsequent decisions. See, e.g., Featherstone v. Columbus City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (Mar. 30, 1999), Franklin App. No. 98AP-889, 1999 WL 177561, *3 (holding that a prisoner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies when he did not utilize grievance procedures that permitted waiver of the time limit for good cause", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nremedies before suing the employer.’ ” Id. at 236, 20 OBR 290, 485 N.E.2d 757, quoting Anderson v. Alpha Portland Industries, Inc. (C.A.8, 1984), 727 F.2d 177, 185. The Tenth District noted that retirees come within one of several exceptions to the general rule that employees must attempt to use contract-grievance procedures. The reasons for this exception include that the union does not owe a duty of fair representation to persons who ax*e not members of the collective-bargaining unit and the possibility of potential conflicts of interest between retirees and active employees. Id. {¶ 32} Rutledge has been followed in a number of subsequent decisions. See, e.g., Featherstone v. Columbus City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (Mar. 30, 1999), Franklin App. No. 98AP-889, 1999 WL 177561, *3 (holding that a retired teacher did not fail to exhaust administrative remedies because he was not subject to the grievance procedure in the collectivebargaining agreement", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nremedies before suing the employer.’ ” Id. at 236, 20 OBR 290, 485 N.E.2d 757, quoting Anderson v. Alpha Portland Industries, Inc. (C.A.8, 1984), 727 F.2d 177, 185. The Tenth District noted that retirees come within one of several exceptions to the general rule that employees must attempt to use contract-grievance procedures. The reasons for this exception include that the union does not owe a duty of fair representation to persons who ax*e not members of the collective-bargaining unit and the possibility of potential conflicts of interest between retirees and active employees. Id. {¶ 32} Rutledge has been followed in a number of subsequent decisions. See, e.g., Featherstone v. Columbus City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (Mar. 30, 1999), Franklin App. No. 98AP-889, 1999 WL 177561, *3 (holding that plaintiff could not look to the courts for relief because he did not exhaust his administrative remedies under the adea", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nremedies before suing the employer.’ ” Id. at 236, 20 OBR 290, 485 N.E.2d 757, quoting Anderson v. Alpha Portland Industries, Inc. (C.A.8, 1984), 727 F.2d 177, 185. The Tenth District noted that retirees come within one of several exceptions to the general rule that employees must attempt to use contract-grievance procedures. The reasons for this exception include that the union does not owe a duty of fair representation to persons who ax*e not members of the collective-bargaining unit and the possibility of potential conflicts of interest between retirees and active employees. Id. {¶ 32} Rutledge has been followed in a number of subsequent decisions. See, e.g., Featherstone v. Columbus City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (Mar. 30, 1999), Franklin App. No. 98AP-889, 1999 WL 177561, *3 (holding that a plaintiff need not exhaust his administrative remedies to bring a retaliation claim" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nby the statute. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489, 97 S.Ct. 690, 50 L.Ed.2d 701 (1977); see Hovenkamp, ¶ 2362, at 234-35. With respect to the latter requirement, the Supreme Court has held that [a] private plaintiff may not recover damages under § 4 of the Clayton Act merely by showing “injury causally linked to an illegal presence in the market.” Instead, a plaintiff must prove the existence of “antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants’ acts unlawful.” Atlantic Richfield Co., 495 U.S. at 334, 110 S.Ct. 1884 (quoting Brunswick Corp. 429 U.S. at 489, 97 S.Ct. 690 (internal citations omitted)); see also J. Truett Payne, 451 U.S. at 562, 101 S.Ct. 1923. (holding that standing to raise a claim under 2a of robinsonpatman act is derived from section 4 of the clayton act", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nby the statute. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489, 97 S.Ct. 690, 50 L.Ed.2d 701 (1977); see Hovenkamp, ¶ 2362, at 234-35. With respect to the latter requirement, the Supreme Court has held that [a] private plaintiff may not recover damages under § 4 of the Clayton Act merely by showing “injury causally linked to an illegal presence in the market.” Instead, a plaintiff must prove the existence of “antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants’ acts unlawful.” Atlantic Richfield Co., 495 U.S. at 334, 110 S.Ct. 1884 (quoting Brunswick Corp. 429 U.S. at 489, 97 S.Ct. 690 (internal citations omitted)); see also J. Truett Payne, 451 U.S. at 562, 101 S.Ct. 1923. (holding that to have standing to bring a 2a robinsonpatman claim a private plaintiff must make some showing of actual injury attributable to something the antitrust laws were designed to prevent", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nby the statute. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489, 97 S.Ct. 690, 50 L.Ed.2d 701 (1977); see Hovenkamp, ¶ 2362, at 234-35. With respect to the latter requirement, the Supreme Court has held that [a] private plaintiff may not recover damages under § 4 of the Clayton Act merely by showing “injury causally linked to an illegal presence in the market.” Instead, a plaintiff must prove the existence of “antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants’ acts unlawful.” Atlantic Richfield Co., 495 U.S. at 334, 110 S.Ct. 1884 (quoting Brunswick Corp. 429 U.S. at 489, 97 S.Ct. 690 (internal citations omitted)); see also J. Truett Payne, 451 U.S. at 562, 101 S.Ct. 1923. (holding that plaintiff must show antitrust injury meaning injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and which flows from defendants unlawful acts", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nby the statute. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489, 97 S.Ct. 690, 50 L.Ed.2d 701 (1977); see Hovenkamp, ¶ 2362, at 234-35. With respect to the latter requirement, the Supreme Court has held that [a] private plaintiff may not recover damages under § 4 of the Clayton Act merely by showing “injury causally linked to an illegal presence in the market.” Instead, a plaintiff must prove the existence of “antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants’ acts unlawful.” Atlantic Richfield Co., 495 U.S. at 334, 110 S.Ct. 1884 (quoting Brunswick Corp. 429 U.S. at 489, 97 S.Ct. 690 (internal citations omitted)); see also J. Truett Payne, 451 U.S. at 562, 101 S.Ct. 1923. (holding that a plaintiff must show antitrust injury in order to bring an antitrust lawsuit", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nby the statute. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489, 97 S.Ct. 690, 50 L.Ed.2d 701 (1977); see Hovenkamp, ¶ 2362, at 234-35. With respect to the latter requirement, the Supreme Court has held that [a] private plaintiff may not recover damages under § 4 of the Clayton Act merely by showing “injury causally linked to an illegal presence in the market.” Instead, a plaintiff must prove the existence of “antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants’ acts unlawful.” Atlantic Richfield Co., 495 U.S. at 334, 110 S.Ct. 1884 (quoting Brunswick Corp. 429 U.S. at 489, 97 S.Ct. 690 (internal citations omitted)); see also J. Truett Payne, 451 U.S. at 562, 101 S.Ct. 1923. (holding that plaintiff seeking injunction under clayton act 16 must allege an injury of the type the antitrust laws were designed to prevent " ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nknew or should have known that Flores was a foreign national. As a foreign national of Mexico, the Vienna Convention applies to Flores. ¶ 17 Pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, federal statutes and treaties are the supreme law of the land. U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl. 2. Acts of Congress are on full parity with treaties. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375, 118 S.Ct. 1352, 1355, 140 L.Ed.2d 529 (1998). However, rights under a treaty and rights under a federal statute are not the equivalent of constitutional rights. Id.; see also, Murphy v. Netherland, 116 F.3d 97, 100 (C.A.4),cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1144, 118 S.Ct. 26, 138 L.Ed.2d 1050 (1997); Waldron v. I.N.S., 17 F.3d 511, 518 (C.A.2, 1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1014, 115 S.Ct. 572, 130 L.Ed.2d 489 (1994)(holding that state rights are equivalent to federal rights in this area", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nknew or should have known that Flores was a foreign national. As a foreign national of Mexico, the Vienna Convention applies to Flores. ¶ 17 Pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, federal statutes and treaties are the supreme law of the land. U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl. 2. Acts of Congress are on full parity with treaties. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375, 118 S.Ct. 1352, 1355, 140 L.Ed.2d 529 (1998). However, rights under a treaty and rights under a federal statute are not the equivalent of constitutional rights. Id.; see also, Murphy v. Netherland, 116 F.3d 97, 100 (C.A.4),cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1144, 118 S.Ct. 26, 138 L.Ed.2d 1050 (1997); Waldron v. I.N.S., 17 F.3d 511, 518 (C.A.2, 1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1014, 115 S.Ct. 572, 130 L.Ed.2d 489 (1994)(holding that patria potestas rights under mexican law are custody rights under the hague convention", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nknew or should have known that Flores was a foreign national. As a foreign national of Mexico, the Vienna Convention applies to Flores. ¶ 17 Pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, federal statutes and treaties are the supreme law of the land. U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl. 2. Acts of Congress are on full parity with treaties. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375, 118 S.Ct. 1352, 1355, 140 L.Ed.2d 529 (1998). However, rights under a treaty and rights under a federal statute are not the equivalent of constitutional rights. Id.; see also, Murphy v. Netherland, 116 F.3d 97, 100 (C.A.4),cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1144, 118 S.Ct. 26, 138 L.Ed.2d 1050 (1997); Waldron v. I.N.S., 17 F.3d 511, 518 (C.A.2, 1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1014, 115 S.Ct. 572, 130 L.Ed.2d 489 (1994)(recognizing us obligations under article 22 of the vienna convention", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nknew or should have known that Flores was a foreign national. As a foreign national of Mexico, the Vienna Convention applies to Flores. ¶ 17 Pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, federal statutes and treaties are the supreme law of the land. U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl. 2. Acts of Congress are on full parity with treaties. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375, 118 S.Ct. 1352, 1355, 140 L.Ed.2d 529 (1998). However, rights under a treaty and rights under a federal statute are not the equivalent of constitutional rights. Id.; see also, Murphy v. Netherland, 116 F.3d 97, 100 (C.A.4),cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1144, 118 S.Ct. 26, 138 L.Ed.2d 1050 (1997); Waldron v. I.N.S., 17 F.3d 511, 518 (C.A.2, 1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1014, 115 S.Ct. 572, 130 L.Ed.2d 489 (1994)(holding that rights under vienna convention are not the equivalent of fundamental rights such as the right to counsel", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nknew or should have known that Flores was a foreign national. As a foreign national of Mexico, the Vienna Convention applies to Flores. ¶ 17 Pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, federal statutes and treaties are the supreme law of the land. U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl. 2. Acts of Congress are on full parity with treaties. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375, 118 S.Ct. 1352, 1355, 140 L.Ed.2d 529 (1998). However, rights under a treaty and rights under a federal statute are not the equivalent of constitutional rights. Id.; see also, Murphy v. Netherland, 116 F.3d 97, 100 (C.A.4),cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1144, 118 S.Ct. 26, 138 L.Ed.2d 1050 (1997); Waldron v. I.N.S., 17 F.3d 511, 518 (C.A.2, 1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1014, 115 S.Ct. 572, 130 L.Ed.2d 489 (1994)(holding right to be fundamental" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nfor Sixth Amendment purposes. The court noted that the “Sixth Amendment protections can be bypassed[ ][i]f the defendant ... admits the fact otherwise committed to the jury.” Id. at 387. A defendant may admit facts through “guilty pleas and stipulations, a defendant’s own statements in open court, and representations by counsel.” United States v. Revels, 455 F.3d 448, 450 (4th Cir.2006) (citations omitted). “Any admission of fact must, of course, be of sufficient clarity and kind to justify taking the fact from the jury.” Milam, 443 F.3d at 387. Whether a defendant has admitted a fact for Booker purposes depends upon where a defendant’s “verbalizations ... fall along a spectrum” from silence to “statements such as T admit,’ or the functional equivalent thereof.” Revels, 455 F.3d at 450 (holding that sentencing court may not adopt facts from codefendants presentence report that was not disclosed to defendant", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nfor Sixth Amendment purposes. The court noted that the “Sixth Amendment protections can be bypassed[ ][i]f the defendant ... admits the fact otherwise committed to the jury.” Id. at 387. A defendant may admit facts through “guilty pleas and stipulations, a defendant’s own statements in open court, and representations by counsel.” United States v. Revels, 455 F.3d 448, 450 (4th Cir.2006) (citations omitted). “Any admission of fact must, of course, be of sufficient clarity and kind to justify taking the fact from the jury.” Milam, 443 F.3d at 387. Whether a defendant has admitted a fact for Booker purposes depends upon where a defendant’s “verbalizations ... fall along a spectrum” from silence to “statements such as T admit,’ or the functional equivalent thereof.” Revels, 455 F.3d at 450 (holding that defendant did not admit facts supporting sentencing enhancement where he lodged blakely objection and replied no sir to courts inquiry as to whether he had objections to anything contained or omitted from the presentence report", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nfor Sixth Amendment purposes. The court noted that the “Sixth Amendment protections can be bypassed[ ][i]f the defendant ... admits the fact otherwise committed to the jury.” Id. at 387. A defendant may admit facts through “guilty pleas and stipulations, a defendant’s own statements in open court, and representations by counsel.” United States v. Revels, 455 F.3d 448, 450 (4th Cir.2006) (citations omitted). “Any admission of fact must, of course, be of sufficient clarity and kind to justify taking the fact from the jury.” Milam, 443 F.3d at 387. Whether a defendant has admitted a fact for Booker purposes depends upon where a defendant’s “verbalizations ... fall along a spectrum” from silence to “statements such as T admit,’ or the functional equivalent thereof.” Revels, 455 F.3d at 450 (holding that appellant properly preserved booker claim by citing blakely in his written objections to the psi and reminding the court at sentencing of his blakely objection", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nfor Sixth Amendment purposes. The court noted that the “Sixth Amendment protections can be bypassed[ ][i]f the defendant ... admits the fact otherwise committed to the jury.” Id. at 387. A defendant may admit facts through “guilty pleas and stipulations, a defendant’s own statements in open court, and representations by counsel.” United States v. Revels, 455 F.3d 448, 450 (4th Cir.2006) (citations omitted). “Any admission of fact must, of course, be of sufficient clarity and kind to justify taking the fact from the jury.” Milam, 443 F.3d at 387. Whether a defendant has admitted a fact for Booker purposes depends upon where a defendant’s “verbalizations ... fall along a spectrum” from silence to “statements such as T admit,’ or the functional equivalent thereof.” Revels, 455 F.3d at 450 (holding that the defendants prior conviction referenced in his presentence report could be taken as admitted because he had made no objection to the facts in his report", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nfor Sixth Amendment purposes. The court noted that the “Sixth Amendment protections can be bypassed[ ][i]f the defendant ... admits the fact otherwise committed to the jury.” Id. at 387. A defendant may admit facts through “guilty pleas and stipulations, a defendant’s own statements in open court, and representations by counsel.” United States v. Revels, 455 F.3d 448, 450 (4th Cir.2006) (citations omitted). “Any admission of fact must, of course, be of sufficient clarity and kind to justify taking the fact from the jury.” Milam, 443 F.3d at 387. Whether a defendant has admitted a fact for Booker purposes depends upon where a defendant’s “verbalizations ... fall along a spectrum” from silence to “statements such as T admit,’ or the functional equivalent thereof.” Revels, 455 F.3d at 450 (holding that sentencing upon general remand is to be de novo requiring the district court to consider new objections to the presentence report" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe plaintiff was financially able to retain an attorney this was a \"special circumstance” that would allow the court to deny it an award of attorney’s fees. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court remanded the matter with some instructions. On remand the Chancery Court determined that the ability to pay attorney’s fees was not an appropriate special circumstance; thus, Wilmington Materials was entitled to and awarded attorney's fees pursuant to § 1988. 17 .2000 WL 1724326, 2000 Del. Ch. Lexis 168. 18 . The court determined that Wilmington Materials had a vested right to utilize the property because it had \"incurred expenses in reasonable reliance of its belief that the Code permitted its intended use.” Wilmington Materials I, 1993 WL 280411 at *2, 1993 Del. Ch. Lexis 145. 19 . Id. 20 . Id. (holding that an award of attorneys fees under supreme court rule 38 precursor to rule 222 did not preempt an award of attorneys fees to which one is otherwise entitled and thus appellant could seek an award of attorneys fees pursuant to section 1577300 which permits an award of fees for a party prevailing in an action against a state agency", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe plaintiff was financially able to retain an attorney this was a \"special circumstance” that would allow the court to deny it an award of attorney’s fees. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court remanded the matter with some instructions. On remand the Chancery Court determined that the ability to pay attorney’s fees was not an appropriate special circumstance; thus, Wilmington Materials was entitled to and awarded attorney's fees pursuant to § 1988. 17 .2000 WL 1724326, 2000 Del. Ch. Lexis 168. 18 . The court determined that Wilmington Materials had a vested right to utilize the property because it had \"incurred expenses in reasonable reliance of its belief that the Code permitted its intended use.” Wilmington Materials I, 1993 WL 280411 at *2, 1993 Del. Ch. Lexis 145. 19 . Id. 20 . Id. (holding that although plaintiff was entitled to fees under 1988 there were special circumstances which allowed the chancellor in his discretion to deny an award", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe plaintiff was financially able to retain an attorney this was a \"special circumstance” that would allow the court to deny it an award of attorney’s fees. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court remanded the matter with some instructions. On remand the Chancery Court determined that the ability to pay attorney’s fees was not an appropriate special circumstance; thus, Wilmington Materials was entitled to and awarded attorney's fees pursuant to § 1988. 17 .2000 WL 1724326, 2000 Del. Ch. Lexis 168. 18 . The court determined that Wilmington Materials had a vested right to utilize the property because it had \"incurred expenses in reasonable reliance of its belief that the Code permitted its intended use.” Wilmington Materials I, 1993 WL 280411 at *2, 1993 Del. Ch. Lexis 145. 19 . Id. 20 . Id. (holding that a pro se litigant who is an attorney is not entitled to fees under 1988", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe plaintiff was financially able to retain an attorney this was a \"special circumstance” that would allow the court to deny it an award of attorney’s fees. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court remanded the matter with some instructions. On remand the Chancery Court determined that the ability to pay attorney’s fees was not an appropriate special circumstance; thus, Wilmington Materials was entitled to and awarded attorney's fees pursuant to § 1988. 17 .2000 WL 1724326, 2000 Del. Ch. Lexis 168. 18 . The court determined that Wilmington Materials had a vested right to utilize the property because it had \"incurred expenses in reasonable reliance of its belief that the Code permitted its intended use.” Wilmington Materials I, 1993 WL 280411 at *2, 1993 Del. Ch. Lexis 145. 19 . Id. 20 . Id. (holding that under 42 usc 1988 which allows the award of attorneys fees in a civil rights action under 1983 a prevailing plaintiff should ordinarily recover an attorneys fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust quoting srep no 941011 p 4 1976", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe plaintiff was financially able to retain an attorney this was a \"special circumstance” that would allow the court to deny it an award of attorney’s fees. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court remanded the matter with some instructions. On remand the Chancery Court determined that the ability to pay attorney’s fees was not an appropriate special circumstance; thus, Wilmington Materials was entitled to and awarded attorney's fees pursuant to § 1988. 17 .2000 WL 1724326, 2000 Del. Ch. Lexis 168. 18 . The court determined that Wilmington Materials had a vested right to utilize the property because it had \"incurred expenses in reasonable reliance of its belief that the Code permitted its intended use.” Wilmington Materials I, 1993 WL 280411 at *2, 1993 Del. Ch. Lexis 145. 19 . Id. 20 . Id. (holding that it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to deny an award of attorneys fees to the wife" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nhim from practicing his religion in other ways. See docket entries # 77 and # 78 (emphasis added). Under Gladson and Murphy, Plaintiff is not required to make such an allegation in order to state a valid free exercise claim. See Gladson, 551 F.3d at 831-32; Murphy, 372 F.3d at 988. Instead, as previously explained, he is only required to allege that Defendants prevented him from practicing a central tenet of his faith, which in this case, appears to be regularly reading his Bible. Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit has held, in several cases, that prisoners state viable free exercise claims when they allege that prison officials have limited their access to religious reading materials. See Roddy v. Banks, Case No. OS-3735, 2005 WL 433404 (8th Cir. Feb. 25, 2005) (unpublished opinion) (holding a muslim prisoners free exercise claim failed because even though the prison did not provide him with halal meat he could comply with his religious requirements by simply eating a vegetarian meal and therefore the disputed policy did not force the prisoner to violate his religion", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nhim from practicing his religion in other ways. See docket entries # 77 and # 78 (emphasis added). Under Gladson and Murphy, Plaintiff is not required to make such an allegation in order to state a valid free exercise claim. See Gladson, 551 F.3d at 831-32; Murphy, 372 F.3d at 988. Instead, as previously explained, he is only required to allege that Defendants prevented him from practicing a central tenet of his faith, which in this case, appears to be regularly reading his Bible. Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit has held, in several cases, that prisoners state viable free exercise claims when they allege that prison officials have limited their access to religious reading materials. See Roddy v. Banks, Case No. OS-3735, 2005 WL 433404 (8th Cir. Feb. 25, 2005) (unpublished opinion) (holding that a prisoner stated a valid equal protection claim when he alleged he was denied a work assignment because of his sexual orientation", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nhim from practicing his religion in other ways. See docket entries # 77 and # 78 (emphasis added). Under Gladson and Murphy, Plaintiff is not required to make such an allegation in order to state a valid free exercise claim. See Gladson, 551 F.3d at 831-32; Murphy, 372 F.3d at 988. Instead, as previously explained, he is only required to allege that Defendants prevented him from practicing a central tenet of his faith, which in this case, appears to be regularly reading his Bible. Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit has held, in several cases, that prisoners state viable free exercise claims when they allege that prison officials have limited their access to religious reading materials. See Roddy v. Banks, Case No. OS-3735, 2005 WL 433404 (8th Cir. Feb. 25, 2005) (unpublished opinion) (recognizing a religious institutions right to free exercise of religion", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nhim from practicing his religion in other ways. See docket entries # 77 and # 78 (emphasis added). Under Gladson and Murphy, Plaintiff is not required to make such an allegation in order to state a valid free exercise claim. See Gladson, 551 F.3d at 831-32; Murphy, 372 F.3d at 988. Instead, as previously explained, he is only required to allege that Defendants prevented him from practicing a central tenet of his faith, which in this case, appears to be regularly reading his Bible. Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit has held, in several cases, that prisoners state viable free exercise claims when they allege that prison officials have limited their access to religious reading materials. See Roddy v. Banks, Case No. OS-3735, 2005 WL 433404 (8th Cir. Feb. 25, 2005) (unpublished opinion) (holding that a prisoner stated a valid free exercise of religion claim where he alleged that prison officials refused to allow him to receive certain religious books", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nhim from practicing his religion in other ways. See docket entries # 77 and # 78 (emphasis added). Under Gladson and Murphy, Plaintiff is not required to make such an allegation in order to state a valid free exercise claim. See Gladson, 551 F.3d at 831-32; Murphy, 372 F.3d at 988. Instead, as previously explained, he is only required to allege that Defendants prevented him from practicing a central tenet of his faith, which in this case, appears to be regularly reading his Bible. Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit has held, in several cases, that prisoners state viable free exercise claims when they allege that prison officials have limited their access to religious reading materials. See Roddy v. Banks, Case No. OS-3735, 2005 WL 433404 (8th Cir. Feb. 25, 2005) (unpublished opinion) (holding that religious exercise is any exercise of religion whether or not compelled by or central to a system of religious belief and that the use building or conversion of real property for the purpose of religious exercise shall be considered religious exercise" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nsupport his claim with respect to Caine, defendant attaches Caine’s original and amended motions to suppress. These motions allege that Caine was not informed of his Miranda rights, that the police officers promised him leniency, that the police officers struck him in the head and kicked him in the stomach, and that he was intoxi cated when he gave his statement. The motions, however, do not identify any of the officers involved or describe with any particularity misconduct similar to what defendant suffered. Without some evidence indicating that the same officers or supervisors were involved or that the same type of misconduct was involved, we have no basis upon which to conclude that this evidence was relevant to defendant’s claims. See People v. Hobley, 159 Ill. 2d 272, 312 (1994) (holding that because the allegations purportedly suppressed by the government were not material an evidentiary hearing further exploring the allegations themselves and the governments knowledge of the allegations is unnecessary", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nsupport his claim with respect to Caine, defendant attaches Caine’s original and amended motions to suppress. These motions allege that Caine was not informed of his Miranda rights, that the police officers promised him leniency, that the police officers struck him in the head and kicked him in the stomach, and that he was intoxi cated when he gave his statement. The motions, however, do not identify any of the officers involved or describe with any particularity misconduct similar to what defendant suffered. Without some evidence indicating that the same officers or supervisors were involved or that the same type of misconduct was involved, we have no basis upon which to conclude that this evidence was relevant to defendant’s claims. See People v. Hobley, 159 Ill. 2d 272, 312 (1994) (holding that similar allegations were insufficient to state a due process claim", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nsupport his claim with respect to Caine, defendant attaches Caine’s original and amended motions to suppress. These motions allege that Caine was not informed of his Miranda rights, that the police officers promised him leniency, that the police officers struck him in the head and kicked him in the stomach, and that he was intoxi cated when he gave his statement. The motions, however, do not identify any of the officers involved or describe with any particularity misconduct similar to what defendant suffered. Without some evidence indicating that the same officers or supervisors were involved or that the same type of misconduct was involved, we have no basis upon which to conclude that this evidence was relevant to defendant’s claims. See People v. Hobley, 159 Ill. 2d 272, 312 (1994) (holding that plaintiffs allegations of abuse did not amount to the allegations of torture required by 1605a7 to survive a motion to dismiss", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nsupport his claim with respect to Caine, defendant attaches Caine’s original and amended motions to suppress. These motions allege that Caine was not informed of his Miranda rights, that the police officers promised him leniency, that the police officers struck him in the head and kicked him in the stomach, and that he was intoxi cated when he gave his statement. The motions, however, do not identify any of the officers involved or describe with any particularity misconduct similar to what defendant suffered. Without some evidence indicating that the same officers or supervisors were involved or that the same type of misconduct was involved, we have no basis upon which to conclude that this evidence was relevant to defendant’s claims. See People v. Hobley, 159 Ill. 2d 272, 312 (1994) (holding that plaintiff failed to establish pretext where plaintiff was terminated after the employer conducted an investigation into a subordinates allegations of misconduct on the part of the plaintiff and believed the allegations to be true even though plaintiff presented evidence in the lawsuit that the allegations may have been false", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nsupport his claim with respect to Caine, defendant attaches Caine’s original and amended motions to suppress. These motions allege that Caine was not informed of his Miranda rights, that the police officers promised him leniency, that the police officers struck him in the head and kicked him in the stomach, and that he was intoxi cated when he gave his statement. The motions, however, do not identify any of the officers involved or describe with any particularity misconduct similar to what defendant suffered. Without some evidence indicating that the same officers or supervisors were involved or that the same type of misconduct was involved, we have no basis upon which to conclude that this evidence was relevant to defendant’s claims. See People v. Hobley, 159 Ill. 2d 272, 312 (1994) (holding that evidence of other allegations of torture was inadmissible in part because it was not similar to the allegations made by defendant" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nstandard for searches of the two. In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its application of law to those facts de novo. United States v. Gibson, 708 F.3d 1256, 1274 (11th Cir. 2013). All facts are construed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below, in this case, the government. Id. The Fourth Amendment guarantees: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.” U.S. Const, amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures applies to probationers. Owens v. Kelley, 681 F.2d 1362, -11 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that a probationers challenge to a condition of his probation was moot in light of the supreme courts reversal of the underlying conviction and the probationers apparent completion of probation ", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nstandard for searches of the two. In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its application of law to those facts de novo. United States v. Gibson, 708 F.3d 1256, 1274 (11th Cir. 2013). All facts are construed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below, in this case, the government. Id. The Fourth Amendment guarantees: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.” U.S. Const, amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures applies to probationers. Owens v. Kelley, 681 F.2d 1362, -11 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding search provision in probation order constitute a reasonable and necessary element of the courts regulation of probationers which did not require the defendants consent", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nstandard for searches of the two. In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its application of law to those facts de novo. United States v. Gibson, 708 F.3d 1256, 1274 (11th Cir. 2013). All facts are construed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below, in this case, the government. Id. The Fourth Amendment guarantees: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.” U.S. Const, amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures applies to probationers. Owens v. Kelley, 681 F.2d 1362, -11 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding search of probationers computer by probation officers was reasonable even in absence of a search provision when conditions on probationers computer use reduced his expectation of privacy in his computer", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nstandard for searches of the two. In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its application of law to those facts de novo. United States v. Gibson, 708 F.3d 1256, 1274 (11th Cir. 2013). All facts are construed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below, in this case, the government. Id. The Fourth Amendment guarantees: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.” U.S. Const, amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures applies to probationers. Owens v. Kelley, 681 F.2d 1362, -11 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that a roommate with shared access to anothers computer has common authority over the computer and can grant consent to search", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nstandard for searches of the two. In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its application of law to those facts de novo. United States v. Gibson, 708 F.3d 1256, 1274 (11th Cir. 2013). All facts are construed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below, in this case, the government. Id. The Fourth Amendment guarantees: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.” U.S. Const, amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures applies to probationers. Owens v. Kelley, 681 F.2d 1362, -11 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding warrantless search of probationers home by law enforcement officer for investigatory purposes was reasonable when conditions of probation included a search term and search was supported by reasonable suspicion" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nUnited States Industries, 736 F.2d 656, 657 (11th Cir.1984); Pyramid Securities Ltd. v. IB Resolution, Inc., 924 F.2d 1114, 1123 (D.C.Cir.1991). It may be argued that this principle does not apply where a non-moving party's testimony changes over a very brief period of time. Here, Mullins's testimony changed overnight. In any event, the disputes in the record are not material and this is dispositive. 20 . It is worth noting that in adopting this position to avoid the consequences of Maryland law, Mullins is taking a position inconsistent with her original contention that she was terminated in Maryland on March 26. 21 . See Kessler v. Equity Management, Inc., 82 Md.App. 577, 585, 572 A.2d 1144 (1990). 22 . See Watson v. Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co., 322 Md. 467, 478, 588 A.2d 760 (1991) (recognizing a tort action for wrongful discharge when employee was terminated because he refused to commit a criminal act", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nUnited States Industries, 736 F.2d 656, 657 (11th Cir.1984); Pyramid Securities Ltd. v. IB Resolution, Inc., 924 F.2d 1114, 1123 (D.C.Cir.1991). It may be argued that this principle does not apply where a non-moving party's testimony changes over a very brief period of time. Here, Mullins's testimony changed overnight. In any event, the disputes in the record are not material and this is dispositive. 20 . It is worth noting that in adopting this position to avoid the consequences of Maryland law, Mullins is taking a position inconsistent with her original contention that she was terminated in Maryland on March 26. 21 . See Kessler v. Equity Management, Inc., 82 Md.App. 577, 585, 572 A.2d 1144 (1990). 22 . See Watson v. Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co., 322 Md. 467, 478, 588 A.2d 760 (1991) (holding a claim for patronage dismissal was legally cognizable", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nUnited States Industries, 736 F.2d 656, 657 (11th Cir.1984); Pyramid Securities Ltd. v. IB Resolution, Inc., 924 F.2d 1114, 1123 (D.C.Cir.1991). It may be argued that this principle does not apply where a non-moving party's testimony changes over a very brief period of time. Here, Mullins's testimony changed overnight. In any event, the disputes in the record are not material and this is dispositive. 20 . It is worth noting that in adopting this position to avoid the consequences of Maryland law, Mullins is taking a position inconsistent with her original contention that she was terminated in Maryland on March 26. 21 . See Kessler v. Equity Management, Inc., 82 Md.App. 577, 585, 572 A.2d 1144 (1990). 22 . See Watson v. Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co., 322 Md. 467, 478, 588 A.2d 760 (1991) (recognizing cause of action for wrongful discharge", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nUnited States Industries, 736 F.2d 656, 657 (11th Cir.1984); Pyramid Securities Ltd. v. IB Resolution, Inc., 924 F.2d 1114, 1123 (D.C.Cir.1991). It may be argued that this principle does not apply where a non-moving party's testimony changes over a very brief period of time. Here, Mullins's testimony changed overnight. In any event, the disputes in the record are not material and this is dispositive. 20 . It is worth noting that in adopting this position to avoid the consequences of Maryland law, Mullins is taking a position inconsistent with her original contention that she was terminated in Maryland on March 26. 21 . See Kessler v. Equity Management, Inc., 82 Md.App. 577, 585, 572 A.2d 1144 (1990). 22 . See Watson v. Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co., 322 Md. 467, 478, 588 A.2d 760 (1991) (holding that accountant terminated for refusing to violate professional codes stated cognizable claim for wrongful discharge", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nUnited States Industries, 736 F.2d 656, 657 (11th Cir.1984); Pyramid Securities Ltd. v. IB Resolution, Inc., 924 F.2d 1114, 1123 (D.C.Cir.1991). It may be argued that this principle does not apply where a non-moving party's testimony changes over a very brief period of time. Here, Mullins's testimony changed overnight. In any event, the disputes in the record are not material and this is dispositive. 20 . It is worth noting that in adopting this position to avoid the consequences of Maryland law, Mullins is taking a position inconsistent with her original contention that she was terminated in Maryland on March 26. 21 . See Kessler v. Equity Management, Inc., 82 Md.App. 577, 585, 572 A.2d 1144 (1990). 22 . See Watson v. Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co., 322 Md. 467, 478, 588 A.2d 760 (1991) (holding no legally cognizable claim for wrongful discharge where employee was terminated after seeking legal redress against a coworker for assault and battery" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndetermining the reasonableness of small business bids.” 49 Comp.Gen. at 743. While noting that the provisions of the Small Business Act authorize the award of contracts to small businesses at prices higher than those obtainable by unrestricted competition, the GAO found no valid basis for concluding that the Act “was intended to require the award of contracts to small business concerns at prices considered unreasonable” by the procurement officers. Id. at 742-43; see also No. B-149889 (November 2, 1962). The GAO held that the regulations “properly permit the withdrawal of a set-aside, based on a valid determination that bid prices received from small business concerns are unreasonable.” Id. at 743. See also Boog-Allen Applied Research, No. B-179085 (November 5, 1973), 53 Comp.Gen. 307 (recognizing that officers are permitted though not required to compare small business bids and large business bids from previous competitions in establishing the competitive range of acceptability", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndetermining the reasonableness of small business bids.” 49 Comp.Gen. at 743. While noting that the provisions of the Small Business Act authorize the award of contracts to small businesses at prices higher than those obtainable by unrestricted competition, the GAO found no valid basis for concluding that the Act “was intended to require the award of contracts to small business concerns at prices considered unreasonable” by the procurement officers. Id. at 742-43; see also No. B-149889 (November 2, 1962). The GAO held that the regulations “properly permit the withdrawal of a set-aside, based on a valid determination that bid prices received from small business concerns are unreasonable.” Id. at 743. See also Boog-Allen Applied Research, No. B-179085 (November 5, 1973), 53 Comp.Gen. 307 (recognizing that pursuant to the business judgment rule the decisions of business professionals on the board of directors should be presumed valid", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndetermining the reasonableness of small business bids.” 49 Comp.Gen. at 743. While noting that the provisions of the Small Business Act authorize the award of contracts to small businesses at prices higher than those obtainable by unrestricted competition, the GAO found no valid basis for concluding that the Act “was intended to require the award of contracts to small business concerns at prices considered unreasonable” by the procurement officers. Id. at 742-43; see also No. B-149889 (November 2, 1962). The GAO held that the regulations “properly permit the withdrawal of a set-aside, based on a valid determination that bid prices received from small business concerns are unreasonable.” Id. at 743. See also Boog-Allen Applied Research, No. B-179085 (November 5, 1973), 53 Comp.Gen. 307 (recognizing the wide range of competitive results in oligopolistic markets", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndetermining the reasonableness of small business bids.” 49 Comp.Gen. at 743. While noting that the provisions of the Small Business Act authorize the award of contracts to small businesses at prices higher than those obtainable by unrestricted competition, the GAO found no valid basis for concluding that the Act “was intended to require the award of contracts to small business concerns at prices considered unreasonable” by the procurement officers. Id. at 742-43; see also No. B-149889 (November 2, 1962). The GAO held that the regulations “properly permit the withdrawal of a set-aside, based on a valid determination that bid prices received from small business concerns are unreasonable.” Id. at 743. See also Boog-Allen Applied Research, No. B-179085 (November 5, 1973), 53 Comp.Gen. 307 (holding that documents that were not created by but that were received maintained and relied upon by a business are business records under 8036", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndetermining the reasonableness of small business bids.” 49 Comp.Gen. at 743. While noting that the provisions of the Small Business Act authorize the award of contracts to small businesses at prices higher than those obtainable by unrestricted competition, the GAO found no valid basis for concluding that the Act “was intended to require the award of contracts to small business concerns at prices considered unreasonable” by the procurement officers. Id. at 742-43; see also No. B-149889 (November 2, 1962). The GAO held that the regulations “properly permit the withdrawal of a set-aside, based on a valid determination that bid prices received from small business concerns are unreasonable.” Id. at 743. See also Boog-Allen Applied Research, No. B-179085 (November 5, 1973), 53 Comp.Gen. 307 (holding plaintiff lacked standing to challenge small business status of awardee because plaintiff was not a small business" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n... if committed while the person is on probation for a conviction of a felony offense or parole, work furlough or any other release or escape from confinement for conviction of a felony offense shall be sentenced to life imprisonment and is not eligible for suspension or commutation of sentence, probation, pardon, parole, work furlough or release from confinement on any other basis ... until the person has served not less than twenty-five years. 2 . A.R.S. § 13-604(1) provides, in part, that: “A person who has been convicted in any court outside the jurisdiction of this state of an offense which if committed within this state would be punishable as a felony or misdemean- or is subject to the provisions of this section.” See also State v. Decker, 172 Ariz. 33, 833 P.2d 704 (1992) (holding that reversal of conviction for felony murder was required where jury failed to find the defendant guilty of the underlying felony as essential element of the felony murder offense", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n... if committed while the person is on probation for a conviction of a felony offense or parole, work furlough or any other release or escape from confinement for conviction of a felony offense shall be sentenced to life imprisonment and is not eligible for suspension or commutation of sentence, probation, pardon, parole, work furlough or release from confinement on any other basis ... until the person has served not less than twenty-five years. 2 . A.R.S. § 13-604(1) provides, in part, that: “A person who has been convicted in any court outside the jurisdiction of this state of an offense which if committed within this state would be punishable as a felony or misdemean- or is subject to the provisions of this section.” See also State v. Decker, 172 Ariz. 33, 833 P.2d 704 (1992) (holding that a prior nonarizona conviction to be used as a prior felony conviction under the statute must both be for an offense that would constitute a felony in arizona and be classified as a felony in the other jurisdiction", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n... if committed while the person is on probation for a conviction of a felony offense or parole, work furlough or any other release or escape from confinement for conviction of a felony offense shall be sentenced to life imprisonment and is not eligible for suspension or commutation of sentence, probation, pardon, parole, work furlough or release from confinement on any other basis ... until the person has served not less than twenty-five years. 2 . A.R.S. § 13-604(1) provides, in part, that: “A person who has been convicted in any court outside the jurisdiction of this state of an offense which if committed within this state would be punishable as a felony or misdemean- or is subject to the provisions of this section.” See also State v. Decker, 172 Ariz. 33, 833 P.2d 704 (1992) (holding that felony conviction for which imposition of sentence was stayed could be counted as prior felony conviction under sentencing guidelines", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n... if committed while the person is on probation for a conviction of a felony offense or parole, work furlough or any other release or escape from confinement for conviction of a felony offense shall be sentenced to life imprisonment and is not eligible for suspension or commutation of sentence, probation, pardon, parole, work furlough or release from confinement on any other basis ... until the person has served not less than twenty-five years. 2 . A.R.S. § 13-604(1) provides, in part, that: “A person who has been convicted in any court outside the jurisdiction of this state of an offense which if committed within this state would be punishable as a felony or misdemean- or is subject to the provisions of this section.” See also State v. Decker, 172 Ariz. 33, 833 P.2d 704 (1992) (holding that proof of an agreement to commit a felony is not a necessary element in a conviction for the commission of the felony", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n... if committed while the person is on probation for a conviction of a felony offense or parole, work furlough or any other release or escape from confinement for conviction of a felony offense shall be sentenced to life imprisonment and is not eligible for suspension or commutation of sentence, probation, pardon, parole, work furlough or release from confinement on any other basis ... until the person has served not less than twenty-five years. 2 . A.R.S. § 13-604(1) provides, in part, that: “A person who has been convicted in any court outside the jurisdiction of this state of an offense which if committed within this state would be punishable as a felony or misdemean- or is subject to the provisions of this section.” See also State v. Decker, 172 Ariz. 33, 833 P.2d 704 (1992) (holding that in determining whether a prior conviction is a violent felony a court generally must look only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nunder 18 U.S.C. § 2314. His contention is that Palmyra Island is not a possession of the United States within the meaning of the relevant statutes. We disagree and affirm the district court’s denial of his petition. One of the elements of 18 U.S.C. § 2314 is that the stolen property was transported in “interstate commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 10 defines “interstate commerce” as “commerce between one State, Territory, Possession, or the District of Columbia and another State, Territory, Possession, or the District of Columbia.” Palmyra Island is a possession of the United States. See 48 U.S.C. § 644a (placing Palmyra and seven other American Pacific Islands under the jurisdiction of the District of Hawaii); United States v. Fullard-Leo, 331 U.S. 256, 67 S.Ct. 1287, 91 L.Ed. 1474 (1947) (holding that the land under navigable waters was not granted by the constitution to the united states but was reserved to the states respectively and that new states have the same rights jurisdiction and sovereignty over the soil under navigable water as the original states", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nunder 18 U.S.C. § 2314. His contention is that Palmyra Island is not a possession of the United States within the meaning of the relevant statutes. We disagree and affirm the district court’s denial of his petition. One of the elements of 18 U.S.C. § 2314 is that the stolen property was transported in “interstate commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 10 defines “interstate commerce” as “commerce between one State, Territory, Possession, or the District of Columbia and another State, Territory, Possession, or the District of Columbia.” Palmyra Island is a possession of the United States. See 48 U.S.C. § 644a (placing Palmyra and seven other American Pacific Islands under the jurisdiction of the District of Hawaii); United States v. Fullard-Leo, 331 U.S. 256, 67 S.Ct. 1287, 91 L.Ed. 1474 (1947) (recognizing that palmyra is under united states sovereignty", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nunder 18 U.S.C. § 2314. His contention is that Palmyra Island is not a possession of the United States within the meaning of the relevant statutes. We disagree and affirm the district court’s denial of his petition. One of the elements of 18 U.S.C. § 2314 is that the stolen property was transported in “interstate commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 10 defines “interstate commerce” as “commerce between one State, Territory, Possession, or the District of Columbia and another State, Territory, Possession, or the District of Columbia.” Palmyra Island is a possession of the United States. See 48 U.S.C. § 644a (placing Palmyra and seven other American Pacific Islands under the jurisdiction of the District of Hawaii); United States v. Fullard-Leo, 331 U.S. 256, 67 S.Ct. 1287, 91 L.Ed. 1474 (1947) (holding that tribal sovereignty is dependent on and subordinate to only the federal government not the states", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nunder 18 U.S.C. § 2314. His contention is that Palmyra Island is not a possession of the United States within the meaning of the relevant statutes. We disagree and affirm the district court’s denial of his petition. One of the elements of 18 U.S.C. § 2314 is that the stolen property was transported in “interstate commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 10 defines “interstate commerce” as “commerce between one State, Territory, Possession, or the District of Columbia and another State, Territory, Possession, or the District of Columbia.” Palmyra Island is a possession of the United States. See 48 U.S.C. § 644a (placing Palmyra and seven other American Pacific Islands under the jurisdiction of the District of Hawaii); United States v. Fullard-Leo, 331 U.S. 256, 67 S.Ct. 1287, 91 L.Ed. 1474 (1947) (holding that the united states has not recognized the sovereignty of the moorish nation thus precluding sovereign immunity claims", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nunder 18 U.S.C. § 2314. His contention is that Palmyra Island is not a possession of the United States within the meaning of the relevant statutes. We disagree and affirm the district court’s denial of his petition. One of the elements of 18 U.S.C. § 2314 is that the stolen property was transported in “interstate commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 10 defines “interstate commerce” as “commerce between one State, Territory, Possession, or the District of Columbia and another State, Territory, Possession, or the District of Columbia.” Palmyra Island is a possession of the United States. See 48 U.S.C. § 644a (placing Palmyra and seven other American Pacific Islands under the jurisdiction of the District of Hawaii); United States v. Fullard-Leo, 331 U.S. 256, 67 S.Ct. 1287, 91 L.Ed. 1474 (1947) (recognizing federal constitutional claim against the united states" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nv. Long Island R.R., 70 N.Y.2d 382, 521 N.Y.S.2d 653, 516 N.E.2d 190 (1987) (“The existence of a valid and enforceable written contract governing a particular subject matter ordinarily precludes recovery in quasi contract for events arising out of the same subject matter.”). Moreover, the claim, which is based on the contention that plaintiffs were not aware of the risks involved in the transaction so that when the baht was pulled from the currency basket, Morgan realized an unbargained-for windfall, cannot be sustained. As already discussed, the risk involved in the transaction was patent, and a claim for unjust enrichment cannot be premised on a known risk. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. 58 W. 72nd St. Realty Assocs., No. 91 Civ. 3299, 1992 WL 183741, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 1992) (holding that a claim for unjust enrichment should not be dismissed because the court may find that the express contract was no longer in force", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nv. Long Island R.R., 70 N.Y.2d 382, 521 N.Y.S.2d 653, 516 N.E.2d 190 (1987) (“The existence of a valid and enforceable written contract governing a particular subject matter ordinarily precludes recovery in quasi contract for events arising out of the same subject matter.”). Moreover, the claim, which is based on the contention that plaintiffs were not aware of the risks involved in the transaction so that when the baht was pulled from the currency basket, Morgan realized an unbargained-for windfall, cannot be sustained. As already discussed, the risk involved in the transaction was patent, and a claim for unjust enrichment cannot be premised on a known risk. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. 58 W. 72nd St. Realty Assocs., No. 91 Civ. 3299, 1992 WL 183741, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 1992) (holding that where a prior agreement fixed the salary of the plaintiff plaintiff could not seek to recover for his services on a theory of unjust enrichment", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nv. Long Island R.R., 70 N.Y.2d 382, 521 N.Y.S.2d 653, 516 N.E.2d 190 (1987) (“The existence of a valid and enforceable written contract governing a particular subject matter ordinarily precludes recovery in quasi contract for events arising out of the same subject matter.”). Moreover, the claim, which is based on the contention that plaintiffs were not aware of the risks involved in the transaction so that when the baht was pulled from the currency basket, Morgan realized an unbargained-for windfall, cannot be sustained. As already discussed, the risk involved in the transaction was patent, and a claim for unjust enrichment cannot be premised on a known risk. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. 58 W. 72nd St. Realty Assocs., No. 91 Civ. 3299, 1992 WL 183741, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 1992) (holding a claim for unjust enrichment could not be sustained where known risk would merely prevent the partys business expenditures from generating the return on investment which had been hoped for", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nv. Long Island R.R., 70 N.Y.2d 382, 521 N.Y.S.2d 653, 516 N.E.2d 190 (1987) (“The existence of a valid and enforceable written contract governing a particular subject matter ordinarily precludes recovery in quasi contract for events arising out of the same subject matter.”). Moreover, the claim, which is based on the contention that plaintiffs were not aware of the risks involved in the transaction so that when the baht was pulled from the currency basket, Morgan realized an unbargained-for windfall, cannot be sustained. As already discussed, the risk involved in the transaction was patent, and a claim for unjust enrichment cannot be premised on a known risk. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. 58 W. 72nd St. Realty Assocs., No. 91 Civ. 3299, 1992 WL 183741, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 1992) (holding that there is no cause of action in california for unjust enrichment", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nv. Long Island R.R., 70 N.Y.2d 382, 521 N.Y.S.2d 653, 516 N.E.2d 190 (1987) (“The existence of a valid and enforceable written contract governing a particular subject matter ordinarily precludes recovery in quasi contract for events arising out of the same subject matter.”). Moreover, the claim, which is based on the contention that plaintiffs were not aware of the risks involved in the transaction so that when the baht was pulled from the currency basket, Morgan realized an unbargained-for windfall, cannot be sustained. As already discussed, the risk involved in the transaction was patent, and a claim for unjust enrichment cannot be premised on a known risk. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. 58 W. 72nd St. Realty Assocs., No. 91 Civ. 3299, 1992 WL 183741, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 1992) (holding that unjust enrichment claim could prevail contrary to the ucc priority system" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nperson, the individual can be charged with and convicted of more than one count of resisting arrest — one for each person that the individual has committed criminal conduct against — without running afoul of the Double Jeopardy Clause. See Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 344, 101 S.Ct. 1137 (“Where Congress intended ... to impose multiple punishments, imposition of such sentences does not violate the Constitution.”); see also State v. Burdick, 211 Ariz. 583, 585-86 ¶¶ 5-10, 125 P.3d 1039, 1041-42 (App.2005) (“[W]here crimes against persons are involved we believe a separate interest of society has been invaded with each victim and that, therefore, where two persons are assaulted, there are two separate offenses.”); State v. Riley, 196 Ariz. 40, 45-6 ¶¶ 17-19, 992 P.2d 1135, 1140-41 (App.1999) (recognizing that a bank customer may have a tort claim against a bank for the wrongful dishonor of a check", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nperson, the individual can be charged with and convicted of more than one count of resisting arrest — one for each person that the individual has committed criminal conduct against — without running afoul of the Double Jeopardy Clause. See Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 344, 101 S.Ct. 1137 (“Where Congress intended ... to impose multiple punishments, imposition of such sentences does not violate the Constitution.”); see also State v. Burdick, 211 Ariz. 583, 585-86 ¶¶ 5-10, 125 P.3d 1039, 1041-42 (App.2005) (“[W]here crimes against persons are involved we believe a separate interest of society has been invaded with each victim and that, therefore, where two persons are assaulted, there are two separate offenses.”); State v. Riley, 196 Ariz. 40, 45-6 ¶¶ 17-19, 992 P.2d 1135, 1140-41 (App.1999) (holding the defendant properly convicted of multiple counts of armed robbery against bank employees even though the defendant robbed only the bank", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nperson, the individual can be charged with and convicted of more than one count of resisting arrest — one for each person that the individual has committed criminal conduct against — without running afoul of the Double Jeopardy Clause. See Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 344, 101 S.Ct. 1137 (“Where Congress intended ... to impose multiple punishments, imposition of such sentences does not violate the Constitution.”); see also State v. Burdick, 211 Ariz. 583, 585-86 ¶¶ 5-10, 125 P.3d 1039, 1041-42 (App.2005) (“[W]here crimes against persons are involved we believe a separate interest of society has been invaded with each victim and that, therefore, where two persons are assaulted, there are two separate offenses.”); State v. Riley, 196 Ariz. 40, 45-6 ¶¶ 17-19, 992 P.2d 1135, 1140-41 (App.1999) (holding judge in bank robbery prosecution did not abuse discretion in refusing to excuse juror whose wife was bank employee or juror whose daughter had been victim of bank robbery", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nperson, the individual can be charged with and convicted of more than one count of resisting arrest — one for each person that the individual has committed criminal conduct against — without running afoul of the Double Jeopardy Clause. See Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 344, 101 S.Ct. 1137 (“Where Congress intended ... to impose multiple punishments, imposition of such sentences does not violate the Constitution.”); see also State v. Burdick, 211 Ariz. 583, 585-86 ¶¶ 5-10, 125 P.3d 1039, 1041-42 (App.2005) (“[W]here crimes against persons are involved we believe a separate interest of society has been invaded with each victim and that, therefore, where two persons are assaulted, there are two separate offenses.”); State v. Riley, 196 Ariz. 40, 45-6 ¶¶ 17-19, 992 P.2d 1135, 1140-41 (App.1999) (holding that escape driver with no prior knowledge that robbery would be armed is aider and abettor of aimed bank robbery if he knowingly and willfully joins in the escape phase of an armed bank robbery knowing that an accomplice has a gun", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nperson, the individual can be charged with and convicted of more than one count of resisting arrest — one for each person that the individual has committed criminal conduct against — without running afoul of the Double Jeopardy Clause. See Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 344, 101 S.Ct. 1137 (“Where Congress intended ... to impose multiple punishments, imposition of such sentences does not violate the Constitution.”); see also State v. Burdick, 211 Ariz. 583, 585-86 ¶¶ 5-10, 125 P.3d 1039, 1041-42 (App.2005) (“[W]here crimes against persons are involved we believe a separate interest of society has been invaded with each victim and that, therefore, where two persons are assaulted, there are two separate offenses.”); State v. Riley, 196 Ariz. 40, 45-6 ¶¶ 17-19, 992 P.2d 1135, 1140-41 (App.1999) (holding that an africanamerican investment advisor who accompanied two clients into a bank could assert a 51 claim alleging discrimination against the bank even though his clients were the actual customers of the bank" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nQuinn, 204 F.Supp.2d at 163. We agree that stare decisis governs. The last time around, we addressed this aspect of the standard for measuring compliance head-on and held that the proper data are the “contemporaneous population figures [for] ... ‘the percentage of minorities within the community.’ ” Mackin, 969 F.2d at 1276 (quoting the Beecher decree). At that time, we considered the very authorities upon which the Candidates now rely and specifically repudiated the notion that the pertinent language of the decree was overbroad. Id. at 1277-78. Thus, principles of stare decisis required the district court to -reject the Candidates’ version of how the second variable should be constructed. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992) (holding that the doctrine of stare decisis is most frequently applied in cases affecting real property", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nQuinn, 204 F.Supp.2d at 163. We agree that stare decisis governs. The last time around, we addressed this aspect of the standard for measuring compliance head-on and held that the proper data are the “contemporaneous population figures [for] ... ‘the percentage of minorities within the community.’ ” Mackin, 969 F.2d at 1276 (quoting the Beecher decree). At that time, we considered the very authorities upon which the Candidates now rely and specifically repudiated the notion that the pertinent language of the decree was overbroad. Id. at 1277-78. Thus, principles of stare decisis required the district court to -reject the Candidates’ version of how the second variable should be constructed. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992) (recognizing that the doctrine of stare decisis embodies the obligation to follow precedent", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nQuinn, 204 F.Supp.2d at 163. We agree that stare decisis governs. The last time around, we addressed this aspect of the standard for measuring compliance head-on and held that the proper data are the “contemporaneous population figures [for] ... ‘the percentage of minorities within the community.’ ” Mackin, 969 F.2d at 1276 (quoting the Beecher decree). At that time, we considered the very authorities upon which the Candidates now rely and specifically repudiated the notion that the pertinent language of the decree was overbroad. Id. at 1277-78. Thus, principles of stare decisis required the district court to -reject the Candidates’ version of how the second variable should be constructed. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992) (holding that decision by panel of this court is established precedent under rules of stare decisis", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nQuinn, 204 F.Supp.2d at 163. We agree that stare decisis governs. The last time around, we addressed this aspect of the standard for measuring compliance head-on and held that the proper data are the “contemporaneous population figures [for] ... ‘the percentage of minorities within the community.’ ” Mackin, 969 F.2d at 1276 (quoting the Beecher decree). At that time, we considered the very authorities upon which the Candidates now rely and specifically repudiated the notion that the pertinent language of the decree was overbroad. Id. at 1277-78. Thus, principles of stare decisis required the district court to -reject the Candidates’ version of how the second variable should be constructed. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992) (holding that stare decisis is not applicable unless the issue was squarely addressed in a prior decision", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nQuinn, 204 F.Supp.2d at 163. We agree that stare decisis governs. The last time around, we addressed this aspect of the standard for measuring compliance head-on and held that the proper data are the “contemporaneous population figures [for] ... ‘the percentage of minorities within the community.’ ” Mackin, 969 F.2d at 1276 (quoting the Beecher decree). At that time, we considered the very authorities upon which the Candidates now rely and specifically repudiated the notion that the pertinent language of the decree was overbroad. Id. at 1277-78. Thus, principles of stare decisis required the district court to -reject the Candidates’ version of how the second variable should be constructed. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992) (holding that the doctrine of stare decisis applies to the issue of reliability of new scientific techniques the intoxilyzer in that case" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nto avail themselves of existing procedures that has foreclosed their claims presented here. Alternatively, plaintiffs claim that availing themselves of the existing procedures would have been futile because, once the government initiates the eminent domain process, Connecticut law does not allow for a valuation of the property that includes a decline in property value occasioned by pre-eminent domain activities of the government. (See Dkt. #22 at 3-4.) This argument is not persuasive for two reasons. First, plaintiffs do not present facts indicating that they even attempted to raise the issue during the eminent domain process. Second, plaintiffs interpretation of Connecticut law has recently been disavowed. See Albahary v. City of Bristol, 276 Conn. 426, 436, 886 A.2d 802 (2005) (holding that the constitutional level of punitive damages is not a finding of fact that must be determined by the jury it may be determined de novo by the court", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nto avail themselves of existing procedures that has foreclosed their claims presented here. Alternatively, plaintiffs claim that availing themselves of the existing procedures would have been futile because, once the government initiates the eminent domain process, Connecticut law does not allow for a valuation of the property that includes a decline in property value occasioned by pre-eminent domain activities of the government. (See Dkt. #22 at 3-4.) This argument is not persuasive for two reasons. First, plaintiffs do not present facts indicating that they even attempted to raise the issue during the eminent domain process. Second, plaintiffs interpretation of Connecticut law has recently been disavowed. See Albahary v. City of Bristol, 276 Conn. 426, 436, 886 A.2d 802 (2005) (holding before huffman was decided that younger abstention was inapplicable to an eminent domain proceeding", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nto avail themselves of existing procedures that has foreclosed their claims presented here. Alternatively, plaintiffs claim that availing themselves of the existing procedures would have been futile because, once the government initiates the eminent domain process, Connecticut law does not allow for a valuation of the property that includes a decline in property value occasioned by pre-eminent domain activities of the government. (See Dkt. #22 at 3-4.) This argument is not persuasive for two reasons. First, plaintiffs do not present facts indicating that they even attempted to raise the issue during the eminent domain process. Second, plaintiffs interpretation of Connecticut law has recently been disavowed. See Albahary v. City of Bristol, 276 Conn. 426, 436, 886 A.2d 802 (2005) (holding that the appellate court properly determined that generally under principles of inverse condemnation a property owner may seek compensation in an eminent domain proceeding for pretaking damages caused by the condemnor", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nto avail themselves of existing procedures that has foreclosed their claims presented here. Alternatively, plaintiffs claim that availing themselves of the existing procedures would have been futile because, once the government initiates the eminent domain process, Connecticut law does not allow for a valuation of the property that includes a decline in property value occasioned by pre-eminent domain activities of the government. (See Dkt. #22 at 3-4.) This argument is not persuasive for two reasons. First, plaintiffs do not present facts indicating that they even attempted to raise the issue during the eminent domain process. Second, plaintiffs interpretation of Connecticut law has recently been disavowed. See Albahary v. City of Bristol, 276 Conn. 426, 436, 886 A.2d 802 (2005) (holding that an eminent domain action that ended with a stipulated final judgment was not a supplemental proceeding", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nto avail themselves of existing procedures that has foreclosed their claims presented here. Alternatively, plaintiffs claim that availing themselves of the existing procedures would have been futile because, once the government initiates the eminent domain process, Connecticut law does not allow for a valuation of the property that includes a decline in property value occasioned by pre-eminent domain activities of the government. (See Dkt. #22 at 3-4.) This argument is not persuasive for two reasons. First, plaintiffs do not present facts indicating that they even attempted to raise the issue during the eminent domain process. Second, plaintiffs interpretation of Connecticut law has recently been disavowed. See Albahary v. City of Bristol, 276 Conn. 426, 436, 886 A.2d 802 (2005) (holding that a workers compensation proceeding is a legal proceeding" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nshould receive the death penalty, ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B) further provides: “In determining the issue in paragraph (b)(D) of this subsection, the court shall instruct the jury to answer the question ‘no’ if one or more of the jurors find there is any aspect of the defendant’s character or background, or any circumstance of the offense, that one or more of the jurors believe would justify a sentence less than death.” The testimony offered by defendant in this case cannot be said to relate to the circumstances of the offense. Thus, in order to be relevant, the evidence must be relevant to “any aspect of the defendant’s character or background * * * that one or more * * * jurors believe would justify a sentence less than death.” See State v. Guzek, 322 Or 245, 254, 906 P2d 272 (1995) (holding defense counsel was ineffective at sentencing when he failed to make a significant effort based on reasonable investigation and logical argument to ably present the defendants fate to the jury and to focus the attention of the jury on any mitigating factors", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nshould receive the death penalty, ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B) further provides: “In determining the issue in paragraph (b)(D) of this subsection, the court shall instruct the jury to answer the question ‘no’ if one or more of the jurors find there is any aspect of the defendant’s character or background, or any circumstance of the offense, that one or more of the jurors believe would justify a sentence less than death.” The testimony offered by defendant in this case cannot be said to relate to the circumstances of the offense. Thus, in order to be relevant, the evidence must be relevant to “any aspect of the defendant’s character or background * * * that one or more * * * jurors believe would justify a sentence less than death.” See State v. Guzek, 322 Or 245, 254, 906 P2d 272 (1995) (holding that any relevant mitigating evidence concerning a defendants character should not be excluded", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nshould receive the death penalty, ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B) further provides: “In determining the issue in paragraph (b)(D) of this subsection, the court shall instruct the jury to answer the question ‘no’ if one or more of the jurors find there is any aspect of the defendant’s character or background, or any circumstance of the offense, that one or more of the jurors believe would justify a sentence less than death.” The testimony offered by defendant in this case cannot be said to relate to the circumstances of the offense. Thus, in order to be relevant, the evidence must be relevant to “any aspect of the defendant’s character or background * * * that one or more * * * jurors believe would justify a sentence less than death.” See State v. Guzek, 322 Or 245, 254, 906 P2d 272 (1995) (holding counsel ineffective for failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nshould receive the death penalty, ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B) further provides: “In determining the issue in paragraph (b)(D) of this subsection, the court shall instruct the jury to answer the question ‘no’ if one or more of the jurors find there is any aspect of the defendant’s character or background, or any circumstance of the offense, that one or more of the jurors believe would justify a sentence less than death.” The testimony offered by defendant in this case cannot be said to relate to the circumstances of the offense. Thus, in order to be relevant, the evidence must be relevant to “any aspect of the defendant’s character or background * * * that one or more * * * jurors believe would justify a sentence less than death.” See State v. Guzek, 322 Or 245, 254, 906 P2d 272 (1995) (holding that focus of ors 1631501bd is on mitigating evidence", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nshould receive the death penalty, ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B) further provides: “In determining the issue in paragraph (b)(D) of this subsection, the court shall instruct the jury to answer the question ‘no’ if one or more of the jurors find there is any aspect of the defendant’s character or background, or any circumstance of the offense, that one or more of the jurors believe would justify a sentence less than death.” The testimony offered by defendant in this case cannot be said to relate to the circumstances of the offense. Thus, in order to be relevant, the evidence must be relevant to “any aspect of the defendant’s character or background * * * that one or more * * * jurors believe would justify a sentence less than death.” See State v. Guzek, 322 Or 245, 254, 906 P2d 272 (1995) (holding that counsel cannot be found ineffective for failing to pursue a particular mitigating factor where despite a reasonable investigation by counsel counsel was not put on notice of any such mitigating evidence" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nState v. Welke, 298 Minn. 402, 216 N.W.2d 641 (1974) (prospective application only); State v. DeSantis, 65 N.J. 462, 323 A.2d 489 (1974) (prospective application only); State v. Bryant, 285 N.C. 27, 203 S.E. 2d 27, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 974, 95 S.Ct. 238, 42 L.Ed.2d 188 (1974); State v. Watkins, 262 S.C. 178, 203 S.E.2d 429 (1973), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 911, 94 S.Ct. 3204, 41 L.Ed.2d 1157 (1974); West v. State, 514 S.W.2d 433 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); State v. J-R Distributors, Inc., 82 Wash.2d 584, 512 P.2d 1049 (1973), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 949, 94 S.Ct. 3217, 41 L.Ed.2d 1166 (1974) (semble) (may have been applying pre-Miller construction); State ex rel. Chobot v. Circuit Court, 61 Wis.2d 354, 212 N.W.2d 690 (1973). 16 . Commonwealth v. Winkleman, 230 Pa.Super. 265, 326 A.2d 496 (1974) (holding that an unconstitutional act of congress has no legal effect", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nState v. Welke, 298 Minn. 402, 216 N.W.2d 641 (1974) (prospective application only); State v. DeSantis, 65 N.J. 462, 323 A.2d 489 (1974) (prospective application only); State v. Bryant, 285 N.C. 27, 203 S.E. 2d 27, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 974, 95 S.Ct. 238, 42 L.Ed.2d 188 (1974); State v. Watkins, 262 S.C. 178, 203 S.E.2d 429 (1973), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 911, 94 S.Ct. 3204, 41 L.Ed.2d 1157 (1974); West v. State, 514 S.W.2d 433 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); State v. J-R Distributors, Inc., 82 Wash.2d 584, 512 P.2d 1049 (1973), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 949, 94 S.Ct. 3217, 41 L.Ed.2d 1166 (1974) (semble) (may have been applying pre-Miller construction); State ex rel. Chobot v. Circuit Court, 61 Wis.2d 354, 212 N.W.2d 690 (1973). 16 . Commonwealth v. Winkleman, 230 Pa.Super. 265, 326 A.2d 496 (1974) (holding that although probation statute was repealed by sentencing reform act old provision continued to apply to offenses which occurred before effective date of act nov 1 1987", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nState v. Welke, 298 Minn. 402, 216 N.W.2d 641 (1974) (prospective application only); State v. DeSantis, 65 N.J. 462, 323 A.2d 489 (1974) (prospective application only); State v. Bryant, 285 N.C. 27, 203 S.E. 2d 27, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 974, 95 S.Ct. 238, 42 L.Ed.2d 188 (1974); State v. Watkins, 262 S.C. 178, 203 S.E.2d 429 (1973), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 911, 94 S.Ct. 3204, 41 L.Ed.2d 1157 (1974); West v. State, 514 S.W.2d 433 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); State v. J-R Distributors, Inc., 82 Wash.2d 584, 512 P.2d 1049 (1973), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 949, 94 S.Ct. 3217, 41 L.Ed.2d 1166 (1974) (semble) (may have been applying pre-Miller construction); State ex rel. Chobot v. Circuit Court, 61 Wis.2d 354, 212 N.W.2d 690 (1973). 16 . Commonwealth v. Winkleman, 230 Pa.Super. 265, 326 A.2d 496 (1974) (holding that 1972 amendments had no effect on persons not covered by the act", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nState v. Welke, 298 Minn. 402, 216 N.W.2d 641 (1974) (prospective application only); State v. DeSantis, 65 N.J. 462, 323 A.2d 489 (1974) (prospective application only); State v. Bryant, 285 N.C. 27, 203 S.E. 2d 27, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 974, 95 S.Ct. 238, 42 L.Ed.2d 188 (1974); State v. Watkins, 262 S.C. 178, 203 S.E.2d 429 (1973), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 911, 94 S.Ct. 3204, 41 L.Ed.2d 1157 (1974); West v. State, 514 S.W.2d 433 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); State v. J-R Distributors, Inc., 82 Wash.2d 584, 512 P.2d 1049 (1973), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 949, 94 S.Ct. 3217, 41 L.Ed.2d 1166 (1974) (semble) (may have been applying pre-Miller construction); State ex rel. Chobot v. Circuit Court, 61 Wis.2d 354, 212 N.W.2d 690 (1973). 16 . Commonwealth v. Winkleman, 230 Pa.Super. 265, 326 A.2d 496 (1974) (holding that section 211a of the act commonly known as the parole act act of august 6 1941 added by section 5 of the act of august 24 1951 pl 1401 as amended formerly 61 ps 33121aa repealed by the act of august 11 2009 pl 147 providing that a convicted parole violator forfeits all the time spent at liberty on parole similar language can be found at section 6138 of the prisons and parole code 61 pa cs 6138a2 was not subject to the rule of lenity because that section did not define elements of a crime but defines the ramifications when an individual who was on parole from a prior crime is convicted of committing a new crime", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nState v. Welke, 298 Minn. 402, 216 N.W.2d 641 (1974) (prospective application only); State v. DeSantis, 65 N.J. 462, 323 A.2d 489 (1974) (prospective application only); State v. Bryant, 285 N.C. 27, 203 S.E. 2d 27, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 974, 95 S.Ct. 238, 42 L.Ed.2d 188 (1974); State v. Watkins, 262 S.C. 178, 203 S.E.2d 429 (1973), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 911, 94 S.Ct. 3204, 41 L.Ed.2d 1157 (1974); West v. State, 514 S.W.2d 433 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); State v. J-R Distributors, Inc., 82 Wash.2d 584, 512 P.2d 1049 (1973), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 949, 94 S.Ct. 3217, 41 L.Ed.2d 1166 (1974) (semble) (may have been applying pre-Miller construction); State ex rel. Chobot v. Circuit Court, 61 Wis.2d 354, 212 N.W.2d 690 (1973). 16 . Commonwealth v. Winkleman, 230 Pa.Super. 265, 326 A.2d 496 (1974) (holding unconstitutional act of june 24 1939 pl 872 528 as amended formerly codified as 18 ps 4528 repealed by act of december 6 1972 pl 1605 no 334 5" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwe need not address whether the district court could have applied a lower standard of proof in this context. 13 . See United States v. Rodriguez, 279 F.3d 947, 952 (11th Cir.2002) (\"It is also a basic principle of criminal law that foreseeable negligent acts of a third party do not sever the chain of causation.”); 1 Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law § 3.12, at 408-09 (1986) (same); see also United States v. Guillette, 547 F.2d 743, 749 (2d Cir.1976) (\"Where such intervening events [as negligent medical treatment] are foreseeable and naturally result from a perpetrator's criminal conduct, the law considers the chain of legal causation unbroken and holds the perpetrator criminally responsible for the resulting harm.”). 14 . Cf. Rodriguez, 279 F.3d at 952 (holding 841b1c which covers drug offenses is an exception to 18 usc 3583b", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwe need not address whether the district court could have applied a lower standard of proof in this context. 13 . See United States v. Rodriguez, 279 F.3d 947, 952 (11th Cir.2002) (\"It is also a basic principle of criminal law that foreseeable negligent acts of a third party do not sever the chain of causation.”); 1 Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law § 3.12, at 408-09 (1986) (same); see also United States v. Guillette, 547 F.2d 743, 749 (2d Cir.1976) (\"Where such intervening events [as negligent medical treatment] are foreseeable and naturally result from a perpetrator's criminal conduct, the law considers the chain of legal causation unbroken and holds the perpetrator criminally responsible for the resulting harm.”). 14 . Cf. Rodriguez, 279 F.3d at 952 (holding that drug quantity is an element of an offense under 21 usc 841", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwe need not address whether the district court could have applied a lower standard of proof in this context. 13 . See United States v. Rodriguez, 279 F.3d 947, 952 (11th Cir.2002) (\"It is also a basic principle of criminal law that foreseeable negligent acts of a third party do not sever the chain of causation.”); 1 Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law § 3.12, at 408-09 (1986) (same); see also United States v. Guillette, 547 F.2d 743, 749 (2d Cir.1976) (\"Where such intervening events [as negligent medical treatment] are foreseeable and naturally result from a perpetrator's criminal conduct, the law considers the chain of legal causation unbroken and holds the perpetrator criminally responsible for the resulting harm.”). 14 . Cf. Rodriguez, 279 F.3d at 952 (holding conviction for cce murder 21 usc 848e1 is a separate offense from a cce 21 usc 848c", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwe need not address whether the district court could have applied a lower standard of proof in this context. 13 . See United States v. Rodriguez, 279 F.3d 947, 952 (11th Cir.2002) (\"It is also a basic principle of criminal law that foreseeable negligent acts of a third party do not sever the chain of causation.”); 1 Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law § 3.12, at 408-09 (1986) (same); see also United States v. Guillette, 547 F.2d 743, 749 (2d Cir.1976) (\"Where such intervening events [as negligent medical treatment] are foreseeable and naturally result from a perpetrator's criminal conduct, the law considers the chain of legal causation unbroken and holds the perpetrator criminally responsible for the resulting harm.”). 14 . Cf. Rodriguez, 279 F.3d at 952 (holding that a failure to obtain prompt medical treatment for overdosing heroin user did not break the chain of legal causation under 21 usc 841b1c", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwe need not address whether the district court could have applied a lower standard of proof in this context. 13 . See United States v. Rodriguez, 279 F.3d 947, 952 (11th Cir.2002) (\"It is also a basic principle of criminal law that foreseeable negligent acts of a third party do not sever the chain of causation.”); 1 Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law § 3.12, at 408-09 (1986) (same); see also United States v. Guillette, 547 F.2d 743, 749 (2d Cir.1976) (\"Where such intervening events [as negligent medical treatment] are foreseeable and naturally result from a perpetrator's criminal conduct, the law considers the chain of legal causation unbroken and holds the perpetrator criminally responsible for the resulting harm.”). 14 . Cf. Rodriguez, 279 F.3d at 952 (holding that a defendant convicted of distributing heroin failed to satisfy 3553f5 when he refused to provide complete information regarding the immediate chain of distribution" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nDocket No. 137 at 20. ■ Defendants further argue that the patent specifications similarly fail to identify any corresponding structure for these terms. Id. at 21. “Processing device” is readily recognized by those skilled in the art as a processor, thereby evidencing corresponding structure. Accordingly, “processing device” is not a means-plus-function term, and because it is easily understood by a jury, needs no further construction. However, “module” is not as readily recognized in the art. While “module” has sometimes avoided means-plus-function construction in specific contexts, module has also been considered a nonce word and subject to § 112, ¶ 6. Compare, e.g., Beneficial Innovations, Inc. v. Blockdot, Inc., No. 2:07-cv-263, 2010 WL 1441779, at *16 (E.D.Tex. Apr. 12, 2010) (holding that 112 6 did not apply when construing a term including module in the context of a software system", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nDocket No. 137 at 20. ■ Defendants further argue that the patent specifications similarly fail to identify any corresponding structure for these terms. Id. at 21. “Processing device” is readily recognized by those skilled in the art as a processor, thereby evidencing corresponding structure. Accordingly, “processing device” is not a means-plus-function term, and because it is easily understood by a jury, needs no further construction. However, “module” is not as readily recognized in the art. While “module” has sometimes avoided means-plus-function construction in specific contexts, module has also been considered a nonce word and subject to § 112, ¶ 6. Compare, e.g., Beneficial Innovations, Inc. v. Blockdot, Inc., No. 2:07-cv-263, 2010 WL 1441779, at *16 (E.D.Tex. Apr. 12, 2010) (holding that claim limitation using the term means for and not reciting any structure presumptively falls within the scope of 112 6", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nDocket No. 137 at 20. ■ Defendants further argue that the patent specifications similarly fail to identify any corresponding structure for these terms. Id. at 21. “Processing device” is readily recognized by those skilled in the art as a processor, thereby evidencing corresponding structure. Accordingly, “processing device” is not a means-plus-function term, and because it is easily understood by a jury, needs no further construction. However, “module” is not as readily recognized in the art. While “module” has sometimes avoided means-plus-function construction in specific contexts, module has also been considered a nonce word and subject to § 112, ¶ 6. Compare, e.g., Beneficial Innovations, Inc. v. Blockdot, Inc., No. 2:07-cv-263, 2010 WL 1441779, at *16 (E.D.Tex. Apr. 12, 2010) (holding that person as defined in njsa 112 does not include the state based on the fact that 1 the definition of person indicates that such term includes the state when it is used to designate the owner of property which may be the subject of an offense and 2 state and municipality are separately defined in njsa 112", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nDocket No. 137 at 20. ■ Defendants further argue that the patent specifications similarly fail to identify any corresponding structure for these terms. Id. at 21. “Processing device” is readily recognized by those skilled in the art as a processor, thereby evidencing corresponding structure. Accordingly, “processing device” is not a means-plus-function term, and because it is easily understood by a jury, needs no further construction. However, “module” is not as readily recognized in the art. While “module” has sometimes avoided means-plus-function construction in specific contexts, module has also been considered a nonce word and subject to § 112, ¶ 6. Compare, e.g., Beneficial Innovations, Inc. v. Blockdot, Inc., No. 2:07-cv-263, 2010 WL 1441779, at *16 (E.D.Tex. Apr. 12, 2010) (recognizing that the term including is somewhat ambiguous", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nDocket No. 137 at 20. ■ Defendants further argue that the patent specifications similarly fail to identify any corresponding structure for these terms. Id. at 21. “Processing device” is readily recognized by those skilled in the art as a processor, thereby evidencing corresponding structure. Accordingly, “processing device” is not a means-plus-function term, and because it is easily understood by a jury, needs no further construction. However, “module” is not as readily recognized in the art. While “module” has sometimes avoided means-plus-function construction in specific contexts, module has also been considered a nonce word and subject to § 112, ¶ 6. Compare, e.g., Beneficial Innovations, Inc. v. Blockdot, Inc., No. 2:07-cv-263, 2010 WL 1441779, at *16 (E.D.Tex. Apr. 12, 2010) (holding that when a term is not defined in a contract the presumption is that the term is to be given its ordinary meaning and significance" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nv. Keller 737 A.2d 279, 283 (Pa.Super.1999). With regard to specific personal jurisdiction, our focus is narrow in scope; we examine the particular events that gave rise to the underlying claim. Id. at 281. ¶ 6 Appellants urge this Court to adopt the sliding scale test, as pronounced in Efford, to assess specific jurisdiction. We decline to do so; the facts of this case are not such that the underlying cause of action arose from appellants’ use of appel-lee’s website. Appellants’ arguments premised on Efford are more specifically aimed to a general jurisdiction attack. Specific jurisdiction ¶ 7 Generally our specific jurisdiction inquiry focuses on the party’s course of dealing and the known benefits incurred by contracting with a party from the forum state. See, e.g., Keller at 282, (holding that to the extent simple assault under pennsylvania law is committed intentionally or knowingly it is by definition purposeful", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nv. Keller 737 A.2d 279, 283 (Pa.Super.1999). With regard to specific personal jurisdiction, our focus is narrow in scope; we examine the particular events that gave rise to the underlying claim. Id. at 281. ¶ 6 Appellants urge this Court to adopt the sliding scale test, as pronounced in Efford, to assess specific jurisdiction. We decline to do so; the facts of this case are not such that the underlying cause of action arose from appellants’ use of appel-lee’s website. Appellants’ arguments premised on Efford are more specifically aimed to a general jurisdiction attack. Specific jurisdiction ¶ 7 Generally our specific jurisdiction inquiry focuses on the party’s course of dealing and the known benefits incurred by contracting with a party from the forum state. See, e.g., Keller at 282, (holding that a nonresident defendants contract in this case a guaranty with a pennsylvania business entity alone cannot automatically establish sufficient minimum contacts", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nv. Keller 737 A.2d 279, 283 (Pa.Super.1999). With regard to specific personal jurisdiction, our focus is narrow in scope; we examine the particular events that gave rise to the underlying claim. Id. at 281. ¶ 6 Appellants urge this Court to adopt the sliding scale test, as pronounced in Efford, to assess specific jurisdiction. We decline to do so; the facts of this case are not such that the underlying cause of action arose from appellants’ use of appel-lee’s website. Appellants’ arguments premised on Efford are more specifically aimed to a general jurisdiction attack. Specific jurisdiction ¶ 7 Generally our specific jurisdiction inquiry focuses on the party’s course of dealing and the known benefits incurred by contracting with a party from the forum state. See, e.g., Keller at 282, (holding that rookerfeldman did not bar the plaintiffs federal action where a pennsylvania state court had previously dismissed the plaintiffs petition for review of an agencys decision for failure to comply with the pennsylvania rules of appellate procedure since the extent of the plaintiffs compliance with those rules had no bearing on the merits of the plaintiffs constitutional claims", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nv. Keller 737 A.2d 279, 283 (Pa.Super.1999). With regard to specific personal jurisdiction, our focus is narrow in scope; we examine the particular events that gave rise to the underlying claim. Id. at 281. ¶ 6 Appellants urge this Court to adopt the sliding scale test, as pronounced in Efford, to assess specific jurisdiction. We decline to do so; the facts of this case are not such that the underlying cause of action arose from appellants’ use of appel-lee’s website. Appellants’ arguments premised on Efford are more specifically aimed to a general jurisdiction attack. Specific jurisdiction ¶ 7 Generally our specific jurisdiction inquiry focuses on the party’s course of dealing and the known benefits incurred by contracting with a party from the forum state. See, e.g., Keller at 282, (holding that a criminal defendants right to an impartial jury is guaranteed by article 1 section 9 of the pennsylvania constitution", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nv. Keller 737 A.2d 279, 283 (Pa.Super.1999). With regard to specific personal jurisdiction, our focus is narrow in scope; we examine the particular events that gave rise to the underlying claim. Id. at 281. ¶ 6 Appellants urge this Court to adopt the sliding scale test, as pronounced in Efford, to assess specific jurisdiction. We decline to do so; the facts of this case are not such that the underlying cause of action arose from appellants’ use of appel-lee’s website. Appellants’ arguments premised on Efford are more specifically aimed to a general jurisdiction attack. Specific jurisdiction ¶ 7 Generally our specific jurisdiction inquiry focuses on the party’s course of dealing and the known benefits incurred by contracting with a party from the forum state. See, e.g., Keller at 282, (holding that a party contracting with a resident of pennsylvania despite not physically signing the contract in pennsylvania was sufficient to determine purposeful availment and vest pennsylvania with jurisdiction given that the party mailed the contract to pennsylvania directed payments to pennsylvania and conducted business with the same pennsylvania company repeatedly" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nwho “multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously.” 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Like an award made pursuant to the court’s inherent power, an award under § 1927 is proper when the attorney’s actions are so plainly without merit as to require the conclusion that they must have been undertaken for some improper purpose. See, e.g., Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1273 (2d Cir.1986) (police photographs of client taken an hour after incident in which police officers allegedly employed excessive force in taking client into custody did not constitute such clear evidence of absence of excessive force to render client’s attorney liable for his adversary’s attorney’s fees as a result of bad faith); Acevedo v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 538 F.2d 918, 920 (2d Cir.1976) (holding that evidence submitted for a motion to reopen must be material and state new facts that rebut the underlying finding", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nwho “multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously.” 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Like an award made pursuant to the court’s inherent power, an award under § 1927 is proper when the attorney’s actions are so plainly without merit as to require the conclusion that they must have been undertaken for some improper purpose. See, e.g., Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1273 (2d Cir.1986) (police photographs of client taken an hour after incident in which police officers allegedly employed excessive force in taking client into custody did not constitute such clear evidence of absence of excessive force to render client’s attorney liable for his adversary’s attorney’s fees as a result of bad faith); Acevedo v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 538 F.2d 918, 920 (2d Cir.1976) (holding that there was no new and material evidence to reopen claim where newly presented evidence was not accompanied by any medical evidence indicating a nexus to service", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nwho “multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously.” 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Like an award made pursuant to the court’s inherent power, an award under § 1927 is proper when the attorney’s actions are so plainly without merit as to require the conclusion that they must have been undertaken for some improper purpose. See, e.g., Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1273 (2d Cir.1986) (police photographs of client taken an hour after incident in which police officers allegedly employed excessive force in taking client into custody did not constitute such clear evidence of absence of excessive force to render client’s attorney liable for his adversary’s attorney’s fees as a result of bad faith); Acevedo v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 538 F.2d 918, 920 (2d Cir.1976) (holding petition seeking review of motion to reopen deportation hearing in the absence of new evidence as without merit under 1927 since petitioner was not entitled to reopen except on showing of significant new evidence", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nwho “multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously.” 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Like an award made pursuant to the court’s inherent power, an award under § 1927 is proper when the attorney’s actions are so plainly without merit as to require the conclusion that they must have been undertaken for some improper purpose. See, e.g., Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1273 (2d Cir.1986) (police photographs of client taken an hour after incident in which police officers allegedly employed excessive force in taking client into custody did not constitute such clear evidence of absence of excessive force to render client’s attorney liable for his adversary’s attorney’s fees as a result of bad faith); Acevedo v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 538 F.2d 918, 920 (2d Cir.1976) (holding that a motion to reopen seeking only to apply for a form of relief which was unavailable to the movant at the time of the hearing is subject to the regulatory requirements governing motions to reopen", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nwho “multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously.” 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Like an award made pursuant to the court’s inherent power, an award under § 1927 is proper when the attorney’s actions are so plainly without merit as to require the conclusion that they must have been undertaken for some improper purpose. See, e.g., Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1273 (2d Cir.1986) (police photographs of client taken an hour after incident in which police officers allegedly employed excessive force in taking client into custody did not constitute such clear evidence of absence of excessive force to render client’s attorney liable for his adversary’s attorney’s fees as a result of bad faith); Acevedo v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 538 F.2d 918, 920 (2d Cir.1976) (holding that a properly filed motion to reopen is a prerequisite to the filing of a new asylum application when the petitioner is under a final removal order" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nobserved that, “[a]t the time of al-Kidd’s arrest, not a single judicial opinion had held that pretext could render an objectively reasonable arrest pursuant to a material-witness warrant unconstitutional.” Id. Furthermore, the Court’s decisions as a whole had emphasized that Fourth Amendment reasonableness is “predominantly an objective inquiry,” id. at 2080 (quoting City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47, 121 S.Ct. 447, 148 L.Ed.2d 333 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted), asking “whether ‘the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the challenged] action,’ ” id. (alteration in original) (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 56 L.Ed.2 , 129 S.Ct. 2431, 174 L.Ed.2d 226 (2009); Or. Advocacy Ctr. v. Mink, 322 F.3d 1101, 1120 (9th Cir.2003) (holding that pretrial detainees can bring substantive due process claim", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nobserved that, “[a]t the time of al-Kidd’s arrest, not a single judicial opinion had held that pretext could render an objectively reasonable arrest pursuant to a material-witness warrant unconstitutional.” Id. Furthermore, the Court’s decisions as a whole had emphasized that Fourth Amendment reasonableness is “predominantly an objective inquiry,” id. at 2080 (quoting City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47, 121 S.Ct. 447, 148 L.Ed.2d 333 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted), asking “whether ‘the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the challenged] action,’ ” id. (alteration in original) (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 56 L.Ed.2 , 129 S.Ct. 2431, 174 L.Ed.2d 226 (2009); Or. Advocacy Ctr. v. Mink, 322 F.3d 1101, 1120 (9th Cir.2003) (holding in light of the supreme courts observation that the due process rights of pretrial detainees are at least as great as the eighth amendment protections available to a convicted prisoner that the eighth amendment provides a minimum standard of care for determining the rights of pretrial detainees quoting revere 463 us at 244 103 sct 2979", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nobserved that, “[a]t the time of al-Kidd’s arrest, not a single judicial opinion had held that pretext could render an objectively reasonable arrest pursuant to a material-witness warrant unconstitutional.” Id. Furthermore, the Court’s decisions as a whole had emphasized that Fourth Amendment reasonableness is “predominantly an objective inquiry,” id. at 2080 (quoting City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47, 121 S.Ct. 447, 148 L.Ed.2d 333 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted), asking “whether ‘the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the challenged] action,’ ” id. (alteration in original) (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 56 L.Ed.2 , 129 S.Ct. 2431, 174 L.Ed.2d 226 (2009); Or. Advocacy Ctr. v. Mink, 322 F.3d 1101, 1120 (9th Cir.2003) (holding that pretrial detainees have at least the same protections under the fourteenth amendment as posttrial detainees have under the eighth amendment", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nobserved that, “[a]t the time of al-Kidd’s arrest, not a single judicial opinion had held that pretext could render an objectively reasonable arrest pursuant to a material-witness warrant unconstitutional.” Id. Furthermore, the Court’s decisions as a whole had emphasized that Fourth Amendment reasonableness is “predominantly an objective inquiry,” id. at 2080 (quoting City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47, 121 S.Ct. 447, 148 L.Ed.2d 333 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted), asking “whether ‘the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the challenged] action,’ ” id. (alteration in original) (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 56 L.Ed.2 , 129 S.Ct. 2431, 174 L.Ed.2d 226 (2009); Or. Advocacy Ctr. v. Mink, 322 F.3d 1101, 1120 (9th Cir.2003) (holding that pretrial detainees possess a constitutional right against deliberate indifference to their serious medical needs because the due process rights of a pretrial detainee are at least as great as the eighth amendment protections available to a convicted prisoner", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nobserved that, “[a]t the time of al-Kidd’s arrest, not a single judicial opinion had held that pretext could render an objectively reasonable arrest pursuant to a material-witness warrant unconstitutional.” Id. Furthermore, the Court’s decisions as a whole had emphasized that Fourth Amendment reasonableness is “predominantly an objective inquiry,” id. at 2080 (quoting City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47, 121 S.Ct. 447, 148 L.Ed.2d 333 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted), asking “whether ‘the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the challenged] action,’ ” id. (alteration in original) (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 56 L.Ed.2 , 129 S.Ct. 2431, 174 L.Ed.2d 226 (2009); Or. Advocacy Ctr. v. Mink, 322 F.3d 1101, 1120 (9th Cir.2003) (holding that because pretrial detainees fourteenth amendment rights are comparable to prisoners eighth amendment rights the same standards apply" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nprobation. A special condition of the probation was jail time equal to the amount of time he had already served in this case. This meant, in effect, that his sentence was complete upon the court’s acceptance of the plea and entry of the judgment and sentence. Because Petitioner had already completed the incarceration which was a special condition of his probation, the trial court “terminated” Petitioner’s probation following acceptance of the plea. The court then discharged the $5000 bond Petitioner had previously posted. The court’s plea offer was made over the objection of the State. The sentence departed below the sentencing guidelines, and the trial court did not provide written reasons for the departure. See Fla.R.Crim. P. 3.701(d)(11) and Pope v. State, 561 So.2d 554 (Fla.1990) (recognizing that postoffense rehabilitative efforts while normally not grounds for departure may support departure in extraordinary circumstances and noting that the totality of the circumstances may justify a departure where a single circumstance is not alone sufficient", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nprobation. A special condition of the probation was jail time equal to the amount of time he had already served in this case. This meant, in effect, that his sentence was complete upon the court’s acceptance of the plea and entry of the judgment and sentence. Because Petitioner had already completed the incarceration which was a special condition of his probation, the trial court “terminated” Petitioner’s probation following acceptance of the plea. The court then discharged the $5000 bond Petitioner had previously posted. The court’s plea offer was made over the objection of the State. The sentence departed below the sentencing guidelines, and the trial court did not provide written reasons for the departure. See Fla.R.Crim. P. 3.701(d)(11) and Pope v. State, 561 So.2d 554 (Fla.1990) (holding district court correctly reversed a departure sentence where the trial court failed to provide written reasons for the departure", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nprobation. A special condition of the probation was jail time equal to the amount of time he had already served in this case. This meant, in effect, that his sentence was complete upon the court’s acceptance of the plea and entry of the judgment and sentence. Because Petitioner had already completed the incarceration which was a special condition of his probation, the trial court “terminated” Petitioner’s probation following acceptance of the plea. The court then discharged the $5000 bond Petitioner had previously posted. The court’s plea offer was made over the objection of the State. The sentence departed below the sentencing guidelines, and the trial court did not provide written reasons for the departure. See Fla.R.Crim. P. 3.701(d)(11) and Pope v. State, 561 So.2d 554 (Fla.1990) (holding that notice must state the specific grounds for the departure", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nprobation. A special condition of the probation was jail time equal to the amount of time he had already served in this case. This meant, in effect, that his sentence was complete upon the court’s acceptance of the plea and entry of the judgment and sentence. Because Petitioner had already completed the incarceration which was a special condition of his probation, the trial court “terminated” Petitioner’s probation following acceptance of the plea. The court then discharged the $5000 bond Petitioner had previously posted. The court’s plea offer was made over the objection of the State. The sentence departed below the sentencing guidelines, and the trial court did not provide written reasons for the departure. See Fla.R.Crim. P. 3.701(d)(11) and Pope v. State, 561 So.2d 554 (Fla.1990) (holding that we may not review a district courts refusal to grant a downward departure unless the court mistakenly believed that it lacked the authority to grant such a departure", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nprobation. A special condition of the probation was jail time equal to the amount of time he had already served in this case. This meant, in effect, that his sentence was complete upon the court’s acceptance of the plea and entry of the judgment and sentence. Because Petitioner had already completed the incarceration which was a special condition of his probation, the trial court “terminated” Petitioner’s probation following acceptance of the plea. The court then discharged the $5000 bond Petitioner had previously posted. The court’s plea offer was made over the objection of the State. The sentence departed below the sentencing guidelines, and the trial court did not provide written reasons for the departure. See Fla.R.Crim. P. 3.701(d)(11) and Pope v. State, 561 So.2d 554 (Fla.1990) (holding same rule applied and required resentencing within the guidelines when trial judge failed to supply written reasons for downward departure" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nis required”). Conduct is actionable if it is either “sufficiently severe or pervasive.” Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (emphasis added). Indeed, the Supreme Court recently noted that an isolated incident can amount to a “discriminatory changef] in the 'terms and conditions of employment’ ” when the incident is “extremely serious.” Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 121 S.Ct. at 1510, 149 L.Ed.2d 509 (citation omitted). Other circuits have come to a similar conclusion. See, e.g., Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1305 (2d Cir.1995) (noting that “even a single incident of sexual assault sufficiently alters the conditions of the victim’s employment and clearly creates an abusive work environment for purposes of Title VII liability”); Guess v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 913 F.2d 463, 464 (7th Cir.1990) (holding that a viable hostile work environment claim requires an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nis required”). Conduct is actionable if it is either “sufficiently severe or pervasive.” Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (emphasis added). Indeed, the Supreme Court recently noted that an isolated incident can amount to a “discriminatory changef] in the 'terms and conditions of employment’ ” when the incident is “extremely serious.” Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 121 S.Ct. at 1510, 149 L.Ed.2d 509 (citation omitted). Other circuits have come to a similar conclusion. See, e.g., Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1305 (2d Cir.1995) (noting that “even a single incident of sexual assault sufficiently alters the conditions of the victim’s employment and clearly creates an abusive work environment for purposes of Title VII liability”); Guess v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 913 F.2d 463, 464 (7th Cir.1990) (holding that a single incident where supervisor picked up plaintiff and forced her face against his crotch impliedly considered to create hostile environment", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nis required”). Conduct is actionable if it is either “sufficiently severe or pervasive.” Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (emphasis added). Indeed, the Supreme Court recently noted that an isolated incident can amount to a “discriminatory changef] in the 'terms and conditions of employment’ ” when the incident is “extremely serious.” Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 121 S.Ct. at 1510, 149 L.Ed.2d 509 (citation omitted). Other circuits have come to a similar conclusion. See, e.g., Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1305 (2d Cir.1995) (noting that “even a single incident of sexual assault sufficiently alters the conditions of the victim’s employment and clearly creates an abusive work environment for purposes of Title VII liability”); Guess v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 913 F.2d 463, 464 (7th Cir.1990) (holding in a 42 usc 1981 and 1983 context that although a single incident ordinarily will not give rise to a cognizable claim for hostile work environment where the plaintiff was subjected to a physical assault in which he was punched in the ribs and temporarily blinded by having mace sprayed in his eyes we cannot say that as a matter of law such an incident is not sufficiently severe in all the circumstances to create a hostile work environment", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nis required”). Conduct is actionable if it is either “sufficiently severe or pervasive.” Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (emphasis added). Indeed, the Supreme Court recently noted that an isolated incident can amount to a “discriminatory changef] in the 'terms and conditions of employment’ ” when the incident is “extremely serious.” Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 121 S.Ct. at 1510, 149 L.Ed.2d 509 (citation omitted). Other circuits have come to a similar conclusion. See, e.g., Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1305 (2d Cir.1995) (noting that “even a single incident of sexual assault sufficiently alters the conditions of the victim’s employment and clearly creates an abusive work environment for purposes of Title VII liability”); Guess v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 913 F.2d 463, 464 (7th Cir.1990) (holding single incident of sexual harassment was neither sufficiently pervasive nor severe to constitute a hostile work environment", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nis required”). Conduct is actionable if it is either “sufficiently severe or pervasive.” Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (emphasis added). Indeed, the Supreme Court recently noted that an isolated incident can amount to a “discriminatory changef] in the 'terms and conditions of employment’ ” when the incident is “extremely serious.” Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 121 S.Ct. at 1510, 149 L.Ed.2d 509 (citation omitted). Other circuits have come to a similar conclusion. See, e.g., Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1305 (2d Cir.1995) (noting that “even a single incident of sexual assault sufficiently alters the conditions of the victim’s employment and clearly creates an abusive work environment for purposes of Title VII liability”); Guess v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 913 F.2d 463, 464 (7th Cir.1990) (holding that plaintiffs allegation of one incident where supervisor wrapped his arms around her and made sexually explicit statements was not sufficient to establish a claim of a hostile working environment absent the most stringent circumstances courts have refused to hold that one incident in itself was so severe as to create a hostile work environment" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nhowever, between the public interest asserted here and the public interest present in Dep’t of Navy. In Dep’t of Navy, this court held that collective bargaining was in the public interest, and the union, as the chosen bargaining representative, was the party specifically designated by Congress to further that public interest. In this case, by contrast, Congress has authorized the contracting federal agency and the Department of Labor to safeguard the public interest embodied in the Davis-Bacon Act by giving them the power to enforce the statute. Although we do not decide the issue, it is likely that the Union has no private cause of action against the employer for Davis-Bacon Act violations. Cf. Weber v. Heat Control Co., 579 F.Supp. 346 (D.N.J.1982), aff'd, 728 F.2d 599 (3d Cir.1984) (holding that the employees of government contractors do not have a cause of action for back pay against employers who violate the davisbacon act", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nhowever, between the public interest asserted here and the public interest present in Dep’t of Navy. In Dep’t of Navy, this court held that collective bargaining was in the public interest, and the union, as the chosen bargaining representative, was the party specifically designated by Congress to further that public interest. In this case, by contrast, Congress has authorized the contracting federal agency and the Department of Labor to safeguard the public interest embodied in the Davis-Bacon Act by giving them the power to enforce the statute. Although we do not decide the issue, it is likely that the Union has no private cause of action against the employer for Davis-Bacon Act violations. Cf. Weber v. Heat Control Co., 579 F.Supp. 346 (D.N.J.1982), aff'd, 728 F.2d 599 (3d Cir.1984) (holding in fca suit regarding contractors classification of employees for purposes of the davisbacon act that deferral to the department of labor was proper only with respect to the resolution of how particular types of work should be classified but not with respect to whether the contractors misclassified their employees", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nhowever, between the public interest asserted here and the public interest present in Dep’t of Navy. In Dep’t of Navy, this court held that collective bargaining was in the public interest, and the union, as the chosen bargaining representative, was the party specifically designated by Congress to further that public interest. In this case, by contrast, Congress has authorized the contracting federal agency and the Department of Labor to safeguard the public interest embodied in the Davis-Bacon Act by giving them the power to enforce the statute. Although we do not decide the issue, it is likely that the Union has no private cause of action against the employer for Davis-Bacon Act violations. Cf. Weber v. Heat Control Co., 579 F.Supp. 346 (D.N.J.1982), aff'd, 728 F.2d 599 (3d Cir.1984) (holding that an award of back pay is an issue for the court", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nhowever, between the public interest asserted here and the public interest present in Dep’t of Navy. In Dep’t of Navy, this court held that collective bargaining was in the public interest, and the union, as the chosen bargaining representative, was the party specifically designated by Congress to further that public interest. In this case, by contrast, Congress has authorized the contracting federal agency and the Department of Labor to safeguard the public interest embodied in the Davis-Bacon Act by giving them the power to enforce the statute. Although we do not decide the issue, it is likely that the Union has no private cause of action against the employer for Davis-Bacon Act violations. Cf. Weber v. Heat Control Co., 579 F.Supp. 346 (D.N.J.1982), aff'd, 728 F.2d 599 (3d Cir.1984) (holding that court would not imply a statutory cause of action for employers interference in employees assertion of claim for compensation", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nhowever, between the public interest asserted here and the public interest present in Dep’t of Navy. In Dep’t of Navy, this court held that collective bargaining was in the public interest, and the union, as the chosen bargaining representative, was the party specifically designated by Congress to further that public interest. In this case, by contrast, Congress has authorized the contracting federal agency and the Department of Labor to safeguard the public interest embodied in the Davis-Bacon Act by giving them the power to enforce the statute. Although we do not decide the issue, it is likely that the Union has no private cause of action against the employer for Davis-Bacon Act violations. Cf. Weber v. Heat Control Co., 579 F.Supp. 346 (D.N.J.1982), aff'd, 728 F.2d 599 (3d Cir.1984) (recognizing the cause of action" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nintimidate[ ], or interfere[ ] ... with any person,” (3) “because that person [the victim] is ... obtaining or providing reproductive health services.” Act, § 3(a). The government’s first defense is that the Act does not implicate the First Amendment at all; rather, it regulates conduct that is outside the First Amendment. According to the government, the Act leaves plaintiffs free to engage in any form of protected speech they choose. In many respects the government is correct. The Access Act does not prohibit protestors from prayin S.Ct. 2538, 2546-47, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992). Finally, certain physical obstructions, such as a blockade of pedestrian traffic, are not protected by the First Amendment. See Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 617, 88 S.Ct. 1335, 1339, 20 L.Ed.2d 182 (1968) (holding that under 521 the coercive force applied against a plaintiff must result in an interference with a separate constitutional or statutory right and it is not sufficient that the right interfered with is the right to be free of the force or threat of force that was applied", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nintimidate[ ], or interfere[ ] ... with any person,” (3) “because that person [the victim] is ... obtaining or providing reproductive health services.” Act, § 3(a). The government’s first defense is that the Act does not implicate the First Amendment at all; rather, it regulates conduct that is outside the First Amendment. According to the government, the Act leaves plaintiffs free to engage in any form of protected speech they choose. In many respects the government is correct. The Access Act does not prohibit protestors from prayin S.Ct. 2538, 2546-47, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992). Finally, certain physical obstructions, such as a blockade of pedestrian traffic, are not protected by the First Amendment. See Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 617, 88 S.Ct. 1335, 1339, 20 L.Ed.2d 182 (1968) (holding that the plaintiffs right to political speech is fully in accord with the publics interest in free speech and association", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nintimidate[ ], or interfere[ ] ... with any person,” (3) “because that person [the victim] is ... obtaining or providing reproductive health services.” Act, § 3(a). The government’s first defense is that the Act does not implicate the First Amendment at all; rather, it regulates conduct that is outside the First Amendment. According to the government, the Act leaves plaintiffs free to engage in any form of protected speech they choose. In many respects the government is correct. The Access Act does not prohibit protestors from prayin S.Ct. 2538, 2546-47, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992). Finally, certain physical obstructions, such as a blockade of pedestrian traffic, are not protected by the First Amendment. See Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 617, 88 S.Ct. 1335, 1339, 20 L.Ed.2d 182 (1968) (holding that shortterm and sporadic interference with free exercise rights does not violate the first amendment", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nintimidate[ ], or interfere[ ] ... with any person,” (3) “because that person [the victim] is ... obtaining or providing reproductive health services.” Act, § 3(a). The government’s first defense is that the Act does not implicate the First Amendment at all; rather, it regulates conduct that is outside the First Amendment. According to the government, the Act leaves plaintiffs free to engage in any form of protected speech they choose. In many respects the government is correct. The Access Act does not prohibit protestors from prayin S.Ct. 2538, 2546-47, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992). Finally, certain physical obstructions, such as a blockade of pedestrian traffic, are not protected by the First Amendment. See Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 617, 88 S.Ct. 1335, 1339, 20 L.Ed.2d 182 (1968) (holding that to the extent compliance with the flsa interferes with the state budgetary process that interference is caused by state law not federal law", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nintimidate[ ], or interfere[ ] ... with any person,” (3) “because that person [the victim] is ... obtaining or providing reproductive health services.” Act, § 3(a). The government’s first defense is that the Act does not implicate the First Amendment at all; rather, it regulates conduct that is outside the First Amendment. According to the government, the Act leaves plaintiffs free to engage in any form of protected speech they choose. In many respects the government is correct. The Access Act does not prohibit protestors from prayin S.Ct. 2538, 2546-47, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992). Finally, certain physical obstructions, such as a blockade of pedestrian traffic, are not protected by the First Amendment. See Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 617, 88 S.Ct. 1335, 1339, 20 L.Ed.2d 182 (1968) (holding that a statute which prohibited unreasonable interference with access to a courthouse was a valid law and the fact that free speech is intermingled with such conduct does not bring with it constitutional protection" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n292 Ga. at 452 (“The purpose of an indictment is to inform the accused of the charges against him and to protect the accused against another prosecution for the same offense.”). 34 Austin, 297 Ga. App. at 478. 35 Id. at 478-79 (punctuation omitted). 36 See former OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2) (2006). 37 Austin, 297 Ga. App. at 480 (punctuation omitted); see also State v. Wyatt, 295 Ga. 257, 260 (2) (759 SE2d 500) (2014) (noting that “an indictment couched in the language of the statute alleged to have been violated is not subject to a general demurrer” (punctuation omitted)). 38 See OCGA § 16-5-20 (a). 39 Chase v. State, Til Ga. 636, 638 (1) (592 SE2d 656) (2004); accord Wyatt, 295 Ga. at 261 (2) (a). 40 Johnson v. State, 286 Ga. 432, 434 (687 SE2d 833) (2010); see Austin, 297 Ga. App. at 480 (holding that instructions are sufficient which substantially follow the language of the statute or use equivalent language", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n292 Ga. at 452 (“The purpose of an indictment is to inform the accused of the charges against him and to protect the accused against another prosecution for the same offense.”). 34 Austin, 297 Ga. App. at 478. 35 Id. at 478-79 (punctuation omitted). 36 See former OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2) (2006). 37 Austin, 297 Ga. App. at 480 (punctuation omitted); see also State v. Wyatt, 295 Ga. 257, 260 (2) (759 SE2d 500) (2014) (noting that “an indictment couched in the language of the statute alleged to have been violated is not subject to a general demurrer” (punctuation omitted)). 38 See OCGA § 16-5-20 (a). 39 Chase v. State, Til Ga. 636, 638 (1) (592 SE2d 656) (2004); accord Wyatt, 295 Ga. at 261 (2) (a). 40 Johnson v. State, 286 Ga. 432, 434 (687 SE2d 833) (2010); see Austin, 297 Ga. App. at 480 (holding that possession of a controlled substance is a crime only if the defendant knowingly possesses the substance and has knowledge of the nature of that substance", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n292 Ga. at 452 (“The purpose of an indictment is to inform the accused of the charges against him and to protect the accused against another prosecution for the same offense.”). 34 Austin, 297 Ga. App. at 478. 35 Id. at 478-79 (punctuation omitted). 36 See former OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2) (2006). 37 Austin, 297 Ga. App. at 480 (punctuation omitted); see also State v. Wyatt, 295 Ga. 257, 260 (2) (759 SE2d 500) (2014) (noting that “an indictment couched in the language of the statute alleged to have been violated is not subject to a general demurrer” (punctuation omitted)). 38 See OCGA § 16-5-20 (a). 39 Chase v. State, Til Ga. 636, 638 (1) (592 SE2d 656) (2004); accord Wyatt, 295 Ga. at 261 (2) (a). 40 Johnson v. State, 286 Ga. 432, 434 (687 SE2d 833) (2010); see Austin, 297 Ga. App. at 480 (holding that an indictment gave sufficient notice when the indictment charged the elements of the offense", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n292 Ga. at 452 (“The purpose of an indictment is to inform the accused of the charges against him and to protect the accused against another prosecution for the same offense.”). 34 Austin, 297 Ga. App. at 478. 35 Id. at 478-79 (punctuation omitted). 36 See former OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2) (2006). 37 Austin, 297 Ga. App. at 480 (punctuation omitted); see also State v. Wyatt, 295 Ga. 257, 260 (2) (759 SE2d 500) (2014) (noting that “an indictment couched in the language of the statute alleged to have been violated is not subject to a general demurrer” (punctuation omitted)). 38 See OCGA § 16-5-20 (a). 39 Chase v. State, Til Ga. 636, 638 (1) (592 SE2d 656) (2004); accord Wyatt, 295 Ga. at 261 (2) (a). 40 Johnson v. State, 286 Ga. 432, 434 (687 SE2d 833) (2010); see Austin, 297 Ga. App. at 480 (holding that knowledge that a substance is a controlled substance is an element of 952", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n292 Ga. at 452 (“The purpose of an indictment is to inform the accused of the charges against him and to protect the accused against another prosecution for the same offense.”). 34 Austin, 297 Ga. App. at 478. 35 Id. at 478-79 (punctuation omitted). 36 See former OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2) (2006). 37 Austin, 297 Ga. App. at 480 (punctuation omitted); see also State v. Wyatt, 295 Ga. 257, 260 (2) (759 SE2d 500) (2014) (noting that “an indictment couched in the language of the statute alleged to have been violated is not subject to a general demurrer” (punctuation omitted)). 38 See OCGA § 16-5-20 (a). 39 Chase v. State, Til Ga. 636, 638 (1) (592 SE2d 656) (2004); accord Wyatt, 295 Ga. at 261 (2) (a). 40 Johnson v. State, 286 Ga. 432, 434 (687 SE2d 833) (2010); see Austin, 297 Ga. App. at 480 (holding that an indictment that is substantially in the language of the code is sufficient inform and substance" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nnominal owner. This claim may be cognizable under New York rulings that have recognized ownership in persons other than owners of record. For example, in Ryen v. Terry (In re Terry), 56 B.R. 713 (Bankr.W.D.N.Y.1986), a bankruptcy trustee sued to recover a disability payment of $19,000 that the debtor had deposited in her mother's bank account. Although the mother had sole legal title to the funds, the bankruptcy court granted the trustee's motion for turnover, holding that a bailment had been created by the debtor's deposit of funds into her mother's account, and that “[ujnder the bailment, the debtor did not transfer her equitable nor beneficial interests in those funds to her mother.” Id. at 715. See also Herzfeld & Stern v. Freidus, 69 Misc.2d 578, 330 N.Y.S.2d 479 (1st Dep't 1971) (holding that where both vessels had the same owner it was not an abuse of discretion to give 75 of the salvage award to the owner", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nnominal owner. This claim may be cognizable under New York rulings that have recognized ownership in persons other than owners of record. For example, in Ryen v. Terry (In re Terry), 56 B.R. 713 (Bankr.W.D.N.Y.1986), a bankruptcy trustee sued to recover a disability payment of $19,000 that the debtor had deposited in her mother's bank account. Although the mother had sole legal title to the funds, the bankruptcy court granted the trustee's motion for turnover, holding that a bailment had been created by the debtor's deposit of funds into her mother's account, and that “[ujnder the bailment, the debtor did not transfer her equitable nor beneficial interests in those funds to her mother.” Id. at 715. See also Herzfeld & Stern v. Freidus, 69 Misc.2d 578, 330 N.Y.S.2d 479 (1st Dep't 1971) (recognizing a cause of action by the owner of contaminated property against a previous owner who allegedly caused the contamination", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nnominal owner. This claim may be cognizable under New York rulings that have recognized ownership in persons other than owners of record. For example, in Ryen v. Terry (In re Terry), 56 B.R. 713 (Bankr.W.D.N.Y.1986), a bankruptcy trustee sued to recover a disability payment of $19,000 that the debtor had deposited in her mother's bank account. Although the mother had sole legal title to the funds, the bankruptcy court granted the trustee's motion for turnover, holding that a bailment had been created by the debtor's deposit of funds into her mother's account, and that “[ujnder the bailment, the debtor did not transfer her equitable nor beneficial interests in those funds to her mother.” Id. at 715. See also Herzfeld & Stern v. Freidus, 69 Misc.2d 578, 330 N.Y.S.2d 479 (1st Dep't 1971) (holding that the current property owner may not assert a public nuisance claim against the former owner", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nnominal owner. This claim may be cognizable under New York rulings that have recognized ownership in persons other than owners of record. For example, in Ryen v. Terry (In re Terry), 56 B.R. 713 (Bankr.W.D.N.Y.1986), a bankruptcy trustee sued to recover a disability payment of $19,000 that the debtor had deposited in her mother's bank account. Although the mother had sole legal title to the funds, the bankruptcy court granted the trustee's motion for turnover, holding that a bailment had been created by the debtor's deposit of funds into her mother's account, and that “[ujnder the bailment, the debtor did not transfer her equitable nor beneficial interests in those funds to her mother.” Id. at 715. See also Herzfeld & Stern v. Freidus, 69 Misc.2d 578, 330 N.Y.S.2d 479 (1st Dep't 1971) (holding that stock in a housing cooperative that entitled the owner to the use of an apartment but not to any cash return was not a security", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nnominal owner. This claim may be cognizable under New York rulings that have recognized ownership in persons other than owners of record. For example, in Ryen v. Terry (In re Terry), 56 B.R. 713 (Bankr.W.D.N.Y.1986), a bankruptcy trustee sued to recover a disability payment of $19,000 that the debtor had deposited in her mother's bank account. Although the mother had sole legal title to the funds, the bankruptcy court granted the trustee's motion for turnover, holding that a bailment had been created by the debtor's deposit of funds into her mother's account, and that “[ujnder the bailment, the debtor did not transfer her equitable nor beneficial interests in those funds to her mother.” Id. at 715. See also Herzfeld & Stern v. Freidus, 69 Misc.2d 578, 330 N.Y.S.2d 479 (1st Dep't 1971) (holding stock dividend payable to actual owner not owner of record" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nArea School District, 882 F.2d 720 (3rd Cir.1989) “state officials may [not] escape liability arising from their policies maintained in deliberate indifference to actions taken by their subordinates”. 882 F.2d at 725. In addition, we noted that a municipality may be liable under § 1983 “where its policymakers made a ‘deliberate choice to follow a course of action from among various alternatives’.” Id. (Citations omitted.) Here, the deliberate choice made by the Freeholders could be considered that of doing nothing. The district court found that Ryan possessed a third right of being housed in a “reasonably safe prison environment.” Ryan III, 708 F.Supp. at 626. The court based this right on our decision in Stoneking v. Bradford Area School District, 856 F.2d 594, n. 14 (3d Cir.1988) (holding a business owner must protect invitees against injury caused by third persons", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nArea School District, 882 F.2d 720 (3rd Cir.1989) “state officials may [not] escape liability arising from their policies maintained in deliberate indifference to actions taken by their subordinates”. 882 F.2d at 725. In addition, we noted that a municipality may be liable under § 1983 “where its policymakers made a ‘deliberate choice to follow a course of action from among various alternatives’.” Id. (Citations omitted.) Here, the deliberate choice made by the Freeholders could be considered that of doing nothing. The district court found that Ryan possessed a third right of being housed in a “reasonably safe prison environment.” Ryan III, 708 F.Supp. at 626. The court based this right on our decision in Stoneking v. Bradford Area School District, 856 F.2d 594, n. 14 (3d Cir.1988) (recognizing that by 1979 state officials had duty to protect institutionalized persons from selfinjury or assault", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nArea School District, 882 F.2d 720 (3rd Cir.1989) “state officials may [not] escape liability arising from their policies maintained in deliberate indifference to actions taken by their subordinates”. 882 F.2d at 725. In addition, we noted that a municipality may be liable under § 1983 “where its policymakers made a ‘deliberate choice to follow a course of action from among various alternatives’.” Id. (Citations omitted.) Here, the deliberate choice made by the Freeholders could be considered that of doing nothing. The district court found that Ryan possessed a third right of being housed in a “reasonably safe prison environment.” Ryan III, 708 F.Supp. at 626. The court based this right on our decision in Stoneking v. Bradford Area School District, 856 F.2d 594, n. 14 (3d Cir.1988) (holding a business owes a duty to protect invitees from reasonably foreseeable harm by third persons", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nArea School District, 882 F.2d 720 (3rd Cir.1989) “state officials may [not] escape liability arising from their policies maintained in deliberate indifference to actions taken by their subordinates”. 882 F.2d at 725. In addition, we noted that a municipality may be liable under § 1983 “where its policymakers made a ‘deliberate choice to follow a course of action from among various alternatives’.” Id. (Citations omitted.) Here, the deliberate choice made by the Freeholders could be considered that of doing nothing. The district court found that Ryan possessed a third right of being housed in a “reasonably safe prison environment.” Ryan III, 708 F.Supp. at 626. The court based this right on our decision in Stoneking v. Bradford Area School District, 856 F.2d 594, n. 14 (3d Cir.1988) (holding that walmart was not under a duty to protect a patron from a criminal assault absent prior similar incidents at their facility or in the general area", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nArea School District, 882 F.2d 720 (3rd Cir.1989) “state officials may [not] escape liability arising from their policies maintained in deliberate indifference to actions taken by their subordinates”. 882 F.2d at 725. In addition, we noted that a municipality may be liable under § 1983 “where its policymakers made a ‘deliberate choice to follow a course of action from among various alternatives’.” Id. (Citations omitted.) Here, the deliberate choice made by the Freeholders could be considered that of doing nothing. The district court found that Ryan possessed a third right of being housed in a “reasonably safe prison environment.” Ryan III, 708 F.Supp. at 626. The court based this right on our decision in Stoneking v. Bradford Area School District, 856 F.2d 594, n. 14 (3d Cir.1988) (holding that a school had no duty to protect pedestrian from student" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nof success on the merits, the “sine qua non of th[e] four-part inquiry.” New Comm Wireless Servs., Inc. 287 F.3d at 9. Diaz does not argue that the Legislature lacked the power to abolish his Advocate position. Instead, he disputes the existence of that historical fact. Specifically, he claims that the legislative history does not evince an intent to eliminate Diaz’s Advocate position and that Law 78 does not explicitly provide for his removal. While perhaps accurate, this argument misses the point. Article 75, after providing numerous reasons for doing so, unambiguously repealed the very Reorganization Plan which created Diaz’s job. In so doing, the Legislature abolished the position of Advocate. See Lewis v. United States, 244 U.S. 134, 144, 37 S.Ct. 570, 61 L.Ed. 1039 (1917) (holding that the prohibition of section 35 article iii against the increase or diminution of compensation for public officers applied to the treasurer of calvert county and therefore even though the legislature retained the power to alter or abolish the office it could not change the treasurers salary while in office", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nof success on the merits, the “sine qua non of th[e] four-part inquiry.” New Comm Wireless Servs., Inc. 287 F.3d at 9. Diaz does not argue that the Legislature lacked the power to abolish his Advocate position. Instead, he disputes the existence of that historical fact. Specifically, he claims that the legislative history does not evince an intent to eliminate Diaz’s Advocate position and that Law 78 does not explicitly provide for his removal. While perhaps accurate, this argument misses the point. Article 75, after providing numerous reasons for doing so, unambiguously repealed the very Reorganization Plan which created Diaz’s job. In so doing, the Legislature abolished the position of Advocate. See Lewis v. United States, 244 U.S. 134, 144, 37 S.Ct. 570, 61 L.Ed. 1039 (1917) (recognizing that a prosecutors office is an entity and that information in the possession of one attorney in the office must be attributed to the office as a whole", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nof success on the merits, the “sine qua non of th[e] four-part inquiry.” New Comm Wireless Servs., Inc. 287 F.3d at 9. Diaz does not argue that the Legislature lacked the power to abolish his Advocate position. Instead, he disputes the existence of that historical fact. Specifically, he claims that the legislative history does not evince an intent to eliminate Diaz’s Advocate position and that Law 78 does not explicitly provide for his removal. While perhaps accurate, this argument misses the point. Article 75, after providing numerous reasons for doing so, unambiguously repealed the very Reorganization Plan which created Diaz’s job. In so doing, the Legislature abolished the position of Advocate. See Lewis v. United States, 244 U.S. 134, 144, 37 S.Ct. 570, 61 L.Ed. 1039 (1917) (holding that congressional repeal of an act creating an office had the effect to abolish it", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nof success on the merits, the “sine qua non of th[e] four-part inquiry.” New Comm Wireless Servs., Inc. 287 F.3d at 9. Diaz does not argue that the Legislature lacked the power to abolish his Advocate position. Instead, he disputes the existence of that historical fact. Specifically, he claims that the legislative history does not evince an intent to eliminate Diaz’s Advocate position and that Law 78 does not explicitly provide for his removal. While perhaps accurate, this argument misses the point. Article 75, after providing numerous reasons for doing so, unambiguously repealed the very Reorganization Plan which created Diaz’s job. In so doing, the Legislature abolished the position of Advocate. See Lewis v. United States, 244 U.S. 134, 144, 37 S.Ct. 570, 61 L.Ed. 1039 (1917) (holding that an outofstate attorney paying rent for a desk in an attorneys instate office had satisfied the office requirement", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nof success on the merits, the “sine qua non of th[e] four-part inquiry.” New Comm Wireless Servs., Inc. 287 F.3d at 9. Diaz does not argue that the Legislature lacked the power to abolish his Advocate position. Instead, he disputes the existence of that historical fact. Specifically, he claims that the legislative history does not evince an intent to eliminate Diaz’s Advocate position and that Law 78 does not explicitly provide for his removal. While perhaps accurate, this argument misses the point. Article 75, after providing numerous reasons for doing so, unambiguously repealed the very Reorganization Plan which created Diaz’s job. In so doing, the Legislature abolished the position of Advocate. See Lewis v. United States, 244 U.S. 134, 144, 37 S.Ct. 570, 61 L.Ed. 1039 (1917) (holding that when a judicial office is created by legislative act or municipal ordinance the office is regarded as a de facto office until the act or ordinance is declared invalid" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthe consent, the presence of intervening circumstances, and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.” United States v. Santa, 236 F.3d 662, 677 (11th Cir.2000). “The proper inquiry is not simply whether [Mr. Scott’s] will was overborne by the agents’ illegal entry, but also whether his consent was a “product” of that illegality.” Id. Considering these factors, we conclude that Mr. Scott’s consent was not tainted by the illegal protective sweep of his home. To be sure, Mr. Scott’s consent was obtained minutes after the illegal protective sweep was completed. And we recognize that the fact that Mr. Scott was apprised of his right to refuse the search does not constitute an intervening factor sufficient to dissipate the taint of the illegal sweep. Id. at 678 (recognizing that unconstitutionally obtained evidence can become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthe consent, the presence of intervening circumstances, and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.” United States v. Santa, 236 F.3d 662, 677 (11th Cir.2000). “The proper inquiry is not simply whether [Mr. Scott’s] will was overborne by the agents’ illegal entry, but also whether his consent was a “product” of that illegality.” Id. Considering these factors, we conclude that Mr. Scott’s consent was not tainted by the illegal protective sweep of his home. To be sure, Mr. Scott’s consent was obtained minutes after the illegal protective sweep was completed. And we recognize that the fact that Mr. Scott was apprised of his right to refuse the search does not constitute an intervening factor sufficient to dissipate the taint of the illegal sweep. Id. at 678 (holding that the reading of miranda warnings and the signing of a waiver of fourth and fifth amendment rights are not sufficient intervening factors sufficient to dissipate the taint of an unlawful entry into a home", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthe consent, the presence of intervening circumstances, and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.” United States v. Santa, 236 F.3d 662, 677 (11th Cir.2000). “The proper inquiry is not simply whether [Mr. Scott’s] will was overborne by the agents’ illegal entry, but also whether his consent was a “product” of that illegality.” Id. Considering these factors, we conclude that Mr. Scott’s consent was not tainted by the illegal protective sweep of his home. To be sure, Mr. Scott’s consent was obtained minutes after the illegal protective sweep was completed. And we recognize that the fact that Mr. Scott was apprised of his right to refuse the search does not constitute an intervening factor sufficient to dissipate the taint of the illegal sweep. Id. at 678 (holding that consent to search did not purge the taint of an unlawful detention when no intervening circumstances sufficiently separated the consent from the unlawful detention", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthe consent, the presence of intervening circumstances, and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.” United States v. Santa, 236 F.3d 662, 677 (11th Cir.2000). “The proper inquiry is not simply whether [Mr. Scott’s] will was overborne by the agents’ illegal entry, but also whether his consent was a “product” of that illegality.” Id. Considering these factors, we conclude that Mr. Scott’s consent was not tainted by the illegal protective sweep of his home. To be sure, Mr. Scott’s consent was obtained minutes after the illegal protective sweep was completed. And we recognize that the fact that Mr. Scott was apprised of his right to refuse the search does not constitute an intervening factor sufficient to dissipate the taint of the illegal sweep. Id. at 678 (holding that because miranda warnings make defendant aware of right to counsel and of consequences of waiving sixth amendment rights defendants waiver of right to counsel after receiving such warnings is valid", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthe consent, the presence of intervening circumstances, and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.” United States v. Santa, 236 F.3d 662, 677 (11th Cir.2000). “The proper inquiry is not simply whether [Mr. Scott’s] will was overborne by the agents’ illegal entry, but also whether his consent was a “product” of that illegality.” Id. Considering these factors, we conclude that Mr. Scott’s consent was not tainted by the illegal protective sweep of his home. To be sure, Mr. Scott’s consent was obtained minutes after the illegal protective sweep was completed. And we recognize that the fact that Mr. Scott was apprised of his right to refuse the search does not constitute an intervening factor sufficient to dissipate the taint of the illegal sweep. Id. at 678 (holding that although defendant was a deputy sheriff miranda warnings were required irrespective of defendants knowledge of his fifth amendment rights" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\ndamage to the front end, and a broken steering wheel. Is this the damage which Dr. Brown says is essential to his opinion? What of damage to the frame and understructure of the car? If speed is to be based partially on the damage done to the vehicles, that damage must be ascertained by something more than looking at a picture of the exterior of the automobile. No case has been cited to us which is factually similar to the one now before us. However we find substantial support for the views here expressed in Twidwell v. Davidson, 54 Wash.2d 75, 338 P.2d 326, 329-332; Stephanofsky v. Hill, 136 Conn. 379, 71 A.2d 560, 561; Kale v. Douthitt, 4 Cir., 274 F.2d 476, 480-483 (dealing particularly with evidence as to the angle of impact); Levine v. Remolif, 80 Nev. 168, 390 P.2d 718, 719-721 (holding trial court properly excluded testimony concerning speed of vehicle where witness observed vehicle travel on a diagonal for thirtyfive 35 feet on poorly lit road estimate of speed may not be predicated on such a slender data base ", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\ndamage to the front end, and a broken steering wheel. Is this the damage which Dr. Brown says is essential to his opinion? What of damage to the frame and understructure of the car? If speed is to be based partially on the damage done to the vehicles, that damage must be ascertained by something more than looking at a picture of the exterior of the automobile. No case has been cited to us which is factually similar to the one now before us. However we find substantial support for the views here expressed in Twidwell v. Davidson, 54 Wash.2d 75, 338 P.2d 326, 329-332; Stephanofsky v. Hill, 136 Conn. 379, 71 A.2d 560, 561; Kale v. Douthitt, 4 Cir., 274 F.2d 476, 480-483 (dealing particularly with evidence as to the angle of impact); Levine v. Remolif, 80 Nev. 168, 390 P.2d 718, 719-721 (holding that an experts opinion must be based on facts in evidence or within his or her knowledge and that the admission of an experts opinion is reviewed for an abuse of discretion", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\ndamage to the front end, and a broken steering wheel. Is this the damage which Dr. Brown says is essential to his opinion? What of damage to the frame and understructure of the car? If speed is to be based partially on the damage done to the vehicles, that damage must be ascertained by something more than looking at a picture of the exterior of the automobile. No case has been cited to us which is factually similar to the one now before us. However we find substantial support for the views here expressed in Twidwell v. Davidson, 54 Wash.2d 75, 338 P.2d 326, 329-332; Stephanofsky v. Hill, 136 Conn. 379, 71 A.2d 560, 561; Kale v. Douthitt, 4 Cir., 274 F.2d 476, 480-483 (dealing particularly with evidence as to the angle of impact); Levine v. Remolif, 80 Nev. 168, 390 P.2d 718, 719-721 (holding that rules of evidence do not permit an expert to give opinion or state legal conclusions regarding a question of law", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\ndamage to the front end, and a broken steering wheel. Is this the damage which Dr. Brown says is essential to his opinion? What of damage to the frame and understructure of the car? If speed is to be based partially on the damage done to the vehicles, that damage must be ascertained by something more than looking at a picture of the exterior of the automobile. No case has been cited to us which is factually similar to the one now before us. However we find substantial support for the views here expressed in Twidwell v. Davidson, 54 Wash.2d 75, 338 P.2d 326, 329-332; Stephanofsky v. Hill, 136 Conn. 379, 71 A.2d 560, 561; Kale v. Douthitt, 4 Cir., 274 F.2d 476, 480-483 (dealing particularly with evidence as to the angle of impact); Levine v. Remolif, 80 Nev. 168, 390 P.2d 718, 719-721 (holding that a picture of a damaged vehicle was insufficient to permit an opinion of speed based on damage to the vehicles", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\ndamage to the front end, and a broken steering wheel. Is this the damage which Dr. Brown says is essential to his opinion? What of damage to the frame and understructure of the car? If speed is to be based partially on the damage done to the vehicles, that damage must be ascertained by something more than looking at a picture of the exterior of the automobile. No case has been cited to us which is factually similar to the one now before us. However we find substantial support for the views here expressed in Twidwell v. Davidson, 54 Wash.2d 75, 338 P.2d 326, 329-332; Stephanofsky v. Hill, 136 Conn. 379, 71 A.2d 560, 561; Kale v. Douthitt, 4 Cir., 274 F.2d 476, 480-483 (dealing particularly with evidence as to the angle of impact); Levine v. Remolif, 80 Nev. 168, 390 P.2d 718, 719-721 (recognizing that a common illustration of an admissible opinion under rule 701 is an expression of opinion by a lay observer of a cars speed" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\ngesture, understood and agreed to cooperate to achieve the objective of the conspiracy. Id. at 145-46, 767 A.2d 844. In Heckstall v. State, 120 Md.App. 621, 626, 707 A.2d 953 (1998), we concluded that, “standing alone, a single buyer-seller transaction ordinarily does not constitute a conspiracy,” and we held that, because the evidence at Heckstall’s trial was limited to a single sale of a small amount of heroin, the evidence was legally insufficient to sustain his conviction of conspiracy. Appellants acknowledge that our holding in Heck-stall was narrow and based on the facts of that case. They urge us nonetheless to recognize a “somewhat broader ‘buyer-seller’ doctrine[,]” and then find reversible error L.Ed.2d 130 (1999); United States v. Jones, 160 F.3d 473, 481-82 (8th Cir.1998) (holding that defendant was not entitled to buyerseller instruction in drug conspiracy prosecution given evidence that defendant played numerous roles in the conspiracy and that massive amounts of cocaine were involved", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\ngesture, understood and agreed to cooperate to achieve the objective of the conspiracy. Id. at 145-46, 767 A.2d 844. In Heckstall v. State, 120 Md.App. 621, 626, 707 A.2d 953 (1998), we concluded that, “standing alone, a single buyer-seller transaction ordinarily does not constitute a conspiracy,” and we held that, because the evidence at Heckstall’s trial was limited to a single sale of a small amount of heroin, the evidence was legally insufficient to sustain his conviction of conspiracy. Appellants acknowledge that our holding in Heck-stall was narrow and based on the facts of that case. They urge us nonetheless to recognize a “somewhat broader ‘buyer-seller’ doctrine[,]” and then find reversible error L.Ed.2d 130 (1999); United States v. Jones, 160 F.3d 473, 481-82 (8th Cir.1998) (holding that defendant was not entitled to buyerseller instruction despite defendants contention that buyerseller transactions were the only contacts between defendant and alleged coconspirator because the government adduced far more evidence than the prior drug purchases to establish the conspiracy and instructions as a whole did not allow jury to convict on mere buyerseller theory", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\ngesture, understood and agreed to cooperate to achieve the objective of the conspiracy. Id. at 145-46, 767 A.2d 844. In Heckstall v. State, 120 Md.App. 621, 626, 707 A.2d 953 (1998), we concluded that, “standing alone, a single buyer-seller transaction ordinarily does not constitute a conspiracy,” and we held that, because the evidence at Heckstall’s trial was limited to a single sale of a small amount of heroin, the evidence was legally insufficient to sustain his conviction of conspiracy. Appellants acknowledge that our holding in Heck-stall was narrow and based on the facts of that case. They urge us nonetheless to recognize a “somewhat broader ‘buyer-seller’ doctrine[,]” and then find reversible error L.Ed.2d 130 (1999); United States v. Jones, 160 F.3d 473, 481-82 (8th Cir.1998) (holding that defendant charged with conspiracy to manufacture marijuana and possessing marijuana with intent to distribute was not entitled to specific buyerseller instruction even though support for such instruction existed because court gave a complete instruction reciting all the elements of conspiracy", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\ngesture, understood and agreed to cooperate to achieve the objective of the conspiracy. Id. at 145-46, 767 A.2d 844. In Heckstall v. State, 120 Md.App. 621, 626, 707 A.2d 953 (1998), we concluded that, “standing alone, a single buyer-seller transaction ordinarily does not constitute a conspiracy,” and we held that, because the evidence at Heckstall’s trial was limited to a single sale of a small amount of heroin, the evidence was legally insufficient to sustain his conviction of conspiracy. Appellants acknowledge that our holding in Heck-stall was narrow and based on the facts of that case. They urge us nonetheless to recognize a “somewhat broader ‘buyer-seller’ doctrine[,]” and then find reversible error L.Ed.2d 130 (1999); United States v. Jones, 160 F.3d 473, 481-82 (8th Cir.1998) (holding that evidence of specific uncharged drug trafficking offenses were not extrinsic to prosecution for conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine where the events occurred within the time period of the alleged conspiracy and were demonstrative of the conspirators conduct", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\ngesture, understood and agreed to cooperate to achieve the objective of the conspiracy. Id. at 145-46, 767 A.2d 844. In Heckstall v. State, 120 Md.App. 621, 626, 707 A.2d 953 (1998), we concluded that, “standing alone, a single buyer-seller transaction ordinarily does not constitute a conspiracy,” and we held that, because the evidence at Heckstall’s trial was limited to a single sale of a small amount of heroin, the evidence was legally insufficient to sustain his conviction of conspiracy. Appellants acknowledge that our holding in Heck-stall was narrow and based on the facts of that case. They urge us nonetheless to recognize a “somewhat broader ‘buyer-seller’ doctrine[,]” and then find reversible error L.Ed.2d 130 (1999); United States v. Jones, 160 F.3d 473, 481-82 (8th Cir.1998) (holding that evidence of prior drug transactions was admissible under rule 404b to show inter alia intent to enter into the drug conspiracy and knowledge of the conspiracy" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nof an abuse of process claim, but does not state that 134 . For the purpose of an abuse of criminal process claim, an arrest may be considered as \"regularly issued process.” See Widget, 2013 WL 1104273, at *8 (citing Cook, 41 F.3d at 80; TADCO Constr. Corp. v. Dormitory Auth. of N.Y., 700 F.Supp.2d 253, 272 (E.D.N.Y.2010)). I also note that the fact that Pinter’s arrest may not have been based on probable cause, and thus could be considered “irregular” criminal process, is not fatal to Pinter’s claim. Cook illustrates that irregular process — in that case, an arraignment known to be based on an arrest lacking probable cause — can constitute abuse of criminal process. See Cook, 41 F.3d at 80. 135 . See Ketchuck v. Boyer, No. 10 Civ. 870, 2011 WL 5080404, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2011) (recognizing that an arrest based on probable cause cannot be the basis of a claim for false arrestimprisonment", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nof an abuse of process claim, but does not state that 134 . For the purpose of an abuse of criminal process claim, an arrest may be considered as \"regularly issued process.” See Widget, 2013 WL 1104273, at *8 (citing Cook, 41 F.3d at 80; TADCO Constr. Corp. v. Dormitory Auth. of N.Y., 700 F.Supp.2d 253, 272 (E.D.N.Y.2010)). I also note that the fact that Pinter’s arrest may not have been based on probable cause, and thus could be considered “irregular” criminal process, is not fatal to Pinter’s claim. Cook illustrates that irregular process — in that case, an arraignment known to be based on an arrest lacking probable cause — can constitute abuse of criminal process. See Cook, 41 F.3d at 80. 135 . See Ketchuck v. Boyer, No. 10 Civ. 870, 2011 WL 5080404, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2011) (holding that qualified immunity applies only if an officer had arguable probable cause to arrest", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nof an abuse of process claim, but does not state that 134 . For the purpose of an abuse of criminal process claim, an arrest may be considered as \"regularly issued process.” See Widget, 2013 WL 1104273, at *8 (citing Cook, 41 F.3d at 80; TADCO Constr. Corp. v. Dormitory Auth. of N.Y., 700 F.Supp.2d 253, 272 (E.D.N.Y.2010)). I also note that the fact that Pinter’s arrest may not have been based on probable cause, and thus could be considered “irregular” criminal process, is not fatal to Pinter’s claim. Cook illustrates that irregular process — in that case, an arraignment known to be based on an arrest lacking probable cause — can constitute abuse of criminal process. See Cook, 41 F.3d at 80. 135 . See Ketchuck v. Boyer, No. 10 Civ. 870, 2011 WL 5080404, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2011) (holding that arguable probable cause provides an objectively reasonable justification for issuing process and thus gives rise to qualified immunity against an abuse of process claim no less than against a false arrest claim", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nof an abuse of process claim, but does not state that 134 . For the purpose of an abuse of criminal process claim, an arrest may be considered as \"regularly issued process.” See Widget, 2013 WL 1104273, at *8 (citing Cook, 41 F.3d at 80; TADCO Constr. Corp. v. Dormitory Auth. of N.Y., 700 F.Supp.2d 253, 272 (E.D.N.Y.2010)). I also note that the fact that Pinter’s arrest may not have been based on probable cause, and thus could be considered “irregular” criminal process, is not fatal to Pinter’s claim. Cook illustrates that irregular process — in that case, an arraignment known to be based on an arrest lacking probable cause — can constitute abuse of criminal process. See Cook, 41 F.3d at 80. 135 . See Ketchuck v. Boyer, No. 10 Civ. 870, 2011 WL 5080404, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2011) (holding that probable cause is a complete defense to an action for false arrest", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nof an abuse of process claim, but does not state that 134 . For the purpose of an abuse of criminal process claim, an arrest may be considered as \"regularly issued process.” See Widget, 2013 WL 1104273, at *8 (citing Cook, 41 F.3d at 80; TADCO Constr. Corp. v. Dormitory Auth. of N.Y., 700 F.Supp.2d 253, 272 (E.D.N.Y.2010)). I also note that the fact that Pinter’s arrest may not have been based on probable cause, and thus could be considered “irregular” criminal process, is not fatal to Pinter’s claim. Cook illustrates that irregular process — in that case, an arraignment known to be based on an arrest lacking probable cause — can constitute abuse of criminal process. See Cook, 41 F.3d at 80. 135 . See Ketchuck v. Boyer, No. 10 Civ. 870, 2011 WL 5080404, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2011) (holding that the existence of probable cause for an arrest is a complete defense to a first amendment retaliation claim under the doctrine of qualified immunity" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\n342 N.C. 813, 823, 467 S.E.2d 428, 433-34 (1996) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 723 (alteration in original)). However, “[although custodial interrogation must cease when a suspect unequivocally invokes his right to silence, an ambiguous invocation does not require police to cease interrogation immediately.” State v. Forte, 360 N.C. 427, 438, 629 S.E.2d 137, 145, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1021, 166 L. Ed. 2d 413 (2006). Defendant’s statement that he “was not going to snitch” when asked the correct name of an accomplice is not a clear invocation of his right to silence. At most, his response was ambiguous and did not require officers to cease their questioning or seek clarification. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459, 129 L. Ed. 2d 362, 371-72 (1994) (holding that interrogation must cease if the suspect unambiguously asserts his right to counsel", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\n342 N.C. 813, 823, 467 S.E.2d 428, 433-34 (1996) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 723 (alteration in original)). However, “[although custodial interrogation must cease when a suspect unequivocally invokes his right to silence, an ambiguous invocation does not require police to cease interrogation immediately.” State v. Forte, 360 N.C. 427, 438, 629 S.E.2d 137, 145, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1021, 166 L. Ed. 2d 413 (2006). Defendant’s statement that he “was not going to snitch” when asked the correct name of an accomplice is not a clear invocation of his right to silence. At most, his response was ambiguous and did not require officers to cease their questioning or seek clarification. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459, 129 L. Ed. 2d 362, 371-72 (1994) (holding that after a suspect unambiguously requests counsel the suspects responses to further interrogation may not be used to cast retrospective doubt on the clarity of the initial request", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\n342 N.C. 813, 823, 467 S.E.2d 428, 433-34 (1996) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 723 (alteration in original)). However, “[although custodial interrogation must cease when a suspect unequivocally invokes his right to silence, an ambiguous invocation does not require police to cease interrogation immediately.” State v. Forte, 360 N.C. 427, 438, 629 S.E.2d 137, 145, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1021, 166 L. Ed. 2d 413 (2006). Defendant’s statement that he “was not going to snitch” when asked the correct name of an accomplice is not a clear invocation of his right to silence. At most, his response was ambiguous and did not require officers to cease their questioning or seek clarification. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459, 129 L. Ed. 2d 362, 371-72 (1994) (holding that a suspect must unambiguously request counsel", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\n342 N.C. 813, 823, 467 S.E.2d 428, 433-34 (1996) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 723 (alteration in original)). However, “[although custodial interrogation must cease when a suspect unequivocally invokes his right to silence, an ambiguous invocation does not require police to cease interrogation immediately.” State v. Forte, 360 N.C. 427, 438, 629 S.E.2d 137, 145, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1021, 166 L. Ed. 2d 413 (2006). Defendant’s statement that he “was not going to snitch” when asked the correct name of an accomplice is not a clear invocation of his right to silence. At most, his response was ambiguous and did not require officers to cease their questioning or seek clarification. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459, 129 L. Ed. 2d 362, 371-72 (1994) (holding that a suspect who wants to invoke his or her right to remain silent must do so unambiguously", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\n342 N.C. 813, 823, 467 S.E.2d 428, 433-34 (1996) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 723 (alteration in original)). However, “[although custodial interrogation must cease when a suspect unequivocally invokes his right to silence, an ambiguous invocation does not require police to cease interrogation immediately.” State v. Forte, 360 N.C. 427, 438, 629 S.E.2d 137, 145, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1021, 166 L. Ed. 2d 413 (2006). Defendant’s statement that he “was not going to snitch” when asked the correct name of an accomplice is not a clear invocation of his right to silence. At most, his response was ambiguous and did not require officers to cease their questioning or seek clarification. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459, 129 L. Ed. 2d 362, 371-72 (1994) (holding suspect must unambiguously request counsel before applying rule established in edwards that police questioning must cease once suspect requests counsel during interview" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nto those who have requested the evidence be preserved creates an inequity for plaintiffs — like Justo here — who are hampered in their ability to request preservation. This argument misses the point. The essential reason for a spoliation claim is its deterrent effect on miscreant defendants. This purpose is served only when an actual duty owed by a defendant to a plaintiff has been willfully or recklessly disregarded. See Grand Hall Enter. Co. v. Mackoul, 780 So.2d 275, 276 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)(finding no basis to award sanctions based on a spoliation allegation where the defendant had not intentionally destroyed the evidence and was not under a court order to preserve the evidence); Pennsylvania Lumberman’s Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 724 So.2d 629, 630 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)(holding no intentional spoliation occurred where defendant was not on notice that evidence was relevant to claim", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nto those who have requested the evidence be preserved creates an inequity for plaintiffs — like Justo here — who are hampered in their ability to request preservation. This argument misses the point. The essential reason for a spoliation claim is its deterrent effect on miscreant defendants. This purpose is served only when an actual duty owed by a defendant to a plaintiff has been willfully or recklessly disregarded. See Grand Hall Enter. Co. v. Mackoul, 780 So.2d 275, 276 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)(finding no basis to award sanctions based on a spoliation allegation where the defendant had not intentionally destroyed the evidence and was not under a court order to preserve the evidence); Pennsylvania Lumberman’s Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 724 So.2d 629, 630 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)(holding that there was no actual prejudice where the defendant has the functional equivalent of the notice required", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nto those who have requested the evidence be preserved creates an inequity for plaintiffs — like Justo here — who are hampered in their ability to request preservation. This argument misses the point. The essential reason for a spoliation claim is its deterrent effect on miscreant defendants. This purpose is served only when an actual duty owed by a defendant to a plaintiff has been willfully or recklessly disregarded. See Grand Hall Enter. Co. v. Mackoul, 780 So.2d 275, 276 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)(finding no basis to award sanctions based on a spoliation allegation where the defendant had not intentionally destroyed the evidence and was not under a court order to preserve the evidence); Pennsylvania Lumberman’s Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 724 So.2d 629, 630 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)(holding that no fiduciary duty existed between the plaintiff and defendant because there was no evidence that the parties agreed that defendant would be acting primarily for the benefit of the plaintiffs", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nto those who have requested the evidence be preserved creates an inequity for plaintiffs — like Justo here — who are hampered in their ability to request preservation. This argument misses the point. The essential reason for a spoliation claim is its deterrent effect on miscreant defendants. This purpose is served only when an actual duty owed by a defendant to a plaintiff has been willfully or recklessly disregarded. See Grand Hall Enter. Co. v. Mackoul, 780 So.2d 275, 276 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)(finding no basis to award sanctions based on a spoliation allegation where the defendant had not intentionally destroyed the evidence and was not under a court order to preserve the evidence); Pennsylvania Lumberman’s Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 724 So.2d 629, 630 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)(holding that no spoliation claim existed where the defendant was not under any statutory or contractual duty to maintain or preserve the transformer in question and no evidence showed the defendant received actual notice before destroying the transformer", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nto those who have requested the evidence be preserved creates an inequity for plaintiffs — like Justo here — who are hampered in their ability to request preservation. This argument misses the point. The essential reason for a spoliation claim is its deterrent effect on miscreant defendants. This purpose is served only when an actual duty owed by a defendant to a plaintiff has been willfully or recklessly disregarded. See Grand Hall Enter. Co. v. Mackoul, 780 So.2d 275, 276 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)(finding no basis to award sanctions based on a spoliation allegation where the defendant had not intentionally destroyed the evidence and was not under a court order to preserve the evidence); Pennsylvania Lumberman’s Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 724 So.2d 629, 630 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)(holding that to consider whether to apply a spoliation sanction the evidence must be relevant to an issue in the case and the party who destroyed the evidence must be under a duty to preserve the evidence" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nneutral. Accordingly, the court must determine whether the defendants’ actions are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and whether there are sufficient alternative channels of communication. 1. Narrowly Tailored to Serve a Significant Government Interest The determination of whether the Village’s restriction on Sandefur’s speech was narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest is a legal rather than a factual question. See Mesa v. White, 197 F.3d 1041, 1046 & n. 5 (10th Cir.1999); White House Vigil for the ERA Comm. v. Clark, 746 F.2d 1518, 1528-29 (D.C.Cir. 1984). It is thus appropriate for resolution on summary judgment when no material underlying facts are in dispute. See MacDonald v. City of Chicago, 243 F.3d 1021, 1034 (7th Cir.2001) (holding that even in a public forum the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time place or manner of protected speech provided the restrictions are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nneutral. Accordingly, the court must determine whether the defendants’ actions are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and whether there are sufficient alternative channels of communication. 1. Narrowly Tailored to Serve a Significant Government Interest The determination of whether the Village’s restriction on Sandefur’s speech was narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest is a legal rather than a factual question. See Mesa v. White, 197 F.3d 1041, 1046 & n. 5 (10th Cir.1999); White House Vigil for the ERA Comm. v. Clark, 746 F.2d 1518, 1528-29 (D.C.Cir. 1984). It is thus appropriate for resolution on summary judgment when no material underlying facts are in dispute. See MacDonald v. City of Chicago, 243 F.3d 1021, 1034 (7th Cir.2001) (holding 18 usca 922g8 passes constitutional muster because it is a reasonable restriction on the right to bear arms and is narrowly tailored to support a compelling government interest", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nneutral. Accordingly, the court must determine whether the defendants’ actions are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and whether there are sufficient alternative channels of communication. 1. Narrowly Tailored to Serve a Significant Government Interest The determination of whether the Village’s restriction on Sandefur’s speech was narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest is a legal rather than a factual question. See Mesa v. White, 197 F.3d 1041, 1046 & n. 5 (10th Cir.1999); White House Vigil for the ERA Comm. v. Clark, 746 F.2d 1518, 1528-29 (D.C.Cir. 1984). It is thus appropriate for resolution on summary judgment when no material underlying facts are in dispute. See MacDonald v. City of Chicago, 243 F.3d 1021, 1034 (7th Cir.2001) (holding on summary judgment that a regulation is narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nneutral. Accordingly, the court must determine whether the defendants’ actions are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and whether there are sufficient alternative channels of communication. 1. Narrowly Tailored to Serve a Significant Government Interest The determination of whether the Village’s restriction on Sandefur’s speech was narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest is a legal rather than a factual question. See Mesa v. White, 197 F.3d 1041, 1046 & n. 5 (10th Cir.1999); White House Vigil for the ERA Comm. v. Clark, 746 F.2d 1518, 1528-29 (D.C.Cir. 1984). It is thus appropriate for resolution on summary judgment when no material underlying facts are in dispute. See MacDonald v. City of Chicago, 243 F.3d 1021, 1034 (7th Cir.2001) (holding that such classifications are permissible only when suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nneutral. Accordingly, the court must determine whether the defendants’ actions are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and whether there are sufficient alternative channels of communication. 1. Narrowly Tailored to Serve a Significant Government Interest The determination of whether the Village’s restriction on Sandefur’s speech was narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest is a legal rather than a factual question. See Mesa v. White, 197 F.3d 1041, 1046 & n. 5 (10th Cir.1999); White House Vigil for the ERA Comm. v. Clark, 746 F.2d 1518, 1528-29 (D.C.Cir. 1984). It is thus appropriate for resolution on summary judgment when no material underlying facts are in dispute. See MacDonald v. City of Chicago, 243 F.3d 1021, 1034 (7th Cir.2001) (holding restrictions embodied in content neutral statute must be narrowly tailored to serve significant government interest while leaving open sufficient alternative channels of communication" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nCourt’s holding in Montana was the notion that “[b]eeause such a [third party] has had the ‘opportunity to present proofs and argument,’ he has already ‘had his day in court’ even though he was not a formal party to the litigation.” Taylor, 128 S.Ct. at 2173(quoting Restatement 2d of Judgments § 39, Comment a, p. 302). The facts alleged by Bhatia in support of his privity argument come nowhere close to establishing privity between the government and Inderra. To be sure, the FBI was involved in a parallel criminal investigation of Bhatia while the civil suit was ongoing, but nothing in the record supports the claim that the government controlled or influenced the civil litigation, or took the “laboring oar.” See Headwaters Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 399 F.3d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir.2005) (holding the failure to establish identity alone is sufficient grounds to deny asylumrelated relief", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nCourt’s holding in Montana was the notion that “[b]eeause such a [third party] has had the ‘opportunity to present proofs and argument,’ he has already ‘had his day in court’ even though he was not a formal party to the litigation.” Taylor, 128 S.Ct. at 2173(quoting Restatement 2d of Judgments § 39, Comment a, p. 302). The facts alleged by Bhatia in support of his privity argument come nowhere close to establishing privity between the government and Inderra. To be sure, the FBI was involved in a parallel criminal investigation of Bhatia while the civil suit was ongoing, but nothing in the record supports the claim that the government controlled or influenced the civil litigation, or took the “laboring oar.” See Headwaters Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 399 F.3d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir.2005) (holding that numbers alone are not sufficient to establish or negate a prima facie ease", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nCourt’s holding in Montana was the notion that “[b]eeause such a [third party] has had the ‘opportunity to present proofs and argument,’ he has already ‘had his day in court’ even though he was not a formal party to the litigation.” Taylor, 128 S.Ct. at 2173(quoting Restatement 2d of Judgments § 39, Comment a, p. 302). The facts alleged by Bhatia in support of his privity argument come nowhere close to establishing privity between the government and Inderra. To be sure, the FBI was involved in a parallel criminal investigation of Bhatia while the civil suit was ongoing, but nothing in the record supports the claim that the government controlled or influenced the civil litigation, or took the “laboring oar.” See Headwaters Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 399 F.3d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir.2005) (holding that defamation standing alone is not sufficient to establish a claim for deprivation of a liberty interest citations omitted", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nCourt’s holding in Montana was the notion that “[b]eeause such a [third party] has had the ‘opportunity to present proofs and argument,’ he has already ‘had his day in court’ even though he was not a formal party to the litigation.” Taylor, 128 S.Ct. at 2173(quoting Restatement 2d of Judgments § 39, Comment a, p. 302). The facts alleged by Bhatia in support of his privity argument come nowhere close to establishing privity between the government and Inderra. To be sure, the FBI was involved in a parallel criminal investigation of Bhatia while the civil suit was ongoing, but nothing in the record supports the claim that the government controlled or influenced the civil litigation, or took the “laboring oar.” See Headwaters Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 399 F.3d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir.2005) (holding that parallel legal interests alone identical or otherwise are not sufficient to establish privity", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nCourt’s holding in Montana was the notion that “[b]eeause such a [third party] has had the ‘opportunity to present proofs and argument,’ he has already ‘had his day in court’ even though he was not a formal party to the litigation.” Taylor, 128 S.Ct. at 2173(quoting Restatement 2d of Judgments § 39, Comment a, p. 302). The facts alleged by Bhatia in support of his privity argument come nowhere close to establishing privity between the government and Inderra. To be sure, the FBI was involved in a parallel criminal investigation of Bhatia while the civil suit was ongoing, but nothing in the record supports the claim that the government controlled or influenced the civil litigation, or took the “laboring oar.” See Headwaters Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 399 F.3d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir.2005) (holding that the accrual of attorneys fees alone is sufficient to establish cause" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwhen considered in the context of the whole trial. See Alexander, 163 F.3d at 429-30; United States v. Reed, 2 F.3d 1441, 1450 (7th Cir.1993). To guide us in this deci but harmless the prosecutor’s comment that a federal agent would risk his career by committing perjury). Lassar’s comment did not serve to bolster anyone’s credibility and so did not invade the province of the jury to assess credibility or determine facts. Essentially, the prosecution appealed to the jury’s supposed belief that the government only prosecutes strong eases and this was, in Lassar’s opinion, one of the strongest. Although improper, this generalized comment cannot be considered nearly as damaging as introducing a fact that bolsters a particular witness’s credibility. Cf. Johnson-Dix, 54 F.3d at 1304 (holding that while not reversible error a prosecutors vouching for a witness was improper and should be avoided on retrial", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwhen considered in the context of the whole trial. See Alexander, 163 F.3d at 429-30; United States v. Reed, 2 F.3d 1441, 1450 (7th Cir.1993). To guide us in this deci but harmless the prosecutor’s comment that a federal agent would risk his career by committing perjury). Lassar’s comment did not serve to bolster anyone’s credibility and so did not invade the province of the jury to assess credibility or determine facts. Essentially, the prosecution appealed to the jury’s supposed belief that the government only prosecutes strong eases and this was, in Lassar’s opinion, one of the strongest. Although improper, this generalized comment cannot be considered nearly as damaging as introducing a fact that bolsters a particular witness’s credibility. Cf. Johnson-Dix, 54 F.3d at 1304 (holding that the prosecutors indirect reference to a defendants prior conviction was improper", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwhen considered in the context of the whole trial. See Alexander, 163 F.3d at 429-30; United States v. Reed, 2 F.3d 1441, 1450 (7th Cir.1993). To guide us in this deci but harmless the prosecutor’s comment that a federal agent would risk his career by committing perjury). Lassar’s comment did not serve to bolster anyone’s credibility and so did not invade the province of the jury to assess credibility or determine facts. Essentially, the prosecution appealed to the jury’s supposed belief that the government only prosecutes strong eases and this was, in Lassar’s opinion, one of the strongest. Although improper, this generalized comment cannot be considered nearly as damaging as introducing a fact that bolsters a particular witness’s credibility. Cf. Johnson-Dix, 54 F.3d at 1304 (holding that prosecutors remark vouching for credibility of government agent was certainly improper", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwhen considered in the context of the whole trial. See Alexander, 163 F.3d at 429-30; United States v. Reed, 2 F.3d 1441, 1450 (7th Cir.1993). To guide us in this deci but harmless the prosecutor’s comment that a federal agent would risk his career by committing perjury). Lassar’s comment did not serve to bolster anyone’s credibility and so did not invade the province of the jury to assess credibility or determine facts. Essentially, the prosecution appealed to the jury’s supposed belief that the government only prosecutes strong eases and this was, in Lassar’s opinion, one of the strongest. Although improper, this generalized comment cannot be considered nearly as damaging as introducing a fact that bolsters a particular witness’s credibility. Cf. Johnson-Dix, 54 F.3d at 1304 (holding that a prosecutors argument about the special agents disincentive to lie was impermissible vouching", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwhen considered in the context of the whole trial. See Alexander, 163 F.3d at 429-30; United States v. Reed, 2 F.3d 1441, 1450 (7th Cir.1993). To guide us in this deci but harmless the prosecutor’s comment that a federal agent would risk his career by committing perjury). Lassar’s comment did not serve to bolster anyone’s credibility and so did not invade the province of the jury to assess credibility or determine facts. Essentially, the prosecution appealed to the jury’s supposed belief that the government only prosecutes strong eases and this was, in Lassar’s opinion, one of the strongest. Although improper, this generalized comment cannot be considered nearly as damaging as introducing a fact that bolsters a particular witness’s credibility. Cf. Johnson-Dix, 54 F.3d at 1304 (holding that the prosecutors question to the defendant about a prior unrelated offense was improper" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nbecause of the fear that their results would become public knowledge. § 381.004(1), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1996). The specific safeguards provided by the statute to prevent disclosure lend weight to the argument that public dissemination of the test results would cause emotional distress, and thus Continental should have known that by sending the results in an unsecured fax, it was risking causing great emotional distress to the Abrils if an unauthorized party saw the test results. Because the only reasonable damages arising from a breach of section 381.004(3)(f) are emotional distress, and because this emotional damage would be akin to that suffered by victims of defamation or invasion of privacy, we conclude they should not be barred by the impact rule. See Gracey, 837 So.2d at 356-57 (holding that the victim impact and victim vulnerability aggravators were not overbroad and explaining that though the concepts of victim impact and victim vulnerability may well be relevant in every case evidence of victim vulnerability and victim impact in a particular case is inherently individualized", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nbecause of the fear that their results would become public knowledge. § 381.004(1), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1996). The specific safeguards provided by the statute to prevent disclosure lend weight to the argument that public dissemination of the test results would cause emotional distress, and thus Continental should have known that by sending the results in an unsecured fax, it was risking causing great emotional distress to the Abrils if an unauthorized party saw the test results. Because the only reasonable damages arising from a breach of section 381.004(3)(f) are emotional distress, and because this emotional damage would be akin to that suffered by victims of defamation or invasion of privacy, we conclude they should not be barred by the impact rule. See Gracey, 837 So.2d at 356-57 (holding in a fcra case that plaintiffs may not rely on mere conclusory statements rather they must sufficiently articulate true demonstrable emotional distress including the factual context in which the emotional distress arose evidence corroborating the testimony of the plaintiff the nexus between the conduct of the defendant and the emotional distress the degree of such mental distress mitigating circumstances if any physical injuries suffered due to the emotional distress medical attention resulting from the emotional duress psychiatric or psychological treatment and the loss of income if any", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nbecause of the fear that their results would become public knowledge. § 381.004(1), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1996). The specific safeguards provided by the statute to prevent disclosure lend weight to the argument that public dissemination of the test results would cause emotional distress, and thus Continental should have known that by sending the results in an unsecured fax, it was risking causing great emotional distress to the Abrils if an unauthorized party saw the test results. Because the only reasonable damages arising from a breach of section 381.004(3)(f) are emotional distress, and because this emotional damage would be akin to that suffered by victims of defamation or invasion of privacy, we conclude they should not be barred by the impact rule. See Gracey, 837 So.2d at 356-57 (holding that the impact rule should not bar recovery because the emotional distress that plaintiffs allege they have suffered is at least equal to that typically suffered by the victim of a defamation or an invasion of privacy and that ijmposition of the impact rule in this context would render the legislative intent and its statutory implementation meaningless and without substance", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nbecause of the fear that their results would become public knowledge. § 381.004(1), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1996). The specific safeguards provided by the statute to prevent disclosure lend weight to the argument that public dissemination of the test results would cause emotional distress, and thus Continental should have known that by sending the results in an unsecured fax, it was risking causing great emotional distress to the Abrils if an unauthorized party saw the test results. Because the only reasonable damages arising from a breach of section 381.004(3)(f) are emotional distress, and because this emotional damage would be akin to that suffered by victims of defamation or invasion of privacy, we conclude they should not be barred by the impact rule. See Gracey, 837 So.2d at 356-57 (holding emotional distress suffered must be severe and not trivial", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nbecause of the fear that their results would become public knowledge. § 381.004(1), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1996). The specific safeguards provided by the statute to prevent disclosure lend weight to the argument that public dissemination of the test results would cause emotional distress, and thus Continental should have known that by sending the results in an unsecured fax, it was risking causing great emotional distress to the Abrils if an unauthorized party saw the test results. Because the only reasonable damages arising from a breach of section 381.004(3)(f) are emotional distress, and because this emotional damage would be akin to that suffered by victims of defamation or invasion of privacy, we conclude they should not be barred by the impact rule. See Gracey, 837 So.2d at 356-57 (holding that employee could not state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress under fela without a showing of physical impact" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nare not applied strictly. Flexible applications of procedural statutes of limitations may be based on equitable principles, such as the discovery rule, e.g., Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 300 A.2d 563 (1973), or estoppel, e.g., O’Keeffe v. Snyder, 83 N.J. 478, 416 A.2d 862 (1980).” In short, under varying circumstances we have recognized that tolling of the statute of limitations is the fair and responsible result, because the “[ujnswerving ‘mechanistic’ application of statutes of limitations would at times inflict obvious and unnecessary harm upon individual plaintiffs without advancing [the] legislative purposes.” Galligan v. Westfield Ctr. Serv., Inc., 82 N.J. 188, 192, 412 A.2d 122, 124 (1980). See also Peloso v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 56 N.J. 514, 521, 267 A.2d 498, 501 (1970) (holding fanresolution of statutory incongruity is to toll period of limitation from time insured gives notice until liability is formally declined by insurer", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nare not applied strictly. Flexible applications of procedural statutes of limitations may be based on equitable principles, such as the discovery rule, e.g., Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 300 A.2d 563 (1973), or estoppel, e.g., O’Keeffe v. Snyder, 83 N.J. 478, 416 A.2d 862 (1980).” In short, under varying circumstances we have recognized that tolling of the statute of limitations is the fair and responsible result, because the “[ujnswerving ‘mechanistic’ application of statutes of limitations would at times inflict obvious and unnecessary harm upon individual plaintiffs without advancing [the] legislative purposes.” Galligan v. Westfield Ctr. Serv., Inc., 82 N.J. 188, 192, 412 A.2d 122, 124 (1980). See also Peloso v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 56 N.J. 514, 521, 267 A.2d 498, 501 (1970) (recognizing that equitable tolling doctrines may toll the time period for filing", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nare not applied strictly. Flexible applications of procedural statutes of limitations may be based on equitable principles, such as the discovery rule, e.g., Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 300 A.2d 563 (1973), or estoppel, e.g., O’Keeffe v. Snyder, 83 N.J. 478, 416 A.2d 862 (1980).” In short, under varying circumstances we have recognized that tolling of the statute of limitations is the fair and responsible result, because the “[ujnswerving ‘mechanistic’ application of statutes of limitations would at times inflict obvious and unnecessary harm upon individual plaintiffs without advancing [the] legislative purposes.” Galligan v. Westfield Ctr. Serv., Inc., 82 N.J. 188, 192, 412 A.2d 122, 124 (1980). See also Peloso v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 56 N.J. 514, 521, 267 A.2d 498, 501 (1970) (holding that limitation period begins to run at the time of the breach", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nare not applied strictly. Flexible applications of procedural statutes of limitations may be based on equitable principles, such as the discovery rule, e.g., Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 300 A.2d 563 (1973), or estoppel, e.g., O’Keeffe v. Snyder, 83 N.J. 478, 416 A.2d 862 (1980).” In short, under varying circumstances we have recognized that tolling of the statute of limitations is the fair and responsible result, because the “[ujnswerving ‘mechanistic’ application of statutes of limitations would at times inflict obvious and unnecessary harm upon individual plaintiffs without advancing [the] legislative purposes.” Galligan v. Westfield Ctr. Serv., Inc., 82 N.J. 188, 192, 412 A.2d 122, 124 (1980). See also Peloso v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 56 N.J. 514, 521, 267 A.2d 498, 501 (1970) (holding that a defect in notice by the faa does no more than toll the statutory time limit", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nare not applied strictly. Flexible applications of procedural statutes of limitations may be based on equitable principles, such as the discovery rule, e.g., Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 300 A.2d 563 (1973), or estoppel, e.g., O’Keeffe v. Snyder, 83 N.J. 478, 416 A.2d 862 (1980).” In short, under varying circumstances we have recognized that tolling of the statute of limitations is the fair and responsible result, because the “[ujnswerving ‘mechanistic’ application of statutes of limitations would at times inflict obvious and unnecessary harm upon individual plaintiffs without advancing [the] legislative purposes.” Galligan v. Westfield Ctr. Serv., Inc., 82 N.J. 188, 192, 412 A.2d 122, 124 (1980). See also Peloso v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 56 N.J. 514, 521, 267 A.2d 498, 501 (1970) (holding that limitation of liability clause was unambiguous" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nor (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court’s resolution of disputed facts.” Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161 (citing Barrera-Montenegro v. United States, 74 F.3d 657, 659 (5th Cir.1992)). When a defendant submits a factual attack on the complaint, he must provide support with “affidavits, testimony, or other evidentiary materials.” Paterson v. Weinberger, 644 F.2d 521, 523 (5th Cir.1981). Given the burden of proof on the party asserting jurisdiction, the plaintiff must submit evidence to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the court does have jurisdiction based on the complaints and evidence. Id. Courts are to hold pro se litigants to less stringent pleading standards than other parties. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (holding that while pro se complaints are liberally construed issues not raised in the district court are deemed waived", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nor (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court’s resolution of disputed facts.” Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161 (citing Barrera-Montenegro v. United States, 74 F.3d 657, 659 (5th Cir.1992)). When a defendant submits a factual attack on the complaint, he must provide support with “affidavits, testimony, or other evidentiary materials.” Paterson v. Weinberger, 644 F.2d 521, 523 (5th Cir.1981). Given the burden of proof on the party asserting jurisdiction, the plaintiff must submit evidence to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the court does have jurisdiction based on the complaints and evidence. Id. Courts are to hold pro se litigants to less stringent pleading standards than other parties. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (holding that pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nor (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court’s resolution of disputed facts.” Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161 (citing Barrera-Montenegro v. United States, 74 F.3d 657, 659 (5th Cir.1992)). When a defendant submits a factual attack on the complaint, he must provide support with “affidavits, testimony, or other evidentiary materials.” Paterson v. Weinberger, 644 F.2d 521, 523 (5th Cir.1981). Given the burden of proof on the party asserting jurisdiction, the plaintiff must submit evidence to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the court does have jurisdiction based on the complaints and evidence. Id. Courts are to hold pro se litigants to less stringent pleading standards than other parties. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (holding that although pro se briefs are liberally construed even pro se litigants must brief arguments in order to preserve them", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nor (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court’s resolution of disputed facts.” Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161 (citing Barrera-Montenegro v. United States, 74 F.3d 657, 659 (5th Cir.1992)). When a defendant submits a factual attack on the complaint, he must provide support with “affidavits, testimony, or other evidentiary materials.” Paterson v. Weinberger, 644 F.2d 521, 523 (5th Cir.1981). Given the burden of proof on the party asserting jurisdiction, the plaintiff must submit evidence to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the court does have jurisdiction based on the complaints and evidence. Id. Courts are to hold pro se litigants to less stringent pleading standards than other parties. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (recognizing courts special duty to construe liberally a pro se plaintiffs pleadings", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nor (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court’s resolution of disputed facts.” Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161 (citing Barrera-Montenegro v. United States, 74 F.3d 657, 659 (5th Cir.1992)). When a defendant submits a factual attack on the complaint, he must provide support with “affidavits, testimony, or other evidentiary materials.” Paterson v. Weinberger, 644 F.2d 521, 523 (5th Cir.1981). Given the burden of proof on the party asserting jurisdiction, the plaintiff must submit evidence to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the court does have jurisdiction based on the complaints and evidence. Id. Courts are to hold pro se litigants to less stringent pleading standards than other parties. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (holding that pleadings under the rico act are to be liberally construed" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n10 . Plaintiff avers incorrectly that the LOGO provision becomes inoperative upon receipt of full funding under the contract. Rather, because this is a fixed-price contract, the LOGO clause remains operative with regard to work under the original scope of the contract or any subsequently executed bilateral modification. 11 . Defendant argued that the LOGO and FP limitations on liability would preclude plaintiff from recovery even in the event of breach. Defendant's argument is curious. The court will not interpret these clauses to reach an unjust or impractical result. It is axiomatic that either party would be entitled to some recovery in the event of a breach of the contract. See Raymond Constructors of Africa, Ltd. v. United States, 188 Ct.Cl. 147, 166, 411 F.2d 1227, 1237 (1969) (holding confrontation clause inapplicable at sentencing", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n10 . Plaintiff avers incorrectly that the LOGO provision becomes inoperative upon receipt of full funding under the contract. Rather, because this is a fixed-price contract, the LOGO clause remains operative with regard to work under the original scope of the contract or any subsequently executed bilateral modification. 11 . Defendant argued that the LOGO and FP limitations on liability would preclude plaintiff from recovery even in the event of breach. Defendant's argument is curious. The court will not interpret these clauses to reach an unjust or impractical result. It is axiomatic that either party would be entitled to some recovery in the event of a breach of the contract. See Raymond Constructors of Africa, Ltd. v. United States, 188 Ct.Cl. 147, 166, 411 F.2d 1227, 1237 (1969) (holding that bankruptcy court could not enter judgment for 7402564 under 107a for incurred costs when such costs had not been incurred", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n10 . Plaintiff avers incorrectly that the LOGO provision becomes inoperative upon receipt of full funding under the contract. Rather, because this is a fixed-price contract, the LOGO clause remains operative with regard to work under the original scope of the contract or any subsequently executed bilateral modification. 11 . Defendant argued that the LOGO and FP limitations on liability would preclude plaintiff from recovery even in the event of breach. Defendant's argument is curious. The court will not interpret these clauses to reach an unjust or impractical result. It is axiomatic that either party would be entitled to some recovery in the event of a breach of the contract. See Raymond Constructors of Africa, Ltd. v. United States, 188 Ct.Cl. 147, 166, 411 F.2d 1227, 1237 (1969) (recognizing that the contractor may recover costs when loss of productivity results from the governments actions", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n10 . Plaintiff avers incorrectly that the LOGO provision becomes inoperative upon receipt of full funding under the contract. Rather, because this is a fixed-price contract, the LOGO clause remains operative with regard to work under the original scope of the contract or any subsequently executed bilateral modification. 11 . Defendant argued that the LOGO and FP limitations on liability would preclude plaintiff from recovery even in the event of breach. Defendant's argument is curious. The court will not interpret these clauses to reach an unjust or impractical result. It is axiomatic that either party would be entitled to some recovery in the event of a breach of the contract. See Raymond Constructors of Africa, Ltd. v. United States, 188 Ct.Cl. 147, 166, 411 F.2d 1227, 1237 (1969) (holding limitation clause inapplicable where contractor incurred additional costs as a result of governments failure to perform", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n10 . Plaintiff avers incorrectly that the LOGO provision becomes inoperative upon receipt of full funding under the contract. Rather, because this is a fixed-price contract, the LOGO clause remains operative with regard to work under the original scope of the contract or any subsequently executed bilateral modification. 11 . Defendant argued that the LOGO and FP limitations on liability would preclude plaintiff from recovery even in the event of breach. Defendant's argument is curious. The court will not interpret these clauses to reach an unjust or impractical result. It is axiomatic that either party would be entitled to some recovery in the event of a breach of the contract. See Raymond Constructors of Africa, Ltd. v. United States, 188 Ct.Cl. 147, 166, 411 F.2d 1227, 1237 (1969) (holding that the government could not charge contractor excess cost of relet contract where government caused a delay in contract performance in which contractor was to use his own equipment original contractors costs increased and government refused to allow original contractor to perform at cost but allowed new contractor to use government equipment and paid new contractor a different rate" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nAna Pozos appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Cory Birnberg APC, in Birnberg’s action to enforce an order awarding attorney fees pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 928(c) in a Long-shore and Harbor Workers Compensation case. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Feiler v. United States, 62 F.3d 315, 316 (9th Cir.1995), and we affirm. The district court properly granted summary judgment because Birnberg’s attorney fee order was enforceable and the district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain Pozos’ challenges to the ALJ’s underlying decision. See Thompson v. Potashnick Constr. Co, 812 F.2d 574, 576 (9th Cir.1987) (holding that a district court only has jurisdiction to order compliance with compensation orders entered by an administrative law judge alj and reviewed by the benefits review board and to screen for procedural defects but may not otherwise affirm modify suspend or set aside a compensation order based on the substantive merits of the aljs decision", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nAna Pozos appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Cory Birnberg APC, in Birnberg’s action to enforce an order awarding attorney fees pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 928(c) in a Long-shore and Harbor Workers Compensation case. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Feiler v. United States, 62 F.3d 315, 316 (9th Cir.1995), and we affirm. The district court properly granted summary judgment because Birnberg’s attorney fee order was enforceable and the district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain Pozos’ challenges to the ALJ’s underlying decision. See Thompson v. Potashnick Constr. Co, 812 F.2d 574, 576 (9th Cir.1987) (holding that a presumptive partial disability exists by virtue of the order to suspend compensation the employer can eliminate liability only by offering suitable work", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nAna Pozos appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Cory Birnberg APC, in Birnberg’s action to enforce an order awarding attorney fees pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 928(c) in a Long-shore and Harbor Workers Compensation case. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Feiler v. United States, 62 F.3d 315, 316 (9th Cir.1995), and we affirm. The district court properly granted summary judgment because Birnberg’s attorney fee order was enforceable and the district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain Pozos’ challenges to the ALJ’s underlying decision. See Thompson v. Potashnick Constr. Co, 812 F.2d 574, 576 (9th Cir.1987) (holding that an order in a criminal matter drafted by the prosecutor and signed by the circuit judge was in compliance with requirements of the law", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nAna Pozos appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Cory Birnberg APC, in Birnberg’s action to enforce an order awarding attorney fees pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 928(c) in a Long-shore and Harbor Workers Compensation case. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Feiler v. United States, 62 F.3d 315, 316 (9th Cir.1995), and we affirm. The district court properly granted summary judgment because Birnberg’s attorney fee order was enforceable and the district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain Pozos’ challenges to the ALJ’s underlying decision. See Thompson v. Potashnick Constr. Co, 812 F.2d 574, 576 (9th Cir.1987) (holding that an appellate court may not exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction to review a nonfinal district court order where the merits of the nonfinal order are not inextricably intertwined with the properly appealed collateral order or where review of the former is not necessary to ensure meaningful review of the latter", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nAna Pozos appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Cory Birnberg APC, in Birnberg’s action to enforce an order awarding attorney fees pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 928(c) in a Long-shore and Harbor Workers Compensation case. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Feiler v. United States, 62 F.3d 315, 316 (9th Cir.1995), and we affirm. The district court properly granted summary judgment because Birnberg’s attorney fee order was enforceable and the district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain Pozos’ challenges to the ALJ’s underlying decision. See Thompson v. Potashnick Constr. Co, 812 F.2d 574, 576 (9th Cir.1987) (holding that this court could not affirm the aljs finding of gross misconduct because the alj failed to make findings on every material contested issue of fact" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nof the victim’s conduct. See § 90.405, Fla. Stat. (2009). There are, however, important distinctions and evi-dentiary requirements between reputation evidence and evidence of specific acts admitted under section 90.404(l)(b). Grace v. State, 832 So.2d 224, 226 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); Pino, 389 So.2d at 1194. The purpose of introducing the reputation evidence in a self-defense case is to show that the victim was the initial aggressor. Pino, 389 So.2d at 1194. Reputation evidence is offered to show that the victim acted in conformity with a known character trait. Because reputation evidence relates to the conduct of the victim, the defendant is not required to have had prior knowledge of the victim’s reputation in the community. See Dwyer v. State, 743 So.2d 46, 48 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (holding that evidence of assault on victim that was subsequent to the arson for which defendant was tried was admissible to show defendants bent of mind toward violence directed at the victim", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nof the victim’s conduct. See § 90.405, Fla. Stat. (2009). There are, however, important distinctions and evi-dentiary requirements between reputation evidence and evidence of specific acts admitted under section 90.404(l)(b). Grace v. State, 832 So.2d 224, 226 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); Pino, 389 So.2d at 1194. The purpose of introducing the reputation evidence in a self-defense case is to show that the victim was the initial aggressor. Pino, 389 So.2d at 1194. Reputation evidence is offered to show that the victim acted in conformity with a known character trait. Because reputation evidence relates to the conduct of the victim, the defendant is not required to have had prior knowledge of the victim’s reputation in the community. See Dwyer v. State, 743 So.2d 46, 48 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (holding that uncharged sexual acts committed upon the same victim are admissible to show the conduct of the defendant toward the victim and to corroborate the evidence of the offense charged in the indictment", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nof the victim’s conduct. See § 90.405, Fla. Stat. (2009). There are, however, important distinctions and evi-dentiary requirements between reputation evidence and evidence of specific acts admitted under section 90.404(l)(b). Grace v. State, 832 So.2d 224, 226 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); Pino, 389 So.2d at 1194. The purpose of introducing the reputation evidence in a self-defense case is to show that the victim was the initial aggressor. Pino, 389 So.2d at 1194. Reputation evidence is offered to show that the victim acted in conformity with a known character trait. Because reputation evidence relates to the conduct of the victim, the defendant is not required to have had prior knowledge of the victim’s reputation in the community. See Dwyer v. State, 743 So.2d 46, 48 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (holding that a defendant who alleges selfdefense can show through the testimony of another witness that the alleged victim had a propensity for violence thereby inferring that the alleged victim was the aggressor a defendants prior knowledge of the victims reputation for violence is irrelevant because the evidence is offered to show the conduct of the victim rather than the defendants state of mind", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nof the victim’s conduct. See § 90.405, Fla. Stat. (2009). There are, however, important distinctions and evi-dentiary requirements between reputation evidence and evidence of specific acts admitted under section 90.404(l)(b). Grace v. State, 832 So.2d 224, 226 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); Pino, 389 So.2d at 1194. The purpose of introducing the reputation evidence in a self-defense case is to show that the victim was the initial aggressor. Pino, 389 So.2d at 1194. Reputation evidence is offered to show that the victim acted in conformity with a known character trait. Because reputation evidence relates to the conduct of the victim, the defendant is not required to have had prior knowledge of the victim’s reputation in the community. See Dwyer v. State, 743 So.2d 46, 48 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (holding that before a defendant is entitled to introduce evidence of the victims character for violence there must be sufficient evidence to support a finding that the victim was the first aggressor and that once the defendant testified that he was attacked and cut by the victim without provocation before using the victims utility tool to stab the victim the defendant was clearly entitled to question the victim about past acts of violence reflected in court documents from the state of oregon", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nof the victim’s conduct. See § 90.405, Fla. Stat. (2009). There are, however, important distinctions and evi-dentiary requirements between reputation evidence and evidence of specific acts admitted under section 90.404(l)(b). Grace v. State, 832 So.2d 224, 226 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); Pino, 389 So.2d at 1194. The purpose of introducing the reputation evidence in a self-defense case is to show that the victim was the initial aggressor. Pino, 389 So.2d at 1194. Reputation evidence is offered to show that the victim acted in conformity with a known character trait. Because reputation evidence relates to the conduct of the victim, the defendant is not required to have had prior knowledge of the victim’s reputation in the community. See Dwyer v. State, 743 So.2d 46, 48 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (holding that corroborative evidence of prior specific acts of violence by victim may be admissible in selfdefense case where the defendant knew of the act" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nIt is established that when a hearing officer awards relief requested by the parents, the hearing officer’s decision constitutes an agreement between the State and the parents sufficient to change the placement of a child. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.518 (“If the hearing officer in a due process hearing ... agrees wit officer’s decision was incorrect, the District was not free to simply ignore its obligation to comply with the HOD. Under these circumstances, the parents were within their rights to enroll M.M. at Ivym-ount, and are entitled to reimbursement for their expenses. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) (authorizing court to grant relief “as the court determines is appropriate” in IDEA action); Forest Grove School Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 246, 129 S.Ct. 2484, 174 L.Ed.2d 168 (2009) (holding that the local educational agency is the appropriate target of a suit under the idea and that private entities cannot be held liable under the statute as the idea obligates the statenot the private schoolto ensure that such children are provided special education and related services in accordance with an individualized education program ", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nIt is established that when a hearing officer awards relief requested by the parents, the hearing officer’s decision constitutes an agreement between the State and the parents sufficient to change the placement of a child. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.518 (“If the hearing officer in a due process hearing ... agrees wit officer’s decision was incorrect, the District was not free to simply ignore its obligation to comply with the HOD. Under these circumstances, the parents were within their rights to enroll M.M. at Ivym-ount, and are entitled to reimbursement for their expenses. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) (authorizing court to grant relief “as the court determines is appropriate” in IDEA action); Forest Grove School Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 246, 129 S.Ct. 2484, 174 L.Ed.2d 168 (2009) (recognizing that a school district must be a prevailing party in order to be entitled to attorneys fees under the idea", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nIt is established that when a hearing officer awards relief requested by the parents, the hearing officer’s decision constitutes an agreement between the State and the parents sufficient to change the placement of a child. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.518 (“If the hearing officer in a due process hearing ... agrees wit officer’s decision was incorrect, the District was not free to simply ignore its obligation to comply with the HOD. Under these circumstances, the parents were within their rights to enroll M.M. at Ivym-ount, and are entitled to reimbursement for their expenses. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) (authorizing court to grant relief “as the court determines is appropriate” in IDEA action); Forest Grove School Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 246, 129 S.Ct. 2484, 174 L.Ed.2d 168 (2009) (holding reimbursement for private tutoring available under the idea", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nIt is established that when a hearing officer awards relief requested by the parents, the hearing officer’s decision constitutes an agreement between the State and the parents sufficient to change the placement of a child. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.518 (“If the hearing officer in a due process hearing ... agrees wit officer’s decision was incorrect, the District was not free to simply ignore its obligation to comply with the HOD. Under these circumstances, the parents were within their rights to enroll M.M. at Ivym-ount, and are entitled to reimbursement for their expenses. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) (authorizing court to grant relief “as the court determines is appropriate” in IDEA action); Forest Grove School Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 246, 129 S.Ct. 2484, 174 L.Ed.2d 168 (2009) (holding that court may order reimbursement of private school expenses incurred by parents of handicapped child in successful challenge to iep brought under eha predecessor to idea stating that it is beyond cavil that appropriate relief would include a prospective injunction directing the school official to develop and implement at public expense an iep placing the child in a private school and affirming reimbursement award against petitioner local school district ", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nIt is established that when a hearing officer awards relief requested by the parents, the hearing officer’s decision constitutes an agreement between the State and the parents sufficient to change the placement of a child. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.518 (“If the hearing officer in a due process hearing ... agrees wit officer’s decision was incorrect, the District was not free to simply ignore its obligation to comply with the HOD. Under these circumstances, the parents were within their rights to enroll M.M. at Ivym-ount, and are entitled to reimbursement for their expenses. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) (authorizing court to grant relief “as the court determines is appropriate” in IDEA action); Forest Grove School Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 246, 129 S.Ct. 2484, 174 L.Ed.2d 168 (2009) (recognizing that the idea authorizes courts to order reimbursement of the costs of private specialeducation services in appropriate circumstances" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nsimilar results, generally holding that contingency fees are assets of the partnership. As an example, where one partner worked on contingency fee cases with which the clients indicated they wanted him to remain involved after dissolution, a court held that the contractual obligation to conclude the cases was part of the fiduciary duty owed amongst the partners. Resnick v. Kaplan, 49 Md.App. 499, 434 A.2d 582, 585, 587 (1981). Fees earned from cases pending at dissolution were partnership assets. Id. at 587. The court also affirmed that, although a client has the right to select the attorney the client wants, the client’s right does not diminish or change the fiduciary duties of the partners. Id. at 588. See also Jewel v. Boxer, 156 Cal.App.3d 171, 203 Cal.Rptr. 13, 16-17 (1984) (holding that when an attorney represents multiple clients and a dispute between the attorney and one client later occurs there is a waiver of the privilege but only by the client asserting the liability", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nsimilar results, generally holding that contingency fees are assets of the partnership. As an example, where one partner worked on contingency fee cases with which the clients indicated they wanted him to remain involved after dissolution, a court held that the contractual obligation to conclude the cases was part of the fiduciary duty owed amongst the partners. Resnick v. Kaplan, 49 Md.App. 499, 434 A.2d 582, 585, 587 (1981). Fees earned from cases pending at dissolution were partnership assets. Id. at 587. The court also affirmed that, although a client has the right to select the attorney the client wants, the client’s right does not diminish or change the fiduciary duties of the partners. Id. at 588. See also Jewel v. Boxer, 156 Cal.App.3d 171, 203 Cal.Rptr. 13, 16-17 (1984) (holding that an attorney may only undertake to represent a new client against a former client where there is no confidential information received from the former client that is in any way relevant to representation of the current client", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nsimilar results, generally holding that contingency fees are assets of the partnership. As an example, where one partner worked on contingency fee cases with which the clients indicated they wanted him to remain involved after dissolution, a court held that the contractual obligation to conclude the cases was part of the fiduciary duty owed amongst the partners. Resnick v. Kaplan, 49 Md.App. 499, 434 A.2d 582, 585, 587 (1981). Fees earned from cases pending at dissolution were partnership assets. Id. at 587. The court also affirmed that, although a client has the right to select the attorney the client wants, the client’s right does not diminish or change the fiduciary duties of the partners. Id. at 588. See also Jewel v. Boxer, 156 Cal.App.3d 171, 203 Cal.Rptr. 13, 16-17 (1984) (holding income generated through the winding up of unfinished cases is allocated to the former partners and the right of the client to select an attorney of ones choice is irrelevant to the rights and duties between the parties", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nsimilar results, generally holding that contingency fees are assets of the partnership. As an example, where one partner worked on contingency fee cases with which the clients indicated they wanted him to remain involved after dissolution, a court held that the contractual obligation to conclude the cases was part of the fiduciary duty owed amongst the partners. Resnick v. Kaplan, 49 Md.App. 499, 434 A.2d 582, 585, 587 (1981). Fees earned from cases pending at dissolution were partnership assets. Id. at 587. The court also affirmed that, although a client has the right to select the attorney the client wants, the client’s right does not diminish or change the fiduciary duties of the partners. Id. at 588. See also Jewel v. Boxer, 156 Cal.App.3d 171, 203 Cal.Rptr. 13, 16-17 (1984) (holding client is not liable for actions of attorney who misled client as to the status of case", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nsimilar results, generally holding that contingency fees are assets of the partnership. As an example, where one partner worked on contingency fee cases with which the clients indicated they wanted him to remain involved after dissolution, a court held that the contractual obligation to conclude the cases was part of the fiduciary duty owed amongst the partners. Resnick v. Kaplan, 49 Md.App. 499, 434 A.2d 582, 585, 587 (1981). Fees earned from cases pending at dissolution were partnership assets. Id. at 587. The court also affirmed that, although a client has the right to select the attorney the client wants, the client’s right does not diminish or change the fiduciary duties of the partners. Id. at 588. See also Jewel v. Boxer, 156 Cal.App.3d 171, 203 Cal.Rptr. 13, 16-17 (1984) (holding an attorney is an agent of the client and therefore cannot conspire with the client" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nto Hilton. Alternatively, Hilton argues that Arlynn was the initial transferee because Video Depot’s ledger .appears to indicate that the cashier’s check was a “loan” to Arlynn. We address each of these arguments in turn. I. Arlynn’s Control over Video Depot While the Bankruptcy Code does not define “transferee,” it is widely accepted that a transferee is one who, at a minimum, has ‘“dominion over the money or other asset, the right to put the money to one’s own purposes.’ ” In re Bullion, 922 F.2d at 548 (quoting Bonded Fin. Servs., 838 F.2d at 893). The bankruptcy court determined that Arlynn did not have, dominion over the $65,-000. The court reasoned that although Arlynn controlled Video Depot’s operations and arranged for the cheek Inc.), 164 B.R. 117, 127 (Bankr.N.D.Cal.1994) (holding that a trustee may settle with an initial transferee and still pursue recovery against a subsequent transferee but notwithstanding the trustee will still be required to prove that the transfers were fraudulent and improper in connection with its suit against the subsequent transferee because the trustees settlement with the initial transferee did not involve any determination on the merits as to the initial transfers and in this way the subsequent transferee will be afforded its due process rights to contest the avoidability of these initial transfers", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nto Hilton. Alternatively, Hilton argues that Arlynn was the initial transferee because Video Depot’s ledger .appears to indicate that the cashier’s check was a “loan” to Arlynn. We address each of these arguments in turn. I. Arlynn’s Control over Video Depot While the Bankruptcy Code does not define “transferee,” it is widely accepted that a transferee is one who, at a minimum, has ‘“dominion over the money or other asset, the right to put the money to one’s own purposes.’ ” In re Bullion, 922 F.2d at 548 (quoting Bonded Fin. Servs., 838 F.2d at 893). The bankruptcy court determined that Arlynn did not have, dominion over the $65,-000. The court reasoned that although Arlynn controlled Video Depot’s operations and arranged for the cheek Inc.), 164 B.R. 117, 127 (Bankr.N.D.Cal.1994) (holding that principal who caused debtor to issue cashiers check to satisfy personal obligation was not initial transferee", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nto Hilton. Alternatively, Hilton argues that Arlynn was the initial transferee because Video Depot’s ledger .appears to indicate that the cashier’s check was a “loan” to Arlynn. We address each of these arguments in turn. I. Arlynn’s Control over Video Depot While the Bankruptcy Code does not define “transferee,” it is widely accepted that a transferee is one who, at a minimum, has ‘“dominion over the money or other asset, the right to put the money to one’s own purposes.’ ” In re Bullion, 922 F.2d at 548 (quoting Bonded Fin. Servs., 838 F.2d at 893). The bankruptcy court determined that Arlynn did not have, dominion over the $65,-000. The court reasoned that although Arlynn controlled Video Depot’s operations and arranged for the cheek Inc.), 164 B.R. 117, 127 (Bankr.N.D.Cal.1994) (holding that the principal of a corporate debtor does not become a transferee by the mere act of causing the debtor to make a fraudulent transfer", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nto Hilton. Alternatively, Hilton argues that Arlynn was the initial transferee because Video Depot’s ledger .appears to indicate that the cashier’s check was a “loan” to Arlynn. We address each of these arguments in turn. I. Arlynn’s Control over Video Depot While the Bankruptcy Code does not define “transferee,” it is widely accepted that a transferee is one who, at a minimum, has ‘“dominion over the money or other asset, the right to put the money to one’s own purposes.’ ” In re Bullion, 922 F.2d at 548 (quoting Bonded Fin. Servs., 838 F.2d at 893). The bankruptcy court determined that Arlynn did not have, dominion over the $65,-000. The court reasoned that although Arlynn controlled Video Depot’s operations and arranged for the cheek Inc.), 164 B.R. 117, 127 (Bankr.N.D.Cal.1994) (holding that agent of corporation who used corporate funds to secure personal loan was initial transferee", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nto Hilton. Alternatively, Hilton argues that Arlynn was the initial transferee because Video Depot’s ledger .appears to indicate that the cashier’s check was a “loan” to Arlynn. We address each of these arguments in turn. I. Arlynn’s Control over Video Depot While the Bankruptcy Code does not define “transferee,” it is widely accepted that a transferee is one who, at a minimum, has ‘“dominion over the money or other asset, the right to put the money to one’s own purposes.’ ” In re Bullion, 922 F.2d at 548 (quoting Bonded Fin. Servs., 838 F.2d at 893). The bankruptcy court determined that Arlynn did not have, dominion over the $65,-000. The court reasoned that although Arlynn controlled Video Depot’s operations and arranged for the cheek Inc.), 164 B.R. 117, 127 (Bankr.N.D.Cal.1994) (holding a party to be an initial transferee because she was given legal title to the funds" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nuse, and (4) lost profits on gas that TGP was unable to sell because it had to be used for venting and to perform emergency shutdowns. Id. at 10-11. C. Analysis We conclude that some of the damages awarded to HP are permitted direct damages and some are impermissible consequential damages. 1. Costs Relating to Transformer B: Damage Elements (a), (b), (c) & (f) Damages that flow “naturally and necessarily” from a breach of the parties’ contract are those inherent in the nature of the breach of the obligation between the parties, as compared to those damages that flow “naturally but not necessarily” from the breach because they require the existence of some other fact (known or unknown) beyond the relationship between the parties. Cf. Tennessee Gas Pipeline, 2008 WL 3876141, at *9-10 (holding that government claim seeking incidental and consequential damages for plaintiffs alleged breach of contract did not require certification", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nuse, and (4) lost profits on gas that TGP was unable to sell because it had to be used for venting and to perform emergency shutdowns. Id. at 10-11. C. Analysis We conclude that some of the damages awarded to HP are permitted direct damages and some are impermissible consequential damages. 1. Costs Relating to Transformer B: Damage Elements (a), (b), (c) & (f) Damages that flow “naturally and necessarily” from a breach of the parties’ contract are those inherent in the nature of the breach of the obligation between the parties, as compared to those damages that flow “naturally but not necessarily” from the breach because they require the existence of some other fact (known or unknown) beyond the relationship between the parties. Cf. Tennessee Gas Pipeline, 2008 WL 3876141, at *9-10 (holding that cost for backup generator necessitated by power outage were consequential damages of defendants premature dismantling of old generator and costs for penalty under utility contract for delayed use of utilities were consequential damages from construction delay because the cost depended on terms of owners contract with third party utility company", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nuse, and (4) lost profits on gas that TGP was unable to sell because it had to be used for venting and to perform emergency shutdowns. Id. at 10-11. C. Analysis We conclude that some of the damages awarded to HP are permitted direct damages and some are impermissible consequential damages. 1. Costs Relating to Transformer B: Damage Elements (a), (b), (c) & (f) Damages that flow “naturally and necessarily” from a breach of the parties’ contract are those inherent in the nature of the breach of the obligation between the parties, as compared to those damages that flow “naturally but not necessarily” from the breach because they require the existence of some other fact (known or unknown) beyond the relationship between the parties. Cf. Tennessee Gas Pipeline, 2008 WL 3876141, at *9-10 (holding that consequential damages are not to be considered", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nuse, and (4) lost profits on gas that TGP was unable to sell because it had to be used for venting and to perform emergency shutdowns. Id. at 10-11. C. Analysis We conclude that some of the damages awarded to HP are permitted direct damages and some are impermissible consequential damages. 1. Costs Relating to Transformer B: Damage Elements (a), (b), (c) & (f) Damages that flow “naturally and necessarily” from a breach of the parties’ contract are those inherent in the nature of the breach of the obligation between the parties, as compared to those damages that flow “naturally but not necessarily” from the breach because they require the existence of some other fact (known or unknown) beyond the relationship between the parties. Cf. Tennessee Gas Pipeline, 2008 WL 3876141, at *9-10 (holding that provision barring recovery of consequential damages did not necessarily bar all loss of use damages but damages for loss of use of money were consequential", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nuse, and (4) lost profits on gas that TGP was unable to sell because it had to be used for venting and to perform emergency shutdowns. Id. at 10-11. C. Analysis We conclude that some of the damages awarded to HP are permitted direct damages and some are impermissible consequential damages. 1. Costs Relating to Transformer B: Damage Elements (a), (b), (c) & (f) Damages that flow “naturally and necessarily” from a breach of the parties’ contract are those inherent in the nature of the breach of the obligation between the parties, as compared to those damages that flow “naturally but not necessarily” from the breach because they require the existence of some other fact (known or unknown) beyond the relationship between the parties. Cf. Tennessee Gas Pipeline, 2008 WL 3876141, at *9-10 (holding that plaintiffs consequential damages were too speculative because no evidence connected damages to defendants breach of contract" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nundermines her arguments. (Defs-.’ Mem. 9-10.) However, the issue before the Court on this claim is not whether Plaintiff was guilty of disclosing official NYPD -information, but whether her termination was motivated, even in part, by her sex. The evidence that a similarly situated male lieutenant who engaged in comparable or worse conduct than Plaintiff received a much lighter pen alty, in combination with the evidence that Defendants departed from procedural regularity by providing Commissioner Weisel with an inaccurate and version of Plaintiffs disciplinary record than they provid: ed to Plaintiff, is legally sufficient for- a reasonable jury to find that Defendants terminated Plaintiff in part on the basis of her sex. See Kwan v. Andalex Grp. LLC, 737 F.3d 834, 847 (2d Cir.2013) (holding that plaintiffs prima facie case plus evidence of pretext sufficed to permit reasonable juror to infer that retaliation was butfor cause of adverse action", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nundermines her arguments. (Defs-.’ Mem. 9-10.) However, the issue before the Court on this claim is not whether Plaintiff was guilty of disclosing official NYPD -information, but whether her termination was motivated, even in part, by her sex. The evidence that a similarly situated male lieutenant who engaged in comparable or worse conduct than Plaintiff received a much lighter pen alty, in combination with the evidence that Defendants departed from procedural regularity by providing Commissioner Weisel with an inaccurate and version of Plaintiffs disciplinary record than they provid: ed to Plaintiff, is legally sufficient for- a reasonable jury to find that Defendants terminated Plaintiff in part on the basis of her sex. See Kwan v. Andalex Grp. LLC, 737 F.3d 834, 847 (2d Cir.2013) (holding that a prima facie case of retaliation requires a causal link between the employees protected activity and the employers adverse employment action", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nundermines her arguments. (Defs-.’ Mem. 9-10.) However, the issue before the Court on this claim is not whether Plaintiff was guilty of disclosing official NYPD -information, but whether her termination was motivated, even in part, by her sex. The evidence that a similarly situated male lieutenant who engaged in comparable or worse conduct than Plaintiff received a much lighter pen alty, in combination with the evidence that Defendants departed from procedural regularity by providing Commissioner Weisel with an inaccurate and version of Plaintiffs disciplinary record than they provid: ed to Plaintiff, is legally sufficient for- a reasonable jury to find that Defendants terminated Plaintiff in part on the basis of her sex. See Kwan v. Andalex Grp. LLC, 737 F.3d 834, 847 (2d Cir.2013) (holding that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation because there was no evidence that the decisionmaker knew of the plaintiffs protected conduct", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nundermines her arguments. (Defs-.’ Mem. 9-10.) However, the issue before the Court on this claim is not whether Plaintiff was guilty of disclosing official NYPD -information, but whether her termination was motivated, even in part, by her sex. The evidence that a similarly situated male lieutenant who engaged in comparable or worse conduct than Plaintiff received a much lighter pen alty, in combination with the evidence that Defendants departed from procedural regularity by providing Commissioner Weisel with an inaccurate and version of Plaintiffs disciplinary record than they provid: ed to Plaintiff, is legally sufficient for- a reasonable jury to find that Defendants terminated Plaintiff in part on the basis of her sex. See Kwan v. Andalex Grp. LLC, 737 F.3d 834, 847 (2d Cir.2013) (holding that plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of retaliation without evidence that the decisionmaker knew about plaintiffs protected activity when he made the decision that resulted in the adverse action", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nundermines her arguments. (Defs-.’ Mem. 9-10.) However, the issue before the Court on this claim is not whether Plaintiff was guilty of disclosing official NYPD -information, but whether her termination was motivated, even in part, by her sex. The evidence that a similarly situated male lieutenant who engaged in comparable or worse conduct than Plaintiff received a much lighter pen alty, in combination with the evidence that Defendants departed from procedural regularity by providing Commissioner Weisel with an inaccurate and version of Plaintiffs disciplinary record than they provid: ed to Plaintiff, is legally sufficient for- a reasonable jury to find that Defendants terminated Plaintiff in part on the basis of her sex. See Kwan v. Andalex Grp. LLC, 737 F.3d 834, 847 (2d Cir.2013) (holding that plaintiffs statistical evidence failed to establish prima facie case or pretext where evidence failed to make specific analytical comparisons" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nto hold those for either — they’re on file, he can bring them, if you choose to do that.” On December 13, 2001, defendant filed a pro se notice of appeal. The State Appellate Defender was appointed to represent defendant on appeal. II. ANALYSIS A. Posttrial Motions Defendant first contends that this cause must be remanded for further proceedings because the trial court failed to rule on his post-trial motion for recusal or his motion for a new trial. At the outset, we question whether defendant’s pro se posttrial motions were properly before the trial court. The motions were filed at a time during which he was represented by counsel. It is well established that a defendant may not simultaneously proceed pro se and by counsel. See People v. Handy, 278 Ill. App. 3d 829, 836-37 (1996) (holding that a defendant proceeding pro se is bound by same rules as party represented by counsel and a court cannot allow pro se litigant lower standard of performance", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nto hold those for either — they’re on file, he can bring them, if you choose to do that.” On December 13, 2001, defendant filed a pro se notice of appeal. The State Appellate Defender was appointed to represent defendant on appeal. II. ANALYSIS A. Posttrial Motions Defendant first contends that this cause must be remanded for further proceedings because the trial court failed to rule on his post-trial motion for recusal or his motion for a new trial. At the outset, we question whether defendant’s pro se posttrial motions were properly before the trial court. The motions were filed at a time during which he was represented by counsel. It is well established that a defendant may not simultaneously proceed pro se and by counsel. See People v. Handy, 278 Ill. App. 3d 829, 836-37 (1996) (holding that a defendant has a right to proceed pro se at trial", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nto hold those for either — they’re on file, he can bring them, if you choose to do that.” On December 13, 2001, defendant filed a pro se notice of appeal. The State Appellate Defender was appointed to represent defendant on appeal. II. ANALYSIS A. Posttrial Motions Defendant first contends that this cause must be remanded for further proceedings because the trial court failed to rule on his post-trial motion for recusal or his motion for a new trial. At the outset, we question whether defendant’s pro se posttrial motions were properly before the trial court. The motions were filed at a time during which he was represented by counsel. It is well established that a defendant may not simultaneously proceed pro se and by counsel. See People v. Handy, 278 Ill. App. 3d 829, 836-37 (1996) (holding that pro se pleadings from defendants who are represented by counsel in the pending criminal proceedings are unauthorized", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nto hold those for either — they’re on file, he can bring them, if you choose to do that.” On December 13, 2001, defendant filed a pro se notice of appeal. The State Appellate Defender was appointed to represent defendant on appeal. II. ANALYSIS A. Posttrial Motions Defendant first contends that this cause must be remanded for further proceedings because the trial court failed to rule on his post-trial motion for recusal or his motion for a new trial. At the outset, we question whether defendant’s pro se posttrial motions were properly before the trial court. The motions were filed at a time during which he was represented by counsel. It is well established that a defendant may not simultaneously proceed pro se and by counsel. See People v. Handy, 278 Ill. App. 3d 829, 836-37 (1996) (holding that trial court erred in considering pro se motion for new trial filed when defendant was represented by counsel", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nto hold those for either — they’re on file, he can bring them, if you choose to do that.” On December 13, 2001, defendant filed a pro se notice of appeal. The State Appellate Defender was appointed to represent defendant on appeal. II. ANALYSIS A. Posttrial Motions Defendant first contends that this cause must be remanded for further proceedings because the trial court failed to rule on his post-trial motion for recusal or his motion for a new trial. At the outset, we question whether defendant’s pro se posttrial motions were properly before the trial court. The motions were filed at a time during which he was represented by counsel. It is well established that a defendant may not simultaneously proceed pro se and by counsel. See People v. Handy, 278 Ill. App. 3d 829, 836-37 (1996) (holding defendants pro se motion to reduce sentence was not properly before the trial court when defendant was represented by counsel since defendant may not proceed both by counsel and pro se" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n(2001) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Abrams v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 764 F.3d 244, 254 (2d Cir.2014) (same). Notwithstanding Dooley’s argument to the contrary, the temporal relationship between her sex-discrimination complaint and the denial of her internal appeal is not “evident,” as her amended complaint provides no date for either event. In fact, Dooley does not even allege that there was close temporal proximity between them. All we know is that both occurred after she was fired. Dooley’s claim therefore fails to satisfy the fourth prong, as it is impossible to determine whether “the temporal proximity [between the two events is] very close.” Clark, 532 U.S. at 273, 121 S.Ct. 1508 (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Dawes v. Walker, 239 F.3d 489, 492 (2d Cir.2001) (holding that a prima facie case of retaliation requires a causal link between the employees protected activity and the employers adverse employment action", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n(2001) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Abrams v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 764 F.3d 244, 254 (2d Cir.2014) (same). Notwithstanding Dooley’s argument to the contrary, the temporal relationship between her sex-discrimination complaint and the denial of her internal appeal is not “evident,” as her amended complaint provides no date for either event. In fact, Dooley does not even allege that there was close temporal proximity between them. All we know is that both occurred after she was fired. Dooley’s claim therefore fails to satisfy the fourth prong, as it is impossible to determine whether “the temporal proximity [between the two events is] very close.” Clark, 532 U.S. at 273, 121 S.Ct. 1508 (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Dawes v. Walker, 239 F.3d 489, 492 (2d Cir.2001) (holding that to establish a causal connection plaintiff must show that the individual who took adverse action against him knew of the employees protected activity", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n(2001) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Abrams v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 764 F.3d 244, 254 (2d Cir.2014) (same). Notwithstanding Dooley’s argument to the contrary, the temporal relationship between her sex-discrimination complaint and the denial of her internal appeal is not “evident,” as her amended complaint provides no date for either event. In fact, Dooley does not even allege that there was close temporal proximity between them. All we know is that both occurred after she was fired. Dooley’s claim therefore fails to satisfy the fourth prong, as it is impossible to determine whether “the temporal proximity [between the two events is] very close.” Clark, 532 U.S. at 273, 121 S.Ct. 1508 (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Dawes v. Walker, 239 F.3d 489, 492 (2d Cir.2001) (holding that the plaintiff failed to raise an issue of fact regarding her retaliation claim because she failed to offer any evidence of a causal relationship between her involvement in protected activity and the adverse employment action", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n(2001) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Abrams v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 764 F.3d 244, 254 (2d Cir.2014) (same). Notwithstanding Dooley’s argument to the contrary, the temporal relationship between her sex-discrimination complaint and the denial of her internal appeal is not “evident,” as her amended complaint provides no date for either event. In fact, Dooley does not even allege that there was close temporal proximity between them. All we know is that both occurred after she was fired. Dooley’s claim therefore fails to satisfy the fourth prong, as it is impossible to determine whether “the temporal proximity [between the two events is] very close.” Clark, 532 U.S. at 273, 121 S.Ct. 1508 (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Dawes v. Walker, 239 F.3d 489, 492 (2d Cir.2001) (holding that a temporal link between protected activity and an adverse employment action may in some cases be sufficient to create an inference of retaliation", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n(2001) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Abrams v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 764 F.3d 244, 254 (2d Cir.2014) (same). Notwithstanding Dooley’s argument to the contrary, the temporal relationship between her sex-discrimination complaint and the denial of her internal appeal is not “evident,” as her amended complaint provides no date for either event. In fact, Dooley does not even allege that there was close temporal proximity between them. All we know is that both occurred after she was fired. Dooley’s claim therefore fails to satisfy the fourth prong, as it is impossible to determine whether “the temporal proximity [between the two events is] very close.” Clark, 532 U.S. at 273, 121 S.Ct. 1508 (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Dawes v. Walker, 239 F.3d 489, 492 (2d Cir.2001) (holding that the plaintiffs failure to set forth a time frame in which his protected activity and the adverse action took place precluded an inference of a causal relationship between them and warranted dismissal of his first amendment retaliation claim" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\neven appeared at a review hearing smelling of the impurities of alcohol. The court found the only obstacle to Atwell achieving the goals in the performance agreement was her lack of cooperation, and that HRS proved by clear and convincing evidence that Atwell failed to substantially comply with s for termination because the evidence showed that the risk of future abuse was likely, considering Atwell’s past conduct, and that there is no reasonable basis to conclude that her behavior will improve. Hroncich v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Servs., 667 So.2d 804, 808 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). The trial court appropriately determined that returning M.A. to Atwell would place M.A. at a significant risk of neglect and abuse. See In Interest of C.W., 616 So.2d 127 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (holding that a respondent in a termination of parental rights proceeding may not file a counterclaim", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\neven appeared at a review hearing smelling of the impurities of alcohol. The court found the only obstacle to Atwell achieving the goals in the performance agreement was her lack of cooperation, and that HRS proved by clear and convincing evidence that Atwell failed to substantially comply with s for termination because the evidence showed that the risk of future abuse was likely, considering Atwell’s past conduct, and that there is no reasonable basis to conclude that her behavior will improve. Hroncich v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Servs., 667 So.2d 804, 808 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). The trial court appropriately determined that returning M.A. to Atwell would place M.A. at a significant risk of neglect and abuse. See In Interest of C.W., 616 So.2d 127 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (recognizing this substantial interest in context of termination of parental rights", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\neven appeared at a review hearing smelling of the impurities of alcohol. The court found the only obstacle to Atwell achieving the goals in the performance agreement was her lack of cooperation, and that HRS proved by clear and convincing evidence that Atwell failed to substantially comply with s for termination because the evidence showed that the risk of future abuse was likely, considering Atwell’s past conduct, and that there is no reasonable basis to conclude that her behavior will improve. Hroncich v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Servs., 667 So.2d 804, 808 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). The trial court appropriately determined that returning M.A. to Atwell would place M.A. at a significant risk of neglect and abuse. See In Interest of C.W., 616 So.2d 127 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (holding that noncompliance with terms of agreement did not terminate agreement failure to comply with date requirement in termination procedure rendered termination ineffective and letter between nonparty and party could not terminate agreement", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\neven appeared at a review hearing smelling of the impurities of alcohol. The court found the only obstacle to Atwell achieving the goals in the performance agreement was her lack of cooperation, and that HRS proved by clear and convincing evidence that Atwell failed to substantially comply with s for termination because the evidence showed that the risk of future abuse was likely, considering Atwell’s past conduct, and that there is no reasonable basis to conclude that her behavior will improve. Hroncich v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Servs., 667 So.2d 804, 808 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). The trial court appropriately determined that returning M.A. to Atwell would place M.A. at a significant risk of neglect and abuse. See In Interest of C.W., 616 So.2d 127 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (holding that termination of parental rights may be supported by past neglect in addition to failure to sub stantially comply with performance agreement", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\neven appeared at a review hearing smelling of the impurities of alcohol. The court found the only obstacle to Atwell achieving the goals in the performance agreement was her lack of cooperation, and that HRS proved by clear and convincing evidence that Atwell failed to substantially comply with s for termination because the evidence showed that the risk of future abuse was likely, considering Atwell’s past conduct, and that there is no reasonable basis to conclude that her behavior will improve. Hroncich v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Servs., 667 So.2d 804, 808 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). The trial court appropriately determined that returning M.A. to Atwell would place M.A. at a significant risk of neglect and abuse. See In Interest of C.W., 616 So.2d 127 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (holding that generally parents have a due process right to participate in a permanency hearing because the opportunity to defend against charges of abuse and neglect may prevent a termination of parental rights" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nand misappropriation liability.” Cuban, 620 F.3d at 555; see also Yun, 327 F.3d at 1271 (acknowledging that after O’Hagan and before Rule 10b5-2 “it [was] unsettled whether non-business relationships ... provide the duty of loyalty and confidentiality necessary to satisfy the misappropriation theory”). Accordingly, the imposition of a duty to disclose under Rule 10b5-2(b)(2) when parties have a history, pattern or practice of sharing confidences does not conflict with Supreme Court precedent. Moreover, even if the rule were to conflict with the Court’s interpretation of deceptive devices, the Court “did not purport to adopt or apply the unambiguous meaning” of § 10. See Swallows Holding, Ltd. v. Comm’r, 515 F.3d 162, 170 n. 11 (3d Cir.2008); Brand X, 545 U.S. at 982, 125 S.Ct. 2688 (holding that a courts prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency construction otherwise entitled to chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency discretion", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nand misappropriation liability.” Cuban, 620 F.3d at 555; see also Yun, 327 F.3d at 1271 (acknowledging that after O’Hagan and before Rule 10b5-2 “it [was] unsettled whether non-business relationships ... provide the duty of loyalty and confidentiality necessary to satisfy the misappropriation theory”). Accordingly, the imposition of a duty to disclose under Rule 10b5-2(b)(2) when parties have a history, pattern or practice of sharing confidences does not conflict with Supreme Court precedent. Moreover, even if the rule were to conflict with the Court’s interpretation of deceptive devices, the Court “did not purport to adopt or apply the unambiguous meaning” of § 10. See Swallows Holding, Ltd. v. Comm’r, 515 F.3d 162, 170 n. 11 (3d Cir.2008); Brand X, 545 U.S. at 982, 125 S.Ct. 2688 (holding that the interpretation of an unambiguous contract is a question of law", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nand misappropriation liability.” Cuban, 620 F.3d at 555; see also Yun, 327 F.3d at 1271 (acknowledging that after O’Hagan and before Rule 10b5-2 “it [was] unsettled whether non-business relationships ... provide the duty of loyalty and confidentiality necessary to satisfy the misappropriation theory”). Accordingly, the imposition of a duty to disclose under Rule 10b5-2(b)(2) when parties have a history, pattern or practice of sharing confidences does not conflict with Supreme Court precedent. Moreover, even if the rule were to conflict with the Court’s interpretation of deceptive devices, the Court “did not purport to adopt or apply the unambiguous meaning” of § 10. See Swallows Holding, Ltd. v. Comm’r, 515 F.3d 162, 170 n. 11 (3d Cir.2008); Brand X, 545 U.S. at 982, 125 S.Ct. 2688 (holding that to foreclose a conflicting agency interpretation a prior court decision must hold that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nand misappropriation liability.” Cuban, 620 F.3d at 555; see also Yun, 327 F.3d at 1271 (acknowledging that after O’Hagan and before Rule 10b5-2 “it [was] unsettled whether non-business relationships ... provide the duty of loyalty and confidentiality necessary to satisfy the misappropriation theory”). Accordingly, the imposition of a duty to disclose under Rule 10b5-2(b)(2) when parties have a history, pattern or practice of sharing confidences does not conflict with Supreme Court precedent. Moreover, even if the rule were to conflict with the Court’s interpretation of deceptive devices, the Court “did not purport to adopt or apply the unambiguous meaning” of § 10. See Swallows Holding, Ltd. v. Comm’r, 515 F.3d 162, 170 n. 11 (3d Cir.2008); Brand X, 545 U.S. at 982, 125 S.Ct. 2688 (holding that when a statutes terms are clear and unambiguous on their face there is no room for statutory construction and a court must apply the statute according to its literal meaning", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nand misappropriation liability.” Cuban, 620 F.3d at 555; see also Yun, 327 F.3d at 1271 (acknowledging that after O’Hagan and before Rule 10b5-2 “it [was] unsettled whether non-business relationships ... provide the duty of loyalty and confidentiality necessary to satisfy the misappropriation theory”). Accordingly, the imposition of a duty to disclose under Rule 10b5-2(b)(2) when parties have a history, pattern or practice of sharing confidences does not conflict with Supreme Court precedent. Moreover, even if the rule were to conflict with the Court’s interpretation of deceptive devices, the Court “did not purport to adopt or apply the unambiguous meaning” of § 10. See Swallows Holding, Ltd. v. Comm’r, 515 F.3d 162, 170 n. 11 (3d Cir.2008); Brand X, 545 U.S. at 982, 125 S.Ct. 2688 (recognizing court must enforce unambiguous contract according to its terms" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nto the merits of the litigation.’ ”) (citation omitted); Hidahl v. Gilpin County Dep’t of Social Servs., 699 F.Supp. 846, 849 (D.Colo.1988) (denying attorney’s fees pursuant to § 1988 where civil rights action dismissed for lack of jurisdiction). Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s grant of attorney’s fees pursuant to § 1988. B. Before the district court, defendants sought sanctions pursuant to Rule 11, rather than attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The district court did not address defendants’ Rule 11 motion. That the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Branson’s complaint does not preclude it from imposing Rule 11 sanctions for filing a frivolous complaint. See Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 138, 112 S.Ct. 1076, 1080-81, 117 L.Ed.2d 280 (1992) (holding that a district court could constitutionally impose rule 11 sanctions in a case in which was later determined that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nto the merits of the litigation.’ ”) (citation omitted); Hidahl v. Gilpin County Dep’t of Social Servs., 699 F.Supp. 846, 849 (D.Colo.1988) (denying attorney’s fees pursuant to § 1988 where civil rights action dismissed for lack of jurisdiction). Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s grant of attorney’s fees pursuant to § 1988. B. Before the district court, defendants sought sanctions pursuant to Rule 11, rather than attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The district court did not address defendants’ Rule 11 motion. That the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Branson’s complaint does not preclude it from imposing Rule 11 sanctions for filing a frivolous complaint. See Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 138, 112 S.Ct. 1076, 1080-81, 117 L.Ed.2d 280 (1992) (holding that an award of sanctions under rule 11 survives despite a later determination that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nto the merits of the litigation.’ ”) (citation omitted); Hidahl v. Gilpin County Dep’t of Social Servs., 699 F.Supp. 846, 849 (D.Colo.1988) (denying attorney’s fees pursuant to § 1988 where civil rights action dismissed for lack of jurisdiction). Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s grant of attorney’s fees pursuant to § 1988. B. Before the district court, defendants sought sanctions pursuant to Rule 11, rather than attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The district court did not address defendants’ Rule 11 motion. That the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Branson’s complaint does not preclude it from imposing Rule 11 sanctions for filing a frivolous complaint. See Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 138, 112 S.Ct. 1076, 1080-81, 117 L.Ed.2d 280 (1992) (holding that rule 11 sanctions imposed by district court remained in effect after case was remanded to state court upon a finding that district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nto the merits of the litigation.’ ”) (citation omitted); Hidahl v. Gilpin County Dep’t of Social Servs., 699 F.Supp. 846, 849 (D.Colo.1988) (denying attorney’s fees pursuant to § 1988 where civil rights action dismissed for lack of jurisdiction). Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s grant of attorney’s fees pursuant to § 1988. B. Before the district court, defendants sought sanctions pursuant to Rule 11, rather than attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The district court did not address defendants’ Rule 11 motion. That the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Branson’s complaint does not preclude it from imposing Rule 11 sanctions for filing a frivolous complaint. See Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 138, 112 S.Ct. 1076, 1080-81, 117 L.Ed.2d 280 (1992) (holding that a district court had jurisdiction to impose rule 11 sanctions regardless of the existence of subjectmatter jurisdiction", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nto the merits of the litigation.’ ”) (citation omitted); Hidahl v. Gilpin County Dep’t of Social Servs., 699 F.Supp. 846, 849 (D.Colo.1988) (denying attorney’s fees pursuant to § 1988 where civil rights action dismissed for lack of jurisdiction). Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s grant of attorney’s fees pursuant to § 1988. B. Before the district court, defendants sought sanctions pursuant to Rule 11, rather than attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The district court did not address defendants’ Rule 11 motion. That the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Branson’s complaint does not preclude it from imposing Rule 11 sanctions for filing a frivolous complaint. See Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 138, 112 S.Ct. 1076, 1080-81, 117 L.Ed.2d 280 (1992) (holding that a district court may impose sanctions for abuse of judicial process pursuant to rule 11 even after it is determined that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs claims" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nadded to the underlying works is protected by copyright.”). The term original means that a writing must have been “independently created by the author ... [and] possess at least some minimal level of creativity.” Feist, 499 U.S. at 345, 111 S.Ct. 1282. However, “the requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice.” Id.; see also Key Publications, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publ’g Enters., Inc., 945 F.2d 509, 512-13 (2d Cir.1991) (“Simply stated, original means not copied, and exhibiting a minimal amount of creativity.”). While a finding of originality is generally a question a of fact for the jury, under these circumstances it may be treated as a matter of law. See CMM Cable Rep Inc. v. Ocean Coast Properties, Inc., 97 F.3d 1504, 1517 (1st Cir.1996) (recognizing a claim for injunctive relief is disposed of when expressly tied to claims dismissed on summary judgment", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nadded to the underlying works is protected by copyright.”). The term original means that a writing must have been “independently created by the author ... [and] possess at least some minimal level of creativity.” Feist, 499 U.S. at 345, 111 S.Ct. 1282. However, “the requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice.” Id.; see also Key Publications, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publ’g Enters., Inc., 945 F.2d 509, 512-13 (2d Cir.1991) (“Simply stated, original means not copied, and exhibiting a minimal amount of creativity.”). While a finding of originality is generally a question a of fact for the jury, under these circumstances it may be treated as a matter of law. See CMM Cable Rep Inc. v. Ocean Coast Properties, Inc., 97 F.3d 1504, 1517 (1st Cir.1996) (holding that affidavit in support of summary judgment may not be based upon factual conclusion or conclusions of law", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nadded to the underlying works is protected by copyright.”). The term original means that a writing must have been “independently created by the author ... [and] possess at least some minimal level of creativity.” Feist, 499 U.S. at 345, 111 S.Ct. 1282. However, “the requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice.” Id.; see also Key Publications, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publ’g Enters., Inc., 945 F.2d 509, 512-13 (2d Cir.1991) (“Simply stated, original means not copied, and exhibiting a minimal amount of creativity.”). While a finding of originality is generally a question a of fact for the jury, under these circumstances it may be treated as a matter of law. See CMM Cable Rep Inc. v. Ocean Coast Properties, Inc., 97 F.3d 1504, 1517 (1st Cir.1996) (holding that summary judgment may be reversed when it is based on an error of law", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nadded to the underlying works is protected by copyright.”). The term original means that a writing must have been “independently created by the author ... [and] possess at least some minimal level of creativity.” Feist, 499 U.S. at 345, 111 S.Ct. 1282. However, “the requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice.” Id.; see also Key Publications, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publ’g Enters., Inc., 945 F.2d 509, 512-13 (2d Cir.1991) (“Simply stated, original means not copied, and exhibiting a minimal amount of creativity.”). While a finding of originality is generally a question a of fact for the jury, under these circumstances it may be treated as a matter of law. See CMM Cable Rep Inc. v. Ocean Coast Properties, Inc., 97 F.3d 1504, 1517 (1st Cir.1996) (holding that evidence in an inadmissible form may be considered at the summary judgment stage as long as the evidence is submitted in an admissible form at trial", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nadded to the underlying works is protected by copyright.”). The term original means that a writing must have been “independently created by the author ... [and] possess at least some minimal level of creativity.” Feist, 499 U.S. at 345, 111 S.Ct. 1282. However, “the requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice.” Id.; see also Key Publications, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publ’g Enters., Inc., 945 F.2d 509, 512-13 (2d Cir.1991) (“Simply stated, original means not copied, and exhibiting a minimal amount of creativity.”). While a finding of originality is generally a question a of fact for the jury, under these circumstances it may be treated as a matter of law. See CMM Cable Rep Inc. v. Ocean Coast Properties, Inc., 97 F.3d 1504, 1517 (1st Cir.1996) (holding that where there is insufficient evidence to permit a reasonable factual finding of originality the question may be disposed of as an issue of law at summary judgment" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n‘either knew, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, that [he or she] had a claim.’ ” 2013 WL 717755, at *6 (quoting Izaak Walton League of Am., Inc. v. Kimbell, 558 F.3d 751, 759 (8th Cir.2009)). However, as discussed herein, Congress manifested a different intent for the applicable statute of limitations period for 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a). The Court disagrees with Plaintiff that by amending subsection (b), and not subsection (a), “Congress was silent on the discovery or injury-occurrence rule.” (Pl.’s Resp. to Defs. at 28 n. 3 [Doc. No. 13].) In fact, in TRW Inc., the Supreme Court stated that a directive from Congress need not be explicit — it may also be implied from the text or structure of a particular statute. TRW Inc., 534 U.S. at 27-28, 122 S.Ct. 441 (holding that while as a general matter discovery should be freely permitted j jurisdictional discovery is justified only if the plaintiff reasonably demonstrates that it can supplement its jurisdictional allegations through discovery", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n‘either knew, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, that [he or she] had a claim.’ ” 2013 WL 717755, at *6 (quoting Izaak Walton League of Am., Inc. v. Kimbell, 558 F.3d 751, 759 (8th Cir.2009)). However, as discussed herein, Congress manifested a different intent for the applicable statute of limitations period for 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a). The Court disagrees with Plaintiff that by amending subsection (b), and not subsection (a), “Congress was silent on the discovery or injury-occurrence rule.” (Pl.’s Resp. to Defs. at 28 n. 3 [Doc. No. 13].) In fact, in TRW Inc., the Supreme Court stated that a directive from Congress need not be explicit — it may also be implied from the text or structure of a particular statute. TRW Inc., 534 U.S. at 27-28, 122 S.Ct. 441 (recognizing without explicitly affirming the general rule", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n‘either knew, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, that [he or she] had a claim.’ ” 2013 WL 717755, at *6 (quoting Izaak Walton League of Am., Inc. v. Kimbell, 558 F.3d 751, 759 (8th Cir.2009)). However, as discussed herein, Congress manifested a different intent for the applicable statute of limitations period for 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a). The Court disagrees with Plaintiff that by amending subsection (b), and not subsection (a), “Congress was silent on the discovery or injury-occurrence rule.” (Pl.’s Resp. to Defs. at 28 n. 3 [Doc. No. 13].) In fact, in TRW Inc., the Supreme Court stated that a directive from Congress need not be explicit — it may also be implied from the text or structure of a particular statute. TRW Inc., 534 U.S. at 27-28, 122 S.Ct. 441 (holding that the more transformative the new work the more likely the use of the old work is a fair one", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n‘either knew, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, that [he or she] had a claim.’ ” 2013 WL 717755, at *6 (quoting Izaak Walton League of Am., Inc. v. Kimbell, 558 F.3d 751, 759 (8th Cir.2009)). However, as discussed herein, Congress manifested a different intent for the applicable statute of limitations period for 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a). The Court disagrees with Plaintiff that by amending subsection (b), and not subsection (a), “Congress was silent on the discovery or injury-occurrence rule.” (Pl.’s Resp. to Defs. at 28 n. 3 [Doc. No. 13].) In fact, in TRW Inc., the Supreme Court stated that a directive from Congress need not be explicit — it may also be implied from the text or structure of a particular statute. TRW Inc., 534 U.S. at 27-28, 122 S.Ct. 441 (holding that the text and structure of the fair credit reporting act fcra demonstrates that congress implicitly excluded a general discovery rule by explicitly including a more limited one", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n‘either knew, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, that [he or she] had a claim.’ ” 2013 WL 717755, at *6 (quoting Izaak Walton League of Am., Inc. v. Kimbell, 558 F.3d 751, 759 (8th Cir.2009)). However, as discussed herein, Congress manifested a different intent for the applicable statute of limitations period for 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a). The Court disagrees with Plaintiff that by amending subsection (b), and not subsection (a), “Congress was silent on the discovery or injury-occurrence rule.” (Pl.’s Resp. to Defs. at 28 n. 3 [Doc. No. 13].) In fact, in TRW Inc., the Supreme Court stated that a directive from Congress need not be explicit — it may also be implied from the text or structure of a particular statute. TRW Inc., 534 U.S. at 27-28, 122 S.Ct. 441 (recognizing general rule" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nSupreme Court concluded in Bell that strip searches were not per se unreasonable and could be performed in conformity with the Fourth Amendment on less than probable cause in some instances. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 559-560, 99 S.Ct. at 1884-85. In order to determine the reasonableness of the search and the instances requiring less than probable cause, the Supreme Court set out the following test: The test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application. In each case it requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails. Courts must consider the scope L.Ed.2d 479 (1985); Tinetti v. Wittke, 620 F.2d 160 (7th Cir.1980), aff'g, 479 F.Supp. 486 (E.D.Wis.1979) (holding that mandatory visual strip search policy in county jail was unconstitutional", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nSupreme Court concluded in Bell that strip searches were not per se unreasonable and could be performed in conformity with the Fourth Amendment on less than probable cause in some instances. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 559-560, 99 S.Ct. at 1884-85. In order to determine the reasonableness of the search and the instances requiring less than probable cause, the Supreme Court set out the following test: The test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application. In each case it requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails. Courts must consider the scope L.Ed.2d 479 (1985); Tinetti v. Wittke, 620 F.2d 160 (7th Cir.1980), aff'g, 479 F.Supp. 486 (E.D.Wis.1979) (holding that arrestees for minor offenses may be subjected to a strip search only if jail officials have probable cause to believe that arrestees are concealing weapons or contraband", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nSupreme Court concluded in Bell that strip searches were not per se unreasonable and could be performed in conformity with the Fourth Amendment on less than probable cause in some instances. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 559-560, 99 S.Ct. at 1884-85. In order to determine the reasonableness of the search and the instances requiring less than probable cause, the Supreme Court set out the following test: The test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application. In each case it requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails. Courts must consider the scope L.Ed.2d 479 (1985); Tinetti v. Wittke, 620 F.2d 160 (7th Cir.1980), aff'g, 479 F.Supp. 486 (E.D.Wis.1979) (holding unconstitutional blanket jail policy of subjecting all arrestees to strip and visual body cavity searches", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nSupreme Court concluded in Bell that strip searches were not per se unreasonable and could be performed in conformity with the Fourth Amendment on less than probable cause in some instances. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 559-560, 99 S.Ct. at 1884-85. In order to determine the reasonableness of the search and the instances requiring less than probable cause, the Supreme Court set out the following test: The test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application. In each case it requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails. Courts must consider the scope L.Ed.2d 479 (1985); Tinetti v. Wittke, 620 F.2d 160 (7th Cir.1980), aff'g, 479 F.Supp. 486 (E.D.Wis.1979) (holding that police may search containers whether open or closed located within arrestees reach", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nSupreme Court concluded in Bell that strip searches were not per se unreasonable and could be performed in conformity with the Fourth Amendment on less than probable cause in some instances. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 559-560, 99 S.Ct. at 1884-85. In order to determine the reasonableness of the search and the instances requiring less than probable cause, the Supreme Court set out the following test: The test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application. In each case it requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails. Courts must consider the scope L.Ed.2d 479 (1985); Tinetti v. Wittke, 620 F.2d 160 (7th Cir.1980), aff'g, 479 F.Supp. 486 (E.D.Wis.1979) (holding that mandatory routine visual strip search policy for all arrestees who were to be introduced into general jail population was constitutional" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nfor providing compensated lawyers where the defendant cannot afford to compensate counsel himself eliminates the opportunity for such extraneous influences on criminal proceedings. Nor was the district court entitled to rely on Rivera-Corona’s statement during his plea colloquy that he was satisfied with Marchi’s representation. According to Rivera-Corona, Marchi demanded money that his client presumably did not have as a condition of going to trial, and was prepared to “prosecute” — presumably sue— Rivera-Corona’s family if he didn’t pay it. If true, these facts could support a motion to set aside his plea, as Rivera-Corona’s statement of satisfaction with Marchi at the colloquy could be explained by the same facts. See United States v. Gonzalez, 113 F.3d 1026, 1028 (9th Cir.1997) (holding that the plaintiffs evidence that his back injury precluded him from performing at least 50 of the jobs previously available to him was enough to classify him as disabled under the ada", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nfor providing compensated lawyers where the defendant cannot afford to compensate counsel himself eliminates the opportunity for such extraneous influences on criminal proceedings. Nor was the district court entitled to rely on Rivera-Corona’s statement during his plea colloquy that he was satisfied with Marchi’s representation. According to Rivera-Corona, Marchi demanded money that his client presumably did not have as a condition of going to trial, and was prepared to “prosecute” — presumably sue— Rivera-Corona’s family if he didn’t pay it. If true, these facts could support a motion to set aside his plea, as Rivera-Corona’s statement of satisfaction with Marchi at the colloquy could be explained by the same facts. See United States v. Gonzalez, 113 F.3d 1026, 1028 (9th Cir.1997) (holding no coercion where counsel told movant his conviction was likely because movant stated he understood full range of punishment and no one threatened him to plead guilty", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nfor providing compensated lawyers where the defendant cannot afford to compensate counsel himself eliminates the opportunity for such extraneous influences on criminal proceedings. Nor was the district court entitled to rely on Rivera-Corona’s statement during his plea colloquy that he was satisfied with Marchi’s representation. According to Rivera-Corona, Marchi demanded money that his client presumably did not have as a condition of going to trial, and was prepared to “prosecute” — presumably sue— Rivera-Corona’s family if he didn’t pay it. If true, these facts could support a motion to set aside his plea, as Rivera-Corona’s statement of satisfaction with Marchi at the colloquy could be explained by the same facts. See United States v. Gonzalez, 113 F.3d 1026, 1028 (9th Cir.1997) (holding that the movant failed to establish that plea counsel coerced him to plead guilty to avoid taking the case to trial", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nfor providing compensated lawyers where the defendant cannot afford to compensate counsel himself eliminates the opportunity for such extraneous influences on criminal proceedings. Nor was the district court entitled to rely on Rivera-Corona’s statement during his plea colloquy that he was satisfied with Marchi’s representation. According to Rivera-Corona, Marchi demanded money that his client presumably did not have as a condition of going to trial, and was prepared to “prosecute” — presumably sue— Rivera-Corona’s family if he didn’t pay it. If true, these facts could support a motion to set aside his plea, as Rivera-Corona’s statement of satisfaction with Marchi at the colloquy could be explained by the same facts. See United States v. Gonzalez, 113 F.3d 1026, 1028 (9th Cir.1997) (holding the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendants motion to withdraw his guilty plea because the defendant did not admit to facts demonstrating the required mental state", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nfor providing compensated lawyers where the defendant cannot afford to compensate counsel himself eliminates the opportunity for such extraneous influences on criminal proceedings. Nor was the district court entitled to rely on Rivera-Corona’s statement during his plea colloquy that he was satisfied with Marchi’s representation. According to Rivera-Corona, Marchi demanded money that his client presumably did not have as a condition of going to trial, and was prepared to “prosecute” — presumably sue— Rivera-Corona’s family if he didn’t pay it. If true, these facts could support a motion to set aside his plea, as Rivera-Corona’s statement of satisfaction with Marchi at the colloquy could be explained by the same facts. See United States v. Gonzalez, 113 F.3d 1026, 1028 (9th Cir.1997) (holding that the trial court abused its discretion in denying a motion to substitute counsel on the strength of gonzalezs sworn responses at the pleataking that no one was threatening him or forcing him to plead where the defendant alleged that his attorney forced him to plead guilty and threatened him if he did not take the plea" ]