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[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nevidence was admissible under Rule 404(b) as proof of the identification, intent, and modus operandi of defendant. The trial court expressly limited the admission of the evidence of the subsequent rape in instructions to the jury both before the tender of the evidence and in its final mandate to the jury immediately prior to their deliberations. As the evidence of the subsequent rape was admitted in part to show intent and modus operandi of defendant, remoteness in time of the second act is less important to its admissibility. Id. As defendant concedes, this Court has upheld the admission of evidence under Rule 404(b) where the crimes] wrongs, or acts occurred after the offenses for which a defendant was on trial. State v. Hutchinson, 139 N.C. App. 132, 136, 532 S.E.2d 569, 572 (2000) (holding that evidence of gang involvement was properly admitted to prove motive for participating in the alleged crimes", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nevidence was admissible under Rule 404(b) as proof of the identification, intent, and modus operandi of defendant. The trial court expressly limited the admission of the evidence of the subsequent rape in instructions to the jury both before the tender of the evidence and in its final mandate to the jury immediately prior to their deliberations. As the evidence of the subsequent rape was admitted in part to show intent and modus operandi of defendant, remoteness in time of the second act is less important to its admissibility. Id. As defendant concedes, this Court has upheld the admission of evidence under Rule 404(b) where the crimes] wrongs, or acts occurred after the offenses for which a defendant was on trial. State v. Hutchinson, 139 N.C. App. 132, 136, 532 S.E.2d 569, 572 (2000) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to accept the defendants guilty pleas to two counts of the indictment and stating that even if the trial court erred the error had not prejudiced the defendant because he was found guilty by the jury of the charges to which he intended to plead and the evidence of the other crimes would have been admissible in the trial for the first degree murder charge", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nevidence was admissible under Rule 404(b) as proof of the identification, intent, and modus operandi of defendant. The trial court expressly limited the admission of the evidence of the subsequent rape in instructions to the jury both before the tender of the evidence and in its final mandate to the jury immediately prior to their deliberations. As the evidence of the subsequent rape was admitted in part to show intent and modus operandi of defendant, remoteness in time of the second act is less important to its admissibility. Id. As defendant concedes, this Court has upheld the admission of evidence under Rule 404(b) where the crimes] wrongs, or acts occurred after the offenses for which a defendant was on trial. State v. Hutchinson, 139 N.C. App. 132, 136, 532 S.E.2d 569, 572 (2000) (holding trial court improperly instructed jury in trial for possession of cocaine base with intent to distribute that evidence of defendants similar acts of possession was admissible to show motive where motive was not element of crime charged and defendant did not contest motive", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nevidence was admissible under Rule 404(b) as proof of the identification, intent, and modus operandi of defendant. The trial court expressly limited the admission of the evidence of the subsequent rape in instructions to the jury both before the tender of the evidence and in its final mandate to the jury immediately prior to their deliberations. As the evidence of the subsequent rape was admitted in part to show intent and modus operandi of defendant, remoteness in time of the second act is less important to its admissibility. Id. As defendant concedes, this Court has upheld the admission of evidence under Rule 404(b) where the crimes] wrongs, or acts occurred after the offenses for which a defendant was on trial. State v. Hutchinson, 139 N.C. App. 132, 136, 532 S.E.2d 569, 572 (2000) (holding the trial court properly admitted evidence of defendants subsequent conduct in determining whether he possessed the intent and motive for the first degree burglary charge", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nevidence was admissible under Rule 404(b) as proof of the identification, intent, and modus operandi of defendant. The trial court expressly limited the admission of the evidence of the subsequent rape in instructions to the jury both before the tender of the evidence and in its final mandate to the jury immediately prior to their deliberations. As the evidence of the subsequent rape was admitted in part to show intent and modus operandi of defendant, remoteness in time of the second act is less important to its admissibility. Id. As defendant concedes, this Court has upheld the admission of evidence under Rule 404(b) where the crimes] wrongs, or acts occurred after the offenses for which a defendant was on trial. State v. Hutchinson, 139 N.C. App. 132, 136, 532 S.E.2d 569, 572 (2000) (holding that motive is circumstantial evidence of intent" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nbars relitigation of an issue if: (1) the issue sought to be p ration of orders to provide installments of a fixed amount, rendering the party's overall exposure a direct consequence of the order's duration. See, eg., Ferris v. Hawkins, 135 Ariz. 329, 660 P.2d 1256, 1259 (App.1983) (noting marked difference in available remedies where one was limited in compensation and duration and the other posed much greater degree of liability with long term consequences). Although the incentive to vigorously defend might be artificially created by the operation of collateral estoppel principles, augmenting a party's incentive to litigate in the first instance would undermine the very purpose behind permitting t ication of workers' compensation benefits. See\" Messina, 874 P.2d at 1066 n. 13 (holding that legislature clearly intended that workers compensation act and unemployment security act be construed together thus prohibiting worker from receiving both unemployment compensation and workers compensation payments for same period", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nbars relitigation of an issue if: (1) the issue sought to be p ration of orders to provide installments of a fixed amount, rendering the party's overall exposure a direct consequence of the order's duration. See, eg., Ferris v. Hawkins, 135 Ariz. 329, 660 P.2d 1256, 1259 (App.1983) (noting marked difference in available remedies where one was limited in compensation and duration and the other posed much greater degree of liability with long term consequences). Although the incentive to vigorously defend might be artificially created by the operation of collateral estoppel principles, augmenting a party's incentive to litigate in the first instance would undermine the very purpose behind permitting t ication of workers' compensation benefits. See\" Messina, 874 P.2d at 1066 n. 13 (holding collateral estoppel elements met considering changed circumstances in the context of an exception to the general rule of collateral estoppel", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nbars relitigation of an issue if: (1) the issue sought to be p ration of orders to provide installments of a fixed amount, rendering the party's overall exposure a direct consequence of the order's duration. See, eg., Ferris v. Hawkins, 135 Ariz. 329, 660 P.2d 1256, 1259 (App.1983) (noting marked difference in available remedies where one was limited in compensation and duration and the other posed much greater degree of liability with long term consequences). Although the incentive to vigorously defend might be artificially created by the operation of collateral estoppel principles, augmenting a party's incentive to litigate in the first instance would undermine the very purpose behind permitting t ication of workers' compensation benefits. See\" Messina, 874 P.2d at 1066 n. 13 (recognizing the doctrine of collateral estoppel in agency proceedings", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nbars relitigation of an issue if: (1) the issue sought to be p ration of orders to provide installments of a fixed amount, rendering the party's overall exposure a direct consequence of the order's duration. See, eg., Ferris v. Hawkins, 135 Ariz. 329, 660 P.2d 1256, 1259 (App.1983) (noting marked difference in available remedies where one was limited in compensation and duration and the other posed much greater degree of liability with long term consequences). Although the incentive to vigorously defend might be artificially created by the operation of collateral estoppel principles, augmenting a party's incentive to litigate in the first instance would undermine the very purpose behind permitting t ication of workers' compensation benefits. See\" Messina, 874 P.2d at 1066 n. 13 (recognizing that rationale underlying inapplicability of collateral estoppel to unemployment hearings is useful when analyzing same doctrine in workers compensation cases", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nbars relitigation of an issue if: (1) the issue sought to be p ration of orders to provide installments of a fixed amount, rendering the party's overall exposure a direct consequence of the order's duration. See, eg., Ferris v. Hawkins, 135 Ariz. 329, 660 P.2d 1256, 1259 (App.1983) (noting marked difference in available remedies where one was limited in compensation and duration and the other posed much greater degree of liability with long term consequences). Although the incentive to vigorously defend might be artificially created by the operation of collateral estoppel principles, augmenting a party's incentive to litigate in the first instance would undermine the very purpose behind permitting t ication of workers' compensation benefits. See\" Messina, 874 P.2d at 1066 n. 13 (holding that pursuant to statute unemployment benefits must be offset against workers compensation payments" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nburden is on Cig-na to demonstrate “constitutionally significant inconvenience[.]” Id.; see also id. (“Because we conclude that the First American defendants have not demonstrated any constitutionally significant inconvenience, we find no infringement of their individual liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”). None of the evidence presented by Cigna conforms to this Fifth Amendment framework. Rather, Cigna offers only proof related to its lack of contacts with Alabama, but this type of evidence is essentially meaningless when the federal statute bestowing this court with federal question jurisdiction contains a nationwide service of process provision, such as ERISA does. See Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Arnold, 809 F.2d 1520, 1522-23 (11th Cir.1987) (holding that 1132e2 allows for nationwide service of process and thus jurisdiction and that the nationwide service of process provision comports with the constitution", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nburden is on Cig-na to demonstrate “constitutionally significant inconvenience[.]” Id.; see also id. (“Because we conclude that the First American defendants have not demonstrated any constitutionally significant inconvenience, we find no infringement of their individual liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”). None of the evidence presented by Cigna conforms to this Fifth Amendment framework. Rather, Cigna offers only proof related to its lack of contacts with Alabama, but this type of evidence is essentially meaningless when the federal statute bestowing this court with federal question jurisdiction contains a nationwide service of process provision, such as ERISA does. See Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Arnold, 809 F.2d 1520, 1522-23 (11th Cir.1987) (recognizing that although provision of municipal service is not fundamental right inequitable provision of that service is subject to equal protection analysis", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nburden is on Cig-na to demonstrate “constitutionally significant inconvenience[.]” Id.; see also id. (“Because we conclude that the First American defendants have not demonstrated any constitutionally significant inconvenience, we find no infringement of their individual liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”). None of the evidence presented by Cigna conforms to this Fifth Amendment framework. Rather, Cigna offers only proof related to its lack of contacts with Alabama, but this type of evidence is essentially meaningless when the federal statute bestowing this court with federal question jurisdiction contains a nationwide service of process provision, such as ERISA does. See Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Arnold, 809 F.2d 1520, 1522-23 (11th Cir.1987) (recognizing that erisas venue provision can provide broad access to the federal courts and clarifying that nationwide service of process is available only if the suit is an action under this subchapter emphasis in original quoting 29 usc 1132e2", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nburden is on Cig-na to demonstrate “constitutionally significant inconvenience[.]” Id.; see also id. (“Because we conclude that the First American defendants have not demonstrated any constitutionally significant inconvenience, we find no infringement of their individual liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”). None of the evidence presented by Cigna conforms to this Fifth Amendment framework. Rather, Cigna offers only proof related to its lack of contacts with Alabama, but this type of evidence is essentially meaningless when the federal statute bestowing this court with federal question jurisdiction contains a nationwide service of process provision, such as ERISA does. See Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Arnold, 809 F.2d 1520, 1522-23 (11th Cir.1987) (recognizing that it is well settled law that an action is commenced by the service of a summons and without valid service of process the trial court has no jurisdiction to act", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nburden is on Cig-na to demonstrate “constitutionally significant inconvenience[.]” Id.; see also id. (“Because we conclude that the First American defendants have not demonstrated any constitutionally significant inconvenience, we find no infringement of their individual liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”). None of the evidence presented by Cigna conforms to this Fifth Amendment framework. Rather, Cigna offers only proof related to its lack of contacts with Alabama, but this type of evidence is essentially meaningless when the federal statute bestowing this court with federal question jurisdiction contains a nationwide service of process provision, such as ERISA does. See Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Arnold, 809 F.2d 1520, 1522-23 (11th Cir.1987) (holding that ricos nationwide service of process provision did not authorize service outside the united states" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nwith the great weight of authority, with the rule of the Restatement of the Law of Contracts, and with the views of eminent text-writers.” Id. (citations omitted). Juxtaposed to this authority, we have a competing concern — the ability of parties to fully and finally resolve disputes between them. Parties should be able to bargain for and execute a release barring all further dispute. This principle necessarily contemplates that parties may disclaim rebanee on representations. And such a disclaimer, where the parties’ intent is clear and specific, should be effective to negate a fraudulent inducement claim. As an example, a disclaimer of reliance may conclusively negate the element of reliance, which is essential to a fraudulent inducement claim. See Prudential, 896 S.W.2d at 161-62 (holding that agreement to buy property as is in which buyer included voluntary freely negotiated affirmation that he was depending on his own assessment of the building precluded claim for damages when building was found to contain asbestos", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nwith the great weight of authority, with the rule of the Restatement of the Law of Contracts, and with the views of eminent text-writers.” Id. (citations omitted). Juxtaposed to this authority, we have a competing concern — the ability of parties to fully and finally resolve disputes between them. Parties should be able to bargain for and execute a release barring all further dispute. This principle necessarily contemplates that parties may disclaim rebanee on representations. And such a disclaimer, where the parties’ intent is clear and specific, should be effective to negate a fraudulent inducement claim. As an example, a disclaimer of reliance may conclusively negate the element of reliance, which is essential to a fraudulent inducement claim. See Prudential, 896 S.W.2d at 161-62 (holding that while the complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations it must contain more than a formulaic recitation of the elements of a claim and must state a claim that is plausible on its face", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nwith the great weight of authority, with the rule of the Restatement of the Law of Contracts, and with the views of eminent text-writers.” Id. (citations omitted). Juxtaposed to this authority, we have a competing concern — the ability of parties to fully and finally resolve disputes between them. Parties should be able to bargain for and execute a release barring all further dispute. This principle necessarily contemplates that parties may disclaim rebanee on representations. And such a disclaimer, where the parties’ intent is clear and specific, should be effective to negate a fraudulent inducement claim. As an example, a disclaimer of reliance may conclusively negate the element of reliance, which is essential to a fraudulent inducement claim. See Prudential, 896 S.W.2d at 161-62 (holding that to be adequate a complaint must contain a statement of facts on which a claim is based showing that the pleader is entitled to relief", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nwith the great weight of authority, with the rule of the Restatement of the Law of Contracts, and with the views of eminent text-writers.” Id. (citations omitted). Juxtaposed to this authority, we have a competing concern — the ability of parties to fully and finally resolve disputes between them. Parties should be able to bargain for and execute a release barring all further dispute. This principle necessarily contemplates that parties may disclaim rebanee on representations. And such a disclaimer, where the parties’ intent is clear and specific, should be effective to negate a fraudulent inducement claim. As an example, a disclaimer of reliance may conclusively negate the element of reliance, which is essential to a fraudulent inducement claim. See Prudential, 896 S.W.2d at 161-62 (holding that lay testimony as to the presence of asbestos in the workplace which was based upon personal knowledge of employees was properly admitted", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nwith the great weight of authority, with the rule of the Restatement of the Law of Contracts, and with the views of eminent text-writers.” Id. (citations omitted). Juxtaposed to this authority, we have a competing concern — the ability of parties to fully and finally resolve disputes between them. Parties should be able to bargain for and execute a release barring all further dispute. This principle necessarily contemplates that parties may disclaim rebanee on representations. And such a disclaimer, where the parties’ intent is clear and specific, should be effective to negate a fraudulent inducement claim. As an example, a disclaimer of reliance may conclusively negate the element of reliance, which is essential to a fraudulent inducement claim. See Prudential, 896 S.W.2d at 161-62 (holding that pennsylvanias full judicial review of a denied building permit is adequate process" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nof emotional distress claim beyond those asserted above, namely BANA’s failure to provide her with proper notice of the foreclosure. The trial court did not err in concluding that she “failed to allege any acts by [BANA] that were extreme and outrageous or that her emotional distress was so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it.” Thompson-El v. Bank of America, 327 Ga. App. at 313 (3). Consequently, the grant of judgment on the pleadings as to this claim was proper. See id. (affirming dismissal of plaintiff’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress based upon bank’s foreclosure, allegedly without her knowledge, and subsequent attempts to remove her from the property); Racette v. Bank of America, 318 Ga. App. 171, 179 (3) (733 SE2d 457) (2012) (holding that a failure to comply with the foreclosure statutes invalidates a foreclosure sale", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nof emotional distress claim beyond those asserted above, namely BANA’s failure to provide her with proper notice of the foreclosure. The trial court did not err in concluding that she “failed to allege any acts by [BANA] that were extreme and outrageous or that her emotional distress was so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it.” Thompson-El v. Bank of America, 327 Ga. App. at 313 (3). Consequently, the grant of judgment on the pleadings as to this claim was proper. See id. (affirming dismissal of plaintiff’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress based upon bank’s foreclosure, allegedly without her knowledge, and subsequent attempts to remove her from the property); Racette v. Bank of America, 318 Ga. App. 171, 179 (3) (733 SE2d 457) (2012) (holding that after a judgment entry grants a decree of foreclosure and order of sale the foreclosure action cannot be dismissed as the judgment is final", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nof emotional distress claim beyond those asserted above, namely BANA’s failure to provide her with proper notice of the foreclosure. The trial court did not err in concluding that she “failed to allege any acts by [BANA] that were extreme and outrageous or that her emotional distress was so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it.” Thompson-El v. Bank of America, 327 Ga. App. at 313 (3). Consequently, the grant of judgment on the pleadings as to this claim was proper. See id. (affirming dismissal of plaintiff’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress based upon bank’s foreclosure, allegedly without her knowledge, and subsequent attempts to remove her from the property); Racette v. Bank of America, 318 Ga. App. 171, 179 (3) (733 SE2d 457) (2012) (holding that in contrast to foreclosure of a mortgage secured by personal property foreclosure of real property under a deed of trust need hot be at a commercially reasonable sale and the failure to conduct a commercially reasonable foreclosure sale of real property is not actionable", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nof emotional distress claim beyond those asserted above, namely BANA’s failure to provide her with proper notice of the foreclosure. The trial court did not err in concluding that she “failed to allege any acts by [BANA] that were extreme and outrageous or that her emotional distress was so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it.” Thompson-El v. Bank of America, 327 Ga. App. at 313 (3). Consequently, the grant of judgment on the pleadings as to this claim was proper. See id. (affirming dismissal of plaintiff’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress based upon bank’s foreclosure, allegedly without her knowledge, and subsequent attempts to remove her from the property); Racette v. Bank of America, 318 Ga. App. 171, 179 (3) (733 SE2d 457) (2012) (holding that debtors allegation that mortgage holder failed to provide him with the statutorily required notice of foreclosure was sufficient to state a claim for wrongful foreclosure", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nof emotional distress claim beyond those asserted above, namely BANA’s failure to provide her with proper notice of the foreclosure. The trial court did not err in concluding that she “failed to allege any acts by [BANA] that were extreme and outrageous or that her emotional distress was so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it.” Thompson-El v. Bank of America, 327 Ga. App. at 313 (3). Consequently, the grant of judgment on the pleadings as to this claim was proper. See id. (affirming dismissal of plaintiff’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress based upon bank’s foreclosure, allegedly without her knowledge, and subsequent attempts to remove her from the property); Racette v. Bank of America, 318 Ga. App. 171, 179 (3) (733 SE2d 457) (2012) (holding that appellants allegation that creditor conducted foreclosure sale despite knowing of inaccuracies in the published foreclosure advertisements cannot be described as extreme outrageous atrocious intolerable or beyond the bounds of decency" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n3553(e)[,] asserting the defendant’s substantial assistance to the Government; or (2) the defendant meets the “safety valve” criteria set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f).’ Otherwise, post-Booker sentencing courts lack discretion to depart below relevant statutory mínimums.” In this case, the gov 606, 2008 WL 946065 (5th Cir.2008) (noting that alleged violations of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment are subject to harmless error analysis). 4 . Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 189, 107 S.Ct. 1714, 95 L.Ed.2d 162 (1987) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. VI). 5 . Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354. 6 . Id. at 51, 124 S.Ct. 1354. 7 . Id. at 53, 124 S.Ct. 1354. 8 . Id. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354. 9 . See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135-36, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968) (holding that lesser sentence imposed on codefendant did not constitute abuse of discretion where defendant was sentenced within the statutory and guideline range and where codefendant received reduction for acceptance of responsibility and for being a minimal participant", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n3553(e)[,] asserting the defendant’s substantial assistance to the Government; or (2) the defendant meets the “safety valve” criteria set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f).’ Otherwise, post-Booker sentencing courts lack discretion to depart below relevant statutory mínimums.” In this case, the gov 606, 2008 WL 946065 (5th Cir.2008) (noting that alleged violations of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment are subject to harmless error analysis). 4 . Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 189, 107 S.Ct. 1714, 95 L.Ed.2d 162 (1987) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. VI). 5 . Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354. 6 . Id. at 51, 124 S.Ct. 1354. 7 . Id. at 53, 124 S.Ct. 1354. 8 . Id. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354. 9 . See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135-36, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968) (holding that a defendants sixth amendment confrontation clause rights are violated when a court admits into evidence an incriminating statement given by a nontestifying codefendant", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n3553(e)[,] asserting the defendant’s substantial assistance to the Government; or (2) the defendant meets the “safety valve” criteria set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f).’ Otherwise, post-Booker sentencing courts lack discretion to depart below relevant statutory mínimums.” In this case, the gov 606, 2008 WL 946065 (5th Cir.2008) (noting that alleged violations of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment are subject to harmless error analysis). 4 . Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 189, 107 S.Ct. 1714, 95 L.Ed.2d 162 (1987) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. VI). 5 . Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354. 6 . Id. at 51, 124 S.Ct. 1354. 7 . Id. at 53, 124 S.Ct. 1354. 8 . Id. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354. 9 . See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135-36, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968) (holding that admission of a postal inspectors testimony about an oral confession by a defendants codefendant violated the defendants sixth amendment right to crossexamine his codefendant who was unavailable because the codefendant asserted his right not to testify", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n3553(e)[,] asserting the defendant’s substantial assistance to the Government; or (2) the defendant meets the “safety valve” criteria set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f).’ Otherwise, post-Booker sentencing courts lack discretion to depart below relevant statutory mínimums.” In this case, the gov 606, 2008 WL 946065 (5th Cir.2008) (noting that alleged violations of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment are subject to harmless error analysis). 4 . Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 189, 107 S.Ct. 1714, 95 L.Ed.2d 162 (1987) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. VI). 5 . Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354. 6 . Id. at 51, 124 S.Ct. 1354. 7 . Id. at 53, 124 S.Ct. 1354. 8 . Id. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354. 9 . See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135-36, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968) (holding that the defendants allegations that his codefendant admitted that the defendant had no role in the robbery and that the codefendant had not testified on the defendants behalf because he had been coerced by the state were sufficient to state a prima facie claim of newly discovered evidence", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n3553(e)[,] asserting the defendant’s substantial assistance to the Government; or (2) the defendant meets the “safety valve” criteria set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f).’ Otherwise, post-Booker sentencing courts lack discretion to depart below relevant statutory mínimums.” In this case, the gov 606, 2008 WL 946065 (5th Cir.2008) (noting that alleged violations of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment are subject to harmless error analysis). 4 . Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 189, 107 S.Ct. 1714, 95 L.Ed.2d 162 (1987) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. VI). 5 . Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354. 6 . Id. at 51, 124 S.Ct. 1354. 7 . Id. at 53, 124 S.Ct. 1354. 8 . Id. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354. 9 . See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135-36, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968) (holding that the admission of a pretrial confession of a nontestifying codefendant that incriminates the defendant violates that defendants right to confront witnesses even if a limiting instruction is given" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nmotions are rendered moot by the dismissal of the appeal. While the request for posteonviction relief filed by Barnes was timely filed in accordance with Rule 37.2(c), which requires that, when a petitioner entered a plea of guilty, a petition under the Rule must be filed in the trial court within ninety days of the date of entry of judgment, the request for postconviction relief filed by Barnes was not properly verified. For that reason, it was subject to dismissal by the trial court. Keck v. State, 2013 Ark. 139, at 5, 2013 WL 1385240 (per curiam). Barnes could not circumvent the requirement that a [.¡petition for postconviction relief be verified by labeling his petition as a motion to retract his guilty plea. See Lambert v. State, 2012 Ark. 310, at 2, 2012 WL 3373199 (per curiam) (holding that because the petitioner had already filed a rule 371 petition he was barred from submitting a subsequent petition under that rule and his petition was subject to dismissal on that basis regardless of the label he placed on it", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nmotions are rendered moot by the dismissal of the appeal. While the request for posteonviction relief filed by Barnes was timely filed in accordance with Rule 37.2(c), which requires that, when a petitioner entered a plea of guilty, a petition under the Rule must be filed in the trial court within ninety days of the date of entry of judgment, the request for postconviction relief filed by Barnes was not properly verified. For that reason, it was subject to dismissal by the trial court. Keck v. State, 2013 Ark. 139, at 5, 2013 WL 1385240 (per curiam). Barnes could not circumvent the requirement that a [.¡petition for postconviction relief be verified by labeling his petition as a motion to retract his guilty plea. See Lambert v. State, 2012 Ark. 310, at 2, 2012 WL 3373199 (per curiam) (holding that appellate courts may not on appeal from the dismissal of a rule 32 petition consider claims not raised in the rule 32 petition", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nmotions are rendered moot by the dismissal of the appeal. While the request for posteonviction relief filed by Barnes was timely filed in accordance with Rule 37.2(c), which requires that, when a petitioner entered a plea of guilty, a petition under the Rule must be filed in the trial court within ninety days of the date of entry of judgment, the request for postconviction relief filed by Barnes was not properly verified. For that reason, it was subject to dismissal by the trial court. Keck v. State, 2013 Ark. 139, at 5, 2013 WL 1385240 (per curiam). Barnes could not circumvent the requirement that a [.¡petition for postconviction relief be verified by labeling his petition as a motion to retract his guilty plea. See Lambert v. State, 2012 Ark. 310, at 2, 2012 WL 3373199 (per curiam) (holding that a petition to correct sentence was properly considered as a petition for postconviction relief pursuant to rule 371 because it challenged a judgment entered on a plea of guilty on grounds cognizable under the rule", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nmotions are rendered moot by the dismissal of the appeal. While the request for posteonviction relief filed by Barnes was timely filed in accordance with Rule 37.2(c), which requires that, when a petitioner entered a plea of guilty, a petition under the Rule must be filed in the trial court within ninety days of the date of entry of judgment, the request for postconviction relief filed by Barnes was not properly verified. For that reason, it was subject to dismissal by the trial court. Keck v. State, 2013 Ark. 139, at 5, 2013 WL 1385240 (per curiam). Barnes could not circumvent the requirement that a [.¡petition for postconviction relief be verified by labeling his petition as a motion to retract his guilty plea. See Lambert v. State, 2012 Ark. 310, at 2, 2012 WL 3373199 (per curiam) (holding that appellate courts may not on appeal from the dismissal of a rule 32 petition consider claims not raise in the rule 32 petition", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nmotions are rendered moot by the dismissal of the appeal. While the request for posteonviction relief filed by Barnes was timely filed in accordance with Rule 37.2(c), which requires that, when a petitioner entered a plea of guilty, a petition under the Rule must be filed in the trial court within ninety days of the date of entry of judgment, the request for postconviction relief filed by Barnes was not properly verified. For that reason, it was subject to dismissal by the trial court. Keck v. State, 2013 Ark. 139, at 5, 2013 WL 1385240 (per curiam). Barnes could not circumvent the requirement that a [.¡petition for postconviction relief be verified by labeling his petition as a motion to retract his guilty plea. See Lambert v. State, 2012 Ark. 310, at 2, 2012 WL 3373199 (per curiam) (holding that petition was properly filed even though the state court denied it as procedurally barred because the petition was delivered to and accepted by the state court" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nThis is not fee simple. When all reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the non-moving party, there is a disputed issue of fact as to when and how MassMutual determines its compensation for each SIA involving a single mutual fund. The caselaw is clear that a service provider’s retention of discretion to set compensation can create fiduciary duties under ERISA with respect to its compensation. Generally speaking, a service provider “does not act as a fiduciary with respect to the terms in the service agreement if it does not control the named fiduciary’s negotiation and approval of those terms.” Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 583 (7th Cir.2009) (citing cases); Santomenno v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., Civ. No. 2:10-ev-01655, 2013 WL 3864395, at *1 (D.N.J. July 24, 2013) (holding that service provider was not a fiduciary with respect to revenue sharing because the total expenses associated with each investment option were fully disclosed", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nThis is not fee simple. When all reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the non-moving party, there is a disputed issue of fact as to when and how MassMutual determines its compensation for each SIA involving a single mutual fund. The caselaw is clear that a service provider’s retention of discretion to set compensation can create fiduciary duties under ERISA with respect to its compensation. Generally speaking, a service provider “does not act as a fiduciary with respect to the terms in the service agreement if it does not control the named fiduciary’s negotiation and approval of those terms.” Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 583 (7th Cir.2009) (citing cases); Santomenno v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., Civ. No. 2:10-ev-01655, 2013 WL 3864395, at *1 (D.N.J. July 24, 2013) (holding that the phrases in connection with and associated with are synonymous with the terms with respect to with reference to and relating to which mean connected by reason of an established or discoverable relation", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nThis is not fee simple. When all reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the non-moving party, there is a disputed issue of fact as to when and how MassMutual determines its compensation for each SIA involving a single mutual fund. The caselaw is clear that a service provider’s retention of discretion to set compensation can create fiduciary duties under ERISA with respect to its compensation. Generally speaking, a service provider “does not act as a fiduciary with respect to the terms in the service agreement if it does not control the named fiduciary’s negotiation and approval of those terms.” Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 583 (7th Cir.2009) (citing cases); Santomenno v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., Civ. No. 2:10-ev-01655, 2013 WL 3864395, at *1 (D.N.J. July 24, 2013) (holding the same with respect to an apartment", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nThis is not fee simple. When all reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the non-moving party, there is a disputed issue of fact as to when and how MassMutual determines its compensation for each SIA involving a single mutual fund. The caselaw is clear that a service provider’s retention of discretion to set compensation can create fiduciary duties under ERISA with respect to its compensation. Generally speaking, a service provider “does not act as a fiduciary with respect to the terms in the service agreement if it does not control the named fiduciary’s negotiation and approval of those terms.” Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 583 (7th Cir.2009) (citing cases); Santomenno v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., Civ. No. 2:10-ev-01655, 2013 WL 3864395, at *1 (D.N.J. July 24, 2013) (holding that when attorneys were acting as members of the firm with respect to the case in question section 504b1 applies to allow fee sharing with any member whether that membership is regular or sporadic", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nThis is not fee simple. When all reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the non-moving party, there is a disputed issue of fact as to when and how MassMutual determines its compensation for each SIA involving a single mutual fund. The caselaw is clear that a service provider’s retention of discretion to set compensation can create fiduciary duties under ERISA with respect to its compensation. Generally speaking, a service provider “does not act as a fiduciary with respect to the terms in the service agreement if it does not control the named fiduciary’s negotiation and approval of those terms.” Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 583 (7th Cir.2009) (citing cases); Santomenno v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., Civ. No. 2:10-ev-01655, 2013 WL 3864395, at *1 (D.N.J. July 24, 2013) (holding that defendant was not a fiduciary with respect to a fixed fee that was set by an agreement negotiated at arms length" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nvictim of age discrimination. Four employees testified that they heard Collins confess that he overcharged the complaining customer, and Collins adduced scant evidence of discriminatory intent. In short, Collins would have us believe that there is some reasonable possibility that the jury, in order to eliminate the chance that Collins might be awarded attorney fees, took the disproportionate step of returning a verdict against him even though it believed he was the victim of age discrimination, notwithstanding the District Court’s clear instructions to the contrary. In our view, such a theory is too implausible to support a finding of plain error. A contrary holding is not required by the two cases on which Collins principally relies. See Brooks v. Cook, 938 F.2d 1048 (9th Cir.1991) (recognizing absolute immunity to suits under 42 usc 1988", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nvictim of age discrimination. Four employees testified that they heard Collins confess that he overcharged the complaining customer, and Collins adduced scant evidence of discriminatory intent. In short, Collins would have us believe that there is some reasonable possibility that the jury, in order to eliminate the chance that Collins might be awarded attorney fees, took the disproportionate step of returning a verdict against him even though it believed he was the victim of age discrimination, notwithstanding the District Court’s clear instructions to the contrary. In our view, such a theory is too implausible to support a finding of plain error. A contrary holding is not required by the two cases on which Collins principally relies. See Brooks v. Cook, 938 F.2d 1048 (9th Cir.1991) (holding that the district court abused its discretion by telling the jury about the right of a prevailing plaintiff to attorney fees under 42 usc 1988", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nvictim of age discrimination. Four employees testified that they heard Collins confess that he overcharged the complaining customer, and Collins adduced scant evidence of discriminatory intent. In short, Collins would have us believe that there is some reasonable possibility that the jury, in order to eliminate the chance that Collins might be awarded attorney fees, took the disproportionate step of returning a verdict against him even though it believed he was the victim of age discrimination, notwithstanding the District Court’s clear instructions to the contrary. In our view, such a theory is too implausible to support a finding of plain error. A contrary holding is not required by the two cases on which Collins principally relies. See Brooks v. Cook, 938 F.2d 1048 (9th Cir.1991) (holding defendant may receive only the portion of his fees under 42 usc 1988 that he would not have paid but for the frivolous claim", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nvictim of age discrimination. Four employees testified that they heard Collins confess that he overcharged the complaining customer, and Collins adduced scant evidence of discriminatory intent. In short, Collins would have us believe that there is some reasonable possibility that the jury, in order to eliminate the chance that Collins might be awarded attorney fees, took the disproportionate step of returning a verdict against him even though it believed he was the victim of age discrimination, notwithstanding the District Court’s clear instructions to the contrary. In our view, such a theory is too implausible to support a finding of plain error. A contrary holding is not required by the two cases on which Collins principally relies. See Brooks v. Cook, 938 F.2d 1048 (9th Cir.1991) (holding that a contingentfee agreement should not act as a ceiling on the award of attorney fees under 42 usc 1988", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nvictim of age discrimination. Four employees testified that they heard Collins confess that he overcharged the complaining customer, and Collins adduced scant evidence of discriminatory intent. In short, Collins would have us believe that there is some reasonable possibility that the jury, in order to eliminate the chance that Collins might be awarded attorney fees, took the disproportionate step of returning a verdict against him even though it believed he was the victim of age discrimination, notwithstanding the District Court’s clear instructions to the contrary. In our view, such a theory is too implausible to support a finding of plain error. A contrary holding is not required by the two cases on which Collins principally relies. See Brooks v. Cook, 938 F.2d 1048 (9th Cir.1991) (holding that plaintiffs were prevailing parties under 42 usc section 1988 despite dismissal of the appeal as moot and vacation of the district court judgment" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof remand — a time that may or may not present exigencies permitting an exception to disqualification under Rule 3.7. For the reasons set forth above, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. So ordered. 1 . Francis Wagner died on April 14, 1999. 2 . Mr. Wagner sued for loss of consortium. 3 . On March 8, 2001, this court affirmed the dismissal against Dr. Kobrine but reversed the judgment in favor of Georgetown, remanding with instructions that Mrs. Wagner’s lack of informed consent claim could proceed against the hospital. Wagner v. Georgetown Univ. Med. Ctr., 768 A.2d 546 (D.C.2001). 4 .See Wagner, 768 A.2d at 564-65. 5 . Actually, the court inadvertently disqualified defendants’ counsel instead of Camenisch. I 673 S.W.2d 860, 864-65 (Tenn.1983) (holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that motion to set aside default made at least seven months after defendant learned of entry of default was not made within a reasonable time", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof remand — a time that may or may not present exigencies permitting an exception to disqualification under Rule 3.7. For the reasons set forth above, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. So ordered. 1 . Francis Wagner died on April 14, 1999. 2 . Mr. Wagner sued for loss of consortium. 3 . On March 8, 2001, this court affirmed the dismissal against Dr. Kobrine but reversed the judgment in favor of Georgetown, remanding with instructions that Mrs. Wagner’s lack of informed consent claim could proceed against the hospital. Wagner v. Georgetown Univ. Med. Ctr., 768 A.2d 546 (D.C.2001). 4 .See Wagner, 768 A.2d at 564-65. 5 . Actually, the court inadvertently disqualified defendants’ counsel instead of Camenisch. I 673 S.W.2d 860, 864-65 (Tenn.1983) (holding bondholders injured at time of default not when lawsuit concluded against grantors", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof remand — a time that may or may not present exigencies permitting an exception to disqualification under Rule 3.7. For the reasons set forth above, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. So ordered. 1 . Francis Wagner died on April 14, 1999. 2 . Mr. Wagner sued for loss of consortium. 3 . On March 8, 2001, this court affirmed the dismissal against Dr. Kobrine but reversed the judgment in favor of Georgetown, remanding with instructions that Mrs. Wagner’s lack of informed consent claim could proceed against the hospital. Wagner v. Georgetown Univ. Med. Ctr., 768 A.2d 546 (D.C.2001). 4 .See Wagner, 768 A.2d at 564-65. 5 . Actually, the court inadvertently disqualified defendants’ counsel instead of Camenisch. I 673 S.W.2d 860, 864-65 (Tenn.1983) (holding that the point of accrual is better linked to a time at which the indemnitee is injured not the time at which the original plaintiff was injured", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof remand — a time that may or may not present exigencies permitting an exception to disqualification under Rule 3.7. For the reasons set forth above, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. So ordered. 1 . Francis Wagner died on April 14, 1999. 2 . Mr. Wagner sued for loss of consortium. 3 . On March 8, 2001, this court affirmed the dismissal against Dr. Kobrine but reversed the judgment in favor of Georgetown, remanding with instructions that Mrs. Wagner’s lack of informed consent claim could proceed against the hospital. Wagner v. Georgetown Univ. Med. Ctr., 768 A.2d 546 (D.C.2001). 4 .See Wagner, 768 A.2d at 564-65. 5 . Actually, the court inadvertently disqualified defendants’ counsel instead of Camenisch. I 673 S.W.2d 860, 864-65 (Tenn.1983) (holding that risk must be measured at the time the lawsuit is filed", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof remand — a time that may or may not present exigencies permitting an exception to disqualification under Rule 3.7. For the reasons set forth above, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. So ordered. 1 . Francis Wagner died on April 14, 1999. 2 . Mr. Wagner sued for loss of consortium. 3 . On March 8, 2001, this court affirmed the dismissal against Dr. Kobrine but reversed the judgment in favor of Georgetown, remanding with instructions that Mrs. Wagner’s lack of informed consent claim could proceed against the hospital. Wagner v. Georgetown Univ. Med. Ctr., 768 A.2d 546 (D.C.2001). 4 .See Wagner, 768 A.2d at 564-65. 5 . Actually, the court inadvertently disqualified defendants’ counsel instead of Camenisch. I 673 S.W.2d 860, 864-65 (Tenn.1983) (holding that trial court must make entry of default prior to entry of default judgment and court may not make entry of default when there is no default in law or in fact" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nor cannot insist that those practices are mandated. Neither the Supreme Court nor this court has ever adopted a rule limiting protection to practices that are compelled by a litigant’s religion. We decline to adopt such a rule today. C. The Impingement Threshold The fact that the First Amendment does not protect only compelled religious conduct does not mean that the Constitution forbids all constraints on religiously motivated conduct, however trivial. Instead, the First Amendment is implicated when a law or regulation imposes a substantial, as opposed to inconsequential, burden on the litigant’s religious practice. Our cases make clear that this threshold showing must be made before the First Amendment is implicated. See Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 142 (D.C.Cir.2000) (holding a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the constitution and laws of the united states to state a claim under 1983", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nor cannot insist that those practices are mandated. Neither the Supreme Court nor this court has ever adopted a rule limiting protection to practices that are compelled by a litigant’s religion. We decline to adopt such a rule today. C. The Impingement Threshold The fact that the First Amendment does not protect only compelled religious conduct does not mean that the Constitution forbids all constraints on religiously motivated conduct, however trivial. Instead, the First Amendment is implicated when a law or regulation imposes a substantial, as opposed to inconsequential, burden on the litigant’s religious practice. Our cases make clear that this threshold showing must be made before the First Amendment is implicated. See Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 142 (D.C.Cir.2000) (holding that the constitutional right to crossexamination must be satisfied first before the court can exercise its discretion in limiting the scope or extent of crossexamination", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nor cannot insist that those practices are mandated. Neither the Supreme Court nor this court has ever adopted a rule limiting protection to practices that are compelled by a litigant’s religion. We decline to adopt such a rule today. C. The Impingement Threshold The fact that the First Amendment does not protect only compelled religious conduct does not mean that the Constitution forbids all constraints on religiously motivated conduct, however trivial. Instead, the First Amendment is implicated when a law or regulation imposes a substantial, as opposed to inconsequential, burden on the litigant’s religious practice. Our cases make clear that this threshold showing must be made before the First Amendment is implicated. See Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 142 (D.C.Cir.2000) (holding that when determining the proper amount for a burdened property that was purchased in a package only two methods suggest themselves as arguably appropriate 1 a determination of the fair market value of the property burdened by the right of first refusal or 2 a determination of the portion of the purchase price which based on the percentage of the fair market value of the entire package represented by the property burdened by the right of first refusal should be allocated to the property burdened by the right of first refusal", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nor cannot insist that those practices are mandated. Neither the Supreme Court nor this court has ever adopted a rule limiting protection to practices that are compelled by a litigant’s religion. We decline to adopt such a rule today. C. The Impingement Threshold The fact that the First Amendment does not protect only compelled religious conduct does not mean that the Constitution forbids all constraints on religiously motivated conduct, however trivial. Instead, the First Amendment is implicated when a law or regulation imposes a substantial, as opposed to inconsequential, burden on the litigant’s religious practice. Our cases make clear that this threshold showing must be made before the First Amendment is implicated. See Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 142 (D.C.Cir.2000) (holding that to sustain its claim under either the constitution or rfra a plaintiff must first establish that its free exercise right has been substantially burdened", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nor cannot insist that those practices are mandated. Neither the Supreme Court nor this court has ever adopted a rule limiting protection to practices that are compelled by a litigant’s religion. We decline to adopt such a rule today. C. The Impingement Threshold The fact that the First Amendment does not protect only compelled religious conduct does not mean that the Constitution forbids all constraints on religiously motivated conduct, however trivial. Instead, the First Amendment is implicated when a law or regulation imposes a substantial, as opposed to inconsequential, burden on the litigant’s religious practice. Our cases make clear that this threshold showing must be made before the First Amendment is implicated. See Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 142 (D.C.Cir.2000) (holding that possession of marijuana is not protected by the free exercise clause of the first amendment" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfailed to pay Wall’s commissions or did so in bad faith in order to receive treble damages. We disagree and find that the trial court’s interpretation was not an abuse of discretion. South Carolina case law does not support Fruehaufs position. Fruehauf cites to a number of cases which discuss puni tive damages in general, but not treble damages under § 41-10-80(0). See, e.g., Carter v. R.C. Jordan Oil Co., 301 S.C. 84, 390 S.E.2d 367, 368 (S.C.Ct.App.1990). Although South Carolina law requires that there be no good faith dispute concerning the wages due in order for treble damages to be awarded under § 41-10-80(0, the decision is in the complete discretion of the trial court and no specific finding of bad faith or willfulness is required. Rice, 318 S.C. 95, 456 S.E.2d 381 (S.C.1995) (holding that the tcpas treble damages provision is remedial", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfailed to pay Wall’s commissions or did so in bad faith in order to receive treble damages. We disagree and find that the trial court’s interpretation was not an abuse of discretion. South Carolina case law does not support Fruehaufs position. Fruehauf cites to a number of cases which discuss puni tive damages in general, but not treble damages under § 41-10-80(0). See, e.g., Carter v. R.C. Jordan Oil Co., 301 S.C. 84, 390 S.E.2d 367, 368 (S.C.Ct.App.1990). Although South Carolina law requires that there be no good faith dispute concerning the wages due in order for treble damages to be awarded under § 41-10-80(0, the decision is in the complete discretion of the trial court and no specific finding of bad faith or willfulness is required. Rice, 318 S.C. 95, 456 S.E.2d 381 (S.C.1995) (holding that when a trial court determines that the amount of damages awarded by a jury is excessive the court may either suggest remittitur or grant a new trial on the issue of damages", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfailed to pay Wall’s commissions or did so in bad faith in order to receive treble damages. We disagree and find that the trial court’s interpretation was not an abuse of discretion. South Carolina case law does not support Fruehaufs position. Fruehauf cites to a number of cases which discuss puni tive damages in general, but not treble damages under § 41-10-80(0). See, e.g., Carter v. R.C. Jordan Oil Co., 301 S.C. 84, 390 S.E.2d 367, 368 (S.C.Ct.App.1990). Although South Carolina law requires that there be no good faith dispute concerning the wages due in order for treble damages to be awarded under § 41-10-80(0, the decision is in the complete discretion of the trial court and no specific finding of bad faith or willfulness is required. Rice, 318 S.C. 95, 456 S.E.2d 381 (S.C.1995) (holding that threequarter guarantee payments were not wages under arizona wage payment laws permitting treble damages for nonpayment under rationale that wages are restricted to compensation due an employee in return for work performed", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfailed to pay Wall’s commissions or did so in bad faith in order to receive treble damages. We disagree and find that the trial court’s interpretation was not an abuse of discretion. South Carolina case law does not support Fruehaufs position. Fruehauf cites to a number of cases which discuss puni tive damages in general, but not treble damages under § 41-10-80(0). See, e.g., Carter v. R.C. Jordan Oil Co., 301 S.C. 84, 390 S.E.2d 367, 368 (S.C.Ct.App.1990). Although South Carolina law requires that there be no good faith dispute concerning the wages due in order for treble damages to be awarded under § 41-10-80(0, the decision is in the complete discretion of the trial court and no specific finding of bad faith or willfulness is required. Rice, 318 S.C. 95, 456 S.E.2d 381 (S.C.1995) (holding that the treble damages provision is not mandatory and will not apply if the trial court determines that a good faith dispute over the wages allegedly due exists", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfailed to pay Wall’s commissions or did so in bad faith in order to receive treble damages. We disagree and find that the trial court’s interpretation was not an abuse of discretion. South Carolina case law does not support Fruehaufs position. Fruehauf cites to a number of cases which discuss puni tive damages in general, but not treble damages under § 41-10-80(0). See, e.g., Carter v. R.C. Jordan Oil Co., 301 S.C. 84, 390 S.E.2d 367, 368 (S.C.Ct.App.1990). Although South Carolina law requires that there be no good faith dispute concerning the wages due in order for treble damages to be awarded under § 41-10-80(0, the decision is in the complete discretion of the trial court and no specific finding of bad faith or willfulness is required. Rice, 318 S.C. 95, 456 S.E.2d 381 (S.C.1995) (holding that the award of treble damages while a matter of discretion for the trial court is inappropriate in circumstances where there is a bona fide wage dispute" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwith less than ideal clarity; occasionally, legislation is opaque in instructing which federal tribunal is the proper — or a proper — forum for the first court airing of, or an appeal in, a particular kind of federal case. Compare Hohri v. United States, 782 F.2d 227, 239-41 (D.C. Cir.1985), with id. at 944-946 (dissenting opinion) (divided views on “plain meaning” of 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(2) (1982)). When administrative' action is in question, as in the instant case, the governing statute may fail to say with precision whether judicial review should initially occur in a district court, or directly in a court of appeals. The matter at hand pointedly illustrates these difficulties, as did our previous encounter with these appellants, Lorion v. NRC, 712 F.2d 1472 (D.C.Cir.1983) (holding that there must first be a denial by atf for the district court to review", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwith less than ideal clarity; occasionally, legislation is opaque in instructing which federal tribunal is the proper — or a proper — forum for the first court airing of, or an appeal in, a particular kind of federal case. Compare Hohri v. United States, 782 F.2d 227, 239-41 (D.C. Cir.1985), with id. at 944-946 (dissenting opinion) (divided views on “plain meaning” of 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(2) (1982)). When administrative' action is in question, as in the instant case, the governing statute may fail to say with precision whether judicial review should initially occur in a district court, or directly in a court of appeals. The matter at hand pointedly illustrates these difficulties, as did our previous encounter with these appellants, Lorion v. NRC, 712 F.2d 1472 (D.C.Cir.1983) (holding that federal district courts lack jurisdiction to review a final state court decision in a particular case", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwith less than ideal clarity; occasionally, legislation is opaque in instructing which federal tribunal is the proper — or a proper — forum for the first court airing of, or an appeal in, a particular kind of federal case. Compare Hohri v. United States, 782 F.2d 227, 239-41 (D.C. Cir.1985), with id. at 944-946 (dissenting opinion) (divided views on “plain meaning” of 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(2) (1982)). When administrative' action is in question, as in the instant case, the governing statute may fail to say with precision whether judicial review should initially occur in a district court, or directly in a court of appeals. The matter at hand pointedly illustrates these difficulties, as did our previous encounter with these appellants, Lorion v. NRC, 712 F.2d 1472 (D.C.Cir.1983) (holding that because here the statutes in issue provide for judicial review via citizen suit provisions yet do not set forth a standard for that review judicial review is limited to apa review on the administrative record", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwith less than ideal clarity; occasionally, legislation is opaque in instructing which federal tribunal is the proper — or a proper — forum for the first court airing of, or an appeal in, a particular kind of federal case. Compare Hohri v. United States, 782 F.2d 227, 239-41 (D.C. Cir.1985), with id. at 944-946 (dissenting opinion) (divided views on “plain meaning” of 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(2) (1982)). When administrative' action is in question, as in the instant case, the governing statute may fail to say with precision whether judicial review should initially occur in a district court, or directly in a court of appeals. The matter at hand pointedly illustrates these difficulties, as did our previous encounter with these appellants, Lorion v. NRC, 712 F.2d 1472 (D.C.Cir.1983) (holding in land use situations courts have concluded in order for a regulatory takings claim to be ripe there must be a final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the property at issue", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwith less than ideal clarity; occasionally, legislation is opaque in instructing which federal tribunal is the proper — or a proper — forum for the first court airing of, or an appeal in, a particular kind of federal case. Compare Hohri v. United States, 782 F.2d 227, 239-41 (D.C. Cir.1985), with id. at 944-946 (dissenting opinion) (divided views on “plain meaning” of 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(2) (1982)). When administrative' action is in question, as in the instant case, the governing statute may fail to say with precision whether judicial review should initially occur in a district court, or directly in a court of appeals. The matter at hand pointedly illustrates these difficulties, as did our previous encounter with these appellants, Lorion v. NRC, 712 F.2d 1472 (D.C.Cir.1983) (holding that judicial review of nuclear regulatory commission decision at issue must first occur in district court" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\ncoverage of an existing one. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 12-13, 116 S.Ct. 1923, 135 L.Ed.2d 337 (1996) (citing Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 48-50, 100 S.Ct. 906, 63 L.Ed.2d 186 (1980)). Faced with a dearth of federal precedent, blindly resorting to only the forum state’s privilege law is inappropriate. Appellant has not shown that California law is in accord with most states, or that it is likely that the federal common law would be advanced by the injection of California’s broadened view of the client-representative extension of attorney-client privilege. Fed.R.Evid. 501 (stating that federal courts should recognize evidentiary privileges according to the principles of the common law in the light of reason and experience); see also Trammel, 445 U.S. at 50, 100 S.Ct. 906 (holding that the burden rests upon the party seeking benefits to prove the injury sustained was the result of an accident arising out of and in the course of employment and the rule of liberal construction is not a substitute for the claimants burden of establishing his claim by a preponderance of the evidence", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\ncoverage of an existing one. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 12-13, 116 S.Ct. 1923, 135 L.Ed.2d 337 (1996) (citing Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 48-50, 100 S.Ct. 906, 63 L.Ed.2d 186 (1980)). Faced with a dearth of federal precedent, blindly resorting to only the forum state’s privilege law is inappropriate. Appellant has not shown that California law is in accord with most states, or that it is likely that the federal common law would be advanced by the injection of California’s broadened view of the client-representative extension of attorney-client privilege. Fed.R.Evid. 501 (stating that federal courts should recognize evidentiary privileges according to the principles of the common law in the light of reason and experience); see also Trammel, 445 U.S. at 50, 100 S.Ct. 906 (holding that the party asserting work product protection has the burden of establishing that the doctrine applies", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\ncoverage of an existing one. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 12-13, 116 S.Ct. 1923, 135 L.Ed.2d 337 (1996) (citing Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 48-50, 100 S.Ct. 906, 63 L.Ed.2d 186 (1980)). Faced with a dearth of federal precedent, blindly resorting to only the forum state’s privilege law is inappropriate. Appellant has not shown that California law is in accord with most states, or that it is likely that the federal common law would be advanced by the injection of California’s broadened view of the client-representative extension of attorney-client privilege. Fed.R.Evid. 501 (stating that federal courts should recognize evidentiary privileges according to the principles of the common law in the light of reason and experience); see also Trammel, 445 U.S. at 50, 100 S.Ct. 906 (holding that a party seeking a new privilege must overcome a significant burden of establishing that excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\ncoverage of an existing one. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 12-13, 116 S.Ct. 1923, 135 L.Ed.2d 337 (1996) (citing Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 48-50, 100 S.Ct. 906, 63 L.Ed.2d 186 (1980)). Faced with a dearth of federal precedent, blindly resorting to only the forum state’s privilege law is inappropriate. Appellant has not shown that California law is in accord with most states, or that it is likely that the federal common law would be advanced by the injection of California’s broadened view of the client-representative extension of attorney-client privilege. Fed.R.Evid. 501 (stating that federal courts should recognize evidentiary privileges according to the principles of the common law in the light of reason and experience); see also Trammel, 445 U.S. at 50, 100 S.Ct. 906 (holding that a party seeking a writ bears the burden of proving that it has no other means of attaining the relief such as by appeal", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\ncoverage of an existing one. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 12-13, 116 S.Ct. 1923, 135 L.Ed.2d 337 (1996) (citing Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 48-50, 100 S.Ct. 906, 63 L.Ed.2d 186 (1980)). Faced with a dearth of federal precedent, blindly resorting to only the forum state’s privilege law is inappropriate. Appellant has not shown that California law is in accord with most states, or that it is likely that the federal common law would be advanced by the injection of California’s broadened view of the client-representative extension of attorney-client privilege. Fed.R.Evid. 501 (stating that federal courts should recognize evidentiary privileges according to the principles of the common law in the light of reason and experience); see also Trammel, 445 U.S. at 50, 100 S.Ct. 906 (holding that the party seeking to vacate the award has the burden of providing the court with the evidence to support its arguments" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nHospital Damas. See id. (“[A] fact, question or right distinctly adjudged in the original action cannot be disputed in a subsequent’ action, even though the determination was reached upon an erroneous view or by an erroneous application of the law.” (emphasis omitted) (quoting United States v. Moser, 266 U.S. 236, 242, 45 S.Ct. 66, 69 L.Ed. 262 (1924))). f. L.C.V. also argues that, as a matter of public policy, issue preclusion should not be applied to this case, which, according to her, involves Fundación’s perpetration of a “fraud” “to evade responsibility and eventually justice.” We are unpersuaded by L.C.V.’s public-policy argument. For starters, the‘cases on which L.C.V. relies apply Puerto Rico law of preclusion. See Barreto-Rosa v. Varona-Mendez, 470 F.3d 42, 48 (1st Cir. 2006) (holding that the court of appeals correctly stated the public policy exception but erroneously concluded that the exception did not apply", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nHospital Damas. See id. (“[A] fact, question or right distinctly adjudged in the original action cannot be disputed in a subsequent’ action, even though the determination was reached upon an erroneous view or by an erroneous application of the law.” (emphasis omitted) (quoting United States v. Moser, 266 U.S. 236, 242, 45 S.Ct. 66, 69 L.Ed. 262 (1924))). f. L.C.V. also argues that, as a matter of public policy, issue preclusion should not be applied to this case, which, according to her, involves Fundación’s perpetration of a “fraud” “to evade responsibility and eventually justice.” We are unpersuaded by L.C.V.’s public-policy argument. For starters, the‘cases on which L.C.V. relies apply Puerto Rico law of preclusion. See Barreto-Rosa v. Varona-Mendez, 470 F.3d 42, 48 (1st Cir. 2006) (recognizing that under puerto rico law res judicata may not apply if public policy demands an exception but noting that this exception was successfully argued in only two cases and concluding that public policy does not demand an exception in this case", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nHospital Damas. See id. (“[A] fact, question or right distinctly adjudged in the original action cannot be disputed in a subsequent’ action, even though the determination was reached upon an erroneous view or by an erroneous application of the law.” (emphasis omitted) (quoting United States v. Moser, 266 U.S. 236, 242, 45 S.Ct. 66, 69 L.Ed. 262 (1924))). f. L.C.V. also argues that, as a matter of public policy, issue preclusion should not be applied to this case, which, according to her, involves Fundación’s perpetration of a “fraud” “to evade responsibility and eventually justice.” We are unpersuaded by L.C.V.’s public-policy argument. For starters, the‘cases on which L.C.V. relies apply Puerto Rico law of preclusion. See Barreto-Rosa v. Varona-Mendez, 470 F.3d 42, 48 (1st Cir. 2006) (recognizing exception", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nHospital Damas. See id. (“[A] fact, question or right distinctly adjudged in the original action cannot be disputed in a subsequent’ action, even though the determination was reached upon an erroneous view or by an erroneous application of the law.” (emphasis omitted) (quoting United States v. Moser, 266 U.S. 236, 242, 45 S.Ct. 66, 69 L.Ed. 262 (1924))). f. L.C.V. also argues that, as a matter of public policy, issue preclusion should not be applied to this case, which, according to her, involves Fundación’s perpetration of a “fraud” “to evade responsibility and eventually justice.” We are unpersuaded by L.C.V.’s public-policy argument. For starters, the‘cases on which L.C.V. relies apply Puerto Rico law of preclusion. See Barreto-Rosa v. Varona-Mendez, 470 F.3d 42, 48 (1st Cir. 2006) (recognizing the public interest exception", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nHospital Damas. See id. (“[A] fact, question or right distinctly adjudged in the original action cannot be disputed in a subsequent’ action, even though the determination was reached upon an erroneous view or by an erroneous application of the law.” (emphasis omitted) (quoting United States v. Moser, 266 U.S. 236, 242, 45 S.Ct. 66, 69 L.Ed. 262 (1924))). f. L.C.V. also argues that, as a matter of public policy, issue preclusion should not be applied to this case, which, according to her, involves Fundación’s perpetration of a “fraud” “to evade responsibility and eventually justice.” We are unpersuaded by L.C.V.’s public-policy argument. For starters, the‘cases on which L.C.V. relies apply Puerto Rico law of preclusion. See Barreto-Rosa v. Varona-Mendez, 470 F.3d 42, 48 (1st Cir. 2006) (recognizing public policy exception to atwill doctrine" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nassociation with, supervision of, delegation of authority to, support for, training of, or participation in a private group practice with, a member or members of a particular class of health care practitioner or professional, or (E) any other matter that does not relate to the competence or professional conduct of a physician. 42 U.S.C. § 11151(9). 18 . Respondents assert that Dr. Freilich's \"asserted bad faith whistle-blower animus standard ... conflicts with HCQIA’s objective reasonableness standard.” 19 . Our holding is also consistent with cases in which we set forth a plaintiff's burden when faced with a defense motion for summary judgment under other totality of the circumstances tests. See, e.g., Jones v. Mid-Atlantic Funding Co., 362 Md. 661, 681, 766 A.2d 617, 628 (2001) (holding that the plaintiffs burden at summary judgment in a case involving a totality of the circumstances test is whether the facts put forth by petitioners examined in their totality and in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party might satisfy a trier of fact that the test was met", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nassociation with, supervision of, delegation of authority to, support for, training of, or participation in a private group practice with, a member or members of a particular class of health care practitioner or professional, or (E) any other matter that does not relate to the competence or professional conduct of a physician. 42 U.S.C. § 11151(9). 18 . Respondents assert that Dr. Freilich's \"asserted bad faith whistle-blower animus standard ... conflicts with HCQIA’s objective reasonableness standard.” 19 . Our holding is also consistent with cases in which we set forth a plaintiff's burden when faced with a defense motion for summary judgment under other totality of the circumstances tests. See, e.g., Jones v. Mid-Atlantic Funding Co., 362 Md. 661, 681, 766 A.2d 617, 628 (2001) (holding that the government bears the burden of proving voluntary consent under the totality of the circumstances", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nassociation with, supervision of, delegation of authority to, support for, training of, or participation in a private group practice with, a member or members of a particular class of health care practitioner or professional, or (E) any other matter that does not relate to the competence or professional conduct of a physician. 42 U.S.C. § 11151(9). 18 . Respondents assert that Dr. Freilich's \"asserted bad faith whistle-blower animus standard ... conflicts with HCQIA’s objective reasonableness standard.” 19 . Our holding is also consistent with cases in which we set forth a plaintiff's burden when faced with a defense motion for summary judgment under other totality of the circumstances tests. See, e.g., Jones v. Mid-Atlantic Funding Co., 362 Md. 661, 681, 766 A.2d 617, 628 (2001) (holding that the reasonableness inquiry is based upon the totality of the circumstances in determining whether or not a search was reasonable", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nassociation with, supervision of, delegation of authority to, support for, training of, or participation in a private group practice with, a member or members of a particular class of health care practitioner or professional, or (E) any other matter that does not relate to the competence or professional conduct of a physician. 42 U.S.C. § 11151(9). 18 . Respondents assert that Dr. Freilich's \"asserted bad faith whistle-blower animus standard ... conflicts with HCQIA’s objective reasonableness standard.” 19 . Our holding is also consistent with cases in which we set forth a plaintiff's burden when faced with a defense motion for summary judgment under other totality of the circumstances tests. See, e.g., Jones v. Mid-Atlantic Funding Co., 362 Md. 661, 681, 766 A.2d 617, 628 (2001) (holding that the level of detail in testimony is a relevant factor in the totality of the circumstances test of credibility employed by immigration judges", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nassociation with, supervision of, delegation of authority to, support for, training of, or participation in a private group practice with, a member or members of a particular class of health care practitioner or professional, or (E) any other matter that does not relate to the competence or professional conduct of a physician. 42 U.S.C. § 11151(9). 18 . Respondents assert that Dr. Freilich's \"asserted bad faith whistle-blower animus standard ... conflicts with HCQIA’s objective reasonableness standard.” 19 . Our holding is also consistent with cases in which we set forth a plaintiff's burden when faced with a defense motion for summary judgment under other totality of the circumstances tests. See, e.g., Jones v. Mid-Atlantic Funding Co., 362 Md. 661, 681, 766 A.2d 617, 628 (2001) (holding that the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and all doubts are resolved against the moving party" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nto a decision concerning the effective date for service-connected PTSD under these circumstances and thus it was error for the Board not to discuss its applicability. See Robinson v. Peake, 21 Vet.App. 545, 553 (2008) (requiring the Board to consider all theories of entitlement raised by the claimant or by the evidence of record). Because the Board has not yet made any factual findings pertinent to the application of this regulation, the appropriate remedy is for the Court to vacate the Board’s conclusion that the appellant cannot receive an effective date earlier than November 20, 2002, for his service-connected PTSD, and remand the matter so that the Board may address the applicability of § 3.156(c) in the first instance. See Hensley v. West, 212 F.3d 1255, 1264 (Fed.Cir.2000) (recognizing that the court is not the appropriate forum for initial factfinding", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nto a decision concerning the effective date for service-connected PTSD under these circumstances and thus it was error for the Board not to discuss its applicability. See Robinson v. Peake, 21 Vet.App. 545, 553 (2008) (requiring the Board to consider all theories of entitlement raised by the claimant or by the evidence of record). Because the Board has not yet made any factual findings pertinent to the application of this regulation, the appropriate remedy is for the Court to vacate the Board’s conclusion that the appellant cannot receive an effective date earlier than November 20, 2002, for his service-connected PTSD, and remand the matter so that the Board may address the applicability of § 3.156(c) in the first instance. See Hensley v. West, 212 F.3d 1255, 1264 (Fed.Cir.2000) (recognizing that where plaintiff is from the forum state and defendant is from an alternate forum each forum can claim a connection to one of the parties", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nto a decision concerning the effective date for service-connected PTSD under these circumstances and thus it was error for the Board not to discuss its applicability. See Robinson v. Peake, 21 Vet.App. 545, 553 (2008) (requiring the Board to consider all theories of entitlement raised by the claimant or by the evidence of record). Because the Board has not yet made any factual findings pertinent to the application of this regulation, the appropriate remedy is for the Court to vacate the Board’s conclusion that the appellant cannot receive an effective date earlier than November 20, 2002, for his service-connected PTSD, and remand the matter so that the Board may address the applicability of § 3.156(c) in the first instance. See Hensley v. West, 212 F.3d 1255, 1264 (Fed.Cir.2000) (recognizing that booker error may occur even in the absence of judicial factfinding where district court treats guidelines as mandatory", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nto a decision concerning the effective date for service-connected PTSD under these circumstances and thus it was error for the Board not to discuss its applicability. See Robinson v. Peake, 21 Vet.App. 545, 553 (2008) (requiring the Board to consider all theories of entitlement raised by the claimant or by the evidence of record). Because the Board has not yet made any factual findings pertinent to the application of this regulation, the appropriate remedy is for the Court to vacate the Board’s conclusion that the appellant cannot receive an effective date earlier than November 20, 2002, for his service-connected PTSD, and remand the matter so that the Board may address the applicability of § 3.156(c) in the first instance. See Hensley v. West, 212 F.3d 1255, 1264 (Fed.Cir.2000) (holding that phone and facsimile communications to the forum purchase orders and payments sent to the forum a choice of law clause within the contract regarding the forum state and delivery of the product within the forum state were not enough to satisfy minimum contacts", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nto a decision concerning the effective date for service-connected PTSD under these circumstances and thus it was error for the Board not to discuss its applicability. See Robinson v. Peake, 21 Vet.App. 545, 553 (2008) (requiring the Board to consider all theories of entitlement raised by the claimant or by the evidence of record). Because the Board has not yet made any factual findings pertinent to the application of this regulation, the appropriate remedy is for the Court to vacate the Board’s conclusion that the appellant cannot receive an effective date earlier than November 20, 2002, for his service-connected PTSD, and remand the matter so that the Board may address the applicability of § 3.156(c) in the first instance. See Hensley v. West, 212 F.3d 1255, 1264 (Fed.Cir.2000) (holding that the situs of the alleged tortious conduct is relevant in choosing the most appropriate forum" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nforth the exceptions). Consistent with Illinois law, the Rules and Regulations of the Chicago Police Department—which Anderson himself invokes as definitive of “the authorized time and space limits” 'of Moussa’s employment, Doc. 53 at 5—make clear that officers are tasked with “respond[ing] to ... law enforcement needs in different parts of the City,” and “protecting] ... life, limb and property in the City of Chicago.” Rules and Regulations of the Chicago Police Department (“CPD Regulations”) at I.B.9 and II.A (Doc. 53-1 at 5, 7) (emphases added). The fact that Moussa was operating outside both the time and the place limits of his employment suffices, standing alone, to establish that he was not acting within the scope of his employment. See Adames, 330 Ill.Dec. 720, 909 N.E.2d at 757 (holding that the failure to satisfy the time and spacelimits criterion forecloses a finding that an employee acted within the scope of his employment", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nforth the exceptions). Consistent with Illinois law, the Rules and Regulations of the Chicago Police Department—which Anderson himself invokes as definitive of “the authorized time and space limits” 'of Moussa’s employment, Doc. 53 at 5—make clear that officers are tasked with “respond[ing] to ... law enforcement needs in different parts of the City,” and “protecting] ... life, limb and property in the City of Chicago.” Rules and Regulations of the Chicago Police Department (“CPD Regulations”) at I.B.9 and II.A (Doc. 53-1 at 5, 7) (emphases added). The fact that Moussa was operating outside both the time and the place limits of his employment suffices, standing alone, to establish that he was not acting within the scope of his employment. See Adames, 330 Ill.Dec. 720, 909 N.E.2d at 757 (holding that the inquiry into whether an employee was acting within the scope of his employment depends on the respondeat superior law of the state in which the tort occurred", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nforth the exceptions). Consistent with Illinois law, the Rules and Regulations of the Chicago Police Department—which Anderson himself invokes as definitive of “the authorized time and space limits” 'of Moussa’s employment, Doc. 53 at 5—make clear that officers are tasked with “respond[ing] to ... law enforcement needs in different parts of the City,” and “protecting] ... life, limb and property in the City of Chicago.” Rules and Regulations of the Chicago Police Department (“CPD Regulations”) at I.B.9 and II.A (Doc. 53-1 at 5, 7) (emphases added). The fact that Moussa was operating outside both the time and the place limits of his employment suffices, standing alone, to establish that he was not acting within the scope of his employment. See Adames, 330 Ill.Dec. 720, 909 N.E.2d at 757 (holding that whether the tortious act was committed during the time the employee was on duty and whether the tortious act was committed while the employee was on the employers premises were both factors weighing in favor of finding the activity within the scope of employment", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nforth the exceptions). Consistent with Illinois law, the Rules and Regulations of the Chicago Police Department—which Anderson himself invokes as definitive of “the authorized time and space limits” 'of Moussa’s employment, Doc. 53 at 5—make clear that officers are tasked with “respond[ing] to ... law enforcement needs in different parts of the City,” and “protecting] ... life, limb and property in the City of Chicago.” Rules and Regulations of the Chicago Police Department (“CPD Regulations”) at I.B.9 and II.A (Doc. 53-1 at 5, 7) (emphases added). The fact that Moussa was operating outside both the time and the place limits of his employment suffices, standing alone, to establish that he was not acting within the scope of his employment. See Adames, 330 Ill.Dec. 720, 909 N.E.2d at 757 (holding that issues of fact precluded summary judgment on the question of whether an employee was acting within the course and scope of his employment for purposes of insurance coverage when the employee was simply sitting in his vehicle in his employers parking lot waiting for the business to open at the time the accident occurred", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nforth the exceptions). Consistent with Illinois law, the Rules and Regulations of the Chicago Police Department—which Anderson himself invokes as definitive of “the authorized time and space limits” 'of Moussa’s employment, Doc. 53 at 5—make clear that officers are tasked with “respond[ing] to ... law enforcement needs in different parts of the City,” and “protecting] ... life, limb and property in the City of Chicago.” Rules and Regulations of the Chicago Police Department (“CPD Regulations”) at I.B.9 and II.A (Doc. 53-1 at 5, 7) (emphases added). The fact that Moussa was operating outside both the time and the place limits of his employment suffices, standing alone, to establish that he was not acting within the scope of his employment. See Adames, 330 Ill.Dec. 720, 909 N.E.2d at 757 (holding that an injury is not within the scope of employment after the employee has left work unless the injury was caused by the employers negligence" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nand walked out slamming the door. Arredondo testified that he had never formally married the children’s mother. They had lived together intermittently at her great-grandmother’s house. He claimed to have worked at various jobs and that he provided for his children. However, the only time the children did not live at their great-grandmother’s house was for a few mo lustrating that Arredondo was unable or failed to provide a safe environment because of his vague and unstable employment history, lack of a permanent residence when out of prison, failure to obtain proper medical assistance for one child’s urinary tract infections and a prosthesis for another child, recurrent alcohol abuse, and failure to abide by the conditions necessary to stay out of prison. In re P.R., 994 S.W.2d at 416 (holding that in computing time to determine whether an act was performed within a specified period of time under the statute of limitations the first day is excluded and the last day of the period is included", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nand walked out slamming the door. Arredondo testified that he had never formally married the children’s mother. They had lived together intermittently at her great-grandmother’s house. He claimed to have worked at various jobs and that he provided for his children. However, the only time the children did not live at their great-grandmother’s house was for a few mo lustrating that Arredondo was unable or failed to provide a safe environment because of his vague and unstable employment history, lack of a permanent residence when out of prison, failure to obtain proper medical assistance for one child’s urinary tract infections and a prosthesis for another child, recurrent alcohol abuse, and failure to abide by the conditions necessary to stay out of prison. In re P.R., 994 S.W.2d at 416 (holding that a child has a 1983 action against the state while in foster care where the state is deliberately indifferent to the likelihood that a foster home is unsafe yet places the child there or allows the child to remain there", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nand walked out slamming the door. Arredondo testified that he had never formally married the children’s mother. They had lived together intermittently at her great-grandmother’s house. He claimed to have worked at various jobs and that he provided for his children. However, the only time the children did not live at their great-grandmother’s house was for a few mo lustrating that Arredondo was unable or failed to provide a safe environment because of his vague and unstable employment history, lack of a permanent residence when out of prison, failure to obtain proper medical assistance for one child’s urinary tract infections and a prosthesis for another child, recurrent alcohol abuse, and failure to abide by the conditions necessary to stay out of prison. In re P.R., 994 S.W.2d at 416 (recognizing that an injury arises out of the employment relationship if it can be traced to the nature of employment or the workplace environment", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nand walked out slamming the door. Arredondo testified that he had never formally married the children’s mother. They had lived together intermittently at her great-grandmother’s house. He claimed to have worked at various jobs and that he provided for his children. However, the only time the children did not live at their great-grandmother’s house was for a few mo lustrating that Arredondo was unable or failed to provide a safe environment because of his vague and unstable employment history, lack of a permanent residence when out of prison, failure to obtain proper medical assistance for one child’s urinary tract infections and a prosthesis for another child, recurrent alcohol abuse, and failure to abide by the conditions necessary to stay out of prison. In re P.R., 994 S.W.2d at 416 (holding there was a showing of an inability to provide a safe environment because of living at 13 to 17 different places in the last year an unstable employment history failure to obtain immunizations for the child and use of methamphetamines and marijuana the day before a courtordered psychologist evaluation", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nand walked out slamming the door. Arredondo testified that he had never formally married the children’s mother. They had lived together intermittently at her great-grandmother’s house. He claimed to have worked at various jobs and that he provided for his children. However, the only time the children did not live at their great-grandmother’s house was for a few mo lustrating that Arredondo was unable or failed to provide a safe environment because of his vague and unstable employment history, lack of a permanent residence when out of prison, failure to obtain proper medical assistance for one child’s urinary tract infections and a prosthesis for another child, recurrent alcohol abuse, and failure to abide by the conditions necessary to stay out of prison. In re P.R., 994 S.W.2d at 416 (holding that the affiants profession of an intent to return to the places they had visited before is simply not enough because such some day intentions without any description of concrete plans or indeed any specification of when the some day will be do not support a finding of the actual or imminent injury that our cases require emphasis in original" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\n340). California courts have uniformly rejected IIED claims related to foreclosure actions, including allegedly wrongful foreclosure. See, e.g., Baidoobonso-Iam v. Bank of America, No. CV 10-9171, 2011 WL 5870065, at *5 (C.D.Cal. Nov. 22, 2011) (“to the extent that Collier’s claim is solely predicated on the foreclosure of his property, California courts have held that such conduct does not state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.”); Smith v. Wachovia, No. C 09-01300, 2009 WL 1948829, at *4 (N.D.Cal. July 6, 2009) (allegations that defendant “wrongfully and intentionally initiated non-judicial foreclosure proceedings” were “not so extreme as to exceed the bounds of civilized society”); Davenport v. Litton Loan Servicing, LP, 725 F.Supp.2d 862, 884 (N.D.Cal.2010) (holding that tobacco companies statements that they would report on the results of their research into the health effects of cigarettes were not an undertaking to warn customers of those effects", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\n340). California courts have uniformly rejected IIED claims related to foreclosure actions, including allegedly wrongful foreclosure. See, e.g., Baidoobonso-Iam v. Bank of America, No. CV 10-9171, 2011 WL 5870065, at *5 (C.D.Cal. Nov. 22, 2011) (“to the extent that Collier’s claim is solely predicated on the foreclosure of his property, California courts have held that such conduct does not state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.”); Smith v. Wachovia, No. C 09-01300, 2009 WL 1948829, at *4 (N.D.Cal. July 6, 2009) (allegations that defendant “wrongfully and intentionally initiated non-judicial foreclosure proceedings” were “not so extreme as to exceed the bounds of civilized society”); Davenport v. Litton Loan Servicing, LP, 725 F.Supp.2d 862, 884 (N.D.Cal.2010) (holding that the sound of a television on the inside of the house and the presence of a car in the driveway were sufficient to form the basis of the reasonable belief that the suspect was in the home", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\n340). California courts have uniformly rejected IIED claims related to foreclosure actions, including allegedly wrongful foreclosure. See, e.g., Baidoobonso-Iam v. Bank of America, No. CV 10-9171, 2011 WL 5870065, at *5 (C.D.Cal. Nov. 22, 2011) (“to the extent that Collier’s claim is solely predicated on the foreclosure of his property, California courts have held that such conduct does not state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.”); Smith v. Wachovia, No. C 09-01300, 2009 WL 1948829, at *4 (N.D.Cal. July 6, 2009) (allegations that defendant “wrongfully and intentionally initiated non-judicial foreclosure proceedings” were “not so extreme as to exceed the bounds of civilized society”); Davenport v. Litton Loan Servicing, LP, 725 F.Supp.2d 862, 884 (N.D.Cal.2010) (holding that the legal incidence of the kansas fuel tax falls on the distributor", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\n340). California courts have uniformly rejected IIED claims related to foreclosure actions, including allegedly wrongful foreclosure. See, e.g., Baidoobonso-Iam v. Bank of America, No. CV 10-9171, 2011 WL 5870065, at *5 (C.D.Cal. Nov. 22, 2011) (“to the extent that Collier’s claim is solely predicated on the foreclosure of his property, California courts have held that such conduct does not state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.”); Smith v. Wachovia, No. C 09-01300, 2009 WL 1948829, at *4 (N.D.Cal. July 6, 2009) (allegations that defendant “wrongfully and intentionally initiated non-judicial foreclosure proceedings” were “not so extreme as to exceed the bounds of civilized society”); Davenport v. Litton Loan Servicing, LP, 725 F.Supp.2d 862, 884 (N.D.Cal.2010) (holding that when a person entrusts effects to another and the police discover those effects in the others home by means of a search that violates article i section 9 the search also violates the entrustors rights under article i section 9", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\n340). California courts have uniformly rejected IIED claims related to foreclosure actions, including allegedly wrongful foreclosure. See, e.g., Baidoobonso-Iam v. Bank of America, No. CV 10-9171, 2011 WL 5870065, at *5 (C.D.Cal. Nov. 22, 2011) (“to the extent that Collier’s claim is solely predicated on the foreclosure of his property, California courts have held that such conduct does not state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.”); Smith v. Wachovia, No. C 09-01300, 2009 WL 1948829, at *4 (N.D.Cal. July 6, 2009) (allegations that defendant “wrongfully and intentionally initiated non-judicial foreclosure proceedings” were “not so extreme as to exceed the bounds of civilized society”); Davenport v. Litton Loan Servicing, LP, 725 F.Supp.2d 862, 884 (N.D.Cal.2010) (holding that the act of foreclosing on a home falls shy of outrageous however wrenching the effects on the borrower" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nspecific acts indicating that propensity. Although the State does not advance this argument in its brief, it might be claimed that the defendant had done so by giving direct testimony in which he indicated that he “would” not “under any circumstances” “ever” have hired someone to kill his mother or have told Pope that it was “okay” to kill her. However, we do not believe that such ■ ambiguous statements, which appear to have been made in the context of attempting to show that the defendant had a close and loving relationship with his mother, and, hence, no motive to kill her, can be fairly construed as an unequivocal assertion of good character that would justify cross-examination about prior violence against others generally. Compare United States v. Collier, 29 M.J. 365 (C.M.A.1990) (holding that discharge of a police officer for the choice to enter into a relationship with the wife of his superior officer on the force was rational", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nspecific acts indicating that propensity. Although the State does not advance this argument in its brief, it might be claimed that the defendant had done so by giving direct testimony in which he indicated that he “would” not “under any circumstances” “ever” have hired someone to kill his mother or have told Pope that it was “okay” to kill her. However, we do not believe that such ■ ambiguous statements, which appear to have been made in the context of attempting to show that the defendant had a close and loving relationship with his mother, and, hence, no motive to kill her, can be fairly construed as an unequivocal assertion of good character that would justify cross-examination about prior violence against others generally. Compare United States v. Collier, 29 M.J. 365 (C.M.A.1990) (holding that defendants constitutional right to travel was not abridged when he was ordered not to make contact with the victim he attempted to rape", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nspecific acts indicating that propensity. Although the State does not advance this argument in its brief, it might be claimed that the defendant had done so by giving direct testimony in which he indicated that he “would” not “under any circumstances” “ever” have hired someone to kill his mother or have told Pope that it was “okay” to kill her. However, we do not believe that such ■ ambiguous statements, which appear to have been made in the context of attempting to show that the defendant had a close and loving relationship with his mother, and, hence, no motive to kill her, can be fairly construed as an unequivocal assertion of good character that would justify cross-examination about prior violence against others generally. Compare United States v. Collier, 29 M.J. 365 (C.M.A.1990) (holding that a defendants answer on direct examination that he would have at eased if ordered to do so by a particular superior officer was not an unequivocal assertion that he possessed the character trait of obedience to orders because the defendants answer could be explained by showing a special relationship to that superior officer", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nspecific acts indicating that propensity. Although the State does not advance this argument in its brief, it might be claimed that the defendant had done so by giving direct testimony in which he indicated that he “would” not “under any circumstances” “ever” have hired someone to kill his mother or have told Pope that it was “okay” to kill her. However, we do not believe that such ■ ambiguous statements, which appear to have been made in the context of attempting to show that the defendant had a close and loving relationship with his mother, and, hence, no motive to kill her, can be fairly construed as an unequivocal assertion of good character that would justify cross-examination about prior violence against others generally. Compare United States v. Collier, 29 M.J. 365 (C.M.A.1990) (holding suspects contradictory answers on miranda waiver form that he would answer questions without an attorney and that he wanted to talk to a lawyer to be ambiguous", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nspecific acts indicating that propensity. Although the State does not advance this argument in its brief, it might be claimed that the defendant had done so by giving direct testimony in which he indicated that he “would” not “under any circumstances” “ever” have hired someone to kill his mother or have told Pope that it was “okay” to kill her. However, we do not believe that such ■ ambiguous statements, which appear to have been made in the context of attempting to show that the defendant had a close and loving relationship with his mother, and, hence, no motive to kill her, can be fairly construed as an unequivocal assertion of good character that would justify cross-examination about prior violence against others generally. Compare United States v. Collier, 29 M.J. 365 (C.M.A.1990) (holding that although jury found officer not to have had probable cause for arrest officer was entitled to immunity because law was not clearly established as to circumstances in which officer found himself" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nbetween Nobri-ga and the victim of his Hawaii AFHM conviction does not fall within any of the four categories prescribed by § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii), the government did not establish that Nobriga had .previously been convicted of a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.” Nobriga’s motion to dismiss should therefore have been granted. Nor is there any question as to whether we should correct the error. As our above analysis indicates, the district court’s error was plain and prejudiced Nobriga. A plea based on an offense that the defendant could not have committed as a matter of law satisfies Cotton’s third prong — whether the error affected substantial rights. See Cotton, 535 U.S. at 631, 122 S.Ct. 1781; see also United States v. Choy, 309 F.3d 602, 607-08 & n. 5 (9th Cir.2002) (holding that prosecutorial error does not warrant reversal unless substantial prejudice results", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nbetween Nobri-ga and the victim of his Hawaii AFHM conviction does not fall within any of the four categories prescribed by § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii), the government did not establish that Nobriga had .previously been convicted of a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.” Nobriga’s motion to dismiss should therefore have been granted. Nor is there any question as to whether we should correct the error. As our above analysis indicates, the district court’s error was plain and prejudiced Nobriga. A plea based on an offense that the defendant could not have committed as a matter of law satisfies Cotton’s third prong — whether the error affected substantial rights. See Cotton, 535 U.S. at 631, 122 S.Ct. 1781; see also United States v. Choy, 309 F.3d 602, 607-08 & n. 5 (9th Cir.2002) (holding under a plain error analysis that a failure to charge the jury with an essential element did not warrant reversal of the conviction where the evidence supporting that element was overwhelming", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nbetween Nobri-ga and the victim of his Hawaii AFHM conviction does not fall within any of the four categories prescribed by § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii), the government did not establish that Nobriga had .previously been convicted of a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.” Nobriga’s motion to dismiss should therefore have been granted. Nor is there any question as to whether we should correct the error. As our above analysis indicates, the district court’s error was plain and prejudiced Nobriga. A plea based on an offense that the defendant could not have committed as a matter of law satisfies Cotton’s third prong — whether the error affected substantial rights. See Cotton, 535 U.S. at 631, 122 S.Ct. 1781; see also United States v. Choy, 309 F.3d 602, 607-08 & n. 5 (9th Cir.2002) (holding that even if evidence admitted in error admission must result in material prejudice to warrant reversal", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nbetween Nobri-ga and the victim of his Hawaii AFHM conviction does not fall within any of the four categories prescribed by § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii), the government did not establish that Nobriga had .previously been convicted of a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.” Nobriga’s motion to dismiss should therefore have been granted. Nor is there any question as to whether we should correct the error. As our above analysis indicates, the district court’s error was plain and prejudiced Nobriga. A plea based on an offense that the defendant could not have committed as a matter of law satisfies Cotton’s third prong — whether the error affected substantial rights. See Cotton, 535 U.S. at 631, 122 S.Ct. 1781; see also United States v. Choy, 309 F.3d 602, 607-08 & n. 5 (9th Cir.2002) (holding that a plain error that is fatal to a conviction is sufficient to warrant reversal", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nbetween Nobri-ga and the victim of his Hawaii AFHM conviction does not fall within any of the four categories prescribed by § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii), the government did not establish that Nobriga had .previously been convicted of a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.” Nobriga’s motion to dismiss should therefore have been granted. Nor is there any question as to whether we should correct the error. As our above analysis indicates, the district court’s error was plain and prejudiced Nobriga. A plea based on an offense that the defendant could not have committed as a matter of law satisfies Cotton’s third prong — whether the error affected substantial rights. See Cotton, 535 U.S. at 631, 122 S.Ct. 1781; see also United States v. Choy, 309 F.3d 602, 607-08 & n. 5 (9th Cir.2002) (holding that even if there is error in failing to award nominal damages to a plaintiff such error is not a basis for reversal" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nAmendment, the City has not destroyed “a major portion” of the license’s value. Moore v. City of Costa Mesa, 886 F.2d at 262. Plaintiff has two other wireless communication towers within the City (AR, Ex. 1 at 23), Plaintiff has rejected a site because it would be too “complex” to build upon (AR, Ex. 1 at 22), and Plaintiffs own witnesses have not testified that other sites would be entirely unavailable (See, e.g., AR at 21-22, 27-28). In other words, Plaintiffs FCC license is being used within the City through the two existing towers, and may well be used more if Plaintiff applies at additional sites. Plaintiff has not proven to the satisfaction of this Court that the value of its FCC license has decreased. See United States v. 129.59 Acres of Land, 612 F.2d 459, 462 (9th Cir.1980) (holding that landowner was entitled to compensation because the condemnation destroyed all reasonable access to remainder property", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nAmendment, the City has not destroyed “a major portion” of the license’s value. Moore v. City of Costa Mesa, 886 F.2d at 262. Plaintiff has two other wireless communication towers within the City (AR, Ex. 1 at 23), Plaintiff has rejected a site because it would be too “complex” to build upon (AR, Ex. 1 at 22), and Plaintiffs own witnesses have not testified that other sites would be entirely unavailable (See, e.g., AR at 21-22, 27-28). In other words, Plaintiffs FCC license is being used within the City through the two existing towers, and may well be used more if Plaintiff applies at additional sites. Plaintiff has not proven to the satisfaction of this Court that the value of its FCC license has decreased. See United States v. 129.59 Acres of Land, 612 F.2d 459, 462 (9th Cir.1980) (holding that the party asserting work product protection has the burden of establishing that the doctrine applies", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nAmendment, the City has not destroyed “a major portion” of the license’s value. Moore v. City of Costa Mesa, 886 F.2d at 262. Plaintiff has two other wireless communication towers within the City (AR, Ex. 1 at 23), Plaintiff has rejected a site because it would be too “complex” to build upon (AR, Ex. 1 at 22), and Plaintiffs own witnesses have not testified that other sites would be entirely unavailable (See, e.g., AR at 21-22, 27-28). In other words, Plaintiffs FCC license is being used within the City through the two existing towers, and may well be used more if Plaintiff applies at additional sites. Plaintiff has not proven to the satisfaction of this Court that the value of its FCC license has decreased. See United States v. 129.59 Acres of Land, 612 F.2d 459, 462 (9th Cir.1980) (holding the circuit court has exclusive jurisdiction over condemnation proceedings", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nAmendment, the City has not destroyed “a major portion” of the license’s value. Moore v. City of Costa Mesa, 886 F.2d at 262. Plaintiff has two other wireless communication towers within the City (AR, Ex. 1 at 23), Plaintiff has rejected a site because it would be too “complex” to build upon (AR, Ex. 1 at 22), and Plaintiffs own witnesses have not testified that other sites would be entirely unavailable (See, e.g., AR at 21-22, 27-28). In other words, Plaintiffs FCC license is being used within the City through the two existing towers, and may well be used more if Plaintiff applies at additional sites. Plaintiff has not proven to the satisfaction of this Court that the value of its FCC license has decreased. See United States v. 129.59 Acres of Land, 612 F.2d 459, 462 (9th Cir.1980) (holding that in condemnation proceedings the landowner has the burden of establishing the value of the property", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nAmendment, the City has not destroyed “a major portion” of the license’s value. Moore v. City of Costa Mesa, 886 F.2d at 262. Plaintiff has two other wireless communication towers within the City (AR, Ex. 1 at 23), Plaintiff has rejected a site because it would be too “complex” to build upon (AR, Ex. 1 at 22), and Plaintiffs own witnesses have not testified that other sites would be entirely unavailable (See, e.g., AR at 21-22, 27-28). In other words, Plaintiffs FCC license is being used within the City through the two existing towers, and may well be used more if Plaintiff applies at additional sites. Plaintiff has not proven to the satisfaction of this Court that the value of its FCC license has decreased. See United States v. 129.59 Acres of Land, 612 F.2d 459, 462 (9th Cir.1980) (recognizing no right to damages if landowner retains reasonable access to property after a condemnation" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nis encapsulated in the general negligence principles that apply to any other design professional. 17 . There was a jury finding that the property owner was negligent in hiring and supervising the contractor. McDaniel, 887 S.W.2d at 170. Such a claim is not covered by Strakos v. Gehring, 360 S.W.2d 787, 795-96 (Tex.1962), which we discuss below. 18 . This Court has recently explained in another context that, when a party takes on multiple roles with respect to an event or transaction, the fact that one of those roles is one for which there is no liability (former premises owner) does not shield the party from liability arising out of the other roles (designer of a faulty acid addition system). See Strebel v. Wimberly, 371 S.W.3d 267, 279-81 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. filed) (holding that role as limited partner with no duty did not insulate party from liability for other nonpassive role in partnership which did give rise to duty", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nis encapsulated in the general negligence principles that apply to any other design professional. 17 . There was a jury finding that the property owner was negligent in hiring and supervising the contractor. McDaniel, 887 S.W.2d at 170. Such a claim is not covered by Strakos v. Gehring, 360 S.W.2d 787, 795-96 (Tex.1962), which we discuss below. 18 . This Court has recently explained in another context that, when a party takes on multiple roles with respect to an event or transaction, the fact that one of those roles is one for which there is no liability (former premises owner) does not shield the party from liability arising out of the other roles (designer of a faulty acid addition system). See Strebel v. Wimberly, 371 S.W.3d 267, 279-81 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. filed) (holding the voluntary assumption of a duty will give rise to liability if the performance is not done with reasonable care", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nis encapsulated in the general negligence principles that apply to any other design professional. 17 . There was a jury finding that the property owner was negligent in hiring and supervising the contractor. McDaniel, 887 S.W.2d at 170. Such a claim is not covered by Strakos v. Gehring, 360 S.W.2d 787, 795-96 (Tex.1962), which we discuss below. 18 . This Court has recently explained in another context that, when a party takes on multiple roles with respect to an event or transaction, the fact that one of those roles is one for which there is no liability (former premises owner) does not shield the party from liability arising out of the other roles (designer of a faulty acid addition system). See Strebel v. Wimberly, 371 S.W.3d 267, 279-81 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. filed) (holding only a party to the partnership agreement can breach it and be liable for a breach of fiduciary duty relating to partnership obligations", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nis encapsulated in the general negligence principles that apply to any other design professional. 17 . There was a jury finding that the property owner was negligent in hiring and supervising the contractor. McDaniel, 887 S.W.2d at 170. Such a claim is not covered by Strakos v. Gehring, 360 S.W.2d 787, 795-96 (Tex.1962), which we discuss below. 18 . This Court has recently explained in another context that, when a party takes on multiple roles with respect to an event or transaction, the fact that one of those roles is one for which there is no liability (former premises owner) does not shield the party from liability arising out of the other roles (designer of a faulty acid addition system). See Strebel v. Wimberly, 371 S.W.3d 267, 279-81 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. filed) (holding that under texas law limited partner could not bring breach of fiduciary duty claims without the partnership because the partners claims would be indirect and duplicative of the partnerships claims", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nis encapsulated in the general negligence principles that apply to any other design professional. 17 . There was a jury finding that the property owner was negligent in hiring and supervising the contractor. McDaniel, 887 S.W.2d at 170. Such a claim is not covered by Strakos v. Gehring, 360 S.W.2d 787, 795-96 (Tex.1962), which we discuss below. 18 . This Court has recently explained in another context that, when a party takes on multiple roles with respect to an event or transaction, the fact that one of those roles is one for which there is no liability (former premises owner) does not shield the party from liability arising out of the other roles (designer of a faulty acid addition system). See Strebel v. Wimberly, 371 S.W.3d 267, 279-81 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. filed) (holding partner owes fiduciary duty in dealings effecting the winding up of the partnership and the proper preservation of partnership assets during that time" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthe moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The judge is not to “weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A genuine issue for trial exists only when there is sufficient “evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. B. Brentwood has not waived its 2 S.Ct. 775, 31 L.Ed.2d 124 (1972) (holding a judgment in the absence of notice violates due process rights", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthe moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The judge is not to “weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A genuine issue for trial exists only when there is sufficient “evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. B. Brentwood has not waived its 2 S.Ct. 775, 31 L.Ed.2d 124 (1972) (holding that there is no due process right to appellate review", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthe moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The judge is not to “weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A genuine issue for trial exists only when there is sufficient “evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. B. Brentwood has not waived its 2 S.Ct. 775, 31 L.Ed.2d 124 (1972) (holding that a cognovit clause which provided for judgment without notice or hearing was not unconstitutional per se because due process rights are subject to waiver", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthe moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The judge is not to “weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A genuine issue for trial exists only when there is sufficient “evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. B. Brentwood has not waived its 2 S.Ct. 775, 31 L.Ed.2d 124 (1972) (holding that where there is no unequal bargaining power or overreaching debtors can voluntarily intelligently and knowingly waive due process rights by signing a cognovit note which is an agreement by which a debtor consents in advance to a holders obtaining a judgment without notice or hearing", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthe moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The judge is not to “weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A genuine issue for trial exists only when there is sufficient “evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. B. Brentwood has not waived its 2 S.Ct. 775, 31 L.Ed.2d 124 (1972) (holding that an individual can waive any process to which he or she has a right" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfee award, Defendants do not dispute the district court’s calculation of the lodestar— the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433-34, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983); Norman v. Hous. Auth. of City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1299-1302 (11th Cir.1988). Rather, Defendants contend that the district court was required to reduce the lodestar in proportion to the “partial and extremely limited” success achieved by Quainoo at trial. We disagree. Because Quainoo’s successful and unsuccessful claims were related, as they arose from a common core of facts, the district court was not required to reduce the lodestar. See Popham v. City of Kennesaw, 820 F.2d 1570, 1578-79 (11th Cir.1987) (holding despite not finding undue hardship that it would be equitable to reduce the amount of nondischargeable liability by the amount of the accrued interest", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfee award, Defendants do not dispute the district court’s calculation of the lodestar— the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433-34, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983); Norman v. Hous. Auth. of City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1299-1302 (11th Cir.1988). Rather, Defendants contend that the district court was required to reduce the lodestar in proportion to the “partial and extremely limited” success achieved by Quainoo at trial. We disagree. Because Quainoo’s successful and unsuccessful claims were related, as they arose from a common core of facts, the district court was not required to reduce the lodestar. See Popham v. City of Kennesaw, 820 F.2d 1570, 1578-79 (11th Cir.1987) (holding that claims are related if they involve a common core of facts or they are based on related legal theories", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfee award, Defendants do not dispute the district court’s calculation of the lodestar— the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433-34, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983); Norman v. Hous. Auth. of City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1299-1302 (11th Cir.1988). Rather, Defendants contend that the district court was required to reduce the lodestar in proportion to the “partial and extremely limited” success achieved by Quainoo at trial. We disagree. Because Quainoo’s successful and unsuccessful claims were related, as they arose from a common core of facts, the district court was not required to reduce the lodestar. See Popham v. City of Kennesaw, 820 F.2d 1570, 1578-79 (11th Cir.1987) (holding that a liquidated damages amount set by contract is enforceable where the amount bears a reasonable relation to the damages actually sustained", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfee award, Defendants do not dispute the district court’s calculation of the lodestar— the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433-34, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983); Norman v. Hous. Auth. of City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1299-1302 (11th Cir.1988). Rather, Defendants contend that the district court was required to reduce the lodestar in proportion to the “partial and extremely limited” success achieved by Quainoo at trial. We disagree. Because Quainoo’s successful and unsuccessful claims were related, as they arose from a common core of facts, the district court was not required to reduce the lodestar. See Popham v. City of Kennesaw, 820 F.2d 1570, 1578-79 (11th Cir.1987) (holding that where claims involve a common core of facts or are based on related legal theories and the plaintiff obtained only partial or limited success the court may reduce the lodestar amount if it believes that amount is excessive in relation to the plaintiffs relief emphasis added", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfee award, Defendants do not dispute the district court’s calculation of the lodestar— the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433-34, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983); Norman v. Hous. Auth. of City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1299-1302 (11th Cir.1988). Rather, Defendants contend that the district court was required to reduce the lodestar in proportion to the “partial and extremely limited” success achieved by Quainoo at trial. We disagree. Because Quainoo’s successful and unsuccessful claims were related, as they arose from a common core of facts, the district court was not required to reduce the lodestar. See Popham v. City of Kennesaw, 820 F.2d 1570, 1578-79 (11th Cir.1987) (holding that the presumptive amount is rebuttable and that the court may deviate from the presumptive amount if such amount is determined to be unjust or inappropriate in consideration of any relevant evidence pertaining to the factors set forth in code 201072 and 201081" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nid. at 71, and Brown made no such request. (iv) Findings adequate to support closure. Before deciding to close the courtroom, the trial judge held a hearing at which he took testimony and allowed each party to present argument. He credited certain testimony and he issued a ruling based upon the record. Specifically, as discussed supra, the judge found that the officer “was really concerned for his safety.” While the reasons he gave for concluding that this fear was objectively reasonable were neither entirely accurate nor particularly compelling, the strength of the judge’s findings must be evaluated by reference to the very limited scope of the closure that they support; by that standard, the trial court’s findings were adequate. Cf. Woods v. Kuhlmann, 977 F.2d 74, 77-78 (2d Cir.1992) (holding that the fourth waller factor was satisfied despite the lack of specific findings of fact where the information gleaned from the record was sufficient to support the partial temporary closure of petitioners trial", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nid. at 71, and Brown made no such request. (iv) Findings adequate to support closure. Before deciding to close the courtroom, the trial judge held a hearing at which he took testimony and allowed each party to present argument. He credited certain testimony and he issued a ruling based upon the record. Specifically, as discussed supra, the judge found that the officer “was really concerned for his safety.” While the reasons he gave for concluding that this fear was objectively reasonable were neither entirely accurate nor particularly compelling, the strength of the judge’s findings must be evaluated by reference to the very limited scope of the closure that they support; by that standard, the trial court’s findings were adequate. Cf. Woods v. Kuhlmann, 977 F.2d 74, 77-78 (2d Cir.1992) (holding the trial court is not required to make specific findings of fact on the record for each wham factor if the record contains sufficient evidentiary support for the finding of lack of good cause", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nid. at 71, and Brown made no such request. (iv) Findings adequate to support closure. Before deciding to close the courtroom, the trial judge held a hearing at which he took testimony and allowed each party to present argument. He credited certain testimony and he issued a ruling based upon the record. Specifically, as discussed supra, the judge found that the officer “was really concerned for his safety.” While the reasons he gave for concluding that this fear was objectively reasonable were neither entirely accurate nor particularly compelling, the strength of the judge’s findings must be evaluated by reference to the very limited scope of the closure that they support; by that standard, the trial court’s findings were adequate. Cf. Woods v. Kuhlmann, 977 F.2d 74, 77-78 (2d Cir.1992) (holding the findings of fact required to support an alimony award are sufficient if findings of fact have been made on the ultimate facts at issue in the case and the findings of fact show the trial court properly applied the law in the case", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nid. at 71, and Brown made no such request. (iv) Findings adequate to support closure. Before deciding to close the courtroom, the trial judge held a hearing at which he took testimony and allowed each party to present argument. He credited certain testimony and he issued a ruling based upon the record. Specifically, as discussed supra, the judge found that the officer “was really concerned for his safety.” While the reasons he gave for concluding that this fear was objectively reasonable were neither entirely accurate nor particularly compelling, the strength of the judge’s findings must be evaluated by reference to the very limited scope of the closure that they support; by that standard, the trial court’s findings were adequate. Cf. Woods v. Kuhlmann, 977 F.2d 74, 77-78 (2d Cir.1992) (holding that under waller insufficient space because of the size of the venire and the risk of tainting the jury pool are not compelling reasons for closure", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nid. at 71, and Brown made no such request. (iv) Findings adequate to support closure. Before deciding to close the courtroom, the trial judge held a hearing at which he took testimony and allowed each party to present argument. He credited certain testimony and he issued a ruling based upon the record. Specifically, as discussed supra, the judge found that the officer “was really concerned for his safety.” While the reasons he gave for concluding that this fear was objectively reasonable were neither entirely accurate nor particularly compelling, the strength of the judge’s findings must be evaluated by reference to the very limited scope of the closure that they support; by that standard, the trial court’s findings were adequate. Cf. Woods v. Kuhlmann, 977 F.2d 74, 77-78 (2d Cir.1992) (holding the trial court must make findings adequate to support a closure" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nstrengthened by Congress' express assignment to DOE of the initial adjudication of alleged violations of price control regulations. See 42 U.S.C. § 7193(a). TCC points out that this statute was not made effective until October 1, 1977, after the events in issue here had already occurred. However, the statute was passed well before DOE issued its RO in this case. Moreover, Congress' decision to give DOE express authority to issue remedial orders does not automatically mean that the agency lacked the authority prior to passage of the provision. Courts have held both expressly and impliedly that the Federal Energy Administration (FEA), DOE's predecessor, had power to issue remedial orders before October 1977. See Getty Oil Co. v. Dep’t of Energy, 478 F.Supp. 523, 527, n. 4 (C.D.Cal.1978) (holding the fea had authority to issue a remedial order in september 1976 despite plaintiffs contention that fea had no such power until passage of 42 usc 7193 expressly authorized doe to issue remedial orders", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nstrengthened by Congress' express assignment to DOE of the initial adjudication of alleged violations of price control regulations. See 42 U.S.C. § 7193(a). TCC points out that this statute was not made effective until October 1, 1977, after the events in issue here had already occurred. However, the statute was passed well before DOE issued its RO in this case. Moreover, Congress' decision to give DOE express authority to issue remedial orders does not automatically mean that the agency lacked the authority prior to passage of the provision. Courts have held both expressly and impliedly that the Federal Energy Administration (FEA), DOE's predecessor, had power to issue remedial orders before October 1977. See Getty Oil Co. v. Dep’t of Energy, 478 F.Supp. 523, 527, n. 4 (C.D.Cal.1978) (recognizing that the forest service supervisor had authority to issue orders pursuant to 36 cfr 26150", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nstrengthened by Congress' express assignment to DOE of the initial adjudication of alleged violations of price control regulations. See 42 U.S.C. § 7193(a). TCC points out that this statute was not made effective until October 1, 1977, after the events in issue here had already occurred. However, the statute was passed well before DOE issued its RO in this case. Moreover, Congress' decision to give DOE express authority to issue remedial orders does not automatically mean that the agency lacked the authority prior to passage of the provision. Courts have held both expressly and impliedly that the Federal Energy Administration (FEA), DOE's predecessor, had power to issue remedial orders before October 1977. See Getty Oil Co. v. Dep’t of Energy, 478 F.Supp. 523, 527, n. 4 (C.D.Cal.1978) (holding that failure to raise issue in brief constitutes waiver of appeal of the issue", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nstrengthened by Congress' express assignment to DOE of the initial adjudication of alleged violations of price control regulations. See 42 U.S.C. § 7193(a). TCC points out that this statute was not made effective until October 1, 1977, after the events in issue here had already occurred. However, the statute was passed well before DOE issued its RO in this case. Moreover, Congress' decision to give DOE express authority to issue remedial orders does not automatically mean that the agency lacked the authority prior to passage of the provision. Courts have held both expressly and impliedly that the Federal Energy Administration (FEA), DOE's predecessor, had power to issue remedial orders before October 1977. See Getty Oil Co. v. Dep’t of Energy, 478 F.Supp. 523, 527, n. 4 (C.D.Cal.1978) (holding that inclusion of failure to mitigate damages as an issue in a final pretrial order saved the issue from waiver under rule 8c even though the defendant had failed to plead the issue", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nstrengthened by Congress' express assignment to DOE of the initial adjudication of alleged violations of price control regulations. See 42 U.S.C. § 7193(a). TCC points out that this statute was not made effective until October 1, 1977, after the events in issue here had already occurred. However, the statute was passed well before DOE issued its RO in this case. Moreover, Congress' decision to give DOE express authority to issue remedial orders does not automatically mean that the agency lacked the authority prior to passage of the provision. Courts have held both expressly and impliedly that the Federal Energy Administration (FEA), DOE's predecessor, had power to issue remedial orders before October 1977. See Getty Oil Co. v. Dep’t of Energy, 478 F.Supp. 523, 527, n. 4 (C.D.Cal.1978) (holding that the federal action at issue must be authorized" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nthat may arise when a court addresses the issues whether an objective or subjective intent is required for murder and whether voluntary intoxication can negate the requisite intent. See People v Watson, 30 Cal 3d 290; 637 P2d 279 (1981) (a finding of implied malice depends on a determination that the defendant actually appreciated the risk involved, i.e., a subjective standard); People v Whitfield, 7 Cal 4th 437; 868 P2d 272 (1994) (evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible to determine whether the defendant harbored either express or implied malice for purposes of a second-degree murder conviction. If voluntary intoxication prevented a defendant from forming malice, the defendant cannot be found guilty of murder); People v Reyes, 52 Cal App 4th 975; 61 Cal Rptr 2d 39 (1997) (holding that a refusal to perform field sobriety tests was admissible as evidence of intoxication", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nthat may arise when a court addresses the issues whether an objective or subjective intent is required for murder and whether voluntary intoxication can negate the requisite intent. See People v Watson, 30 Cal 3d 290; 637 P2d 279 (1981) (a finding of implied malice depends on a determination that the defendant actually appreciated the risk involved, i.e., a subjective standard); People v Whitfield, 7 Cal 4th 437; 868 P2d 272 (1994) (evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible to determine whether the defendant harbored either express or implied malice for purposes of a second-degree murder conviction. If voluntary intoxication prevented a defendant from forming malice, the defendant cannot be found guilty of murder); People v Reyes, 52 Cal App 4th 975; 61 Cal Rptr 2d 39 (1997) (holding that under florida precedent trial court erred in excluding expert testimony on intoxication as voluntary intoxication was a valid defense to a specific intent crime and expert testimony is relevant to a disputed voluntary intoxication defense", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nthat may arise when a court addresses the issues whether an objective or subjective intent is required for murder and whether voluntary intoxication can negate the requisite intent. See People v Watson, 30 Cal 3d 290; 637 P2d 279 (1981) (a finding of implied malice depends on a determination that the defendant actually appreciated the risk involved, i.e., a subjective standard); People v Whitfield, 7 Cal 4th 437; 868 P2d 272 (1994) (evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible to determine whether the defendant harbored either express or implied malice for purposes of a second-degree murder conviction. If voluntary intoxication prevented a defendant from forming malice, the defendant cannot be found guilty of murder); People v Reyes, 52 Cal App 4th 975; 61 Cal Rptr 2d 39 (1997) (holding such intoxication to be voluntary", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nthat may arise when a court addresses the issues whether an objective or subjective intent is required for murder and whether voluntary intoxication can negate the requisite intent. See People v Watson, 30 Cal 3d 290; 637 P2d 279 (1981) (a finding of implied malice depends on a determination that the defendant actually appreciated the risk involved, i.e., a subjective standard); People v Whitfield, 7 Cal 4th 437; 868 P2d 272 (1994) (evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible to determine whether the defendant harbored either express or implied malice for purposes of a second-degree murder conviction. If voluntary intoxication prevented a defendant from forming malice, the defendant cannot be found guilty of murder); People v Reyes, 52 Cal App 4th 975; 61 Cal Rptr 2d 39 (1997) (holding that a defendants insanity due to voluntary intoxication is not a defense", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nthat may arise when a court addresses the issues whether an objective or subjective intent is required for murder and whether voluntary intoxication can negate the requisite intent. See People v Watson, 30 Cal 3d 290; 637 P2d 279 (1981) (a finding of implied malice depends on a determination that the defendant actually appreciated the risk involved, i.e., a subjective standard); People v Whitfield, 7 Cal 4th 437; 868 P2d 272 (1994) (evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible to determine whether the defendant harbored either express or implied malice for purposes of a second-degree murder conviction. If voluntary intoxication prevented a defendant from forming malice, the defendant cannot be found guilty of murder); People v Reyes, 52 Cal App 4th 975; 61 Cal Rptr 2d 39 (1997) (recognizing that the holding of people v whitfield was superseded by a 1995 statutory amendment that provided that evidence of voluntary intoxication is no longer admissible on the issue of implied malice aforethought" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nCourt, however, need not decide the issue on this record. 9 . The two sections may simply reflect legislative changes in the bills. The original bills, S. 830 and S. 788, contained the provisions of § 633(a), but neither § 633(b) nor § 626(d). Those provisions were added subsequent to hearings. Section 633(b), added in response to testimony concerning § 633(a), is not necessarily intended to be distinct from § 626. 10 . Current case law has only dealt with § 626(d) as jurisdictional. (Hiscott, supra; Powell v. Southwestern Bell, 494 F.2d 485 (5 Cir. 1974); Edwards v. Kaiser Aluminum, 515 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir. 1975)). In addition, there has been some tendency to isolate § 626(d) as containing the jurisdictional prerequisites. (See Ott v. Midland Ross Corp., 523 F.2d 1367 (6th Cir. 1975) (holding that exhaustion is mandatory and jurisdictional", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nCourt, however, need not decide the issue on this record. 9 . The two sections may simply reflect legislative changes in the bills. The original bills, S. 830 and S. 788, contained the provisions of § 633(a), but neither § 633(b) nor § 626(d). Those provisions were added subsequent to hearings. Section 633(b), added in response to testimony concerning § 633(a), is not necessarily intended to be distinct from § 626. 10 . Current case law has only dealt with § 626(d) as jurisdictional. (Hiscott, supra; Powell v. Southwestern Bell, 494 F.2d 485 (5 Cir. 1974); Edwards v. Kaiser Aluminum, 515 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir. 1975)). In addition, there has been some tendency to isolate § 626(d) as containing the jurisdictional prerequisites. (See Ott v. Midland Ross Corp., 523 F.2d 1367 (6th Cir. 1975) (holding that the aedpa statute of limitations is not jurisdictional", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nCourt, however, need not decide the issue on this record. 9 . The two sections may simply reflect legislative changes in the bills. The original bills, S. 830 and S. 788, contained the provisions of § 633(a), but neither § 633(b) nor § 626(d). Those provisions were added subsequent to hearings. Section 633(b), added in response to testimony concerning § 633(a), is not necessarily intended to be distinct from § 626. 10 . Current case law has only dealt with § 626(d) as jurisdictional. (Hiscott, supra; Powell v. Southwestern Bell, 494 F.2d 485 (5 Cir. 1974); Edwards v. Kaiser Aluminum, 515 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir. 1975)). In addition, there has been some tendency to isolate § 626(d) as containing the jurisdictional prerequisites. (See Ott v. Midland Ross Corp., 523 F.2d 1367 (6th Cir. 1975) (holding that exhaustion of issues is jurisdictional", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nCourt, however, need not decide the issue on this record. 9 . The two sections may simply reflect legislative changes in the bills. The original bills, S. 830 and S. 788, contained the provisions of § 633(a), but neither § 633(b) nor § 626(d). Those provisions were added subsequent to hearings. Section 633(b), added in response to testimony concerning § 633(a), is not necessarily intended to be distinct from § 626. 10 . Current case law has only dealt with § 626(d) as jurisdictional. (Hiscott, supra; Powell v. Southwestern Bell, 494 F.2d 485 (5 Cir. 1974); Edwards v. Kaiser Aluminum, 515 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir. 1975)). In addition, there has been some tendency to isolate § 626(d) as containing the jurisdictional prerequisites. (See Ott v. Midland Ross Corp., 523 F.2d 1367 (6th Cir. 1975) (holding immunity from liability is not jurisdictional", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nCourt, however, need not decide the issue on this record. 9 . The two sections may simply reflect legislative changes in the bills. The original bills, S. 830 and S. 788, contained the provisions of § 633(a), but neither § 633(b) nor § 626(d). Those provisions were added subsequent to hearings. Section 633(b), added in response to testimony concerning § 633(a), is not necessarily intended to be distinct from § 626. 10 . Current case law has only dealt with § 626(d) as jurisdictional. (Hiscott, supra; Powell v. Southwestern Bell, 494 F.2d 485 (5 Cir. 1974); Edwards v. Kaiser Aluminum, 515 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir. 1975)). In addition, there has been some tendency to isolate § 626(d) as containing the jurisdictional prerequisites. (See Ott v. Midland Ross Corp., 523 F.2d 1367 (6th Cir. 1975) (holding that while 626d is jurisdictional 626e is not" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n(applying a formula to divide varying sources of commingled funds because “equity dictates that all ... funds be distributed on a pro rata basis”), rev’d on other grounds, 875 F.2d 76 (4th Cir.1989); In re Leedy Mortgage Co., 111 B.R. 488, 489 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1990) (disallowing differential distribution of funds based on the “precept that preferences or priorities to creditors should be carefully assessed and allowed only when legally or equitably justified”); In re Independence Land Title Corp. of Ill, 18 B.R. 673, 674 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1982) (“[I]t would thwart the general bankruptcy principle of equality of distribution to creditors of equal status if this court allowed [defendant] to receive all the funds held by the trustee.”); In re Johnson, 121 N.J. 244, 244, 579 A.2d 815, 815 (1990) (holding that under 42 usc 407a social security benefits commingled with other nonexempt funds in a bank account remain exempt if the funds are reasonably traceable to social security income", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n(applying a formula to divide varying sources of commingled funds because “equity dictates that all ... funds be distributed on a pro rata basis”), rev’d on other grounds, 875 F.2d 76 (4th Cir.1989); In re Leedy Mortgage Co., 111 B.R. 488, 489 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1990) (disallowing differential distribution of funds based on the “precept that preferences or priorities to creditors should be carefully assessed and allowed only when legally or equitably justified”); In re Independence Land Title Corp. of Ill, 18 B.R. 673, 674 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1982) (“[I]t would thwart the general bankruptcy principle of equality of distribution to creditors of equal status if this court allowed [defendant] to receive all the funds held by the trustee.”); In re Johnson, 121 N.J. 244, 244, 579 A.2d 815, 815 (1990) (holding the commissions recommendation that the attorney be ordered to refund his clients funds could not be adopted because the stipulation failed to detail the amount of such funds and no witness testimony or evidence was taken on the matter", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n(applying a formula to divide varying sources of commingled funds because “equity dictates that all ... funds be distributed on a pro rata basis”), rev’d on other grounds, 875 F.2d 76 (4th Cir.1989); In re Leedy Mortgage Co., 111 B.R. 488, 489 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1990) (disallowing differential distribution of funds based on the “precept that preferences or priorities to creditors should be carefully assessed and allowed only when legally or equitably justified”); In re Independence Land Title Corp. of Ill, 18 B.R. 673, 674 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1982) (“[I]t would thwart the general bankruptcy principle of equality of distribution to creditors of equal status if this court allowed [defendant] to receive all the funds held by the trustee.”); In re Johnson, 121 N.J. 244, 244, 579 A.2d 815, 815 (1990) (holding that companys president was trustee of trust funds because he had control and direction over the funds", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n(applying a formula to divide varying sources of commingled funds because “equity dictates that all ... funds be distributed on a pro rata basis”), rev’d on other grounds, 875 F.2d 76 (4th Cir.1989); In re Leedy Mortgage Co., 111 B.R. 488, 489 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1990) (disallowing differential distribution of funds based on the “precept that preferences or priorities to creditors should be carefully assessed and allowed only when legally or equitably justified”); In re Independence Land Title Corp. of Ill, 18 B.R. 673, 674 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1982) (“[I]t would thwart the general bankruptcy principle of equality of distribution to creditors of equal status if this court allowed [defendant] to receive all the funds held by the trustee.”); In re Johnson, 121 N.J. 244, 244, 579 A.2d 815, 815 (1990) (holding that in a case where a suspended attorney commingled funds between his attorney trust account and attorney business account and the funds could not be traced claimants state of new jersey and clients security fund reached an amicable agreement to divide the funds equally", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n(applying a formula to divide varying sources of commingled funds because “equity dictates that all ... funds be distributed on a pro rata basis”), rev’d on other grounds, 875 F.2d 76 (4th Cir.1989); In re Leedy Mortgage Co., 111 B.R. 488, 489 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1990) (disallowing differential distribution of funds based on the “precept that preferences or priorities to creditors should be carefully assessed and allowed only when legally or equitably justified”); In re Independence Land Title Corp. of Ill, 18 B.R. 673, 674 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1982) (“[I]t would thwart the general bankruptcy principle of equality of distribution to creditors of equal status if this court allowed [defendant] to receive all the funds held by the trustee.”); In re Johnson, 121 N.J. 244, 244, 579 A.2d 815, 815 (1990) (holding both a party and his attorney liable to repay funds withdrawn in violation of a stay where the attorney violated this courts orders and concealed the fund" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nnot constitute ineffective assistance. With regard to Valerie Goins, trial counsel testified that he decided not to call her as a witness because she would have testified that Howard returned home that night around 12:30 a.m., which was inconsistent with the statement Howard provided to law enforcement about being with Patricia and her cousin all night. As previously noted, the determination as to which defense witnesses will be called is “purely a matter of trial strategy and tactics, and trial strategy and tactics do not equate with ineffective assistance of counsel.” And given trial counsel’s reasonable explanation for his strategy here, his decision to not call Goins as a witness certainly did not render his assistance ineffective. (b) , 290 Ga. 574, 575 (2) (722 SE2d 763) (2012) (holding that failure to object to admissible evidence was not ineffective assistance of counsel", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nnot constitute ineffective assistance. With regard to Valerie Goins, trial counsel testified that he decided not to call her as a witness because she would have testified that Howard returned home that night around 12:30 a.m., which was inconsistent with the statement Howard provided to law enforcement about being with Patricia and her cousin all night. As previously noted, the determination as to which defense witnesses will be called is “purely a matter of trial strategy and tactics, and trial strategy and tactics do not equate with ineffective assistance of counsel.” And given trial counsel’s reasonable explanation for his strategy here, his decision to not call Goins as a witness certainly did not render his assistance ineffective. (b) , 290 Ga. 574, 575 (2) (722 SE2d 763) (2012) (holding that defendants conclusory allegation that trial counsel failed to object to leading questions without specifying such instances did not support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nnot constitute ineffective assistance. With regard to Valerie Goins, trial counsel testified that he decided not to call her as a witness because she would have testified that Howard returned home that night around 12:30 a.m., which was inconsistent with the statement Howard provided to law enforcement about being with Patricia and her cousin all night. As previously noted, the determination as to which defense witnesses will be called is “purely a matter of trial strategy and tactics, and trial strategy and tactics do not equate with ineffective assistance of counsel.” And given trial counsel’s reasonable explanation for his strategy here, his decision to not call Goins as a witness certainly did not render his assistance ineffective. (b) , 290 Ga. 574, 575 (2) (722 SE2d 763) (2012) (holding that where trial counsel was not ineffective appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nnot constitute ineffective assistance. With regard to Valerie Goins, trial counsel testified that he decided not to call her as a witness because she would have testified that Howard returned home that night around 12:30 a.m., which was inconsistent with the statement Howard provided to law enforcement about being with Patricia and her cousin all night. As previously noted, the determination as to which defense witnesses will be called is “purely a matter of trial strategy and tactics, and trial strategy and tactics do not equate with ineffective assistance of counsel.” And given trial counsel’s reasonable explanation for his strategy here, his decision to not call Goins as a witness certainly did not render his assistance ineffective. (b) , 290 Ga. 574, 575 (2) (722 SE2d 763) (2012) (recognizing a constitutional claim for ineffective assistance of counsel", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nnot constitute ineffective assistance. With regard to Valerie Goins, trial counsel testified that he decided not to call her as a witness because she would have testified that Howard returned home that night around 12:30 a.m., which was inconsistent with the statement Howard provided to law enforcement about being with Patricia and her cousin all night. As previously noted, the determination as to which defense witnesses will be called is “purely a matter of trial strategy and tactics, and trial strategy and tactics do not equate with ineffective assistance of counsel.” And given trial counsel’s reasonable explanation for his strategy here, his decision to not call Goins as a witness certainly did not render his assistance ineffective. (b) , 290 Ga. 574, 575 (2) (722 SE2d 763) (2012) (holding that defendant failed to show that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not objecting to the states leading questions when there was no evidence that such failure was not based on trial strategy" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\n§ 78dd-l et seq. (2000). 3 . United States v. Kay, 200 F.Supp.2d 681, 686 (S.D.Tex.2002). 4 . United States v. Santos-Riviera, 183 F.3d 367, 369 (5th Cir.1999). 5 . United States v. Hogue, 132 F.3d 1087, 1089 (5th Cir.1998). 6 . United States v. Bearden, 423 F.2d 805, 810 (5th Cir.1970) (citations omitted). 7 . United States v. Ramirez, 233 F.3d 318, 323 (5th Cir.2000). 8 . Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. 447 U.S. 102, 108, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980). 9 . Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 57, 118 S.Ct. 469, 139 L.Ed.2d 352 (1997) (citations and quotation marks omitted). 10 . United States v. Lowe, 118 F.3d 399, 402 (5th Cir.1997) (citations omitted). 11 . United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 36, 112 S.Ct. 1011, 117 L.Ed.2d 181 (1992) (recognizing principle", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\n§ 78dd-l et seq. (2000). 3 . United States v. Kay, 200 F.Supp.2d 681, 686 (S.D.Tex.2002). 4 . United States v. Santos-Riviera, 183 F.3d 367, 369 (5th Cir.1999). 5 . United States v. Hogue, 132 F.3d 1087, 1089 (5th Cir.1998). 6 . United States v. Bearden, 423 F.2d 805, 810 (5th Cir.1970) (citations omitted). 7 . United States v. Ramirez, 233 F.3d 318, 323 (5th Cir.2000). 8 . Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. 447 U.S. 102, 108, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980). 9 . Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 57, 118 S.Ct. 469, 139 L.Ed.2d 352 (1997) (citations and quotation marks omitted). 10 . United States v. Lowe, 118 F.3d 399, 402 (5th Cir.1997) (citations omitted). 11 . United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 36, 112 S.Ct. 1011, 117 L.Ed.2d 181 (1992) (recognizing this as the general rule", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\n§ 78dd-l et seq. (2000). 3 . United States v. Kay, 200 F.Supp.2d 681, 686 (S.D.Tex.2002). 4 . United States v. Santos-Riviera, 183 F.3d 367, 369 (5th Cir.1999). 5 . United States v. Hogue, 132 F.3d 1087, 1089 (5th Cir.1998). 6 . United States v. Bearden, 423 F.2d 805, 810 (5th Cir.1970) (citations omitted). 7 . United States v. Ramirez, 233 F.3d 318, 323 (5th Cir.2000). 8 . Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. 447 U.S. 102, 108, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980). 9 . Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 57, 118 S.Ct. 469, 139 L.Ed.2d 352 (1997) (citations and quotation marks omitted). 10 . United States v. Lowe, 118 F.3d 399, 402 (5th Cir.1997) (citations omitted). 11 . United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 36, 112 S.Ct. 1011, 117 L.Ed.2d 181 (1992) (recognizing this rule", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\n§ 78dd-l et seq. (2000). 3 . United States v. Kay, 200 F.Supp.2d 681, 686 (S.D.Tex.2002). 4 . United States v. Santos-Riviera, 183 F.3d 367, 369 (5th Cir.1999). 5 . United States v. Hogue, 132 F.3d 1087, 1089 (5th Cir.1998). 6 . United States v. Bearden, 423 F.2d 805, 810 (5th Cir.1970) (citations omitted). 7 . United States v. Ramirez, 233 F.3d 318, 323 (5th Cir.2000). 8 . Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. 447 U.S. 102, 108, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980). 9 . Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 57, 118 S.Ct. 469, 139 L.Ed.2d 352 (1997) (citations and quotation marks omitted). 10 . United States v. Lowe, 118 F.3d 399, 402 (5th Cir.1997) (citations omitted). 11 . United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 36, 112 S.Ct. 1011, 117 L.Ed.2d 181 (1992) (recognizing same principle", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\n§ 78dd-l et seq. (2000). 3 . United States v. Kay, 200 F.Supp.2d 681, 686 (S.D.Tex.2002). 4 . United States v. Santos-Riviera, 183 F.3d 367, 369 (5th Cir.1999). 5 . United States v. Hogue, 132 F.3d 1087, 1089 (5th Cir.1998). 6 . United States v. Bearden, 423 F.2d 805, 810 (5th Cir.1970) (citations omitted). 7 . United States v. Ramirez, 233 F.3d 318, 323 (5th Cir.2000). 8 . Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. 447 U.S. 102, 108, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980). 9 . Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 57, 118 S.Ct. 469, 139 L.Ed.2d 352 (1997) (citations and quotation marks omitted). 10 . United States v. Lowe, 118 F.3d 399, 402 (5th Cir.1997) (citations omitted). 11 . United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 36, 112 S.Ct. 1011, 117 L.Ed.2d 181 (1992) (recognizing this principle as a settled rule" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nground or theory apparent on the record.\" Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, ¶ 13, 52 P.3d 1158 (emphases, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted). ' 51 Whether an employee such as Carsey owed a fiduciary duty to his employer is unclear under Utah law. See Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler v. Young, 2004 UT 26, ¶ 22 n. 2, 94 P.3d 179 (\"We need not, and do not, decide today whether all 'mere employees' owe fiduciary duties to their employers to not compete with the employer's legitimate business interests.\"). However, we need not grapple with this issue here, as we agree with Carsey that CDC's breach of fiduciary duty claim is preempted by the UTSA. [ 52 Examination of the factual allegations underlying CDC's breach of fiduciary duty claim shows that this claim is b 857-58 & n. 3 (2000) (holding that utsa preempted a breach of fiduciary duty claim because it was completely dependent on the facts concerning misappropriation of trade secrets", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nground or theory apparent on the record.\" Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, ¶ 13, 52 P.3d 1158 (emphases, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted). ' 51 Whether an employee such as Carsey owed a fiduciary duty to his employer is unclear under Utah law. See Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler v. Young, 2004 UT 26, ¶ 22 n. 2, 94 P.3d 179 (\"We need not, and do not, decide today whether all 'mere employees' owe fiduciary duties to their employers to not compete with the employer's legitimate business interests.\"). However, we need not grapple with this issue here, as we agree with Carsey that CDC's breach of fiduciary duty claim is preempted by the UTSA. [ 52 Examination of the factual allegations underlying CDC's breach of fiduciary duty claim shows that this claim is b 857-58 & n. 3 (2000) (holding that utsa preempted a breach of fiduciary duty claim because it was solely dependent upon misappropriationoftradesecret facts", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nground or theory apparent on the record.\" Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, ¶ 13, 52 P.3d 1158 (emphases, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted). ' 51 Whether an employee such as Carsey owed a fiduciary duty to his employer is unclear under Utah law. See Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler v. Young, 2004 UT 26, ¶ 22 n. 2, 94 P.3d 179 (\"We need not, and do not, decide today whether all 'mere employees' owe fiduciary duties to their employers to not compete with the employer's legitimate business interests.\"). However, we need not grapple with this issue here, as we agree with Carsey that CDC's breach of fiduciary duty claim is preempted by the UTSA. [ 52 Examination of the factual allegations underlying CDC's breach of fiduciary duty claim shows that this claim is b 857-58 & n. 3 (2000) (holding that breach of fiduciary duty claim was preempted by fehba", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nground or theory apparent on the record.\" Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, ¶ 13, 52 P.3d 1158 (emphases, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted). ' 51 Whether an employee such as Carsey owed a fiduciary duty to his employer is unclear under Utah law. See Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler v. Young, 2004 UT 26, ¶ 22 n. 2, 94 P.3d 179 (\"We need not, and do not, decide today whether all 'mere employees' owe fiduciary duties to their employers to not compete with the employer's legitimate business interests.\"). However, we need not grapple with this issue here, as we agree with Carsey that CDC's breach of fiduciary duty claim is preempted by the UTSA. [ 52 Examination of the factual allegations underlying CDC's breach of fiduciary duty claim shows that this claim is b 857-58 & n. 3 (2000) (holding copyright act preempted photographers misappropriation claim when claim did not have extra element such as breach of fiduciary duty", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nground or theory apparent on the record.\" Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, ¶ 13, 52 P.3d 1158 (emphases, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted). ' 51 Whether an employee such as Carsey owed a fiduciary duty to his employer is unclear under Utah law. See Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler v. Young, 2004 UT 26, ¶ 22 n. 2, 94 P.3d 179 (\"We need not, and do not, decide today whether all 'mere employees' owe fiduciary duties to their employers to not compete with the employer's legitimate business interests.\"). However, we need not grapple with this issue here, as we agree with Carsey that CDC's breach of fiduciary duty claim is preempted by the UTSA. [ 52 Examination of the factual allegations underlying CDC's breach of fiduciary duty claim shows that this claim is b 857-58 & n. 3 (2000) (holding that utsa preempted a breach of fiduciary duty claim because the factual allegations supporting that claim involved only the misappropriation of information" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nwhich authorizes use of force to \"defend the national security of the United States ... and ... enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions,” 116 Stat. at 1501, excludes any action that is not called for by a Security Council resolution. They support their reading by reference to the October Resolution’s preamble and to legislative history. 6 .While the Supreme Court has not considered a modern war powers case, lower courts have, and they have reached differing conclusions about the applicability of the political question doctrine. Compare, e.g., Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 37-41 (D.C.Cir.2000) (Tatel, J., concurring) (arguing that challenge to air campaign in Yugoslavia would not pose a political question); Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302, 306 (2d Cir.1970) (holding that party waived public policy challenge by failing to raise it during arbitration", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nwhich authorizes use of force to \"defend the national security of the United States ... and ... enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions,” 116 Stat. at 1501, excludes any action that is not called for by a Security Council resolution. They support their reading by reference to the October Resolution’s preamble and to legislative history. 6 .While the Supreme Court has not considered a modern war powers case, lower courts have, and they have reached differing conclusions about the applicability of the political question doctrine. Compare, e.g., Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 37-41 (D.C.Cir.2000) (Tatel, J., concurring) (arguing that challenge to air campaign in Yugoslavia would not pose a political question); Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302, 306 (2d Cir.1970) (holding the government waived its argument on appeal that the defendant did not have standing to challenge a search when it failed to raise the argument to the district court", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nwhich authorizes use of force to \"defend the national security of the United States ... and ... enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions,” 116 Stat. at 1501, excludes any action that is not called for by a Security Council resolution. They support their reading by reference to the October Resolution’s preamble and to legislative history. 6 .While the Supreme Court has not considered a modern war powers case, lower courts have, and they have reached differing conclusions about the applicability of the political question doctrine. Compare, e.g., Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 37-41 (D.C.Cir.2000) (Tatel, J., concurring) (arguing that challenge to air campaign in Yugoslavia would not pose a political question); Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302, 306 (2d Cir.1970) (holding that challenge to vietnam war did not necessarily raise political question and remanding", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nwhich authorizes use of force to \"defend the national security of the United States ... and ... enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions,” 116 Stat. at 1501, excludes any action that is not called for by a Security Council resolution. They support their reading by reference to the October Resolution’s preamble and to legislative history. 6 .While the Supreme Court has not considered a modern war powers case, lower courts have, and they have reached differing conclusions about the applicability of the political question doctrine. Compare, e.g., Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 37-41 (D.C.Cir.2000) (Tatel, J., concurring) (arguing that challenge to air campaign in Yugoslavia would not pose a political question); Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302, 306 (2d Cir.1970) (holding that similar argument did not raise a colorable question of law for purposes of jurisdiction", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nwhich authorizes use of force to \"defend the national security of the United States ... and ... enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions,” 116 Stat. at 1501, excludes any action that is not called for by a Security Council resolution. They support their reading by reference to the October Resolution’s preamble and to legislative history. 6 .While the Supreme Court has not considered a modern war powers case, lower courts have, and they have reached differing conclusions about the applicability of the political question doctrine. Compare, e.g., Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 37-41 (D.C.Cir.2000) (Tatel, J., concurring) (arguing that challenge to air campaign in Yugoslavia would not pose a political question); Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302, 306 (2d Cir.1970) (holding that the plaintiffs claims against volkswagen and others did not necessarily raise a federal question since they were also based on the assertion that the plaintiffs vehicle did not comply with state law" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nKormanik v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., No. 5:01CV2122 (N.D.Ohio Oct. 19, 2001), a Scott-Pontzer case with facts substantially similar to those in the instant case. In the wake of Kormanik, a number of other courts in the Northern District, including this one, have adopted similar reasoning when remanding Scott-Pontzer cases. See Butler v. Zurich American Ins. Co., 184 F.Supp.2d 695 (N.D.Ohio 2002) (Katz, J.); Stubbins v. Nationwide Agribusiness, 181 F.Supp.2d 805 (N.D.Ohio 2002) (Carr, J.) (collecting cases); Comella v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 177 F.Supp.2d 704, (N.D.Ohio 2001) (O’Malley, J.); Kohus v. Hartford Ins. Co., No. 1:01CV01179 (N.D.Ohio Nov. 19, 2001) (Matia, C.J.); but see Redmon v. Sumitomo Marine Mgmt. (USA), Inc., 179 F.Supp.2d 787 (N.D.Ohio 2001) (Aldrich, J.) (holding that shareholders had standing to bring derivative suit against the government but not direct suit due to lack of privity", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nKormanik v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., No. 5:01CV2122 (N.D.Ohio Oct. 19, 2001), a Scott-Pontzer case with facts substantially similar to those in the instant case. In the wake of Kormanik, a number of other courts in the Northern District, including this one, have adopted similar reasoning when remanding Scott-Pontzer cases. See Butler v. Zurich American Ins. Co., 184 F.Supp.2d 695 (N.D.Ohio 2002) (Katz, J.); Stubbins v. Nationwide Agribusiness, 181 F.Supp.2d 805 (N.D.Ohio 2002) (Carr, J.) (collecting cases); Comella v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 177 F.Supp.2d 704, (N.D.Ohio 2001) (O’Malley, J.); Kohus v. Hartford Ins. Co., No. 1:01CV01179 (N.D.Ohio Nov. 19, 2001) (Matia, C.J.); but see Redmon v. Sumitomo Marine Mgmt. (USA), Inc., 179 F.Supp.2d 787 (N.D.Ohio 2001) (Aldrich, J.) (holding that a prior suit and a subsequent suit between the same parties did not involve the same claim because the evidence necessary to sustain the subsequent suit was insufficient to entitle the plaintiff to relief in the prior suit", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nKormanik v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., No. 5:01CV2122 (N.D.Ohio Oct. 19, 2001), a Scott-Pontzer case with facts substantially similar to those in the instant case. In the wake of Kormanik, a number of other courts in the Northern District, including this one, have adopted similar reasoning when remanding Scott-Pontzer cases. See Butler v. Zurich American Ins. Co., 184 F.Supp.2d 695 (N.D.Ohio 2002) (Katz, J.); Stubbins v. Nationwide Agribusiness, 181 F.Supp.2d 805 (N.D.Ohio 2002) (Carr, J.) (collecting cases); Comella v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 177 F.Supp.2d 704, (N.D.Ohio 2001) (O’Malley, J.); Kohus v. Hartford Ins. Co., No. 1:01CV01179 (N.D.Ohio Nov. 19, 2001) (Matia, C.J.); but see Redmon v. Sumitomo Marine Mgmt. (USA), Inc., 179 F.Supp.2d 787 (N.D.Ohio 2001) (Aldrich, J.) (holding that scottrpontzer suit was not a direct action", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nKormanik v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., No. 5:01CV2122 (N.D.Ohio Oct. 19, 2001), a Scott-Pontzer case with facts substantially similar to those in the instant case. In the wake of Kormanik, a number of other courts in the Northern District, including this one, have adopted similar reasoning when remanding Scott-Pontzer cases. See Butler v. Zurich American Ins. Co., 184 F.Supp.2d 695 (N.D.Ohio 2002) (Katz, J.); Stubbins v. Nationwide Agribusiness, 181 F.Supp.2d 805 (N.D.Ohio 2002) (Carr, J.) (collecting cases); Comella v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 177 F.Supp.2d 704, (N.D.Ohio 2001) (O’Malley, J.); Kohus v. Hartford Ins. Co., No. 1:01CV01179 (N.D.Ohio Nov. 19, 2001) (Matia, C.J.); but see Redmon v. Sumitomo Marine Mgmt. (USA), Inc., 179 F.Supp.2d 787 (N.D.Ohio 2001) (Aldrich, J.) (holding a suit against an agency of the state is a suit against the state", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nKormanik v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., No. 5:01CV2122 (N.D.Ohio Oct. 19, 2001), a Scott-Pontzer case with facts substantially similar to those in the instant case. In the wake of Kormanik, a number of other courts in the Northern District, including this one, have adopted similar reasoning when remanding Scott-Pontzer cases. See Butler v. Zurich American Ins. Co., 184 F.Supp.2d 695 (N.D.Ohio 2002) (Katz, J.); Stubbins v. Nationwide Agribusiness, 181 F.Supp.2d 805 (N.D.Ohio 2002) (Carr, J.) (collecting cases); Comella v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 177 F.Supp.2d 704, (N.D.Ohio 2001) (O’Malley, J.); Kohus v. Hartford Ins. Co., No. 1:01CV01179 (N.D.Ohio Nov. 19, 2001) (Matia, C.J.); but see Redmon v. Sumitomo Marine Mgmt. (USA), Inc., 179 F.Supp.2d 787 (N.D.Ohio 2001) (Aldrich, J.) (holding that dismissal is proper for a derivative cause of action but not for a direct cause of action" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nfor any potential ... overpayments.” Def.’s Reply at 5. In light of the absence of any “meaningful standard by which a court could review the exercise of [the agency’s] discretion,” Def.’s Mot. at 10, and Congress’s choice of precatory statutory language (“may compromise”), the court, supposedly, cannot review the defendant’s decision without intruding upon administrative prerogative. A court may not review an agency action where “(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 828, 105 S.Ct. 1649, 84 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985). The APA’s ban on judicial review of such actions is jurisdictional. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 252 F.3d 456, 459 (D.C.Cir.2001) (holding that ban on unauthorized practice of law did not implicate the first amendment", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nfor any potential ... overpayments.” Def.’s Reply at 5. In light of the absence of any “meaningful standard by which a court could review the exercise of [the agency’s] discretion,” Def.’s Mot. at 10, and Congress’s choice of precatory statutory language (“may compromise”), the court, supposedly, cannot review the defendant’s decision without intruding upon administrative prerogative. A court may not review an agency action where “(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 828, 105 S.Ct. 1649, 84 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985). The APA’s ban on judicial review of such actions is jurisdictional. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 252 F.3d 456, 459 (D.C.Cir.2001) (holding that the faas action in this case was analogous to an exercise of prosecutorial discretion and noting that when prosecutorial discretion is at issue the matter is presumptively committed to agency discretion by law", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nfor any potential ... overpayments.” Def.’s Reply at 5. In light of the absence of any “meaningful standard by which a court could review the exercise of [the agency’s] discretion,” Def.’s Mot. at 10, and Congress’s choice of precatory statutory language (“may compromise”), the court, supposedly, cannot review the defendant’s decision without intruding upon administrative prerogative. A court may not review an agency action where “(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 828, 105 S.Ct. 1649, 84 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985). The APA’s ban on judicial review of such actions is jurisdictional. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 252 F.3d 456, 459 (D.C.Cir.2001) (holding that judicial actions based upon a misapprehension of law constitute an abuse of discretion", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nfor any potential ... overpayments.” Def.’s Reply at 5. In light of the absence of any “meaningful standard by which a court could review the exercise of [the agency’s] discretion,” Def.’s Mot. at 10, and Congress’s choice of precatory statutory language (“may compromise”), the court, supposedly, cannot review the defendant’s decision without intruding upon administrative prerogative. A court may not review an agency action where “(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 828, 105 S.Ct. 1649, 84 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985). The APA’s ban on judicial review of such actions is jurisdictional. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 252 F.3d 456, 459 (D.C.Cir.2001) (holding that the ban on judicial review of actions committed to agency discretion by law is jurisdictional", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nfor any potential ... overpayments.” Def.’s Reply at 5. In light of the absence of any “meaningful standard by which a court could review the exercise of [the agency’s] discretion,” Def.’s Mot. at 10, and Congress’s choice of precatory statutory language (“may compromise”), the court, supposedly, cannot review the defendant’s decision without intruding upon administrative prerogative. A court may not review an agency action where “(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 828, 105 S.Ct. 1649, 84 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985). The APA’s ban on judicial review of such actions is jurisdictional. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 252 F.3d 456, 459 (D.C.Cir.2001) (recognizing judicial immunity for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nOwens’s lengthy criminal history or because Owens was wearing baggy clothes that could have easily concealed a weapon; and the officer did not testify that the stop of the vehicle occurred in a high crime area. In short, nothing of substance appears in the record to justify the frisk of Owens except for the inarguable fact that he was a passenger in a vehicle driven by someone who possessed a crack pipe. Although further questioning may have revealed that the officer did have, in fact, articulable and independent suspicions that Owens was armed or dangerous, those reasons were not explicitly brought forth during the brief suppression hearing. 21 . United States v. Berryhill, 445 F.2d 1189, 1193 (9th Cir.1971). 22 . See, e.g., United States v. Simmons, 567 F.2d 314, 319 (7th Cir.1977) (holding that the automatic companion rule as expressed in benyhill was insufficient to justify a fullblown search of an arrestees companion but the rationale may be sufficient where a search is limited to a pat down ", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nOwens’s lengthy criminal history or because Owens was wearing baggy clothes that could have easily concealed a weapon; and the officer did not testify that the stop of the vehicle occurred in a high crime area. In short, nothing of substance appears in the record to justify the frisk of Owens except for the inarguable fact that he was a passenger in a vehicle driven by someone who possessed a crack pipe. Although further questioning may have revealed that the officer did have, in fact, articulable and independent suspicions that Owens was armed or dangerous, those reasons were not explicitly brought forth during the brief suppression hearing. 21 . United States v. Berryhill, 445 F.2d 1189, 1193 (9th Cir.1971). 22 . See, e.g., United States v. Simmons, 567 F.2d 314, 319 (7th Cir.1977) (holding that reasoning which would justify the arrest by the search and at the same time justify the search by the arrest will not do", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nOwens’s lengthy criminal history or because Owens was wearing baggy clothes that could have easily concealed a weapon; and the officer did not testify that the stop of the vehicle occurred in a high crime area. In short, nothing of substance appears in the record to justify the frisk of Owens except for the inarguable fact that he was a passenger in a vehicle driven by someone who possessed a crack pipe. Although further questioning may have revealed that the officer did have, in fact, articulable and independent suspicions that Owens was armed or dangerous, those reasons were not explicitly brought forth during the brief suppression hearing. 21 . United States v. Berryhill, 445 F.2d 1189, 1193 (9th Cir.1971). 22 . See, e.g., United States v. Simmons, 567 F.2d 314, 319 (7th Cir.1977) (holding that parole status alone is insufficient to justify search of a parolee", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nOwens’s lengthy criminal history or because Owens was wearing baggy clothes that could have easily concealed a weapon; and the officer did not testify that the stop of the vehicle occurred in a high crime area. In short, nothing of substance appears in the record to justify the frisk of Owens except for the inarguable fact that he was a passenger in a vehicle driven by someone who possessed a crack pipe. Although further questioning may have revealed that the officer did have, in fact, articulable and independent suspicions that Owens was armed or dangerous, those reasons were not explicitly brought forth during the brief suppression hearing. 21 . United States v. Berryhill, 445 F.2d 1189, 1193 (9th Cir.1971). 22 . See, e.g., United States v. Simmons, 567 F.2d 314, 319 (7th Cir.1977) (holding that the searehincidenttoalawfularrest rule does not apply to a warrantless search that provides the probable cause for the subsequent arrest because one cannot justify the arrest by the search and then simultaneously justify the search by the arrest", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nOwens’s lengthy criminal history or because Owens was wearing baggy clothes that could have easily concealed a weapon; and the officer did not testify that the stop of the vehicle occurred in a high crime area. In short, nothing of substance appears in the record to justify the frisk of Owens except for the inarguable fact that he was a passenger in a vehicle driven by someone who possessed a crack pipe. Although further questioning may have revealed that the officer did have, in fact, articulable and independent suspicions that Owens was armed or dangerous, those reasons were not explicitly brought forth during the brief suppression hearing. 21 . United States v. Berryhill, 445 F.2d 1189, 1193 (9th Cir.1971). 22 . See, e.g., United States v. Simmons, 567 F.2d 314, 319 (7th Cir.1977) (holding that while search incident to arrest could not justify search in that case probable cause plus exigency justified search" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nN.J.S.A. 56:8-19. We find that Gonzalez’ status as a signatory to the agreements to cure default entered with Wilshire provides her with standing under the CFA. In the circumstances presented, Wilshire’s arguments regarding the lack of privity between Gonzalez and Wilshire arising from the making of the initial loan and the issue of her status as a “consumer” of that loan are irrelevant. A separate contractual relationship between Gonzalez and Wilshire exists that involves the loan, but does not arise directly from it. Further, we find that the monetary damages that Gonzalez claims to exist as the result of Wilshire’s allegedly unconscionable practices, if proven, constitute the statutorily-required “ascertainable loss.” Weinberg v. Sprint, Corp., 173 N.J. 233, 237, 801 A.2d 281 (2002) (holding that a deposition is the time for the plaintiff to make a record capable of surviving summary judgment not a later filed affidavit", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nN.J.S.A. 56:8-19. We find that Gonzalez’ status as a signatory to the agreements to cure default entered with Wilshire provides her with standing under the CFA. In the circumstances presented, Wilshire’s arguments regarding the lack of privity between Gonzalez and Wilshire arising from the making of the initial loan and the issue of her status as a “consumer” of that loan are irrelevant. A separate contractual relationship between Gonzalez and Wilshire exists that involves the loan, but does not arise directly from it. Further, we find that the monetary damages that Gonzalez claims to exist as the result of Wilshire’s allegedly unconscionable practices, if proven, constitute the statutorily-required “ascertainable loss.” Weinberg v. Sprint, Corp., 173 N.J. 233, 237, 801 A.2d 281 (2002) (holding that district court should not have granted summary judgment solely on basis that a motion for summary judgment was not opposed", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nN.J.S.A. 56:8-19. We find that Gonzalez’ status as a signatory to the agreements to cure default entered with Wilshire provides her with standing under the CFA. In the circumstances presented, Wilshire’s arguments regarding the lack of privity between Gonzalez and Wilshire arising from the making of the initial loan and the issue of her status as a “consumer” of that loan are irrelevant. A separate contractual relationship between Gonzalez and Wilshire exists that involves the loan, but does not arise directly from it. Further, we find that the monetary damages that Gonzalez claims to exist as the result of Wilshire’s allegedly unconscionable practices, if proven, constitute the statutorily-required “ascertainable loss.” Weinberg v. Sprint, Corp., 173 N.J. 233, 237, 801 A.2d 281 (2002) (holding a ruling on a motion for summary judgment adjudicating the rights of a party is a final judgment subject to appeal", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nN.J.S.A. 56:8-19. We find that Gonzalez’ status as a signatory to the agreements to cure default entered with Wilshire provides her with standing under the CFA. In the circumstances presented, Wilshire’s arguments regarding the lack of privity between Gonzalez and Wilshire arising from the making of the initial loan and the issue of her status as a “consumer” of that loan are irrelevant. A separate contractual relationship between Gonzalez and Wilshire exists that involves the loan, but does not arise directly from it. Further, we find that the monetary damages that Gonzalez claims to exist as the result of Wilshire’s allegedly unconscionable practices, if proven, constitute the statutorily-required “ascertainable loss.” Weinberg v. Sprint, Corp., 173 N.J. 233, 237, 801 A.2d 281 (2002) (holding that to have standing under the cfa a private party must plead a claim of ascertainable loss that is capable of surviving a motion for summary judgment", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nN.J.S.A. 56:8-19. We find that Gonzalez’ status as a signatory to the agreements to cure default entered with Wilshire provides her with standing under the CFA. In the circumstances presented, Wilshire’s arguments regarding the lack of privity between Gonzalez and Wilshire arising from the making of the initial loan and the issue of her status as a “consumer” of that loan are irrelevant. A separate contractual relationship between Gonzalez and Wilshire exists that involves the loan, but does not arise directly from it. Further, we find that the monetary damages that Gonzalez claims to exist as the result of Wilshire’s allegedly unconscionable practices, if proven, constitute the statutorily-required “ascertainable loss.” Weinberg v. Sprint, Corp., 173 N.J. 233, 237, 801 A.2d 281 (2002) (holding that district court should not have granted summary judgment solely on basis that motion for summary judgment was not opposed" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nwhich was sovereign immunity. While it is true that where the basis of a dismissal is unclear, the jurisdictional ground controls and thus the dismissal does not preclude a future action, see Remus Joint Venture and Envl. Disposal Sys., Inc. v. McAnally, 116 F.3d 180, 184 n. 5 (6th Cir.1997); Restatement (First) of Judgments § 49 cmt. C (1949), it is not clear that a dismissal based on sovereign immunity is sufficiently jurisdictional for the purposes of claim preclusion. Compare Touvell v. Ohio Dept. of Mental Retardation & Developmental Disabilities, 422 F.3d 392, 395 (6th Cir.2005) (“The Eleventh Amendment provides a type of sovereign immunity, and deprives the federal courts of jurisdiction”), with Nair v. Oakland Cnty. Cmty. Mental Health Auth., 443 F.3d 469, 474 (6th Cir. \\2006) (holding that congress had no power under article i to abrogate state sovereign immunity", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nwhich was sovereign immunity. While it is true that where the basis of a dismissal is unclear, the jurisdictional ground controls and thus the dismissal does not preclude a future action, see Remus Joint Venture and Envl. Disposal Sys., Inc. v. McAnally, 116 F.3d 180, 184 n. 5 (6th Cir.1997); Restatement (First) of Judgments § 49 cmt. C (1949), it is not clear that a dismissal based on sovereign immunity is sufficiently jurisdictional for the purposes of claim preclusion. Compare Touvell v. Ohio Dept. of Mental Retardation & Developmental Disabilities, 422 F.3d 392, 395 (6th Cir.2005) (“The Eleventh Amendment provides a type of sovereign immunity, and deprives the federal courts of jurisdiction”), with Nair v. Oakland Cnty. Cmty. Mental Health Auth., 443 F.3d 469, 474 (6th Cir. \\2006) (holding that the exercise of judicial power under article iii of the united states constitution requires an actual case or controversy", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nwhich was sovereign immunity. While it is true that where the basis of a dismissal is unclear, the jurisdictional ground controls and thus the dismissal does not preclude a future action, see Remus Joint Venture and Envl. Disposal Sys., Inc. v. McAnally, 116 F.3d 180, 184 n. 5 (6th Cir.1997); Restatement (First) of Judgments § 49 cmt. C (1949), it is not clear that a dismissal based on sovereign immunity is sufficiently jurisdictional for the purposes of claim preclusion. Compare Touvell v. Ohio Dept. of Mental Retardation & Developmental Disabilities, 422 F.3d 392, 395 (6th Cir.2005) (“The Eleventh Amendment provides a type of sovereign immunity, and deprives the federal courts of jurisdiction”), with Nair v. Oakland Cnty. Cmty. Mental Health Auth., 443 F.3d 469, 474 (6th Cir. \\2006) (holding that dismissal pursuant to a plea to the jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity is with prejudice", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nwhich was sovereign immunity. While it is true that where the basis of a dismissal is unclear, the jurisdictional ground controls and thus the dismissal does not preclude a future action, see Remus Joint Venture and Envl. Disposal Sys., Inc. v. McAnally, 116 F.3d 180, 184 n. 5 (6th Cir.1997); Restatement (First) of Judgments § 49 cmt. C (1949), it is not clear that a dismissal based on sovereign immunity is sufficiently jurisdictional for the purposes of claim preclusion. Compare Touvell v. Ohio Dept. of Mental Retardation & Developmental Disabilities, 422 F.3d 392, 395 (6th Cir.2005) (“The Eleventh Amendment provides a type of sovereign immunity, and deprives the federal courts of jurisdiction”), with Nair v. Oakland Cnty. Cmty. Mental Health Auth., 443 F.3d 469, 474 (6th Cir. \\2006) (holding that the sovereign immunity defense may be raised for the first time on appeal", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nwhich was sovereign immunity. While it is true that where the basis of a dismissal is unclear, the jurisdictional ground controls and thus the dismissal does not preclude a future action, see Remus Joint Venture and Envl. Disposal Sys., Inc. v. McAnally, 116 F.3d 180, 184 n. 5 (6th Cir.1997); Restatement (First) of Judgments § 49 cmt. C (1949), it is not clear that a dismissal based on sovereign immunity is sufficiently jurisdictional for the purposes of claim preclusion. Compare Touvell v. Ohio Dept. of Mental Retardation & Developmental Disabilities, 422 F.3d 392, 395 (6th Cir.2005) (“The Eleventh Amendment provides a type of sovereign immunity, and deprives the federal courts of jurisdiction”), with Nair v. Oakland Cnty. Cmty. Mental Health Auth., 443 F.3d 469, 474 (6th Cir. \\2006) (recognizing that a defense based on sovereign immunity is not coextensive with the limitations on judicial power in article iii" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat an employer must also ignore.” Id. (Emphasis added.) Although the Court’s holding was technically limited to the disparate treatment claim before it, one cannot read that opinion without receiving the strong impression that the Supreme Court is suggesting that the ADEA does not encompass a disparate impact claim. The Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy and Thomas concurred, noting that “there are substantial arguments that it is improper to carry over disparate impact analysis from Title VII to the ADEA” Hazen, 507 U.S. at 618, 113 S.Ct. at 1710. Fifth, of those courts that have considered the issue since Hazen, there is a clear trend toward concluding that the ADEA does not support a disparate impact claim. DiBiase v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d 719, 732-34 (3d Cir.1995) (holding no individual liability under the adea", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat an employer must also ignore.” Id. (Emphasis added.) Although the Court’s holding was technically limited to the disparate treatment claim before it, one cannot read that opinion without receiving the strong impression that the Supreme Court is suggesting that the ADEA does not encompass a disparate impact claim. The Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy and Thomas concurred, noting that “there are substantial arguments that it is improper to carry over disparate impact analysis from Title VII to the ADEA” Hazen, 507 U.S. at 618, 113 S.Ct. at 1710. Fifth, of those courts that have considered the issue since Hazen, there is a clear trend toward concluding that the ADEA does not support a disparate impact claim. DiBiase v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d 719, 732-34 (3d Cir.1995) (recognizing cause of action under section 504 based on claims of disparate impact", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat an employer must also ignore.” Id. (Emphasis added.) Although the Court’s holding was technically limited to the disparate treatment claim before it, one cannot read that opinion without receiving the strong impression that the Supreme Court is suggesting that the ADEA does not encompass a disparate impact claim. The Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy and Thomas concurred, noting that “there are substantial arguments that it is improper to carry over disparate impact analysis from Title VII to the ADEA” Hazen, 507 U.S. at 618, 113 S.Ct. at 1710. Fifth, of those courts that have considered the issue since Hazen, there is a clear trend toward concluding that the ADEA does not support a disparate impact claim. DiBiase v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d 719, 732-34 (3d Cir.1995) (holding that disparate impact claims are not cognizable under the adea", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat an employer must also ignore.” Id. (Emphasis added.) Although the Court’s holding was technically limited to the disparate treatment claim before it, one cannot read that opinion without receiving the strong impression that the Supreme Court is suggesting that the ADEA does not encompass a disparate impact claim. The Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy and Thomas concurred, noting that “there are substantial arguments that it is improper to carry over disparate impact analysis from Title VII to the ADEA” Hazen, 507 U.S. at 618, 113 S.Ct. at 1710. Fifth, of those courts that have considered the issue since Hazen, there is a clear trend toward concluding that the ADEA does not support a disparate impact claim. DiBiase v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d 719, 732-34 (3d Cir.1995) (holding that in title vii disparate impact case an employer may rebut prima facie case of disparate impact by demonstrating that the employment policy at issue is related to the employees job performance and justified by business necessity", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat an employer must also ignore.” Id. (Emphasis added.) Although the Court’s holding was technically limited to the disparate treatment claim before it, one cannot read that opinion without receiving the strong impression that the Supreme Court is suggesting that the ADEA does not encompass a disparate impact claim. The Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy and Thomas concurred, noting that “there are substantial arguments that it is improper to carry over disparate impact analysis from Title VII to the ADEA” Hazen, 507 U.S. at 618, 113 S.Ct. at 1710. Fifth, of those courts that have considered the issue since Hazen, there is a clear trend toward concluding that the ADEA does not support a disparate impact claim. DiBiase v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d 719, 732-34 (3d Cir.1995) (holding that there is no disparate impact claim under the adea" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\npolice department. See Cottrell, 42 Fed.Cl. at 148 (citing United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 588, 61 S.Ct. 767, 770, 85 L.Ed. 1058 (1941)); Moore v. Public Defenders Office, 76 Fed.Cl. 617, 620 (2007) (explaining the court has no jurisdiction over “local, county, or state agencies, rather than federal agencies”). This court may only consider claims properly brought against the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). Fourth, the alleged incident appears to have occurred at least fifteen years ago. See Hicks I, 2011 WL 3319563, at *1. As such, the tort claims are untimely because they fall well outside this court’s general six-year statute of limitations. See 28 U.S.C. § 2501; John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 133-34, 128 S.Ct. 750, 169 L.Ed.2d 591 (2008) (holding that the aedpa statute of limitations is not jurisdictional", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\npolice department. See Cottrell, 42 Fed.Cl. at 148 (citing United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 588, 61 S.Ct. 767, 770, 85 L.Ed. 1058 (1941)); Moore v. Public Defenders Office, 76 Fed.Cl. 617, 620 (2007) (explaining the court has no jurisdiction over “local, county, or state agencies, rather than federal agencies”). This court may only consider claims properly brought against the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). Fourth, the alleged incident appears to have occurred at least fifteen years ago. See Hicks I, 2011 WL 3319563, at *1. As such, the tort claims are untimely because they fall well outside this court’s general six-year statute of limitations. See 28 U.S.C. § 2501; John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 133-34, 128 S.Ct. 750, 169 L.Ed.2d 591 (2008) (holding sixyear statute of limitations applies to adea actions involving federal employees", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\npolice department. See Cottrell, 42 Fed.Cl. at 148 (citing United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 588, 61 S.Ct. 767, 770, 85 L.Ed. 1058 (1941)); Moore v. Public Defenders Office, 76 Fed.Cl. 617, 620 (2007) (explaining the court has no jurisdiction over “local, county, or state agencies, rather than federal agencies”). This court may only consider claims properly brought against the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). Fourth, the alleged incident appears to have occurred at least fifteen years ago. See Hicks I, 2011 WL 3319563, at *1. As such, the tort claims are untimely because they fall well outside this court’s general six-year statute of limitations. See 28 U.S.C. § 2501; John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 133-34, 128 S.Ct. 750, 169 L.Ed.2d 591 (2008) (holding that this courts sixyear statute of limitations is jurisdictional", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\npolice department. See Cottrell, 42 Fed.Cl. at 148 (citing United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 588, 61 S.Ct. 767, 770, 85 L.Ed. 1058 (1941)); Moore v. Public Defenders Office, 76 Fed.Cl. 617, 620 (2007) (explaining the court has no jurisdiction over “local, county, or state agencies, rather than federal agencies”). This court may only consider claims properly brought against the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). Fourth, the alleged incident appears to have occurred at least fifteen years ago. See Hicks I, 2011 WL 3319563, at *1. As such, the tort claims are untimely because they fall well outside this court’s general six-year statute of limitations. See 28 U.S.C. § 2501; John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 133-34, 128 S.Ct. 750, 169 L.Ed.2d 591 (2008) (holding that the courts statute of limitations is jurisdictional in nature and is thus not subject to waiver or estoppel", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\npolice department. See Cottrell, 42 Fed.Cl. at 148 (citing United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 588, 61 S.Ct. 767, 770, 85 L.Ed. 1058 (1941)); Moore v. Public Defenders Office, 76 Fed.Cl. 617, 620 (2007) (explaining the court has no jurisdiction over “local, county, or state agencies, rather than federal agencies”). This court may only consider claims properly brought against the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). Fourth, the alleged incident appears to have occurred at least fifteen years ago. See Hicks I, 2011 WL 3319563, at *1. As such, the tort claims are untimely because they fall well outside this court’s general six-year statute of limitations. See 28 U.S.C. § 2501; John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 133-34, 128 S.Ct. 750, 169 L.Ed.2d 591 (2008) (recognizing a sixyear statute of limitations on claims filed under the coal act" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthe liquidation proceeding, even if that claim \"may be contingent!.]\" NJ.S.A. I7:30C-28(b). Furthermore, those third-party claims may be allowed if, among other requirements, it may be \"reasonably inferred\" from the proofs that the person \"would be able to obtain a judgment upon such cause of action!.]” Ibid. Unlike the requirement in subsection (a) that claims be \"absolute,” the Legislature adopted a different standard, designed to cover non-final, contingent third-party claims, where it so intended. 3 This conclusion is shared by those states that similarly restrict participation in the assets of liquidated insolvent insurers to liquidated claims, as well as by commentators in this field. See, e.g., Quackenbush v. Mission Ins. Co., 46 Cal.App.4th 458, 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 112, 113 (1996) (recognizing that claims against a state under 1981 are barred by the eleventh amendment", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthe liquidation proceeding, even if that claim \"may be contingent!.]\" NJ.S.A. I7:30C-28(b). Furthermore, those third-party claims may be allowed if, among other requirements, it may be \"reasonably inferred\" from the proofs that the person \"would be able to obtain a judgment upon such cause of action!.]” Ibid. Unlike the requirement in subsection (a) that claims be \"absolute,” the Legislature adopted a different standard, designed to cover non-final, contingent third-party claims, where it so intended. 3 This conclusion is shared by those states that similarly restrict participation in the assets of liquidated insolvent insurers to liquidated claims, as well as by commentators in this field. See, e.g., Quackenbush v. Mission Ins. Co., 46 Cal.App.4th 458, 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 112, 113 (1996) (holding that ibnr claims are barred by statute forbidding payment from insolvent insurers estate of claims founded upon unliquidated or undetermined demands", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthe liquidation proceeding, even if that claim \"may be contingent!.]\" NJ.S.A. I7:30C-28(b). Furthermore, those third-party claims may be allowed if, among other requirements, it may be \"reasonably inferred\" from the proofs that the person \"would be able to obtain a judgment upon such cause of action!.]” Ibid. Unlike the requirement in subsection (a) that claims be \"absolute,” the Legislature adopted a different standard, designed to cover non-final, contingent third-party claims, where it so intended. 3 This conclusion is shared by those states that similarly restrict participation in the assets of liquidated insolvent insurers to liquidated claims, as well as by commentators in this field. See, e.g., Quackenbush v. Mission Ins. Co., 46 Cal.App.4th 458, 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 112, 113 (1996) (holding that the industrial commission only had subject matter jurisdiction over claims under the payment of wages statute and not contract claims", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthe liquidation proceeding, even if that claim \"may be contingent!.]\" NJ.S.A. I7:30C-28(b). Furthermore, those third-party claims may be allowed if, among other requirements, it may be \"reasonably inferred\" from the proofs that the person \"would be able to obtain a judgment upon such cause of action!.]” Ibid. Unlike the requirement in subsection (a) that claims be \"absolute,” the Legislature adopted a different standard, designed to cover non-final, contingent third-party claims, where it so intended. 3 This conclusion is shared by those states that similarly restrict participation in the assets of liquidated insolvent insurers to liquidated claims, as well as by commentators in this field. See, e.g., Quackenbush v. Mission Ins. Co., 46 Cal.App.4th 458, 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 112, 113 (1996) (holding that the court of federal claims lacked jurisdiction over claims arising from the violation of a criminal statute", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthe liquidation proceeding, even if that claim \"may be contingent!.]\" NJ.S.A. I7:30C-28(b). Furthermore, those third-party claims may be allowed if, among other requirements, it may be \"reasonably inferred\" from the proofs that the person \"would be able to obtain a judgment upon such cause of action!.]” Ibid. Unlike the requirement in subsection (a) that claims be \"absolute,” the Legislature adopted a different standard, designed to cover non-final, contingent third-party claims, where it so intended. 3 This conclusion is shared by those states that similarly restrict participation in the assets of liquidated insolvent insurers to liquidated claims, as well as by commentators in this field. See, e.g., Quackenbush v. Mission Ins. Co., 46 Cal.App.4th 458, 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 112, 113 (1996) (holding only that the statute does not require insurers to disclose payment logs" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ncurative instructions during the prosecutor’s closing argument. The law is clear that a party’s failure to object to improper prosecutorial comments will preclude appellate review, unless the comments are so prejudicial as to constitute fundamental error. See Street v. State, 636 So.2d 1297 (Fla.1994), cert, denied, -U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 743, 130 L.Ed.2d 644 (1995); Fuller v. State, 540 So.2d 182, 184 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989). The control of prosecutorial comments to the jury is within the trial court’s discretion, and the exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed absent a clear showing of abuse. Absent a contemporaneous objection, Jones’ attorney was required to demonstrate that the prosecutor’s comments constituted fundamental error. See Crump v. State, 622 So.2d 963, 972 (Fla.1993) (recognizing exception to preservation rules for fundamental error that is highly prejudicial", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ncurative instructions during the prosecutor’s closing argument. The law is clear that a party’s failure to object to improper prosecutorial comments will preclude appellate review, unless the comments are so prejudicial as to constitute fundamental error. See Street v. State, 636 So.2d 1297 (Fla.1994), cert, denied, -U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 743, 130 L.Ed.2d 644 (1995); Fuller v. State, 540 So.2d 182, 184 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989). The control of prosecutorial comments to the jury is within the trial court’s discretion, and the exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed absent a clear showing of abuse. Absent a contemporaneous objection, Jones’ attorney was required to demonstrate that the prosecutor’s comments constituted fundamental error. See Crump v. State, 622 So.2d 963, 972 (Fla.1993) (holding that lack of appellate jurisdiction is fundamental error", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ncurative instructions during the prosecutor’s closing argument. The law is clear that a party’s failure to object to improper prosecutorial comments will preclude appellate review, unless the comments are so prejudicial as to constitute fundamental error. See Street v. State, 636 So.2d 1297 (Fla.1994), cert, denied, -U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 743, 130 L.Ed.2d 644 (1995); Fuller v. State, 540 So.2d 182, 184 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989). The control of prosecutorial comments to the jury is within the trial court’s discretion, and the exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed absent a clear showing of abuse. Absent a contemporaneous objection, Jones’ attorney was required to demonstrate that the prosecutor’s comments constituted fundamental error. See Crump v. State, 622 So.2d 963, 972 (Fla.1993) (holding that appellate review is precluded when the error is invited", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ncurative instructions during the prosecutor’s closing argument. The law is clear that a party’s failure to object to improper prosecutorial comments will preclude appellate review, unless the comments are so prejudicial as to constitute fundamental error. See Street v. State, 636 So.2d 1297 (Fla.1994), cert, denied, -U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 743, 130 L.Ed.2d 644 (1995); Fuller v. State, 540 So.2d 182, 184 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989). The control of prosecutorial comments to the jury is within the trial court’s discretion, and the exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed absent a clear showing of abuse. Absent a contemporaneous objection, Jones’ attorney was required to demonstrate that the prosecutor’s comments constituted fundamental error. See Crump v. State, 622 So.2d 963, 972 (Fla.1993) (holding that since prosecutorial comments did not constitute fundamental error absence of preservation of issue by defense counsel precluded appellate review", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ncurative instructions during the prosecutor’s closing argument. The law is clear that a party’s failure to object to improper prosecutorial comments will preclude appellate review, unless the comments are so prejudicial as to constitute fundamental error. See Street v. State, 636 So.2d 1297 (Fla.1994), cert, denied, -U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 743, 130 L.Ed.2d 644 (1995); Fuller v. State, 540 So.2d 182, 184 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989). The control of prosecutorial comments to the jury is within the trial court’s discretion, and the exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed absent a clear showing of abuse. Absent a contemporaneous objection, Jones’ attorney was required to demonstrate that the prosecutor’s comments constituted fundamental error. See Crump v. State, 622 So.2d 963, 972 (Fla.1993) (recognizing fundamental error as an exception to the general rule of preservation" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthis clause, Lefever contends that the trial court considered Hargrave’s motion before it entered its order. Relying upon North E. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Aldridge, 400 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tex.1966), Lefever asserts that the Mother Hubbard clause disposes of all issues that were before the trial court prior to its April order, including Hargrave’s motion. Aldridge stands for the general rule that for appeal purposes, it is presumed a trial court intended to dispose of all parties and issues before it when a judgment is rendered and entered in a case. See 400 S.W.2d at SOT-OS. However, the presumption does not apply to a judgment that affirmatively reserves some ultimate issues or decisions for future adjudication. See Zellers v. Barthel, 727 S.W.2d 364, 365 (Tex.App.Fort Worth 1987, no writ) (holding that an order addressing each parents motion to modify but failed to reference wifes motion to enforce an out of state judgment was not a final appealable order", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthis clause, Lefever contends that the trial court considered Hargrave’s motion before it entered its order. Relying upon North E. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Aldridge, 400 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tex.1966), Lefever asserts that the Mother Hubbard clause disposes of all issues that were before the trial court prior to its April order, including Hargrave’s motion. Aldridge stands for the general rule that for appeal purposes, it is presumed a trial court intended to dispose of all parties and issues before it when a judgment is rendered and entered in a case. See 400 S.W.2d at SOT-OS. However, the presumption does not apply to a judgment that affirmatively reserves some ultimate issues or decisions for future adjudication. See Zellers v. Barthel, 727 S.W.2d 364, 365 (Tex.App.Fort Worth 1987, no writ) (holding that an order was interlocutory in nature despite the trial courts certification of the order as a final appealable judgment", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthis clause, Lefever contends that the trial court considered Hargrave’s motion before it entered its order. Relying upon North E. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Aldridge, 400 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tex.1966), Lefever asserts that the Mother Hubbard clause disposes of all issues that were before the trial court prior to its April order, including Hargrave’s motion. Aldridge stands for the general rule that for appeal purposes, it is presumed a trial court intended to dispose of all parties and issues before it when a judgment is rendered and entered in a case. See 400 S.W.2d at SOT-OS. However, the presumption does not apply to a judgment that affirmatively reserves some ultimate issues or decisions for future adjudication. See Zellers v. Barthel, 727 S.W.2d 364, 365 (Tex.App.Fort Worth 1987, no writ) (holding that an order denying a motion to correct reduce or modify a sentence under rule 3800 is not appealable", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthis clause, Lefever contends that the trial court considered Hargrave’s motion before it entered its order. Relying upon North E. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Aldridge, 400 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tex.1966), Lefever asserts that the Mother Hubbard clause disposes of all issues that were before the trial court prior to its April order, including Hargrave’s motion. Aldridge stands for the general rule that for appeal purposes, it is presumed a trial court intended to dispose of all parties and issues before it when a judgment is rendered and entered in a case. See 400 S.W.2d at SOT-OS. However, the presumption does not apply to a judgment that affirmatively reserves some ultimate issues or decisions for future adjudication. See Zellers v. Barthel, 727 S.W.2d 364, 365 (Tex.App.Fort Worth 1987, no writ) (holding an order denying a motion for summary judgment is interlocutory and not appealable", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthis clause, Lefever contends that the trial court considered Hargrave’s motion before it entered its order. Relying upon North E. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Aldridge, 400 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tex.1966), Lefever asserts that the Mother Hubbard clause disposes of all issues that were before the trial court prior to its April order, including Hargrave’s motion. Aldridge stands for the general rule that for appeal purposes, it is presumed a trial court intended to dispose of all parties and issues before it when a judgment is rendered and entered in a case. See 400 S.W.2d at SOT-OS. However, the presumption does not apply to a judgment that affirmatively reserves some ultimate issues or decisions for future adjudication. See Zellers v. Barthel, 727 S.W.2d 364, 365 (Tex.App.Fort Worth 1987, no writ) (recognizing that an order denying a motion to modify a family court order where the motion is based on changed factual or legal circumstances is appealable as a special order after final judgment" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nbased upon legally sufficient evidence. To the extent that Moye is claiming that the verdicts were against the “weight of the evidence” under People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 (N.Y.1987) (citations omitted), such an argument raised only-issues of New York state law and accordingly cannot provide a basis for habeas relief, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (permitting federal habeas corpus review only where the petitioner has alleged that he is in state custody in violation of “the Constitution or a federal law or treaty”). Federal courts routinely dismiss claims attacking a verdict as against the weight of the evidence on the basis that they are not federal constitutional issues cognizable in a habeas proceeding. Ex parte Craig, 282 F. 138, 148 (2d Cir.1922) (holding that a writ of habeas corpus cannot be used to review the weight of evidence ", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nbased upon legally sufficient evidence. To the extent that Moye is claiming that the verdicts were against the “weight of the evidence” under People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 (N.Y.1987) (citations omitted), such an argument raised only-issues of New York state law and accordingly cannot provide a basis for habeas relief, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (permitting federal habeas corpus review only where the petitioner has alleged that he is in state custody in violation of “the Constitution or a federal law or treaty”). Federal courts routinely dismiss claims attacking a verdict as against the weight of the evidence on the basis that they are not federal constitutional issues cognizable in a habeas proceeding. Ex parte Craig, 282 F. 138, 148 (2d Cir.1922) (holding that a petition for review is an adequate substitute for habeas corpus", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nbased upon legally sufficient evidence. To the extent that Moye is claiming that the verdicts were against the “weight of the evidence” under People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 (N.Y.1987) (citations omitted), such an argument raised only-issues of New York state law and accordingly cannot provide a basis for habeas relief, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (permitting federal habeas corpus review only where the petitioner has alleged that he is in state custody in violation of “the Constitution or a federal law or treaty”). Federal courts routinely dismiss claims attacking a verdict as against the weight of the evidence on the basis that they are not federal constitutional issues cognizable in a habeas proceeding. Ex parte Craig, 282 F. 138, 148 (2d Cir.1922) (holding that threeyear statute of limitations was not an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nbased upon legally sufficient evidence. To the extent that Moye is claiming that the verdicts were against the “weight of the evidence” under People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 (N.Y.1987) (citations omitted), such an argument raised only-issues of New York state law and accordingly cannot provide a basis for habeas relief, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (permitting federal habeas corpus review only where the petitioner has alleged that he is in state custody in violation of “the Constitution or a federal law or treaty”). Federal courts routinely dismiss claims attacking a verdict as against the weight of the evidence on the basis that they are not federal constitutional issues cognizable in a habeas proceeding. Ex parte Craig, 282 F. 138, 148 (2d Cir.1922) (holding a court cannot issue and make returnable to it a writ of habeas corpus if the petitioner is outside the courts authority", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nbased upon legally sufficient evidence. To the extent that Moye is claiming that the verdicts were against the “weight of the evidence” under People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 (N.Y.1987) (citations omitted), such an argument raised only-issues of New York state law and accordingly cannot provide a basis for habeas relief, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (permitting federal habeas corpus review only where the petitioner has alleged that he is in state custody in violation of “the Constitution or a federal law or treaty”). Federal courts routinely dismiss claims attacking a verdict as against the weight of the evidence on the basis that they are not federal constitutional issues cognizable in a habeas proceeding. Ex parte Craig, 282 F. 138, 148 (2d Cir.1922) (holding that managing conservator while in texas to seek return of child by writ of habeas corpus may not be served with civil process and is subject to jurisdiction of court in which habeas corpus is pending and only for purpose of prosecuting writ of habeas corpus" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nto understand how someone who believed that he became the “lead man” in September 2000 should not reasonably have been aware that he was not actually in that position or being paid commensurately until February 2001. Sixth Circuit precedent is clear that in Title VII actions, “the starting date for the 300-day limitations period is when the plaintiff learns of the employment decision itself, not when the plaintiff learns that the employment decision may have been discriminatorily motivated. Indeed, this focus on the discriminatory act is consistent ... with Supreme Court precedent and the statutory language of Title VII.” Amini v. Oberlin College, 259 F.3d 493, 499 (6th Cir.2001); see also Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258, 101 S.Ct. 498, 66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1980) (holding that the insurer is not bound by acts of the agent which are beyond the scope of his authority when the insured has notice of the limitations upon an agents authority or when the circumstances are sufficient to suggest that an inquiry should be made as to such limitations", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nto understand how someone who believed that he became the “lead man” in September 2000 should not reasonably have been aware that he was not actually in that position or being paid commensurately until February 2001. Sixth Circuit precedent is clear that in Title VII actions, “the starting date for the 300-day limitations period is when the plaintiff learns of the employment decision itself, not when the plaintiff learns that the employment decision may have been discriminatorily motivated. Indeed, this focus on the discriminatory act is consistent ... with Supreme Court precedent and the statutory language of Title VII.” Amini v. Oberlin College, 259 F.3d 493, 499 (6th Cir.2001); see also Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258, 101 S.Ct. 498, 66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1980) (holding that the proper focus when determining the starting point of the limitations period is upon the time of the discriminatory acts not upon the time at which the consequences of the acts became most painful ", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nto understand how someone who believed that he became the “lead man” in September 2000 should not reasonably have been aware that he was not actually in that position or being paid commensurately until February 2001. Sixth Circuit precedent is clear that in Title VII actions, “the starting date for the 300-day limitations period is when the plaintiff learns of the employment decision itself, not when the plaintiff learns that the employment decision may have been discriminatorily motivated. Indeed, this focus on the discriminatory act is consistent ... with Supreme Court precedent and the statutory language of Title VII.” Amini v. Oberlin College, 259 F.3d 493, 499 (6th Cir.2001); see also Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258, 101 S.Ct. 498, 66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1980) (holding that the relevant time is the time of the employment decision", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nto understand how someone who believed that he became the “lead man” in September 2000 should not reasonably have been aware that he was not actually in that position or being paid commensurately until February 2001. Sixth Circuit precedent is clear that in Title VII actions, “the starting date for the 300-day limitations period is when the plaintiff learns of the employment decision itself, not when the plaintiff learns that the employment decision may have been discriminatorily motivated. Indeed, this focus on the discriminatory act is consistent ... with Supreme Court precedent and the statutory language of Title VII.” Amini v. Oberlin College, 259 F.3d 493, 499 (6th Cir.2001); see also Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258, 101 S.Ct. 498, 66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1980) (holding that the court may only consider the discrete acts that occurred within the appropriate time period", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nto understand how someone who believed that he became the “lead man” in September 2000 should not reasonably have been aware that he was not actually in that position or being paid commensurately until February 2001. Sixth Circuit precedent is clear that in Title VII actions, “the starting date for the 300-day limitations period is when the plaintiff learns of the employment decision itself, not when the plaintiff learns that the employment decision may have been discriminatorily motivated. Indeed, this focus on the discriminatory act is consistent ... with Supreme Court precedent and the statutory language of Title VII.” Amini v. Oberlin College, 259 F.3d 493, 499 (6th Cir.2001); see also Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258, 101 S.Ct. 498, 66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1980) (holding that an individual could recover for acts occurring outside the statutory time period if at least one act occurred within the time period and the acts were part of the same hostile work environment" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nsuch as evaluations of all of KT.’s IEP goals, may also be useful. (Def.’s Mot. at 8-10.) “[T]he record in an IDEA case is supposed to be made not in the district court but primarily at the administrative level[.]” Reid, 401 F.3d at 527 (Henderson, J., concurring). Thus, although the Court is “troubled at the prospect of further delay,” Nesbitt I, 532 F.Supp.2d at 125, it will remand this case to the Hearing Officer for further proceedings that should be conducted as expeditiously as possible. The Officer should supplement the record with the information needed to “best correct” KT.’s educational “deficits,” Reid, 401 F.3d at 526, and to “determine an appropriate award of compensatory education” based on the District’s failure to provide K.T. with an FAPE. Brown, 568 F.Supp.2d at 54 (holding that the relevant time is the time of the employment decision", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nsuch as evaluations of all of KT.’s IEP goals, may also be useful. (Def.’s Mot. at 8-10.) “[T]he record in an IDEA case is supposed to be made not in the district court but primarily at the administrative level[.]” Reid, 401 F.3d at 527 (Henderson, J., concurring). Thus, although the Court is “troubled at the prospect of further delay,” Nesbitt I, 532 F.Supp.2d at 125, it will remand this case to the Hearing Officer for further proceedings that should be conducted as expeditiously as possible. The Officer should supplement the record with the information needed to “best correct” KT.’s educational “deficits,” Reid, 401 F.3d at 526, and to “determine an appropriate award of compensatory education” based on the District’s failure to provide K.T. with an FAPE. Brown, 568 F.Supp.2d at 54 (recognizing appropriateness of compensatory education award and holding that plaintiff was entitled to recover compensatory education if she prevailed in her claim that she was denied a fape for several years", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nsuch as evaluations of all of KT.’s IEP goals, may also be useful. (Def.’s Mot. at 8-10.) “[T]he record in an IDEA case is supposed to be made not in the district court but primarily at the administrative level[.]” Reid, 401 F.3d at 527 (Henderson, J., concurring). Thus, although the Court is “troubled at the prospect of further delay,” Nesbitt I, 532 F.Supp.2d at 125, it will remand this case to the Hearing Officer for further proceedings that should be conducted as expeditiously as possible. The Officer should supplement the record with the information needed to “best correct” KT.’s educational “deficits,” Reid, 401 F.3d at 526, and to “determine an appropriate award of compensatory education” based on the District’s failure to provide K.T. with an FAPE. Brown, 568 F.Supp.2d at 54 (holding that the plaintiff had established an entitlement to relief on the merits of the claim and was therefore entitled to fees even though it was remanded to the agency for further action", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nsuch as evaluations of all of KT.’s IEP goals, may also be useful. (Def.’s Mot. at 8-10.) “[T]he record in an IDEA case is supposed to be made not in the district court but primarily at the administrative level[.]” Reid, 401 F.3d at 527 (Henderson, J., concurring). Thus, although the Court is “troubled at the prospect of further delay,” Nesbitt I, 532 F.Supp.2d at 125, it will remand this case to the Hearing Officer for further proceedings that should be conducted as expeditiously as possible. The Officer should supplement the record with the information needed to “best correct” KT.’s educational “deficits,” Reid, 401 F.3d at 526, and to “determine an appropriate award of compensatory education” based on the District’s failure to provide K.T. with an FAPE. Brown, 568 F.Supp.2d at 54 (holding so where the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had colluded to claim falsely that the plaintiffs physician had informed the claims adjuster that the plaintiff had been released to work and where the plaintiff was later discharged from employment and denied workers compensation benefits", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nsuch as evaluations of all of KT.’s IEP goals, may also be useful. (Def.’s Mot. at 8-10.) “[T]he record in an IDEA case is supposed to be made not in the district court but primarily at the administrative level[.]” Reid, 401 F.3d at 527 (Henderson, J., concurring). Thus, although the Court is “troubled at the prospect of further delay,” Nesbitt I, 532 F.Supp.2d at 125, it will remand this case to the Hearing Officer for further proceedings that should be conducted as expeditiously as possible. The Officer should supplement the record with the information needed to “best correct” KT.’s educational “deficits,” Reid, 401 F.3d at 526, and to “determine an appropriate award of compensatory education” based on the District’s failure to provide K.T. with an FAPE. Brown, 568 F.Supp.2d at 54 (holding that plaintiff was entitled to an award but remanding to the hearing officer to gather further evidence because plaintiff miscalculated the relevant time that the student had been denied a fape" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nin Florida, his ongoing medical treatment in Florida, and the location of multiple witnesses in Florida. Plaintiff also emphasizes that consent to voluntary dismissal has been obtained from all but two Defendants. In response, the objecting Defendants argue that re-filing this case in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, which is Plaintiffs admitted intention should the case be dismissed, would unfairly impose upon them the costs associated with submitting motions and other documents which have already been filed with this Court. These Defendants, however, apparently overlook the Court’s power to levy costs and, furthermore, fail to demonstrate that they would suffer legal prejudice in the event of a dismissal. See, e.g., Manshack, 915 F.2d at 174 (holding that merely subjecting the defendant to another lawsuit does not amount to plain legal prejudice where the nonmoving party does not complain of excessive litigation costs resulting from discovery", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nin Florida, his ongoing medical treatment in Florida, and the location of multiple witnesses in Florida. Plaintiff also emphasizes that consent to voluntary dismissal has been obtained from all but two Defendants. In response, the objecting Defendants argue that re-filing this case in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, which is Plaintiffs admitted intention should the case be dismissed, would unfairly impose upon them the costs associated with submitting motions and other documents which have already been filed with this Court. These Defendants, however, apparently overlook the Court’s power to levy costs and, furthermore, fail to demonstrate that they would suffer legal prejudice in the event of a dismissal. See, e.g., Manshack, 915 F.2d at 174 (holding under plain error standard of review that apprendi does not apply to restitution because the statute does not prescribe a maximum amount", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nin Florida, his ongoing medical treatment in Florida, and the location of multiple witnesses in Florida. Plaintiff also emphasizes that consent to voluntary dismissal has been obtained from all but two Defendants. In response, the objecting Defendants argue that re-filing this case in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, which is Plaintiffs admitted intention should the case be dismissed, would unfairly impose upon them the costs associated with submitting motions and other documents which have already been filed with this Court. These Defendants, however, apparently overlook the Court’s power to levy costs and, furthermore, fail to demonstrate that they would suffer legal prejudice in the event of a dismissal. See, e.g., Manshack, 915 F.2d at 174 (holding that the nonmoving parly must show how additional discovery will defeat the summary judgment motion ie create a genuine dispute as to a material fact and that the nonmoving party must show that he has diligently pursued discovery of the evidence in question", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nin Florida, his ongoing medical treatment in Florida, and the location of multiple witnesses in Florida. Plaintiff also emphasizes that consent to voluntary dismissal has been obtained from all but two Defendants. In response, the objecting Defendants argue that re-filing this case in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, which is Plaintiffs admitted intention should the case be dismissed, would unfairly impose upon them the costs associated with submitting motions and other documents which have already been filed with this Court. These Defendants, however, apparently overlook the Court’s power to levy costs and, furthermore, fail to demonstrate that they would suffer legal prejudice in the event of a dismissal. See, e.g., Manshack, 915 F.2d at 174 (holding that filing an answer does not invoke the status as a defendant in plaintiffs lawsuit", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nin Florida, his ongoing medical treatment in Florida, and the location of multiple witnesses in Florida. Plaintiff also emphasizes that consent to voluntary dismissal has been obtained from all but two Defendants. In response, the objecting Defendants argue that re-filing this case in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, which is Plaintiffs admitted intention should the case be dismissed, would unfairly impose upon them the costs associated with submitting motions and other documents which have already been filed with this Court. These Defendants, however, apparently overlook the Court’s power to levy costs and, furthermore, fail to demonstrate that they would suffer legal prejudice in the event of a dismissal. See, e.g., Manshack, 915 F.2d at 174 (holding that the nonmoving party must show how additional discovery will defeat the summary judgment motion ie create a genuine dispute as to a material fact and that the nonmoving party must show that he has diligently pursued discovery of the evidence in question" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthat Mr. Tompkins was aware of smoking risks since the 1950s when his wife began urging him to quit. A manufacturer has a duty to warn “the appropriate audience of all potential dangers of which it, through the exercise of reasonable care, knows or should know.” Ellis v. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc., No. 96-CV-0535E(F), 1998 WL 401682, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Jul.17, 1998). Yet there is no duty to warn consumers of “obvious risks and dangers,” which is defined to mean “those risks and dangers which could have been or should have been appreciated by the user or that can be recognized as a matter of common sense.” Pigliavento v. Tyler Equip. Corp., 248 A.D.2d 840, 842, 669 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dep’t 1998); see also Liriano v. Hobart Corp., 92 N.Y.2d 232, 241, 677 N.Y.S.2d 764, 700 N.E.2d 303 (1998) (holding that the airline had no duty to warn passengers of the potential hazards of flying with a head cold", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthat Mr. Tompkins was aware of smoking risks since the 1950s when his wife began urging him to quit. A manufacturer has a duty to warn “the appropriate audience of all potential dangers of which it, through the exercise of reasonable care, knows or should know.” Ellis v. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc., No. 96-CV-0535E(F), 1998 WL 401682, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Jul.17, 1998). Yet there is no duty to warn consumers of “obvious risks and dangers,” which is defined to mean “those risks and dangers which could have been or should have been appreciated by the user or that can be recognized as a matter of common sense.” Pigliavento v. Tyler Equip. Corp., 248 A.D.2d 840, 842, 669 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dep’t 1998); see also Liriano v. Hobart Corp., 92 N.Y.2d 232, 241, 677 N.Y.S.2d 764, 700 N.E.2d 303 (1998) (holding that no duty to warn exists when hazards are known through general knowledge", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthat Mr. Tompkins was aware of smoking risks since the 1950s when his wife began urging him to quit. A manufacturer has a duty to warn “the appropriate audience of all potential dangers of which it, through the exercise of reasonable care, knows or should know.” Ellis v. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc., No. 96-CV-0535E(F), 1998 WL 401682, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Jul.17, 1998). Yet there is no duty to warn consumers of “obvious risks and dangers,” which is defined to mean “those risks and dangers which could have been or should have been appreciated by the user or that can be recognized as a matter of common sense.” Pigliavento v. Tyler Equip. Corp., 248 A.D.2d 840, 842, 669 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dep’t 1998); see also Liriano v. Hobart Corp., 92 N.Y.2d 232, 241, 677 N.Y.S.2d 764, 700 N.E.2d 303 (1998) (holding that such a duty exists", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthat Mr. Tompkins was aware of smoking risks since the 1950s when his wife began urging him to quit. A manufacturer has a duty to warn “the appropriate audience of all potential dangers of which it, through the exercise of reasonable care, knows or should know.” Ellis v. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc., No. 96-CV-0535E(F), 1998 WL 401682, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Jul.17, 1998). Yet there is no duty to warn consumers of “obvious risks and dangers,” which is defined to mean “those risks and dangers which could have been or should have been appreciated by the user or that can be recognized as a matter of common sense.” Pigliavento v. Tyler Equip. Corp., 248 A.D.2d 840, 842, 669 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dep’t 1998); see also Liriano v. Hobart Corp., 92 N.Y.2d 232, 241, 677 N.Y.S.2d 764, 700 N.E.2d 303 (1998) (holding that no legal duty exists to warn of the health risks of alcohol consumption because such risks are common knowledge", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthat Mr. Tompkins was aware of smoking risks since the 1950s when his wife began urging him to quit. A manufacturer has a duty to warn “the appropriate audience of all potential dangers of which it, through the exercise of reasonable care, knows or should know.” Ellis v. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc., No. 96-CV-0535E(F), 1998 WL 401682, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Jul.17, 1998). Yet there is no duty to warn consumers of “obvious risks and dangers,” which is defined to mean “those risks and dangers which could have been or should have been appreciated by the user or that can be recognized as a matter of common sense.” Pigliavento v. Tyler Equip. Corp., 248 A.D.2d 840, 842, 669 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dep’t 1998); see also Liriano v. Hobart Corp., 92 N.Y.2d 232, 241, 677 N.Y.S.2d 764, 700 N.E.2d 303 (1998) (holding a duty to warn arises only when the potential victim is known and foreseeable" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nopposing the motion, including attorney fees, unless the court finds that the making of the motion was substantially justified ....” Rule 37(a)(4), M.R.Civ.P. ¶55 We agree with the District Court that Ribi should have been allowed to discover the drafting history of the CGL policy’s pollution exclusion and that Travelers, as the party seeking protection, failed to show good cause for its omission. Although the issues were ultimately adjudged in its favor, Travelers was not substantially justified seeking a protective order at the time due to the substantial case law relying on the drafting history in interpreting the “sudden and accidental” clause and its potential relevancy in aiding the court’s determination. See, e.g., Textron v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. (R.I. 2000), 754 A.2d 742, 751 (holding that a claim of faulty workmanship that results in damage to property other than the work product is an accident and that a cgl policy is not intended to insure business risks that are the normal frequent or predictable consequences of doing business and which businesses can control and manage a cgl policy does not insure the insureds work itself rather it insures consequential damages that stem from that work as a result a cgl policy may provide coverage for claims arising out of tort breaches of contract and statutory liabilities as long as the requisite accidental occurrence and property damage are present", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nopposing the motion, including attorney fees, unless the court finds that the making of the motion was substantially justified ....” Rule 37(a)(4), M.R.Civ.P. ¶55 We agree with the District Court that Ribi should have been allowed to discover the drafting history of the CGL policy’s pollution exclusion and that Travelers, as the party seeking protection, failed to show good cause for its omission. Although the issues were ultimately adjudged in its favor, Travelers was not substantially justified seeking a protective order at the time due to the substantial case law relying on the drafting history in interpreting the “sudden and accidental” clause and its potential relevancy in aiding the court’s determination. See, e.g., Textron v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. (R.I. 2000), 754 A.2d 742, 751 (holding that a discharge continuously or even sporadically over a period of time cannot be considered sudden within the meaning of the pollution exclusion", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nopposing the motion, including attorney fees, unless the court finds that the making of the motion was substantially justified ....” Rule 37(a)(4), M.R.Civ.P. ¶55 We agree with the District Court that Ribi should have been allowed to discover the drafting history of the CGL policy’s pollution exclusion and that Travelers, as the party seeking protection, failed to show good cause for its omission. Although the issues were ultimately adjudged in its favor, Travelers was not substantially justified seeking a protective order at the time due to the substantial case law relying on the drafting history in interpreting the “sudden and accidental” clause and its potential relevancy in aiding the court’s determination. See, e.g., Textron v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. (R.I. 2000), 754 A.2d 742, 751 (holding that the drafting history of the sudden and accidental exception to the pollution exclusion clause of a cgl policy facilitated an interpretation of sudden to include unexpected", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nopposing the motion, including attorney fees, unless the court finds that the making of the motion was substantially justified ....” Rule 37(a)(4), M.R.Civ.P. ¶55 We agree with the District Court that Ribi should have been allowed to discover the drafting history of the CGL policy’s pollution exclusion and that Travelers, as the party seeking protection, failed to show good cause for its omission. Although the issues were ultimately adjudged in its favor, Travelers was not substantially justified seeking a protective order at the time due to the substantial case law relying on the drafting history in interpreting the “sudden and accidental” clause and its potential relevancy in aiding the court’s determination. See, e.g., Textron v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. (R.I. 2000), 754 A.2d 742, 751 (holding that the release of carbon monoxide into an apartment is not the type of environmental pollution contemplated by the pollution exclusion clause", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nopposing the motion, including attorney fees, unless the court finds that the making of the motion was substantially justified ....” Rule 37(a)(4), M.R.Civ.P. ¶55 We agree with the District Court that Ribi should have been allowed to discover the drafting history of the CGL policy’s pollution exclusion and that Travelers, as the party seeking protection, failed to show good cause for its omission. Although the issues were ultimately adjudged in its favor, Travelers was not substantially justified seeking a protective order at the time due to the substantial case law relying on the drafting history in interpreting the “sudden and accidental” clause and its potential relevancy in aiding the court’s determination. See, e.g., Textron v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. (R.I. 2000), 754 A.2d 742, 751 (holding accidental rupture of insureds oil tanks during a flood subject to pollution exclusion clause" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nargue that grounds exist to toll the statute of limitations from the time their cause of action accrued until they knew that LFUCG failed to report Berry’s abuse and continued funding Micro-City despite knowledge of his abuse. On remand from the Sixth Circuit decision in Doe, the district court made two rulings regarding tolling. First, the district court tolled the statutes of limitation for claims by putative class members against LFUCG from the time of Guy’s filing — October 15, 1998 — as ordered by the Sixth Circuit in Doe. The district court tolled the statutes of limitations only for claims against LFUCG (and not the individual defendants), because LFUCG was the only defendant in Guy. See, e.g., Wyser-Pratte Mgmt. Co., Inc. v. Telxon Corp., 413 F.3d 553, 567-68 (6th Cir.2005) (holding that tolling applies to a subsequent class action when class certification was granted in a prior case", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nargue that grounds exist to toll the statute of limitations from the time their cause of action accrued until they knew that LFUCG failed to report Berry’s abuse and continued funding Micro-City despite knowledge of his abuse. On remand from the Sixth Circuit decision in Doe, the district court made two rulings regarding tolling. First, the district court tolled the statutes of limitation for claims by putative class members against LFUCG from the time of Guy’s filing — October 15, 1998 — as ordered by the Sixth Circuit in Doe. The district court tolled the statutes of limitations only for claims against LFUCG (and not the individual defendants), because LFUCG was the only defendant in Guy. See, e.g., Wyser-Pratte Mgmt. Co., Inc. v. Telxon Corp., 413 F.3d 553, 567-68 (6th Cir.2005) (holding that tolling does not apply to additional defendants who were not named in the class action", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nargue that grounds exist to toll the statute of limitations from the time their cause of action accrued until they knew that LFUCG failed to report Berry’s abuse and continued funding Micro-City despite knowledge of his abuse. On remand from the Sixth Circuit decision in Doe, the district court made two rulings regarding tolling. First, the district court tolled the statutes of limitation for claims by putative class members against LFUCG from the time of Guy’s filing — October 15, 1998 — as ordered by the Sixth Circuit in Doe. The district court tolled the statutes of limitations only for claims against LFUCG (and not the individual defendants), because LFUCG was the only defendant in Guy. See, e.g., Wyser-Pratte Mgmt. Co., Inc. v. Telxon Corp., 413 F.3d 553, 567-68 (6th Cir.2005) (holding that an additional remedy does not constitute an additional requirement", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nargue that grounds exist to toll the statute of limitations from the time their cause of action accrued until they knew that LFUCG failed to report Berry’s abuse and continued funding Micro-City despite knowledge of his abuse. On remand from the Sixth Circuit decision in Doe, the district court made two rulings regarding tolling. First, the district court tolled the statutes of limitation for claims by putative class members against LFUCG from the time of Guy’s filing — October 15, 1998 — as ordered by the Sixth Circuit in Doe. The district court tolled the statutes of limitations only for claims against LFUCG (and not the individual defendants), because LFUCG was the only defendant in Guy. See, e.g., Wyser-Pratte Mgmt. Co., Inc. v. Telxon Corp., 413 F.3d 553, 567-68 (6th Cir.2005) (holding that it is error to certify class when named class representatives are not members of the class they purport to represent", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nargue that grounds exist to toll the statute of limitations from the time their cause of action accrued until they knew that LFUCG failed to report Berry’s abuse and continued funding Micro-City despite knowledge of his abuse. On remand from the Sixth Circuit decision in Doe, the district court made two rulings regarding tolling. First, the district court tolled the statutes of limitation for claims by putative class members against LFUCG from the time of Guy’s filing — October 15, 1998 — as ordered by the Sixth Circuit in Doe. The district court tolled the statutes of limitations only for claims against LFUCG (and not the individual defendants), because LFUCG was the only defendant in Guy. See, e.g., Wyser-Pratte Mgmt. Co., Inc. v. Telxon Corp., 413 F.3d 553, 567-68 (6th Cir.2005) (holding that after a class is certified the controversy may exist between a named defendant and a member of the class represented by the named plaintiff even though the claim of the named plaintiff has become moot" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthe circumstances was not clearly erroneous. Consequently, the ultimate finding that Hamilton negligently operated the boat was not clearly erroneous. Moreover, this finding is consistent with decisions in other circuits finding a boat operator negligent when, along with other factors, he failed to familiarize himself with the area by consulting charts, notices to mariners, or approved light lists. See, e.g., Andrews v. United States, 801 F.2d 644, 649 (3rd Cir.1986) (evidence that recreational boaters were “piloting their boats in wholly unfamiliar waters without the benefit of personal experience, navigational charts, or even the ability to recognize the standard maritime road symbols” supported finding of negligence); Albinder v. United States, 685 F.Supp. 45, 46 (S.D.N.Y.1987) (holding that hired boat pilot who was unfamiliar with the area was negligent in not having available uptodate navigational guides made available to the public by the us government and in selecting a route which departed from the plainly indicated channels and resulted in the accident", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthe circumstances was not clearly erroneous. Consequently, the ultimate finding that Hamilton negligently operated the boat was not clearly erroneous. Moreover, this finding is consistent with decisions in other circuits finding a boat operator negligent when, along with other factors, he failed to familiarize himself with the area by consulting charts, notices to mariners, or approved light lists. See, e.g., Andrews v. United States, 801 F.2d 644, 649 (3rd Cir.1986) (evidence that recreational boaters were “piloting their boats in wholly unfamiliar waters without the benefit of personal experience, navigational charts, or even the ability to recognize the standard maritime road symbols” supported finding of negligence); Albinder v. United States, 685 F.Supp. 45, 46 (S.D.N.Y.1987) (holding that the area of concern raised by appellant is exempted from public rulemaking procedures because the rules of practice which appellant claims the university should be required to promulgate would affect only the staff and faculty of the university and not the private rights of or procedures available to the public", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthe circumstances was not clearly erroneous. Consequently, the ultimate finding that Hamilton negligently operated the boat was not clearly erroneous. Moreover, this finding is consistent with decisions in other circuits finding a boat operator negligent when, along with other factors, he failed to familiarize himself with the area by consulting charts, notices to mariners, or approved light lists. See, e.g., Andrews v. United States, 801 F.2d 644, 649 (3rd Cir.1986) (evidence that recreational boaters were “piloting their boats in wholly unfamiliar waters without the benefit of personal experience, navigational charts, or even the ability to recognize the standard maritime road symbols” supported finding of negligence); Albinder v. United States, 685 F.Supp. 45, 46 (S.D.N.Y.1987) (holding that it is the claimants burden to show that the injury was the result of an accident that not only arose in the course of the employment but that it also grew out of or resulted from the employment", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthe circumstances was not clearly erroneous. Consequently, the ultimate finding that Hamilton negligently operated the boat was not clearly erroneous. Moreover, this finding is consistent with decisions in other circuits finding a boat operator negligent when, along with other factors, he failed to familiarize himself with the area by consulting charts, notices to mariners, or approved light lists. See, e.g., Andrews v. United States, 801 F.2d 644, 649 (3rd Cir.1986) (evidence that recreational boaters were “piloting their boats in wholly unfamiliar waters without the benefit of personal experience, navigational charts, or even the ability to recognize the standard maritime road symbols” supported finding of negligence); Albinder v. United States, 685 F.Supp. 45, 46 (S.D.N.Y.1987) (holding that equitable relief under rico is available only to the government", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthe circumstances was not clearly erroneous. Consequently, the ultimate finding that Hamilton negligently operated the boat was not clearly erroneous. Moreover, this finding is consistent with decisions in other circuits finding a boat operator negligent when, along with other factors, he failed to familiarize himself with the area by consulting charts, notices to mariners, or approved light lists. See, e.g., Andrews v. United States, 801 F.2d 644, 649 (3rd Cir.1986) (evidence that recreational boaters were “piloting their boats in wholly unfamiliar waters without the benefit of personal experience, navigational charts, or even the ability to recognize the standard maritime road symbols” supported finding of negligence); Albinder v. United States, 685 F.Supp. 45, 46 (S.D.N.Y.1987) (holding that a certain loan transaction was not merchandise and not available to the consumer in the popular sense where it was not advertised to the public available to consumers in the ordinary market place mass produced or available in large quantities but that it was more accurately characterized as a rare specialized and complex transaction whose availability is restricted to a small number of corporate insiders who hold a significant volume of corporate stock" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nper se to violation of OSHA regulation because statute provided that regulations were not to enlarge, diminish, or affect common law rights, duties, and liabilities). When a legislative enactment or regulation does not define the applicable standard of care, it may nonetheless “be relevant evidence bearing on the issue of negligent conduct.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 288B (1965). This is particularly true in the case of administrative regulations, whose violation courts commonly regard as evidence of the applicable standard of care. See id. cmt. d. We therefore conclude that violations of commission rules are valid, but not conclusive, evidence that a lessee breached a duty owed to the surface owner. See Blueflame Gas, Inc. v. Van Hoose, 679 P.2d 579, 591-92 (Colo.1984) (recognizing right to privacy in receipt of health care services to the extent consistent with providing adequate medical care and the safety and good order of the facility", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nper se to violation of OSHA regulation because statute provided that regulations were not to enlarge, diminish, or affect common law rights, duties, and liabilities). When a legislative enactment or regulation does not define the applicable standard of care, it may nonetheless “be relevant evidence bearing on the issue of negligent conduct.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 288B (1965). This is particularly true in the case of administrative regulations, whose violation courts commonly regard as evidence of the applicable standard of care. See id. cmt. d. We therefore conclude that violations of commission rules are valid, but not conclusive, evidence that a lessee breached a duty owed to the surface owner. See Blueflame Gas, Inc. v. Van Hoose, 679 P.2d 579, 591-92 (Colo.1984) (holding whistleblower protections available under the washington health care act rcw 4370075 adequately promoted workplace safety ensured compliance with the accepted standard of care and prevented fraudulent billing in the health care industry", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nper se to violation of OSHA regulation because statute provided that regulations were not to enlarge, diminish, or affect common law rights, duties, and liabilities). When a legislative enactment or regulation does not define the applicable standard of care, it may nonetheless “be relevant evidence bearing on the issue of negligent conduct.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 288B (1965). This is particularly true in the case of administrative regulations, whose violation courts commonly regard as evidence of the applicable standard of care. See id. cmt. d. We therefore conclude that violations of commission rules are valid, but not conclusive, evidence that a lessee breached a duty owed to the surface owner. See Blueflame Gas, Inc. v. Van Hoose, 679 P.2d 579, 591-92 (Colo.1984) (holding that although compliance with administrative safety regulations did not establish due care it was evidence of due care", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nper se to violation of OSHA regulation because statute provided that regulations were not to enlarge, diminish, or affect common law rights, duties, and liabilities). When a legislative enactment or regulation does not define the applicable standard of care, it may nonetheless “be relevant evidence bearing on the issue of negligent conduct.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 288B (1965). This is particularly true in the case of administrative regulations, whose violation courts commonly regard as evidence of the applicable standard of care. See id. cmt. d. We therefore conclude that violations of commission rules are valid, but not conclusive, evidence that a lessee breached a duty owed to the surface owner. See Blueflame Gas, Inc. v. Van Hoose, 679 P.2d 579, 591-92 (Colo.1984) (recognizing that missouri courts have often held that regulations may establish the appropriate standard of care in a negligence case", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nper se to violation of OSHA regulation because statute provided that regulations were not to enlarge, diminish, or affect common law rights, duties, and liabilities). When a legislative enactment or regulation does not define the applicable standard of care, it may nonetheless “be relevant evidence bearing on the issue of negligent conduct.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 288B (1965). This is particularly true in the case of administrative regulations, whose violation courts commonly regard as evidence of the applicable standard of care. See id. cmt. d. We therefore conclude that violations of commission rules are valid, but not conclusive, evidence that a lessee breached a duty owed to the surface owner. See Blueflame Gas, Inc. v. Van Hoose, 679 P.2d 579, 591-92 (Colo.1984) (holding that a general acute care hospital may not delegate its duty to provide physicians for emergency room care because the law imposes a duty on hospital to provide that health care" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nplaintiff can show that the third party breached a duty recognized by law. Id. In the absence of affirmative conduct such as an agreement, contract, statute, or other special circumstance, negligence law generally does not impose affirmative duties, such as the duty to preserve evidence. Id. The question “ ‘[w]hether a duty exists is ultimately a question of fairness. The inquiry involves a weighing of the relationship of the parties, the nature of the risk and the public interest in the proposed solution.’ ” Id. (quoting Cruet v. Certain-Teed Corp., 432 Pa.Super. 554, 639 A.2d 478, 479 (1994)). There are two possible duties to consider in the context of this case: 1) duty of a third-party company to its customers, and 2) duty of a third-party employer to its employ d 615 (Ala.1983) (holding that no independent commonlaw duty exists on the part of an employer to preserve evidence for an employees potential civil action against third parties", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nplaintiff can show that the third party breached a duty recognized by law. Id. In the absence of affirmative conduct such as an agreement, contract, statute, or other special circumstance, negligence law generally does not impose affirmative duties, such as the duty to preserve evidence. Id. The question “ ‘[w]hether a duty exists is ultimately a question of fairness. The inquiry involves a weighing of the relationship of the parties, the nature of the risk and the public interest in the proposed solution.’ ” Id. (quoting Cruet v. Certain-Teed Corp., 432 Pa.Super. 554, 639 A.2d 478, 479 (1994)). There are two possible duties to consider in the context of this case: 1) duty of a third-party company to its customers, and 2) duty of a third-party employer to its employ d 615 (Ala.1983) (holding that an employer through its employees did not breach an independent duty to power company not to come in contact with power companys transmission lines because such a duty is a general duty not an independent one", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nplaintiff can show that the third party breached a duty recognized by law. Id. In the absence of affirmative conduct such as an agreement, contract, statute, or other special circumstance, negligence law generally does not impose affirmative duties, such as the duty to preserve evidence. Id. The question “ ‘[w]hether a duty exists is ultimately a question of fairness. The inquiry involves a weighing of the relationship of the parties, the nature of the risk and the public interest in the proposed solution.’ ” Id. (quoting Cruet v. Certain-Teed Corp., 432 Pa.Super. 554, 639 A.2d 478, 479 (1994)). There are two possible duties to consider in the context of this case: 1) duty of a third-party company to its customers, and 2) duty of a third-party employer to its employ d 615 (Ala.1983) (recognizing that the compensation that an employer pays may exceed an employees recovery from third parties", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nplaintiff can show that the third party breached a duty recognized by law. Id. In the absence of affirmative conduct such as an agreement, contract, statute, or other special circumstance, negligence law generally does not impose affirmative duties, such as the duty to preserve evidence. Id. The question “ ‘[w]hether a duty exists is ultimately a question of fairness. The inquiry involves a weighing of the relationship of the parties, the nature of the risk and the public interest in the proposed solution.’ ” Id. (quoting Cruet v. Certain-Teed Corp., 432 Pa.Super. 554, 639 A.2d 478, 479 (1994)). There are two possible duties to consider in the context of this case: 1) duty of a third-party company to its customers, and 2) duty of a third-party employer to its employ d 615 (Ala.1983) (holding there is no duty to third parties on the part of a premises owner who could not have foreseen the criminal acts of third parties", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nplaintiff can show that the third party breached a duty recognized by law. Id. In the absence of affirmative conduct such as an agreement, contract, statute, or other special circumstance, negligence law generally does not impose affirmative duties, such as the duty to preserve evidence. Id. The question “ ‘[w]hether a duty exists is ultimately a question of fairness. The inquiry involves a weighing of the relationship of the parties, the nature of the risk and the public interest in the proposed solution.’ ” Id. (quoting Cruet v. Certain-Teed Corp., 432 Pa.Super. 554, 639 A.2d 478, 479 (1994)). There are two possible duties to consider in the context of this case: 1) duty of a third-party company to its customers, and 2) duty of a third-party employer to its employ d 615 (Ala.1983) (holding that such a duty exists" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nFor example, interrogation in a police station does not amount to custody per se. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977); California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983); Ashe, 125 Md.App. at 551, 726 A.2d 786. As the Supreme Court explained in Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495, 97 S.Ct. 711: Any interview of one suspected of a crime by a police officer will have coercive aspects to it, simply by virtue of the fact that the police officer is part of a law enforcement system which may ultimately cause the suspect to be charged with a crime. But police officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom they question. Another established rule is that police do not violate Mira th Cir.1969) (holding that appellants complaint on appeal that the environment was coercive did not change the fact that he was not in custody when he voluntarily went to the police station was told several times he could leave and did leave after the interrogation", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nFor example, interrogation in a police station does not amount to custody per se. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977); California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983); Ashe, 125 Md.App. at 551, 726 A.2d 786. As the Supreme Court explained in Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495, 97 S.Ct. 711: Any interview of one suspected of a crime by a police officer will have coercive aspects to it, simply by virtue of the fact that the police officer is part of a law enforcement system which may ultimately cause the suspect to be charged with a crime. But police officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom they question. Another established rule is that police do not violate Mira th Cir.1969) (holding that accused was not in custody when told he was not under arrest and was free to leave and did in fact freely leave the interview", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nFor example, interrogation in a police station does not amount to custody per se. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977); California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983); Ashe, 125 Md.App. at 551, 726 A.2d 786. As the Supreme Court explained in Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495, 97 S.Ct. 711: Any interview of one suspected of a crime by a police officer will have coercive aspects to it, simply by virtue of the fact that the police officer is part of a law enforcement system which may ultimately cause the suspect to be charged with a crime. But police officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom they question. Another established rule is that police do not violate Mira th Cir.1969) (holding that a defendant who was told several times he was not under arrest and who never asked to leave during an interview with investigators was not in custody", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nFor example, interrogation in a police station does not amount to custody per se. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977); California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983); Ashe, 125 Md.App. at 551, 726 A.2d 786. As the Supreme Court explained in Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495, 97 S.Ct. 711: Any interview of one suspected of a crime by a police officer will have coercive aspects to it, simply by virtue of the fact that the police officer is part of a law enforcement system which may ultimately cause the suspect to be charged with a crime. But police officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom they question. Another established rule is that police do not violate Mira th Cir.1969) (holding that the defendant was placed in official detention when two police officers approached him and told him that he was under arrest as the defendant could not reasonably have believed that he was free to leave", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nFor example, interrogation in a police station does not amount to custody per se. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977); California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983); Ashe, 125 Md.App. at 551, 726 A.2d 786. As the Supreme Court explained in Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495, 97 S.Ct. 711: Any interview of one suspected of a crime by a police officer will have coercive aspects to it, simply by virtue of the fact that the police officer is part of a law enforcement system which may ultimately cause the suspect to be charged with a crime. But police officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom they question. Another established rule is that police do not violate Mira th Cir.1969) (holding in the context of a prosecution for second degree escape that although defendant was not handcuffed he had nonetheless been placed under arrest had had his liberty restrained in that he was not free to leave and at that point the first step in the process of transporting him to the police station had begun consequently the defendants arrest was complete and he was in custody" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nemployment action complained of’). Consequently, it is difficult to gauge the full significance of Reeves’s remark. See Bennett v. Solis, 729 F.Supp.2d 54, 68-69 (D.D.C.2010) (emphasizing the importance of the context in which allegedly discriminatory remarks were made to their probative value in establishing pretext). Ultimately, the Court must conclude that a reasonable juror could find that Hyson’s non-promotion was based to some extent on her gender. Although, as described above, the facts that Hyson was interviewed while Celin was not and that Hyson had a higher score than Celin on the online test do not give rise to an inference of discrimination by themselves, they might do so in combination with Reeves’s remark. Cf. Pederson v. Mills, 636 F.Supp.2d 78, 84-85 (D.D.C.2009) (recognizing that the plaintiffs mere assertions that the defendant had a discriminatory intent were inadequate without substantial factual evidence to raise an issue to preclude summary judgment", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nemployment action complained of’). Consequently, it is difficult to gauge the full significance of Reeves’s remark. See Bennett v. Solis, 729 F.Supp.2d 54, 68-69 (D.D.C.2010) (emphasizing the importance of the context in which allegedly discriminatory remarks were made to their probative value in establishing pretext). Ultimately, the Court must conclude that a reasonable juror could find that Hyson’s non-promotion was based to some extent on her gender. Although, as described above, the facts that Hyson was interviewed while Celin was not and that Hyson had a higher score than Celin on the online test do not give rise to an inference of discrimination by themselves, they might do so in combination with Reeves’s remark. Cf. Pederson v. Mills, 636 F.Supp.2d 78, 84-85 (D.D.C.2009) (holding that repeated remarks about need to bring in new blood or young blood by one of the decisionmakers were not stray remarks and may permit inference of discrimination", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nemployment action complained of’). Consequently, it is difficult to gauge the full significance of Reeves’s remark. See Bennett v. Solis, 729 F.Supp.2d 54, 68-69 (D.D.C.2010) (emphasizing the importance of the context in which allegedly discriminatory remarks were made to their probative value in establishing pretext). Ultimately, the Court must conclude that a reasonable juror could find that Hyson’s non-promotion was based to some extent on her gender. Although, as described above, the facts that Hyson was interviewed while Celin was not and that Hyson had a higher score than Celin on the online test do not give rise to an inference of discrimination by themselves, they might do so in combination with Reeves’s remark. Cf. Pederson v. Mills, 636 F.Supp.2d 78, 84-85 (D.D.C.2009) (holding that discriminatory remarks made nearly a year before the challenged employment decision could not support an inference of discrimination", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nemployment action complained of’). Consequently, it is difficult to gauge the full significance of Reeves’s remark. See Bennett v. Solis, 729 F.Supp.2d 54, 68-69 (D.D.C.2010) (emphasizing the importance of the context in which allegedly discriminatory remarks were made to their probative value in establishing pretext). Ultimately, the Court must conclude that a reasonable juror could find that Hyson’s non-promotion was based to some extent on her gender. Although, as described above, the facts that Hyson was interviewed while Celin was not and that Hyson had a higher score than Celin on the online test do not give rise to an inference of discrimination by themselves, they might do so in combination with Reeves’s remark. Cf. Pederson v. Mills, 636 F.Supp.2d 78, 84-85 (D.D.C.2009) (holding that biased remarks by decisionmakers in combination with evidence of a minor qualification gap in favor of the plaintiff were sufficient to support an overall inference of discriminatory preference and preclude summary judgment for the defendant", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nemployment action complained of’). Consequently, it is difficult to gauge the full significance of Reeves’s remark. See Bennett v. Solis, 729 F.Supp.2d 54, 68-69 (D.D.C.2010) (emphasizing the importance of the context in which allegedly discriminatory remarks were made to their probative value in establishing pretext). Ultimately, the Court must conclude that a reasonable juror could find that Hyson’s non-promotion was based to some extent on her gender. Although, as described above, the facts that Hyson was interviewed while Celin was not and that Hyson had a higher score than Celin on the online test do not give rise to an inference of discrimination by themselves, they might do so in combination with Reeves’s remark. Cf. Pederson v. Mills, 636 F.Supp.2d 78, 84-85 (D.D.C.2009) (holding that remarks made by decisionmakers could be viewed as reflecting discriminatory animus" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nvery helpful in establishing personal jurisdiction. See Kato-pothis v. Windsor-Mount Joy Mut. Ins. Co., No. 14-380, 211 F.Supp.3d 1, 23, 2016 WL 5374081,. at *16 (D.D.C. Sept. 26,. 2016) (\"[Ejmail and telephone communications sent into the District of Columbia are not sufficient to [confer personal jurisdiction] in themselves, even if they are made pursuant to an underlying contract between a resident [plaintiff] and a nonresident [defendant .... After all, such communications are incidental to nearly every business relationship; they are not indicative of any desire to do business in D.C. and do not suffice to show purposeful availment or minimum contacts.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Dove v. United States, No. 86-0065, 1987 WL 18739, at *3 (D.D.C. Oct. 9, 1987) (holding that the mere delivery of documents does not confer jurisdiction", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nvery helpful in establishing personal jurisdiction. See Kato-pothis v. Windsor-Mount Joy Mut. Ins. Co., No. 14-380, 211 F.Supp.3d 1, 23, 2016 WL 5374081,. at *16 (D.D.C. Sept. 26,. 2016) (\"[Ejmail and telephone communications sent into the District of Columbia are not sufficient to [confer personal jurisdiction] in themselves, even if they are made pursuant to an underlying contract between a resident [plaintiff] and a nonresident [defendant .... After all, such communications are incidental to nearly every business relationship; they are not indicative of any desire to do business in D.C. and do not suffice to show purposeful availment or minimum contacts.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Dove v. United States, No. 86-0065, 1987 WL 18739, at *3 (D.D.C. Oct. 9, 1987) (holding that summary judgment order that does not dispose of all claims between parties does not confer appellate jurisdiction because it is not a final decision under 28 usc 1291", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nvery helpful in establishing personal jurisdiction. See Kato-pothis v. Windsor-Mount Joy Mut. Ins. Co., No. 14-380, 211 F.Supp.3d 1, 23, 2016 WL 5374081,. at *16 (D.D.C. Sept. 26,. 2016) (\"[Ejmail and telephone communications sent into the District of Columbia are not sufficient to [confer personal jurisdiction] in themselves, even if they are made pursuant to an underlying contract between a resident [plaintiff] and a nonresident [defendant .... After all, such communications are incidental to nearly every business relationship; they are not indicative of any desire to do business in D.C. and do not suffice to show purposeful availment or minimum contacts.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Dove v. United States, No. 86-0065, 1987 WL 18739, at *3 (D.D.C. Oct. 9, 1987) (holding that mere reference to a collective bargaining agreement does not confer federal question jurisdiction under section 301a", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nvery helpful in establishing personal jurisdiction. See Kato-pothis v. Windsor-Mount Joy Mut. Ins. Co., No. 14-380, 211 F.Supp.3d 1, 23, 2016 WL 5374081,. at *16 (D.D.C. Sept. 26,. 2016) (\"[Ejmail and telephone communications sent into the District of Columbia are not sufficient to [confer personal jurisdiction] in themselves, even if they are made pursuant to an underlying contract between a resident [plaintiff] and a nonresident [defendant .... After all, such communications are incidental to nearly every business relationship; they are not indicative of any desire to do business in D.C. and do not suffice to show purposeful availment or minimum contacts.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Dove v. United States, No. 86-0065, 1987 WL 18739, at *3 (D.D.C. Oct. 9, 1987) (holding that the flsa does not confer jurisdiction over ambulance services", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nvery helpful in establishing personal jurisdiction. See Kato-pothis v. Windsor-Mount Joy Mut. Ins. Co., No. 14-380, 211 F.Supp.3d 1, 23, 2016 WL 5374081,. at *16 (D.D.C. Sept. 26,. 2016) (\"[Ejmail and telephone communications sent into the District of Columbia are not sufficient to [confer personal jurisdiction] in themselves, even if they are made pursuant to an underlying contract between a resident [plaintiff] and a nonresident [defendant .... After all, such communications are incidental to nearly every business relationship; they are not indicative of any desire to do business in D.C. and do not suffice to show purposeful availment or minimum contacts.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Dove v. United States, No. 86-0065, 1987 WL 18739, at *3 (D.D.C. Oct. 9, 1987) (holding that a choice of law provision is not sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nplaintiff with a private cause of action. However, the Kansas Act does not provide a private cause of action. For these reasons, defendant’s motion to dismiss is granted. A. The Kentucky Act (Count Two) “ERISA comprehensively regulates, among es insurance” under the new legal standard announced by the Supreme Court in Miller. However, while Miller announced a new legal standard for determining whether a state law regulates insurance for purposes of ERISA’s savings clause, Miller involved an “any willing provider” statute, not a state judicial remedy for a claims processing cause of action. Thus, Miller did not modify the body of case law regarding so-called “conflict preemption” in which a state law adds to the judicial remedies available under ERISA. See Elliot, 337 F.3d at 1147 (holding the conflict preemption principle announced in pilot life and clarified in rush prudential remains in force", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nplaintiff with a private cause of action. However, the Kansas Act does not provide a private cause of action. For these reasons, defendant’s motion to dismiss is granted. A. The Kentucky Act (Count Two) “ERISA comprehensively regulates, among es insurance” under the new legal standard announced by the Supreme Court in Miller. However, while Miller announced a new legal standard for determining whether a state law regulates insurance for purposes of ERISA’s savings clause, Miller involved an “any willing provider” statute, not a state judicial remedy for a claims processing cause of action. Thus, Miller did not modify the body of case law regarding so-called “conflict preemption” in which a state law adds to the judicial remedies available under ERISA. See Elliot, 337 F.3d at 1147 (recognizing same principle", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nplaintiff with a private cause of action. However, the Kansas Act does not provide a private cause of action. For these reasons, defendant’s motion to dismiss is granted. A. The Kentucky Act (Count Two) “ERISA comprehensively regulates, among es insurance” under the new legal standard announced by the Supreme Court in Miller. However, while Miller announced a new legal standard for determining whether a state law regulates insurance for purposes of ERISA’s savings clause, Miller involved an “any willing provider” statute, not a state judicial remedy for a claims processing cause of action. Thus, Miller did not modify the body of case law regarding so-called “conflict preemption” in which a state law adds to the judicial remedies available under ERISA. See Elliot, 337 F.3d at 1147 (recognizing principle", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nplaintiff with a private cause of action. However, the Kansas Act does not provide a private cause of action. For these reasons, defendant’s motion to dismiss is granted. A. The Kentucky Act (Count Two) “ERISA comprehensively regulates, among es insurance” under the new legal standard announced by the Supreme Court in Miller. However, while Miller announced a new legal standard for determining whether a state law regulates insurance for purposes of ERISA’s savings clause, Miller involved an “any willing provider” statute, not a state judicial remedy for a claims processing cause of action. Thus, Miller did not modify the body of case law regarding so-called “conflict preemption” in which a state law adds to the judicial remedies available under ERISA. See Elliot, 337 F.3d at 1147 (recognizing the conflict", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nplaintiff with a private cause of action. However, the Kansas Act does not provide a private cause of action. For these reasons, defendant’s motion to dismiss is granted. A. The Kentucky Act (Count Two) “ERISA comprehensively regulates, among es insurance” under the new legal standard announced by the Supreme Court in Miller. However, while Miller announced a new legal standard for determining whether a state law regulates insurance for purposes of ERISA’s savings clause, Miller involved an “any willing provider” statute, not a state judicial remedy for a claims processing cause of action. Thus, Miller did not modify the body of case law regarding so-called “conflict preemption” in which a state law adds to the judicial remedies available under ERISA. See Elliot, 337 F.3d at 1147 (recognizing conflict" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nsecurity, the trial court must hear evidence of “the value of the property interest’s rent or revenue.” Cf. Culbertson v. Brodsky, 775 S.W.2d 451, 455 (Tex.App.Fort Worth 1989, writ dism’d w.o.j.) (“remand[ing] to the trial court with instructions that the trial court shall conduct a hearing and consider evidence relating to the sufficiency of the supersedeas bond, including the present value of the consideration required of Brodsky by the contract and the value of the rent and/or hire of the property”). The trial court thus erred in setting the amount of security without conducting an evidentiary hearing. However, since Reyes does not argue this error harmed him in any way, I would hold the error is harmless. See Tex.R.App. P. 44.1; see Nabelek, — S.W.3d at -, 2005 WL 2148999, at *6 (holding brief hearing not part of trial proper in defendants absence subject to harmless error standard", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nsecurity, the trial court must hear evidence of “the value of the property interest’s rent or revenue.” Cf. Culbertson v. Brodsky, 775 S.W.2d 451, 455 (Tex.App.Fort Worth 1989, writ dism’d w.o.j.) (“remand[ing] to the trial court with instructions that the trial court shall conduct a hearing and consider evidence relating to the sufficiency of the supersedeas bond, including the present value of the consideration required of Brodsky by the contract and the value of the rent and/or hire of the property”). The trial court thus erred in setting the amount of security without conducting an evidentiary hearing. However, since Reyes does not argue this error harmed him in any way, I would hold the error is harmless. See Tex.R.App. P. 44.1; see Nabelek, — S.W.3d at -, 2005 WL 2148999, at *6 (holding law requires court to consider full record of any evidentiary hearing even if hearing held by different judge", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nsecurity, the trial court must hear evidence of “the value of the property interest’s rent or revenue.” Cf. Culbertson v. Brodsky, 775 S.W.2d 451, 455 (Tex.App.Fort Worth 1989, writ dism’d w.o.j.) (“remand[ing] to the trial court with instructions that the trial court shall conduct a hearing and consider evidence relating to the sufficiency of the supersedeas bond, including the present value of the consideration required of Brodsky by the contract and the value of the rent and/or hire of the property”). The trial court thus erred in setting the amount of security without conducting an evidentiary hearing. However, since Reyes does not argue this error harmed him in any way, I would hold the error is harmless. See Tex.R.App. P. 44.1; see Nabelek, — S.W.3d at -, 2005 WL 2148999, at *6 (holding that where defendants counsel objected to the trial judges evidentiary rulings in evidentiary hearing but did not object to the defendants absence any claim of error due to defendants absence had been waived", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nsecurity, the trial court must hear evidence of “the value of the property interest’s rent or revenue.” Cf. Culbertson v. Brodsky, 775 S.W.2d 451, 455 (Tex.App.Fort Worth 1989, writ dism’d w.o.j.) (“remand[ing] to the trial court with instructions that the trial court shall conduct a hearing and consider evidence relating to the sufficiency of the supersedeas bond, including the present value of the consideration required of Brodsky by the contract and the value of the rent and/or hire of the property”). The trial court thus erred in setting the amount of security without conducting an evidentiary hearing. However, since Reyes does not argue this error harmed him in any way, I would hold the error is harmless. See Tex.R.App. P. 44.1; see Nabelek, — S.W.3d at -, 2005 WL 2148999, at *6 (holding that error harmless because appellant failed to identify any specific harm from improper introduction of evidence", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nsecurity, the trial court must hear evidence of “the value of the property interest’s rent or revenue.” Cf. Culbertson v. Brodsky, 775 S.W.2d 451, 455 (Tex.App.Fort Worth 1989, writ dism’d w.o.j.) (“remand[ing] to the trial court with instructions that the trial court shall conduct a hearing and consider evidence relating to the sufficiency of the supersedeas bond, including the present value of the consideration required of Brodsky by the contract and the value of the rent and/or hire of the property”). The trial court thus erred in setting the amount of security without conducting an evidentiary hearing. However, since Reyes does not argue this error harmed him in any way, I would hold the error is harmless. See Tex.R.App. P. 44.1; see Nabelek, — S.W.3d at -, 2005 WL 2148999, at *6 (holding absence of record harmless when hearing was not evidentiary and appellant failed to argue harm" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nissue of sanity even if the testimony discloses or is based on the defendant’s statements to psychologists during a compelled examination and without counsel present. 7 . Cf. D.C.Code § 14-307 (b)(2) (1986) (privilege does not cover \"evidence relating to the mental competency or sanity of an accused in criminal trials where the accused raises the defense of insanity”); United States v. Byers, 239 U.S.App.D.C. at 10, 740 F.2d at 1113 (observing that while court should respect defendant’s \"private enclave of the human personality,” when he \"appeals to the nature of that enclave as the reason why he should not be punished for murder, and introduces psychiatric testimony for that purpose, the state must be able to follow where he has led”); Carr, 141 U.S.App.D.C. at 230, 437 F.2d at 663 (holding in insanity defense case that full scrutiny of defendants mental state overrides the claims founded upon the attorneyclient relationship that might block production of defense psychiatrists examination notes", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nissue of sanity even if the testimony discloses or is based on the defendant’s statements to psychologists during a compelled examination and without counsel present. 7 . Cf. D.C.Code § 14-307 (b)(2) (1986) (privilege does not cover \"evidence relating to the mental competency or sanity of an accused in criminal trials where the accused raises the defense of insanity”); United States v. Byers, 239 U.S.App.D.C. at 10, 740 F.2d at 1113 (observing that while court should respect defendant’s \"private enclave of the human personality,” when he \"appeals to the nature of that enclave as the reason why he should not be punished for murder, and introduces psychiatric testimony for that purpose, the state must be able to follow where he has led”); Carr, 141 U.S.App.D.C. at 230, 437 F.2d at 663 (holding that defendants failure to assert the defense in any pretrial motions did not waive defendants limitations defense because the assertion of a limitations defense in the answer preserved defendants right to raise the defense both during the first trial and before the second", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nissue of sanity even if the testimony discloses or is based on the defendant’s statements to psychologists during a compelled examination and without counsel present. 7 . Cf. D.C.Code § 14-307 (b)(2) (1986) (privilege does not cover \"evidence relating to the mental competency or sanity of an accused in criminal trials where the accused raises the defense of insanity”); United States v. Byers, 239 U.S.App.D.C. at 10, 740 F.2d at 1113 (observing that while court should respect defendant’s \"private enclave of the human personality,” when he \"appeals to the nature of that enclave as the reason why he should not be punished for murder, and introduces psychiatric testimony for that purpose, the state must be able to follow where he has led”); Carr, 141 U.S.App.D.C. at 230, 437 F.2d at 663 (holding that defense counsel was not constitutionally ineffective for presenting a diminished capacity defense as opposed to a defense of legal insanity", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nissue of sanity even if the testimony discloses or is based on the defendant’s statements to psychologists during a compelled examination and without counsel present. 7 . Cf. D.C.Code § 14-307 (b)(2) (1986) (privilege does not cover \"evidence relating to the mental competency or sanity of an accused in criminal trials where the accused raises the defense of insanity”); United States v. Byers, 239 U.S.App.D.C. at 10, 740 F.2d at 1113 (observing that while court should respect defendant’s \"private enclave of the human personality,” when he \"appeals to the nature of that enclave as the reason why he should not be punished for murder, and introduces psychiatric testimony for that purpose, the state must be able to follow where he has led”); Carr, 141 U.S.App.D.C. at 230, 437 F.2d at 663 (holding that insanity is a complete defense to the criminal charge", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nissue of sanity even if the testimony discloses or is based on the defendant’s statements to psychologists during a compelled examination and without counsel present. 7 . Cf. D.C.Code § 14-307 (b)(2) (1986) (privilege does not cover \"evidence relating to the mental competency or sanity of an accused in criminal trials where the accused raises the defense of insanity”); United States v. Byers, 239 U.S.App.D.C. at 10, 740 F.2d at 1113 (observing that while court should respect defendant’s \"private enclave of the human personality,” when he \"appeals to the nature of that enclave as the reason why he should not be punished for murder, and introduces psychiatric testimony for that purpose, the state must be able to follow where he has led”); Carr, 141 U.S.App.D.C. at 230, 437 F.2d at 663 (holding that a defendants insanity due to voluntary intoxication is not a defense" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nfailure to establish requirements or policies has allowed private driver education schools to be inaccessible. Thus, the DOJ’s interpretative guidance indicates that the TEA is not accountable for the driver education schools’ inaccessibility because the TEA’S requirements and policies have not caused it. Finally, as to case law, the named plaintiffs cite two lottery cases as their primary authority for finding that driver education is a program of the TEA. In those state supreme court cases, each court held that the state lottery was a program of the state lottery commission, so the ADA relationship, courts have routinely held that a public entity is not hable for a licensed private actor’s behavior. See, e.g., Noel v. N.Y.C. Taxi & Limousine Comm’n, 687 F.3d 63, 72 (2d Cir.2012) (holding that public entity is not liable for inaccessible taxi companies it licenses and regulates", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nfailure to establish requirements or policies has allowed private driver education schools to be inaccessible. Thus, the DOJ’s interpretative guidance indicates that the TEA is not accountable for the driver education schools’ inaccessibility because the TEA’S requirements and policies have not caused it. Finally, as to case law, the named plaintiffs cite two lottery cases as their primary authority for finding that driver education is a program of the TEA. In those state supreme court cases, each court held that the state lottery was a program of the state lottery commission, so the ADA relationship, courts have routinely held that a public entity is not hable for a licensed private actor’s behavior. See, e.g., Noel v. N.Y.C. Taxi & Limousine Comm’n, 687 F.3d 63, 72 (2d Cir.2012) (holding that city is not liable for inaccessible restaurants and liquor stores it licenses", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nfailure to establish requirements or policies has allowed private driver education schools to be inaccessible. Thus, the DOJ’s interpretative guidance indicates that the TEA is not accountable for the driver education schools’ inaccessibility because the TEA’S requirements and policies have not caused it. Finally, as to case law, the named plaintiffs cite two lottery cases as their primary authority for finding that driver education is a program of the TEA. In those state supreme court cases, each court held that the state lottery was a program of the state lottery commission, so the ADA relationship, courts have routinely held that a public entity is not hable for a licensed private actor’s behavior. See, e.g., Noel v. N.Y.C. Taxi & Limousine Comm’n, 687 F.3d 63, 72 (2d Cir.2012) (holding that the crucial distinction that rendered the public entity liable for a private actors inaccessibility was that the public entity had contracted with the private actor for it to provide aid benefits or services to beneficiaries of the public entitys redevelopment program", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nfailure to establish requirements or policies has allowed private driver education schools to be inaccessible. Thus, the DOJ’s interpretative guidance indicates that the TEA is not accountable for the driver education schools’ inaccessibility because the TEA’S requirements and policies have not caused it. Finally, as to case law, the named plaintiffs cite two lottery cases as their primary authority for finding that driver education is a program of the TEA. In those state supreme court cases, each court held that the state lottery was a program of the state lottery commission, so the ADA relationship, courts have routinely held that a public entity is not hable for a licensed private actor’s behavior. See, e.g., Noel v. N.Y.C. Taxi & Limousine Comm’n, 687 F.3d 63, 72 (2d Cir.2012) (holding that public utility company is not liable for inaccessible bus company it licenses where there is no contract between them", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nfailure to establish requirements or policies has allowed private driver education schools to be inaccessible. Thus, the DOJ’s interpretative guidance indicates that the TEA is not accountable for the driver education schools’ inaccessibility because the TEA’S requirements and policies have not caused it. Finally, as to case law, the named plaintiffs cite two lottery cases as their primary authority for finding that driver education is a program of the TEA. In those state supreme court cases, each court held that the state lottery was a program of the state lottery commission, so the ADA relationship, courts have routinely held that a public entity is not hable for a licensed private actor’s behavior. See, e.g., Noel v. N.Y.C. Taxi & Limousine Comm’n, 687 F.3d 63, 72 (2d Cir.2012) (holding that if property is not property1 of the public entity then the public entity cannot be subject to suit under the dangerous condition waiver" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\ndid not. The fundamental character of the work was the same— harvesting trees. There were no material changes in the way the work was to be performed. Seaboard II, 48 Fed.Cl. at 822. In Axman, the government contracted with Axman to dredge part of San Pablo Bay. 234 U.S. at 39, 34 S.Ct. 736. The contract called for Axman to deposit the spoil in a certain location. Id. Axman mistook the nature of the work, and to reduce his costs requested that the government allow him to dump elsewhere. Id. at 40, 34 S.Ct. 736. The government refused, Axman failed to perform, and the government re-let the contract. Id. at 40-42, 34 S.Ct. 736. In the new contract, however, the government gave the contractor the option to deposit spoil in the location that Axman r t.Cl. 206, 225-26, 1927 WL 2960 (1927) (holding that the government could not charge contractor excess cost of relet contract where the governments specifications were impossible to meet government changed the specifications but did not change the price to be paid original contractor refused to perform and new contractor was paid more to meet new specifications", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\ndid not. The fundamental character of the work was the same— harvesting trees. There were no material changes in the way the work was to be performed. Seaboard II, 48 Fed.Cl. at 822. In Axman, the government contracted with Axman to dredge part of San Pablo Bay. 234 U.S. at 39, 34 S.Ct. 736. The contract called for Axman to deposit the spoil in a certain location. Id. Axman mistook the nature of the work, and to reduce his costs requested that the government allow him to dump elsewhere. Id. at 40, 34 S.Ct. 736. The government refused, Axman failed to perform, and the government re-let the contract. Id. at 40-42, 34 S.Ct. 736. In the new contract, however, the government gave the contractor the option to deposit spoil in the location that Axman r t.Cl. 206, 225-26, 1927 WL 2960 (1927) (holding that the government could not charge contractor excess cost of relet contract where government caused a delay in contract performance in which contractor was to use his own equipment original contractors costs increased and government refused to allow original contractor to perform at cost but allowed new contractor to use government equipment and paid new contractor a different rate", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\ndid not. The fundamental character of the work was the same— harvesting trees. There were no material changes in the way the work was to be performed. Seaboard II, 48 Fed.Cl. at 822. In Axman, the government contracted with Axman to dredge part of San Pablo Bay. 234 U.S. at 39, 34 S.Ct. 736. The contract called for Axman to deposit the spoil in a certain location. Id. Axman mistook the nature of the work, and to reduce his costs requested that the government allow him to dump elsewhere. Id. at 40, 34 S.Ct. 736. The government refused, Axman failed to perform, and the government re-let the contract. Id. at 40-42, 34 S.Ct. 736. In the new contract, however, the government gave the contractor the option to deposit spoil in the location that Axman r t.Cl. 206, 225-26, 1927 WL 2960 (1927) (holding that where contract between contractor and subcontractor allowed subcontractor to recover if contractor recovered contractor was not barred from bringing suit on behalf of subcontractor", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\ndid not. The fundamental character of the work was the same— harvesting trees. There were no material changes in the way the work was to be performed. Seaboard II, 48 Fed.Cl. at 822. In Axman, the government contracted with Axman to dredge part of San Pablo Bay. 234 U.S. at 39, 34 S.Ct. 736. The contract called for Axman to deposit the spoil in a certain location. Id. Axman mistook the nature of the work, and to reduce his costs requested that the government allow him to dump elsewhere. Id. at 40, 34 S.Ct. 736. The government refused, Axman failed to perform, and the government re-let the contract. Id. at 40-42, 34 S.Ct. 736. In the new contract, however, the government gave the contractor the option to deposit spoil in the location that Axman r t.Cl. 206, 225-26, 1927 WL 2960 (1927) (holding original contractor not liable for additional cost of relet contract where significant changes were made to the construction specifications", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\ndid not. The fundamental character of the work was the same— harvesting trees. There were no material changes in the way the work was to be performed. Seaboard II, 48 Fed.Cl. at 822. In Axman, the government contracted with Axman to dredge part of San Pablo Bay. 234 U.S. at 39, 34 S.Ct. 736. The contract called for Axman to deposit the spoil in a certain location. Id. Axman mistook the nature of the work, and to reduce his costs requested that the government allow him to dump elsewhere. Id. at 40, 34 S.Ct. 736. The government refused, Axman failed to perform, and the government re-let the contract. Id. at 40-42, 34 S.Ct. 736. In the new contract, however, the government gave the contractor the option to deposit spoil in the location that Axman r t.Cl. 206, 225-26, 1927 WL 2960 (1927) (holding that the burden to show that reprocurement did not subject the government to excess costs was on the plaintiff contractor" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nand dozing in public place); Franklin v. State, 682 S.W.2d 426, 427 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no pet.) (illegal use of shrimping equipment); Clayton v. State, 652 S.W.2d 810, 811-812 (Tex.App.— Amarillo 1983, no pet.) (driving with suspended license); Diggles v. State, 641 S.W.2d 667, 668 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1982, pet.ref’d)(illegal voter assistance); Hang On, Inc. v. City of Arlington, 65 F.3d 1248, 1254-1255 (5th Cir.1995) (city ordinance prohibiting touching between customers and nude employees at adult cabarets); Howard Gault Co. v. Texas Rural Legal Aid, Inc., 848 F.2d 544, 563 (5th Cir.1988) (statute prohibiting picketing accompanied by slander, libel or public misrepresentation). But see Zulauf v. State, 591 S.W.2d 869, 872-873 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1979) (holding that phrase no person shall drive a vehicle on the highway at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the circumstances then existing is clear command that legislature intended to make speeding a strict liability offense", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nand dozing in public place); Franklin v. State, 682 S.W.2d 426, 427 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no pet.) (illegal use of shrimping equipment); Clayton v. State, 652 S.W.2d 810, 811-812 (Tex.App.— Amarillo 1983, no pet.) (driving with suspended license); Diggles v. State, 641 S.W.2d 667, 668 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1982, pet.ref’d)(illegal voter assistance); Hang On, Inc. v. City of Arlington, 65 F.3d 1248, 1254-1255 (5th Cir.1995) (city ordinance prohibiting touching between customers and nude employees at adult cabarets); Howard Gault Co. v. Texas Rural Legal Aid, Inc., 848 F.2d 544, 563 (5th Cir.1988) (statute prohibiting picketing accompanied by slander, libel or public misrepresentation). But see Zulauf v. State, 591 S.W.2d 869, 872-873 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1979) (holding that officers observations of the speed of the truck coupled with the sound of the engine racing and the bouncing of the truck as it passed through the intersection gave officer probable cause to believe that truck was exceeding a speed greater than was reasonable and prudent under the conditions", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nand dozing in public place); Franklin v. State, 682 S.W.2d 426, 427 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no pet.) (illegal use of shrimping equipment); Clayton v. State, 652 S.W.2d 810, 811-812 (Tex.App.— Amarillo 1983, no pet.) (driving with suspended license); Diggles v. State, 641 S.W.2d 667, 668 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1982, pet.ref’d)(illegal voter assistance); Hang On, Inc. v. City of Arlington, 65 F.3d 1248, 1254-1255 (5th Cir.1995) (city ordinance prohibiting touching between customers and nude employees at adult cabarets); Howard Gault Co. v. Texas Rural Legal Aid, Inc., 848 F.2d 544, 563 (5th Cir.1988) (statute prohibiting picketing accompanied by slander, libel or public misrepresentation). But see Zulauf v. State, 591 S.W.2d 869, 872-873 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1979) (holding that the double jeopardy clause prohibits courts from imposing greater penalties than the legislature intended", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nand dozing in public place); Franklin v. State, 682 S.W.2d 426, 427 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no pet.) (illegal use of shrimping equipment); Clayton v. State, 652 S.W.2d 810, 811-812 (Tex.App.— Amarillo 1983, no pet.) (driving with suspended license); Diggles v. State, 641 S.W.2d 667, 668 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1982, pet.ref’d)(illegal voter assistance); Hang On, Inc. v. City of Arlington, 65 F.3d 1248, 1254-1255 (5th Cir.1995) (city ordinance prohibiting touching between customers and nude employees at adult cabarets); Howard Gault Co. v. Texas Rural Legal Aid, Inc., 848 F.2d 544, 563 (5th Cir.1988) (statute prohibiting picketing accompanied by slander, libel or public misrepresentation). But see Zulauf v. State, 591 S.W.2d 869, 872-873 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1979) (holding that where jury was instructed on both a greater offense and lesserincluded offense and the jury convicted on the lesserincluded offense the double jeopardy provision prohibited retrial on the greater offense", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nand dozing in public place); Franklin v. State, 682 S.W.2d 426, 427 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no pet.) (illegal use of shrimping equipment); Clayton v. State, 652 S.W.2d 810, 811-812 (Tex.App.— Amarillo 1983, no pet.) (driving with suspended license); Diggles v. State, 641 S.W.2d 667, 668 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1982, pet.ref’d)(illegal voter assistance); Hang On, Inc. v. City of Arlington, 65 F.3d 1248, 1254-1255 (5th Cir.1995) (city ordinance prohibiting touching between customers and nude employees at adult cabarets); Howard Gault Co. v. Texas Rural Legal Aid, Inc., 848 F.2d 544, 563 (5th Cir.1988) (statute prohibiting picketing accompanied by slander, libel or public misrepresentation). But see Zulauf v. State, 591 S.W.2d 869, 872-873 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1979) (holding no liability existed under the circumstances" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nreceive sufficient advance written notice of the charges against him. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-64, 94 S.Ct. 2963. The notice provided to Mr. Firth was quite extensive and detailed. It stated generally that Mr. Firth was recommended for termination from treatment because he had “demonstrated a lack of progress in treatment, a lack of motivation for treatment, and a failure to meet program expectations.” R. at 567. The notice then included five single-spaced pages of detailed facts supporting these conclusions. Mr. Firth argues that the notice nonetheless provided insufficient factual detail because it failed to cite program rules or standards upon which the charges were based. But he cites no authority for this proposition. See Phillips v. Calhoun, 956 F.2d 949, 953-54 (10th Cir.1992) (holding that a party waives an argument if the party fails to elaborate or provide any citation of authority in support of the argument", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nreceive sufficient advance written notice of the charges against him. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-64, 94 S.Ct. 2963. The notice provided to Mr. Firth was quite extensive and detailed. It stated generally that Mr. Firth was recommended for termination from treatment because he had “demonstrated a lack of progress in treatment, a lack of motivation for treatment, and a failure to meet program expectations.” R. at 567. The notice then included five single-spaced pages of detailed facts supporting these conclusions. Mr. Firth argues that the notice nonetheless provided insufficient factual detail because it failed to cite program rules or standards upon which the charges were based. But he cites no authority for this proposition. See Phillips v. Calhoun, 956 F.2d 949, 953-54 (10th Cir.1992) (holding party must support argument with legal authority", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nreceive sufficient advance written notice of the charges against him. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-64, 94 S.Ct. 2963. The notice provided to Mr. Firth was quite extensive and detailed. It stated generally that Mr. Firth was recommended for termination from treatment because he had “demonstrated a lack of progress in treatment, a lack of motivation for treatment, and a failure to meet program expectations.” R. at 567. The notice then included five single-spaced pages of detailed facts supporting these conclusions. Mr. Firth argues that the notice nonetheless provided insufficient factual detail because it failed to cite program rules or standards upon which the charges were based. But he cites no authority for this proposition. See Phillips v. Calhoun, 956 F.2d 949, 953-54 (10th Cir.1992) (holding appellate court need not consider argument where party has failed to support it with any authority legal or otherwise", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nreceive sufficient advance written notice of the charges against him. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-64, 94 S.Ct. 2963. The notice provided to Mr. Firth was quite extensive and detailed. It stated generally that Mr. Firth was recommended for termination from treatment because he had “demonstrated a lack of progress in treatment, a lack of motivation for treatment, and a failure to meet program expectations.” R. at 567. The notice then included five single-spaced pages of detailed facts supporting these conclusions. Mr. Firth argues that the notice nonetheless provided insufficient factual detail because it failed to cite program rules or standards upon which the charges were based. But he cites no authority for this proposition. See Phillips v. Calhoun, 956 F.2d 949, 953-54 (10th Cir.1992) (holding that an appellant waived a claim where he failed to cite any legal authority in support of an argument in his appellate brief", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nreceive sufficient advance written notice of the charges against him. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-64, 94 S.Ct. 2963. The notice provided to Mr. Firth was quite extensive and detailed. It stated generally that Mr. Firth was recommended for termination from treatment because he had “demonstrated a lack of progress in treatment, a lack of motivation for treatment, and a failure to meet program expectations.” R. at 567. The notice then included five single-spaced pages of detailed facts supporting these conclusions. Mr. Firth argues that the notice nonetheless provided insufficient factual detail because it failed to cite program rules or standards upon which the charges were based. But he cites no authority for this proposition. See Phillips v. Calhoun, 956 F.2d 949, 953-54 (10th Cir.1992) (holding an argument waived for failure to cite authority" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfactual allegations as to the events or the participants.” Advanced Magnetics, 106 F.3d at 20. Courts should grant leave to substitute if “(1) the defect in the named plaintiffs plausibly resulted from mistake (‘mistake’ prong), and (2) correcting this defect would not unfairly prejudice defendants by changing the particulars of the claims against them (‘prejudice’ prong).” Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 2009 WL 464946, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2009) (citing Advanced Magnetics, 106 F.3d at 20-21). A mistake is plausible “absent evidence of bad faith or intent to deceive.” Wiwa, 2009 WL 464946, at *10 (citing Advanced Magnetics, 106 F.3d at 20-21). Further, an attorney’s ignorance, incompetence, or lack of diligence is not evidence of bad faith. Wiwa, 2009 WL 464946, at *11 (holding that a bad faith claim must be met through the clear and convincing evidence standard", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfactual allegations as to the events or the participants.” Advanced Magnetics, 106 F.3d at 20. Courts should grant leave to substitute if “(1) the defect in the named plaintiffs plausibly resulted from mistake (‘mistake’ prong), and (2) correcting this defect would not unfairly prejudice defendants by changing the particulars of the claims against them (‘prejudice’ prong).” Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 2009 WL 464946, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2009) (citing Advanced Magnetics, 106 F.3d at 20-21). A mistake is plausible “absent evidence of bad faith or intent to deceive.” Wiwa, 2009 WL 464946, at *10 (citing Advanced Magnetics, 106 F.3d at 20-21). Further, an attorney’s ignorance, incompetence, or lack of diligence is not evidence of bad faith. Wiwa, 2009 WL 464946, at *11 (holding that although plaintiffs had shown carelessness and a lack of diligence there was no evidence that they acted in bad faith and thus plaintiffs met the mistake prong", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfactual allegations as to the events or the participants.” Advanced Magnetics, 106 F.3d at 20. Courts should grant leave to substitute if “(1) the defect in the named plaintiffs plausibly resulted from mistake (‘mistake’ prong), and (2) correcting this defect would not unfairly prejudice defendants by changing the particulars of the claims against them (‘prejudice’ prong).” Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 2009 WL 464946, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2009) (citing Advanced Magnetics, 106 F.3d at 20-21). A mistake is plausible “absent evidence of bad faith or intent to deceive.” Wiwa, 2009 WL 464946, at *10 (citing Advanced Magnetics, 106 F.3d at 20-21). Further, an attorney’s ignorance, incompetence, or lack of diligence is not evidence of bad faith. Wiwa, 2009 WL 464946, at *11 (holding that bad faith andor prejudice must be shown by clear and convincing evidence", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfactual allegations as to the events or the participants.” Advanced Magnetics, 106 F.3d at 20. Courts should grant leave to substitute if “(1) the defect in the named plaintiffs plausibly resulted from mistake (‘mistake’ prong), and (2) correcting this defect would not unfairly prejudice defendants by changing the particulars of the claims against them (‘prejudice’ prong).” Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 2009 WL 464946, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2009) (citing Advanced Magnetics, 106 F.3d at 20-21). A mistake is plausible “absent evidence of bad faith or intent to deceive.” Wiwa, 2009 WL 464946, at *10 (citing Advanced Magnetics, 106 F.3d at 20-21). Further, an attorney’s ignorance, incompetence, or lack of diligence is not evidence of bad faith. Wiwa, 2009 WL 464946, at *11 (holding that if the town acted in bad faith in negotiations and litigation which prevented construction then the plaintiffs on remand cannot be deemed to have lost any rights to vest that they would have been able to exercise in the absence of bad faith", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfactual allegations as to the events or the participants.” Advanced Magnetics, 106 F.3d at 20. Courts should grant leave to substitute if “(1) the defect in the named plaintiffs plausibly resulted from mistake (‘mistake’ prong), and (2) correcting this defect would not unfairly prejudice defendants by changing the particulars of the claims against them (‘prejudice’ prong).” Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 2009 WL 464946, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2009) (citing Advanced Magnetics, 106 F.3d at 20-21). A mistake is plausible “absent evidence of bad faith or intent to deceive.” Wiwa, 2009 WL 464946, at *10 (citing Advanced Magnetics, 106 F.3d at 20-21). Further, an attorney’s ignorance, incompetence, or lack of diligence is not evidence of bad faith. Wiwa, 2009 WL 464946, at *11 (holding the bad faith rationale inapplicable given that the defendants acted in good faith in appealing the case and in raising defenses to the plaintiffs claims" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nnever waived or accepted process, and never made an appearance in the suit before the expunction order was entered. Nothing in the record establishes that Google stands in privity to the Commission or to Jackson. Accordingly, we hold that Google was not a party to the suit and that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter orders against Google. Id. When a party is served but there are technical defects in the judgment, the judgment is voidable. PNS Stores, 379 S.W.3d at 275. However, when “the defects in service are so substantial that the defendant was not afforded due process,” the judgment is void. Id. Here, there was no identification of Google as a party or attempt to serve it with process. Accordingly, the judgment against it is void and must be vacated. See id. at 272 (recognizing that a default judgment based on improper service is void", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nnever waived or accepted process, and never made an appearance in the suit before the expunction order was entered. Nothing in the record establishes that Google stands in privity to the Commission or to Jackson. Accordingly, we hold that Google was not a party to the suit and that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter orders against Google. Id. When a party is served but there are technical defects in the judgment, the judgment is voidable. PNS Stores, 379 S.W.3d at 275. However, when “the defects in service are so substantial that the defendant was not afforded due process,” the judgment is void. Id. Here, there was no identification of Google as a party or attempt to serve it with process. Accordingly, the judgment against it is void and must be vacated. See id. at 272 (holding the judgment premature citing one case holding the judgment void and another holding the judgment irregular", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nnever waived or accepted process, and never made an appearance in the suit before the expunction order was entered. Nothing in the record establishes that Google stands in privity to the Commission or to Jackson. Accordingly, we hold that Google was not a party to the suit and that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter orders against Google. Id. When a party is served but there are technical defects in the judgment, the judgment is voidable. PNS Stores, 379 S.W.3d at 275. However, when “the defects in service are so substantial that the defendant was not afforded due process,” the judgment is void. Id. Here, there was no identification of Google as a party or attempt to serve it with process. Accordingly, the judgment against it is void and must be vacated. See id. at 272 (holding judgment in violation of automatic stay void", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nnever waived or accepted process, and never made an appearance in the suit before the expunction order was entered. Nothing in the record establishes that Google stands in privity to the Commission or to Jackson. Accordingly, we hold that Google was not a party to the suit and that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter orders against Google. Id. When a party is served but there are technical defects in the judgment, the judgment is voidable. PNS Stores, 379 S.W.3d at 275. However, when “the defects in service are so substantial that the defendant was not afforded due process,” the judgment is void. Id. Here, there was no identification of Google as a party or attempt to serve it with process. Accordingly, the judgment against it is void and must be vacated. See id. at 272 (holding that void order must exceed courts authority to act and not be merely erroneous", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nnever waived or accepted process, and never made an appearance in the suit before the expunction order was entered. Nothing in the record establishes that Google stands in privity to the Commission or to Jackson. Accordingly, we hold that Google was not a party to the suit and that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter orders against Google. Id. When a party is served but there are technical defects in the judgment, the judgment is voidable. PNS Stores, 379 S.W.3d at 275. However, when “the defects in service are so substantial that the defendant was not afforded due process,” the judgment is void. Id. Here, there was no identification of Google as a party or attempt to serve it with process. Accordingly, the judgment against it is void and must be vacated. See id. at 272 (holding void judgment must be vacated" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nargue that their claim for fraud did not accrue until at least September 25, 1992, the date of the consent judgment for civil forfeiture. Plaintiffs filed their complaint in state court on September 23, 1998. Under Michigan law, a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff can allege each element of the asserted claim. Moll v. Abbott Labs., 444 Mich. 1, 506 N.W.2d 816, 824 (Mich.1993). Further, Michigan courts apply the discovery rule, whereby a claim accrues when the plaintiff discovers, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered, an injury and causal connection between his injury and the defendant’s conduct. Id. (discussing discovery rule in the context of a products liability action); Agristor Fin. Corp. v. Van Sickle, 967 F.2d 233, 236-38 (6th Cir.1992) (recognizing applicability of discovery rule", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nargue that their claim for fraud did not accrue until at least September 25, 1992, the date of the consent judgment for civil forfeiture. Plaintiffs filed their complaint in state court on September 23, 1998. Under Michigan law, a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff can allege each element of the asserted claim. Moll v. Abbott Labs., 444 Mich. 1, 506 N.W.2d 816, 824 (Mich.1993). Further, Michigan courts apply the discovery rule, whereby a claim accrues when the plaintiff discovers, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered, an injury and causal connection between his injury and the defendant’s conduct. Id. (discussing discovery rule in the context of a products liability action); Agristor Fin. Corp. v. Van Sickle, 967 F.2d 233, 236-38 (6th Cir.1992) (holding that a discovery exception to a statute of limitation applies only to the discovery of facts not discovery of the law", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nargue that their claim for fraud did not accrue until at least September 25, 1992, the date of the consent judgment for civil forfeiture. Plaintiffs filed their complaint in state court on September 23, 1998. Under Michigan law, a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff can allege each element of the asserted claim. Moll v. Abbott Labs., 444 Mich. 1, 506 N.W.2d 816, 824 (Mich.1993). Further, Michigan courts apply the discovery rule, whereby a claim accrues when the plaintiff discovers, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered, an injury and causal connection between his injury and the defendant’s conduct. Id. (discussing discovery rule in the context of a products liability action); Agristor Fin. Corp. v. Van Sickle, 967 F.2d 233, 236-38 (6th Cir.1992) (holding that the time of discovery of fraud is not a proper matter for summary judgment", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nargue that their claim for fraud did not accrue until at least September 25, 1992, the date of the consent judgment for civil forfeiture. Plaintiffs filed their complaint in state court on September 23, 1998. Under Michigan law, a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff can allege each element of the asserted claim. Moll v. Abbott Labs., 444 Mich. 1, 506 N.W.2d 816, 824 (Mich.1993). Further, Michigan courts apply the discovery rule, whereby a claim accrues when the plaintiff discovers, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered, an injury and causal connection between his injury and the defendant’s conduct. Id. (discussing discovery rule in the context of a products liability action); Agristor Fin. Corp. v. Van Sickle, 967 F.2d 233, 236-38 (6th Cir.1992) (recognizing that the heck deferred accrual rule applies to fourteenth amendment equal protection claims", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nargue that their claim for fraud did not accrue until at least September 25, 1992, the date of the consent judgment for civil forfeiture. Plaintiffs filed their complaint in state court on September 23, 1998. Under Michigan law, a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff can allege each element of the asserted claim. Moll v. Abbott Labs., 444 Mich. 1, 506 N.W.2d 816, 824 (Mich.1993). Further, Michigan courts apply the discovery rule, whereby a claim accrues when the plaintiff discovers, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered, an injury and causal connection between his injury and the defendant’s conduct. Id. (discussing discovery rule in the context of a products liability action); Agristor Fin. Corp. v. Van Sickle, 967 F.2d 233, 236-38 (6th Cir.1992) (holding that discovery accrual rule applies to causes of action under michigan law for fraud" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nto promote its underlying purposes, which are to protect consumers against unfair and deceptive business practices and to provide efficient and economical procedures to secure such protection.” Cal. Civ.Code § 1760. Relief under the CLRA is available to “any consumer who suffers any damage as a result of the use or employment” of any unlawful “method, act, or practice.” Cal. Civ.Code § 1780(a). Such damage may result “through the materiality” of an alleged omission. See Parkinson v. Hyundai Mot. Am., 258 F.R.D. 580, 595-96 (C.D.Cal.2008). Upon a sufficient showing at the certification stage, whether an omission is “material ]” presents a “common question of fact suitable for treatment in a class action.” Mass. Mut., 97 Cal.App.4th at 1294, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 190; Stearns, 655 F.3d at 1022 (holding that materiality is established if a reasonable man would attach importance to its existence or nonexistence in determining his choice of action in the transaction in question", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nto promote its underlying purposes, which are to protect consumers against unfair and deceptive business practices and to provide efficient and economical procedures to secure such protection.” Cal. Civ.Code § 1760. Relief under the CLRA is available to “any consumer who suffers any damage as a result of the use or employment” of any unlawful “method, act, or practice.” Cal. Civ.Code § 1780(a). Such damage may result “through the materiality” of an alleged omission. See Parkinson v. Hyundai Mot. Am., 258 F.R.D. 580, 595-96 (C.D.Cal.2008). Upon a sufficient showing at the certification stage, whether an omission is “material ]” presents a “common question of fact suitable for treatment in a class action.” Mass. Mut., 97 Cal.App.4th at 1294, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 190; Stearns, 655 F.3d at 1022 (holding that the only relevant inquiry to determine whether a suspect was in custody is how a reasonable man in the suspects position would have understood his situation", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nto promote its underlying purposes, which are to protect consumers against unfair and deceptive business practices and to provide efficient and economical procedures to secure such protection.” Cal. Civ.Code § 1760. Relief under the CLRA is available to “any consumer who suffers any damage as a result of the use or employment” of any unlawful “method, act, or practice.” Cal. Civ.Code § 1780(a). Such damage may result “through the materiality” of an alleged omission. See Parkinson v. Hyundai Mot. Am., 258 F.R.D. 580, 595-96 (C.D.Cal.2008). Upon a sufficient showing at the certification stage, whether an omission is “material ]” presents a “common question of fact suitable for treatment in a class action.” Mass. Mut., 97 Cal.App.4th at 1294, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 190; Stearns, 655 F.3d at 1022 (holding that the existence of probable cause in a 1983 case is a jury question", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nto promote its underlying purposes, which are to protect consumers against unfair and deceptive business practices and to provide efficient and economical procedures to secure such protection.” Cal. Civ.Code § 1760. Relief under the CLRA is available to “any consumer who suffers any damage as a result of the use or employment” of any unlawful “method, act, or practice.” Cal. Civ.Code § 1780(a). Such damage may result “through the materiality” of an alleged omission. See Parkinson v. Hyundai Mot. Am., 258 F.R.D. 580, 595-96 (C.D.Cal.2008). Upon a sufficient showing at the certification stage, whether an omission is “material ]” presents a “common question of fact suitable for treatment in a class action.” Mass. Mut., 97 Cal.App.4th at 1294, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 190; Stearns, 655 F.3d at 1022 (holding that the only relevant inquiry in an in custody determination is how a reasonable man in the suspects position would have understood his situation", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nto promote its underlying purposes, which are to protect consumers against unfair and deceptive business practices and to provide efficient and economical procedures to secure such protection.” Cal. Civ.Code § 1760. Relief under the CLRA is available to “any consumer who suffers any damage as a result of the use or employment” of any unlawful “method, act, or practice.” Cal. Civ.Code § 1780(a). Such damage may result “through the materiality” of an alleged omission. See Parkinson v. Hyundai Mot. Am., 258 F.R.D. 580, 595-96 (C.D.Cal.2008). Upon a sufficient showing at the certification stage, whether an omission is “material ]” presents a “common question of fact suitable for treatment in a class action.” Mass. Mut., 97 Cal.App.4th at 1294, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 190; Stearns, 655 F.3d at 1022 (holding that contractor complaints that late or no payments are affecting performance is a significant factor in determining materiality" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nnon-disclosure. In addition, the trial court does not explain how suppression of Dr. Privette’s or Detective Robinson’s testimony remedies the non-disclosure. Therefore the order does not bear any indication that the trial court “consider[ed] both the materiality of the subject matter and the totality of the circumstances surrounding [the] alleged failure to comply” prior to finding suppression of their testimony “appropriate.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-910(b) (2011). Therefore, because the lesser discovery sanctions rest upon (1) actions that are not discovery violations; or (2) a flawed prejudice analysis, we must vacate the portions of the trial court’s order suppressing related evidence as a discovery sanction. See Blitz v. Agean, Inc., 197 N.C. App. 296, 312, 677 S.E.2d 1, 11 (2009) (holding the immigration judges denial of a continuance request did not constitute an abuse of discretion", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nnon-disclosure. In addition, the trial court does not explain how suppression of Dr. Privette’s or Detective Robinson’s testimony remedies the non-disclosure. Therefore the order does not bear any indication that the trial court “consider[ed] both the materiality of the subject matter and the totality of the circumstances surrounding [the] alleged failure to comply” prior to finding suppression of their testimony “appropriate.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-910(b) (2011). Therefore, because the lesser discovery sanctions rest upon (1) actions that are not discovery violations; or (2) a flawed prejudice analysis, we must vacate the portions of the trial court’s order suppressing related evidence as a discovery sanction. See Blitz v. Agean, Inc., 197 N.C. App. 296, 312, 677 S.E.2d 1, 11 (2009) (holding failure to exercise discretion is abuse of discretion", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nnon-disclosure. In addition, the trial court does not explain how suppression of Dr. Privette’s or Detective Robinson’s testimony remedies the non-disclosure. Therefore the order does not bear any indication that the trial court “consider[ed] both the materiality of the subject matter and the totality of the circumstances surrounding [the] alleged failure to comply” prior to finding suppression of their testimony “appropriate.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-910(b) (2011). Therefore, because the lesser discovery sanctions rest upon (1) actions that are not discovery violations; or (2) a flawed prejudice analysis, we must vacate the portions of the trial court’s order suppressing related evidence as a discovery sanction. See Blitz v. Agean, Inc., 197 N.C. App. 296, 312, 677 S.E.2d 1, 11 (2009) (holding that the ban on judicial review of actions committed to agency discretion by law is jurisdictional", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nnon-disclosure. In addition, the trial court does not explain how suppression of Dr. Privette’s or Detective Robinson’s testimony remedies the non-disclosure. Therefore the order does not bear any indication that the trial court “consider[ed] both the materiality of the subject matter and the totality of the circumstances surrounding [the] alleged failure to comply” prior to finding suppression of their testimony “appropriate.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-910(b) (2011). Therefore, because the lesser discovery sanctions rest upon (1) actions that are not discovery violations; or (2) a flawed prejudice analysis, we must vacate the portions of the trial court’s order suppressing related evidence as a discovery sanction. See Blitz v. Agean, Inc., 197 N.C. App. 296, 312, 677 S.E.2d 1, 11 (2009) (holding that judicial actions based upon a misapprehension of law constitute an abuse of discretion", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nnon-disclosure. In addition, the trial court does not explain how suppression of Dr. Privette’s or Detective Robinson’s testimony remedies the non-disclosure. Therefore the order does not bear any indication that the trial court “consider[ed] both the materiality of the subject matter and the totality of the circumstances surrounding [the] alleged failure to comply” prior to finding suppression of their testimony “appropriate.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-910(b) (2011). Therefore, because the lesser discovery sanctions rest upon (1) actions that are not discovery violations; or (2) a flawed prejudice analysis, we must vacate the portions of the trial court’s order suppressing related evidence as a discovery sanction. See Blitz v. Agean, Inc., 197 N.C. App. 296, 312, 677 S.E.2d 1, 11 (2009) (holding abuse of discretion is established if district court decision was based on an error of law" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nrequirements for public agency employers. Id. “Section 207k give's employers of fire protection and law enforcement personnel greater leeway in structuring wage and time calculations.” Lamon v. City of Shawnee, 972 F.2d 1145, 1153 (10th Cir.1992). Reviewing courts have uniformly noted that the effect of the section 207(k) partial exemption is to temper the impact of the FLSA’s overtime provisions on public employers by raising the average number of hours law enforcement and fire protection personnel may be required to work without triggering the overtime requirement and accommodating the inherently unpredictable nature of those professions by permitting public employers to adopt work periods longer than one week. See Wellington v. City of Montgomery, 935 F.2d 222, 224 (11th Cir.1991) (holding that in enacting flsa amendments of 1974 congress recognized that certain jobs are not easily susceptible to the workweek method of wage and time calculations and therefore provided special calculation methods for some trades including fire protection and law enforcement", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nrequirements for public agency employers. Id. “Section 207k give's employers of fire protection and law enforcement personnel greater leeway in structuring wage and time calculations.” Lamon v. City of Shawnee, 972 F.2d 1145, 1153 (10th Cir.1992). Reviewing courts have uniformly noted that the effect of the section 207(k) partial exemption is to temper the impact of the FLSA’s overtime provisions on public employers by raising the average number of hours law enforcement and fire protection personnel may be required to work without triggering the overtime requirement and accommodating the inherently unpredictable nature of those professions by permitting public employers to adopt work periods longer than one week. See Wellington v. City of Montgomery, 935 F.2d 222, 224 (11th Cir.1991) (holding customer list and pricing information of fire extinguisher business not a trade secret where service was commonly used so potential clients could be easily recognized and market was well established", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nrequirements for public agency employers. Id. “Section 207k give's employers of fire protection and law enforcement personnel greater leeway in structuring wage and time calculations.” Lamon v. City of Shawnee, 972 F.2d 1145, 1153 (10th Cir.1992). Reviewing courts have uniformly noted that the effect of the section 207(k) partial exemption is to temper the impact of the FLSA’s overtime provisions on public employers by raising the average number of hours law enforcement and fire protection personnel may be required to work without triggering the overtime requirement and accommodating the inherently unpredictable nature of those professions by permitting public employers to adopt work periods longer than one week. See Wellington v. City of Montgomery, 935 F.2d 222, 224 (11th Cir.1991) (holding that the public duty doctrine applied to claims against the town and fire chief for negligence in responding to a fire call although plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to show the special duty exception applied", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nrequirements for public agency employers. Id. “Section 207k give's employers of fire protection and law enforcement personnel greater leeway in structuring wage and time calculations.” Lamon v. City of Shawnee, 972 F.2d 1145, 1153 (10th Cir.1992). Reviewing courts have uniformly noted that the effect of the section 207(k) partial exemption is to temper the impact of the FLSA’s overtime provisions on public employers by raising the average number of hours law enforcement and fire protection personnel may be required to work without triggering the overtime requirement and accommodating the inherently unpredictable nature of those professions by permitting public employers to adopt work periods longer than one week. See Wellington v. City of Montgomery, 935 F.2d 222, 224 (11th Cir.1991) (holding that damage to building and personal property as a result of fire negligently caused by defendant was to be measured by reasonable cash market value of the property at the time it was destroyed by the fire or if it was not totally destroyed by the diminution in its fair market value before and after the fire", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nrequirements for public agency employers. Id. “Section 207k give's employers of fire protection and law enforcement personnel greater leeway in structuring wage and time calculations.” Lamon v. City of Shawnee, 972 F.2d 1145, 1153 (10th Cir.1992). Reviewing courts have uniformly noted that the effect of the section 207(k) partial exemption is to temper the impact of the FLSA’s overtime provisions on public employers by raising the average number of hours law enforcement and fire protection personnel may be required to work without triggering the overtime requirement and accommodating the inherently unpredictable nature of those professions by permitting public employers to adopt work periods longer than one week. See Wellington v. City of Montgomery, 935 F.2d 222, 224 (11th Cir.1991) (holding that the relationship between fire insurance regulation and rating fire loss fire prevention and fire investigation is rational and reasonable" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\non his restitution payments. Rule 609 of the Federal Rules of Evidence permits a witness tó be questioned about any felony conviction or any conviction of a crime involving “dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.” The district court in this case limited cross-examination on Stout’s deferred adjudication because deferred adjudication is not a “conviction” under Texas law. Although “conviction” status for the purpose of Rule 609 is properly determined by federal law rather than state law, we hold that the district court’s ruling was not an abuse of discretion. The few Fifth Circuit cases touching on this issue have indicated that when adjudication of guilt is deferred, there is no “conviction.” See United States v. Georgalis, 631 F.2d 1199, 1203 (5th Cir.1980) (holding that there is no crime of attempted felony murder in florida", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\non his restitution payments. Rule 609 of the Federal Rules of Evidence permits a witness tó be questioned about any felony conviction or any conviction of a crime involving “dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.” The district court in this case limited cross-examination on Stout’s deferred adjudication because deferred adjudication is not a “conviction” under Texas law. Although “conviction” status for the purpose of Rule 609 is properly determined by federal law rather than state law, we hold that the district court’s ruling was not an abuse of discretion. The few Fifth Circuit cases touching on this issue have indicated that when adjudication of guilt is deferred, there is no “conviction.” See United States v. Georgalis, 631 F.2d 1199, 1203 (5th Cir.1980) (holding it was proper for the state to crossexamine testifying defendant about prior convictions for purpose of impeaching his credibility", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\non his restitution payments. Rule 609 of the Federal Rules of Evidence permits a witness tó be questioned about any felony conviction or any conviction of a crime involving “dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.” The district court in this case limited cross-examination on Stout’s deferred adjudication because deferred adjudication is not a “conviction” under Texas law. Although “conviction” status for the purpose of Rule 609 is properly determined by federal law rather than state law, we hold that the district court’s ruling was not an abuse of discretion. The few Fifth Circuit cases touching on this issue have indicated that when adjudication of guilt is deferred, there is no “conviction.” See United States v. Georgalis, 631 F.2d 1199, 1203 (5th Cir.1980) (holding that rule 609 was violated when prosecutor attempted to crossexamine defendant about his deferred adjudication for felony check fraud", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\non his restitution payments. Rule 609 of the Federal Rules of Evidence permits a witness tó be questioned about any felony conviction or any conviction of a crime involving “dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.” The district court in this case limited cross-examination on Stout’s deferred adjudication because deferred adjudication is not a “conviction” under Texas law. Although “conviction” status for the purpose of Rule 609 is properly determined by federal law rather than state law, we hold that the district court’s ruling was not an abuse of discretion. The few Fifth Circuit cases touching on this issue have indicated that when adjudication of guilt is deferred, there is no “conviction.” See United States v. Georgalis, 631 F.2d 1199, 1203 (5th Cir.1980) (holding that defendant truthfully stated on firearm purchase form that he had no felony convictions given the fact that adjudication of guilt was deferred and sentence suspended on his prior offense of felony receipt of a stolen car", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\non his restitution payments. Rule 609 of the Federal Rules of Evidence permits a witness tó be questioned about any felony conviction or any conviction of a crime involving “dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.” The district court in this case limited cross-examination on Stout’s deferred adjudication because deferred adjudication is not a “conviction” under Texas law. Although “conviction” status for the purpose of Rule 609 is properly determined by federal law rather than state law, we hold that the district court’s ruling was not an abuse of discretion. The few Fifth Circuit cases touching on this issue have indicated that when adjudication of guilt is deferred, there is no “conviction.” See United States v. Georgalis, 631 F.2d 1199, 1203 (5th Cir.1980) (holding that attempted felony murder was abolished" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nthat claim 1 is broader than its dependent claims and does not contain the dependent limitations. See RF Delaware, Inc. v. Pacific Keystone Techs., Inc., 326 F.3d 1255, 1263 (Fed.Cir.2003). Bosch relies on the preferred embodiment described in the specification for its proposed construction. Bosch, however, does not point to any specific language in the specification requiring that the “power conversion circuit” contain the limitations of the preferred embodiment. Nor does Bosch point to any express disclaimer or disavowal of “power conversion circuits” other than those taught in the preferred embodiment. The Court declines to incorporate limitations from the preferred embodiment into the plain claim language. See Altiris, Inc. v. Symantec Corp., 318 F.3d 1363, 1370 (Fed.Cir.2003) (holding that the district court should have quashed an indictment without requiring the target to show prejudice because the district attorney improperly exercised control over the selection and excusal of grand jurors and the defendant brought this to the attention of the district court before trial", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nthat claim 1 is broader than its dependent claims and does not contain the dependent limitations. See RF Delaware, Inc. v. Pacific Keystone Techs., Inc., 326 F.3d 1255, 1263 (Fed.Cir.2003). Bosch relies on the preferred embodiment described in the specification for its proposed construction. Bosch, however, does not point to any specific language in the specification requiring that the “power conversion circuit” contain the limitations of the preferred embodiment. Nor does Bosch point to any express disclaimer or disavowal of “power conversion circuits” other than those taught in the preferred embodiment. The Court declines to incorporate limitations from the preferred embodiment into the plain claim language. See Altiris, Inc. v. Symantec Corp., 318 F.3d 1363, 1370 (Fed.Cir.2003) (holding that the district court is limited to considering the administrative record in reviewing the denial of benefits under an erisa plan", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nthat claim 1 is broader than its dependent claims and does not contain the dependent limitations. See RF Delaware, Inc. v. Pacific Keystone Techs., Inc., 326 F.3d 1255, 1263 (Fed.Cir.2003). Bosch relies on the preferred embodiment described in the specification for its proposed construction. Bosch, however, does not point to any specific language in the specification requiring that the “power conversion circuit” contain the limitations of the preferred embodiment. Nor does Bosch point to any express disclaimer or disavowal of “power conversion circuits” other than those taught in the preferred embodiment. The Court declines to incorporate limitations from the preferred embodiment into the plain claim language. See Altiris, Inc. v. Symantec Corp., 318 F.3d 1363, 1370 (Fed.Cir.2003) (recognizing that the power of disallowance of claims conferred on the bankruptcy courts embraces the rejection of claims in whole or in part according to the equities of the case and emphasizing that a bankruptcy court may therefore limit the amount of claims in view of equitable considerations", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nthat claim 1 is broader than its dependent claims and does not contain the dependent limitations. See RF Delaware, Inc. v. Pacific Keystone Techs., Inc., 326 F.3d 1255, 1263 (Fed.Cir.2003). Bosch relies on the preferred embodiment described in the specification for its proposed construction. Bosch, however, does not point to any specific language in the specification requiring that the “power conversion circuit” contain the limitations of the preferred embodiment. Nor does Bosch point to any express disclaimer or disavowal of “power conversion circuits” other than those taught in the preferred embodiment. The Court declines to incorporate limitations from the preferred embodiment into the plain claim language. See Altiris, Inc. v. Symantec Corp., 318 F.3d 1363, 1370 (Fed.Cir.2003) (holding that when a court of appeals has jurisdiction on interlocutory appeal the scope of appellate review is not limited to the precise question certified by the district court because the district courts order not the certified question is brought before the court", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nthat claim 1 is broader than its dependent claims and does not contain the dependent limitations. See RF Delaware, Inc. v. Pacific Keystone Techs., Inc., 326 F.3d 1255, 1263 (Fed.Cir.2003). Bosch relies on the preferred embodiment described in the specification for its proposed construction. Bosch, however, does not point to any specific language in the specification requiring that the “power conversion circuit” contain the limitations of the preferred embodiment. Nor does Bosch point to any express disclaimer or disavowal of “power conversion circuits” other than those taught in the preferred embodiment. The Court declines to incorporate limitations from the preferred embodiment into the plain claim language. See Altiris, Inc. v. Symantec Corp., 318 F.3d 1363, 1370 (Fed.Cir.2003) (holding that the district court improperly limited the claims according to the preferred embodiment" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nHe did not provide all of the documents responsive to the request until August 27, 1993, more than seven months after the demand was made. Moskowitz therefore violated his duty of disclosure under ERISA and his conduct gives rise to liability under § 1132(c)(1). Because the award of penalties is committed to the sound discretion of the Court, I must determine whether Moskow-itz’s conduct warrants imposition of such a penalty. In determining whether to assess a penalty under § 1132(c)(1) courts have considered such factors as bad faith or intentional conduct on the part of the administrator, the length of the delay, the number of requests made and documents withheld, and the existence of any prejudice to the participant or beneficiary. See Ziaee v. Vest, 916 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir.1990) (holding that in exercise of its discretion district court may consider factors such as number of requests made and number of documents withheld", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nHe did not provide all of the documents responsive to the request until August 27, 1993, more than seven months after the demand was made. Moskowitz therefore violated his duty of disclosure under ERISA and his conduct gives rise to liability under § 1132(c)(1). Because the award of penalties is committed to the sound discretion of the Court, I must determine whether Moskow-itz’s conduct warrants imposition of such a penalty. In determining whether to assess a penalty under § 1132(c)(1) courts have considered such factors as bad faith or intentional conduct on the part of the administrator, the length of the delay, the number of requests made and documents withheld, and the existence of any prejudice to the participant or beneficiary. See Ziaee v. Vest, 916 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir.1990) (holding that district court may consider documents referred to in plaintiffs complaint and central to his claim", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nHe did not provide all of the documents responsive to the request until August 27, 1993, more than seven months after the demand was made. Moskowitz therefore violated his duty of disclosure under ERISA and his conduct gives rise to liability under § 1132(c)(1). Because the award of penalties is committed to the sound discretion of the Court, I must determine whether Moskow-itz’s conduct warrants imposition of such a penalty. In determining whether to assess a penalty under § 1132(c)(1) courts have considered such factors as bad faith or intentional conduct on the part of the administrator, the length of the delay, the number of requests made and documents withheld, and the existence of any prejudice to the participant or beneficiary. See Ziaee v. Vest, 916 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir.1990) (recognizing that district court in exercise of its rule 16b discretion may consider other relevant factors including in particular whether allowing the amendment of the pleading at this stage of the litigation will prejudice defendants", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nHe did not provide all of the documents responsive to the request until August 27, 1993, more than seven months after the demand was made. Moskowitz therefore violated his duty of disclosure under ERISA and his conduct gives rise to liability under § 1132(c)(1). Because the award of penalties is committed to the sound discretion of the Court, I must determine whether Moskow-itz’s conduct warrants imposition of such a penalty. In determining whether to assess a penalty under § 1132(c)(1) courts have considered such factors as bad faith or intentional conduct on the part of the administrator, the length of the delay, the number of requests made and documents withheld, and the existence of any prejudice to the participant or beneficiary. See Ziaee v. Vest, 916 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir.1990) (holding failure to exercise discretion is abuse of discretion", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nHe did not provide all of the documents responsive to the request until August 27, 1993, more than seven months after the demand was made. Moskowitz therefore violated his duty of disclosure under ERISA and his conduct gives rise to liability under § 1132(c)(1). Because the award of penalties is committed to the sound discretion of the Court, I must determine whether Moskow-itz’s conduct warrants imposition of such a penalty. In determining whether to assess a penalty under § 1132(c)(1) courts have considered such factors as bad faith or intentional conduct on the part of the administrator, the length of the delay, the number of requests made and documents withheld, and the existence of any prejudice to the participant or beneficiary. See Ziaee v. Vest, 916 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir.1990) (holding that a district court may depart upward based upon a significant number of fraudulent schemes conducted by the defendant" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthe protest in question here. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s protest fails to present a timely, valid challenge to Customs’ acceptance of MPF tender, as Plaintiff filed that protest more than ninety days after Customs’ decision. Based on the analysis above, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s protest dated February 6, 1995, was untimely filed, as Plaintiff failed to file it within ninety days of the Customs decisions that it seeks to challenge. Plaintiff, however, sets forth one additional argument to support its contentions that it filed a timely protest. CRMC appears to argue that its subsequent actions cured the defects of the untimely protést. Plaintiff claims that it properly filed, on February 10, 2000, a request for accelerated disposition t. App. 113, 117, 603 F.2d 850, 853 (1979) (holding that although the jurisdiction limitation also works to make decisions final and conclusive upon the government unless it acts to revise them within the limitations period there was no such decision that triggered the ninetyday period and consequently a failure to invoke jurisdiction", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthe protest in question here. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s protest fails to present a timely, valid challenge to Customs’ acceptance of MPF tender, as Plaintiff filed that protest more than ninety days after Customs’ decision. Based on the analysis above, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s protest dated February 6, 1995, was untimely filed, as Plaintiff failed to file it within ninety days of the Customs decisions that it seeks to challenge. Plaintiff, however, sets forth one additional argument to support its contentions that it filed a timely protest. CRMC appears to argue that its subsequent actions cured the defects of the untimely protést. Plaintiff claims that it properly filed, on February 10, 2000, a request for accelerated disposition t. App. 113, 117, 603 F.2d 850, 853 (1979) (holding that the proper focus when determining the starting point of the limitations period is upon the time of the discriminatory acts not upon the time at which the consequences of the acts became most painful ", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthe protest in question here. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s protest fails to present a timely, valid challenge to Customs’ acceptance of MPF tender, as Plaintiff filed that protest more than ninety days after Customs’ decision. Based on the analysis above, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s protest dated February 6, 1995, was untimely filed, as Plaintiff failed to file it within ninety days of the Customs decisions that it seeks to challenge. Plaintiff, however, sets forth one additional argument to support its contentions that it filed a timely protest. CRMC appears to argue that its subsequent actions cured the defects of the untimely protést. Plaintiff claims that it properly filed, on February 10, 2000, a request for accelerated disposition t. App. 113, 117, 603 F.2d 850, 853 (1979) (holding that the court lacked jurisdiction over customs allegedly erroneous duty assessments because the importer failed to timely protest liquidation which thereby made the customs decision final and conclusive upon the parties", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthe protest in question here. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s protest fails to present a timely, valid challenge to Customs’ acceptance of MPF tender, as Plaintiff filed that protest more than ninety days after Customs’ decision. Based on the analysis above, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s protest dated February 6, 1995, was untimely filed, as Plaintiff failed to file it within ninety days of the Customs decisions that it seeks to challenge. Plaintiff, however, sets forth one additional argument to support its contentions that it filed a timely protest. CRMC appears to argue that its subsequent actions cured the defects of the untimely protést. Plaintiff claims that it properly filed, on February 10, 2000, a request for accelerated disposition t. App. 113, 117, 603 F.2d 850, 853 (1979) (holding that refusal by customs officials to reliquidate entries became final and conclusive upon the importer when it failed to file a protest within the previously mandated sixtyday limitations period", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthe protest in question here. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s protest fails to present a timely, valid challenge to Customs’ acceptance of MPF tender, as Plaintiff filed that protest more than ninety days after Customs’ decision. Based on the analysis above, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s protest dated February 6, 1995, was untimely filed, as Plaintiff failed to file it within ninety days of the Customs decisions that it seeks to challenge. Plaintiff, however, sets forth one additional argument to support its contentions that it filed a timely protest. CRMC appears to argue that its subsequent actions cured the defects of the untimely protést. Plaintiff claims that it properly filed, on February 10, 2000, a request for accelerated disposition t. App. 113, 117, 603 F.2d 850, 853 (1979) (holding that the charge was timely when filed within the statute of limitations period even though served after the period" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nCourt to decide, given that the public trust doctrine governs a large portion of the property at issue, is \"whether it constitutes an uncompensated taking to require [Plaintiffs] to construct and maintain the Walkway and its- landscaping to facilitate the public’s enjoyment of its public trust right.” See Def.-Int. Reply at pp. 13-14. In this regard, Plaintiffs assert that the public trust doctrine does not extend to the State’s requirement that Plaintiffs, and others, construct and maintain a walkway on the \"public trust property” along the Hudson River. See PI. Response at p. 3. However, such requirements are well within the State's police power in the area of land use regulation. See, e.g. Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 12 Cal.4th 854, 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 242, 911 P.2d 429, 450 (1996) (holding that the measure of damages for breaching a building construction contract is ordinarily such sum as is required to make the building conform to the contract", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nCourt to decide, given that the public trust doctrine governs a large portion of the property at issue, is \"whether it constitutes an uncompensated taking to require [Plaintiffs] to construct and maintain the Walkway and its- landscaping to facilitate the public’s enjoyment of its public trust right.” See Def.-Int. Reply at pp. 13-14. In this regard, Plaintiffs assert that the public trust doctrine does not extend to the State’s requirement that Plaintiffs, and others, construct and maintain a walkway on the \"public trust property” along the Hudson River. See PI. Response at p. 3. However, such requirements are well within the State's police power in the area of land use regulation. See, e.g. Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 12 Cal.4th 854, 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 242, 911 P.2d 429, 450 (1996) (recognizing that the court has the power to grant leave upon certain conditions", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nCourt to decide, given that the public trust doctrine governs a large portion of the property at issue, is \"whether it constitutes an uncompensated taking to require [Plaintiffs] to construct and maintain the Walkway and its- landscaping to facilitate the public’s enjoyment of its public trust right.” See Def.-Int. Reply at pp. 13-14. In this regard, Plaintiffs assert that the public trust doctrine does not extend to the State’s requirement that Plaintiffs, and others, construct and maintain a walkway on the \"public trust property” along the Hudson River. See PI. Response at p. 3. However, such requirements are well within the State's police power in the area of land use regulation. See, e.g. Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 12 Cal.4th 854, 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 242, 911 P.2d 429, 450 (1996) (holding that the requirement to provide art or a cash equivalent is more akin to traditional land use regulations imposing minimal building setbacks parking and lighting conditions landscaping requirements and other design conditions such as color schemes building materials and architectural amenities such conditions have long been held to be valid exercises of the citys traditional police power and do not amount to a taking merely because they might incidentally impose a cost in connection with the property", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nCourt to decide, given that the public trust doctrine governs a large portion of the property at issue, is \"whether it constitutes an uncompensated taking to require [Plaintiffs] to construct and maintain the Walkway and its- landscaping to facilitate the public’s enjoyment of its public trust right.” See Def.-Int. Reply at pp. 13-14. In this regard, Plaintiffs assert that the public trust doctrine does not extend to the State’s requirement that Plaintiffs, and others, construct and maintain a walkway on the \"public trust property” along the Hudson River. See PI. Response at p. 3. However, such requirements are well within the State's police power in the area of land use regulation. See, e.g. Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 12 Cal.4th 854, 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 242, 911 P.2d 429, 450 (1996) (holding that the failure to articulate orally that conditions 5d13d2 and 3 apply to a defendants sentence of supervised release does not create a conflict with the judgment imposing these conditions", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nCourt to decide, given that the public trust doctrine governs a large portion of the property at issue, is \"whether it constitutes an uncompensated taking to require [Plaintiffs] to construct and maintain the Walkway and its- landscaping to facilitate the public’s enjoyment of its public trust right.” See Def.-Int. Reply at pp. 13-14. In this regard, Plaintiffs assert that the public trust doctrine does not extend to the State’s requirement that Plaintiffs, and others, construct and maintain a walkway on the \"public trust property” along the Hudson River. See PI. Response at p. 3. However, such requirements are well within the State's police power in the area of land use regulation. See, e.g. Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 12 Cal.4th 854, 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 242, 911 P.2d 429, 450 (1996) (holding that a civic center building or recreational building on property dedicated to the city as park property was inconsistent with its use as a park" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ngenerate sufficient revenues to settle the judgment against it. These measures may include but are not limited to a combination of those specified in Conclusion Of Law Numbers 3-9 [of the Order]. According to the Commission, Engelman retains discretion at this stage to choose the means by which it can raise revenue, whether it elects to sell some combination of the assets identified in the Order or to utilize other means not considered by the Commission or the ALJ, including entering into agreements with Shields Brothers to restructure the debt. There is scant authority construing the forced-sale prohibition contained in article XI, apart from a handful of cases involving liens against public building projects. See, e.g., Atascosa County v. Angus, 83 Tex. 202, 18 S.W. 563, 563 (1892) (holding that a valid judgment hen is enforceable against the property of the estate recovered by the trustee", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ngenerate sufficient revenues to settle the judgment against it. These measures may include but are not limited to a combination of those specified in Conclusion Of Law Numbers 3-9 [of the Order]. According to the Commission, Engelman retains discretion at this stage to choose the means by which it can raise revenue, whether it elects to sell some combination of the assets identified in the Order or to utilize other means not considered by the Commission or the ALJ, including entering into agreements with Shields Brothers to restructure the debt. There is scant authority construing the forced-sale prohibition contained in article XI, apart from a handful of cases involving liens against public building projects. See, e.g., Atascosa County v. Angus, 83 Tex. 202, 18 S.W. 563, 563 (1892) (holding that a reasonable contractedfor limitations period that is not contrary to public policy is generally enforceable", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ngenerate sufficient revenues to settle the judgment against it. These measures may include but are not limited to a combination of those specified in Conclusion Of Law Numbers 3-9 [of the Order]. According to the Commission, Engelman retains discretion at this stage to choose the means by which it can raise revenue, whether it elects to sell some combination of the assets identified in the Order or to utilize other means not considered by the Commission or the ALJ, including entering into agreements with Shields Brothers to restructure the debt. There is scant authority construing the forced-sale prohibition contained in article XI, apart from a handful of cases involving liens against public building projects. See, e.g., Atascosa County v. Angus, 83 Tex. 202, 18 S.W. 563, 563 (1892) (holding that waivers of 2255 collateral attack rights must be expressly stated to be enforceable", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ngenerate sufficient revenues to settle the judgment against it. These measures may include but are not limited to a combination of those specified in Conclusion Of Law Numbers 3-9 [of the Order]. According to the Commission, Engelman retains discretion at this stage to choose the means by which it can raise revenue, whether it elects to sell some combination of the assets identified in the Order or to utilize other means not considered by the Commission or the ALJ, including entering into agreements with Shields Brothers to restructure the debt. There is scant authority construing the forced-sale prohibition contained in article XI, apart from a handful of cases involving liens against public building projects. See, e.g., Atascosa County v. Angus, 83 Tex. 202, 18 S.W. 563, 563 (1892) (holding that the legislatures rules of procedure are not reviewable except on constitutional grounds", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ngenerate sufficient revenues to settle the judgment against it. These measures may include but are not limited to a combination of those specified in Conclusion Of Law Numbers 3-9 [of the Order]. According to the Commission, Engelman retains discretion at this stage to choose the means by which it can raise revenue, whether it elects to sell some combination of the assets identified in the Order or to utilize other means not considered by the Commission or the ALJ, including entering into agreements with Shields Brothers to restructure the debt. There is scant authority construing the forced-sale prohibition contained in article XI, apart from a handful of cases involving liens against public building projects. See, e.g., Atascosa County v. Angus, 83 Tex. 202, 18 S.W. 563, 563 (1892) (holding that builders hen is not enforceable against public buildings and grounds except as expressly permitted by statute" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\n892 F.2d at 159. In the instant ease, however, there was not an abundance of evidence on Steward’s intent to defraud the bank. Steward gave conflicting testimony on the issue, once admitting she pleaded guilty to having an intent to defraud, but twice informing the jury she did not intend to defraud the bank. Other than Steward’s conflicting testimony, the government’s limited harmlessness analysis does not reference any evidence of Steward’s intent to defraud, the very element it had to prove to establish Nickl’s guilt. The prosecution was not permitted to use Steward’s guilty plea for the purpose of establishing she had the intent to defraud NBA, because Steward’s intent to defraud was an element of Nickl’s crime. See United States v. Whitney, 229 F.3d 1296, 1304 (10th Cir.2000) (holding coconspirators guilty plea is admissible as an aid to the jurys assessment of witness credibility but not as substantive evidence of a defendants guilt", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\n892 F.2d at 159. In the instant ease, however, there was not an abundance of evidence on Steward’s intent to defraud the bank. Steward gave conflicting testimony on the issue, once admitting she pleaded guilty to having an intent to defraud, but twice informing the jury she did not intend to defraud the bank. Other than Steward’s conflicting testimony, the government’s limited harmlessness analysis does not reference any evidence of Steward’s intent to defraud, the very element it had to prove to establish Nickl’s guilt. The prosecution was not permitted to use Steward’s guilty plea for the purpose of establishing she had the intent to defraud NBA, because Steward’s intent to defraud was an element of Nickl’s crime. See United States v. Whitney, 229 F.3d 1296, 1304 (10th Cir.2000) (holding that testimony regarding witness credibility is prohibited unless it is admissible as character evidence", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\n892 F.2d at 159. In the instant ease, however, there was not an abundance of evidence on Steward’s intent to defraud the bank. Steward gave conflicting testimony on the issue, once admitting she pleaded guilty to having an intent to defraud, but twice informing the jury she did not intend to defraud the bank. Other than Steward’s conflicting testimony, the government’s limited harmlessness analysis does not reference any evidence of Steward’s intent to defraud, the very element it had to prove to establish Nickl’s guilt. The prosecution was not permitted to use Steward’s guilty plea for the purpose of establishing she had the intent to defraud NBA, because Steward’s intent to defraud was an element of Nickl’s crime. See United States v. Whitney, 229 F.3d 1296, 1304 (10th Cir.2000) (holding that entering a guilty plea is an admission of guilt and a waiver of the right to jury trial", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\n892 F.2d at 159. In the instant ease, however, there was not an abundance of evidence on Steward’s intent to defraud the bank. Steward gave conflicting testimony on the issue, once admitting she pleaded guilty to having an intent to defraud, but twice informing the jury she did not intend to defraud the bank. Other than Steward’s conflicting testimony, the government’s limited harmlessness analysis does not reference any evidence of Steward’s intent to defraud, the very element it had to prove to establish Nickl’s guilt. The prosecution was not permitted to use Steward’s guilty plea for the purpose of establishing she had the intent to defraud NBA, because Steward’s intent to defraud was an element of Nickl’s crime. See United States v. Whitney, 229 F.3d 1296, 1304 (10th Cir.2000) (holding evidence of prior drug use admissible to show motive and the nature of the defendants relationship with coconspirators", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\n892 F.2d at 159. In the instant ease, however, there was not an abundance of evidence on Steward’s intent to defraud the bank. Steward gave conflicting testimony on the issue, once admitting she pleaded guilty to having an intent to defraud, but twice informing the jury she did not intend to defraud the bank. Other than Steward’s conflicting testimony, the government’s limited harmlessness analysis does not reference any evidence of Steward’s intent to defraud, the very element it had to prove to establish Nickl’s guilt. The prosecution was not permitted to use Steward’s guilty plea for the purpose of establishing she had the intent to defraud NBA, because Steward’s intent to defraud was an element of Nickl’s crime. See United States v. Whitney, 229 F.3d 1296, 1304 (10th Cir.2000) (holding that police officers testimony as to the victims prior inconsistent statements made to him on day of the alleged crime were not admissible as substantive evidence and could not be used to support a finding of guilt" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nBoth of Appellant’s arguments are without merit and we affirm. I. Appellant argues that attempted second-degree kidnapping as defined by Oregon law is not a crime of violence as that term is defined by U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(l)(ii). Section 4B1.2(1) defines the term “crime of violence” • as any offense punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year that: (i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another, or (ii) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(1). Appellant was convicted under Oregon Revised Statute section 163.225(l)(a) which provides that: [a Cir.1992) (holding that kidnapping is a crime of violence which necessarily involves the threatened use of physical force under 18 usc 924", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nBoth of Appellant’s arguments are without merit and we affirm. I. Appellant argues that attempted second-degree kidnapping as defined by Oregon law is not a crime of violence as that term is defined by U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(l)(ii). Section 4B1.2(1) defines the term “crime of violence” • as any offense punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year that: (i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another, or (ii) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(1). Appellant was convicted under Oregon Revised Statute section 163.225(l)(a) which provides that: [a Cir.1992) (holding that kidnapping is a crime of violence which involves a serious potential risk of injury under 18 usc 924", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nBoth of Appellant’s arguments are without merit and we affirm. I. Appellant argues that attempted second-degree kidnapping as defined by Oregon law is not a crime of violence as that term is defined by U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(l)(ii). Section 4B1.2(1) defines the term “crime of violence” • as any offense punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year that: (i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another, or (ii) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(1). Appellant was convicted under Oregon Revised Statute section 163.225(l)(a) which provides that: [a Cir.1992) (holding that the potential for violence against the victim is an inherent aspect of the crime of kidnapping under 18 usc 924", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nBoth of Appellant’s arguments are without merit and we affirm. I. Appellant argues that attempted second-degree kidnapping as defined by Oregon law is not a crime of violence as that term is defined by U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(l)(ii). Section 4B1.2(1) defines the term “crime of violence” • as any offense punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year that: (i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another, or (ii) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(1). Appellant was convicted under Oregon Revised Statute section 163.225(l)(a) which provides that: [a Cir.1992) (holding that bank robbery by force and violence or intimidation under 18 usc 2113a is a crime of violence", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nBoth of Appellant’s arguments are without merit and we affirm. I. Appellant argues that attempted second-degree kidnapping as defined by Oregon law is not a crime of violence as that term is defined by U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(l)(ii). Section 4B1.2(1) defines the term “crime of violence” • as any offense punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year that: (i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another, or (ii) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(1). Appellant was convicted under Oregon Revised Statute section 163.225(l)(a) which provides that: [a Cir.1992) (holding that kidnapping is a violent crime which inherently involves the threat of violence under ussg 4b121ii" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nof the terms “discipline or discharge” in the context of section 31-51q, the Connecticut Superior Court held that “the language of § 31-51q, which ... is restrictive even by Connecticut standards, simply cannot compare with the expansive texts of these asserted federal counterparts.” Bombalicki v. Pastore, 2000 WL 726839, at *5 (Conn.Super.Ct. May 10, 2000). Rather, under section 31-51q, the term “discipline” contemplates “an affirmative act of deprivation that diminishes the status or happiness of the recipient rather than a failure to enhance that status or happiness.” See Burdick v. Clouet, 2011 WL 2739557, at * 7 (Conn.Sup.Ct. June 14, 2011) (citing Bombalicki, 2000 WL 726839, at *3). Examples of discipline include a change in an employee’s salary or fringe benefits. See id. (holding that the failure to condition a transfer on death or remarriage of the wife was a factor showing that the transfer was not in the nature of alimony", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nof the terms “discipline or discharge” in the context of section 31-51q, the Connecticut Superior Court held that “the language of § 31-51q, which ... is restrictive even by Connecticut standards, simply cannot compare with the expansive texts of these asserted federal counterparts.” Bombalicki v. Pastore, 2000 WL 726839, at *5 (Conn.Super.Ct. May 10, 2000). Rather, under section 31-51q, the term “discipline” contemplates “an affirmative act of deprivation that diminishes the status or happiness of the recipient rather than a failure to enhance that status or happiness.” See Burdick v. Clouet, 2011 WL 2739557, at * 7 (Conn.Sup.Ct. June 14, 2011) (citing Bombalicki, 2000 WL 726839, at *3). Examples of discipline include a change in an employee’s salary or fringe benefits. See id. (holding that transfer was not discipline because transfer neither altered salary nor fringe benefits", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nof the terms “discipline or discharge” in the context of section 31-51q, the Connecticut Superior Court held that “the language of § 31-51q, which ... is restrictive even by Connecticut standards, simply cannot compare with the expansive texts of these asserted federal counterparts.” Bombalicki v. Pastore, 2000 WL 726839, at *5 (Conn.Super.Ct. May 10, 2000). Rather, under section 31-51q, the term “discipline” contemplates “an affirmative act of deprivation that diminishes the status or happiness of the recipient rather than a failure to enhance that status or happiness.” See Burdick v. Clouet, 2011 WL 2739557, at * 7 (Conn.Sup.Ct. June 14, 2011) (citing Bombalicki, 2000 WL 726839, at *3). Examples of discipline include a change in an employee’s salary or fringe benefits. See id. (holding that transfer was proper remedy for improper venue even though the issue of transfer was not raised until the motion hearing in circuit court", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nof the terms “discipline or discharge” in the context of section 31-51q, the Connecticut Superior Court held that “the language of § 31-51q, which ... is restrictive even by Connecticut standards, simply cannot compare with the expansive texts of these asserted federal counterparts.” Bombalicki v. Pastore, 2000 WL 726839, at *5 (Conn.Super.Ct. May 10, 2000). Rather, under section 31-51q, the term “discipline” contemplates “an affirmative act of deprivation that diminishes the status or happiness of the recipient rather than a failure to enhance that status or happiness.” See Burdick v. Clouet, 2011 WL 2739557, at * 7 (Conn.Sup.Ct. June 14, 2011) (citing Bombalicki, 2000 WL 726839, at *3). Examples of discipline include a change in an employee’s salary or fringe benefits. See id. (holding transfer restriction granted right of first refusal in event of voluntary or involuntary transfer of stock", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nof the terms “discipline or discharge” in the context of section 31-51q, the Connecticut Superior Court held that “the language of § 31-51q, which ... is restrictive even by Connecticut standards, simply cannot compare with the expansive texts of these asserted federal counterparts.” Bombalicki v. Pastore, 2000 WL 726839, at *5 (Conn.Super.Ct. May 10, 2000). Rather, under section 31-51q, the term “discipline” contemplates “an affirmative act of deprivation that diminishes the status or happiness of the recipient rather than a failure to enhance that status or happiness.” See Burdick v. Clouet, 2011 WL 2739557, at * 7 (Conn.Sup.Ct. June 14, 2011) (citing Bombalicki, 2000 WL 726839, at *3). Examples of discipline include a change in an employee’s salary or fringe benefits. See id. (holding that a denial of transfer was not an adverse employment action where the plaintiff asserted only that the transfer would allow him to work closer to home" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nCollege, 54 W.Va. 32, 46 S.E. 253, 255 (1903): The acceptance of the bid and the making of a memorandum thereof by the trustee being a complete contract of sale, binding the purchaser to accept the bid and pay the purchase money, must he, in seeking the enforcement of that contract, show that the trustee has proceeded regularly in making the sale? The contract does not confer title upon him. He obtains that by the deed. It confers only the right to call for the legal title, to enforce a specific performance of the contract of sale. Accordingly, legal title to real property does not pass until a conveyance is made by deed; equitable title to the real property, however, passes to the purchaser at the time of sale. See, e.g., Annon v. Lucas, 155 W.Va. 368, 185 S.E.2d 343, 351 (1971) (holding that trespass to try title is the method for determining title to real property", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nCollege, 54 W.Va. 32, 46 S.E. 253, 255 (1903): The acceptance of the bid and the making of a memorandum thereof by the trustee being a complete contract of sale, binding the purchaser to accept the bid and pay the purchase money, must he, in seeking the enforcement of that contract, show that the trustee has proceeded regularly in making the sale? The contract does not confer title upon him. He obtains that by the deed. It confers only the right to call for the legal title, to enforce a specific performance of the contract of sale. Accordingly, legal title to real property does not pass until a conveyance is made by deed; equitable title to the real property, however, passes to the purchaser at the time of sale. See, e.g., Annon v. Lucas, 155 W.Va. 368, 185 S.E.2d 343, 351 (1971) (holding that a constructive trust is imposed in order to prevent injustice and that such a trust may be imposed when the circumstances show that it would be inequitable for the holder of legal title to retain the property", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nCollege, 54 W.Va. 32, 46 S.E. 253, 255 (1903): The acceptance of the bid and the making of a memorandum thereof by the trustee being a complete contract of sale, binding the purchaser to accept the bid and pay the purchase money, must he, in seeking the enforcement of that contract, show that the trustee has proceeded regularly in making the sale? The contract does not confer title upon him. He obtains that by the deed. It confers only the right to call for the legal title, to enforce a specific performance of the contract of sale. Accordingly, legal title to real property does not pass until a conveyance is made by deed; equitable title to the real property, however, passes to the purchaser at the time of sale. See, e.g., Annon v. Lucas, 155 W.Va. 368, 185 S.E.2d 343, 351 (1971) (holding that debtor as grantor and trustee of a trust that held legal title to the property held a sufficient equitable interest in the property to claim it as exempt homestead where she resided on the property prepetition with the intent to maintain it as her primary residence", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nCollege, 54 W.Va. 32, 46 S.E. 253, 255 (1903): The acceptance of the bid and the making of a memorandum thereof by the trustee being a complete contract of sale, binding the purchaser to accept the bid and pay the purchase money, must he, in seeking the enforcement of that contract, show that the trustee has proceeded regularly in making the sale? The contract does not confer title upon him. He obtains that by the deed. It confers only the right to call for the legal title, to enforce a specific performance of the contract of sale. Accordingly, legal title to real property does not pass until a conveyance is made by deed; equitable title to the real property, however, passes to the purchaser at the time of sale. See, e.g., Annon v. Lucas, 155 W.Va. 368, 185 S.E.2d 343, 351 (1971) (holding that the legal title holders to real property held it in constructive trust for the equitable title holder who was entitled to the real property based on an earlier contract", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nCollege, 54 W.Va. 32, 46 S.E. 253, 255 (1903): The acceptance of the bid and the making of a memorandum thereof by the trustee being a complete contract of sale, binding the purchaser to accept the bid and pay the purchase money, must he, in seeking the enforcement of that contract, show that the trustee has proceeded regularly in making the sale? The contract does not confer title upon him. He obtains that by the deed. It confers only the right to call for the legal title, to enforce a specific performance of the contract of sale. Accordingly, legal title to real property does not pass until a conveyance is made by deed; equitable title to the real property, however, passes to the purchaser at the time of sale. See, e.g., Annon v. Lucas, 155 W.Va. 368, 185 S.E.2d 343, 351 (1971) (holding that plaintiffs may have a property interest in real property" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nLobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). The evidence, all facts, and any reasonable inferences from the facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). III. On appeal, WCI challenges the district court’s determination that the assumption and indemnification clauses in the Purchase Agreement place the liability for the cleanup of the Edison Facility on WCI. WCI does not contest the district court’s grant of summary judgment on its claims under CERCLA, the Spill Act, or negligence, and thus has waived its right to appellate review of these claims. See Bickel v. Korean Air Lines Co., 96 F.3d 151, 153 (6th Cir.1996) (holding that generally arguments not briefed on appeal are deemed abandoned or waived", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nLobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). The evidence, all facts, and any reasonable inferences from the facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). III. On appeal, WCI challenges the district court’s determination that the assumption and indemnification clauses in the Purchase Agreement place the liability for the cleanup of the Edison Facility on WCI. WCI does not contest the district court’s grant of summary judgment on its claims under CERCLA, the Spill Act, or negligence, and thus has waived its right to appellate review of these claims. See Bickel v. Korean Air Lines Co., 96 F.3d 151, 153 (6th Cir.1996) (holding that arguments not briefed are abandoned", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nLobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). The evidence, all facts, and any reasonable inferences from the facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). III. On appeal, WCI challenges the district court’s determination that the assumption and indemnification clauses in the Purchase Agreement place the liability for the cleanup of the Edison Facility on WCI. WCI does not contest the district court’s grant of summary judgment on its claims under CERCLA, the Spill Act, or negligence, and thus has waived its right to appellate review of these claims. See Bickel v. Korean Air Lines Co., 96 F.3d 151, 153 (6th Cir.1996) (holding that arguments inadequately briefed in the opening brief are waived", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nLobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). The evidence, all facts, and any reasonable inferences from the facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). III. On appeal, WCI challenges the district court’s determination that the assumption and indemnification clauses in the Purchase Agreement place the liability for the cleanup of the Edison Facility on WCI. WCI does not contest the district court’s grant of summary judgment on its claims under CERCLA, the Spill Act, or negligence, and thus has waived its right to appellate review of these claims. See Bickel v. Korean Air Lines Co., 96 F.3d 151, 153 (6th Cir.1996) (holding arguments not raised on appeal waived", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nLobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). The evidence, all facts, and any reasonable inferences from the facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). III. On appeal, WCI challenges the district court’s determination that the assumption and indemnification clauses in the Purchase Agreement place the liability for the cleanup of the Edison Facility on WCI. WCI does not contest the district court’s grant of summary judgment on its claims under CERCLA, the Spill Act, or negligence, and thus has waived its right to appellate review of these claims. See Bickel v. Korean Air Lines Co., 96 F.3d 151, 153 (6th Cir.1996) (recognizing that arguments not briefed on appeal are waived" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nnot end our inquiry. Our legislature established restitution as part of a defendant’s sentence. “A victim of a crime has the right to receive restitution as part of the disposition of a criminal charge ... against the offender if. the offender is' convicted.” Minn.Stat, § 611A.04, subd. 1(a) (2012). And Minn. Stat. § 609.10, subd. 1(a)(5) (2012), provides that court-ordered restitution is a sentence that may be imposed upon conviction of a felony. Minnesota courts have consistently interpreted these statutes to mean that restitution is part of a criminal sentence. See Evans v. State, 880 N.W.2d 357, 359 (Minn.2016); see also State v, Gaiovnik, 794 N.W.2d 643, 648 (Minn.2011). Because the obligation to pay restitution is a part of a sentence, and the rules of evidence do not Cir.2012) (holding hearsay admissible in revocation hearings", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nnot end our inquiry. Our legislature established restitution as part of a defendant’s sentence. “A victim of a crime has the right to receive restitution as part of the disposition of a criminal charge ... against the offender if. the offender is' convicted.” Minn.Stat, § 611A.04, subd. 1(a) (2012). And Minn. Stat. § 609.10, subd. 1(a)(5) (2012), provides that court-ordered restitution is a sentence that may be imposed upon conviction of a felony. Minnesota courts have consistently interpreted these statutes to mean that restitution is part of a criminal sentence. See Evans v. State, 880 N.W.2d 357, 359 (Minn.2016); see also State v, Gaiovnik, 794 N.W.2d 643, 648 (Minn.2011). Because the obligation to pay restitution is a part of a sentence, and the rules of evidence do not Cir.2012) (recognizing that the federal rules of evidence do not apply to sentencing hearings", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nnot end our inquiry. Our legislature established restitution as part of a defendant’s sentence. “A victim of a crime has the right to receive restitution as part of the disposition of a criminal charge ... against the offender if. the offender is' convicted.” Minn.Stat, § 611A.04, subd. 1(a) (2012). And Minn. Stat. § 609.10, subd. 1(a)(5) (2012), provides that court-ordered restitution is a sentence that may be imposed upon conviction of a felony. Minnesota courts have consistently interpreted these statutes to mean that restitution is part of a criminal sentence. See Evans v. State, 880 N.W.2d 357, 359 (Minn.2016); see also State v, Gaiovnik, 794 N.W.2d 643, 648 (Minn.2011). Because the obligation to pay restitution is a part of a sentence, and the rules of evidence do not Cir.2012) (holding that because the rules of evidence including the rule against hearsay do not apply to sentencing hearings the district court did not err in relying on hearsay in ordering restitution", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nnot end our inquiry. Our legislature established restitution as part of a defendant’s sentence. “A victim of a crime has the right to receive restitution as part of the disposition of a criminal charge ... against the offender if. the offender is' convicted.” Minn.Stat, § 611A.04, subd. 1(a) (2012). And Minn. Stat. § 609.10, subd. 1(a)(5) (2012), provides that court-ordered restitution is a sentence that may be imposed upon conviction of a felony. Minnesota courts have consistently interpreted these statutes to mean that restitution is part of a criminal sentence. See Evans v. State, 880 N.W.2d 357, 359 (Minn.2016); see also State v, Gaiovnik, 794 N.W.2d 643, 648 (Minn.2011). Because the obligation to pay restitution is a part of a sentence, and the rules of evidence do not Cir.2012) (holding that because restitution hearings are a part of sentencing and have nothing to do with a defendants guilt or innocence the rules of evidence do not apply", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nnot end our inquiry. Our legislature established restitution as part of a defendant’s sentence. “A victim of a crime has the right to receive restitution as part of the disposition of a criminal charge ... against the offender if. the offender is' convicted.” Minn.Stat, § 611A.04, subd. 1(a) (2012). And Minn. Stat. § 609.10, subd. 1(a)(5) (2012), provides that court-ordered restitution is a sentence that may be imposed upon conviction of a felony. Minnesota courts have consistently interpreted these statutes to mean that restitution is part of a criminal sentence. See Evans v. State, 880 N.W.2d 357, 359 (Minn.2016); see also State v, Gaiovnik, 794 N.W.2d 643, 648 (Minn.2011). Because the obligation to pay restitution is a part of a sentence, and the rules of evidence do not Cir.2012) (holding that the district court did not err in relying on hearsay evidence where the government offered reasons why its hearsay evidence had indicia of reliability and the court considered the reliability of the evidence in deciding the weight to give the hearsay evidence" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nfor dependency did not reference abandonment. The father’s position is unfounded because the petition for dependency alleged generally that the parents had abused and neglected the child, and the trial court stated on the record that the child was found dependent based upon the father’s neglect. The father also argues that this court erred when it dismissed his first appeal based upon a determination that the trial court’s order finding his daughter dependent but withholding an adjudication of dependency. was not a final, appealable order. Although both parties recognize that this issue is now moot, both request appellate review because of an apparent inconsistency in the manner in which our court has addressed this issue. See Enterprise Leasing Co. v. Jones, 789 So.2d 964 (Fla.2001) (recognizing the general principle that a party who fails to address an issue has conceded the issue", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nfor dependency did not reference abandonment. The father’s position is unfounded because the petition for dependency alleged generally that the parents had abused and neglected the child, and the trial court stated on the record that the child was found dependent based upon the father’s neglect. The father also argues that this court erred when it dismissed his first appeal based upon a determination that the trial court’s order finding his daughter dependent but withholding an adjudication of dependency. was not a final, appealable order. Although both parties recognize that this issue is now moot, both request appellate review because of an apparent inconsistency in the manner in which our court has addressed this issue. See Enterprise Leasing Co. v. Jones, 789 So.2d 964 (Fla.2001) (holding that an appellate court cannot address on appeal an issue never ruled upon by the trial court", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nfor dependency did not reference abandonment. The father’s position is unfounded because the petition for dependency alleged generally that the parents had abused and neglected the child, and the trial court stated on the record that the child was found dependent based upon the father’s neglect. The father also argues that this court erred when it dismissed his first appeal based upon a determination that the trial court’s order finding his daughter dependent but withholding an adjudication of dependency. was not a final, appealable order. Although both parties recognize that this issue is now moot, both request appellate review because of an apparent inconsistency in the manner in which our court has addressed this issue. See Enterprise Leasing Co. v. Jones, 789 So.2d 964 (Fla.2001) (holding that the court can properly address an issue which although moot is likely to recur", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nfor dependency did not reference abandonment. The father’s position is unfounded because the petition for dependency alleged generally that the parents had abused and neglected the child, and the trial court stated on the record that the child was found dependent based upon the father’s neglect. The father also argues that this court erred when it dismissed his first appeal based upon a determination that the trial court’s order finding his daughter dependent but withholding an adjudication of dependency. was not a final, appealable order. Although both parties recognize that this issue is now moot, both request appellate review because of an apparent inconsistency in the manner in which our court has addressed this issue. See Enterprise Leasing Co. v. Jones, 789 So.2d 964 (Fla.2001) (holding that the court properly refused to instruct on an issue for which no evidence was offered", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nfor dependency did not reference abandonment. The father’s position is unfounded because the petition for dependency alleged generally that the parents had abused and neglected the child, and the trial court stated on the record that the child was found dependent based upon the father’s neglect. The father also argues that this court erred when it dismissed his first appeal based upon a determination that the trial court’s order finding his daughter dependent but withholding an adjudication of dependency. was not a final, appealable order. Although both parties recognize that this issue is now moot, both request appellate review because of an apparent inconsistency in the manner in which our court has addressed this issue. See Enterprise Leasing Co. v. Jones, 789 So.2d 964 (Fla.2001) (holding that although an address in which the zip code is incorrect may be properly addressed an address in which both the zip code and the street address is incorrect is not properly addressed" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nheld that “[e]ach patent asserted raises an independent and distinct cause of action.” Id. at 1555-56. Plaintiffs argument appears to be a red herring. While the Court understands that, for purposes of res judi-cata, each patent is distinct, there is undoubtedly no question here as to whether the '505 and '418 patents are independent of the four patents involved in the 2006 Maryland action. Thus, the issue here is not one of res judicata; rather, it is whether StemCells subjected itself to the jurisdiction of this Court when it filed a prior suit against Neuralstem with respect to related patents, involving the same parties, and arising out of the same transaction or same nucleus of operative facts. See Gen. Contracting & Trading Co. v. Interpole, Inc., 940.F.2d 20, 25 (1st Cir.1991) (holding that a defendant that invokes the jurisdiction of a court as a plaintiff waives its personal jurisdiction defense in all actions related to the claim for which it invoked the courts jurisdiction", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nheld that “[e]ach patent asserted raises an independent and distinct cause of action.” Id. at 1555-56. Plaintiffs argument appears to be a red herring. While the Court understands that, for purposes of res judi-cata, each patent is distinct, there is undoubtedly no question here as to whether the '505 and '418 patents are independent of the four patents involved in the 2006 Maryland action. Thus, the issue here is not one of res judicata; rather, it is whether StemCells subjected itself to the jurisdiction of this Court when it filed a prior suit against Neuralstem with respect to related patents, involving the same parties, and arising out of the same transaction or same nucleus of operative facts. See Gen. Contracting & Trading Co. v. Interpole, Inc., 940.F.2d 20, 25 (1st Cir.1991) (holding that the superior court had no jurisdiction over the division of marital property when the district court had properly invoked jurisdiction over the property", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nheld that “[e]ach patent asserted raises an independent and distinct cause of action.” Id. at 1555-56. Plaintiffs argument appears to be a red herring. While the Court understands that, for purposes of res judi-cata, each patent is distinct, there is undoubtedly no question here as to whether the '505 and '418 patents are independent of the four patents involved in the 2006 Maryland action. Thus, the issue here is not one of res judicata; rather, it is whether StemCells subjected itself to the jurisdiction of this Court when it filed a prior suit against Neuralstem with respect to related patents, involving the same parties, and arising out of the same transaction or same nucleus of operative facts. See Gen. Contracting & Trading Co. v. Interpole, Inc., 940.F.2d 20, 25 (1st Cir.1991) (holding that a defendant who elected to avail itself of the benefit of a state courts jurisdiction by filing a prior suit against the same party waives its personal jurisdiction defense in all actions related to the claim and arising out of the same nucleus of operative facts for which it originally invoked the courts jurisdiction", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nheld that “[e]ach patent asserted raises an independent and distinct cause of action.” Id. at 1555-56. Plaintiffs argument appears to be a red herring. While the Court understands that, for purposes of res judi-cata, each patent is distinct, there is undoubtedly no question here as to whether the '505 and '418 patents are independent of the four patents involved in the 2006 Maryland action. Thus, the issue here is not one of res judicata; rather, it is whether StemCells subjected itself to the jurisdiction of this Court when it filed a prior suit against Neuralstem with respect to related patents, involving the same parties, and arising out of the same transaction or same nucleus of operative facts. See Gen. Contracting & Trading Co. v. Interpole, Inc., 940.F.2d 20, 25 (1st Cir.1991) (holding that court did not have personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendant because plaintiff failed to show that defendant was assignee of assignor over whom court had personal jurisdiction", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nheld that “[e]ach patent asserted raises an independent and distinct cause of action.” Id. at 1555-56. Plaintiffs argument appears to be a red herring. While the Court understands that, for purposes of res judi-cata, each patent is distinct, there is undoubtedly no question here as to whether the '505 and '418 patents are independent of the four patents involved in the 2006 Maryland action. Thus, the issue here is not one of res judicata; rather, it is whether StemCells subjected itself to the jurisdiction of this Court when it filed a prior suit against Neuralstem with respect to related patents, involving the same parties, and arising out of the same transaction or same nucleus of operative facts. See Gen. Contracting & Trading Co. v. Interpole, Inc., 940.F.2d 20, 25 (1st Cir.1991) (holding that unlike subject matter jurisdiction personal jurisdiction may be waived" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nfor an exclusionary rule analysis, we will remand. A government search of a private home presumptively violates the Fourth Amendment absent exigent circumstances or a valid warrant. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 576, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). To be valid, the relevant portion of the Fourth Amendment requires that a warrant “particularly describe] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const, amend. IV (emphases added). The particularity requirement — “the touchstone of [the] warrant,” Doe v. Groody, 361 F.3d 232, 239 (3d Cir.2004) — is satisfied by expressly listing items to be seized or expressly incorporating by reference an affidavit that lists such items. See Bartholomew v. Pennsylvania, 221 F.3d 425, 428-429 (3d Cir.2000) (holding that pursuant to the best evidence rule trial testimony relying on documents was inadmissible without submission of such documents or an explanation as to why the documents were unavailable", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nfor an exclusionary rule analysis, we will remand. A government search of a private home presumptively violates the Fourth Amendment absent exigent circumstances or a valid warrant. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 576, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). To be valid, the relevant portion of the Fourth Amendment requires that a warrant “particularly describe] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const, amend. IV (emphases added). The particularity requirement — “the touchstone of [the] warrant,” Doe v. Groody, 361 F.3d 232, 239 (3d Cir.2004) — is satisfied by expressly listing items to be seized or expressly incorporating by reference an affidavit that lists such items. See Bartholomew v. Pennsylvania, 221 F.3d 425, 428-429 (3d Cir.2000) (holding that plan documents could be incorporated without converting the motion to one for summary judgment even though the complaint referred only to the plan and not the accompanying documents", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nfor an exclusionary rule analysis, we will remand. A government search of a private home presumptively violates the Fourth Amendment absent exigent circumstances or a valid warrant. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 576, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). To be valid, the relevant portion of the Fourth Amendment requires that a warrant “particularly describe] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const, amend. IV (emphases added). The particularity requirement — “the touchstone of [the] warrant,” Doe v. Groody, 361 F.3d 232, 239 (3d Cir.2004) — is satisfied by expressly listing items to be seized or expressly incorporating by reference an affidavit that lists such items. See Bartholomew v. Pennsylvania, 221 F.3d 425, 428-429 (3d Cir.2000) (holding that 1 the complaint is deemed to include any documents incorporated in it by reference and any document upon which it solely relies and which is integral to the complaint and that the court may consider such documents on a motion to dismiss pursuant to fedrcivp 12b6", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nfor an exclusionary rule analysis, we will remand. A government search of a private home presumptively violates the Fourth Amendment absent exigent circumstances or a valid warrant. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 576, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). To be valid, the relevant portion of the Fourth Amendment requires that a warrant “particularly describe] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const, amend. IV (emphases added). The particularity requirement — “the touchstone of [the] warrant,” Doe v. Groody, 361 F.3d 232, 239 (3d Cir.2004) — is satisfied by expressly listing items to be seized or expressly incorporating by reference an affidavit that lists such items. See Bartholomew v. Pennsylvania, 221 F.3d 425, 428-429 (3d Cir.2000) (holding that if a warrants particularity depends upon incorporated documents those documents must physically accompany the warrant", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nfor an exclusionary rule analysis, we will remand. A government search of a private home presumptively violates the Fourth Amendment absent exigent circumstances or a valid warrant. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 576, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). To be valid, the relevant portion of the Fourth Amendment requires that a warrant “particularly describe] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const, amend. IV (emphases added). The particularity requirement — “the touchstone of [the] warrant,” Doe v. Groody, 361 F.3d 232, 239 (3d Cir.2004) — is satisfied by expressly listing items to be seized or expressly incorporating by reference an affidavit that lists such items. See Bartholomew v. Pennsylvania, 221 F.3d 425, 428-429 (3d Cir.2000) (holding that where original documents were illegally seized those documents as well as all copies had to be returned" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nUnion made an unconditional agreement or an offer, as the Georgia Court of Appeals has held that an insurer is not estopped to dispute its defense obligations by reason of having sent letters to the insured in which the insurer initially agreed to defend the underlying suit. Ga. Farm, Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Vanhuss, 243 Ga.App. 26, 26, 532 S.E.2d 135, 136 (2000). In Vanhuss, the court held that where the insured did not claim that he relied to his detriment on the insurer’s initial decision to defend the suits and no such reliance appears, the insured is not estopped from later denying coverage. Id.; see also Mahens v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 1:10-cv-174, 2011 WL 1321578, at * 4 (N.D.Ga. Apr. 1, 2011) (citing Danforth v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 282 Ga.App. 421, 638 S.E.2d 852 (2007) (holding that injured employee has right to settle with thirdparty tortfeasor claims not covered by minnesota workers compensation act", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nUnion made an unconditional agreement or an offer, as the Georgia Court of Appeals has held that an insurer is not estopped to dispute its defense obligations by reason of having sent letters to the insured in which the insurer initially agreed to defend the underlying suit. Ga. Farm, Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Vanhuss, 243 Ga.App. 26, 26, 532 S.E.2d 135, 136 (2000). In Vanhuss, the court held that where the insured did not claim that he relied to his detriment on the insurer’s initial decision to defend the suits and no such reliance appears, the insured is not estopped from later denying coverage. Id.; see also Mahens v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 1:10-cv-174, 2011 WL 1321578, at * 4 (N.D.Ga. Apr. 1, 2011) (citing Danforth v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 282 Ga.App. 421, 638 S.E.2d 852 (2007) (holding that insurers assurances that it would pay for repairs including its attempt to settle with a thirdparty did not waive right to deny coverage", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nUnion made an unconditional agreement or an offer, as the Georgia Court of Appeals has held that an insurer is not estopped to dispute its defense obligations by reason of having sent letters to the insured in which the insurer initially agreed to defend the underlying suit. Ga. Farm, Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Vanhuss, 243 Ga.App. 26, 26, 532 S.E.2d 135, 136 (2000). In Vanhuss, the court held that where the insured did not claim that he relied to his detriment on the insurer’s initial decision to defend the suits and no such reliance appears, the insured is not estopped from later denying coverage. Id.; see also Mahens v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 1:10-cv-174, 2011 WL 1321578, at * 4 (N.D.Ga. Apr. 1, 2011) (citing Danforth v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 282 Ga.App. 421, 638 S.E.2d 852 (2007) (holding that an insurer has no obligation to pay diminished value in addition to repairs", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nUnion made an unconditional agreement or an offer, as the Georgia Court of Appeals has held that an insurer is not estopped to dispute its defense obligations by reason of having sent letters to the insured in which the insurer initially agreed to defend the underlying suit. Ga. Farm, Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Vanhuss, 243 Ga.App. 26, 26, 532 S.E.2d 135, 136 (2000). In Vanhuss, the court held that where the insured did not claim that he relied to his detriment on the insurer’s initial decision to defend the suits and no such reliance appears, the insured is not estopped from later denying coverage. Id.; see also Mahens v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 1:10-cv-174, 2011 WL 1321578, at * 4 (N.D.Ga. Apr. 1, 2011) (citing Danforth v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 282 Ga.App. 421, 638 S.E.2d 852 (2007) (recognizing that an insurers obligation to pay for prenotification legal expenses is concomitant with its right to control the defense and that a contrary result would require the insurer to pay for those defense costs which it had no opportunity to control", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nUnion made an unconditional agreement or an offer, as the Georgia Court of Appeals has held that an insurer is not estopped to dispute its defense obligations by reason of having sent letters to the insured in which the insurer initially agreed to defend the underlying suit. Ga. Farm, Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Vanhuss, 243 Ga.App. 26, 26, 532 S.E.2d 135, 136 (2000). In Vanhuss, the court held that where the insured did not claim that he relied to his detriment on the insurer’s initial decision to defend the suits and no such reliance appears, the insured is not estopped from later denying coverage. Id.; see also Mahens v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 1:10-cv-174, 2011 WL 1321578, at * 4 (N.D.Ga. Apr. 1, 2011) (citing Danforth v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 282 Ga.App. 421, 638 S.E.2d 852 (2007) (holding insured relinquished right to sue general liability insurer for breach of contract relative to insurers allegedly improper handling and payment of thirdparty claim by purchasing policy which gave insurer right to settle" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nand ministerial acts in its application of the qualified public official immunity doctrine. See, e.g., Parker v. State, 337 Md. 271, 284, 653 A.2d 436, 442 (1995) (noting that “the Court has distinguished between the qualified and narrower immunity for discretionary acts generally accorded to public officials, and absolute judicial immunity, which ... applies [to judges] regardless of the nature of the tort” (emphasis added)); Mandel, 320 Md. at 110, 576 A.2d at 769 (recognizing that “ ‘the Maryland cases seem to indicate that discretionary action [of officials] will be protected only in the absence of malice’ ” (emphasis added) (quoting Eliason v. Funk, 233 Md. 351, 356, 196 A.2d 887, 890 (1964))); Robinson v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 262 Md. 342, 346-47, 278 A.2d 71, 74 (1971) (holding that the statute incorporated all the rights and obligations of the contract emphasis added", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nand ministerial acts in its application of the qualified public official immunity doctrine. See, e.g., Parker v. State, 337 Md. 271, 284, 653 A.2d 436, 442 (1995) (noting that “the Court has distinguished between the qualified and narrower immunity for discretionary acts generally accorded to public officials, and absolute judicial immunity, which ... applies [to judges] regardless of the nature of the tort” (emphasis added)); Mandel, 320 Md. at 110, 576 A.2d at 769 (recognizing that “ ‘the Maryland cases seem to indicate that discretionary action [of officials] will be protected only in the absence of malice’ ” (emphasis added) (quoting Eliason v. Funk, 233 Md. 351, 356, 196 A.2d 887, 890 (1964))); Robinson v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 262 Md. 342, 346-47, 278 A.2d 71, 74 (1971) (holding that individuals acting in a legislative capacity at a regional level are entitled to absolute immunity", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nand ministerial acts in its application of the qualified public official immunity doctrine. See, e.g., Parker v. State, 337 Md. 271, 284, 653 A.2d 436, 442 (1995) (noting that “the Court has distinguished between the qualified and narrower immunity for discretionary acts generally accorded to public officials, and absolute judicial immunity, which ... applies [to judges] regardless of the nature of the tort” (emphasis added)); Mandel, 320 Md. at 110, 576 A.2d at 769 (recognizing that “ ‘the Maryland cases seem to indicate that discretionary action [of officials] will be protected only in the absence of malice’ ” (emphasis added) (quoting Eliason v. Funk, 233 Md. 351, 356, 196 A.2d 887, 890 (1964))); Robinson v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 262 Md. 342, 346-47, 278 A.2d 71, 74 (1971) (holding that states and state officials acting in their official capacity are not persons under 1983", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nand ministerial acts in its application of the qualified public official immunity doctrine. See, e.g., Parker v. State, 337 Md. 271, 284, 653 A.2d 436, 442 (1995) (noting that “the Court has distinguished between the qualified and narrower immunity for discretionary acts generally accorded to public officials, and absolute judicial immunity, which ... applies [to judges] regardless of the nature of the tort” (emphasis added)); Mandel, 320 Md. at 110, 576 A.2d at 769 (recognizing that “ ‘the Maryland cases seem to indicate that discretionary action [of officials] will be protected only in the absence of malice’ ” (emphasis added) (quoting Eliason v. Funk, 233 Md. 351, 356, 196 A.2d 887, 890 (1964))); Robinson v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 262 Md. 342, 346-47, 278 A.2d 71, 74 (1971) (holding that in maryland governmental immunity is extended to all nonmalicious acts of public officials when acting in a discretionary capacity emphasis added quoting duncan 260 md at 104 271 a2d at 550", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nand ministerial acts in its application of the qualified public official immunity doctrine. See, e.g., Parker v. State, 337 Md. 271, 284, 653 A.2d 436, 442 (1995) (noting that “the Court has distinguished between the qualified and narrower immunity for discretionary acts generally accorded to public officials, and absolute judicial immunity, which ... applies [to judges] regardless of the nature of the tort” (emphasis added)); Mandel, 320 Md. at 110, 576 A.2d at 769 (recognizing that “ ‘the Maryland cases seem to indicate that discretionary action [of officials] will be protected only in the absence of malice’ ” (emphasis added) (quoting Eliason v. Funk, 233 Md. 351, 356, 196 A.2d 887, 890 (1964))); Robinson v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 262 Md. 342, 346-47, 278 A.2d 71, 74 (1971) (holding that as a general rule interlocutory trial court orders rejecting defenses of common law sovereign immunity governmental immunity public official immunity statutory immunity or any other type of immunity are not appealable under the maryland collateral order doctrine" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nby Plain Dealer. Moreover, subsection (c)(7) of those regulations permits, on its face, unbridled discretion and therefore an inherent threat of arbitrary decision making. Since Gannett did not involve a facial challenge to adopted licensing requirements, it is inapplicable to this instant case. B. Provision Granting the Architectural Board of Review With Standardless Discretion Is Unconstitutional The provision requiring the Board to approve the design of newsracks is unconstitutional under a time, place and manner analysis because the provision is not narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest. See Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators’ Association, 460 U.S. 37, 45, 103 S.Ct. 948, 954, 74 L s Board, 301 U.S. 103, 57 S.Ct. 650, 81 L.Ed. 953 (1937) (holding that the national labor relations act does not unconstitutionally abridge the freedom of the press in that it does not interfere with the right to discharge any employee for any proper cause", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nby Plain Dealer. Moreover, subsection (c)(7) of those regulations permits, on its face, unbridled discretion and therefore an inherent threat of arbitrary decision making. Since Gannett did not involve a facial challenge to adopted licensing requirements, it is inapplicable to this instant case. B. Provision Granting the Architectural Board of Review With Standardless Discretion Is Unconstitutional The provision requiring the Board to approve the design of newsracks is unconstitutional under a time, place and manner analysis because the provision is not narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest. See Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators’ Association, 460 U.S. 37, 45, 103 S.Ct. 948, 954, 74 L s Board, 301 U.S. 103, 57 S.Ct. 650, 81 L.Ed. 953 (1937) (holding that a district court may have jurisdiction over action taken by the national labor relations board despite an express statutory finality provision when the agency has acted in excess of its delegated powers and contrary to a specific prohibition in the national labor relations act", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nby Plain Dealer. Moreover, subsection (c)(7) of those regulations permits, on its face, unbridled discretion and therefore an inherent threat of arbitrary decision making. Since Gannett did not involve a facial challenge to adopted licensing requirements, it is inapplicable to this instant case. B. Provision Granting the Architectural Board of Review With Standardless Discretion Is Unconstitutional The provision requiring the Board to approve the design of newsracks is unconstitutional under a time, place and manner analysis because the provision is not narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest. See Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators’ Association, 460 U.S. 37, 45, 103 S.Ct. 948, 954, 74 L s Board, 301 U.S. 103, 57 S.Ct. 650, 81 L.Ed. 953 (1937) (holding ports authority was not an employer subject to the jurisdiction of the national labor relations board", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nby Plain Dealer. Moreover, subsection (c)(7) of those regulations permits, on its face, unbridled discretion and therefore an inherent threat of arbitrary decision making. Since Gannett did not involve a facial challenge to adopted licensing requirements, it is inapplicable to this instant case. B. Provision Granting the Architectural Board of Review With Standardless Discretion Is Unconstitutional The provision requiring the Board to approve the design of newsracks is unconstitutional under a time, place and manner analysis because the provision is not narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest. See Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators’ Association, 460 U.S. 37, 45, 103 S.Ct. 948, 954, 74 L s Board, 301 U.S. 103, 57 S.Ct. 650, 81 L.Ed. 953 (1937) (holding that the nlrb was a creditor within the meaning of the code because it had been granted the power to enforce the national labor relations act even though a back pay award was made to individual workers not to the government", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nby Plain Dealer. Moreover, subsection (c)(7) of those regulations permits, on its face, unbridled discretion and therefore an inherent threat of arbitrary decision making. Since Gannett did not involve a facial challenge to adopted licensing requirements, it is inapplicable to this instant case. B. Provision Granting the Architectural Board of Review With Standardless Discretion Is Unconstitutional The provision requiring the Board to approve the design of newsracks is unconstitutional under a time, place and manner analysis because the provision is not narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest. See Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators’ Association, 460 U.S. 37, 45, 103 S.Ct. 948, 954, 74 L s Board, 301 U.S. 103, 57 S.Ct. 650, 81 L.Ed. 953 (1937) (holding that the but for test applied in a mixed motive case under the national labor relations act" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\noperation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle.’ ” Cruz v State Farm, Mut Auto Ins Co, 241 Mich App 159, 164; 614 NW2d 689 (2000), aff'd 466 Mich 588 (2002), quoting MCL 500.3105(1). 5 MCL 500.3104(17) provides: Not more than 60 days after the initial organizational meeting of the board [of directors of the MCCA], the board shall submit to the commissioner for approval a proposed plan of operation consistent with the objectives and provisions of this section, which shall provide for the economical, fair, and nondiscriminatory administration of the association and for the prompt and efficient provision of indemnity. 6 This Court has previously implicitly found that an insurer constitutes a “third party” under § 10.06. See Farmers Ins Exch, 251 Mich App at 458-459 (holding that 1006 applies to an insurers recoupment of money from another insurer", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\noperation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle.’ ” Cruz v State Farm, Mut Auto Ins Co, 241 Mich App 159, 164; 614 NW2d 689 (2000), aff'd 466 Mich 588 (2002), quoting MCL 500.3105(1). 5 MCL 500.3104(17) provides: Not more than 60 days after the initial organizational meeting of the board [of directors of the MCCA], the board shall submit to the commissioner for approval a proposed plan of operation consistent with the objectives and provisions of this section, which shall provide for the economical, fair, and nondiscriminatory administration of the association and for the prompt and efficient provision of indemnity. 6 This Court has previously implicitly found that an insurer constitutes a “third party” under § 10.06. See Farmers Ins Exch, 251 Mich App at 458-459 (holding that the employer was not the insurers agent", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\noperation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle.’ ” Cruz v State Farm, Mut Auto Ins Co, 241 Mich App 159, 164; 614 NW2d 689 (2000), aff'd 466 Mich 588 (2002), quoting MCL 500.3105(1). 5 MCL 500.3104(17) provides: Not more than 60 days after the initial organizational meeting of the board [of directors of the MCCA], the board shall submit to the commissioner for approval a proposed plan of operation consistent with the objectives and provisions of this section, which shall provide for the economical, fair, and nondiscriminatory administration of the association and for the prompt and efficient provision of indemnity. 6 This Court has previously implicitly found that an insurer constitutes a “third party” under § 10.06. See Farmers Ins Exch, 251 Mich App at 458-459 (holding insurers right to subrogation arises only upon the insurers showing that the sum of the insureds recovery from the insurer and from persons legally responsible for the injury exceeds the insureds loss", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\noperation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle.’ ” Cruz v State Farm, Mut Auto Ins Co, 241 Mich App 159, 164; 614 NW2d 689 (2000), aff'd 466 Mich 588 (2002), quoting MCL 500.3105(1). 5 MCL 500.3104(17) provides: Not more than 60 days after the initial organizational meeting of the board [of directors of the MCCA], the board shall submit to the commissioner for approval a proposed plan of operation consistent with the objectives and provisions of this section, which shall provide for the economical, fair, and nondiscriminatory administration of the association and for the prompt and efficient provision of indemnity. 6 This Court has previously implicitly found that an insurer constitutes a “third party” under § 10.06. See Farmers Ins Exch, 251 Mich App at 458-459 (holding that admonishment for breach of insurers obligation to insured is not applicable to equitable share dispute between insurers", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\noperation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle.’ ” Cruz v State Farm, Mut Auto Ins Co, 241 Mich App 159, 164; 614 NW2d 689 (2000), aff'd 466 Mich 588 (2002), quoting MCL 500.3105(1). 5 MCL 500.3104(17) provides: Not more than 60 days after the initial organizational meeting of the board [of directors of the MCCA], the board shall submit to the commissioner for approval a proposed plan of operation consistent with the objectives and provisions of this section, which shall provide for the economical, fair, and nondiscriminatory administration of the association and for the prompt and efficient provision of indemnity. 6 This Court has previously implicitly found that an insurer constitutes a “third party” under § 10.06. See Farmers Ins Exch, 251 Mich App at 458-459 (holding that the language of 9133 applies only to insurers and not to the insurers employees" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nno confidential/fiduciary relationship existed because the parties were adversaries, each represented by their own attorney. On appeal, Virginia contends the law permits the inference of a confidential relationship to the extent Edwin holds property in excess of $690,000 that rightfully belongs to her. We disagree with Virginia’s argument. Texas law recognizes that a relationship on which a constructive trust can be based may be an informal fiduciary relationship that arises from a moral, social, domestic, or purely personal relationship of trust and confidence. Thigpen v. Locke, 363 S.W.2d 247, 253 (Tex. 1962). However, any such fiduciary relationship between Edwin and Virginia terminated when they divorced. See Solares v. Solares, 232 S.W.3d 873, 881 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, no pet.) (holding that a corporate entity must be represented by licensed counsel", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nno confidential/fiduciary relationship existed because the parties were adversaries, each represented by their own attorney. On appeal, Virginia contends the law permits the inference of a confidential relationship to the extent Edwin holds property in excess of $690,000 that rightfully belongs to her. We disagree with Virginia’s argument. Texas law recognizes that a relationship on which a constructive trust can be based may be an informal fiduciary relationship that arises from a moral, social, domestic, or purely personal relationship of trust and confidence. Thigpen v. Locke, 363 S.W.2d 247, 253 (Tex. 1962). However, any such fiduciary relationship between Edwin and Virginia terminated when they divorced. See Solares v. Solares, 232 S.W.3d 873, 881 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, no pet.) (holding in a contested divorce where each spouse is independently represented by counsel the fiduciary relationship terminates", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nno confidential/fiduciary relationship existed because the parties were adversaries, each represented by their own attorney. On appeal, Virginia contends the law permits the inference of a confidential relationship to the extent Edwin holds property in excess of $690,000 that rightfully belongs to her. We disagree with Virginia’s argument. Texas law recognizes that a relationship on which a constructive trust can be based may be an informal fiduciary relationship that arises from a moral, social, domestic, or purely personal relationship of trust and confidence. Thigpen v. Locke, 363 S.W.2d 247, 253 (Tex. 1962). However, any such fiduciary relationship between Edwin and Virginia terminated when they divorced. See Solares v. Solares, 232 S.W.3d 873, 881 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, no pet.) (holding that the automatic stay terminates completely as to a serially filing spouse but remains in force as to a newly filing spouse", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nno confidential/fiduciary relationship existed because the parties were adversaries, each represented by their own attorney. On appeal, Virginia contends the law permits the inference of a confidential relationship to the extent Edwin holds property in excess of $690,000 that rightfully belongs to her. We disagree with Virginia’s argument. Texas law recognizes that a relationship on which a constructive trust can be based may be an informal fiduciary relationship that arises from a moral, social, domestic, or purely personal relationship of trust and confidence. Thigpen v. Locke, 363 S.W.2d 247, 253 (Tex. 1962). However, any such fiduciary relationship between Edwin and Virginia terminated when they divorced. See Solares v. Solares, 232 S.W.3d 873, 881 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, no pet.) (recognizing a defendants constitutional right to be represented by counsel of his own choice", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nno confidential/fiduciary relationship existed because the parties were adversaries, each represented by their own attorney. On appeal, Virginia contends the law permits the inference of a confidential relationship to the extent Edwin holds property in excess of $690,000 that rightfully belongs to her. We disagree with Virginia’s argument. Texas law recognizes that a relationship on which a constructive trust can be based may be an informal fiduciary relationship that arises from a moral, social, domestic, or purely personal relationship of trust and confidence. Thigpen v. Locke, 363 S.W.2d 247, 253 (Tex. 1962). However, any such fiduciary relationship between Edwin and Virginia terminated when they divorced. See Solares v. Solares, 232 S.W.3d 873, 881 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, no pet.) (recognizing that the rights accorded by the homestead laws vest independently in each spouse regardless of whether one spouse or both actually owns the fee interest in the homestead" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nof the issuer ....” 15 U.S.C. § 7244(a)(2)(B) (emphasis added). By contrast, section 304 does not mention the availability of any action to enforce its mandates, nor does it explicitly describe a forum in which suit may be brought or a plaintiff for whom such a forum is available. Accordingly, any private right of action within section 304 must be implied from the statute’s language, structure, context and legislative history. Opera Plaza Residential Parcel Homeowners Ass’n v. Hoang, 376 F.3d 831, 836 (9th Cir.2004). B We next turn to whether section 304 creates an implied private right of action. So far as we can determine, no circuit has yet answered this question, except in dicta. Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp. Retiree Med. Benefits Trust v. Raines, 534 F.3d 779, 792-93 (D.C.Cir.2008) (holding that a private right of action exists", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nof the issuer ....” 15 U.S.C. § 7244(a)(2)(B) (emphasis added). By contrast, section 304 does not mention the availability of any action to enforce its mandates, nor does it explicitly describe a forum in which suit may be brought or a plaintiff for whom such a forum is available. Accordingly, any private right of action within section 304 must be implied from the statute’s language, structure, context and legislative history. Opera Plaza Residential Parcel Homeowners Ass’n v. Hoang, 376 F.3d 831, 836 (9th Cir.2004). B We next turn to whether section 304 creates an implied private right of action. So far as we can determine, no circuit has yet answered this question, except in dicta. Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp. Retiree Med. Benefits Trust v. Raines, 534 F.3d 779, 792-93 (D.C.Cir.2008) (holding itca does not create new causes of action but creates acceptance of liability under circumstances that would bring private liability into existence", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nof the issuer ....” 15 U.S.C. § 7244(a)(2)(B) (emphasis added). By contrast, section 304 does not mention the availability of any action to enforce its mandates, nor does it explicitly describe a forum in which suit may be brought or a plaintiff for whom such a forum is available. Accordingly, any private right of action within section 304 must be implied from the statute’s language, structure, context and legislative history. Opera Plaza Residential Parcel Homeowners Ass’n v. Hoang, 376 F.3d 831, 836 (9th Cir.2004). B We next turn to whether section 304 creates an implied private right of action. So far as we can determine, no circuit has yet answered this question, except in dicta. Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp. Retiree Med. Benefits Trust v. Raines, 534 F.3d 779, 792-93 (D.C.Cir.2008) (holding that section 4625bc does not create a private right of action for money damages", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nof the issuer ....” 15 U.S.C. § 7244(a)(2)(B) (emphasis added). By contrast, section 304 does not mention the availability of any action to enforce its mandates, nor does it explicitly describe a forum in which suit may be brought or a plaintiff for whom such a forum is available. Accordingly, any private right of action within section 304 must be implied from the statute’s language, structure, context and legislative history. Opera Plaza Residential Parcel Homeowners Ass’n v. Hoang, 376 F.3d 831, 836 (9th Cir.2004). B We next turn to whether section 304 creates an implied private right of action. So far as we can determine, no circuit has yet answered this question, except in dicta. Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp. Retiree Med. Benefits Trust v. Raines, 534 F.3d 779, 792-93 (D.C.Cir.2008) (holding that defendants directors decision not to bring suit under section 304 for disgorgement by ceo and cfo was within the business judgment rule since 304 does not create a private right of action", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nof the issuer ....” 15 U.S.C. § 7244(a)(2)(B) (emphasis added). By contrast, section 304 does not mention the availability of any action to enforce its mandates, nor does it explicitly describe a forum in which suit may be brought or a plaintiff for whom such a forum is available. Accordingly, any private right of action within section 304 must be implied from the statute’s language, structure, context and legislative history. Opera Plaza Residential Parcel Homeowners Ass’n v. Hoang, 376 F.3d 831, 836 (9th Cir.2004). B We next turn to whether section 304 creates an implied private right of action. So far as we can determine, no circuit has yet answered this question, except in dicta. Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp. Retiree Med. Benefits Trust v. Raines, 534 F.3d 779, 792-93 (D.C.Cir.2008) (recognizing private right of action" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\n10 . The Disciplinary Commission reviews questions of law de novo and defers to the hearing officer’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Ariz. R. Sup.Ct. 58(b). 11 . Former Standard 9.32(j). 12 . Peasley received the FBI reports from the State Bar four months after he deposed Judge Nichols. But Peasley contends that he did not \"revisit” those reports until after the hearing officer issued his decision. 13 . No explanation is given why Judge Nichols did not disclose this contact either before the hearing on the motion to dismiss or during his deposition in this proceeding. 14 . A judge’s findings in the underlying criminal case do not necessarily determine whether or not an ethical violation occurred. Cf. In re Wolfram, 174 Ariz. 49, 53, 847 P.2d 94, 98 (1993) (holding that the postconviction court erred in finding the ineffective assistance of counsel claim proeedurally barred because the courts opinion did not comment specifically on the ineffective counsel argument and the overall holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the jurys verdict could not be viewed as an adjudication on the merits of the ineffective assistance claim", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\n10 . The Disciplinary Commission reviews questions of law de novo and defers to the hearing officer’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Ariz. R. Sup.Ct. 58(b). 11 . Former Standard 9.32(j). 12 . Peasley received the FBI reports from the State Bar four months after he deposed Judge Nichols. But Peasley contends that he did not \"revisit” those reports until after the hearing officer issued his decision. 13 . No explanation is given why Judge Nichols did not disclose this contact either before the hearing on the motion to dismiss or during his deposition in this proceeding. 14 . A judge’s findings in the underlying criminal case do not necessarily determine whether or not an ethical violation occurred. Cf. In re Wolfram, 174 Ariz. 49, 53, 847 P.2d 94, 98 (1993) (recognizing claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel usually must be raised in collateral proceeding", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\n10 . The Disciplinary Commission reviews questions of law de novo and defers to the hearing officer’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Ariz. R. Sup.Ct. 58(b). 11 . Former Standard 9.32(j). 12 . Peasley received the FBI reports from the State Bar four months after he deposed Judge Nichols. But Peasley contends that he did not \"revisit” those reports until after the hearing officer issued his decision. 13 . No explanation is given why Judge Nichols did not disclose this contact either before the hearing on the motion to dismiss or during his deposition in this proceeding. 14 . A judge’s findings in the underlying criminal case do not necessarily determine whether or not an ethical violation occurred. Cf. In re Wolfram, 174 Ariz. 49, 53, 847 P.2d 94, 98 (1993) (holding that a trial courts finding of ineffective assistance of counsel in a rule 32 proceeding does not necessarily equate to a finding of a violation of our ethical rules", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\n10 . The Disciplinary Commission reviews questions of law de novo and defers to the hearing officer’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Ariz. R. Sup.Ct. 58(b). 11 . Former Standard 9.32(j). 12 . Peasley received the FBI reports from the State Bar four months after he deposed Judge Nichols. But Peasley contends that he did not \"revisit” those reports until after the hearing officer issued his decision. 13 . No explanation is given why Judge Nichols did not disclose this contact either before the hearing on the motion to dismiss or during his deposition in this proceeding. 14 . A judge’s findings in the underlying criminal case do not necessarily determine whether or not an ethical violation occurred. Cf. In re Wolfram, 174 Ariz. 49, 53, 847 P.2d 94, 98 (1993) (recognizing a constitutional claim for ineffective assistance of counsel", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\n10 . The Disciplinary Commission reviews questions of law de novo and defers to the hearing officer’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Ariz. R. Sup.Ct. 58(b). 11 . Former Standard 9.32(j). 12 . Peasley received the FBI reports from the State Bar four months after he deposed Judge Nichols. But Peasley contends that he did not \"revisit” those reports until after the hearing officer issued his decision. 13 . No explanation is given why Judge Nichols did not disclose this contact either before the hearing on the motion to dismiss or during his deposition in this proceeding. 14 . A judge’s findings in the underlying criminal case do not necessarily determine whether or not an ethical violation occurred. Cf. In re Wolfram, 174 Ariz. 49, 53, 847 P.2d 94, 98 (1993) (holding that appellate courts may not on appeal from the dismissal of a rule 32 petition consider claims not raised in the rule 32 petition" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfrequently made, to accommodate conditions such as plaintiffs insomnia, Kleiner’s opinion is not framed in those terms. Rather, because Kleiner’s opinion does not proffer any specialized knowledge, and invokes legal standards (■ie., that defendants could have accommodated plaintiffs disability without significant impact, and that defendants retaliated against plaintiff), his opinion would “not aid the jury in making a decision, but rather attempts to substitute [his] judgment for the jury’s.” See United States v. Duncan, 42 F.3d 97, 102 (2d Cir.1994) (“When this occurs, the expert acts outside of his limited role of providing the groundwork in the form of an opinion to enable the jury to make its own informed determination.”); see also Hygh v. Jacobs, 961 F.2d 359, 363-64 (2d Cir.1992) (holding that fire expert should not have been sequestered where opposing expert testified to facts and theories not revealed prior to trial", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfrequently made, to accommodate conditions such as plaintiffs insomnia, Kleiner’s opinion is not framed in those terms. Rather, because Kleiner’s opinion does not proffer any specialized knowledge, and invokes legal standards (■ie., that defendants could have accommodated plaintiffs disability without significant impact, and that defendants retaliated against plaintiff), his opinion would “not aid the jury in making a decision, but rather attempts to substitute [his] judgment for the jury’s.” See United States v. Duncan, 42 F.3d 97, 102 (2d Cir.1994) (“When this occurs, the expert acts outside of his limited role of providing the groundwork in the form of an opinion to enable the jury to make its own informed determination.”); see also Hygh v. Jacobs, 961 F.2d 359, 363-64 (2d Cir.1992) (holding that expert testimony on what constitutes deadly physical force and whether the use of force was justified should have been excluded", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfrequently made, to accommodate conditions such as plaintiffs insomnia, Kleiner’s opinion is not framed in those terms. Rather, because Kleiner’s opinion does not proffer any specialized knowledge, and invokes legal standards (■ie., that defendants could have accommodated plaintiffs disability without significant impact, and that defendants retaliated against plaintiff), his opinion would “not aid the jury in making a decision, but rather attempts to substitute [his] judgment for the jury’s.” See United States v. Duncan, 42 F.3d 97, 102 (2d Cir.1994) (“When this occurs, the expert acts outside of his limited role of providing the groundwork in the form of an opinion to enable the jury to make its own informed determination.”); see also Hygh v. Jacobs, 961 F.2d 359, 363-64 (2d Cir.1992) (holding that the district court should have excluded expert testimony in an excessive force case where the expert testified that defendants conduct was not justified or warranted under the circumstances and totally improper noting that the experts opinions merely told the jury what result to reach", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfrequently made, to accommodate conditions such as plaintiffs insomnia, Kleiner’s opinion is not framed in those terms. Rather, because Kleiner’s opinion does not proffer any specialized knowledge, and invokes legal standards (■ie., that defendants could have accommodated plaintiffs disability without significant impact, and that defendants retaliated against plaintiff), his opinion would “not aid the jury in making a decision, but rather attempts to substitute [his] judgment for the jury’s.” See United States v. Duncan, 42 F.3d 97, 102 (2d Cir.1994) (“When this occurs, the expert acts outside of his limited role of providing the groundwork in the form of an opinion to enable the jury to make its own informed determination.”); see also Hygh v. Jacobs, 961 F.2d 359, 363-64 (2d Cir.1992) (holding that expert testimony should be excluded when jury is equally competent to form an opinion about ultimate fact issue or experts testimony is within jurys common knowledge", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfrequently made, to accommodate conditions such as plaintiffs insomnia, Kleiner’s opinion is not framed in those terms. Rather, because Kleiner’s opinion does not proffer any specialized knowledge, and invokes legal standards (■ie., that defendants could have accommodated plaintiffs disability without significant impact, and that defendants retaliated against plaintiff), his opinion would “not aid the jury in making a decision, but rather attempts to substitute [his] judgment for the jury’s.” See United States v. Duncan, 42 F.3d 97, 102 (2d Cir.1994) (“When this occurs, the expert acts outside of his limited role of providing the groundwork in the form of an opinion to enable the jury to make its own informed determination.”); see also Hygh v. Jacobs, 961 F.2d 359, 363-64 (2d Cir.1992) (holding that using the opinions of an expert that were not testified to during trial which were irrelevant and solely used to destroy the credibility of the expert was not admissible" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\na defense to the claims asserted. It is a \"constitutional principle” that \"limit[s] the federal courts’ jurisdiction under Article III,” Seminole Tribe v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44, 64, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996), therefore the Court considers Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on the basis of sovereign immunity as attacking subject matter jurisdiction. 9 . FMC v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 753-54, 122 S.Ct. 1864, 152 L.Ed.2d 962 (2002) (explaining that \"the Eleventh Amendment does not define the scope of the States' sovereign immunity; it is but one particular exemplification of that immunity .... the sovereign immunity enjoyed by the States extends beyond the literal text of the Eleventh Amendment.”); see also Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890) (holding that sovereign immunity barred a federal question suit against a state brought by one of its own citizens even though the text of the eleventh amendment only addresses suits brought by citizens of another state", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\na defense to the claims asserted. It is a \"constitutional principle” that \"limit[s] the federal courts’ jurisdiction under Article III,” Seminole Tribe v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44, 64, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996), therefore the Court considers Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on the basis of sovereign immunity as attacking subject matter jurisdiction. 9 . FMC v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 753-54, 122 S.Ct. 1864, 152 L.Ed.2d 962 (2002) (explaining that \"the Eleventh Amendment does not define the scope of the States' sovereign immunity; it is but one particular exemplification of that immunity .... the sovereign immunity enjoyed by the States extends beyond the literal text of the Eleventh Amendment.”); see also Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890) (holding that eleventh amendment bars federal suits against state courts", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\na defense to the claims asserted. It is a \"constitutional principle” that \"limit[s] the federal courts’ jurisdiction under Article III,” Seminole Tribe v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44, 64, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996), therefore the Court considers Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on the basis of sovereign immunity as attacking subject matter jurisdiction. 9 . FMC v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 753-54, 122 S.Ct. 1864, 152 L.Ed.2d 962 (2002) (explaining that \"the Eleventh Amendment does not define the scope of the States' sovereign immunity; it is but one particular exemplification of that immunity .... the sovereign immunity enjoyed by the States extends beyond the literal text of the Eleventh Amendment.”); see also Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890) (holding that the eleventh amendment protects a state from suit by its own citizens", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\na defense to the claims asserted. It is a \"constitutional principle” that \"limit[s] the federal courts’ jurisdiction under Article III,” Seminole Tribe v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44, 64, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996), therefore the Court considers Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on the basis of sovereign immunity as attacking subject matter jurisdiction. 9 . FMC v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 753-54, 122 S.Ct. 1864, 152 L.Ed.2d 962 (2002) (explaining that \"the Eleventh Amendment does not define the scope of the States' sovereign immunity; it is but one particular exemplification of that immunity .... the sovereign immunity enjoyed by the States extends beyond the literal text of the Eleventh Amendment.”); see also Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890) (holding state immune from suit brought by its own citizens", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\na defense to the claims asserted. It is a \"constitutional principle” that \"limit[s] the federal courts’ jurisdiction under Article III,” Seminole Tribe v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44, 64, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996), therefore the Court considers Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on the basis of sovereign immunity as attacking subject matter jurisdiction. 9 . FMC v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 753-54, 122 S.Ct. 1864, 152 L.Ed.2d 962 (2002) (explaining that \"the Eleventh Amendment does not define the scope of the States' sovereign immunity; it is but one particular exemplification of that immunity .... the sovereign immunity enjoyed by the States extends beyond the literal text of the Eleventh Amendment.”); see also Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890) (holding that utah did not waive its eleventh amendment immunity with respect to a suit brought in federal court because state statute provided for exclusive original jurisdiction in its own courts" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nJudge. Freddick Woodson appeals the revocation of his probation for committing a new offense. The trial court sentenced him to five years in prison. We affirm. In doing so, we reject without discussion Mr. Wood-son’s suggestion that he was not properly advised of his probationary terms. See State v. Green, 667 So.2d 959, 960-61 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (holding that due process does not require notice or hearing before writ of garnishment issues", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nJudge. Freddick Woodson appeals the revocation of his probation for committing a new offense. The trial court sentenced him to five years in prison. We affirm. In doing so, we reject without discussion Mr. Wood-son’s suggestion that he was not properly advised of his probationary terms. See State v. Green, 667 So.2d 959, 960-61 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (holding that a defendant is not entitled to relief from default judgment because notice to an attorney of filing of motions and orders is constructive notice to the client even when the client did not have actual notice", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nJudge. Freddick Woodson appeals the revocation of his probation for committing a new offense. The trial court sentenced him to five years in prison. We affirm. In doing so, we reject without discussion Mr. Wood-son’s suggestion that he was not properly advised of his probationary terms. See State v. Green, 667 So.2d 959, 960-61 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (holding that due process does not require defendant to receive verbal notice of standard probation conditions because all persons have constructive notice of states criminal statutes", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nJudge. Freddick Woodson appeals the revocation of his probation for committing a new offense. The trial court sentenced him to five years in prison. We affirm. In doing so, we reject without discussion Mr. Wood-son’s suggestion that he was not properly advised of his probationary terms. See State v. Green, 667 So.2d 959, 960-61 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (holding that alien need not receive actual notice for due process requirements to be satisfied", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nJudge. Freddick Woodson appeals the revocation of his probation for committing a new offense. The trial court sentenced him to five years in prison. We affirm. In doing so, we reject without discussion Mr. Wood-son’s suggestion that he was not properly advised of his probationary terms. See State v. Green, 667 So.2d 959, 960-61 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (holding that due process requires that notice be reasonably calculated under all circumstances to provide parties with notice of the pending action" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nfailure to respond to the court’s inquiry is not the only instance of abandonment. His counsel filed documents with the court just two days after Smart filed his request. This included an “Exhibit List” and “Defendant’s Witness List.” Additionally, Islas represented to the court that he was acting as Smart’s attorney. Cf. Brown, 665 F.2d at 612 (“The general rule is that a court may accept counsel’s representations and the defendant is bound thereby, except upon a showing of counsel’s bad faith or gross negligence.”). Though silence alone does not constitute waiver, silence in the face of contradictory intent to be represented by counsel generally indicates abandonment of the request to proceed pro se. See id. at 611-12; see also United States v. Long, 597 F.3d 720, 728 (5th Cir.2010) (holding petitioner cannot claim he was denied right to assistance of counsel when he knowingly and voluntarily decided to represent himself", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nfailure to respond to the court’s inquiry is not the only instance of abandonment. His counsel filed documents with the court just two days after Smart filed his request. This included an “Exhibit List” and “Defendant’s Witness List.” Additionally, Islas represented to the court that he was acting as Smart’s attorney. Cf. Brown, 665 F.2d at 612 (“The general rule is that a court may accept counsel’s representations and the defendant is bound thereby, except upon a showing of counsel’s bad faith or gross negligence.”). Though silence alone does not constitute waiver, silence in the face of contradictory intent to be represented by counsel generally indicates abandonment of the request to proceed pro se. See id. at 611-12; see also United States v. Long, 597 F.3d 720, 728 (5th Cir.2010) (holding that it was error for the trial judge to answer a jurys question without giving defendants counsel an opportunity to be heard before the trial judge responded", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nfailure to respond to the court’s inquiry is not the only instance of abandonment. His counsel filed documents with the court just two days after Smart filed his request. This included an “Exhibit List” and “Defendant’s Witness List.” Additionally, Islas represented to the court that he was acting as Smart’s attorney. Cf. Brown, 665 F.2d at 612 (“The general rule is that a court may accept counsel’s representations and the defendant is bound thereby, except upon a showing of counsel’s bad faith or gross negligence.”). Though silence alone does not constitute waiver, silence in the face of contradictory intent to be represented by counsel generally indicates abandonment of the request to proceed pro se. See id. at 611-12; see also United States v. Long, 597 F.3d 720, 728 (5th Cir.2010) (holding that a defendant in a state criminal trial has an independent constitutional right of selfrepresentation and that he may proceed to represent himself without counsel when he voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nfailure to respond to the court’s inquiry is not the only instance of abandonment. His counsel filed documents with the court just two days after Smart filed his request. This included an “Exhibit List” and “Defendant’s Witness List.” Additionally, Islas represented to the court that he was acting as Smart’s attorney. Cf. Brown, 665 F.2d at 612 (“The general rule is that a court may accept counsel’s representations and the defendant is bound thereby, except upon a showing of counsel’s bad faith or gross negligence.”). Though silence alone does not constitute waiver, silence in the face of contradictory intent to be represented by counsel generally indicates abandonment of the request to proceed pro se. See id. at 611-12; see also United States v. Long, 597 F.3d 720, 728 (5th Cir.2010) (holding that the district court did not err in continuing the trial without defendant when the trial had commenced in defendants presence he vigorously expressed his desire to be absent he was given ample opportunity to change his mind despite the disturbance he had created he had competent counsel and he knew of his right to be present", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nfailure to respond to the court’s inquiry is not the only instance of abandonment. His counsel filed documents with the court just two days after Smart filed his request. This included an “Exhibit List” and “Defendant’s Witness List.” Additionally, Islas represented to the court that he was acting as Smart’s attorney. Cf. Brown, 665 F.2d at 612 (“The general rule is that a court may accept counsel’s representations and the defendant is bound thereby, except upon a showing of counsel’s bad faith or gross negligence.”). Though silence alone does not constitute waiver, silence in the face of contradictory intent to be represented by counsel generally indicates abandonment of the request to proceed pro se. See id. at 611-12; see also United States v. Long, 597 F.3d 720, 728 (5th Cir.2010) (holding that defendant waived his right to selfrepresentation where he told the trial judge before trial that he did not want to represent himself and the public defender acted as counsel for the remainder of trial without objection" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nsufficient to render it liable to suit. Id. at 1385. We rejected this argument, instead defining maintain as \"keeping a constructed edifice, structure, or improvement in the same general state of being, repair, or efficiency as initially constructed.\" Id. at 1886. A failure to maintain a roadway therefore, \"is not a failure to keep a roadway in existence, but a failure to. restore a roadway to the state in which it was originally constructed.\" Id. In explaining our construction of the statute, we recognized that in 1992, to clarify the meaning of maintenance, the General Assembly added the following language to the definition of \"dangerous condition\": \"Maintenanée does not include any duty to upgrade, modernize, modify, or improve the design or construction of a facility.\" Id. at 1885 (holding the word individuals is not the equivalent of the dictionary acts use of the word persons", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nsufficient to render it liable to suit. Id. at 1385. We rejected this argument, instead defining maintain as \"keeping a constructed edifice, structure, or improvement in the same general state of being, repair, or efficiency as initially constructed.\" Id. at 1886. A failure to maintain a roadway therefore, \"is not a failure to keep a roadway in existence, but a failure to. restore a roadway to the state in which it was originally constructed.\" Id. In explaining our construction of the statute, we recognized that in 1992, to clarify the meaning of maintenance, the General Assembly added the following language to the definition of \"dangerous condition\": \"Maintenanée does not include any duty to upgrade, modernize, modify, or improve the design or construction of a facility.\" Id. at 1885 (holding that the word interest is to be understood in its ordinary senseto hold that congress intended to use the word in the sense of a penalty is contrary to all rules of interpretation and invokes a special definition of the word interest that is unwarranted citations omitted", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nsufficient to render it liable to suit. Id. at 1385. We rejected this argument, instead defining maintain as \"keeping a constructed edifice, structure, or improvement in the same general state of being, repair, or efficiency as initially constructed.\" Id. at 1886. A failure to maintain a roadway therefore, \"is not a failure to keep a roadway in existence, but a failure to. restore a roadway to the state in which it was originally constructed.\" Id. In explaining our construction of the statute, we recognized that in 1992, to clarify the meaning of maintenance, the General Assembly added the following language to the definition of \"dangerous condition\": \"Maintenanée does not include any duty to upgrade, modernize, modify, or improve the design or construction of a facility.\" Id. at 1885 (holding that the most common definition of a word does not preclude other accepted alternatives", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nsufficient to render it liable to suit. Id. at 1385. We rejected this argument, instead defining maintain as \"keeping a constructed edifice, structure, or improvement in the same general state of being, repair, or efficiency as initially constructed.\" Id. at 1886. A failure to maintain a roadway therefore, \"is not a failure to keep a roadway in existence, but a failure to. restore a roadway to the state in which it was originally constructed.\" Id. In explaining our construction of the statute, we recognized that in 1992, to clarify the meaning of maintenance, the General Assembly added the following language to the definition of \"dangerous condition\": \"Maintenanée does not include any duty to upgrade, modernize, modify, or improve the design or construction of a facility.\" Id. at 1885 (holding that purpose of the amendment was to clarify the definition of the word maintain", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nsufficient to render it liable to suit. Id. at 1385. We rejected this argument, instead defining maintain as \"keeping a constructed edifice, structure, or improvement in the same general state of being, repair, or efficiency as initially constructed.\" Id. at 1886. A failure to maintain a roadway therefore, \"is not a failure to keep a roadway in existence, but a failure to. restore a roadway to the state in which it was originally constructed.\" Id. In explaining our construction of the statute, we recognized that in 1992, to clarify the meaning of maintenance, the General Assembly added the following language to the definition of \"dangerous condition\": \"Maintenanée does not include any duty to upgrade, modernize, modify, or improve the design or construction of a facility.\" Id. at 1885 (holding that the word void is not sufficient" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nMotion that Figure 7 of the FAC contains an accurate version of the endorsement email. See ECF No. 42. 5 . Plaintiffs selectively quote this blog post in the FAC, but the Court takes judicial notice of the entire document, which is available at http://blog.linkedin.com/2009/03/27/how-to-report-abusive-behavior-on-linkedin/, because the document has been incorporated by reference into the FAC. See infra Section II.C. 6 . In addition, Plaintiffs attach two judicial documents (an order and a complaint) to their Request for Judicial Notice, though they do not explicitly request judicial notice of these documents. See ECF No. 25-2, Exs. E-F. The Court takes judicial notice of these documents. See Disabled Rights Action Comm. v. Las Vegas Events, Inc., 375 F.3d 861, 866 n. 1 (9th Cir.2004) (recognizing that a court may take judicial notice of court filings and other matters of public record", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nMotion that Figure 7 of the FAC contains an accurate version of the endorsement email. See ECF No. 42. 5 . Plaintiffs selectively quote this blog post in the FAC, but the Court takes judicial notice of the entire document, which is available at http://blog.linkedin.com/2009/03/27/how-to-report-abusive-behavior-on-linkedin/, because the document has been incorporated by reference into the FAC. See infra Section II.C. 6 . In addition, Plaintiffs attach two judicial documents (an order and a complaint) to their Request for Judicial Notice, though they do not explicitly request judicial notice of these documents. See ECF No. 25-2, Exs. E-F. The Court takes judicial notice of these documents. See Disabled Rights Action Comm. v. Las Vegas Events, Inc., 375 F.3d 861, 866 n. 1 (9th Cir.2004) (holding that undisputed matters of public record are proper subjects for judicial notice", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nMotion that Figure 7 of the FAC contains an accurate version of the endorsement email. See ECF No. 42. 5 . Plaintiffs selectively quote this blog post in the FAC, but the Court takes judicial notice of the entire document, which is available at http://blog.linkedin.com/2009/03/27/how-to-report-abusive-behavior-on-linkedin/, because the document has been incorporated by reference into the FAC. See infra Section II.C. 6 . In addition, Plaintiffs attach two judicial documents (an order and a complaint) to their Request for Judicial Notice, though they do not explicitly request judicial notice of these documents. See ECF No. 25-2, Exs. E-F. The Court takes judicial notice of these documents. See Disabled Rights Action Comm. v. Las Vegas Events, Inc., 375 F.3d 861, 866 n. 1 (9th Cir.2004) (holding that another courts decision is a proper subject of judicial notice", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nMotion that Figure 7 of the FAC contains an accurate version of the endorsement email. See ECF No. 42. 5 . Plaintiffs selectively quote this blog post in the FAC, but the Court takes judicial notice of the entire document, which is available at http://blog.linkedin.com/2009/03/27/how-to-report-abusive-behavior-on-linkedin/, because the document has been incorporated by reference into the FAC. See infra Section II.C. 6 . In addition, Plaintiffs attach two judicial documents (an order and a complaint) to their Request for Judicial Notice, though they do not explicitly request judicial notice of these documents. See ECF No. 25-2, Exs. E-F. The Court takes judicial notice of these documents. See Disabled Rights Action Comm. v. Las Vegas Events, Inc., 375 F.3d 861, 866 n. 1 (9th Cir.2004) (holding that the existence of prior convictions are typically matters of public record of which the trial court can take judicial notice without violating the defendants right to due process", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nMotion that Figure 7 of the FAC contains an accurate version of the endorsement email. See ECF No. 42. 5 . Plaintiffs selectively quote this blog post in the FAC, but the Court takes judicial notice of the entire document, which is available at http://blog.linkedin.com/2009/03/27/how-to-report-abusive-behavior-on-linkedin/, because the document has been incorporated by reference into the FAC. See infra Section II.C. 6 . In addition, Plaintiffs attach two judicial documents (an order and a complaint) to their Request for Judicial Notice, though they do not explicitly request judicial notice of these documents. See ECF No. 25-2, Exs. E-F. The Court takes judicial notice of these documents. See Disabled Rights Action Comm. v. Las Vegas Events, Inc., 375 F.3d 861, 866 n. 1 (9th Cir.2004) (holding that courts may take judicial notice of sec filings that are matters of public record" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\n84 S.Ct. 710, 725-26, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964). Moreover, she did not have to reach the question whether the media defendants’ actions were protected by a common law privilege for reporting official actions in the District. See Phillips, 424 A.2d at 88. 17 . The balance of the instruction explains what is meant by “publication of a statement\" and by a \"defamatory statement.” 18 . It is important to emphasize that we are taking no position on the question whether, in this context, expert testimony would be required if a party raised the point. We note, however, that there is nothing to prevent a person who acted in or observed the transactions or occurrences at issue from testifying as an expert on the applicable standard of care. See Adkins v. Morton, 494 A.2d 652, 656-57 (D.C.1985) (holding that a request for funds for expert testimony must show inter alia that the testimony is crucial and is subject to varying expert opinions", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\n84 S.Ct. 710, 725-26, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964). Moreover, she did not have to reach the question whether the media defendants’ actions were protected by a common law privilege for reporting official actions in the District. See Phillips, 424 A.2d at 88. 17 . The balance of the instruction explains what is meant by “publication of a statement\" and by a \"defamatory statement.” 18 . It is important to emphasize that we are taking no position on the question whether, in this context, expert testimony would be required if a party raised the point. We note, however, that there is nothing to prevent a person who acted in or observed the transactions or occurrences at issue from testifying as an expert on the applicable standard of care. See Adkins v. Morton, 494 A.2d 652, 656-57 (D.C.1985) (holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding testimony of mechanical engineer in products liability case involving automobile because expert did not have specific experience regarding subject matter of lawsuit", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\n84 S.Ct. 710, 725-26, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964). Moreover, she did not have to reach the question whether the media defendants’ actions were protected by a common law privilege for reporting official actions in the District. See Phillips, 424 A.2d at 88. 17 . The balance of the instruction explains what is meant by “publication of a statement\" and by a \"defamatory statement.” 18 . It is important to emphasize that we are taking no position on the question whether, in this context, expert testimony would be required if a party raised the point. We note, however, that there is nothing to prevent a person who acted in or observed the transactions or occurrences at issue from testifying as an expert on the applicable standard of care. See Adkins v. Morton, 494 A.2d 652, 656-57 (D.C.1985) (holding that an expert witnesss testimony on an ultimate issue was admissible recognizing that the expert did not specifically testify that the defendant was guilty or that as a matter of law the facts satisfied the applicable legal standard", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\n84 S.Ct. 710, 725-26, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964). Moreover, she did not have to reach the question whether the media defendants’ actions were protected by a common law privilege for reporting official actions in the District. See Phillips, 424 A.2d at 88. 17 . The balance of the instruction explains what is meant by “publication of a statement\" and by a \"defamatory statement.” 18 . It is important to emphasize that we are taking no position on the question whether, in this context, expert testimony would be required if a party raised the point. We note, however, that there is nothing to prevent a person who acted in or observed the transactions or occurrences at issue from testifying as an expert on the applicable standard of care. See Adkins v. Morton, 494 A.2d 652, 656-57 (D.C.1985) (holding that an expert may base his or her opinions and inferences on facts andor data perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing internal quotation marks omitted", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\n84 S.Ct. 710, 725-26, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964). Moreover, she did not have to reach the question whether the media defendants’ actions were protected by a common law privilege for reporting official actions in the District. See Phillips, 424 A.2d at 88. 17 . The balance of the instruction explains what is meant by “publication of a statement\" and by a \"defamatory statement.” 18 . It is important to emphasize that we are taking no position on the question whether, in this context, expert testimony would be required if a party raised the point. We note, however, that there is nothing to prevent a person who acted in or observed the transactions or occurrences at issue from testifying as an expert on the applicable standard of care. See Adkins v. Morton, 494 A.2d 652, 656-57 (D.C.1985) (holding that professional whose opinions about lawsuit are acquired as an actor or viewer with respect to transactions or occurrences that are part of the subject matter of the lawsuit may provide expert testimony without certification as expert under superctcivr 26b4" ]