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[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\ncontract balances on any of the above contracts.” D’s App. at 92-93. The Postal Service’s response, dated March 22, 1989, indicated that the Lake Worth contract should not be covered by the agreement and then stated that there should be further discussions on March 24, 1989 if this were unacceptable. D’s App. at 95. By letter dated April 4, 1989, Rodeo’s attorney notified USPS that ”[t]he [draft] mods are acceptable except that one element of the agreement that is important to Rodeo has been left out.\" D’s App. at 96. That element was that Rodeo would continue to be eligible for contracts with USPS. The modifications were executed on April 5, 1989 after they were amended to reflect this change. See supra note 5. 8 . See ARB, Inc. v. E-Sys., Inc., 663 F.2d 189, 198-99 (D.C.Cir.1980) (holding that integration clauses are to be given effect under ucc law and maryland common law", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\ncontract balances on any of the above contracts.” D’s App. at 92-93. The Postal Service’s response, dated March 22, 1989, indicated that the Lake Worth contract should not be covered by the agreement and then stated that there should be further discussions on March 24, 1989 if this were unacceptable. D’s App. at 95. By letter dated April 4, 1989, Rodeo’s attorney notified USPS that ”[t]he [draft] mods are acceptable except that one element of the agreement that is important to Rodeo has been left out.\" D’s App. at 96. That element was that Rodeo would continue to be eligible for contracts with USPS. The modifications were executed on April 5, 1989 after they were amended to reflect this change. See supra note 5. 8 . See ARB, Inc. v. E-Sys., Inc., 663 F.2d 189, 198-99 (D.C.Cir.1980) (holding that article 2 of the ucc preempts common law claims", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\ncontract balances on any of the above contracts.” D’s App. at 92-93. The Postal Service’s response, dated March 22, 1989, indicated that the Lake Worth contract should not be covered by the agreement and then stated that there should be further discussions on March 24, 1989 if this were unacceptable. D’s App. at 95. By letter dated April 4, 1989, Rodeo’s attorney notified USPS that ”[t]he [draft] mods are acceptable except that one element of the agreement that is important to Rodeo has been left out.\" D’s App. at 96. That element was that Rodeo would continue to be eligible for contracts with USPS. The modifications were executed on April 5, 1989 after they were amended to reflect this change. See supra note 5. 8 . See ARB, Inc. v. E-Sys., Inc., 663 F.2d 189, 198-99 (D.C.Cir.1980) (holding that article 4a of the ucc preempts common law claims where they are inconsistent or duplicative", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\ncontract balances on any of the above contracts.” D’s App. at 92-93. The Postal Service’s response, dated March 22, 1989, indicated that the Lake Worth contract should not be covered by the agreement and then stated that there should be further discussions on March 24, 1989 if this were unacceptable. D’s App. at 95. By letter dated April 4, 1989, Rodeo’s attorney notified USPS that ”[t]he [draft] mods are acceptable except that one element of the agreement that is important to Rodeo has been left out.\" D’s App. at 96. That element was that Rodeo would continue to be eligible for contracts with USPS. The modifications were executed on April 5, 1989 after they were amended to reflect this change. See supra note 5. 8 . See ARB, Inc. v. E-Sys., Inc., 663 F.2d 189, 198-99 (D.C.Cir.1980) (holding that acceleration clauses are quite common and are generally enforceable according to their terms", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\ncontract balances on any of the above contracts.” D’s App. at 92-93. The Postal Service’s response, dated March 22, 1989, indicated that the Lake Worth contract should not be covered by the agreement and then stated that there should be further discussions on March 24, 1989 if this were unacceptable. D’s App. at 95. By letter dated April 4, 1989, Rodeo’s attorney notified USPS that ”[t]he [draft] mods are acceptable except that one element of the agreement that is important to Rodeo has been left out.\" D’s App. at 96. That element was that Rodeo would continue to be eligible for contracts with USPS. The modifications were executed on April 5, 1989 after they were amended to reflect this change. See supra note 5. 8 . See ARB, Inc. v. E-Sys., Inc., 663 F.2d 189, 198-99 (D.C.Cir.1980) (holding that intent of parties to choice of law must be given effect" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nwhereas before ... they were exempt from the requirements of § 327. The difference is significant because § 327 authorizes the trustee to employ an attorney ‘with the court’s approval.’ ” Id. In Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 538-39, 124 S.Ct. 1023, 157 L.Ed.2d 1024 (2004), the Court succinctly stated: [W]e hold that § 330(a)(1) does not authorize compensation awards to debtors’ attorneys from estate funds, unless they are employed as authorized by § 327. If the attorney is to be paid from estate funds under § 330(a)(1) in a Chapter 7 case, he must be employed by the trustee and approved by the court. This reading of the statute shows “that the revised § 330 means what it says.” Weinschneider, 395 F.3d at 403; see also In re Oliver, 511 B.R. 556, 561-62 (Bankr. W.D.Wis.2014) (holding that where an attorney serves as trustee and attorney for the trustee in a bankruptcy proceeding the attorney must distinguish time spent in each role", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nwhereas before ... they were exempt from the requirements of § 327. The difference is significant because § 327 authorizes the trustee to employ an attorney ‘with the court’s approval.’ ” Id. In Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 538-39, 124 S.Ct. 1023, 157 L.Ed.2d 1024 (2004), the Court succinctly stated: [W]e hold that § 330(a)(1) does not authorize compensation awards to debtors’ attorneys from estate funds, unless they are employed as authorized by § 327. If the attorney is to be paid from estate funds under § 330(a)(1) in a Chapter 7 case, he must be employed by the trustee and approved by the court. This reading of the statute shows “that the revised § 330 means what it says.” Weinschneider, 395 F.3d at 403; see also In re Oliver, 511 B.R. 556, 561-62 (Bankr. W.D.Wis.2014) (holding that where the insurer retains an attorney to represent the insured pursuant to an insurance policy the attorney acts in the capacity of an independent contractor for the insured", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nwhereas before ... they were exempt from the requirements of § 327. The difference is significant because § 327 authorizes the trustee to employ an attorney ‘with the court’s approval.’ ” Id. In Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 538-39, 124 S.Ct. 1023, 157 L.Ed.2d 1024 (2004), the Court succinctly stated: [W]e hold that § 330(a)(1) does not authorize compensation awards to debtors’ attorneys from estate funds, unless they are employed as authorized by § 327. If the attorney is to be paid from estate funds under § 330(a)(1) in a Chapter 7 case, he must be employed by the trustee and approved by the court. This reading of the statute shows “that the revised § 330 means what it says.” Weinschneider, 395 F.3d at 403; see also In re Oliver, 511 B.R. 556, 561-62 (Bankr. W.D.Wis.2014) (holding the district courts conclusion that the attorney should receive no compensation was an abuse of discretion because we are confident that some legitimate time was expended by the attorney", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nwhereas before ... they were exempt from the requirements of § 327. The difference is significant because § 327 authorizes the trustee to employ an attorney ‘with the court’s approval.’ ” Id. In Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 538-39, 124 S.Ct. 1023, 157 L.Ed.2d 1024 (2004), the Court succinctly stated: [W]e hold that § 330(a)(1) does not authorize compensation awards to debtors’ attorneys from estate funds, unless they are employed as authorized by § 327. If the attorney is to be paid from estate funds under § 330(a)(1) in a Chapter 7 case, he must be employed by the trustee and approved by the court. This reading of the statute shows “that the revised § 330 means what it says.” Weinschneider, 395 F.3d at 403; see also In re Oliver, 511 B.R. 556, 561-62 (Bankr. W.D.Wis.2014) (holding that an attorney could not receive compensation from the estate pursuant to 330 because the chapter 7 trustee never sought to hire the attorney pursuant to 327 whose employment would have also required court approval", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nwhereas before ... they were exempt from the requirements of § 327. The difference is significant because § 327 authorizes the trustee to employ an attorney ‘with the court’s approval.’ ” Id. In Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 538-39, 124 S.Ct. 1023, 157 L.Ed.2d 1024 (2004), the Court succinctly stated: [W]e hold that § 330(a)(1) does not authorize compensation awards to debtors’ attorneys from estate funds, unless they are employed as authorized by § 327. If the attorney is to be paid from estate funds under § 330(a)(1) in a Chapter 7 case, he must be employed by the trustee and approved by the court. This reading of the statute shows “that the revised § 330 means what it says.” Weinschneider, 395 F.3d at 403; see also In re Oliver, 511 B.R. 556, 561-62 (Bankr. W.D.Wis.2014) (holding that an attorney approval clause in a contract for the sale of real estate was a part of that contract and would have to be satisfied for the underlying contract to be enforceable" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nbefore us, it would not salvage the day. There is nothing talismanic about the phrase “procedural harm.” A party claiming under that rúbric is not relieved from compliance with the actual injury requirement for standing. See, e.g., Munoz-Mendoza, 711 F.2d at 425-26 (requiring, as a precondition to standing, that plaintiffs who allege procedural harm also show “injury in fact”). Thus, one who asserts procedural harm as the basis for standing must set forth particulars that serve to indicate a distinct and palpable injury. Warth, 422 U.S. at 501, 95 S.Ct. at 2206. Put bluntly, a party must set forth a sufficient panoply of facts to show that his injury is real as opposed to being theoretical or abstract. See Capital Legal Found. v. Commodity Credit Corp., 711 F.2d 253, 258 (D.C.Cir.1983) (holding that hypothetical injury was insufficient for standing", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nbefore us, it would not salvage the day. There is nothing talismanic about the phrase “procedural harm.” A party claiming under that rúbric is not relieved from compliance with the actual injury requirement for standing. See, e.g., Munoz-Mendoza, 711 F.2d at 425-26 (requiring, as a precondition to standing, that plaintiffs who allege procedural harm also show “injury in fact”). Thus, one who asserts procedural harm as the basis for standing must set forth particulars that serve to indicate a distinct and palpable injury. Warth, 422 U.S. at 501, 95 S.Ct. at 2206. Put bluntly, a party must set forth a sufficient panoply of facts to show that his injury is real as opposed to being theoretical or abstract. See Capital Legal Found. v. Commodity Credit Corp., 711 F.2d 253, 258 (D.C.Cir.1983) (holding that to have standing a plaintiff must establish an injury in fact a casual connection between the injury and that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nbefore us, it would not salvage the day. There is nothing talismanic about the phrase “procedural harm.” A party claiming under that rúbric is not relieved from compliance with the actual injury requirement for standing. See, e.g., Munoz-Mendoza, 711 F.2d at 425-26 (requiring, as a precondition to standing, that plaintiffs who allege procedural harm also show “injury in fact”). Thus, one who asserts procedural harm as the basis for standing must set forth particulars that serve to indicate a distinct and palpable injury. Warth, 422 U.S. at 501, 95 S.Ct. at 2206. Put bluntly, a party must set forth a sufficient panoply of facts to show that his injury is real as opposed to being theoretical or abstract. See Capital Legal Found. v. Commodity Credit Corp., 711 F.2d 253, 258 (D.C.Cir.1983) (holding that allegation of procedural injury does not affect the issues of injury in fact or causation", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nbefore us, it would not salvage the day. There is nothing talismanic about the phrase “procedural harm.” A party claiming under that rúbric is not relieved from compliance with the actual injury requirement for standing. See, e.g., Munoz-Mendoza, 711 F.2d at 425-26 (requiring, as a precondition to standing, that plaintiffs who allege procedural harm also show “injury in fact”). Thus, one who asserts procedural harm as the basis for standing must set forth particulars that serve to indicate a distinct and palpable injury. Warth, 422 U.S. at 501, 95 S.Ct. at 2206. Put bluntly, a party must set forth a sufficient panoply of facts to show that his injury is real as opposed to being theoretical or abstract. See Capital Legal Found. v. Commodity Credit Corp., 711 F.2d 253, 258 (D.C.Cir.1983) (holding that because fact of injury was a distinct question from quantum of injury common proof could establish classwide injury even though amount of damage to each plaintiff was uncertain", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nbefore us, it would not salvage the day. There is nothing talismanic about the phrase “procedural harm.” A party claiming under that rúbric is not relieved from compliance with the actual injury requirement for standing. See, e.g., Munoz-Mendoza, 711 F.2d at 425-26 (requiring, as a precondition to standing, that plaintiffs who allege procedural harm also show “injury in fact”). Thus, one who asserts procedural harm as the basis for standing must set forth particulars that serve to indicate a distinct and palpable injury. Warth, 422 U.S. at 501, 95 S.Ct. at 2206. Put bluntly, a party must set forth a sufficient panoply of facts to show that his injury is real as opposed to being theoretical or abstract. See Capital Legal Found. v. Commodity Credit Corp., 711 F.2d 253, 258 (D.C.Cir.1983) (holding that a plaintiffs claim of injury stemming from alleged procedural harm is insufficient to ground standing where the harm is uncoupled from any injury in fact or tied only to an undifferentiated injury common to all members of the public" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nalleges that an unauthorized surgical procedure was performed, the burden is on plaintiff to prove that the operation that was performed was not authorized by him). In Appellants’ view, by proving that the “contact” or “touching” was not consented to, the patient establishes that it was “offensive,” which is sufficient to make the unauthorized surgery a de facto battery. Thus, they conclude, there is no need to instruct the jury on the elements of an “actual” battery. Appellants further argue that the trial court’s jury charge requiring proof of the surgeon’s intent to harm is inconsistent with well-settled case law establishing that a patient may pursue a claim for lack of consent even where no physical injury resulted from the unauthorized surgery. See Montgomery, 798 A.2d at 749 (holding that courts lack jurisdiction to address merits of a claim where party raising the claim is found to lack standing to maintain suit", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nalleges that an unauthorized surgical procedure was performed, the burden is on plaintiff to prove that the operation that was performed was not authorized by him). In Appellants’ view, by proving that the “contact” or “touching” was not consented to, the patient establishes that it was “offensive,” which is sufficient to make the unauthorized surgery a de facto battery. Thus, they conclude, there is no need to instruct the jury on the elements of an “actual” battery. Appellants further argue that the trial court’s jury charge requiring proof of the surgeon’s intent to harm is inconsistent with well-settled case law establishing that a patient may pursue a claim for lack of consent even where no physical injury resulted from the unauthorized surgery. See Montgomery, 798 A.2d at 749 (holding that a lack of consent claim is actionable even if the subject surgery was properly performed and the overall result is beneficial", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nalleges that an unauthorized surgical procedure was performed, the burden is on plaintiff to prove that the operation that was performed was not authorized by him). In Appellants’ view, by proving that the “contact” or “touching” was not consented to, the patient establishes that it was “offensive,” which is sufficient to make the unauthorized surgery a de facto battery. Thus, they conclude, there is no need to instruct the jury on the elements of an “actual” battery. Appellants further argue that the trial court’s jury charge requiring proof of the surgeon’s intent to harm is inconsistent with well-settled case law establishing that a patient may pursue a claim for lack of consent even where no physical injury resulted from the unauthorized surgery. See Montgomery, 798 A.2d at 749 (holding that lack of justiciable interest resulted in lack of standing to pursue claim and that lack of standing deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to act", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nalleges that an unauthorized surgical procedure was performed, the burden is on plaintiff to prove that the operation that was performed was not authorized by him). In Appellants’ view, by proving that the “contact” or “touching” was not consented to, the patient establishes that it was “offensive,” which is sufficient to make the unauthorized surgery a de facto battery. Thus, they conclude, there is no need to instruct the jury on the elements of an “actual” battery. Appellants further argue that the trial court’s jury charge requiring proof of the surgeon’s intent to harm is inconsistent with well-settled case law establishing that a patient may pursue a claim for lack of consent even where no physical injury resulted from the unauthorized surgery. See Montgomery, 798 A.2d at 749 (holding that lack of jurisdiction cannot be cured by consent", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nalleges that an unauthorized surgical procedure was performed, the burden is on plaintiff to prove that the operation that was performed was not authorized by him). In Appellants’ view, by proving that the “contact” or “touching” was not consented to, the patient establishes that it was “offensive,” which is sufficient to make the unauthorized surgery a de facto battery. Thus, they conclude, there is no need to instruct the jury on the elements of an “actual” battery. Appellants further argue that the trial court’s jury charge requiring proof of the surgeon’s intent to harm is inconsistent with well-settled case law establishing that a patient may pursue a claim for lack of consent even where no physical injury resulted from the unauthorized surgery. See Montgomery, 798 A.2d at 749 (holding that claim for sons suicide was not actionable" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfactors, the Burnet court relied on Snedigar, which had in turn relied on Associated Mortgage, 15 Wn. App. 223. The Snedigar court’s holding (with the Burnet court’s deletions italicized) is as follows: We . . . hold that when a trial judge chooses one of the harsher remedies allowable under CR 37(b), the reasons for that choice should he clearly stated on the record. We further hold that when the most severe sanction of default or dismissal is ordered, it must be apparent from the record that the trial court explicitly considered whether a lesser sanction would probably have sufficed, and whether it found the Associated Mortgage due process factors [of willfulness and substantial prejudice] to be present. 53 Wn. App. at 487 (emphasis added); Associated Mortgage, 15 Wn. App. at 228-29 (holding that a trial court had the authority to impose a default judgment as a sanction for violating a rule 16 scheduling order pursuant to rule 37b2 stating we agree with the basic premise that a default sanction can under certain circumstances be an appropriate response to a violation of a rule 16 order after all the express terms of rule 37 permit a trial court to impose sanctions when a party fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfactors, the Burnet court relied on Snedigar, which had in turn relied on Associated Mortgage, 15 Wn. App. 223. The Snedigar court’s holding (with the Burnet court’s deletions italicized) is as follows: We . . . hold that when a trial judge chooses one of the harsher remedies allowable under CR 37(b), the reasons for that choice should he clearly stated on the record. We further hold that when the most severe sanction of default or dismissal is ordered, it must be apparent from the record that the trial court explicitly considered whether a lesser sanction would probably have sufficed, and whether it found the Associated Mortgage due process factors [of willfulness and substantial prejudice] to be present. 53 Wn. App. at 487 (emphasis added); Associated Mortgage, 15 Wn. App. at 228-29 (holding that district courts order granting motion for default judgment was erroneous because a default judgment cannot be entered until the amount of damages has been ascertained ", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfactors, the Burnet court relied on Snedigar, which had in turn relied on Associated Mortgage, 15 Wn. App. 223. The Snedigar court’s holding (with the Burnet court’s deletions italicized) is as follows: We . . . hold that when a trial judge chooses one of the harsher remedies allowable under CR 37(b), the reasons for that choice should he clearly stated on the record. We further hold that when the most severe sanction of default or dismissal is ordered, it must be apparent from the record that the trial court explicitly considered whether a lesser sanction would probably have sufficed, and whether it found the Associated Mortgage due process factors [of willfulness and substantial prejudice] to be present. 53 Wn. App. at 487 (emphasis added); Associated Mortgage, 15 Wn. App. at 228-29 (holding that a postjudgment contempt sanction for refusal to obey orders whether it is characterized as a civil or a criminal sanction is immediately appealable as a final order under 1291", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfactors, the Burnet court relied on Snedigar, which had in turn relied on Associated Mortgage, 15 Wn. App. 223. The Snedigar court’s holding (with the Burnet court’s deletions italicized) is as follows: We . . . hold that when a trial judge chooses one of the harsher remedies allowable under CR 37(b), the reasons for that choice should he clearly stated on the record. We further hold that when the most severe sanction of default or dismissal is ordered, it must be apparent from the record that the trial court explicitly considered whether a lesser sanction would probably have sufficed, and whether it found the Associated Mortgage due process factors [of willfulness and substantial prejudice] to be present. 53 Wn. App. at 487 (emphasis added); Associated Mortgage, 15 Wn. App. at 228-29 (recognizing that courts have discretion to exclude evidence as a sanction for violation of a discovery order", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfactors, the Burnet court relied on Snedigar, which had in turn relied on Associated Mortgage, 15 Wn. App. 223. The Snedigar court’s holding (with the Burnet court’s deletions italicized) is as follows: We . . . hold that when a trial judge chooses one of the harsher remedies allowable under CR 37(b), the reasons for that choice should he clearly stated on the record. We further hold that when the most severe sanction of default or dismissal is ordered, it must be apparent from the record that the trial court explicitly considered whether a lesser sanction would probably have sufficed, and whether it found the Associated Mortgage due process factors [of willfulness and substantial prejudice] to be present. 53 Wn. App. at 487 (emphasis added); Associated Mortgage, 15 Wn. App. at 228-29 (holding that the sanction of a default judgment authorized by cr 37b2c is a harsh remedy which should only be granted where there has been a willful or deliberate refusal to obey a discovery order which refusal substantially prejudices the opponents ability to prepare for trial" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nPhillips, 807 So.2d at 718. Based on Blackshear, the gravity of appellant’s crimes, as well as the treatment of like juveniles, supports the imposition of appellant’s true life sentence premised on a Solem factor analysis. As such, similar to the defendant in Blackshear and based on the particular facts of this case, appellant’s sentence does not violate either the Florida or the United States Constitutions’ ban on cruel and unusual punishment. B. International treaty violation Appellant further asserts the imposition of such a sentence violates the ICCPR, an international treaty ratified by the United States in 1966. Even if appellant has standing to personally invoke the provisions of the ICCPR (compare Hanoch Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 517 F.Supp. 542, 545-47 (D.D.C.1981) (holding that defendant may be subject to death penalty on resentencing", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nPhillips, 807 So.2d at 718. Based on Blackshear, the gravity of appellant’s crimes, as well as the treatment of like juveniles, supports the imposition of appellant’s true life sentence premised on a Solem factor analysis. As such, similar to the defendant in Blackshear and based on the particular facts of this case, appellant’s sentence does not violate either the Florida or the United States Constitutions’ ban on cruel and unusual punishment. B. International treaty violation Appellant further asserts the imposition of such a sentence violates the ICCPR, an international treaty ratified by the United States in 1966. Even if appellant has standing to personally invoke the provisions of the ICCPR (compare Hanoch Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 517 F.Supp. 542, 545-47 (D.D.C.1981) (holding that the death penalty is unconstitutional as applied to juvenile defendants", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nPhillips, 807 So.2d at 718. Based on Blackshear, the gravity of appellant’s crimes, as well as the treatment of like juveniles, supports the imposition of appellant’s true life sentence premised on a Solem factor analysis. As such, similar to the defendant in Blackshear and based on the particular facts of this case, appellant’s sentence does not violate either the Florida or the United States Constitutions’ ban on cruel and unusual punishment. B. International treaty violation Appellant further asserts the imposition of such a sentence violates the ICCPR, an international treaty ratified by the United States in 1966. Even if appellant has standing to personally invoke the provisions of the ICCPR (compare Hanoch Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 517 F.Supp. 542, 545-47 (D.D.C.1981) (holding that leaning towards the death penalty is not the same as an automatic vote for the death penalty", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nPhillips, 807 So.2d at 718. Based on Blackshear, the gravity of appellant’s crimes, as well as the treatment of like juveniles, supports the imposition of appellant’s true life sentence premised on a Solem factor analysis. As such, similar to the defendant in Blackshear and based on the particular facts of this case, appellant’s sentence does not violate either the Florida or the United States Constitutions’ ban on cruel and unusual punishment. B. International treaty violation Appellant further asserts the imposition of such a sentence violates the ICCPR, an international treaty ratified by the United States in 1966. Even if appellant has standing to personally invoke the provisions of the ICCPR (compare Hanoch Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 517 F.Supp. 542, 545-47 (D.D.C.1981) (holding that the defendant lacked standing to challenge the death penalty based on the iccpr because treaties apply only to disputes between sovereign governments", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nPhillips, 807 So.2d at 718. Based on Blackshear, the gravity of appellant’s crimes, as well as the treatment of like juveniles, supports the imposition of appellant’s true life sentence premised on a Solem factor analysis. As such, similar to the defendant in Blackshear and based on the particular facts of this case, appellant’s sentence does not violate either the Florida or the United States Constitutions’ ban on cruel and unusual punishment. B. International treaty violation Appellant further asserts the imposition of such a sentence violates the ICCPR, an international treaty ratified by the United States in 1966. Even if appellant has standing to personally invoke the provisions of the ICCPR (compare Hanoch Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 517 F.Supp. 542, 545-47 (D.D.C.1981) (holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nStates v. Bowman, 634 F.3d 357, 360 (6th Cir.2011) (published opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted). “But because plea agreements’ constitutional and supervisory implications raise concerns over and above those present in the traditional contract context, in interpreting such agreements we hold the government to a greater degree of responsibility than the defendant ... for imprecisions or ambiguities in the plea agreements.” Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Ambiguities in a plea agreement are therefore construed against the government, especially because the government can take steps in drafting a plea agreement to avoid imprecision.” Id. (citing United States v. Fitch, 282 F.3d 364, 367-68 (6th Cir.2002)); see also Gordon, 480 F.3d at 1209-10 (holding that equitable restitution is available but that legal restitution is not", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nStates v. Bowman, 634 F.3d 357, 360 (6th Cir.2011) (published opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted). “But because plea agreements’ constitutional and supervisory implications raise concerns over and above those present in the traditional contract context, in interpreting such agreements we hold the government to a greater degree of responsibility than the defendant ... for imprecisions or ambiguities in the plea agreements.” Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Ambiguities in a plea agreement are therefore construed against the government, especially because the government can take steps in drafting a plea agreement to avoid imprecision.” Id. (citing United States v. Fitch, 282 F.3d 364, 367-68 (6th Cir.2002)); see also Gordon, 480 F.3d at 1209-10 (holding that where the government has not presented evidence at the hearing concerning the appropriate amount of restitution the imposition of the restitution order constitutes plain error", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nStates v. Bowman, 634 F.3d 357, 360 (6th Cir.2011) (published opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted). “But because plea agreements’ constitutional and supervisory implications raise concerns over and above those present in the traditional contract context, in interpreting such agreements we hold the government to a greater degree of responsibility than the defendant ... for imprecisions or ambiguities in the plea agreements.” Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Ambiguities in a plea agreement are therefore construed against the government, especially because the government can take steps in drafting a plea agreement to avoid imprecision.” Id. (citing United States v. Fitch, 282 F.3d 364, 367-68 (6th Cir.2002)); see also Gordon, 480 F.3d at 1209-10 (holding no restitution hearing is mandated when defendant did not object to order of restitution or request a hearing", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nStates v. Bowman, 634 F.3d 357, 360 (6th Cir.2011) (published opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted). “But because plea agreements’ constitutional and supervisory implications raise concerns over and above those present in the traditional contract context, in interpreting such agreements we hold the government to a greater degree of responsibility than the defendant ... for imprecisions or ambiguities in the plea agreements.” Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Ambiguities in a plea agreement are therefore construed against the government, especially because the government can take steps in drafting a plea agreement to avoid imprecision.” Id. (citing United States v. Fitch, 282 F.3d 364, 367-68 (6th Cir.2002)); see also Gordon, 480 F.3d at 1209-10 (holding that as a matter of contract interpretation a plea agreement permitting a court to impose a restitution order beyond that authorized by statute might well be unenforceable on grounds of public policy and that the defendant is entitled to presume when she entered the plea agreement that the judge would order restitution in a legal manner", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nStates v. Bowman, 634 F.3d 357, 360 (6th Cir.2011) (published opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted). “But because plea agreements’ constitutional and supervisory implications raise concerns over and above those present in the traditional contract context, in interpreting such agreements we hold the government to a greater degree of responsibility than the defendant ... for imprecisions or ambiguities in the plea agreements.” Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Ambiguities in a plea agreement are therefore construed against the government, especially because the government can take steps in drafting a plea agreement to avoid imprecision.” Id. (citing United States v. Fitch, 282 F.3d 364, 367-68 (6th Cir.2002)); see also Gordon, 480 F.3d at 1209-10 (holding that a district court may order restitution despite a settlement agreement" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nfailed in determining whether it breached the contract. Because “Question 1” submitted only a single theory of liability and the trial court did not otherwise instruct the jury to consider erroneous matters, we conclude that the trial court did not err by submitting an invalid theory of liability in “Question 1.” Cf. Bush, 122 S.W.3d at 857-58; Bed, Bath & Beyond, Inc., 211 S.W.3d at 757 (“When, as here, the broad-form questions submitted a single liability theory (negligence) to the jury, Casteel’s multiple-liability-theory analysis does not apply.”); Mustafa v. Matrut, No. 01-08-00985-CV, 2010 WL 1492419, at *4-5 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 15, 2010) (mem. op.), supplemented, No. 01-08-00985-CV, 2010 WL 1839944 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] May 6, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that evidence of nonpayment of salary and writing of bad checks did not result in submission of unpled theories of fraud liability where evidence supported pled fraud claim based on nonpayment of loan", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nfailed in determining whether it breached the contract. Because “Question 1” submitted only a single theory of liability and the trial court did not otherwise instruct the jury to consider erroneous matters, we conclude that the trial court did not err by submitting an invalid theory of liability in “Question 1.” Cf. Bush, 122 S.W.3d at 857-58; Bed, Bath & Beyond, Inc., 211 S.W.3d at 757 (“When, as here, the broad-form questions submitted a single liability theory (negligence) to the jury, Casteel’s multiple-liability-theory analysis does not apply.”); Mustafa v. Matrut, No. 01-08-00985-CV, 2010 WL 1492419, at *4-5 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 15, 2010) (mem. op.), supplemented, No. 01-08-00985-CV, 2010 WL 1839944 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] May 6, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that the submission of false information with regard to loan applications was not the result of spur of the moment conduct", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nfailed in determining whether it breached the contract. Because “Question 1” submitted only a single theory of liability and the trial court did not otherwise instruct the jury to consider erroneous matters, we conclude that the trial court did not err by submitting an invalid theory of liability in “Question 1.” Cf. Bush, 122 S.W.3d at 857-58; Bed, Bath & Beyond, Inc., 211 S.W.3d at 757 (“When, as here, the broad-form questions submitted a single liability theory (negligence) to the jury, Casteel’s multiple-liability-theory analysis does not apply.”); Mustafa v. Matrut, No. 01-08-00985-CV, 2010 WL 1492419, at *4-5 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 15, 2010) (mem. op.), supplemented, No. 01-08-00985-CV, 2010 WL 1839944 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] May 6, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that where an agent is guilty of independent fraud for his benefit knowledge of the fraud is not imputed to the principal", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nfailed in determining whether it breached the contract. Because “Question 1” submitted only a single theory of liability and the trial court did not otherwise instruct the jury to consider erroneous matters, we conclude that the trial court did not err by submitting an invalid theory of liability in “Question 1.” Cf. Bush, 122 S.W.3d at 857-58; Bed, Bath & Beyond, Inc., 211 S.W.3d at 757 (“When, as here, the broad-form questions submitted a single liability theory (negligence) to the jury, Casteel’s multiple-liability-theory analysis does not apply.”); Mustafa v. Matrut, No. 01-08-00985-CV, 2010 WL 1492419, at *4-5 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 15, 2010) (mem. op.), supplemented, No. 01-08-00985-CV, 2010 WL 1839944 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] May 6, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that defendant was not harmed by submission of invalid fraud claim", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nfailed in determining whether it breached the contract. Because “Question 1” submitted only a single theory of liability and the trial court did not otherwise instruct the jury to consider erroneous matters, we conclude that the trial court did not err by submitting an invalid theory of liability in “Question 1.” Cf. Bush, 122 S.W.3d at 857-58; Bed, Bath & Beyond, Inc., 211 S.W.3d at 757 (“When, as here, the broad-form questions submitted a single liability theory (negligence) to the jury, Casteel’s multiple-liability-theory analysis does not apply.”); Mustafa v. Matrut, No. 01-08-00985-CV, 2010 WL 1492419, at *4-5 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 15, 2010) (mem. op.), supplemented, No. 01-08-00985-CV, 2010 WL 1839944 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] May 6, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that fraud on the court must be supported by clear unequivocal and convincing evidence" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nexecutives, they were temporally remote from the decision to discharge Appellants, and completely unrelated to the investigation regarding Appellants’ violation of the EC Policy. Thus, the comments qualify as ‘stray remarks’ and are entitled to minimal weight.”); Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 545 (3d Cir.1992) (“Stray remarks ... by decisionmakers unrelated to the decision process are rarely given great weight, particularly if they were made temporally remote from the date of decision.”). Additionally, under Third Circuit precedent, a plaintiffs uncorroborated testimony about discriminatory treatment cannot — on its own — demonstrate invidious intent at the summary judgment stage. See Solomon v. Soc’y of Auto. Eng’rs, 41 Fed.Appx. 585, 586 (3d Cir.2002) (holding that plaintiffs negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims are not independent of the breach of contract claim and summary judgment is warranted on these claims", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nexecutives, they were temporally remote from the decision to discharge Appellants, and completely unrelated to the investigation regarding Appellants’ violation of the EC Policy. Thus, the comments qualify as ‘stray remarks’ and are entitled to minimal weight.”); Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 545 (3d Cir.1992) (“Stray remarks ... by decisionmakers unrelated to the decision process are rarely given great weight, particularly if they were made temporally remote from the date of decision.”). Additionally, under Third Circuit precedent, a plaintiffs uncorroborated testimony about discriminatory treatment cannot — on its own — demonstrate invidious intent at the summary judgment stage. See Solomon v. Soc’y of Auto. Eng’rs, 41 Fed.Appx. 585, 586 (3d Cir.2002) (holding that the court had an adequate record to grant the defendants motion for summary judgment because the relevant evidence would have been in plaintiffs possession", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nexecutives, they were temporally remote from the decision to discharge Appellants, and completely unrelated to the investigation regarding Appellants’ violation of the EC Policy. Thus, the comments qualify as ‘stray remarks’ and are entitled to minimal weight.”); Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 545 (3d Cir.1992) (“Stray remarks ... by decisionmakers unrelated to the decision process are rarely given great weight, particularly if they were made temporally remote from the date of decision.”). Additionally, under Third Circuit precedent, a plaintiffs uncorroborated testimony about discriminatory treatment cannot — on its own — demonstrate invidious intent at the summary judgment stage. See Solomon v. Soc’y of Auto. Eng’rs, 41 Fed.Appx. 585, 586 (3d Cir.2002) (holding summary judgment for the employer was warranted because the only evidence in support of plaintiffs claims was solomons own testimony", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nexecutives, they were temporally remote from the decision to discharge Appellants, and completely unrelated to the investigation regarding Appellants’ violation of the EC Policy. Thus, the comments qualify as ‘stray remarks’ and are entitled to minimal weight.”); Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 545 (3d Cir.1992) (“Stray remarks ... by decisionmakers unrelated to the decision process are rarely given great weight, particularly if they were made temporally remote from the date of decision.”). Additionally, under Third Circuit precedent, a plaintiffs uncorroborated testimony about discriminatory treatment cannot — on its own — demonstrate invidious intent at the summary judgment stage. See Solomon v. Soc’y of Auto. Eng’rs, 41 Fed.Appx. 585, 586 (3d Cir.2002) (holding in the alternative that summary judgment was warranted on abuse of process claim because defendants established probable cause to prosecute plaintiffs", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nexecutives, they were temporally remote from the decision to discharge Appellants, and completely unrelated to the investigation regarding Appellants’ violation of the EC Policy. Thus, the comments qualify as ‘stray remarks’ and are entitled to minimal weight.”); Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 545 (3d Cir.1992) (“Stray remarks ... by decisionmakers unrelated to the decision process are rarely given great weight, particularly if they were made temporally remote from the date of decision.”). Additionally, under Third Circuit precedent, a plaintiffs uncorroborated testimony about discriminatory treatment cannot — on its own — demonstrate invidious intent at the summary judgment stage. See Solomon v. Soc’y of Auto. Eng’rs, 41 Fed.Appx. 585, 586 (3d Cir.2002) (holding summary judgment was not warranted because material facts were in dispute" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n177-78, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 137 L.Ed.2d 281 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted): DHS’s policy of considering deterrence has profound and immediate consequences for Central American asylum seekers detained as a result. Relatedly, Defendants emphasize that Plaintiffs have failed to cite any statute, regulation, policy memoranda, or any other document memorializing the policy they challenge. See Def. Opp. & Mot. at 22. Agency action, however, need not be in writing to be final and judicially reviewable. See Venetian Casino Resort LLC v. EEOC, 530 F.3d 925, 929 (D.C.Cir.2008) (concluding that “the record” as a whole “leaves no doubt” that a policy exists, even though “the details ... are still unclear”); Grand Canyon Trust v. Pub. Serv. Co. of N.M., 283 F.Supp.2d 1249, 1252 (D.N.M.2003) (holding that pure issue of law is preserved by motion for summary judgment and is reviewable after final judgment", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n177-78, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 137 L.Ed.2d 281 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted): DHS’s policy of considering deterrence has profound and immediate consequences for Central American asylum seekers detained as a result. Relatedly, Defendants emphasize that Plaintiffs have failed to cite any statute, regulation, policy memoranda, or any other document memorializing the policy they challenge. See Def. Opp. & Mot. at 22. Agency action, however, need not be in writing to be final and judicially reviewable. See Venetian Casino Resort LLC v. EEOC, 530 F.3d 925, 929 (D.C.Cir.2008) (concluding that “the record” as a whole “leaves no doubt” that a policy exists, even though “the details ... are still unclear”); Grand Canyon Trust v. Pub. Serv. Co. of N.M., 283 F.Supp.2d 1249, 1252 (D.N.M.2003) (holding that a reviewable final order is necessary for subjectmatter jurisdiction", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n177-78, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 137 L.Ed.2d 281 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted): DHS’s policy of considering deterrence has profound and immediate consequences for Central American asylum seekers detained as a result. Relatedly, Defendants emphasize that Plaintiffs have failed to cite any statute, regulation, policy memoranda, or any other document memorializing the policy they challenge. See Def. Opp. & Mot. at 22. Agency action, however, need not be in writing to be final and judicially reviewable. See Venetian Casino Resort LLC v. EEOC, 530 F.3d 925, 929 (D.C.Cir.2008) (concluding that “the record” as a whole “leaves no doubt” that a policy exists, even though “the details ... are still unclear”); Grand Canyon Trust v. Pub. Serv. Co. of N.M., 283 F.Supp.2d 1249, 1252 (D.N.M.2003) (holding that both law and logic dictate that an unwritten agency policy is reviewable", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n177-78, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 137 L.Ed.2d 281 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted): DHS’s policy of considering deterrence has profound and immediate consequences for Central American asylum seekers detained as a result. Relatedly, Defendants emphasize that Plaintiffs have failed to cite any statute, regulation, policy memoranda, or any other document memorializing the policy they challenge. See Def. Opp. & Mot. at 22. Agency action, however, need not be in writing to be final and judicially reviewable. See Venetian Casino Resort LLC v. EEOC, 530 F.3d 925, 929 (D.C.Cir.2008) (concluding that “the record” as a whole “leaves no doubt” that a policy exists, even though “the details ... are still unclear”); Grand Canyon Trust v. Pub. Serv. Co. of N.M., 283 F.Supp.2d 1249, 1252 (D.N.M.2003) (holding an agency could not use a policy found in a departments employee manual as the rule of law to determine a contested issue because the agency never adopted a rule containing such a policy", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n177-78, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 137 L.Ed.2d 281 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted): DHS’s policy of considering deterrence has profound and immediate consequences for Central American asylum seekers detained as a result. Relatedly, Defendants emphasize that Plaintiffs have failed to cite any statute, regulation, policy memoranda, or any other document memorializing the policy they challenge. See Def. Opp. & Mot. at 22. Agency action, however, need not be in writing to be final and judicially reviewable. See Venetian Casino Resort LLC v. EEOC, 530 F.3d 925, 929 (D.C.Cir.2008) (concluding that “the record” as a whole “leaves no doubt” that a policy exists, even though “the details ... are still unclear”); Grand Canyon Trust v. Pub. Serv. Co. of N.M., 283 F.Supp.2d 1249, 1252 (D.N.M.2003) (holding that an arbitration award based on the conclusion that unappended waiver forms are unenforceable pursuant to public policy is not reviewable by the courts because as stated in schultz it is not based on an allegation that a specific provision in an insurance policy contravenes public policy" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nmedical records — was that the wear and tear on his discs was the result of his work activities. The dissent dismisses Anderson’s testimony because it was in response to “questions posed to Anderson ... phrased by Anderson’s employer using a disjunctive clause” — that is, whether Anderson’s work for Frontier Communications was “causing” or “aggravating” Anderson’s back problems. According to the dissent, “the fact that [Anderson] acknowledged that work may have aggravated his back pain does not mean that he also acknowledged that work caused his back injury.” But Anderson’s injuries were compensable, whether caused in the first instance by his work or whether his work merely aggravated a preexisting condition. See Gillette v. Harold Inc., 257 Minn. 313, 317, 101 N.W.2d 200, 204 (1960) (recognizing the natural consequences flowing from a compensable injury absent an independent intervening cause are compensable as well as the aggravation of a preexisting condition infirmity or disease by a workrelated injury", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nmedical records — was that the wear and tear on his discs was the result of his work activities. The dissent dismisses Anderson’s testimony because it was in response to “questions posed to Anderson ... phrased by Anderson’s employer using a disjunctive clause” — that is, whether Anderson’s work for Frontier Communications was “causing” or “aggravating” Anderson’s back problems. According to the dissent, “the fact that [Anderson] acknowledged that work may have aggravated his back pain does not mean that he also acknowledged that work caused his back injury.” But Anderson’s injuries were compensable, whether caused in the first instance by his work or whether his work merely aggravated a preexisting condition. See Gillette v. Harold Inc., 257 Minn. 313, 317, 101 N.W.2d 200, 204 (1960) (holding that when a preexisting infirmity is aggravated by repetitive minute trauma as a result of the ordinary and necessary duties of employment the disability resulting from such aggravation is compensable as a personal injury under the workers compensation statute", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nmedical records — was that the wear and tear on his discs was the result of his work activities. The dissent dismisses Anderson’s testimony because it was in response to “questions posed to Anderson ... phrased by Anderson’s employer using a disjunctive clause” — that is, whether Anderson’s work for Frontier Communications was “causing” or “aggravating” Anderson’s back problems. According to the dissent, “the fact that [Anderson] acknowledged that work may have aggravated his back pain does not mean that he also acknowledged that work caused his back injury.” But Anderson’s injuries were compensable, whether caused in the first instance by his work or whether his work merely aggravated a preexisting condition. See Gillette v. Harold Inc., 257 Minn. 313, 317, 101 N.W.2d 200, 204 (1960) (holding that the employees thirdparty tort claim stemming from the employees occupational disease does not accrue and the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the occupational disease begins to manifest itself", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nmedical records — was that the wear and tear on his discs was the result of his work activities. The dissent dismisses Anderson’s testimony because it was in response to “questions posed to Anderson ... phrased by Anderson’s employer using a disjunctive clause” — that is, whether Anderson’s work for Frontier Communications was “causing” or “aggravating” Anderson’s back problems. According to the dissent, “the fact that [Anderson] acknowledged that work may have aggravated his back pain does not mean that he also acknowledged that work caused his back injury.” But Anderson’s injuries were compensable, whether caused in the first instance by his work or whether his work merely aggravated a preexisting condition. See Gillette v. Harold Inc., 257 Minn. 313, 317, 101 N.W.2d 200, 204 (1960) (recognizing that a preexisting disease or infirmity of the employee does not disqualify a claim arising out of employment if the employment aggravated accelerated or combined with the disease or infirmity to produce disability for which compensation is sought", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nmedical records — was that the wear and tear on his discs was the result of his work activities. The dissent dismisses Anderson’s testimony because it was in response to “questions posed to Anderson ... phrased by Anderson’s employer using a disjunctive clause” — that is, whether Anderson’s work for Frontier Communications was “causing” or “aggravating” Anderson’s back problems. According to the dissent, “the fact that [Anderson] acknowledged that work may have aggravated his back pain does not mean that he also acknowledged that work caused his back injury.” But Anderson’s injuries were compensable, whether caused in the first instance by his work or whether his work merely aggravated a preexisting condition. See Gillette v. Harold Inc., 257 Minn. 313, 317, 101 N.W.2d 200, 204 (1960) (recognizing that an injury arises out of the employment relationship if it can be traced to the nature of employment or the workplace environment" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nStates v. Lalor, 996 F.2d 1578 (4th Cir.1993). See Opinion 2 (\"The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has stated that 'residential searches have been upheld only where some information links the criminal activity to the defendant’s residence.' ” (quoting Lalor, 996 F.2d at 1583)). In Lalor, we concluded that a search warrant for the defendant’s residence was not supported by probable cause. See 996 F.2d at 1583. In so doing, however, we distinguished Lalor’s case from prior ones, including Suarez and Williams, wherein the nexus between criminal activity and the targeted premises was based on evidence of the suspect’s drug traf ficking activities combined with the reasonable inference that drug-related evidence would be found in the suspect’s home. See id. at 1582-83 (holding a person at anothers residence solely for the purpose of engaging in drug related activity has no legitimate expectation of privacy in the residence", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nStates v. Lalor, 996 F.2d 1578 (4th Cir.1993). See Opinion 2 (\"The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has stated that 'residential searches have been upheld only where some information links the criminal activity to the defendant’s residence.' ” (quoting Lalor, 996 F.2d at 1583)). In Lalor, we concluded that a search warrant for the defendant’s residence was not supported by probable cause. See 996 F.2d at 1583. In so doing, however, we distinguished Lalor’s case from prior ones, including Suarez and Williams, wherein the nexus between criminal activity and the targeted premises was based on evidence of the suspect’s drug traf ficking activities combined with the reasonable inference that drug-related evidence would be found in the suspect’s home. See id. at 1582-83 (holding that there was sufficient probable cause to search a defendants residence after evidence of drug dealing was found in his car during a traffic stop that was conducted when the defendant was coming from his residence and noting that under such circumstances a practical commonsense conclusion could be made that the drugs and money had been at the defendants residence a short time before the stop", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nStates v. Lalor, 996 F.2d 1578 (4th Cir.1993). See Opinion 2 (\"The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has stated that 'residential searches have been upheld only where some information links the criminal activity to the defendant’s residence.' ” (quoting Lalor, 996 F.2d at 1583)). In Lalor, we concluded that a search warrant for the defendant’s residence was not supported by probable cause. See 996 F.2d at 1583. In so doing, however, we distinguished Lalor’s case from prior ones, including Suarez and Williams, wherein the nexus between criminal activity and the targeted premises was based on evidence of the suspect’s drug traf ficking activities combined with the reasonable inference that drug-related evidence would be found in the suspect’s home. See id. at 1582-83 (holding that the affidavit gave absolutely no indication that the fruits of criminal activity would probably be found at that location rendering the officers belief in probable cause based solely on the affidavit objectively unreasonable ", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nStates v. Lalor, 996 F.2d 1578 (4th Cir.1993). See Opinion 2 (\"The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has stated that 'residential searches have been upheld only where some information links the criminal activity to the defendant’s residence.' ” (quoting Lalor, 996 F.2d at 1583)). In Lalor, we concluded that a search warrant for the defendant’s residence was not supported by probable cause. See 996 F.2d at 1583. In so doing, however, we distinguished Lalor’s case from prior ones, including Suarez and Williams, wherein the nexus between criminal activity and the targeted premises was based on evidence of the suspect’s drug traf ficking activities combined with the reasonable inference that drug-related evidence would be found in the suspect’s home. See id. at 1582-83 (recognizing that in suarez residential search upheld based on officers reasoned belief that evidence of drug activity would be found at residence", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nStates v. Lalor, 996 F.2d 1578 (4th Cir.1993). See Opinion 2 (\"The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has stated that 'residential searches have been upheld only where some information links the criminal activity to the defendant’s residence.' ” (quoting Lalor, 996 F.2d at 1583)). In Lalor, we concluded that a search warrant for the defendant’s residence was not supported by probable cause. See 996 F.2d at 1583. In so doing, however, we distinguished Lalor’s case from prior ones, including Suarez and Williams, wherein the nexus between criminal activity and the targeted premises was based on evidence of the suspect’s drug traf ficking activities combined with the reasonable inference that drug-related evidence would be found in the suspect’s home. See id. at 1582-83 (holding that a warrant authorizing the search of a residence vehicles at the residence and all persons found in the residence was not overly broad given that search was limited to places were drugs or weapons might be found" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nimplies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences.”). Policymakers may act with an awareness of race — unaccompanied by a facial racial classification or a discriminatory purpose — without thereby subjecting the resultant policies to the rigors of strict constitutional scrutiny. The Supreme Court has specified that “race may be considered in certain circumstances and in a proper fashion .... [M]ere awareness of race in attempting to solve the problems facing inner cities does not doom that endeavor [to foster diversity and combat racial isolation] at the outset.” Tex. Dep’t Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmties. Project, — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2507, 2525, 192 L.Ed.2d 514 (2015); see Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 646, 113 S.Ct. 2816, 125 L.Ed.2d 511 (1993) (holding that the race of the prosecutor is irrelevant", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nimplies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences.”). Policymakers may act with an awareness of race — unaccompanied by a facial racial classification or a discriminatory purpose — without thereby subjecting the resultant policies to the rigors of strict constitutional scrutiny. The Supreme Court has specified that “race may be considered in certain circumstances and in a proper fashion .... [M]ere awareness of race in attempting to solve the problems facing inner cities does not doom that endeavor [to foster diversity and combat racial isolation] at the outset.” Tex. Dep’t Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmties. Project, — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2507, 2525, 192 L.Ed.2d 514 (2015); see Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 646, 113 S.Ct. 2816, 125 L.Ed.2d 511 (1993) (holding that a violation of 1981 requires purposeful race discrimination", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nimplies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences.”). Policymakers may act with an awareness of race — unaccompanied by a facial racial classification or a discriminatory purpose — without thereby subjecting the resultant policies to the rigors of strict constitutional scrutiny. The Supreme Court has specified that “race may be considered in certain circumstances and in a proper fashion .... [M]ere awareness of race in attempting to solve the problems facing inner cities does not doom that endeavor [to foster diversity and combat racial isolation] at the outset.” Tex. Dep’t Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmties. Project, — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2507, 2525, 192 L.Ed.2d 514 (2015); see Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 646, 113 S.Ct. 2816, 125 L.Ed.2d 511 (1993) (holding that more favorable treatment of similarly situated employees outside the race classification is required to make a prima facie race discrimination case", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nimplies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences.”). Policymakers may act with an awareness of race — unaccompanied by a facial racial classification or a discriminatory purpose — without thereby subjecting the resultant policies to the rigors of strict constitutional scrutiny. The Supreme Court has specified that “race may be considered in certain circumstances and in a proper fashion .... [M]ere awareness of race in attempting to solve the problems facing inner cities does not doom that endeavor [to foster diversity and combat racial isolation] at the outset.” Tex. Dep’t Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmties. Project, — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2507, 2525, 192 L.Ed.2d 514 (2015); see Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 646, 113 S.Ct. 2816, 125 L.Ed.2d 511 (1993) (recognizing that certain forms of race consciousness do not lead inevitably to impermissible race discrimination", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nimplies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences.”). Policymakers may act with an awareness of race — unaccompanied by a facial racial classification or a discriminatory purpose — without thereby subjecting the resultant policies to the rigors of strict constitutional scrutiny. The Supreme Court has specified that “race may be considered in certain circumstances and in a proper fashion .... [M]ere awareness of race in attempting to solve the problems facing inner cities does not doom that endeavor [to foster diversity and combat racial isolation] at the outset.” Tex. Dep’t Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmties. Project, — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2507, 2525, 192 L.Ed.2d 514 (2015); see Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 646, 113 S.Ct. 2816, 125 L.Ed.2d 511 (1993) (holding race and gender discrimination claim barred" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n” Citing United States v. Johnson, 909 F.2d 1517, 1519 (D.C.Cir. 1990). (Emphasis added.) In United States v. Woods, 568 F.2d 509 (6th Cir. 1978), the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals stated, regarding heroin possession: “[A]s long as the statute does not graduate the gravity of the crime of possession of heroin by the quantity possessed, we see no indication that Congress intended to permit a multiplication of the offenses of possession at any given time by a defendant upon evidence that the heroin may merely have been separately packaged or stashed. Woods, 568 F.2d at 513 (Emphasis added.). Woods also explains that the sentencing potentialities permit one conviction to accommodate an inclusive possession conviction. See also, United States v. Williams, 480 F.2d 1204 (6th Cir. 1973), (holding that 30 pallets were the cogsa packages where the bill of lading stated that there were 30 packages", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n” Citing United States v. Johnson, 909 F.2d 1517, 1519 (D.C.Cir. 1990). (Emphasis added.) In United States v. Woods, 568 F.2d 509 (6th Cir. 1978), the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals stated, regarding heroin possession: “[A]s long as the statute does not graduate the gravity of the crime of possession of heroin by the quantity possessed, we see no indication that Congress intended to permit a multiplication of the offenses of possession at any given time by a defendant upon evidence that the heroin may merely have been separately packaged or stashed. Woods, 568 F.2d at 513 (Emphasis added.). Woods also explains that the sentencing potentialities permit one conviction to accommodate an inclusive possession conviction. See also, United States v. Williams, 480 F.2d 1204 (6th Cir. 1973), (holding that statutory maximum is twenty years when drug quantity is not charged as element of offense and found by jury beyond a reasonable doubt", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n” Citing United States v. Johnson, 909 F.2d 1517, 1519 (D.C.Cir. 1990). (Emphasis added.) In United States v. Woods, 568 F.2d 509 (6th Cir. 1978), the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals stated, regarding heroin possession: “[A]s long as the statute does not graduate the gravity of the crime of possession of heroin by the quantity possessed, we see no indication that Congress intended to permit a multiplication of the offenses of possession at any given time by a defendant upon evidence that the heroin may merely have been separately packaged or stashed. Woods, 568 F.2d at 513 (Emphasis added.). Woods also explains that the sentencing potentialities permit one conviction to accommodate an inclusive possession conviction. See also, United States v. Williams, 480 F.2d 1204 (6th Cir. 1973), (holding separate convictions for drug transactions occurring four or five days apart were properly counted as separate convictions", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n” Citing United States v. Johnson, 909 F.2d 1517, 1519 (D.C.Cir. 1990). (Emphasis added.) In United States v. Woods, 568 F.2d 509 (6th Cir. 1978), the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals stated, regarding heroin possession: “[A]s long as the statute does not graduate the gravity of the crime of possession of heroin by the quantity possessed, we see no indication that Congress intended to permit a multiplication of the offenses of possession at any given time by a defendant upon evidence that the heroin may merely have been separately packaged or stashed. Woods, 568 F.2d at 513 (Emphasis added.). Woods also explains that the sentencing potentialities permit one conviction to accommodate an inclusive possession conviction. See also, United States v. Williams, 480 F.2d 1204 (6th Cir. 1973), (holding that prior drug convictions that were four ten and eleven years old were not so remote from the charged drug offenses as to render them inadmissible", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n” Citing United States v. Johnson, 909 F.2d 1517, 1519 (D.C.Cir. 1990). (Emphasis added.) In United States v. Woods, 568 F.2d 509 (6th Cir. 1978), the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals stated, regarding heroin possession: “[A]s long as the statute does not graduate the gravity of the crime of possession of heroin by the quantity possessed, we see no indication that Congress intended to permit a multiplication of the offenses of possession at any given time by a defendant upon evidence that the heroin may merely have been separately packaged or stashed. Woods, 568 F.2d at 513 (Emphasis added.). Woods also explains that the sentencing potentialities permit one conviction to accommodate an inclusive possession conviction. See also, United States v. Williams, 480 F.2d 1204 (6th Cir. 1973), (holding that only one offense should have been charged when four separate packages of the same drug were found" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nCir.1991), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1235, 111 S.Ct. 2863, 115 L.Ed.2d 1030 (1991); Wesson v. Oglesby, 910 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir.1990); Williams v. Luna, 909 F.2d 121, 123 (5th Cir.1990); Wilson v. Lynaugh, 878 F.2d 846, 849 (5th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 969, 110 S.Ct. 417, 107 L.Ed.2d 382 (1989); and Pugh v. Parish of St. Tammany, 875 F.2d 436, 438 (5th Cir.1989). 91 . See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. at 327, 109 S.Ct. at 1833. See also Krueger v. Reimer, 66 F.3d at 76-77, and Boyd v. Biggers, 31 F.3d at 284-85, (both upholding the dismissal as frivolous of civil rights lawsuits on the grounds that the defendants were entitled to absolute judicial and prosecutorial immunity). 92 . See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. at 327, 109 S.Ct. at 1833; Siglarv. Hightower, 112 F.3d at 193, (holding that emotional distress requires a showing of either physical symptoms or mental illness", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nCir.1991), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1235, 111 S.Ct. 2863, 115 L.Ed.2d 1030 (1991); Wesson v. Oglesby, 910 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir.1990); Williams v. Luna, 909 F.2d 121, 123 (5th Cir.1990); Wilson v. Lynaugh, 878 F.2d 846, 849 (5th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 969, 110 S.Ct. 417, 107 L.Ed.2d 382 (1989); and Pugh v. Parish of St. Tammany, 875 F.2d 436, 438 (5th Cir.1989). 91 . See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. at 327, 109 S.Ct. at 1833. See also Krueger v. Reimer, 66 F.3d at 76-77, and Boyd v. Biggers, 31 F.3d at 284-85, (both upholding the dismissal as frivolous of civil rights lawsuits on the grounds that the defendants were entitled to absolute judicial and prosecutorial immunity). 92 . See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. at 327, 109 S.Ct. at 1833; Siglarv. Hightower, 112 F.3d at 193, (holding that a state prisoner may not challenge the constitutionality of his conviction in a suit for damages under 42 usc 1983", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nCir.1991), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1235, 111 S.Ct. 2863, 115 L.Ed.2d 1030 (1991); Wesson v. Oglesby, 910 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir.1990); Williams v. Luna, 909 F.2d 121, 123 (5th Cir.1990); Wilson v. Lynaugh, 878 F.2d 846, 849 (5th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 969, 110 S.Ct. 417, 107 L.Ed.2d 382 (1989); and Pugh v. Parish of St. Tammany, 875 F.2d 436, 438 (5th Cir.1989). 91 . See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. at 327, 109 S.Ct. at 1833. See also Krueger v. Reimer, 66 F.3d at 76-77, and Boyd v. Biggers, 31 F.3d at 284-85, (both upholding the dismissal as frivolous of civil rights lawsuits on the grounds that the defendants were entitled to absolute judicial and prosecutorial immunity). 92 . See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. at 327, 109 S.Ct. at 1833; Siglarv. Hightower, 112 F.3d at 193, (holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc 1983", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nCir.1991), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1235, 111 S.Ct. 2863, 115 L.Ed.2d 1030 (1991); Wesson v. Oglesby, 910 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir.1990); Williams v. Luna, 909 F.2d 121, 123 (5th Cir.1990); Wilson v. Lynaugh, 878 F.2d 846, 849 (5th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 969, 110 S.Ct. 417, 107 L.Ed.2d 382 (1989); and Pugh v. Parish of St. Tammany, 875 F.2d 436, 438 (5th Cir.1989). 91 . See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. at 327, 109 S.Ct. at 1833. See also Krueger v. Reimer, 66 F.3d at 76-77, and Boyd v. Biggers, 31 F.3d at 284-85, (both upholding the dismissal as frivolous of civil rights lawsuits on the grounds that the defendants were entitled to absolute judicial and prosecutorial immunity). 92 . See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. at 327, 109 S.Ct. at 1833; Siglarv. Hightower, 112 F.3d at 193, (holding that under south dakota law compensation for negligent infliction of emotional distress requires manifestation of physical symptoms and intentional infliction of emotional distress requires an extreme disabling emotional response", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nCir.1991), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1235, 111 S.Ct. 2863, 115 L.Ed.2d 1030 (1991); Wesson v. Oglesby, 910 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir.1990); Williams v. Luna, 909 F.2d 121, 123 (5th Cir.1990); Wilson v. Lynaugh, 878 F.2d 846, 849 (5th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 969, 110 S.Ct. 417, 107 L.Ed.2d 382 (1989); and Pugh v. Parish of St. Tammany, 875 F.2d 436, 438 (5th Cir.1989). 91 . See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. at 327, 109 S.Ct. at 1833. See also Krueger v. Reimer, 66 F.3d at 76-77, and Boyd v. Biggers, 31 F.3d at 284-85, (both upholding the dismissal as frivolous of civil rights lawsuits on the grounds that the defendants were entitled to absolute judicial and prosecutorial immunity). 92 . See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. at 327, 109 S.Ct. at 1833; Siglarv. Hightower, 112 F.3d at 193, (holding that title 42 usc 1997ee requires proof of a physical injury before a prisoner can recover for emotional or mental distress and that verbal abuse is not actionable under section 1983" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\ncannot deny authorization of a [nonmember PCP] based on past practices.” Former OAR 436-015-0070(2) (2002). Managed Healthcare does not challenge DCBS’s general authority to adopt the rule at issue. See ORS 656.726(4)(a) (providing that DCBS director may “[m]ake and declare all rules and issue orders which are reasonably required in the performance of the director’s duties”). Neither does Managed Healthcare contend that DCBS adopted the rule without complying with the applicable rulemaking procedures. Instead, and as noted above, Managed Healthcare argues only that DCBS exceeded its statutory authority by adopting an otherwise valid rule that conflicts with clearly stated statutory policy. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Assn. v. Dept. of Human Res., 297 Or 562, 573, 687 P2d 785 (1984) (holding that ors 30905 did not make ors 12250 applicable to claims brought under that statute because ors 12250 applies only to limitations contained in ors chapter 12", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\ncannot deny authorization of a [nonmember PCP] based on past practices.” Former OAR 436-015-0070(2) (2002). Managed Healthcare does not challenge DCBS’s general authority to adopt the rule at issue. See ORS 656.726(4)(a) (providing that DCBS director may “[m]ake and declare all rules and issue orders which are reasonably required in the performance of the director’s duties”). Neither does Managed Healthcare contend that DCBS adopted the rule without complying with the applicable rulemaking procedures. Instead, and as noted above, Managed Healthcare argues only that DCBS exceeded its statutory authority by adopting an otherwise valid rule that conflicts with clearly stated statutory policy. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Assn. v. Dept. of Human Res., 297 Or 562, 573, 687 P2d 785 (1984) (recognizing that basis for challenging administrative rule under ors 1834004b", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\ncannot deny authorization of a [nonmember PCP] based on past practices.” Former OAR 436-015-0070(2) (2002). Managed Healthcare does not challenge DCBS’s general authority to adopt the rule at issue. See ORS 656.726(4)(a) (providing that DCBS director may “[m]ake and declare all rules and issue orders which are reasonably required in the performance of the director’s duties”). Neither does Managed Healthcare contend that DCBS adopted the rule without complying with the applicable rulemaking procedures. Instead, and as noted above, Managed Healthcare argues only that DCBS exceeded its statutory authority by adopting an otherwise valid rule that conflicts with clearly stated statutory policy. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Assn. v. Dept. of Human Res., 297 Or 562, 573, 687 P2d 785 (1984) (recognizing this rule", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\ncannot deny authorization of a [nonmember PCP] based on past practices.” Former OAR 436-015-0070(2) (2002). Managed Healthcare does not challenge DCBS’s general authority to adopt the rule at issue. See ORS 656.726(4)(a) (providing that DCBS director may “[m]ake and declare all rules and issue orders which are reasonably required in the performance of the director’s duties”). Neither does Managed Healthcare contend that DCBS adopted the rule without complying with the applicable rulemaking procedures. Instead, and as noted above, Managed Healthcare argues only that DCBS exceeded its statutory authority by adopting an otherwise valid rule that conflicts with clearly stated statutory policy. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Assn. v. Dept. of Human Res., 297 Or 562, 573, 687 P2d 785 (1984) (recognizing general rule", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\ncannot deny authorization of a [nonmember PCP] based on past practices.” Former OAR 436-015-0070(2) (2002). Managed Healthcare does not challenge DCBS’s general authority to adopt the rule at issue. See ORS 656.726(4)(a) (providing that DCBS director may “[m]ake and declare all rules and issue orders which are reasonably required in the performance of the director’s duties”). Neither does Managed Healthcare contend that DCBS adopted the rule without complying with the applicable rulemaking procedures. Instead, and as noted above, Managed Healthcare argues only that DCBS exceeded its statutory authority by adopting an otherwise valid rule that conflicts with clearly stated statutory policy. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Assn. v. Dept. of Human Res., 297 Or 562, 573, 687 P2d 785 (1984) (recognizing rule" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nconduct at issue); Kari v. City of Maplewood, 582 N.W.2d 921, 923 (Minn.1998) (distinguishing discretionary from ministerial acts). The specific conduct Pahnke complained of is Deputy Sass’s order to leave her apartment immediately despite the fact that Pahnke presented him with notice of what she urges is her statutory right to a 24-hour deadline for removal. The district court found that both Sass and Har-grove served the notice and removed Pahnke from the apartment, and Officer Hargrove does not contend that this finding is erroneous. It is the immediacy of Pahnke’s removal by the offi y requiring officers to use red lights and siren “in a continuous manner” during vehicular pursuit imposed a ministerial duty); Brown v. City of Bloomington, 706 N.W.2d 519, 523-24 (Minn.App.2005) (holding that the relationship between fire insurance regulation and rating fire loss fire prevention and fire investigation is rational and reasonable", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nconduct at issue); Kari v. City of Maplewood, 582 N.W.2d 921, 923 (Minn.1998) (distinguishing discretionary from ministerial acts). The specific conduct Pahnke complained of is Deputy Sass’s order to leave her apartment immediately despite the fact that Pahnke presented him with notice of what she urges is her statutory right to a 24-hour deadline for removal. The district court found that both Sass and Har-grove served the notice and removed Pahnke from the apartment, and Officer Hargrove does not contend that this finding is erroneous. It is the immediacy of Pahnke’s removal by the offi y requiring officers to use red lights and siren “in a continuous manner” during vehicular pursuit imposed a ministerial duty); Brown v. City of Bloomington, 706 N.W.2d 519, 523-24 (Minn.App.2005) (holding that it was plain error for trial court to allow more than one conviction of grossly negligent operation of a vehicle where more than one person was injured", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nconduct at issue); Kari v. City of Maplewood, 582 N.W.2d 921, 923 (Minn.1998) (distinguishing discretionary from ministerial acts). The specific conduct Pahnke complained of is Deputy Sass’s order to leave her apartment immediately despite the fact that Pahnke presented him with notice of what she urges is her statutory right to a 24-hour deadline for removal. The district court found that both Sass and Har-grove served the notice and removed Pahnke from the apartment, and Officer Hargrove does not contend that this finding is erroneous. It is the immediacy of Pahnke’s removal by the offi y requiring officers to use red lights and siren “in a continuous manner” during vehicular pursuit imposed a ministerial duty); Brown v. City of Bloomington, 706 N.W.2d 519, 523-24 (Minn.App.2005) (holding that the public duty doctrine applied to claims against the town and fire chief for negligence in responding to a fire call although plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to show the special duty exception applied", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nconduct at issue); Kari v. City of Maplewood, 582 N.W.2d 921, 923 (Minn.1998) (distinguishing discretionary from ministerial acts). The specific conduct Pahnke complained of is Deputy Sass’s order to leave her apartment immediately despite the fact that Pahnke presented him with notice of what she urges is her statutory right to a 24-hour deadline for removal. The district court found that both Sass and Har-grove served the notice and removed Pahnke from the apartment, and Officer Hargrove does not contend that this finding is erroneous. It is the immediacy of Pahnke’s removal by the offi y requiring officers to use red lights and siren “in a continuous manner” during vehicular pursuit imposed a ministerial duty); Brown v. City of Bloomington, 706 N.W.2d 519, 523-24 (Minn.App.2005) (holding that more than notice to a defendant is required", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nconduct at issue); Kari v. City of Maplewood, 582 N.W.2d 921, 923 (Minn.1998) (distinguishing discretionary from ministerial acts). The specific conduct Pahnke complained of is Deputy Sass’s order to leave her apartment immediately despite the fact that Pahnke presented him with notice of what she urges is her statutory right to a 24-hour deadline for removal. The district court found that both Sass and Har-grove served the notice and removed Pahnke from the apartment, and Officer Hargrove does not contend that this finding is erroneous. It is the immediacy of Pahnke’s removal by the offi y requiring officers to use red lights and siren “in a continuous manner” during vehicular pursuit imposed a ministerial duty); Brown v. City of Bloomington, 706 N.W.2d 519, 523-24 (Minn.App.2005) (holding that officers decisions to use lesslethal ammunition and to fire more than one round were discretionary but that departments procedure for making transition from lethal to lesslethal shells when loading weapon imposed a ministerial duty" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\non appeal, therefore, turns on the legal question of the burden of proof. We review questions of law de novo. See Housing Fin. & Dev. Corp. v. Fe cts Liability § 8.04[7][b], at 8-228-27 (rev. ed.1999): As a practical matter, ... in most strict liability lawsuits, in most jurisdictions, whether or not there was a substantial change in the condition in the product is a non-issue. The product under consideration may be brand new, its very nature will obviate (Mo.Ct.App.1992) (affirming summary judgment because plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the allegedly defective transmission had not been somehow replaced or substantially changed over the life of the automobile); Humphreys v. General Motors Corp., 839 F.Supp. 822, 827-28 & n. 6 (N.D.Fla.1993), aff'd, 47 F.3d 430 (11th Cir.1995) (holding that once the defendant has submitted to the control of the officer and the process of taking him or her to the police station has commenced his or her arrest is complete and he or she is in custody for the purposes of the escape statute", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\non appeal, therefore, turns on the legal question of the burden of proof. We review questions of law de novo. See Housing Fin. & Dev. Corp. v. Fe cts Liability § 8.04[7][b], at 8-228-27 (rev. ed.1999): As a practical matter, ... in most strict liability lawsuits, in most jurisdictions, whether or not there was a substantial change in the condition in the product is a non-issue. The product under consideration may be brand new, its very nature will obviate (Mo.Ct.App.1992) (affirming summary judgment because plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the allegedly defective transmission had not been somehow replaced or substantially changed over the life of the automobile); Humphreys v. General Motors Corp., 839 F.Supp. 822, 827-28 & n. 6 (N.D.Fla.1993), aff'd, 47 F.3d 430 (11th Cir.1995) (holding that threatening employee to mind her own business investigating her videotaping her without her permission and forcing her to take polygraph could not be considered adverse employment actions because they had no effect on conditions of employment", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\non appeal, therefore, turns on the legal question of the burden of proof. We review questions of law de novo. See Housing Fin. & Dev. Corp. v. Fe cts Liability § 8.04[7][b], at 8-228-27 (rev. ed.1999): As a practical matter, ... in most strict liability lawsuits, in most jurisdictions, whether or not there was a substantial change in the condition in the product is a non-issue. The product under consideration may be brand new, its very nature will obviate (Mo.Ct.App.1992) (affirming summary judgment because plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the allegedly defective transmission had not been somehow replaced or substantially changed over the life of the automobile); Humphreys v. General Motors Corp., 839 F.Supp. 822, 827-28 & n. 6 (N.D.Fla.1993), aff'd, 47 F.3d 430 (11th Cir.1995) (holding that for a legal malpractice claim to accrue a plaintiff need not know the precise extent of his or her damages or even have suffered all of the damages attributable to his or her attorneys negligence", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\non appeal, therefore, turns on the legal question of the burden of proof. We review questions of law de novo. See Housing Fin. & Dev. Corp. v. Fe cts Liability § 8.04[7][b], at 8-228-27 (rev. ed.1999): As a practical matter, ... in most strict liability lawsuits, in most jurisdictions, whether or not there was a substantial change in the condition in the product is a non-issue. The product under consideration may be brand new, its very nature will obviate (Mo.Ct.App.1992) (affirming summary judgment because plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the allegedly defective transmission had not been somehow replaced or substantially changed over the life of the automobile); Humphreys v. General Motors Corp., 839 F.Supp. 822, 827-28 & n. 6 (N.D.Fla.1993), aff'd, 47 F.3d 430 (11th Cir.1995) (holding that plaintiff must on his or her own initiative prove that the product reached him or her without substantial change", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\non appeal, therefore, turns on the legal question of the burden of proof. We review questions of law de novo. See Housing Fin. & Dev. Corp. v. Fe cts Liability § 8.04[7][b], at 8-228-27 (rev. ed.1999): As a practical matter, ... in most strict liability lawsuits, in most jurisdictions, whether or not there was a substantial change in the condition in the product is a non-issue. The product under consideration may be brand new, its very nature will obviate (Mo.Ct.App.1992) (affirming summary judgment because plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the allegedly defective transmission had not been somehow replaced or substantially changed over the life of the automobile); Humphreys v. General Motors Corp., 839 F.Supp. 822, 827-28 & n. 6 (N.D.Fla.1993), aff'd, 47 F.3d 430 (11th Cir.1995) (holding that counsel cannot raise his or her own ineffectiveness" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nkeep an accurate record of these funds. Due to the nature of the position, the treasurer is in a unique position to monitor the financial affairs of the tribe and is more likely to discover improprieties as they arise. Moreover, as a member of the tribal council, the treasurer is charged with the duty of “safeguarding] and promot[ing] the peace, safety, morals, and general welfare” of the tribe. Informing tribal members of financial matters of tribal concern is consistent with the tribe’s sovereign power and that treasurer’s duty. Because there is no factual issue about the tribe’s duty to safeguard and promote the tribe, we conclude that Johnson had the authority to send the newsletters. See Diver v. Peterson, 524 N.W.2d 288, 290 (Minn.App.1994), review denied (Minn. Feb. 14, 1995) (holding that disputes involving questions of interpretation of a tribal constitution and tribal law is not within the jurisdiction of the district court", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nkeep an accurate record of these funds. Due to the nature of the position, the treasurer is in a unique position to monitor the financial affairs of the tribe and is more likely to discover improprieties as they arise. Moreover, as a member of the tribal council, the treasurer is charged with the duty of “safeguarding] and promot[ing] the peace, safety, morals, and general welfare” of the tribe. Informing tribal members of financial matters of tribal concern is consistent with the tribe’s sovereign power and that treasurer’s duty. Because there is no factual issue about the tribe’s duty to safeguard and promote the tribe, we conclude that Johnson had the authority to send the newsletters. See Diver v. Peterson, 524 N.W.2d 288, 290 (Minn.App.1994), review denied (Minn. Feb. 14, 1995) (holding that acoma tribal law was the law of the place because the tribal court could have jurisdiction over the plaintiffs claim", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nkeep an accurate record of these funds. Due to the nature of the position, the treasurer is in a unique position to monitor the financial affairs of the tribe and is more likely to discover improprieties as they arise. Moreover, as a member of the tribal council, the treasurer is charged with the duty of “safeguarding] and promot[ing] the peace, safety, morals, and general welfare” of the tribe. Informing tribal members of financial matters of tribal concern is consistent with the tribe’s sovereign power and that treasurer’s duty. Because there is no factual issue about the tribe’s duty to safeguard and promote the tribe, we conclude that Johnson had the authority to send the newsletters. See Diver v. Peterson, 524 N.W.2d 288, 290 (Minn.App.1994), review denied (Minn. Feb. 14, 1995) (holding that federal courts do not have jurisdiction to interpret a tribal constitution or tribal laws", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nkeep an accurate record of these funds. Due to the nature of the position, the treasurer is in a unique position to monitor the financial affairs of the tribe and is more likely to discover improprieties as they arise. Moreover, as a member of the tribal council, the treasurer is charged with the duty of “safeguarding] and promot[ing] the peace, safety, morals, and general welfare” of the tribe. Informing tribal members of financial matters of tribal concern is consistent with the tribe’s sovereign power and that treasurer’s duty. Because there is no factual issue about the tribe’s duty to safeguard and promote the tribe, we conclude that Johnson had the authority to send the newsletters. See Diver v. Peterson, 524 N.W.2d 288, 290 (Minn.App.1994), review denied (Minn. Feb. 14, 1995) (holding that tribal attorney acted within the scope of his authority in making comments in newspaper and on television regarding the reasons for terminating tribal employees despite the fact that no lawsuit was currently pending because it was his duty to make public statements on internal tribal affairs", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nkeep an accurate record of these funds. Due to the nature of the position, the treasurer is in a unique position to monitor the financial affairs of the tribe and is more likely to discover improprieties as they arise. Moreover, as a member of the tribal council, the treasurer is charged with the duty of “safeguarding] and promot[ing] the peace, safety, morals, and general welfare” of the tribe. Informing tribal members of financial matters of tribal concern is consistent with the tribe’s sovereign power and that treasurer’s duty. Because there is no factual issue about the tribe’s duty to safeguard and promote the tribe, we conclude that Johnson had the authority to send the newsletters. See Diver v. Peterson, 524 N.W.2d 288, 290 (Minn.App.1994), review denied (Minn. Feb. 14, 1995) (holding that a tribal housing authority established by tribal council pursuant to its powers of selfgovernment was a tribal agency rather than a separate corporate entity created by the tribe" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthat he was responsible. Our conclusion that the district judge did not violate Rule 11 and that Lucas’s guilty plea was valid does not dispose of this issue, because Apprendi applies to cases on direct review involving sentences imposed before Apprendi was decided. See United States v. Flowal, 234 F.3d 932, 936 (6th Cir.2000) (applying Apprendi where the district court sentenced the defendant before Apprendi was decided). We must therefore determine whether Lucas’s sentence of 210 months (17.5 years) in prison and a five-year term of supervised release withstands review under Ap-prendi. If Lucas had admitted responsibility for either the 595.8 grams of crack cocaine that the district court attributed to him, or the 54.2 grams that were in Horton’s car when Lucas -52 (6th Cir.2001) (holding that the defendants sentence did not violate apprendi where the actual sentence imposed did not exceed the maximum penalty corresponding to the quantity of drugs for which the defendant acknowledged responsibility nor was the sentence at the bottom end of a higher statutory range of penalties", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthat he was responsible. Our conclusion that the district judge did not violate Rule 11 and that Lucas’s guilty plea was valid does not dispose of this issue, because Apprendi applies to cases on direct review involving sentences imposed before Apprendi was decided. See United States v. Flowal, 234 F.3d 932, 936 (6th Cir.2000) (applying Apprendi where the district court sentenced the defendant before Apprendi was decided). We must therefore determine whether Lucas’s sentence of 210 months (17.5 years) in prison and a five-year term of supervised release withstands review under Ap-prendi. If Lucas had admitted responsibility for either the 595.8 grams of crack cocaine that the district court attributed to him, or the 54.2 grams that were in Horton’s car when Lucas -52 (6th Cir.2001) (holding that the defendants rights under apprendi were violated where the sentence was at the mandatory minimum for the judgedetermined drug quantity and the judge felt constrained by the statute to impose this sentence", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthat he was responsible. Our conclusion that the district judge did not violate Rule 11 and that Lucas’s guilty plea was valid does not dispose of this issue, because Apprendi applies to cases on direct review involving sentences imposed before Apprendi was decided. See United States v. Flowal, 234 F.3d 932, 936 (6th Cir.2000) (applying Apprendi where the district court sentenced the defendant before Apprendi was decided). We must therefore determine whether Lucas’s sentence of 210 months (17.5 years) in prison and a five-year term of supervised release withstands review under Ap-prendi. If Lucas had admitted responsibility for either the 595.8 grams of crack cocaine that the district court attributed to him, or the 54.2 grams that were in Horton’s car when Lucas -52 (6th Cir.2001) (holding that even if the minimum mandatory exceeds the statutory maximum the court must impose the minimum mandatory", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthat he was responsible. Our conclusion that the district judge did not violate Rule 11 and that Lucas’s guilty plea was valid does not dispose of this issue, because Apprendi applies to cases on direct review involving sentences imposed before Apprendi was decided. See United States v. Flowal, 234 F.3d 932, 936 (6th Cir.2000) (applying Apprendi where the district court sentenced the defendant before Apprendi was decided). We must therefore determine whether Lucas’s sentence of 210 months (17.5 years) in prison and a five-year term of supervised release withstands review under Ap-prendi. If Lucas had admitted responsibility for either the 595.8 grams of crack cocaine that the district court attributed to him, or the 54.2 grams that were in Horton’s car when Lucas -52 (6th Cir.2001) (holding where the statutory minimum sentence exceeds the guidelines sentence a substantialassistance downward departure begins at the mandatory minimum sentence", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthat he was responsible. Our conclusion that the district judge did not violate Rule 11 and that Lucas’s guilty plea was valid does not dispose of this issue, because Apprendi applies to cases on direct review involving sentences imposed before Apprendi was decided. See United States v. Flowal, 234 F.3d 932, 936 (6th Cir.2000) (applying Apprendi where the district court sentenced the defendant before Apprendi was decided). We must therefore determine whether Lucas’s sentence of 210 months (17.5 years) in prison and a five-year term of supervised release withstands review under Ap-prendi. If Lucas had admitted responsibility for either the 595.8 grams of crack cocaine that the district court attributed to him, or the 54.2 grams that were in Horton’s car when Lucas -52 (6th Cir.2001) (holding that a sentence was based on a mandatory statutory minimum sentence even though it was lowered under another statute" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\n1982). Despite the similarity of facts, we decline to adopt the reasoning of either. The Taylorville Eisner court suggests that \"collateral\" transferred under the third sentence of UCC sec. 9-402(7) retains any after-acquired property \"obligation\" under which it was originally secured. Id. at 669. Under this reasoning, any property acquired by the transferee at any time after the initial transfer is \"infected\" with perfection under the financing statement listing the trans-feror as debtor. We reject this reading of sec. 9-402(7) because it ignores the four month limitation of sec. 9-402's second sentence and unreasonably burdens a potential creditor with a duty to inquire as to the source of title of all the transferee's assets. The Sac City court concluded that a s 117 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that the debtor in possession could utilize the strongarm powers of the trustee to avoid an unperfected security interest even though the debtor knew of the interest prior to bankruptcy because the two are distinct entities and the debtor in possessions responsibility is to preserve the estates assets for the benefit of the creditors", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\n1982). Despite the similarity of facts, we decline to adopt the reasoning of either. The Taylorville Eisner court suggests that \"collateral\" transferred under the third sentence of UCC sec. 9-402(7) retains any after-acquired property \"obligation\" under which it was originally secured. Id. at 669. Under this reasoning, any property acquired by the transferee at any time after the initial transfer is \"infected\" with perfection under the financing statement listing the trans-feror as debtor. We reject this reading of sec. 9-402(7) because it ignores the four month limitation of sec. 9-402's second sentence and unreasonably burdens a potential creditor with a duty to inquire as to the source of title of all the transferee's assets. The Sac City court concluded that a s 117 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding a filing under hatfield wayne l sufficient to perfect an interest in the assets of a corporation called hatfield construction company", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\n1982). Despite the similarity of facts, we decline to adopt the reasoning of either. The Taylorville Eisner court suggests that \"collateral\" transferred under the third sentence of UCC sec. 9-402(7) retains any after-acquired property \"obligation\" under which it was originally secured. Id. at 669. Under this reasoning, any property acquired by the transferee at any time after the initial transfer is \"infected\" with perfection under the financing statement listing the trans-feror as debtor. We reject this reading of sec. 9-402(7) because it ignores the four month limitation of sec. 9-402's second sentence and unreasonably burdens a potential creditor with a duty to inquire as to the source of title of all the transferee's assets. The Sac City court concluded that a s 117 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding a filing under mccauleys reprographics and mapping insufficient to perfect a security interest in the assets of the debtor corporation", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\n1982). Despite the similarity of facts, we decline to adopt the reasoning of either. The Taylorville Eisner court suggests that \"collateral\" transferred under the third sentence of UCC sec. 9-402(7) retains any after-acquired property \"obligation\" under which it was originally secured. Id. at 669. Under this reasoning, any property acquired by the transferee at any time after the initial transfer is \"infected\" with perfection under the financing statement listing the trans-feror as debtor. We reject this reading of sec. 9-402(7) because it ignores the four month limitation of sec. 9-402's second sentence and unreasonably burdens a potential creditor with a duty to inquire as to the source of title of all the transferee's assets. The Sac City court concluded that a s 117 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding a filing under john and mayella lintz insufficient to identify the debtor corporation", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\n1982). Despite the similarity of facts, we decline to adopt the reasoning of either. The Taylorville Eisner court suggests that \"collateral\" transferred under the third sentence of UCC sec. 9-402(7) retains any after-acquired property \"obligation\" under which it was originally secured. Id. at 669. Under this reasoning, any property acquired by the transferee at any time after the initial transfer is \"infected\" with perfection under the financing statement listing the trans-feror as debtor. We reject this reading of sec. 9-402(7) because it ignores the four month limitation of sec. 9-402's second sentence and unreasonably burdens a potential creditor with a duty to inquire as to the source of title of all the transferee's assets. The Sac City court concluded that a s 117 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that 727a2a does not apply to the transfer of the assets of a corporation in which the debtor is a shareholder" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nTex. Const, art. V, § 8; see Dubai Petrol. Co. v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71, 75 (Tex.2000). Thus, the real question presented by these motions to dismiss is not Lapi-ner’s “standing” in the jurisdictional sense of that term. See Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 160-61, 130 S.Ct. 1237, 176 L.Ed.2d 18 (2010) (explaining that the term “jurisdictional” properly applies only to prescriptions delineating the classes of cases (subject-matter jurisdiction) and persons (personal jurisdiction) that implicate a court’s adjudicatory authority). Instead, as the plurality opinion and many other courts recognize, the question before us is whether Lapiner should be treated as a party for purposes of appeal. See Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 6-7, 122 S.Ct. 2005, 153 L.Ed.2d 27 (2002) (holding question whether unnamed class member has standing to appeal does not implicate courts subjectmatter jurisdiction but instead whether he should be considered a party for purposes of appealing the trial courts approval of the settlement over his objection", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nTex. Const, art. V, § 8; see Dubai Petrol. Co. v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71, 75 (Tex.2000). Thus, the real question presented by these motions to dismiss is not Lapi-ner’s “standing” in the jurisdictional sense of that term. See Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 160-61, 130 S.Ct. 1237, 176 L.Ed.2d 18 (2010) (explaining that the term “jurisdictional” properly applies only to prescriptions delineating the classes of cases (subject-matter jurisdiction) and persons (personal jurisdiction) that implicate a court’s adjudicatory authority). Instead, as the plurality opinion and many other courts recognize, the question before us is whether Lapiner should be treated as a party for purposes of appeal. See Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 6-7, 122 S.Ct. 2005, 153 L.Ed.2d 27 (2002) (holding that district courts do not have appellate jurisdiction over state courts", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nTex. Const, art. V, § 8; see Dubai Petrol. Co. v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71, 75 (Tex.2000). Thus, the real question presented by these motions to dismiss is not Lapi-ner’s “standing” in the jurisdictional sense of that term. See Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 160-61, 130 S.Ct. 1237, 176 L.Ed.2d 18 (2010) (explaining that the term “jurisdictional” properly applies only to prescriptions delineating the classes of cases (subject-matter jurisdiction) and persons (personal jurisdiction) that implicate a court’s adjudicatory authority). Instead, as the plurality opinion and many other courts recognize, the question before us is whether Lapiner should be treated as a party for purposes of appeal. See Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 6-7, 122 S.Ct. 2005, 153 L.Ed.2d 27 (2002) (holding that standing is component of subjectmatter jurisdiction and subjectmatter jurisdiction is essential to courts authority to hear case", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nTex. Const, art. V, § 8; see Dubai Petrol. Co. v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71, 75 (Tex.2000). Thus, the real question presented by these motions to dismiss is not Lapi-ner’s “standing” in the jurisdictional sense of that term. See Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 160-61, 130 S.Ct. 1237, 176 L.Ed.2d 18 (2010) (explaining that the term “jurisdictional” properly applies only to prescriptions delineating the classes of cases (subject-matter jurisdiction) and persons (personal jurisdiction) that implicate a court’s adjudicatory authority). Instead, as the plurality opinion and many other courts recognize, the question before us is whether Lapiner should be treated as a party for purposes of appeal. See Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 6-7, 122 S.Ct. 2005, 153 L.Ed.2d 27 (2002) (holding that standing is component of subjectmatter jurisdiction", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nTex. Const, art. V, § 8; see Dubai Petrol. Co. v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71, 75 (Tex.2000). Thus, the real question presented by these motions to dismiss is not Lapi-ner’s “standing” in the jurisdictional sense of that term. See Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 160-61, 130 S.Ct. 1237, 176 L.Ed.2d 18 (2010) (explaining that the term “jurisdictional” properly applies only to prescriptions delineating the classes of cases (subject-matter jurisdiction) and persons (personal jurisdiction) that implicate a court’s adjudicatory authority). Instead, as the plurality opinion and many other courts recognize, the question before us is whether Lapiner should be treated as a party for purposes of appeal. See Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 6-7, 122 S.Ct. 2005, 153 L.Ed.2d 27 (2002) (holding that prevailing party has no standing to appeal" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nof his actual innocence. Accordingly, the court will deny claim six as procedurally barred. F. Claim Seven: Post-conviction Proceedings Violated Petitioner’s Due Process And Equal Protection Rights In his seventh claim, petitioner contends that the Delaware Supreme Court’s summary affirmance of his post-conviction appeal violated his right to equal protection and due process. He complains that the State Supreme Court failed to give a thorough and comprehensive review and analysis of his Massiah claims. The court concludes that this claim alleges a state law claim that is not cognizable on federal habeas relief, because petitioner’s ultimate criticism is with the Delaware State Courts’ analysis in a state collateral proceeding. See Hassine v. Zimmerman, 160 F.3d 941, 954 (3d Cir.1998)(holding habeas petitioners may show cause for such default in specific circumstances in states that require petitioners to raise iatc claims in initial state habeas proceedings rather than on direct appeal", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nof his actual innocence. Accordingly, the court will deny claim six as procedurally barred. F. Claim Seven: Post-conviction Proceedings Violated Petitioner’s Due Process And Equal Protection Rights In his seventh claim, petitioner contends that the Delaware Supreme Court’s summary affirmance of his post-conviction appeal violated his right to equal protection and due process. He complains that the State Supreme Court failed to give a thorough and comprehensive review and analysis of his Massiah claims. The court concludes that this claim alleges a state law claim that is not cognizable on federal habeas relief, because petitioner’s ultimate criticism is with the Delaware State Courts’ analysis in a state collateral proceeding. See Hassine v. Zimmerman, 160 F.3d 941, 954 (3d Cir.1998)(holding that the federal role in reviewing an application for habeas corpus is limited to evaluating what occurred in the state or federal proceedings that actually led to the petitioners conviction what occurred in the petitioners collateral proceeding does not enter into the habeas proceeding", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nof his actual innocence. Accordingly, the court will deny claim six as procedurally barred. F. Claim Seven: Post-conviction Proceedings Violated Petitioner’s Due Process And Equal Protection Rights In his seventh claim, petitioner contends that the Delaware Supreme Court’s summary affirmance of his post-conviction appeal violated his right to equal protection and due process. He complains that the State Supreme Court failed to give a thorough and comprehensive review and analysis of his Massiah claims. The court concludes that this claim alleges a state law claim that is not cognizable on federal habeas relief, because petitioner’s ultimate criticism is with the Delaware State Courts’ analysis in a state collateral proceeding. See Hassine v. Zimmerman, 160 F.3d 941, 954 (3d Cir.1998)(holding federal habeas proceeding was properly dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies when petitioners direct appeal from resentencing was still pending in state court at the time he sought habeas relief", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nof his actual innocence. Accordingly, the court will deny claim six as procedurally barred. F. Claim Seven: Post-conviction Proceedings Violated Petitioner’s Due Process And Equal Protection Rights In his seventh claim, petitioner contends that the Delaware Supreme Court’s summary affirmance of his post-conviction appeal violated his right to equal protection and due process. He complains that the State Supreme Court failed to give a thorough and comprehensive review and analysis of his Massiah claims. The court concludes that this claim alleges a state law claim that is not cognizable on federal habeas relief, because petitioner’s ultimate criticism is with the Delaware State Courts’ analysis in a state collateral proceeding. See Hassine v. Zimmerman, 160 F.3d 941, 954 (3d Cir.1998)(holding that once federal jurisdiction has attached it is not defeated by the petitioners release prior to completion of the proceedings on his habeas application", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nof his actual innocence. Accordingly, the court will deny claim six as procedurally barred. F. Claim Seven: Post-conviction Proceedings Violated Petitioner’s Due Process And Equal Protection Rights In his seventh claim, petitioner contends that the Delaware Supreme Court’s summary affirmance of his post-conviction appeal violated his right to equal protection and due process. He complains that the State Supreme Court failed to give a thorough and comprehensive review and analysis of his Massiah claims. The court concludes that this claim alleges a state law claim that is not cognizable on federal habeas relief, because petitioner’s ultimate criticism is with the Delaware State Courts’ analysis in a state collateral proceeding. See Hassine v. Zimmerman, 160 F.3d 941, 954 (3d Cir.1998)(holding that federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nofficial conduct. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Obergefell v. Hodges does not alter applicable law. — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2598, 192 L.Ed.2d 609 (2015). Whatever ramifications Obergefell may have for sexual relations beyond the approval of same-sex marriage are unstated at best, but Obergefell is expressly premised on the unique and special bond created by the formal marital relationship and children of that relationship. Id. at 2594-95. Obergefell does not create “rights” based on relationships that mock marriage, and no court has so held. The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED. 1 . The alleged fact dispute does not exist, nor would it be material if it did. While Coker and Golden maintain they were ordered to \"cease all contact” with the other (10th Cir. 2008) (holding that sexual harassment need not take the form of sexual advances or other explicitly sexual conduct in order to be actionable under title vii", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nofficial conduct. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Obergefell v. Hodges does not alter applicable law. — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2598, 192 L.Ed.2d 609 (2015). Whatever ramifications Obergefell may have for sexual relations beyond the approval of same-sex marriage are unstated at best, but Obergefell is expressly premised on the unique and special bond created by the formal marital relationship and children of that relationship. Id. at 2594-95. Obergefell does not create “rights” based on relationships that mock marriage, and no court has so held. The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED. 1 . The alleged fact dispute does not exist, nor would it be material if it did. While Coker and Golden maintain they were ordered to \"cease all contact” with the other (10th Cir. 2008) (holding that baltimore city cannot be liable for police officers alleged tortious conduct where the officer was acting in a governmental capacity", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nofficial conduct. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Obergefell v. Hodges does not alter applicable law. — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2598, 192 L.Ed.2d 609 (2015). Whatever ramifications Obergefell may have for sexual relations beyond the approval of same-sex marriage are unstated at best, but Obergefell is expressly premised on the unique and special bond created by the formal marital relationship and children of that relationship. Id. at 2594-95. Obergefell does not create “rights” based on relationships that mock marriage, and no court has so held. The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED. 1 . The alleged fact dispute does not exist, nor would it be material if it did. While Coker and Golden maintain they were ordered to \"cease all contact” with the other (10th Cir. 2008) (holding that police officers have a duty to conduct an investigation into the basis of the witness report", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nofficial conduct. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Obergefell v. Hodges does not alter applicable law. — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2598, 192 L.Ed.2d 609 (2015). Whatever ramifications Obergefell may have for sexual relations beyond the approval of same-sex marriage are unstated at best, but Obergefell is expressly premised on the unique and special bond created by the formal marital relationship and children of that relationship. Id. at 2594-95. Obergefell does not create “rights” based on relationships that mock marriage, and no court has so held. The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED. 1 . The alleged fact dispute does not exist, nor would it be material if it did. While Coker and Golden maintain they were ordered to \"cease all contact” with the other (10th Cir. 2008) (holding that the illinois statutory definitions of sexual penetration and sexual conduct cover clearly distinct conduct and that therefore the statute was not unconstitutionally vague", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nofficial conduct. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Obergefell v. Hodges does not alter applicable law. — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2598, 192 L.Ed.2d 609 (2015). Whatever ramifications Obergefell may have for sexual relations beyond the approval of same-sex marriage are unstated at best, but Obergefell is expressly premised on the unique and special bond created by the formal marital relationship and children of that relationship. Id. at 2594-95. Obergefell does not create “rights” based on relationships that mock marriage, and no court has so held. The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED. 1 . The alleged fact dispute does not exist, nor would it be material if it did. While Coker and Golden maintain they were ordered to \"cease all contact” with the other (10th Cir. 2008) (holding that governmental actions restricting police officers sexual conduct of an extramarital affair were reasonable" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\npet.). The Bisby Court held that a defendant’s attempt to introduce evidence at the punishment phase of the trial that he was not the person who shot complainant was irrelevant because it concerned his guilt or innocence, not the proper punishment. Bisby, 907 S.W.2d at 959-60. Likewise, the Garcia Court upheld the trial court’s exclusion of the defendant’s attempt to introduce impeachment evidence that the State’s witnesses had consumed more alcohol at the time of the incident than they had admitted to because “[s]uch impeachment evidence might be collateral testimony regarding appellant’s guilt, but would be of no import in determining punishment so as to require reversal.” Garcia, 704 S.W.2d at 499; see also Oregon v. Guzek, - U.S. -, -, 126 S.Ct. 1226, 1228, 163 L.Ed.2d 1112 (2006) (holding that trial court abused its discretion to admit at the punishment phase of the defendants capital murder trial a photograph of the murder victim and her unborn child lying in a casket", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\npet.). The Bisby Court held that a defendant’s attempt to introduce evidence at the punishment phase of the trial that he was not the person who shot complainant was irrelevant because it concerned his guilt or innocence, not the proper punishment. Bisby, 907 S.W.2d at 959-60. Likewise, the Garcia Court upheld the trial court’s exclusion of the defendant’s attempt to introduce impeachment evidence that the State’s witnesses had consumed more alcohol at the time of the incident than they had admitted to because “[s]uch impeachment evidence might be collateral testimony regarding appellant’s guilt, but would be of no import in determining punishment so as to require reversal.” Garcia, 704 S.W.2d at 499; see also Oregon v. Guzek, - U.S. -, -, 126 S.Ct. 1226, 1228, 163 L.Ed.2d 1112 (2006) (holding that there is no eighth of fourteenth amendment rights to present alibi evidence at punishment phase of capital murder trial", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\npet.). The Bisby Court held that a defendant’s attempt to introduce evidence at the punishment phase of the trial that he was not the person who shot complainant was irrelevant because it concerned his guilt or innocence, not the proper punishment. Bisby, 907 S.W.2d at 959-60. Likewise, the Garcia Court upheld the trial court’s exclusion of the defendant’s attempt to introduce impeachment evidence that the State’s witnesses had consumed more alcohol at the time of the incident than they had admitted to because “[s]uch impeachment evidence might be collateral testimony regarding appellant’s guilt, but would be of no import in determining punishment so as to require reversal.” Garcia, 704 S.W.2d at 499; see also Oregon v. Guzek, - U.S. -, -, 126 S.Ct. 1226, 1228, 163 L.Ed.2d 1112 (2006) (holding that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment incorporates the eighth amendments guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\npet.). The Bisby Court held that a defendant’s attempt to introduce evidence at the punishment phase of the trial that he was not the person who shot complainant was irrelevant because it concerned his guilt or innocence, not the proper punishment. Bisby, 907 S.W.2d at 959-60. Likewise, the Garcia Court upheld the trial court’s exclusion of the defendant’s attempt to introduce impeachment evidence that the State’s witnesses had consumed more alcohol at the time of the incident than they had admitted to because “[s]uch impeachment evidence might be collateral testimony regarding appellant’s guilt, but would be of no import in determining punishment so as to require reversal.” Garcia, 704 S.W.2d at 499; see also Oregon v. Guzek, - U.S. -, -, 126 S.Ct. 1226, 1228, 163 L.Ed.2d 1112 (2006) (holding defendant waived right to challenge incourt identification when he admitted guilt at punishment phase of trial", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\npet.). The Bisby Court held that a defendant’s attempt to introduce evidence at the punishment phase of the trial that he was not the person who shot complainant was irrelevant because it concerned his guilt or innocence, not the proper punishment. Bisby, 907 S.W.2d at 959-60. Likewise, the Garcia Court upheld the trial court’s exclusion of the defendant’s attempt to introduce impeachment evidence that the State’s witnesses had consumed more alcohol at the time of the incident than they had admitted to because “[s]uch impeachment evidence might be collateral testimony regarding appellant’s guilt, but would be of no import in determining punishment so as to require reversal.” Garcia, 704 S.W.2d at 499; see also Oregon v. Guzek, - U.S. -, -, 126 S.Ct. 1226, 1228, 163 L.Ed.2d 1112 (2006) (holding that because pretrial detainees fourteenth amendment rights are comparable to prisoners eighth amendment rights the same standards apply" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthat will reasonably assure the appearance of a defendant as required and the safety of any other person in the community are set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g). They include the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, including whether the offense is a crime of violence or a federal crime of terrorism, the weight of the evidence against the defendant, the history and characteristics of the defendant and the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be posed if the defendant is released. A danger to the eom- munity does not only include physical harm or violent behavior. The concept of “safety” may include non-physical harm. United States v. Giampa, 904 F.Supp. 235, 358 (D.N.J.1995); United States v. Provenzano, 605 F.2d 85, 95 (3d Cir.1979) (holding that preventative detention under bail reform act justified by the need to prevent danger to the community was regulatory and preventative rather than punitive", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthat will reasonably assure the appearance of a defendant as required and the safety of any other person in the community are set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g). They include the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, including whether the offense is a crime of violence or a federal crime of terrorism, the weight of the evidence against the defendant, the history and characteristics of the defendant and the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be posed if the defendant is released. A danger to the eom- munity does not only include physical harm or violent behavior. The concept of “safety” may include non-physical harm. United States v. Giampa, 904 F.Supp. 235, 358 (D.N.J.1995); United States v. Provenzano, 605 F.2d 85, 95 (3d Cir.1979) (holding that a defendants propensity to commit crime generally even if the resulting harm would be not solely physical may constitute sufficient risk of danger to come within contemplation of the bail reform act", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthat will reasonably assure the appearance of a defendant as required and the safety of any other person in the community are set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g). They include the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, including whether the offense is a crime of violence or a federal crime of terrorism, the weight of the evidence against the defendant, the history and characteristics of the defendant and the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be posed if the defendant is released. A danger to the eom- munity does not only include physical harm or violent behavior. The concept of “safety” may include non-physical harm. United States v. Giampa, 904 F.Supp. 235, 358 (D.N.J.1995); United States v. Provenzano, 605 F.2d 85, 95 (3d Cir.1979) (holding that to come under the act the harm must be caused by a failure of something a worker is using to support himself", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthat will reasonably assure the appearance of a defendant as required and the safety of any other person in the community are set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g). They include the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, including whether the offense is a crime of violence or a federal crime of terrorism, the weight of the evidence against the defendant, the history and characteristics of the defendant and the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be posed if the defendant is released. A danger to the eom- munity does not only include physical harm or violent behavior. The concept of “safety” may include non-physical harm. United States v. Giampa, 904 F.Supp. 235, 358 (D.N.J.1995); United States v. Provenzano, 605 F.2d 85, 95 (3d Cir.1979) (holding that nursing home owed duty not to subject resident to unreasonable risk of harm at hands of coresident with known propensity for violence", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthat will reasonably assure the appearance of a defendant as required and the safety of any other person in the community are set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g). They include the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, including whether the offense is a crime of violence or a federal crime of terrorism, the weight of the evidence against the defendant, the history and characteristics of the defendant and the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be posed if the defendant is released. A danger to the eom- munity does not only include physical harm or violent behavior. The concept of “safety” may include non-physical harm. United States v. Giampa, 904 F.Supp. 235, 358 (D.N.J.1995); United States v. Provenzano, 605 F.2d 85, 95 (3d Cir.1979) (holding that monetary damages do not generally constitute irreparable harm" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n“agencies do not waive a defense of untimely exhaustion merely by accepting and investigating a discrimination complaint.” Bowden v. United States, 106 F.3d 433, 438 (D.C.Cir.1997) (citing Boyd v. United States Postal Serv., 752 F.2d 410, 414 (9th Cir.1985)); see also Rowe v. Sullivan, 967 F.2d 186, 191 (5th Cir.1992) (“In order to waive a timeliness objection, the agency must make a specific finding that the claimant’s submission was timely.”). We now adopt this rule as well. Indeed, were we to do otherwise we would “vitiate any incentive for [government] agencies to investigate and voluntarily remedy” instances of discrimination, lest the agencies risk forfeiting a valid defense to a potential suit. Bruno v. Brady, Civ. No. 91-2605, 1992 WL 57920, at *3 (E.D.Pa. Mar. 16, 1992) (holding that 28 usc 1331 does not constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n“agencies do not waive a defense of untimely exhaustion merely by accepting and investigating a discrimination complaint.” Bowden v. United States, 106 F.3d 433, 438 (D.C.Cir.1997) (citing Boyd v. United States Postal Serv., 752 F.2d 410, 414 (9th Cir.1985)); see also Rowe v. Sullivan, 967 F.2d 186, 191 (5th Cir.1992) (“In order to waive a timeliness objection, the agency must make a specific finding that the claimant’s submission was timely.”). We now adopt this rule as well. Indeed, were we to do otherwise we would “vitiate any incentive for [government] agencies to investigate and voluntarily remedy” instances of discrimination, lest the agencies risk forfeiting a valid defense to a potential suit. Bruno v. Brady, Civ. No. 91-2605, 1992 WL 57920, at *3 (E.D.Pa. Mar. 16, 1992) (holding that an agreement to submit age discrimination claims to arbitration does not constitute a waiver", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n“agencies do not waive a defense of untimely exhaustion merely by accepting and investigating a discrimination complaint.” Bowden v. United States, 106 F.3d 433, 438 (D.C.Cir.1997) (citing Boyd v. United States Postal Serv., 752 F.2d 410, 414 (9th Cir.1985)); see also Rowe v. Sullivan, 967 F.2d 186, 191 (5th Cir.1992) (“In order to waive a timeliness objection, the agency must make a specific finding that the claimant’s submission was timely.”). We now adopt this rule as well. Indeed, were we to do otherwise we would “vitiate any incentive for [government] agencies to investigate and voluntarily remedy” instances of discrimination, lest the agencies risk forfeiting a valid defense to a potential suit. Bruno v. Brady, Civ. No. 91-2605, 1992 WL 57920, at *3 (E.D.Pa. Mar. 16, 1992) (holding an employees investigation of nothing more than his employers noncompliance with federal or state regulations does not state a whistleblower claim", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n“agencies do not waive a defense of untimely exhaustion merely by accepting and investigating a discrimination complaint.” Bowden v. United States, 106 F.3d 433, 438 (D.C.Cir.1997) (citing Boyd v. United States Postal Serv., 752 F.2d 410, 414 (9th Cir.1985)); see also Rowe v. Sullivan, 967 F.2d 186, 191 (5th Cir.1992) (“In order to waive a timeliness objection, the agency must make a specific finding that the claimant’s submission was timely.”). We now adopt this rule as well. Indeed, were we to do otherwise we would “vitiate any incentive for [government] agencies to investigate and voluntarily remedy” instances of discrimination, lest the agencies risk forfeiting a valid defense to a potential suit. Bruno v. Brady, Civ. No. 91-2605, 1992 WL 57920, at *3 (E.D.Pa. Mar. 16, 1992) (holding that the ada does not contain a waiver of sovereign immunity and thus does not apply to the federal government", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n“agencies do not waive a defense of untimely exhaustion merely by accepting and investigating a discrimination complaint.” Bowden v. United States, 106 F.3d 433, 438 (D.C.Cir.1997) (citing Boyd v. United States Postal Serv., 752 F.2d 410, 414 (9th Cir.1985)); see also Rowe v. Sullivan, 967 F.2d 186, 191 (5th Cir.1992) (“In order to waive a timeliness objection, the agency must make a specific finding that the claimant’s submission was timely.”). We now adopt this rule as well. Indeed, were we to do otherwise we would “vitiate any incentive for [government] agencies to investigate and voluntarily remedy” instances of discrimination, lest the agencies risk forfeiting a valid defense to a potential suit. Bruno v. Brady, Civ. No. 91-2605, 1992 WL 57920, at *3 (E.D.Pa. Mar. 16, 1992) (holding that acceptance and investigation of a federal employees complaint does not constitute waiver" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nits discretion in finding the former wife in contempt with regard to that provision of the agreement. The former wife also argues that the trial court erred by finding her in contempt for taking out a second mortgage on the marital residence because, she says, she did not know she was taking out a second mortgage. We note, however, that the trial court could have disbelieved the former wife’s testimony that she did not know she was taking out a second mortgage. Clemons, 627 So.2d at 434. By taking out a second mortgage, the former wife made it impossible to comply with the agreement by giving the former husband a second mortgage. Thus, we find no error in the trial court’s finding her in contempt as to this issue. See, e.g., Hudson v. Hudson, 494 So.2d 664, 666 (Ala.Civ.App.1986) (holding that a wife obtained a vested interest in her portion of the retirement benefits as of the date of the divorce decree and any act of the military spouse that unilaterally decreases the nonmilitary spouses vested interest is an impermissible modification of a division of marital property and a violation of the final decree of divorce", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nits discretion in finding the former wife in contempt with regard to that provision of the agreement. The former wife also argues that the trial court erred by finding her in contempt for taking out a second mortgage on the marital residence because, she says, she did not know she was taking out a second mortgage. We note, however, that the trial court could have disbelieved the former wife’s testimony that she did not know she was taking out a second mortgage. Clemons, 627 So.2d at 434. By taking out a second mortgage, the former wife made it impossible to comply with the agreement by giving the former husband a second mortgage. Thus, we find no error in the trial court’s finding her in contempt as to this issue. See, e.g., Hudson v. Hudson, 494 So.2d 664, 666 (Ala.Civ.App.1986) (holding that contempt finding was proper where the former wife attempted to directly thwart the divorce judgment and cloud the title to certain marital property by transferring her interest by deed to her sister", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nits discretion in finding the former wife in contempt with regard to that provision of the agreement. The former wife also argues that the trial court erred by finding her in contempt for taking out a second mortgage on the marital residence because, she says, she did not know she was taking out a second mortgage. We note, however, that the trial court could have disbelieved the former wife’s testimony that she did not know she was taking out a second mortgage. Clemons, 627 So.2d at 434. By taking out a second mortgage, the former wife made it impossible to comply with the agreement by giving the former husband a second mortgage. Thus, we find no error in the trial court’s finding her in contempt as to this issue. See, e.g., Hudson v. Hudson, 494 So.2d 664, 666 (Ala.Civ.App.1986) (holding that the former wife did not waive her attorneyclient privilege simply because the credibility of her claim that she relied on her husbands representations could be impeached by deposing her former attorney", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nits discretion in finding the former wife in contempt with regard to that provision of the agreement. The former wife also argues that the trial court erred by finding her in contempt for taking out a second mortgage on the marital residence because, she says, she did not know she was taking out a second mortgage. We note, however, that the trial court could have disbelieved the former wife’s testimony that she did not know she was taking out a second mortgage. Clemons, 627 So.2d at 434. By taking out a second mortgage, the former wife made it impossible to comply with the agreement by giving the former husband a second mortgage. Thus, we find no error in the trial court’s finding her in contempt as to this issue. See, e.g., Hudson v. Hudson, 494 So.2d 664, 666 (Ala.Civ.App.1986) (holding that the trial court erred in finding that marital property was the former wifes separate property based on a nonseparation agreement in which the former husband purported to relinquish any interest in the marital property", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nits discretion in finding the former wife in contempt with regard to that provision of the agreement. The former wife also argues that the trial court erred by finding her in contempt for taking out a second mortgage on the marital residence because, she says, she did not know she was taking out a second mortgage. We note, however, that the trial court could have disbelieved the former wife’s testimony that she did not know she was taking out a second mortgage. Clemons, 627 So.2d at 434. By taking out a second mortgage, the former wife made it impossible to comply with the agreement by giving the former husband a second mortgage. Thus, we find no error in the trial court’s finding her in contempt as to this issue. See, e.g., Hudson v. Hudson, 494 So.2d 664, 666 (Ala.Civ.App.1986) (holding that a wife is not liable simply by virtue of the marital relationship for her husbands fraudulent acts" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\na \"jurisdictional element which would ensure, through case-hy-case inquiry,” that the defendant's particular offense \"affects interstate commerce.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561, 115 S.Ct. at 1631; see also United States v. Olin Corp., 107 F.3d 1506, 1509 (11th Cir.1997). The conclusion that Lopez does not require an individualized finding of \"substantial effect\" to sustain a conviction under § 844(i)’s second prong is consistent with the holdings of several other circuits. See, e.g., United States v. Tocco, 135 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir.) (rejecting the contention that Lopez requires the government to show a substantial effect on interstate commerce for purposes of § 844(i)), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 1581, 140 L.Ed.2d 795 (1998); United States v. Hicks, 106 F.3d 187, 190 (7th Cir.) (holding after lopez that the interstate nexus element of the hobbs act still requires the government to show only a minimal connection to interstate commerce", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\na \"jurisdictional element which would ensure, through case-hy-case inquiry,” that the defendant's particular offense \"affects interstate commerce.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561, 115 S.Ct. at 1631; see also United States v. Olin Corp., 107 F.3d 1506, 1509 (11th Cir.1997). The conclusion that Lopez does not require an individualized finding of \"substantial effect\" to sustain a conviction under § 844(i)’s second prong is consistent with the holdings of several other circuits. See, e.g., United States v. Tocco, 135 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir.) (rejecting the contention that Lopez requires the government to show a substantial effect on interstate commerce for purposes of § 844(i)), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 1581, 140 L.Ed.2d 795 (1998); United States v. Hicks, 106 F.3d 187, 190 (7th Cir.) (recognizing power of states to engage in some regulation of interstate commerce", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\na \"jurisdictional element which would ensure, through case-hy-case inquiry,” that the defendant's particular offense \"affects interstate commerce.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561, 115 S.Ct. at 1631; see also United States v. Olin Corp., 107 F.3d 1506, 1509 (11th Cir.1997). The conclusion that Lopez does not require an individualized finding of \"substantial effect\" to sustain a conviction under § 844(i)’s second prong is consistent with the holdings of several other circuits. See, e.g., United States v. Tocco, 135 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir.) (rejecting the contention that Lopez requires the government to show a substantial effect on interstate commerce for purposes of § 844(i)), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 1581, 140 L.Ed.2d 795 (1998); United States v. Hicks, 106 F.3d 187, 190 (7th Cir.) (holding that the connection between the robbery and interstate commerce was much more direct than in wang because at the time of the robbery the victim in walker was selling illegal drugs that had traveled through interstate commerce", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\na \"jurisdictional element which would ensure, through case-hy-case inquiry,” that the defendant's particular offense \"affects interstate commerce.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561, 115 S.Ct. at 1631; see also United States v. Olin Corp., 107 F.3d 1506, 1509 (11th Cir.1997). The conclusion that Lopez does not require an individualized finding of \"substantial effect\" to sustain a conviction under § 844(i)’s second prong is consistent with the holdings of several other circuits. See, e.g., United States v. Tocco, 135 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir.) (rejecting the contention that Lopez requires the government to show a substantial effect on interstate commerce for purposes of § 844(i)), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 1581, 140 L.Ed.2d 795 (1998); United States v. Hicks, 106 F.3d 187, 190 (7th Cir.) (holding that the government can satisfy the hobbs act interstate commerce requirement by showing that the robbery resulted in the closure of a business engaged in interstate commerce", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\na \"jurisdictional element which would ensure, through case-hy-case inquiry,” that the defendant's particular offense \"affects interstate commerce.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561, 115 S.Ct. at 1631; see also United States v. Olin Corp., 107 F.3d 1506, 1509 (11th Cir.1997). The conclusion that Lopez does not require an individualized finding of \"substantial effect\" to sustain a conviction under § 844(i)’s second prong is consistent with the holdings of several other circuits. See, e.g., United States v. Tocco, 135 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir.) (rejecting the contention that Lopez requires the government to show a substantial effect on interstate commerce for purposes of § 844(i)), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 1581, 140 L.Ed.2d 795 (1998); United States v. Hicks, 106 F.3d 187, 190 (7th Cir.) (holding that 844i requires the government only to establish a minimal connection between the property at issue and some aspect of interstate commerce" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nsurely not what the Legislature intends. The dissenting opinion contends that the literal wording of the statute unambiguously provides a strategic tool to the accused. We disagree. Nowhere in the statute are the words \"strategic tool” used, and this interpretation is contradicted by the fact that only one shuffle is authorized and it can be effected by either the defendant or the State. The dissent further contends that we recognized in Wilkerson v. State, 681 S.W.2d 29 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) that providing such a strategic tool was \"the very intent behind the passage of the statute.” However, the case actually said that the legislative intent would be thwarted if a trial court's sua sponte shuffle foreclosed the State or a defendant from effecting one. Id. at 30. There are no spec 2002)(holding that accused must competently and intelligently waive the right to counsel", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nsurely not what the Legislature intends. The dissenting opinion contends that the literal wording of the statute unambiguously provides a strategic tool to the accused. We disagree. Nowhere in the statute are the words \"strategic tool” used, and this interpretation is contradicted by the fact that only one shuffle is authorized and it can be effected by either the defendant or the State. The dissent further contends that we recognized in Wilkerson v. State, 681 S.W.2d 29 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) that providing such a strategic tool was \"the very intent behind the passage of the statute.” However, the case actually said that the legislative intent would be thwarted if a trial court's sua sponte shuffle foreclosed the State or a defendant from effecting one. Id. at 30. There are no spec 2002)(holding that a parents statutory right to counsel in termination proceedings guarantees the right to effective counsel", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nsurely not what the Legislature intends. The dissenting opinion contends that the literal wording of the statute unambiguously provides a strategic tool to the accused. We disagree. Nowhere in the statute are the words \"strategic tool” used, and this interpretation is contradicted by the fact that only one shuffle is authorized and it can be effected by either the defendant or the State. The dissent further contends that we recognized in Wilkerson v. State, 681 S.W.2d 29 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) that providing such a strategic tool was \"the very intent behind the passage of the statute.” However, the case actually said that the legislative intent would be thwarted if a trial court's sua sponte shuffle foreclosed the State or a defendant from effecting one. Id. at 30. There are no spec 2002)(recognizing the right to counsel on appeal", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nsurely not what the Legislature intends. The dissenting opinion contends that the literal wording of the statute unambiguously provides a strategic tool to the accused. We disagree. Nowhere in the statute are the words \"strategic tool” used, and this interpretation is contradicted by the fact that only one shuffle is authorized and it can be effected by either the defendant or the State. The dissent further contends that we recognized in Wilkerson v. State, 681 S.W.2d 29 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) that providing such a strategic tool was \"the very intent behind the passage of the statute.” However, the case actually said that the legislative intent would be thwarted if a trial court's sua sponte shuffle foreclosed the State or a defendant from effecting one. Id. at 30. There are no spec 2002)(holding that a death row inmates statutory right to competent counsel does not really mean counsel that performs competently", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nsurely not what the Legislature intends. The dissenting opinion contends that the literal wording of the statute unambiguously provides a strategic tool to the accused. We disagree. Nowhere in the statute are the words \"strategic tool” used, and this interpretation is contradicted by the fact that only one shuffle is authorized and it can be effected by either the defendant or the State. The dissent further contends that we recognized in Wilkerson v. State, 681 S.W.2d 29 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) that providing such a strategic tool was \"the very intent behind the passage of the statute.” However, the case actually said that the legislative intent would be thwarted if a trial court's sua sponte shuffle foreclosed the State or a defendant from effecting one. Id. at 30. There are no spec 2002)(recognizing that a criminal defendants right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nof privacy because their contents can be inferred from their outward appearance.” See State v. Telthorster (1997), Licking App. No. 97CA87, 1997 WL 973456; Arkansas v. Sanders (1979), 442 U.S. 753, 764-765, 99 S.Ct. 2586, 61 L.Ed.2d 235. {¶ 12} Though Officer Bininger testified that in his experience, the type of container that fell from Suter’s pants is often used to transport narcotics, the court does not find the container to be a rare, single-purpose container. Notably, Officer Bininger did not say that drugs were always found in this type of container or that the contents of the container were immediately apparent to him. Cases discussing single-purpose containers bolster this court’s conclusion. Compare State v. Telthorster (Dec. 24, 1997), Licking App. No. 97CA87, 1997 WL 973456 (holding that defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of plastic bags placed in or near his open garbage cans and that the police did not violate his fourth amendment rights in seizing and searching the bags where they were able to do so without trespassing on the defendants property", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nof privacy because their contents can be inferred from their outward appearance.” See State v. Telthorster (1997), Licking App. No. 97CA87, 1997 WL 973456; Arkansas v. Sanders (1979), 442 U.S. 753, 764-765, 99 S.Ct. 2586, 61 L.Ed.2d 235. {¶ 12} Though Officer Bininger testified that in his experience, the type of container that fell from Suter’s pants is often used to transport narcotics, the court does not find the container to be a rare, single-purpose container. Notably, Officer Bininger did not say that drugs were always found in this type of container or that the contents of the container were immediately apparent to him. Cases discussing single-purpose containers bolster this court’s conclusion. Compare State v. Telthorster (Dec. 24, 1997), Licking App. No. 97CA87, 1997 WL 973456 (holding that prisoners do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their cells", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nof privacy because their contents can be inferred from their outward appearance.” See State v. Telthorster (1997), Licking App. No. 97CA87, 1997 WL 973456; Arkansas v. Sanders (1979), 442 U.S. 753, 764-765, 99 S.Ct. 2586, 61 L.Ed.2d 235. {¶ 12} Though Officer Bininger testified that in his experience, the type of container that fell from Suter’s pants is often used to transport narcotics, the court does not find the container to be a rare, single-purpose container. Notably, Officer Bininger did not say that drugs were always found in this type of container or that the contents of the container were immediately apparent to him. Cases discussing single-purpose containers bolster this court’s conclusion. Compare State v. Telthorster (Dec. 24, 1997), Licking App. No. 97CA87, 1997 WL 973456 (holding that car passenger who left her purse in her boyfriends car had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of her purse indeed a purse is a type of container in which a person possesses the highest expectations of privacy", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nof privacy because their contents can be inferred from their outward appearance.” See State v. Telthorster (1997), Licking App. No. 97CA87, 1997 WL 973456; Arkansas v. Sanders (1979), 442 U.S. 753, 764-765, 99 S.Ct. 2586, 61 L.Ed.2d 235. {¶ 12} Though Officer Bininger testified that in his experience, the type of container that fell from Suter’s pants is often used to transport narcotics, the court does not find the container to be a rare, single-purpose container. Notably, Officer Bininger did not say that drugs were always found in this type of container or that the contents of the container were immediately apparent to him. Cases discussing single-purpose containers bolster this court’s conclusion. Compare State v. Telthorster (Dec. 24, 1997), Licking App. No. 97CA87, 1997 WL 973456 (holding that a person does not have any reasonable expectation of privacy in a tiedoff piece of opaque plastic because its contents can be inferred from its appearance and based in part on officers testimony that he had never seen such a container used to transport anything other than drugs", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nof privacy because their contents can be inferred from their outward appearance.” See State v. Telthorster (1997), Licking App. No. 97CA87, 1997 WL 973456; Arkansas v. Sanders (1979), 442 U.S. 753, 764-765, 99 S.Ct. 2586, 61 L.Ed.2d 235. {¶ 12} Though Officer Bininger testified that in his experience, the type of container that fell from Suter’s pants is often used to transport narcotics, the court does not find the container to be a rare, single-purpose container. Notably, Officer Bininger did not say that drugs were always found in this type of container or that the contents of the container were immediately apparent to him. Cases discussing single-purpose containers bolster this court’s conclusion. Compare State v. Telthorster (Dec. 24, 1997), Licking App. No. 97CA87, 1997 WL 973456 (holding that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of plastic garbage bags left on or at the side of a public street" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nThompson v. Tormike, Inc. (1st Dist. 1984), 127 Ill. App. 3d 674, 469 N.E.2d 453, 82 Ill. Dec. 919 (rejecting implied private action under City nuisance ordinance); Rhoades v. Mill Race Inn, Inc. (2d Dist. 1984), 126 Ill. App. 3d 1024, 467 N.E.2d 915, 81 Ill. Dec. 793 (rejecting implied private action under the Safety Glazing Materials Act); Kinney v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. (1st Dist. 1983), 120 Ill. App. 3d 294, 458 N.E.2d 79, 75 Ill. Dec. 911 (rejecting implied additional private action under the Insurance Code). We do not suggest by omission that post-Sawyer appellate decisions have consistently rejected implied statutory torts. To the contrary, see, e.g., Noyola o. Board of Education of City of Chicago (1st Dist. 1996), 284 Ill. App. 3d 128, 671 N.E.2d 802, 219 Ill. Dec. 635 (recognizing implied private action under the plat act rejecting implied private action under the national flood insurance act of 1968", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nThompson v. Tormike, Inc. (1st Dist. 1984), 127 Ill. App. 3d 674, 469 N.E.2d 453, 82 Ill. Dec. 919 (rejecting implied private action under City nuisance ordinance); Rhoades v. Mill Race Inn, Inc. (2d Dist. 1984), 126 Ill. App. 3d 1024, 467 N.E.2d 915, 81 Ill. Dec. 793 (rejecting implied private action under the Safety Glazing Materials Act); Kinney v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. (1st Dist. 1983), 120 Ill. App. 3d 294, 458 N.E.2d 79, 75 Ill. Dec. 911 (rejecting implied additional private action under the Insurance Code). We do not suggest by omission that post-Sawyer appellate decisions have consistently rejected implied statutory torts. To the contrary, see, e.g., Noyola o. Board of Education of City of Chicago (1st Dist. 1996), 284 Ill. App. 3d 128, 671 N.E.2d 802, 219 Ill. Dec. 635 (recognizing implied private action against employer under election code timeofftovote provision", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nThompson v. Tormike, Inc. (1st Dist. 1984), 127 Ill. App. 3d 674, 469 N.E.2d 453, 82 Ill. Dec. 919 (rejecting implied private action under City nuisance ordinance); Rhoades v. Mill Race Inn, Inc. (2d Dist. 1984), 126 Ill. App. 3d 1024, 467 N.E.2d 915, 81 Ill. Dec. 793 (rejecting implied private action under the Safety Glazing Materials Act); Kinney v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. (1st Dist. 1983), 120 Ill. App. 3d 294, 458 N.E.2d 79, 75 Ill. Dec. 911 (rejecting implied additional private action under the Insurance Code). We do not suggest by omission that post-Sawyer appellate decisions have consistently rejected implied statutory torts. To the contrary, see, e.g., Noyola o. Board of Education of City of Chicago (1st Dist. 1996), 284 Ill. App. 3d 128, 671 N.E.2d 802, 219 Ill. Dec. 635 (recognizing implied private action under the collection agency act", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nThompson v. Tormike, Inc. (1st Dist. 1984), 127 Ill. App. 3d 674, 469 N.E.2d 453, 82 Ill. Dec. 919 (rejecting implied private action under City nuisance ordinance); Rhoades v. Mill Race Inn, Inc. (2d Dist. 1984), 126 Ill. App. 3d 1024, 467 N.E.2d 915, 81 Ill. Dec. 793 (rejecting implied private action under the Safety Glazing Materials Act); Kinney v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. (1st Dist. 1983), 120 Ill. App. 3d 294, 458 N.E.2d 79, 75 Ill. Dec. 911 (rejecting implied additional private action under the Insurance Code). We do not suggest by omission that post-Sawyer appellate decisions have consistently rejected implied statutory torts. To the contrary, see, e.g., Noyola o. Board of Education of City of Chicago (1st Dist. 1996), 284 Ill. App. 3d 128, 671 N.E.2d 802, 219 Ill. Dec. 635 (recognizing implied private action under the school code as to chapter 1 funds", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nThompson v. Tormike, Inc. (1st Dist. 1984), 127 Ill. App. 3d 674, 469 N.E.2d 453, 82 Ill. Dec. 919 (rejecting implied private action under City nuisance ordinance); Rhoades v. Mill Race Inn, Inc. (2d Dist. 1984), 126 Ill. App. 3d 1024, 467 N.E.2d 915, 81 Ill. Dec. 793 (rejecting implied private action under the Safety Glazing Materials Act); Kinney v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. (1st Dist. 1983), 120 Ill. App. 3d 294, 458 N.E.2d 79, 75 Ill. Dec. 911 (rejecting implied additional private action under the Insurance Code). We do not suggest by omission that post-Sawyer appellate decisions have consistently rejected implied statutory torts. To the contrary, see, e.g., Noyola o. Board of Education of City of Chicago (1st Dist. 1996), 284 Ill. App. 3d 128, 671 N.E.2d 802, 219 Ill. Dec. 635 (recognizing private right of action" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nno more speech than.necessary to serve a significant government interest.” Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 765, 114 S.Ct. 2516, 129 L.Ed.2d 593 (1994). Although this standard is very close to strict scrutiny, it does not require that the prior restraint serve a “compelling state' interest,” but merely a significant one. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45, 103 S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983) (reciting the strict scrutiny standard). This standard is the minimum scrutiny applied to all prior restraints; if the content of the restriction — not mérely its manner of enforcement as a prior restraint — itself triggers strict scrutiny, then strict scrutiny applies. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45, 103 S.Ct. 948 (recognizing that strict scrutiny applies to facial discrimination against a suspect class", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nno more speech than.necessary to serve a significant government interest.” Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 765, 114 S.Ct. 2516, 129 L.Ed.2d 593 (1994). Although this standard is very close to strict scrutiny, it does not require that the prior restraint serve a “compelling state' interest,” but merely a significant one. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45, 103 S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983) (reciting the strict scrutiny standard). This standard is the minimum scrutiny applied to all prior restraints; if the content of the restriction — not mérely its manner of enforcement as a prior restraint — itself triggers strict scrutiny, then strict scrutiny applies. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45, 103 S.Ct. 948 (holding that strict scrutiny applies", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nno more speech than.necessary to serve a significant government interest.” Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 765, 114 S.Ct. 2516, 129 L.Ed.2d 593 (1994). Although this standard is very close to strict scrutiny, it does not require that the prior restraint serve a “compelling state' interest,” but merely a significant one. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45, 103 S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983) (reciting the strict scrutiny standard). This standard is the minimum scrutiny applied to all prior restraints; if the content of the restriction — not mérely its manner of enforcement as a prior restraint — itself triggers strict scrutiny, then strict scrutiny applies. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45, 103 S.Ct. 948 (holding that an ordinance exempting certain signs from a general sign ban was an unconstitutional contentbased restriction on speech", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nno more speech than.necessary to serve a significant government interest.” Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 765, 114 S.Ct. 2516, 129 L.Ed.2d 593 (1994). Although this standard is very close to strict scrutiny, it does not require that the prior restraint serve a “compelling state' interest,” but merely a significant one. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45, 103 S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983) (reciting the strict scrutiny standard). This standard is the minimum scrutiny applied to all prior restraints; if the content of the restriction — not mérely its manner of enforcement as a prior restraint — itself triggers strict scrutiny, then strict scrutiny applies. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45, 103 S.Ct. 948 (holding that prior restraint analysis applies to commercial speech but that the general health claim regulation 21 cfr 10114 was sufficiently welldefined to survive prior restraint analysis", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nno more speech than.necessary to serve a significant government interest.” Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 765, 114 S.Ct. 2516, 129 L.Ed.2d 593 (1994). Although this standard is very close to strict scrutiny, it does not require that the prior restraint serve a “compelling state' interest,” but merely a significant one. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45, 103 S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983) (reciting the strict scrutiny standard). This standard is the minimum scrutiny applied to all prior restraints; if the content of the restriction — not mérely its manner of enforcement as a prior restraint — itself triggers strict scrutiny, then strict scrutiny applies. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45, 103 S.Ct. 948 (holding that strict scrutiny applies to a prior restraint enforcing a contentbased restriction on speech in a traditional public forum" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nquotation marks omitted) (quoting Poelstra v. Basin Elec. Power Coop., 545 N.W.2d 823, 825 (S.D.1996)). “As a general rule, the possessor of land owes an invitee or business visitor the duty of exercising reasonable or ordinary care for the benefit of the invitee’s safety, and the possessor is liable for the breach of such duty,” W. at 501 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mitchell v. Ankney, 396 N.W.2d 312, 313 (S.D.1986)). “A business invitee is a business visitor who is invited to enter or remain on land for a purpose directly or indirectly connected with business dealings with the possessor of land.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Ms. Larmon qualifies as a business invitee in this case. See Small v. McKennan Hosp., 437 N.W.2d 194, 199 (S.D.1989) (holding that an employee qualified as a business visitor which the janis court subsequently defined as a business invitee", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nquotation marks omitted) (quoting Poelstra v. Basin Elec. Power Coop., 545 N.W.2d 823, 825 (S.D.1996)). “As a general rule, the possessor of land owes an invitee or business visitor the duty of exercising reasonable or ordinary care for the benefit of the invitee’s safety, and the possessor is liable for the breach of such duty,” W. at 501 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mitchell v. Ankney, 396 N.W.2d 312, 313 (S.D.1986)). “A business invitee is a business visitor who is invited to enter or remain on land for a purpose directly or indirectly connected with business dealings with the possessor of land.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Ms. Larmon qualifies as a business invitee in this case. See Small v. McKennan Hosp., 437 N.W.2d 194, 199 (S.D.1989) (holding that monitoring telephone calls is in the ordinary course of business where the employer has reason to suspect an employee of disclosing confidential information to business competitor", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nquotation marks omitted) (quoting Poelstra v. Basin Elec. Power Coop., 545 N.W.2d 823, 825 (S.D.1996)). “As a general rule, the possessor of land owes an invitee or business visitor the duty of exercising reasonable or ordinary care for the benefit of the invitee’s safety, and the possessor is liable for the breach of such duty,” W. at 501 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mitchell v. Ankney, 396 N.W.2d 312, 313 (S.D.1986)). “A business invitee is a business visitor who is invited to enter or remain on land for a purpose directly or indirectly connected with business dealings with the possessor of land.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Ms. Larmon qualifies as a business invitee in this case. See Small v. McKennan Hosp., 437 N.W.2d 194, 199 (S.D.1989) (recognizing duty of care owed by business invitor to invitee", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nquotation marks omitted) (quoting Poelstra v. Basin Elec. Power Coop., 545 N.W.2d 823, 825 (S.D.1996)). “As a general rule, the possessor of land owes an invitee or business visitor the duty of exercising reasonable or ordinary care for the benefit of the invitee’s safety, and the possessor is liable for the breach of such duty,” W. at 501 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mitchell v. Ankney, 396 N.W.2d 312, 313 (S.D.1986)). “A business invitee is a business visitor who is invited to enter or remain on land for a purpose directly or indirectly connected with business dealings with the possessor of land.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Ms. Larmon qualifies as a business invitee in this case. See Small v. McKennan Hosp., 437 N.W.2d 194, 199 (S.D.1989) (holding that the innkeeperguest special relationship simply is not applicable to the potential duty of care owed to a business invitee", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nquotation marks omitted) (quoting Poelstra v. Basin Elec. Power Coop., 545 N.W.2d 823, 825 (S.D.1996)). “As a general rule, the possessor of land owes an invitee or business visitor the duty of exercising reasonable or ordinary care for the benefit of the invitee’s safety, and the possessor is liable for the breach of such duty,” W. at 501 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mitchell v. Ankney, 396 N.W.2d 312, 313 (S.D.1986)). “A business invitee is a business visitor who is invited to enter or remain on land for a purpose directly or indirectly connected with business dealings with the possessor of land.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Ms. Larmon qualifies as a business invitee in this case. See Small v. McKennan Hosp., 437 N.W.2d 194, 199 (S.D.1989) (recognizing that pursuant to the business judgment rule the decisions of business professionals on the board of directors should be presumed valid" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nCarolina, a landlord must prove: (1) That it distinctly reserved in the lease a right to declare a forfeiture for the alleged act or event; (2) that there is clear proof of the happening of an act or event for which the landlord reserved the right to declare a forfeiture; (3) that the landlord promptly exercised its right to declare a forfeiture, and (4) that the result of enforcing the forfeiture is not unconscionable. Charlotte Housing Authority v. Fleming, 123 N.C. App. 511, 513, 473 S.E.2d 373, 375 (1996). “Our courts do not look with favor on lease forfeitures.” Stanley v. Harvey, 90 N.C. App. 535, 539, 369 S.E.2d 382, 385 (1988). “When termination of a lease depends upon notice, the notice must be given in strict compliance with the contract as to both time and contents.” Id. (recognizing that a lease providing for renewal at the termination of the lease did not require the lessee to exercise the option before the lease expired nor did it require renewal at the precise hour of termination but gave the lessee a reasonable time after the termination of the lease in which to make his election", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nCarolina, a landlord must prove: (1) That it distinctly reserved in the lease a right to declare a forfeiture for the alleged act or event; (2) that there is clear proof of the happening of an act or event for which the landlord reserved the right to declare a forfeiture; (3) that the landlord promptly exercised its right to declare a forfeiture, and (4) that the result of enforcing the forfeiture is not unconscionable. Charlotte Housing Authority v. Fleming, 123 N.C. App. 511, 513, 473 S.E.2d 373, 375 (1996). “Our courts do not look with favor on lease forfeitures.” Stanley v. Harvey, 90 N.C. App. 535, 539, 369 S.E.2d 382, 385 (1988). “When termination of a lease depends upon notice, the notice must be given in strict compliance with the contract as to both time and contents.” Id. (holding that when notice to vacate was insufficient to comply with the terms of the lease lease was not properly terminated before commencement of summary ejectment action", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nCarolina, a landlord must prove: (1) That it distinctly reserved in the lease a right to declare a forfeiture for the alleged act or event; (2) that there is clear proof of the happening of an act or event for which the landlord reserved the right to declare a forfeiture; (3) that the landlord promptly exercised its right to declare a forfeiture, and (4) that the result of enforcing the forfeiture is not unconscionable. Charlotte Housing Authority v. Fleming, 123 N.C. App. 511, 513, 473 S.E.2d 373, 375 (1996). “Our courts do not look with favor on lease forfeitures.” Stanley v. Harvey, 90 N.C. App. 535, 539, 369 S.E.2d 382, 385 (1988). “When termination of a lease depends upon notice, the notice must be given in strict compliance with the contract as to both time and contents.” Id. (holding that the plaintiff could not complain that it was unable to comply with the trial courts order to respect the defendants easement because of its lease with a third party where plaintiff had entered into lease knowing that property was subject to an easement", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nCarolina, a landlord must prove: (1) That it distinctly reserved in the lease a right to declare a forfeiture for the alleged act or event; (2) that there is clear proof of the happening of an act or event for which the landlord reserved the right to declare a forfeiture; (3) that the landlord promptly exercised its right to declare a forfeiture, and (4) that the result of enforcing the forfeiture is not unconscionable. Charlotte Housing Authority v. Fleming, 123 N.C. App. 511, 513, 473 S.E.2d 373, 375 (1996). “Our courts do not look with favor on lease forfeitures.” Stanley v. Harvey, 90 N.C. App. 535, 539, 369 S.E.2d 382, 385 (1988). “When termination of a lease depends upon notice, the notice must be given in strict compliance with the contract as to both time and contents.” Id. (holding that the damage for tenancy at sufferance during the holdover period was the monthly rent under the lease versus the apartments fair market value because the lease contained a provision requiring lease payments beyond the lease term", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nCarolina, a landlord must prove: (1) That it distinctly reserved in the lease a right to declare a forfeiture for the alleged act or event; (2) that there is clear proof of the happening of an act or event for which the landlord reserved the right to declare a forfeiture; (3) that the landlord promptly exercised its right to declare a forfeiture, and (4) that the result of enforcing the forfeiture is not unconscionable. Charlotte Housing Authority v. Fleming, 123 N.C. App. 511, 513, 473 S.E.2d 373, 375 (1996). “Our courts do not look with favor on lease forfeitures.” Stanley v. Harvey, 90 N.C. App. 535, 539, 369 S.E.2d 382, 385 (1988). “When termination of a lease depends upon notice, the notice must be given in strict compliance with the contract as to both time and contents.” Id. (holding that former employees of a brokerage firm who had a contractual right to a share of any commission received by the firm upon extension of a lease were not entitled to a share of the commission received when the landlord and tenant entered an amendment to the lease which extended the duration but also added new terms this was a new lease not an extension of the prior lease" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nprocess, they had “at most, a generalized grievance shared by all Michigan residents alike,” and thus lacked the s tute, the Supreme. Court has held that a plaintiff satisfies the injury requirement of standing by alleging “an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a statute, and [that] there exists a credible threat of prosecution thereunder.” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 2334, 2342, 189 L.Ed.2d 246 (2014) (quoting Babbitt v. Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289, 298, 99 S.Ct. 2301, 60 L.Ed.2d 895 (1979)); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264, 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977) (holding that law firm who was plaintiffs adversary in foreclosure proceeding owed no duty to plaintiffs as law firm could not have expected that plaintiffs would rely on law firms representations about payoff amounts", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nprocess, they had “at most, a generalized grievance shared by all Michigan residents alike,” and thus lacked the s tute, the Supreme. Court has held that a plaintiff satisfies the injury requirement of standing by alleging “an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a statute, and [that] there exists a credible threat of prosecution thereunder.” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 2334, 2342, 189 L.Ed.2d 246 (2014) (quoting Babbitt v. Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289, 298, 99 S.Ct. 2301, 60 L.Ed.2d 895 (1979)); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264, 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977) (holding that religious corporation which owned property had standing to challenge zoning ordinance", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nprocess, they had “at most, a generalized grievance shared by all Michigan residents alike,” and thus lacked the s tute, the Supreme. Court has held that a plaintiff satisfies the injury requirement of standing by alleging “an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a statute, and [that] there exists a credible threat of prosecution thereunder.” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 2334, 2342, 189 L.Ed.2d 246 (2014) (quoting Babbitt v. Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289, 298, 99 S.Ct. 2301, 60 L.Ed.2d 895 (1979)); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264, 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977) (holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nprocess, they had “at most, a generalized grievance shared by all Michigan residents alike,” and thus lacked the s tute, the Supreme. Court has held that a plaintiff satisfies the injury requirement of standing by alleging “an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a statute, and [that] there exists a credible threat of prosecution thereunder.” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 2334, 2342, 189 L.Ed.2d 246 (2014) (quoting Babbitt v. Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289, 298, 99 S.Ct. 2301, 60 L.Ed.2d 895 (1979)); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264, 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977) (holding that when plaintiffs bring a facial challenge to a law it must be established that there are no set of circumstances under which the law would be valid", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nprocess, they had “at most, a generalized grievance shared by all Michigan residents alike,” and thus lacked the s tute, the Supreme. Court has held that a plaintiff satisfies the injury requirement of standing by alleging “an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a statute, and [that] there exists a credible threat of prosecution thereunder.” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 2334, 2342, 189 L.Ed.2d 246 (2014) (quoting Babbitt v. Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289, 298, 99 S.Ct. 2301, 60 L.Ed.2d 895 (1979)); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264, 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977) (holding that one of the plaintiffs had standing to challenge a discriminatory zoning law where an injunction against the law would have produced at least a substantial probability warth 422 us at 504 95 sct 2197 that the plaintiffs desired housing project would materialize" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nintervene. See Hawaii-Pacific Venture Capital Corp. v. Rothbard, 564 F.2d 1343, 1346 (9th Cir.1977). If the appellants’ only interest in the present case was to ensure that the MTCA would have sufficient resources to satisfy any judgment they may be able to obtain in the territorial court action, the district court’s reasoning and conclusion would be sound. The district court’s holding, however, does not recognize that the appellants claim an interest in a specific fund being held in the district court’s registry. While a mere economic interest may be insufficient to support the right to intervene, an intervenor’s interest in a specific fund is sufficient to entitle intervention in a case affecting that fund. See, e.g., Gaines v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 434 F.2d 52, 53-54 (5th Cir.1970) (holding contingency fee cases commenced prior to dissolution are assets of the firm", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nintervene. See Hawaii-Pacific Venture Capital Corp. v. Rothbard, 564 F.2d 1343, 1346 (9th Cir.1977). If the appellants’ only interest in the present case was to ensure that the MTCA would have sufficient resources to satisfy any judgment they may be able to obtain in the territorial court action, the district court’s reasoning and conclusion would be sound. The district court’s holding, however, does not recognize that the appellants claim an interest in a specific fund being held in the district court’s registry. While a mere economic interest may be insufficient to support the right to intervene, an intervenor’s interest in a specific fund is sufficient to entitle intervention in a case affecting that fund. See, e.g., Gaines v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 434 F.2d 52, 53-54 (5th Cir.1970) (holding that insurance defense law firm did not have nearpermanent relationship with its clients", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nintervene. See Hawaii-Pacific Venture Capital Corp. v. Rothbard, 564 F.2d 1343, 1346 (9th Cir.1977). If the appellants’ only interest in the present case was to ensure that the MTCA would have sufficient resources to satisfy any judgment they may be able to obtain in the territorial court action, the district court’s reasoning and conclusion would be sound. The district court’s holding, however, does not recognize that the appellants claim an interest in a specific fund being held in the district court’s registry. While a mere economic interest may be insufficient to support the right to intervene, an intervenor’s interest in a specific fund is sufficient to entitle intervention in a case affecting that fund. See, e.g., Gaines v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 434 F.2d 52, 53-54 (5th Cir.1970) (holding that law firm was liable for restitution of contingency fee but not of other noncontingent fees following vacatur of judgment", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nintervene. See Hawaii-Pacific Venture Capital Corp. v. Rothbard, 564 F.2d 1343, 1346 (9th Cir.1977). If the appellants’ only interest in the present case was to ensure that the MTCA would have sufficient resources to satisfy any judgment they may be able to obtain in the territorial court action, the district court’s reasoning and conclusion would be sound. The district court’s holding, however, does not recognize that the appellants claim an interest in a specific fund being held in the district court’s registry. While a mere economic interest may be insufficient to support the right to intervene, an intervenor’s interest in a specific fund is sufficient to entitle intervention in a case affecting that fund. See, e.g., Gaines v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 434 F.2d 52, 53-54 (5th Cir.1970) (holding that workers compensation insurer was required to intervene in injured employees tort action to protect and enforce its subrogation lien and could not file a separate action", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nintervene. See Hawaii-Pacific Venture Capital Corp. v. Rothbard, 564 F.2d 1343, 1346 (9th Cir.1977). If the appellants’ only interest in the present case was to ensure that the MTCA would have sufficient resources to satisfy any judgment they may be able to obtain in the territorial court action, the district court’s reasoning and conclusion would be sound. The district court’s holding, however, does not recognize that the appellants claim an interest in a specific fund being held in the district court’s registry. While a mere economic interest may be insufficient to support the right to intervene, an intervenor’s interest in a specific fund is sufficient to entitle intervention in a case affecting that fund. See, e.g., Gaines v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 434 F.2d 52, 53-54 (5th Cir.1970) (holding that a law firm could intervene in a former clients action to protect its interest in its contingency fee" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nmanslaughter conviction where teenager died in an automobile accident after leaving an underage drinking party that the defendant knowingly permitted her minor daughter to host); Commonwealth v. Keysock, 236 Pa.Super. 474, 345 A.2d 767, 773-74 (1975) (upholding involuntary manslaughter conviction for driver after vehicle on which he put bald tires killed another driver after a traffic accident). It was reasonable for the jury to infer that, had Appellant properly performed his duties, the accident would not have occurred. The cases relied upon by Appellant in support of his sufficiency challenge are inapposite, as they involve factual circumstances where the defendant’s conduct was more remote and attenuated. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Moyer, 436 Pa.Super. 442, 648 A.2d 42, 46 (1994) (holding commonwealth did not establish a prima facie case of involuntary manslaughter after a jet ski crashed into defendants boat because there was no evidence that the defendant could have avoided the accident", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nmanslaughter conviction where teenager died in an automobile accident after leaving an underage drinking party that the defendant knowingly permitted her minor daughter to host); Commonwealth v. Keysock, 236 Pa.Super. 474, 345 A.2d 767, 773-74 (1975) (upholding involuntary manslaughter conviction for driver after vehicle on which he put bald tires killed another driver after a traffic accident). It was reasonable for the jury to infer that, had Appellant properly performed his duties, the accident would not have occurred. The cases relied upon by Appellant in support of his sufficiency challenge are inapposite, as they involve factual circumstances where the defendant’s conduct was more remote and attenuated. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Moyer, 436 Pa.Super. 442, 648 A.2d 42, 46 (1994) (holding that the plaintiff made a prima facie case even though there was no evidence of causal connection other than the fact that the plaintiff was fired after bringing a lawsuit", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nmanslaughter conviction where teenager died in an automobile accident after leaving an underage drinking party that the defendant knowingly permitted her minor daughter to host); Commonwealth v. Keysock, 236 Pa.Super. 474, 345 A.2d 767, 773-74 (1975) (upholding involuntary manslaughter conviction for driver after vehicle on which he put bald tires killed another driver after a traffic accident). It was reasonable for the jury to infer that, had Appellant properly performed his duties, the accident would not have occurred. The cases relied upon by Appellant in support of his sufficiency challenge are inapposite, as they involve factual circumstances where the defendant’s conduct was more remote and attenuated. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Moyer, 436 Pa.Super. 442, 648 A.2d 42, 46 (1994) (holding that plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of discrimination because she was unable to present evidence that she was qualified for the position", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nmanslaughter conviction where teenager died in an automobile accident after leaving an underage drinking party that the defendant knowingly permitted her minor daughter to host); Commonwealth v. Keysock, 236 Pa.Super. 474, 345 A.2d 767, 773-74 (1975) (upholding involuntary manslaughter conviction for driver after vehicle on which he put bald tires killed another driver after a traffic accident). It was reasonable for the jury to infer that, had Appellant properly performed his duties, the accident would not have occurred. The cases relied upon by Appellant in support of his sufficiency challenge are inapposite, as they involve factual circumstances where the defendant’s conduct was more remote and attenuated. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Moyer, 436 Pa.Super. 442, 648 A.2d 42, 46 (1994) (holding that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation because there was no evidence that the decisionmaker knew of the plaintiffs protected conduct", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nmanslaughter conviction where teenager died in an automobile accident after leaving an underage drinking party that the defendant knowingly permitted her minor daughter to host); Commonwealth v. Keysock, 236 Pa.Super. 474, 345 A.2d 767, 773-74 (1975) (upholding involuntary manslaughter conviction for driver after vehicle on which he put bald tires killed another driver after a traffic accident). It was reasonable for the jury to infer that, had Appellant properly performed his duties, the accident would not have occurred. The cases relied upon by Appellant in support of his sufficiency challenge are inapposite, as they involve factual circumstances where the defendant’s conduct was more remote and attenuated. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Moyer, 436 Pa.Super. 442, 648 A.2d 42, 46 (1994) (holding to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination a plaintiff must show he 1" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nsuperfluous subsection (C)’s careful limitation to the Secretary’s failure to perform nondiscretionary duties under 16 U.S.C. § 1533, id. at 172, 117 S.Ct. 1154. Here, Claim V does not allege that the Service committed any act prohibited under § 1538 (“Prohibited Acts”). Rather, plaintiffs allege that the Service “violated” several aspirational provisions that govern how the Service implements the ESA and, by extension, CITES. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 181-87. These are precisely the sort of “maladministration” claims that cannot be enforced through the ESA’s citizen-suit provision. See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 174, 117 S.Ct. 1154. This Court and others have recently applied Bennett to foreclose private enforcement of similar claims. See Marcum, 810 F.Supp.2d at 69-70, 2011 WL 3805666, at *11 (holding that the caption is entitled to considerable weight when determining who the plaintiffs to a suit are since plaintiffs draft complaints", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nsuperfluous subsection (C)’s careful limitation to the Secretary’s failure to perform nondiscretionary duties under 16 U.S.C. § 1533, id. at 172, 117 S.Ct. 1154. Here, Claim V does not allege that the Service committed any act prohibited under § 1538 (“Prohibited Acts”). Rather, plaintiffs allege that the Service “violated” several aspirational provisions that govern how the Service implements the ESA and, by extension, CITES. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 181-87. These are precisely the sort of “maladministration” claims that cannot be enforced through the ESA’s citizen-suit provision. See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 174, 117 S.Ct. 1154. This Court and others have recently applied Bennett to foreclose private enforcement of similar claims. See Marcum, 810 F.Supp.2d at 69-70, 2011 WL 3805666, at *11 (holding unconscionable arbitration provision that applied to all claims brought by borrower in reverse mortgage contract but not claims brought by the drafting party the lender", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nsuperfluous subsection (C)’s careful limitation to the Secretary’s failure to perform nondiscretionary duties under 16 U.S.C. § 1533, id. at 172, 117 S.Ct. 1154. Here, Claim V does not allege that the Service committed any act prohibited under § 1538 (“Prohibited Acts”). Rather, plaintiffs allege that the Service “violated” several aspirational provisions that govern how the Service implements the ESA and, by extension, CITES. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 181-87. These are precisely the sort of “maladministration” claims that cannot be enforced through the ESA’s citizen-suit provision. See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 174, 117 S.Ct. 1154. This Court and others have recently applied Bennett to foreclose private enforcement of similar claims. See Marcum, 810 F.Supp.2d at 69-70, 2011 WL 3805666, at *11 (holding that informal complaints to superiors about discrimination constitute protected activity", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nsuperfluous subsection (C)’s careful limitation to the Secretary’s failure to perform nondiscretionary duties under 16 U.S.C. § 1533, id. at 172, 117 S.Ct. 1154. Here, Claim V does not allege that the Service committed any act prohibited under § 1538 (“Prohibited Acts”). Rather, plaintiffs allege that the Service “violated” several aspirational provisions that govern how the Service implements the ESA and, by extension, CITES. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 181-87. These are precisely the sort of “maladministration” claims that cannot be enforced through the ESA’s citizen-suit provision. See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 174, 117 S.Ct. 1154. This Court and others have recently applied Bennett to foreclose private enforcement of similar claims. See Marcum, 810 F.Supp.2d at 69-70, 2011 WL 3805666, at *11 (holding that plaintiffs complaints about wrongful permit denials could not be brought via the esas citizensuit provision", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nsuperfluous subsection (C)’s careful limitation to the Secretary’s failure to perform nondiscretionary duties under 16 U.S.C. § 1533, id. at 172, 117 S.Ct. 1154. Here, Claim V does not allege that the Service committed any act prohibited under § 1538 (“Prohibited Acts”). Rather, plaintiffs allege that the Service “violated” several aspirational provisions that govern how the Service implements the ESA and, by extension, CITES. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 181-87. These are precisely the sort of “maladministration” claims that cannot be enforced through the ESA’s citizen-suit provision. See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 174, 117 S.Ct. 1154. This Court and others have recently applied Bennett to foreclose private enforcement of similar claims. See Marcum, 810 F.Supp.2d at 69-70, 2011 WL 3805666, at *11 (holding that underlying complaints filed by several plaintiffs all contained express allegations of property damage and that because all complaints arose from the same set of circumstances the allegations in any single complaint can be inferred in the other complaints" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndoes not seek to arrest state tax collection, comity is no bar to such a result. See Hibbs, 542 U.S. at 93, 124 S.Ct. 2276 (citing Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 233, 84 S.Ct. 1226, 12 L.Ed.2d 256 (1964) as a case where the Court acted without regard to the TIA (or related comity concerns) since, when the Court was “faced with unconstitutional closure of county public schools and tuition grants and tax credits for contributions to private segregated schools,” it concluded that the “District Court could require county to levy taxes to fund nondiscriminatory public schools” (emphasis added)). This conclusion means that our decision in U.S. Brewers is no longer good law, which we are not bound to follow. United States v. Rodríguez-Pacheco, 475 F.3d 434, 441 (1st Cir.2007) (recognizing an exception to stare decisis where an existing panel decision is undermined by controlling authority subsequently announced such as an opinion of the supreme court quoting williams v ashland engg co 45 f3d 588 592 1st cir1995", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndoes not seek to arrest state tax collection, comity is no bar to such a result. See Hibbs, 542 U.S. at 93, 124 S.Ct. 2276 (citing Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 233, 84 S.Ct. 1226, 12 L.Ed.2d 256 (1964) as a case where the Court acted without regard to the TIA (or related comity concerns) since, when the Court was “faced with unconstitutional closure of county public schools and tuition grants and tax credits for contributions to private segregated schools,” it concluded that the “District Court could require county to levy taxes to fund nondiscriminatory public schools” (emphasis added)). This conclusion means that our decision in U.S. Brewers is no longer good law, which we are not bound to follow. United States v. Rodríguez-Pacheco, 475 F.3d 434, 441 (1st Cir.2007) (holding stare decisis applies when one court of appeals panel is faced with previous decision of different panel", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndoes not seek to arrest state tax collection, comity is no bar to such a result. See Hibbs, 542 U.S. at 93, 124 S.Ct. 2276 (citing Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 233, 84 S.Ct. 1226, 12 L.Ed.2d 256 (1964) as a case where the Court acted without regard to the TIA (or related comity concerns) since, when the Court was “faced with unconstitutional closure of county public schools and tuition grants and tax credits for contributions to private segregated schools,” it concluded that the “District Court could require county to levy taxes to fund nondiscriminatory public schools” (emphasis added)). This conclusion means that our decision in U.S. Brewers is no longer good law, which we are not bound to follow. United States v. Rodríguez-Pacheco, 475 F.3d 434, 441 (1st Cir.2007) (holding that stare decisis is not applicable unless the issue was squarely addressed in a prior decision", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndoes not seek to arrest state tax collection, comity is no bar to such a result. See Hibbs, 542 U.S. at 93, 124 S.Ct. 2276 (citing Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 233, 84 S.Ct. 1226, 12 L.Ed.2d 256 (1964) as a case where the Court acted without regard to the TIA (or related comity concerns) since, when the Court was “faced with unconstitutional closure of county public schools and tuition grants and tax credits for contributions to private segregated schools,” it concluded that the “District Court could require county to levy taxes to fund nondiscriminatory public schools” (emphasis added)). This conclusion means that our decision in U.S. Brewers is no longer good law, which we are not bound to follow. United States v. Rodríguez-Pacheco, 475 F.3d 434, 441 (1st Cir.2007) (recognizing such an exception", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndoes not seek to arrest state tax collection, comity is no bar to such a result. See Hibbs, 542 U.S. at 93, 124 S.Ct. 2276 (citing Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 233, 84 S.Ct. 1226, 12 L.Ed.2d 256 (1964) as a case where the Court acted without regard to the TIA (or related comity concerns) since, when the Court was “faced with unconstitutional closure of county public schools and tuition grants and tax credits for contributions to private segregated schools,” it concluded that the “District Court could require county to levy taxes to fund nondiscriminatory public schools” (emphasis added)). This conclusion means that our decision in U.S. Brewers is no longer good law, which we are not bound to follow. United States v. Rodríguez-Pacheco, 475 F.3d 434, 441 (1st Cir.2007) (holding that decision by panel of this court is established precedent under rules of stare decisis" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nto attorneys at lower rates were “general assertions of superiority rather than factual misrepresentations.” Id. at 246; see also United States v. Gay, 967 F.2d 322, 329 (9th Cir.1992) (“ ‘Puffing’ concerns expressions of opinion, as opposed to the knowingly false statements of fact which the law proscribes.”). The statements Marin complains of here are, likewise, vague, highly generalized and subjective statements regarding Deloitte’s abilities to implement the RFP. See, e.g., Newcal Indus. v. Ikon Office Solution, 513 F.3d 1038, 1053 (9th Cir.2008) (claims that company would deliver “flexibility” in their contracts and would lower copying costs for consumers is not a “quantifiable claim” but “classic puffery”); Williams v. Aztar Indiana Gaming Corp., 351 F.3d 294, 299 (7th Cir.2003) (holding that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over rico claims and that plaintiffs federal rico claim was barred by res judicata since he failed to bring his rico claim along with his state fraud claims in prior state court action", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nto attorneys at lower rates were “general assertions of superiority rather than factual misrepresentations.” Id. at 246; see also United States v. Gay, 967 F.2d 322, 329 (9th Cir.1992) (“ ‘Puffing’ concerns expressions of opinion, as opposed to the knowingly false statements of fact which the law proscribes.”). The statements Marin complains of here are, likewise, vague, highly generalized and subjective statements regarding Deloitte’s abilities to implement the RFP. See, e.g., Newcal Indus. v. Ikon Office Solution, 513 F.3d 1038, 1053 (9th Cir.2008) (claims that company would deliver “flexibility” in their contracts and would lower copying costs for consumers is not a “quantifiable claim” but “classic puffery”); Williams v. Aztar Indiana Gaming Corp., 351 F.3d 294, 299 (7th Cir.2003) (holding that rule 9bs heightened pleading requirement applies to allegations of mail and wire fraud used as predicate acts for a rico claim", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nto attorneys at lower rates were “general assertions of superiority rather than factual misrepresentations.” Id. at 246; see also United States v. Gay, 967 F.2d 322, 329 (9th Cir.1992) (“ ‘Puffing’ concerns expressions of opinion, as opposed to the knowingly false statements of fact which the law proscribes.”). The statements Marin complains of here are, likewise, vague, highly generalized and subjective statements regarding Deloitte’s abilities to implement the RFP. See, e.g., Newcal Indus. v. Ikon Office Solution, 513 F.3d 1038, 1053 (9th Cir.2008) (claims that company would deliver “flexibility” in their contracts and would lower copying costs for consumers is not a “quantifiable claim” but “classic puffery”); Williams v. Aztar Indiana Gaming Corp., 351 F.3d 294, 299 (7th Cir.2003) (holding that sales puffery cannot constitute mail fraud to support rico claim", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nto attorneys at lower rates were “general assertions of superiority rather than factual misrepresentations.” Id. at 246; see also United States v. Gay, 967 F.2d 322, 329 (9th Cir.1992) (“ ‘Puffing’ concerns expressions of opinion, as opposed to the knowingly false statements of fact which the law proscribes.”). The statements Marin complains of here are, likewise, vague, highly generalized and subjective statements regarding Deloitte’s abilities to implement the RFP. See, e.g., Newcal Indus. v. Ikon Office Solution, 513 F.3d 1038, 1053 (9th Cir.2008) (claims that company would deliver “flexibility” in their contracts and would lower copying costs for consumers is not a “quantifiable claim” but “classic puffery”); Williams v. Aztar Indiana Gaming Corp., 351 F.3d 294, 299 (7th Cir.2003) (holding that plaintiff lacked standing to assert rico claim for mail fraud based on misrepresentations made to third parties", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nto attorneys at lower rates were “general assertions of superiority rather than factual misrepresentations.” Id. at 246; see also United States v. Gay, 967 F.2d 322, 329 (9th Cir.1992) (“ ‘Puffing’ concerns expressions of opinion, as opposed to the knowingly false statements of fact which the law proscribes.”). The statements Marin complains of here are, likewise, vague, highly generalized and subjective statements regarding Deloitte’s abilities to implement the RFP. See, e.g., Newcal Indus. v. Ikon Office Solution, 513 F.3d 1038, 1053 (9th Cir.2008) (claims that company would deliver “flexibility” in their contracts and would lower copying costs for consumers is not a “quantifiable claim” but “classic puffery”); Williams v. Aztar Indiana Gaming Corp., 351 F.3d 294, 299 (7th Cir.2003) (holding that a plaintiff cannot avoid the securities fraud exception by pleading mail fraud or wire fraud if the conduct giving rise to those offenses also amounts to securities fraud" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nHere, however, CNI did not make that choice. CNI’s charter requires board approval to waive sovereign immunity. The charter provides: To sue in its corporate name and, notwithstanding the immunity possessed by the Corporation as a wholly owned corporation of the Chickasaw Nation, to permit by written resolution of the board of directors enforcement of leases, contracts, agreements and mortgage instruments to which the Corporation is a party, against the Corporation in tribal court, or any court of competent jurisdiction by agreement of the board of directors.... MBF argues that CNI’s charter has a sue- and-be sued clause, which expressly waives immunity. Some courts have held that a broad sue-and-be-sued clause does waive trib ain Ute Tribe, 107 P.3d 402, 407-08 (Colo.Ct.App.2004) (holding that a state may waive its sovereign immunity", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nHere, however, CNI did not make that choice. CNI’s charter requires board approval to waive sovereign immunity. The charter provides: To sue in its corporate name and, notwithstanding the immunity possessed by the Corporation as a wholly owned corporation of the Chickasaw Nation, to permit by written resolution of the board of directors enforcement of leases, contracts, agreements and mortgage instruments to which the Corporation is a party, against the Corporation in tribal court, or any court of competent jurisdiction by agreement of the board of directors.... MBF argues that CNI’s charter has a sue- and-be sued clause, which expressly waives immunity. Some courts have held that a broad sue-and-be-sued clause does waive trib ain Ute Tribe, 107 P.3d 402, 407-08 (Colo.Ct.App.2004) (holding that an indian tribes exercise of criminal jurisdiction over nonindians is inconsistent with the domesticdependent status of the tribes and that tribes may not assume such jurisdiction without congressional authorization", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nHere, however, CNI did not make that choice. CNI’s charter requires board approval to waive sovereign immunity. The charter provides: To sue in its corporate name and, notwithstanding the immunity possessed by the Corporation as a wholly owned corporation of the Chickasaw Nation, to permit by written resolution of the board of directors enforcement of leases, contracts, agreements and mortgage instruments to which the Corporation is a party, against the Corporation in tribal court, or any court of competent jurisdiction by agreement of the board of directors.... MBF argues that CNI’s charter has a sue- and-be sued clause, which expressly waives immunity. Some courts have held that a broad sue-and-be-sued clause does waive trib ain Ute Tribe, 107 P.3d 402, 407-08 (Colo.Ct.App.2004) (holding that a tribes agent who has apparent authority may waive immunity without board approval", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nHere, however, CNI did not make that choice. CNI’s charter requires board approval to waive sovereign immunity. The charter provides: To sue in its corporate name and, notwithstanding the immunity possessed by the Corporation as a wholly owned corporation of the Chickasaw Nation, to permit by written resolution of the board of directors enforcement of leases, contracts, agreements and mortgage instruments to which the Corporation is a party, against the Corporation in tribal court, or any court of competent jurisdiction by agreement of the board of directors.... MBF argues that CNI’s charter has a sue- and-be sued clause, which expressly waives immunity. Some courts have held that a broad sue-and-be-sued clause does waive trib ain Ute Tribe, 107 P.3d 402, 407-08 (Colo.Ct.App.2004) (holding that an act of legislature may be required to waive sovereign immunity", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nHere, however, CNI did not make that choice. CNI’s charter requires board approval to waive sovereign immunity. The charter provides: To sue in its corporate name and, notwithstanding the immunity possessed by the Corporation as a wholly owned corporation of the Chickasaw Nation, to permit by written resolution of the board of directors enforcement of leases, contracts, agreements and mortgage instruments to which the Corporation is a party, against the Corporation in tribal court, or any court of competent jurisdiction by agreement of the board of directors.... MBF argues that CNI’s charter has a sue- and-be sued clause, which expressly waives immunity. Some courts have held that a broad sue-and-be-sued clause does waive trib ain Ute Tribe, 107 P.3d 402, 407-08 (Colo.Ct.App.2004) (holding that tribes did not waive their immunity by intervening in administrative proceedings because any waiver must be unequivocal and may not be implied" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nplaintiffs [are] competitors.” C&W counters that CBS alleges no facts even hinting that C&W might itself be a competitor of CBS except for C&W’s 27% investment in CCC, and that as a matter of law such an investment alone cannot vicariously make C&W a compet 8 WL 32012 (Del.Super.1988) (citing cases holding day-today control required before court will pierce corporate veil or find parent liable); Outokumpu Engineering Enterprises, Inc. v. Kvaerner Enviropower, Inc., 685 A.2d 724, 729 n. 21 (Del.Super.1996) (noting test for parent’s liability for act of subsidiary is whether parent had “exclusive domination and control to the point that the subsidiary no longer has legal or independent significance of its own”); cf. Tiger Trash v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 560 F.2d 818 (7th Cir.1977) (holding that a close relationship between a parent corporation and a subsidiary may justify finding that the parent engages in business in the jurisdiction through the local activities of its subsidiary", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nplaintiffs [are] competitors.” C&W counters that CBS alleges no facts even hinting that C&W might itself be a competitor of CBS except for C&W’s 27% investment in CCC, and that as a matter of law such an investment alone cannot vicariously make C&W a compet 8 WL 32012 (Del.Super.1988) (citing cases holding day-today control required before court will pierce corporate veil or find parent liable); Outokumpu Engineering Enterprises, Inc. v. Kvaerner Enviropower, Inc., 685 A.2d 724, 729 n. 21 (Del.Super.1996) (noting test for parent’s liability for act of subsidiary is whether parent had “exclusive domination and control to the point that the subsidiary no longer has legal or independent significance of its own”); cf. Tiger Trash v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 560 F.2d 818 (7th Cir.1977) (holding that a parent must exercise some control over the subsidiarys activities which does not require that the subsidiary be controlled to an ultimate degree by its parent although something more than mere passive investment by the parent is required the parent must have and exercise control and direction over the affairs of its subsidiary in order for venue to be proper", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nplaintiffs [are] competitors.” C&W counters that CBS alleges no facts even hinting that C&W might itself be a competitor of CBS except for C&W’s 27% investment in CCC, and that as a matter of law such an investment alone cannot vicariously make C&W a compet 8 WL 32012 (Del.Super.1988) (citing cases holding day-today control required before court will pierce corporate veil or find parent liable); Outokumpu Engineering Enterprises, Inc. v. Kvaerner Enviropower, Inc., 685 A.2d 724, 729 n. 21 (Del.Super.1996) (noting test for parent’s liability for act of subsidiary is whether parent had “exclusive domination and control to the point that the subsidiary no longer has legal or independent significance of its own”); cf. Tiger Trash v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 560 F.2d 818 (7th Cir.1977) (holding that in order to prevent parent from carrying out anticompetitive activity through subsidiary test for venue is whether parents control over subsidiary caused parent to transact business in state within venue provision of clayton act", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nplaintiffs [are] competitors.” C&W counters that CBS alleges no facts even hinting that C&W might itself be a competitor of CBS except for C&W’s 27% investment in CCC, and that as a matter of law such an investment alone cannot vicariously make C&W a compet 8 WL 32012 (Del.Super.1988) (citing cases holding day-today control required before court will pierce corporate veil or find parent liable); Outokumpu Engineering Enterprises, Inc. v. Kvaerner Enviropower, Inc., 685 A.2d 724, 729 n. 21 (Del.Super.1996) (noting test for parent’s liability for act of subsidiary is whether parent had “exclusive domination and control to the point that the subsidiary no longer has legal or independent significance of its own”); cf. Tiger Trash v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 560 F.2d 818 (7th Cir.1977) (recognizing separate corporate identity of parent despite evidence that parent consolidated its profits and losses with that of its whollyowned subsidiary in presenting parents financial reports to shareholders that subsidiary was considered a division of parent and that subsidiary accounted for 60 of parents and subsidiarys combined operations", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nplaintiffs [are] competitors.” C&W counters that CBS alleges no facts even hinting that C&W might itself be a competitor of CBS except for C&W’s 27% investment in CCC, and that as a matter of law such an investment alone cannot vicariously make C&W a compet 8 WL 32012 (Del.Super.1988) (citing cases holding day-today control required before court will pierce corporate veil or find parent liable); Outokumpu Engineering Enterprises, Inc. v. Kvaerner Enviropower, Inc., 685 A.2d 724, 729 n. 21 (Del.Super.1996) (noting test for parent’s liability for act of subsidiary is whether parent had “exclusive domination and control to the point that the subsidiary no longer has legal or independent significance of its own”); cf. Tiger Trash v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 560 F.2d 818 (7th Cir.1977) (holding that parent is liable for acts of subsidiary under agency theory only if parent dominates subsidiary parent of whollyowned subsidiary that had seats on board took part in financing and approved major policy decisions was not liable because parent did not have daytoday control" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\n456 F.Supp. 355, 358 (N.D.Ga.1978) (O’Kelley, J.) When the initial pleading provides at least a clue as to the plaintiffs citizenship, the burden is on the defendant to file the petition for removal within thirty days of receipt of the initial pleading. Kanter & Eisenberg v. Madison Assocs., 602 F.Supp. 798, 801 (N.D.Ill.1985); Richman v. Zimmer, Inc., 644 F.Supp. 540, 541 (S.D.Fla.1986); Kaneshiro v. North Am. Co. for Life and Health Ins., 496 F.Supp. 452, 462 (D.Haw.1980). An overwhelming majority of the courts that have considered this matter have concluded that the plaintiffs failure to allege a party’s citizenship in the initial pleading does not prevent the thirty day removal period from commencing. See e.g., Stokes v. Victory Carriers, Inc., 577 F.Supp. 9, 11 (E.D.Pa.1983) (holding that failure to allege plaintiffs citizenship in notice of removal amounted to defect in removal procedure under former version of 28 usc 1447c", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\n456 F.Supp. 355, 358 (N.D.Ga.1978) (O’Kelley, J.) When the initial pleading provides at least a clue as to the plaintiffs citizenship, the burden is on the defendant to file the petition for removal within thirty days of receipt of the initial pleading. Kanter & Eisenberg v. Madison Assocs., 602 F.Supp. 798, 801 (N.D.Ill.1985); Richman v. Zimmer, Inc., 644 F.Supp. 540, 541 (S.D.Fla.1986); Kaneshiro v. North Am. Co. for Life and Health Ins., 496 F.Supp. 452, 462 (D.Haw.1980). An overwhelming majority of the courts that have considered this matter have concluded that the plaintiffs failure to allege a party’s citizenship in the initial pleading does not prevent the thirty day removal period from commencing. See e.g., Stokes v. Victory Carriers, Inc., 577 F.Supp. 9, 11 (E.D.Pa.1983) (holding that the failure to join all the defendants in a removal petition is not a jurisdictional defect", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\n456 F.Supp. 355, 358 (N.D.Ga.1978) (O’Kelley, J.) When the initial pleading provides at least a clue as to the plaintiffs citizenship, the burden is on the defendant to file the petition for removal within thirty days of receipt of the initial pleading. Kanter & Eisenberg v. Madison Assocs., 602 F.Supp. 798, 801 (N.D.Ill.1985); Richman v. Zimmer, Inc., 644 F.Supp. 540, 541 (S.D.Fla.1986); Kaneshiro v. North Am. Co. for Life and Health Ins., 496 F.Supp. 452, 462 (D.Haw.1980). An overwhelming majority of the courts that have considered this matter have concluded that the plaintiffs failure to allege a party’s citizenship in the initial pleading does not prevent the thirty day removal period from commencing. See e.g., Stokes v. Victory Carriers, Inc., 577 F.Supp. 9, 11 (E.D.Pa.1983) (holding that plaintiffs failure to allege citizenship of first defendant did not constitute good cause for second defendants failure to timely join in removal petition", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\n456 F.Supp. 355, 358 (N.D.Ga.1978) (O’Kelley, J.) When the initial pleading provides at least a clue as to the plaintiffs citizenship, the burden is on the defendant to file the petition for removal within thirty days of receipt of the initial pleading. Kanter & Eisenberg v. Madison Assocs., 602 F.Supp. 798, 801 (N.D.Ill.1985); Richman v. Zimmer, Inc., 644 F.Supp. 540, 541 (S.D.Fla.1986); Kaneshiro v. North Am. Co. for Life and Health Ins., 496 F.Supp. 452, 462 (D.Haw.1980). An overwhelming majority of the courts that have considered this matter have concluded that the plaintiffs failure to allege a party’s citizenship in the initial pleading does not prevent the thirty day removal period from commencing. See e.g., Stokes v. Victory Carriers, Inc., 577 F.Supp. 9, 11 (E.D.Pa.1983) (holding that a party fraudulently joined to defeat removal need not join in a removal petition and is disregarded in determining diversity of citizenship", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\n456 F.Supp. 355, 358 (N.D.Ga.1978) (O’Kelley, J.) When the initial pleading provides at least a clue as to the plaintiffs citizenship, the burden is on the defendant to file the petition for removal within thirty days of receipt of the initial pleading. Kanter & Eisenberg v. Madison Assocs., 602 F.Supp. 798, 801 (N.D.Ill.1985); Richman v. Zimmer, Inc., 644 F.Supp. 540, 541 (S.D.Fla.1986); Kaneshiro v. North Am. Co. for Life and Health Ins., 496 F.Supp. 452, 462 (D.Haw.1980). An overwhelming majority of the courts that have considered this matter have concluded that the plaintiffs failure to allege a party’s citizenship in the initial pleading does not prevent the thirty day removal period from commencing. See e.g., Stokes v. Victory Carriers, Inc., 577 F.Supp. 9, 11 (E.D.Pa.1983) (holding that the failure of all defendant to join in the petition for removal mandated remand to state court" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\ncase as well over the plaintiffs claim under section 1132(a). In its reply brief, Farm Bureau slipped in an additional jurisdictional argument: that because the plaintiff admitted that its recovery in her uninsured motorist state court case is “potential,” the present declaratory judgment action is not ripe. Arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are not favored. Balsley v. LFP, Inc., 691 F.3d 747, 773 (6th Cir.2012) (“Issues raised for the first time in a reply brief are not properly before this court” (quoting United States v. Perkins, 994 F.2d 1184, 1191 (6th Cir.1993))). Nonetheless, ripeness is an essential feature of Article III jurisdiction, so the Court will address it. See FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231, 110 S.Ct. 596, 107 L.Ed.2d 603 (1990) (holding that article iii standing is necessary for intervention", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\ncase as well over the plaintiffs claim under section 1132(a). In its reply brief, Farm Bureau slipped in an additional jurisdictional argument: that because the plaintiff admitted that its recovery in her uninsured motorist state court case is “potential,” the present declaratory judgment action is not ripe. Arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are not favored. Balsley v. LFP, Inc., 691 F.3d 747, 773 (6th Cir.2012) (“Issues raised for the first time in a reply brief are not properly before this court” (quoting United States v. Perkins, 994 F.2d 1184, 1191 (6th Cir.1993))). Nonetheless, ripeness is an essential feature of Article III jurisdiction, so the Court will address it. See FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231, 110 S.Ct. 596, 107 L.Ed.2d 603 (1990) (holding that federal courts may not consider other issues before resolving standing an article iii jurisdictional matter", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\ncase as well over the plaintiffs claim under section 1132(a). In its reply brief, Farm Bureau slipped in an additional jurisdictional argument: that because the plaintiff admitted that its recovery in her uninsured motorist state court case is “potential,” the present declaratory judgment action is not ripe. Arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are not favored. Balsley v. LFP, Inc., 691 F.3d 747, 773 (6th Cir.2012) (“Issues raised for the first time in a reply brief are not properly before this court” (quoting United States v. Perkins, 994 F.2d 1184, 1191 (6th Cir.1993))). Nonetheless, ripeness is an essential feature of Article III jurisdiction, so the Court will address it. See FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231, 110 S.Ct. 596, 107 L.Ed.2d 603 (1990) (holding that article iii courts have an independent obligation to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\ncase as well over the plaintiffs claim under section 1132(a). In its reply brief, Farm Bureau slipped in an additional jurisdictional argument: that because the plaintiff admitted that its recovery in her uninsured motorist state court case is “potential,” the present declaratory judgment action is not ripe. Arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are not favored. Balsley v. LFP, Inc., 691 F.3d 747, 773 (6th Cir.2012) (“Issues raised for the first time in a reply brief are not properly before this court” (quoting United States v. Perkins, 994 F.2d 1184, 1191 (6th Cir.1993))). Nonetheless, ripeness is an essential feature of Article III jurisdiction, so the Court will address it. See FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231, 110 S.Ct. 596, 107 L.Ed.2d 603 (1990) (holding that the jones act provides an independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\ncase as well over the plaintiffs claim under section 1132(a). In its reply brief, Farm Bureau slipped in an additional jurisdictional argument: that because the plaintiff admitted that its recovery in her uninsured motorist state court case is “potential,” the present declaratory judgment action is not ripe. Arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are not favored. Balsley v. LFP, Inc., 691 F.3d 747, 773 (6th Cir.2012) (“Issues raised for the first time in a reply brief are not properly before this court” (quoting United States v. Perkins, 994 F.2d 1184, 1191 (6th Cir.1993))). Nonetheless, ripeness is an essential feature of Article III jurisdiction, so the Court will address it. See FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231, 110 S.Ct. 596, 107 L.Ed.2d 603 (1990) (holding that the bankruptcy courts jurisdiction to adjudicate common law claims violated article iii without deciding the claims" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nmisconduct based on the patentee’s destruction of relevant documents and lodging of incomplete and misleading extrinsic evidence. 653 F.3d at 1324-25. This court also concluded that the record supported the district court’s finding that the patentee acted in subjective bad faith “by exploiting the high cost to defend complex litigation to extract a nuisance value settlement.” Id. at 1327. We held that the district court properly considered the patentee’s “ability to impose high costs to defend against its meritless claims,” and inducement of settlement payments by proposing low settlemept offers of “less than ten percent of the cost that [the accused infringer] expended to defend suit.” Id. at 1327; see Kilopass Tech., Inc. v. Sidense Corp., 738 F.3d 1302, 1311 (Fed.Cir.2013) (holding that future benefits are available upon a finding of bad faith because repudiation is a legal conclusion which the trial court reaches after the fact finder makes its determinations about whether there was a breach and whether the breach was in bad faith", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nmisconduct based on the patentee’s destruction of relevant documents and lodging of incomplete and misleading extrinsic evidence. 653 F.3d at 1324-25. This court also concluded that the record supported the district court’s finding that the patentee acted in subjective bad faith “by exploiting the high cost to defend complex litigation to extract a nuisance value settlement.” Id. at 1327. We held that the district court properly considered the patentee’s “ability to impose high costs to defend against its meritless claims,” and inducement of settlement payments by proposing low settlemept offers of “less than ten percent of the cost that [the accused infringer] expended to defend suit.” Id. at 1327; see Kilopass Tech., Inc. v. Sidense Corp., 738 F.3d 1302, 1311 (Fed.Cir.2013) (holding that the district court should consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether the patentee acted in subjective bad faith and should consider whether circumstantial evidence would support an inference of bad faith", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nmisconduct based on the patentee’s destruction of relevant documents and lodging of incomplete and misleading extrinsic evidence. 653 F.3d at 1324-25. This court also concluded that the record supported the district court’s finding that the patentee acted in subjective bad faith “by exploiting the high cost to defend complex litigation to extract a nuisance value settlement.” Id. at 1327. We held that the district court properly considered the patentee’s “ability to impose high costs to defend against its meritless claims,” and inducement of settlement payments by proposing low settlemept offers of “less than ten percent of the cost that [the accused infringer] expended to defend suit.” Id. at 1327; see Kilopass Tech., Inc. v. Sidense Corp., 738 F.3d 1302, 1311 (Fed.Cir.2013) (holding that evidence of counsels bad faith constituted unusual circumstances", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nmisconduct based on the patentee’s destruction of relevant documents and lodging of incomplete and misleading extrinsic evidence. 653 F.3d at 1324-25. This court also concluded that the record supported the district court’s finding that the patentee acted in subjective bad faith “by exploiting the high cost to defend complex litigation to extract a nuisance value settlement.” Id. at 1327. We held that the district court properly considered the patentee’s “ability to impose high costs to defend against its meritless claims,” and inducement of settlement payments by proposing low settlemept offers of “less than ten percent of the cost that [the accused infringer] expended to defend suit.” Id. at 1327; see Kilopass Tech., Inc. v. Sidense Corp., 738 F.3d 1302, 1311 (Fed.Cir.2013) (holding the bad faith rationale inapplicable given that the defendants acted in good faith in appealing the case and in raising defenses to the plaintiffs claims", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nmisconduct based on the patentee’s destruction of relevant documents and lodging of incomplete and misleading extrinsic evidence. 653 F.3d at 1324-25. This court also concluded that the record supported the district court’s finding that the patentee acted in subjective bad faith “by exploiting the high cost to defend complex litigation to extract a nuisance value settlement.” Id. at 1327. We held that the district court properly considered the patentee’s “ability to impose high costs to defend against its meritless claims,” and inducement of settlement payments by proposing low settlemept offers of “less than ten percent of the cost that [the accused infringer] expended to defend suit.” Id. at 1327; see Kilopass Tech., Inc. v. Sidense Corp., 738 F.3d 1302, 1311 (Fed.Cir.2013) (holding that a bad faith claim is a tort" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\npresence of criminal activity at Pruett’s residence, but we nonetheless conclude that the executing officers did not act entirely without reason in relying on the magistrate’s determination that evidence of &■ crime would be found in the residence. Although our Circuit has not adopted a per se rule that evidence of a defendant’s drug trafficking establishes an inference that further evidence of drug trafficking will be found in the defendant’s residence, we have held that in applying the Leon exception, such evidence of a defendant’s drug trafficking indicated that officers acted reasonably in relying on a search warrant issued for the defendant’s residence. See United States v. Ross, 487 F.3d 1120, 1123 (8th Cir.2007); see also United States v. Marion, 238 F.3d 965, 969 (8th Cir.2001) (holding that the warrant application at issue did not specifically mention the presence of criminal activity at defendants residence but that the executing officers reasonably relied on warrant", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\npresence of criminal activity at Pruett’s residence, but we nonetheless conclude that the executing officers did not act entirely without reason in relying on the magistrate’s determination that evidence of &■ crime would be found in the residence. Although our Circuit has not adopted a per se rule that evidence of a defendant’s drug trafficking establishes an inference that further evidence of drug trafficking will be found in the defendant’s residence, we have held that in applying the Leon exception, such evidence of a defendant’s drug trafficking indicated that officers acted reasonably in relying on a search warrant issued for the defendant’s residence. See United States v. Ross, 487 F.3d 1120, 1123 (8th Cir.2007); see also United States v. Marion, 238 F.3d 965, 969 (8th Cir.2001) (holding that executing officers reasonably relied on judges determination that there was probable cause to search motel room for evidence of drug activity even though search warrant affidavit failed to mention a connection between motel room and criminal activity", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\npresence of criminal activity at Pruett’s residence, but we nonetheless conclude that the executing officers did not act entirely without reason in relying on the magistrate’s determination that evidence of &■ crime would be found in the residence. Although our Circuit has not adopted a per se rule that evidence of a defendant’s drug trafficking establishes an inference that further evidence of drug trafficking will be found in the defendant’s residence, we have held that in applying the Leon exception, such evidence of a defendant’s drug trafficking indicated that officers acted reasonably in relying on a search warrant issued for the defendant’s residence. See United States v. Ross, 487 F.3d 1120, 1123 (8th Cir.2007); see also United States v. Marion, 238 F.3d 965, 969 (8th Cir.2001) (holding that a defendants prior conviction for possession of a controlled substance and felon in possession of a firearm helped support probable cause to search his motel room for evidence of burglary", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\npresence of criminal activity at Pruett’s residence, but we nonetheless conclude that the executing officers did not act entirely without reason in relying on the magistrate’s determination that evidence of &■ crime would be found in the residence. Although our Circuit has not adopted a per se rule that evidence of a defendant’s drug trafficking establishes an inference that further evidence of drug trafficking will be found in the defendant’s residence, we have held that in applying the Leon exception, such evidence of a defendant’s drug trafficking indicated that officers acted reasonably in relying on a search warrant issued for the defendant’s residence. See United States v. Ross, 487 F.3d 1120, 1123 (8th Cir.2007); see also United States v. Marion, 238 F.3d 965, 969 (8th Cir.2001) (holding warrantless search of motel room after occupant was arrested outside room for drug possession could not be justified as search incident to arrest absent other exigent circumstances", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\npresence of criminal activity at Pruett’s residence, but we nonetheless conclude that the executing officers did not act entirely without reason in relying on the magistrate’s determination that evidence of &■ crime would be found in the residence. Although our Circuit has not adopted a per se rule that evidence of a defendant’s drug trafficking establishes an inference that further evidence of drug trafficking will be found in the defendant’s residence, we have held that in applying the Leon exception, such evidence of a defendant’s drug trafficking indicated that officers acted reasonably in relying on a search warrant issued for the defendant’s residence. See United States v. Ross, 487 F.3d 1120, 1123 (8th Cir.2007); see also United States v. Marion, 238 F.3d 965, 969 (8th Cir.2001) (holding that the warrant application at issue did not specifically mention the presence of criminal activity at defendants residence but that the executing officers reasonably relied on the warrant" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nits boundaries, so long as there is no interference with the jurisdiction asserted by the Federal Government.” Id. at 626-27, 73 S.Ct. at 467 (emphasis added). The Court observed that the sovereign rights in the dual relationship between the United States and Kentucky were not antagonistic in that instance, so that it is “friction, not fiction, which we must give heed.” Id. at 627, 73 S.Ct. at 467; see also Evans v. Comman, 398 U.S. 419, 423, 90 S.Ct. 1752, 1755, 26 L.Ed.2d 370 (1970) (rejecting notion of non-residency in state for voting in Maryland elections by those residing in a federal enclave and noting that “the relationship between federal enclaves and the [sjtate in which they are located has changed considerably”); M.R.S. v. State, 745 So.2d 1139, 1140 (Fla.Dist.Ct. App.1999) (recognizing howard holding that fiction of a state within a state has no validity to prevent exercise of power by state over federal area within its boundaries so long as there is no interference with federal jurisdiction", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nits boundaries, so long as there is no interference with the jurisdiction asserted by the Federal Government.” Id. at 626-27, 73 S.Ct. at 467 (emphasis added). The Court observed that the sovereign rights in the dual relationship between the United States and Kentucky were not antagonistic in that instance, so that it is “friction, not fiction, which we must give heed.” Id. at 627, 73 S.Ct. at 467; see also Evans v. Comman, 398 U.S. 419, 423, 90 S.Ct. 1752, 1755, 26 L.Ed.2d 370 (1970) (rejecting notion of non-residency in state for voting in Maryland elections by those residing in a federal enclave and noting that “the relationship between federal enclaves and the [sjtate in which they are located has changed considerably”); M.R.S. v. State, 745 So.2d 1139, 1140 (Fla.Dist.Ct. App.1999) (recognizing the uncertain state of federal law in this area", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nits boundaries, so long as there is no interference with the jurisdiction asserted by the Federal Government.” Id. at 626-27, 73 S.Ct. at 467 (emphasis added). The Court observed that the sovereign rights in the dual relationship between the United States and Kentucky were not antagonistic in that instance, so that it is “friction, not fiction, which we must give heed.” Id. at 627, 73 S.Ct. at 467; see also Evans v. Comman, 398 U.S. 419, 423, 90 S.Ct. 1752, 1755, 26 L.Ed.2d 370 (1970) (rejecting notion of non-residency in state for voting in Maryland elections by those residing in a federal enclave and noting that “the relationship between federal enclaves and the [sjtate in which they are located has changed considerably”); M.R.S. v. State, 745 So.2d 1139, 1140 (Fla.Dist.Ct. App.1999) (holding a state has a substantial interest in regulating the practice of law within the state", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nits boundaries, so long as there is no interference with the jurisdiction asserted by the Federal Government.” Id. at 626-27, 73 S.Ct. at 467 (emphasis added). The Court observed that the sovereign rights in the dual relationship between the United States and Kentucky were not antagonistic in that instance, so that it is “friction, not fiction, which we must give heed.” Id. at 627, 73 S.Ct. at 467; see also Evans v. Comman, 398 U.S. 419, 423, 90 S.Ct. 1752, 1755, 26 L.Ed.2d 370 (1970) (rejecting notion of non-residency in state for voting in Maryland elections by those residing in a federal enclave and noting that “the relationship between federal enclaves and the [sjtate in which they are located has changed considerably”); M.R.S. v. State, 745 So.2d 1139, 1140 (Fla.Dist.Ct. App.1999) (holding federal courts are bound by state court determinations of state law", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nits boundaries, so long as there is no interference with the jurisdiction asserted by the Federal Government.” Id. at 626-27, 73 S.Ct. at 467 (emphasis added). The Court observed that the sovereign rights in the dual relationship between the United States and Kentucky were not antagonistic in that instance, so that it is “friction, not fiction, which we must give heed.” Id. at 627, 73 S.Ct. at 467; see also Evans v. Comman, 398 U.S. 419, 423, 90 S.Ct. 1752, 1755, 26 L.Ed.2d 370 (1970) (rejecting notion of non-residency in state for voting in Maryland elections by those residing in a federal enclave and noting that “the relationship between federal enclaves and the [sjtate in which they are located has changed considerably”); M.R.S. v. State, 745 So.2d 1139, 1140 (Fla.Dist.Ct. App.1999) (recognizing federal enclave remains within geographic boundaries of state" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nassumption is in error. On April 30, 1993, the court dismissed all the charges against Woodland without prejudice. In October of 1993, new charges were filed. During the approximately seven months separating the dismissal and the reinstatement of charges, Woodland was confined in a mental institution. This period of confinement involved no formal charges. Woodland was not held because he was an alleged criminal but because his mental health at the time warranted such confinement. This period should not be used to calculate a speedy trial violation. See Trafny, 799 P.2d at 706 (stating that time spent holding defendant on separate parole violation following formal dismissal of charges cannot be attributable to state); see also Johnson v. United States, 333 F.2d 371, 374 (10th Cir.1964) (holding that the constitutional right to a speedy trial includes the right to a reasonably prompt sentencing", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nassumption is in error. On April 30, 1993, the court dismissed all the charges against Woodland without prejudice. In October of 1993, new charges were filed. During the approximately seven months separating the dismissal and the reinstatement of charges, Woodland was confined in a mental institution. This period of confinement involved no formal charges. Woodland was not held because he was an alleged criminal but because his mental health at the time warranted such confinement. This period should not be used to calculate a speedy trial violation. See Trafny, 799 P.2d at 706 (stating that time spent holding defendant on separate parole violation following formal dismissal of charges cannot be attributable to state); see also Johnson v. United States, 333 F.2d 371, 374 (10th Cir.1964) (holding that the dismissal of an indictment before trial and institution of a superseding indictment does not trigger double jeopardy", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nassumption is in error. On April 30, 1993, the court dismissed all the charges against Woodland without prejudice. In October of 1993, new charges were filed. During the approximately seven months separating the dismissal and the reinstatement of charges, Woodland was confined in a mental institution. This period of confinement involved no formal charges. Woodland was not held because he was an alleged criminal but because his mental health at the time warranted such confinement. This period should not be used to calculate a speedy trial violation. See Trafny, 799 P.2d at 706 (stating that time spent holding defendant on separate parole violation following formal dismissal of charges cannot be attributable to state); see also Johnson v. United States, 333 F.2d 371, 374 (10th Cir.1964) (holding that ajppellant can not complain of the denial of his constitutional right to a speedy trial because of his confinement in a state mental institution after dismissal of the former indictment", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nassumption is in error. On April 30, 1993, the court dismissed all the charges against Woodland without prejudice. In October of 1993, new charges were filed. During the approximately seven months separating the dismissal and the reinstatement of charges, Woodland was confined in a mental institution. This period of confinement involved no formal charges. Woodland was not held because he was an alleged criminal but because his mental health at the time warranted such confinement. This period should not be used to calculate a speedy trial violation. See Trafny, 799 P.2d at 706 (stating that time spent holding defendant on separate parole violation following formal dismissal of charges cannot be attributable to state); see also Johnson v. United States, 333 F.2d 371, 374 (10th Cir.1964) (holding that a 19month delay between indictment and trial did not violate the constitutional right to a speedy trial", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nassumption is in error. On April 30, 1993, the court dismissed all the charges against Woodland without prejudice. In October of 1993, new charges were filed. During the approximately seven months separating the dismissal and the reinstatement of charges, Woodland was confined in a mental institution. This period of confinement involved no formal charges. Woodland was not held because he was an alleged criminal but because his mental health at the time warranted such confinement. This period should not be used to calculate a speedy trial violation. See Trafny, 799 P.2d at 706 (stating that time spent holding defendant on separate parole violation following formal dismissal of charges cannot be attributable to state); see also Johnson v. United States, 333 F.2d 371, 374 (10th Cir.1964) (holding that trial courts limited findings were insufficient to allow determination of whether trial court abused its discretion in denying defendants motion to dismiss his indictment on constitutional speedy trial grounds" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nconcern is more fundamental: We believe that the commentary is, for the most part, inconsistent with the guideline itself, which unequivocally states that the “threat of death” must be “express.” The Eleventh Circuit has already come to this conclusion, as well as Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit and Judge Arnold of the Eighth Circuit. See Hunn, 24 F.3d at 999-1000 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting); United States v. Cadotte, 57 F.3d 661, 662 (8th Cir.1995)(per curiam) (Arnold, J., dissenting), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 783, 133 L.Ed.2d 733 (1996). In United States v. Tuck, 964 F.2d 1079 (11th Cir.1992), the Eleventh Circuit observed that § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F) predicates the application of the enhancement on two factors. First, the threat must be express 1th Cir.1993)(per curiam)(holding that an enhancement for an express threat of death may not be applied to the sentence for robbery when the threat is related to the use of the firearm and the defendant has a 924c sentence for the same firearm", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nconcern is more fundamental: We believe that the commentary is, for the most part, inconsistent with the guideline itself, which unequivocally states that the “threat of death” must be “express.” The Eleventh Circuit has already come to this conclusion, as well as Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit and Judge Arnold of the Eighth Circuit. See Hunn, 24 F.3d at 999-1000 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting); United States v. Cadotte, 57 F.3d 661, 662 (8th Cir.1995)(per curiam) (Arnold, J., dissenting), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 783, 133 L.Ed.2d 733 (1996). In United States v. Tuck, 964 F.2d 1079 (11th Cir.1992), the Eleventh Circuit observed that § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F) predicates the application of the enhancement on two factors. First, the threat must be express 1th Cir.1993)(per curiam)(holding that the phrase i have a gun constitutes a threat of death under 2b31b2f", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nconcern is more fundamental: We believe that the commentary is, for the most part, inconsistent with the guideline itself, which unequivocally states that the “threat of death” must be “express.” The Eleventh Circuit has already come to this conclusion, as well as Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit and Judge Arnold of the Eighth Circuit. See Hunn, 24 F.3d at 999-1000 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting); United States v. Cadotte, 57 F.3d 661, 662 (8th Cir.1995)(per curiam) (Arnold, J., dissenting), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 783, 133 L.Ed.2d 733 (1996). In United States v. Tuck, 964 F.2d 1079 (11th Cir.1992), the Eleventh Circuit observed that § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F) predicates the application of the enhancement on two factors. First, the threat must be express 1th Cir.1993)(per curiam)(holding that threat i have a gun and nothing to lose was not an express threat of death because there was not express mention of death and could also be interpreted to mean that robber was desperate and willing to turn alleged gun on himself", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nconcern is more fundamental: We believe that the commentary is, for the most part, inconsistent with the guideline itself, which unequivocally states that the “threat of death” must be “express.” The Eleventh Circuit has already come to this conclusion, as well as Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit and Judge Arnold of the Eighth Circuit. See Hunn, 24 F.3d at 999-1000 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting); United States v. Cadotte, 57 F.3d 661, 662 (8th Cir.1995)(per curiam) (Arnold, J., dissenting), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 783, 133 L.Ed.2d 733 (1996). In United States v. Tuck, 964 F.2d 1079 (11th Cir.1992), the Eleventh Circuit observed that § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F) predicates the application of the enhancement on two factors. First, the threat must be express 1th Cir.1993)(per curiam)(holding that the statement i have a gun is a threat of death", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nconcern is more fundamental: We believe that the commentary is, for the most part, inconsistent with the guideline itself, which unequivocally states that the “threat of death” must be “express.” The Eleventh Circuit has already come to this conclusion, as well as Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit and Judge Arnold of the Eighth Circuit. See Hunn, 24 F.3d at 999-1000 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting); United States v. Cadotte, 57 F.3d 661, 662 (8th Cir.1995)(per curiam) (Arnold, J., dissenting), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 783, 133 L.Ed.2d 733 (1996). In United States v. Tuck, 964 F.2d 1079 (11th Cir.1992), the Eleventh Circuit observed that § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F) predicates the application of the enhancement on two factors. First, the threat must be express 1th Cir.1993)(per curiam)(holding that i have a gun give me money may imply threat to use gun but was not an express threat of death" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nand respect for the D.C. Court of Appeals.”). The Supreme Court held in Salve Regina College v. Russell,. 499 U.S. 225, 111 S.Ct. 1217,113 L.Ed.2d 190 (1991), that “a court of appeals should review de novo a district court’s determination of state law.” Id. 499 U.S. at 231, 111 S.Ct. at 1221. The D.C. Court of Appeals has not squarely addressed the question whether bad faith denial of an insurance claim constitutes an independent tort under D.C. law. The district court has considered the issue in two separate reported cases, but these cases are directly in conflict. Compare GEICO, 769 F.Supp. at 387 (“District of Columbia law does not recognize the tort of bad faith denial' of an insurance claim.”) with Washington v. Group Hospitalization, Inc., 585 F.Supp. 517, 520 (D.D.C.1984) (holding that the district of columbia is among the many jurisdictions that have recognized a cause of action in tort for the bad faith refusal of an insurer to pay", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nand respect for the D.C. Court of Appeals.”). The Supreme Court held in Salve Regina College v. Russell,. 499 U.S. 225, 111 S.Ct. 1217,113 L.Ed.2d 190 (1991), that “a court of appeals should review de novo a district court’s determination of state law.” Id. 499 U.S. at 231, 111 S.Ct. at 1221. The D.C. Court of Appeals has not squarely addressed the question whether bad faith denial of an insurance claim constitutes an independent tort under D.C. law. The district court has considered the issue in two separate reported cases, but these cases are directly in conflict. Compare GEICO, 769 F.Supp. at 387 (“District of Columbia law does not recognize the tort of bad faith denial' of an insurance claim.”) with Washington v. Group Hospitalization, Inc., 585 F.Supp. 517, 520 (D.D.C.1984) (holding that insured may recover attorneys fees from insurer where insurer acts in bad faith", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nand respect for the D.C. Court of Appeals.”). The Supreme Court held in Salve Regina College v. Russell,. 499 U.S. 225, 111 S.Ct. 1217,113 L.Ed.2d 190 (1991), that “a court of appeals should review de novo a district court’s determination of state law.” Id. 499 U.S. at 231, 111 S.Ct. at 1221. The D.C. Court of Appeals has not squarely addressed the question whether bad faith denial of an insurance claim constitutes an independent tort under D.C. law. The district court has considered the issue in two separate reported cases, but these cases are directly in conflict. Compare GEICO, 769 F.Supp. at 387 (“District of Columbia law does not recognize the tort of bad faith denial' of an insurance claim.”) with Washington v. Group Hospitalization, Inc., 585 F.Supp. 517, 520 (D.D.C.1984) (holding that no cause of action for bad faith exists when insurer has reasonable grounds to contest liability", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nand respect for the D.C. Court of Appeals.”). The Supreme Court held in Salve Regina College v. Russell,. 499 U.S. 225, 111 S.Ct. 1217,113 L.Ed.2d 190 (1991), that “a court of appeals should review de novo a district court’s determination of state law.” Id. 499 U.S. at 231, 111 S.Ct. at 1221. The D.C. Court of Appeals has not squarely addressed the question whether bad faith denial of an insurance claim constitutes an independent tort under D.C. law. The district court has considered the issue in two separate reported cases, but these cases are directly in conflict. Compare GEICO, 769 F.Supp. at 387 (“District of Columbia law does not recognize the tort of bad faith denial' of an insurance claim.”) with Washington v. Group Hospitalization, Inc., 585 F.Supp. 517, 520 (D.D.C.1984) (holding that a bad faith claim is a tort", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nand respect for the D.C. Court of Appeals.”). The Supreme Court held in Salve Regina College v. Russell,. 499 U.S. 225, 111 S.Ct. 1217,113 L.Ed.2d 190 (1991), that “a court of appeals should review de novo a district court’s determination of state law.” Id. 499 U.S. at 231, 111 S.Ct. at 1221. The D.C. Court of Appeals has not squarely addressed the question whether bad faith denial of an insurance claim constitutes an independent tort under D.C. law. The district court has considered the issue in two separate reported cases, but these cases are directly in conflict. Compare GEICO, 769 F.Supp. at 387 (“District of Columbia law does not recognize the tort of bad faith denial' of an insurance claim.”) with Washington v. Group Hospitalization, Inc., 585 F.Supp. 517, 520 (D.D.C.1984) (holding that an insurance contract between the parties and a breach thereof by the defendant is an element of a bad faith refusal claim" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nill.... “[CJaring for the mentally ill” requires an actual medical diagnosis that the patient is mentally sick or deficient. (Id.) In light of this advice, it would have been reasonable for CGS, when developing a program in 2002 designed to “deliver[ ] the equivalent of the hospital’s comprehensive services directly to the adolescent” (ACT Staff Manual), to take steps to “ascertain what the Act requires” at that time, Wilamowsky, 833 F.2d at 19; see also SNET, 121 F.3d at 72 (finding that even though the employer took some efforts to ascertain its obligations under the Act because it sought advice from the DOL, the resulting opinion letter revealed that the employer “failed to ask the appropriate question” and did not compel a finding of good faith); Debejian, 64 F.Supp.2d at 91 (holding that burden of demonstrating coverage rests with the insured", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nill.... “[CJaring for the mentally ill” requires an actual medical diagnosis that the patient is mentally sick or deficient. (Id.) In light of this advice, it would have been reasonable for CGS, when developing a program in 2002 designed to “deliver[ ] the equivalent of the hospital’s comprehensive services directly to the adolescent” (ACT Staff Manual), to take steps to “ascertain what the Act requires” at that time, Wilamowsky, 833 F.2d at 19; see also SNET, 121 F.3d at 72 (finding that even though the employer took some efforts to ascertain its obligations under the Act because it sought advice from the DOL, the resulting opinion letter revealed that the employer “failed to ask the appropriate question” and did not compel a finding of good faith); Debejian, 64 F.Supp.2d at 91 (holding that regardless of insurers good faith denial of coverage plaintiff is entitled to recover interest to put it in position it would have been in if coverage had not been denied", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nill.... “[CJaring for the mentally ill” requires an actual medical diagnosis that the patient is mentally sick or deficient. (Id.) In light of this advice, it would have been reasonable for CGS, when developing a program in 2002 designed to “deliver[ ] the equivalent of the hospital’s comprehensive services directly to the adolescent” (ACT Staff Manual), to take steps to “ascertain what the Act requires” at that time, Wilamowsky, 833 F.2d at 19; see also SNET, 121 F.3d at 72 (finding that even though the employer took some efforts to ascertain its obligations under the Act because it sought advice from the DOL, the resulting opinion letter revealed that the employer “failed to ask the appropriate question” and did not compel a finding of good faith); Debejian, 64 F.Supp.2d at 91 (holding claimant has burden of demonstrating a good faith work search", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nill.... “[CJaring for the mentally ill” requires an actual medical diagnosis that the patient is mentally sick or deficient. (Id.) In light of this advice, it would have been reasonable for CGS, when developing a program in 2002 designed to “deliver[ ] the equivalent of the hospital’s comprehensive services directly to the adolescent” (ACT Staff Manual), to take steps to “ascertain what the Act requires” at that time, Wilamowsky, 833 F.2d at 19; see also SNET, 121 F.3d at 72 (finding that even though the employer took some efforts to ascertain its obligations under the Act because it sought advice from the DOL, the resulting opinion letter revealed that the employer “failed to ask the appropriate question” and did not compel a finding of good faith); Debejian, 64 F.Supp.2d at 91 (holding that while the creditor has the initial burden to produce some evidence of lack of good faith the ultimate burden is on the debtor to prove his good faith", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nill.... “[CJaring for the mentally ill” requires an actual medical diagnosis that the patient is mentally sick or deficient. (Id.) In light of this advice, it would have been reasonable for CGS, when developing a program in 2002 designed to “deliver[ ] the equivalent of the hospital’s comprehensive services directly to the adolescent” (ACT Staff Manual), to take steps to “ascertain what the Act requires” at that time, Wilamowsky, 833 F.2d at 19; see also SNET, 121 F.3d at 72 (finding that even though the employer took some efforts to ascertain its obligations under the Act because it sought advice from the DOL, the resulting opinion letter revealed that the employer “failed to ask the appropriate question” and did not compel a finding of good faith); Debejian, 64 F.Supp.2d at 91 (holding that where employer did not show it furnished counsel with the specific information necessary to determine coverage it had not met its onerous burden of demonstrating good faith" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n■wrists. Doc. 54-2 at 32, pp. 122-23; Doc. 59 at ¶ 17. Once Anderson was in the sheriff officers’ custody, Moussa left the parking lot, entering the courthous 7th Cir. 1985) (same). “To ascertain when an employee’s conduct is within the scope of employment, the Illinois Supreme Gourt has adopted § 228 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency.” Copeland v. Cnty. of Macon, 403 F.3d 929, 932 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Pyne v. Witmer, 129 Ill.2d 351, 135 Ill.Dec. 557, 543 N.E.2d 1304, 1308-09 (1989)). Section 228 provides: Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if, but only if: (a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform; (b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and place limits; (c) it is- actuated, at least in part, by a p 1, 6-7 (N.D. Ill, Mar. 25, 2014) (holding that an offduty officers assertion to bystanders that he was on the job at the scene of a car accident did not place him within the scope of employment", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n■wrists. Doc. 54-2 at 32, pp. 122-23; Doc. 59 at ¶ 17. Once Anderson was in the sheriff officers’ custody, Moussa left the parking lot, entering the courthous 7th Cir. 1985) (same). “To ascertain when an employee’s conduct is within the scope of employment, the Illinois Supreme Gourt has adopted § 228 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency.” Copeland v. Cnty. of Macon, 403 F.3d 929, 932 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Pyne v. Witmer, 129 Ill.2d 351, 135 Ill.Dec. 557, 543 N.E.2d 1304, 1308-09 (1989)). Section 228 provides: Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if, but only if: (a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform; (b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and place limits; (c) it is- actuated, at least in part, by a p 1, 6-7 (N.D. Ill, Mar. 25, 2014) (holding that a suspended chicago police officer was not acting within his scope of employment when discharging his weapon in the neighboring municipality of cicero", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n■wrists. Doc. 54-2 at 32, pp. 122-23; Doc. 59 at ¶ 17. Once Anderson was in the sheriff officers’ custody, Moussa left the parking lot, entering the courthous 7th Cir. 1985) (same). “To ascertain when an employee’s conduct is within the scope of employment, the Illinois Supreme Gourt has adopted § 228 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency.” Copeland v. Cnty. of Macon, 403 F.3d 929, 932 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Pyne v. Witmer, 129 Ill.2d 351, 135 Ill.Dec. 557, 543 N.E.2d 1304, 1308-09 (1989)). Section 228 provides: Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if, but only if: (a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform; (b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and place limits; (c) it is- actuated, at least in part, by a p 1, 6-7 (N.D. Ill, Mar. 25, 2014) (holding that the officer acted within the scope of his authority in requiring the defendant stopped in middle lane of traffic to exit his vehicle", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n■wrists. Doc. 54-2 at 32, pp. 122-23; Doc. 59 at ¶ 17. Once Anderson was in the sheriff officers’ custody, Moussa left the parking lot, entering the courthous 7th Cir. 1985) (same). “To ascertain when an employee’s conduct is within the scope of employment, the Illinois Supreme Gourt has adopted § 228 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency.” Copeland v. Cnty. of Macon, 403 F.3d 929, 932 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Pyne v. Witmer, 129 Ill.2d 351, 135 Ill.Dec. 557, 543 N.E.2d 1304, 1308-09 (1989)). Section 228 provides: Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if, but only if: (a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform; (b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and place limits; (c) it is- actuated, at least in part, by a p 1, 6-7 (N.D. Ill, Mar. 25, 2014) (holding that a reasonable jury could find that an offduty chicago police officer acted within the scope of his employment during a roadside altercation on interstate 55 near the damen street exit which is in chicago", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n■wrists. Doc. 54-2 at 32, pp. 122-23; Doc. 59 at ¶ 17. Once Anderson was in the sheriff officers’ custody, Moussa left the parking lot, entering the courthous 7th Cir. 1985) (same). “To ascertain when an employee’s conduct is within the scope of employment, the Illinois Supreme Gourt has adopted § 228 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency.” Copeland v. Cnty. of Macon, 403 F.3d 929, 932 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Pyne v. Witmer, 129 Ill.2d 351, 135 Ill.Dec. 557, 543 N.E.2d 1304, 1308-09 (1989)). Section 228 provides: Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if, but only if: (a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform; (b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and place limits; (c) it is- actuated, at least in part, by a p 1, 6-7 (N.D. Ill, Mar. 25, 2014) (holding that scope of employment was an issue for the jury where a chicago police officer was off duty but within the city limits when he shot the plaintiff" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nnot illegal. She ignores that the Administrative Judge disbelieved her explanation that Asenlix, taken pursuant to a valid prescription, caused her positive drug test. In light of that credibility assessment it is irrelevant whether “illegal drugs” includes drugs prescribed outside of this country. Fuentes’ arguments are relevant only to issues the Administrative Judge never reached. Fuentes offers this court no logical or con vincing reason to reverse the Board’s decision on liability. II. Whether or not a penalty was reasonable we must leave to the sound discretion of the agency unless the Board’s affirmance of the penalty is not supported by substantial evidence or the penalty amounts to an abuse of discretion. See Gonzales v. Def. Logistics Agency, 772 F.2d 887, 889 (Fed.Cir.1985) (holding that it is not", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nnot illegal. She ignores that the Administrative Judge disbelieved her explanation that Asenlix, taken pursuant to a valid prescription, caused her positive drug test. In light of that credibility assessment it is irrelevant whether “illegal drugs” includes drugs prescribed outside of this country. Fuentes’ arguments are relevant only to issues the Administrative Judge never reached. Fuentes offers this court no logical or con vincing reason to reverse the Board’s decision on liability. II. Whether or not a penalty was reasonable we must leave to the sound discretion of the agency unless the Board’s affirmance of the penalty is not supported by substantial evidence or the penalty amounts to an abuse of discretion. See Gonzales v. Def. Logistics Agency, 772 F.2d 887, 889 (Fed.Cir.1985) (holding the court will not disturb the decision of the abcmr unless it was arbitrary capricious contrary to law or unsupported by substantial evidence", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nnot illegal. She ignores that the Administrative Judge disbelieved her explanation that Asenlix, taken pursuant to a valid prescription, caused her positive drug test. In light of that credibility assessment it is irrelevant whether “illegal drugs” includes drugs prescribed outside of this country. Fuentes’ arguments are relevant only to issues the Administrative Judge never reached. Fuentes offers this court no logical or con vincing reason to reverse the Board’s decision on liability. II. Whether or not a penalty was reasonable we must leave to the sound discretion of the agency unless the Board’s affirmance of the penalty is not supported by substantial evidence or the penalty amounts to an abuse of discretion. See Gonzales v. Def. Logistics Agency, 772 F.2d 887, 889 (Fed.Cir.1985) (holding that the trial court has broad discretion in granting denying dissolving or modifying injunctions and unless a clear abuse of discretion is demonstrated appellate courts will not disturb the trial courts decision", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nnot illegal. She ignores that the Administrative Judge disbelieved her explanation that Asenlix, taken pursuant to a valid prescription, caused her positive drug test. In light of that credibility assessment it is irrelevant whether “illegal drugs” includes drugs prescribed outside of this country. Fuentes’ arguments are relevant only to issues the Administrative Judge never reached. Fuentes offers this court no logical or con vincing reason to reverse the Board’s decision on liability. II. Whether or not a penalty was reasonable we must leave to the sound discretion of the agency unless the Board’s affirmance of the penalty is not supported by substantial evidence or the penalty amounts to an abuse of discretion. See Gonzales v. Def. Logistics Agency, 772 F.2d 887, 889 (Fed.Cir.1985) (holding that when plaintiffs argue an inconsistent jury verdict this court will not disturb the trial courts denial of a motion for a new trial absent a showing of abuse of discretion", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nnot illegal. She ignores that the Administrative Judge disbelieved her explanation that Asenlix, taken pursuant to a valid prescription, caused her positive drug test. In light of that credibility assessment it is irrelevant whether “illegal drugs” includes drugs prescribed outside of this country. Fuentes’ arguments are relevant only to issues the Administrative Judge never reached. Fuentes offers this court no logical or con vincing reason to reverse the Board’s decision on liability. II. Whether or not a penalty was reasonable we must leave to the sound discretion of the agency unless the Board’s affirmance of the penalty is not supported by substantial evidence or the penalty amounts to an abuse of discretion. See Gonzales v. Def. Logistics Agency, 772 F.2d 887, 889 (Fed.Cir.1985) (holding that the court will not disturb a penalty unless it exceeds the range of permissible punishment or is so harsh and unconscionably disproportionate to the offense that it amounts to an abuse of discretion citation omitted" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nsuch organization to nominate candidates, to vote in elections or referendums of the labor organization, to attend membership meetings, and to participate in the deliberations and voting upon the business of such meetings, subject to reasonable rules and regulations in such organization’s constitution and bylaws.” 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1). “The law does not require that a collective bargaining agreement be submitted to a local d 654, 666 (7th Cir.1992) (same); Ackley v. Western Conf. of Teamsters, 958 F.2d 1463, 1476 (9th Cir.1992) (same); Cumis-key v. Seafarers Int’l Union and Curtis Bay Towing Co., 1988 WL 54041, at *1-2, 1988 Dist. LEXIS 4720, at *4 (E.D.Pa. May 25,1988) (same). Cf. Bunz v. Moving Picture Machine Operators’ Protective Union Local 221, 567 F.2d 1117, 1121 (D.C.Cir.1977) (holding that a union officials comments may be used to infer the object of union activity", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nsuch organization to nominate candidates, to vote in elections or referendums of the labor organization, to attend membership meetings, and to participate in the deliberations and voting upon the business of such meetings, subject to reasonable rules and regulations in such organization’s constitution and bylaws.” 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1). “The law does not require that a collective bargaining agreement be submitted to a local d 654, 666 (7th Cir.1992) (same); Ackley v. Western Conf. of Teamsters, 958 F.2d 1463, 1476 (9th Cir.1992) (same); Cumis-key v. Seafarers Int’l Union and Curtis Bay Towing Co., 1988 WL 54041, at *1-2, 1988 Dist. LEXIS 4720, at *4 (E.D.Pa. May 25,1988) (same). Cf. Bunz v. Moving Picture Machine Operators’ Protective Union Local 221, 567 F.2d 1117, 1121 (D.C.Cir.1977) (recognizing that union members interests are adequately represented by the union", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nsuch organization to nominate candidates, to vote in elections or referendums of the labor organization, to attend membership meetings, and to participate in the deliberations and voting upon the business of such meetings, subject to reasonable rules and regulations in such organization’s constitution and bylaws.” 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1). “The law does not require that a collective bargaining agreement be submitted to a local d 654, 666 (7th Cir.1992) (same); Ackley v. Western Conf. of Teamsters, 958 F.2d 1463, 1476 (9th Cir.1992) (same); Cumis-key v. Seafarers Int’l Union and Curtis Bay Towing Co., 1988 WL 54041, at *1-2, 1988 Dist. LEXIS 4720, at *4 (E.D.Pa. May 25,1988) (same). Cf. Bunz v. Moving Picture Machine Operators’ Protective Union Local 221, 567 F.2d 1117, 1121 (D.C.Cir.1977) (recognizing violations of section 101a1 where union officials circulated inadequate or misleading information about matters to be voted upon", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nsuch organization to nominate candidates, to vote in elections or referendums of the labor organization, to attend membership meetings, and to participate in the deliberations and voting upon the business of such meetings, subject to reasonable rules and regulations in such organization’s constitution and bylaws.” 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1). “The law does not require that a collective bargaining agreement be submitted to a local d 654, 666 (7th Cir.1992) (same); Ackley v. Western Conf. of Teamsters, 958 F.2d 1463, 1476 (9th Cir.1992) (same); Cumis-key v. Seafarers Int’l Union and Curtis Bay Towing Co., 1988 WL 54041, at *1-2, 1988 Dist. LEXIS 4720, at *4 (E.D.Pa. May 25,1988) (same). Cf. Bunz v. Moving Picture Machine Operators’ Protective Union Local 221, 567 F.2d 1117, 1121 (D.C.Cir.1977) (holding that a rico action by union members was properly dismissed where any financial improprieties occurred with union funds and directly injured solely the union", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nsuch organization to nominate candidates, to vote in elections or referendums of the labor organization, to attend membership meetings, and to participate in the deliberations and voting upon the business of such meetings, subject to reasonable rules and regulations in such organization’s constitution and bylaws.” 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1). “The law does not require that a collective bargaining agreement be submitted to a local d 654, 666 (7th Cir.1992) (same); Ackley v. Western Conf. of Teamsters, 958 F.2d 1463, 1476 (9th Cir.1992) (same); Cumis-key v. Seafarers Int’l Union and Curtis Bay Towing Co., 1988 WL 54041, at *1-2, 1988 Dist. LEXIS 4720, at *4 (E.D.Pa. May 25,1988) (same). Cf. Bunz v. Moving Picture Machine Operators’ Protective Union Local 221, 567 F.2d 1117, 1121 (D.C.Cir.1977) (holding no right under section 101a1 to vote on matters relating to collective bargaining agreements" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nFIFRA preempted Plaintiffs failure to warn claims and which relied on Med-tronic only for the proposition that courts must look first to the language of an express pre-emption clause and that the word “requirements” presumptively includes state causes of action as well as laws and regulations. Hawkins, 965 F.Supp. at 571. The court in Hawkins also relied on a New Jersey Appellate Division decision in which that court explicitly distinguished Medtronic from Cipollone and concluded that FIFRA preempts state law failure to warn claims. Hawkins, 965 F.Supp. at 572 (citing Lewis v. American Cyanamid Co., 294 N.J.Super. 53, 682 A.2d 724 (App.Div.1996)). Other courts have also continued to find FIFRA pre-emption after Medtronic. See Koch v. Shell Oil Co., 173 F.R.D. 288, 289-90 (D.Kan.1997) (holding that those state law claims specifically related to labeling and packaging are preempted by fifra", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nFIFRA preempted Plaintiffs failure to warn claims and which relied on Med-tronic only for the proposition that courts must look first to the language of an express pre-emption clause and that the word “requirements” presumptively includes state causes of action as well as laws and regulations. Hawkins, 965 F.Supp. at 571. The court in Hawkins also relied on a New Jersey Appellate Division decision in which that court explicitly distinguished Medtronic from Cipollone and concluded that FIFRA preempts state law failure to warn claims. Hawkins, 965 F.Supp. at 572 (citing Lewis v. American Cyanamid Co., 294 N.J.Super. 53, 682 A.2d 724 (App.Div.1996)). Other courts have also continued to find FIFRA pre-emption after Medtronic. See Koch v. Shell Oil Co., 173 F.R.D. 288, 289-90 (D.Kan.1997) (holding that medtronic does not alter clear tenth circuit law holding that commonlaw labeling claims are preempted", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nFIFRA preempted Plaintiffs failure to warn claims and which relied on Med-tronic only for the proposition that courts must look first to the language of an express pre-emption clause and that the word “requirements” presumptively includes state causes of action as well as laws and regulations. Hawkins, 965 F.Supp. at 571. The court in Hawkins also relied on a New Jersey Appellate Division decision in which that court explicitly distinguished Medtronic from Cipollone and concluded that FIFRA preempts state law failure to warn claims. Hawkins, 965 F.Supp. at 572 (citing Lewis v. American Cyanamid Co., 294 N.J.Super. 53, 682 A.2d 724 (App.Div.1996)). Other courts have also continued to find FIFRA pre-emption after Medtronic. See Koch v. Shell Oil Co., 173 F.R.D. 288, 289-90 (D.Kan.1997) (holding that the federal cigarette labeling and advertising act did not preempt plaintiffs state law claims", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nFIFRA preempted Plaintiffs failure to warn claims and which relied on Med-tronic only for the proposition that courts must look first to the language of an express pre-emption clause and that the word “requirements” presumptively includes state causes of action as well as laws and regulations. Hawkins, 965 F.Supp. at 571. The court in Hawkins also relied on a New Jersey Appellate Division decision in which that court explicitly distinguished Medtronic from Cipollone and concluded that FIFRA preempts state law failure to warn claims. Hawkins, 965 F.Supp. at 572 (citing Lewis v. American Cyanamid Co., 294 N.J.Super. 53, 682 A.2d 724 (App.Div.1996)). Other courts have also continued to find FIFRA pre-emption after Medtronic. See Koch v. Shell Oil Co., 173 F.R.D. 288, 289-90 (D.Kan.1997) (holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nFIFRA preempted Plaintiffs failure to warn claims and which relied on Med-tronic only for the proposition that courts must look first to the language of an express pre-emption clause and that the word “requirements” presumptively includes state causes of action as well as laws and regulations. Hawkins, 965 F.Supp. at 571. The court in Hawkins also relied on a New Jersey Appellate Division decision in which that court explicitly distinguished Medtronic from Cipollone and concluded that FIFRA preempts state law failure to warn claims. Hawkins, 965 F.Supp. at 572 (citing Lewis v. American Cyanamid Co., 294 N.J.Super. 53, 682 A.2d 724 (App.Div.1996)). Other courts have also continued to find FIFRA pre-emption after Medtronic. See Koch v. Shell Oil Co., 173 F.R.D. 288, 289-90 (D.Kan.1997) (holding the state law claims were not preempted" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nto the superior court of the county in which the inferior court is located . . . .” (§ 1466, subd. (a).) 3 Defendant concedes as much in this court. 4 See, e.g., Walker v. City of Birmingham (1967) 388 U.S. 307 [18 L.Ed.2d 1210, 87 S.Ct. 1824] (following so-called collateral bar rule, with certain exceptions); Ex parte Purvis (Ala. 1980) 382 So.2d 512, 514-515 (same); Cologne v. Westfarms Assocs. (1985) 197 Conn. 141 [496 A.2d 476, 481] (same); Dade County Classroom Teachers’ Ass’n v. Rubin (Fla. 1970) 238 So.2d 284, 288 (same); Dept. of Rev. v. Universal Foods Corp. (1993) 318 Or. 78 [862 P.2d 1288, 1291-1292] (appeal from contempt adjudication may not collaterally attack underlying order, with certain exceptions); but see Wood v. Goodson (1972) 253 Ark. 196 [485 S.W.2d 213, 217] (recognizing bankruptcy courts jurisdiction over such a collateral attack", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nto the superior court of the county in which the inferior court is located . . . .” (§ 1466, subd. (a).) 3 Defendant concedes as much in this court. 4 See, e.g., Walker v. City of Birmingham (1967) 388 U.S. 307 [18 L.Ed.2d 1210, 87 S.Ct. 1824] (following so-called collateral bar rule, with certain exceptions); Ex parte Purvis (Ala. 1980) 382 So.2d 512, 514-515 (same); Cologne v. Westfarms Assocs. (1985) 197 Conn. 141 [496 A.2d 476, 481] (same); Dade County Classroom Teachers’ Ass’n v. Rubin (Fla. 1970) 238 So.2d 284, 288 (same); Dept. of Rev. v. Universal Foods Corp. (1993) 318 Or. 78 [862 P.2d 1288, 1291-1292] (appeal from contempt adjudication may not collaterally attack underlying order, with certain exceptions); but see Wood v. Goodson (1972) 253 Ark. 196 [485 S.W.2d 213, 217] (holding that dhss motion to reconsider was a collateral attack on a bia order", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nto the superior court of the county in which the inferior court is located . . . .” (§ 1466, subd. (a).) 3 Defendant concedes as much in this court. 4 See, e.g., Walker v. City of Birmingham (1967) 388 U.S. 307 [18 L.Ed.2d 1210, 87 S.Ct. 1824] (following so-called collateral bar rule, with certain exceptions); Ex parte Purvis (Ala. 1980) 382 So.2d 512, 514-515 (same); Cologne v. Westfarms Assocs. (1985) 197 Conn. 141 [496 A.2d 476, 481] (same); Dade County Classroom Teachers’ Ass’n v. Rubin (Fla. 1970) 238 So.2d 284, 288 (same); Dept. of Rev. v. Universal Foods Corp. (1993) 318 Or. 78 [862 P.2d 1288, 1291-1292] (appeal from contempt adjudication may not collaterally attack underlying order, with certain exceptions); but see Wood v. Goodson (1972) 253 Ark. 196 [485 S.W.2d 213, 217] (recognizing the collateral order doctrine for the first time", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nto the superior court of the county in which the inferior court is located . . . .” (§ 1466, subd. (a).) 3 Defendant concedes as much in this court. 4 See, e.g., Walker v. City of Birmingham (1967) 388 U.S. 307 [18 L.Ed.2d 1210, 87 S.Ct. 1824] (following so-called collateral bar rule, with certain exceptions); Ex parte Purvis (Ala. 1980) 382 So.2d 512, 514-515 (same); Cologne v. Westfarms Assocs. (1985) 197 Conn. 141 [496 A.2d 476, 481] (same); Dade County Classroom Teachers’ Ass’n v. Rubin (Fla. 1970) 238 So.2d 284, 288 (same); Dept. of Rev. v. Universal Foods Corp. (1993) 318 Or. 78 [862 P.2d 1288, 1291-1292] (appeal from contempt adjudication may not collaterally attack underlying order, with certain exceptions); but see Wood v. Goodson (1972) 253 Ark. 196 [485 S.W.2d 213, 217] (holding that a judgment as to the title in a prior litigation was not subject to collateral attack", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nto the superior court of the county in which the inferior court is located . . . .” (§ 1466, subd. (a).) 3 Defendant concedes as much in this court. 4 See, e.g., Walker v. City of Birmingham (1967) 388 U.S. 307 [18 L.Ed.2d 1210, 87 S.Ct. 1824] (following so-called collateral bar rule, with certain exceptions); Ex parte Purvis (Ala. 1980) 382 So.2d 512, 514-515 (same); Cologne v. Westfarms Assocs. (1985) 197 Conn. 141 [496 A.2d 476, 481] (same); Dade County Classroom Teachers’ Ass’n v. Rubin (Fla. 1970) 238 So.2d 284, 288 (same); Dept. of Rev. v. Universal Foods Corp. (1993) 318 Or. 78 [862 P.2d 1288, 1291-1292] (appeal from contempt adjudication may not collaterally attack underlying order, with certain exceptions); but see Wood v. Goodson (1972) 253 Ark. 196 [485 S.W.2d 213, 217] (recognizing collateral attack on void order" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nlittle mitigating weight in tijis case. ¶ 47 Appellant further contends the trial court erred when it failed to regard the giving of a felony murder instruction at trial as a non-statutory mitigating circumstance. We disagree. This court has held that a felony murder instruction “may be mitigating where there is some doubt as to a defendant’s specific intent to' kill.” State v. Henry, 189 Ariz. 542, 552, 944 P.2d 57, 67 (1997). Appellant’s actions in savagely beating and strangling the victim to death, however, undermine any argument that he did not intend to kill the victim. Moreover, the jurors unanimously found Appellant guilty of first-degree premeditated murder as well as felony murder, indicating that they found\" intent to kill. See Atwood, 171 Ariz. at 648-49, 832 P.2d at 665-66 (holding that when the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of premeditated and felony murder a jury instruction on unanimity is irrelevant", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nlittle mitigating weight in tijis case. ¶ 47 Appellant further contends the trial court erred when it failed to regard the giving of a felony murder instruction at trial as a non-statutory mitigating circumstance. We disagree. This court has held that a felony murder instruction “may be mitigating where there is some doubt as to a defendant’s specific intent to' kill.” State v. Henry, 189 Ariz. 542, 552, 944 P.2d 57, 67 (1997). Appellant’s actions in savagely beating and strangling the victim to death, however, undermine any argument that he did not intend to kill the victim. Moreover, the jurors unanimously found Appellant guilty of first-degree premeditated murder as well as felony murder, indicating that they found\" intent to kill. See Atwood, 171 Ariz. at 648-49, 832 P.2d at 665-66 (holding that reversal of conviction for felony murder was required where jury failed to find the defendant guilty of the underlying felony as essential element of the felony murder offense", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nlittle mitigating weight in tijis case. ¶ 47 Appellant further contends the trial court erred when it failed to regard the giving of a felony murder instruction at trial as a non-statutory mitigating circumstance. We disagree. This court has held that a felony murder instruction “may be mitigating where there is some doubt as to a defendant’s specific intent to' kill.” State v. Henry, 189 Ariz. 542, 552, 944 P.2d 57, 67 (1997). Appellant’s actions in savagely beating and strangling the victim to death, however, undermine any argument that he did not intend to kill the victim. Moreover, the jurors unanimously found Appellant guilty of first-degree premeditated murder as well as felony murder, indicating that they found\" intent to kill. See Atwood, 171 Ariz. at 648-49, 832 P.2d at 665-66 (holding that where both firstdegree and felony murder were possible bases for a murder conviction a jury instruction that suggested the jury could rely on felony murder as the predicate offense for a conviction for conspiracy to commit murder was improper because under arizona law a conviction for conspiracy to commit firstdegree murder requires a specific intent to kill", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nlittle mitigating weight in tijis case. ¶ 47 Appellant further contends the trial court erred when it failed to regard the giving of a felony murder instruction at trial as a non-statutory mitigating circumstance. We disagree. This court has held that a felony murder instruction “may be mitigating where there is some doubt as to a defendant’s specific intent to' kill.” State v. Henry, 189 Ariz. 542, 552, 944 P.2d 57, 67 (1997). Appellant’s actions in savagely beating and strangling the victim to death, however, undermine any argument that he did not intend to kill the victim. Moreover, the jurors unanimously found Appellant guilty of first-degree premeditated murder as well as felony murder, indicating that they found\" intent to kill. See Atwood, 171 Ariz. at 648-49, 832 P.2d at 665-66 (holding that the eighth amendment requires finding that a felony murder defendant killed or attempted to kill", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nlittle mitigating weight in tijis case. ¶ 47 Appellant further contends the trial court erred when it failed to regard the giving of a felony murder instruction at trial as a non-statutory mitigating circumstance. We disagree. This court has held that a felony murder instruction “may be mitigating where there is some doubt as to a defendant’s specific intent to' kill.” State v. Henry, 189 Ariz. 542, 552, 944 P.2d 57, 67 (1997). Appellant’s actions in savagely beating and strangling the victim to death, however, undermine any argument that he did not intend to kill the victim. Moreover, the jurors unanimously found Appellant guilty of first-degree premeditated murder as well as felony murder, indicating that they found\" intent to kill. See Atwood, 171 Ariz. at 648-49, 832 P.2d at 665-66 (holding that the giving of a felony murder instruction is not a relevant mitigating circumstance when the defendant acted alone to kill the victim" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nFound, v. Goodfarb, 176 Ariz. 497, 502, 862 P.2d 870, 875 (1993). In assessing whether a city attorney’s communication with city officers or employees will be protected by the city’s attorney-client privilege, Arizona has adopted a “functional approach”. This functional approach focuses “on the relationship between the communicator and the need for legal services.” Id. at 505, 862 P.2d at 878. Thus, if the communication “concerns the employee’s own conduct within the scope of his or her employment and is made to assist the lawyer in assessing or responding to the legal consequences of that conduct,” then the communication falls within the city’s privilege. Id. at 507, 862 P.2d at 880; see also Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. O’Neil, 183 Ariz. 196, 198, 901 P.2d 1226, 1228 (App.1995) (holding that the inadvertent disclosure of a privileged document does not waive the attorneyclient privilege if attorney took all reasonable steps to avoid disclosure and asserted the privilege as soon as the disclosure became known", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nFound, v. Goodfarb, 176 Ariz. 497, 502, 862 P.2d 870, 875 (1993). In assessing whether a city attorney’s communication with city officers or employees will be protected by the city’s attorney-client privilege, Arizona has adopted a “functional approach”. This functional approach focuses “on the relationship between the communicator and the need for legal services.” Id. at 505, 862 P.2d at 878. Thus, if the communication “concerns the employee’s own conduct within the scope of his or her employment and is made to assist the lawyer in assessing or responding to the legal consequences of that conduct,” then the communication falls within the city’s privilege. Id. at 507, 862 P.2d at 880; see also Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. O’Neil, 183 Ariz. 196, 198, 901 P.2d 1226, 1228 (App.1995) (holding that the information is not protected by attorneyclient privilege", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nFound, v. Goodfarb, 176 Ariz. 497, 502, 862 P.2d 870, 875 (1993). In assessing whether a city attorney’s communication with city officers or employees will be protected by the city’s attorney-client privilege, Arizona has adopted a “functional approach”. This functional approach focuses “on the relationship between the communicator and the need for legal services.” Id. at 505, 862 P.2d at 878. Thus, if the communication “concerns the employee’s own conduct within the scope of his or her employment and is made to assist the lawyer in assessing or responding to the legal consequences of that conduct,” then the communication falls within the city’s privilege. Id. at 507, 862 P.2d at 880; see also Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. O’Neil, 183 Ariz. 196, 198, 901 P.2d 1226, 1228 (App.1995) (holding attorneyclient privilege protects disclosure of communications but does not protect client from disclosure of underlying facts", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nFound, v. Goodfarb, 176 Ariz. 497, 502, 862 P.2d 870, 875 (1993). In assessing whether a city attorney’s communication with city officers or employees will be protected by the city’s attorney-client privilege, Arizona has adopted a “functional approach”. This functional approach focuses “on the relationship between the communicator and the need for legal services.” Id. at 505, 862 P.2d at 878. Thus, if the communication “concerns the employee’s own conduct within the scope of his or her employment and is made to assist the lawyer in assessing or responding to the legal consequences of that conduct,” then the communication falls within the city’s privilege. Id. at 507, 862 P.2d at 880; see also Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. O’Neil, 183 Ariz. 196, 198, 901 P.2d 1226, 1228 (App.1995) (holding that failure to timely assert attorneyclient privilege constitutes waiver", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nFound, v. Goodfarb, 176 Ariz. 497, 502, 862 P.2d 870, 875 (1993). In assessing whether a city attorney’s communication with city officers or employees will be protected by the city’s attorney-client privilege, Arizona has adopted a “functional approach”. This functional approach focuses “on the relationship between the communicator and the need for legal services.” Id. at 505, 862 P.2d at 878. Thus, if the communication “concerns the employee’s own conduct within the scope of his or her employment and is made to assist the lawyer in assessing or responding to the legal consequences of that conduct,” then the communication falls within the city’s privilege. Id. at 507, 862 P.2d at 880; see also Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. O’Neil, 183 Ariz. 196, 198, 901 P.2d 1226, 1228 (App.1995) (holding that governmental entities may assert attorneyclient privilege to prevent disclosure of information otherwise required by statute" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthat she had known McCray for approximately only one to two years. Moreover, the officers' testimony is equally, if not more, contradictory. Thus, the court will not discredit Wallace’s testimony. 8 .If the officers had observed some sort of exchange among the parties that might be an objective factor which would give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the parties were engaged in criminal activity. See United States v. Ruiz, No.Crim. A. 98-120, 1998 WL 622405, at *2 (E.D.Pa. Sept. 15, 1998) (finding officer had reasonable suspicion after observing money exchange hands in a high drug area). See also United States v. Williams, 139 F.3d 628, 630 (8th Cir.1998) (finding reasonable suspicion where officer observed exchange of drugs and money); United States v. Garrett, 1007 (DC Cir.1992) (holding that an officers observation of a man holding his hand out with a group of other men looking down at his open palm in an high drug trafficking area late at night constituted reasonable suspicion", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthat she had known McCray for approximately only one to two years. Moreover, the officers' testimony is equally, if not more, contradictory. Thus, the court will not discredit Wallace’s testimony. 8 .If the officers had observed some sort of exchange among the parties that might be an objective factor which would give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the parties were engaged in criminal activity. See United States v. Ruiz, No.Crim. A. 98-120, 1998 WL 622405, at *2 (E.D.Pa. Sept. 15, 1998) (finding officer had reasonable suspicion after observing money exchange hands in a high drug area). See also United States v. Williams, 139 F.3d 628, 630 (8th Cir.1998) (finding reasonable suspicion where officer observed exchange of drugs and money); United States v. Garrett, 1007 (DC Cir.1992) (holding officers articulated reasonable suspicion justified appellants contin ued detention to await canine unit when officer suspected appellant of drug trafficking based on appellants prior arrests for drug offenses appellants lie about his prior criminal history and appellants possession of small jewelers bags used in cocaine trafficking", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthat she had known McCray for approximately only one to two years. Moreover, the officers' testimony is equally, if not more, contradictory. Thus, the court will not discredit Wallace’s testimony. 8 .If the officers had observed some sort of exchange among the parties that might be an objective factor which would give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the parties were engaged in criminal activity. See United States v. Ruiz, No.Crim. A. 98-120, 1998 WL 622405, at *2 (E.D.Pa. Sept. 15, 1998) (finding officer had reasonable suspicion after observing money exchange hands in a high drug area). See also United States v. Williams, 139 F.3d 628, 630 (8th Cir.1998) (finding reasonable suspicion where officer observed exchange of drugs and money); United States v. Garrett, 1007 (DC Cir.1992) (holding that officers observation of a known drug dealer approaching the defendants car gave rise to reasonable suspicion", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthat she had known McCray for approximately only one to two years. Moreover, the officers' testimony is equally, if not more, contradictory. Thus, the court will not discredit Wallace’s testimony. 8 .If the officers had observed some sort of exchange among the parties that might be an objective factor which would give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the parties were engaged in criminal activity. See United States v. Ruiz, No.Crim. A. 98-120, 1998 WL 622405, at *2 (E.D.Pa. Sept. 15, 1998) (finding officer had reasonable suspicion after observing money exchange hands in a high drug area). See also United States v. Williams, 139 F.3d 628, 630 (8th Cir.1998) (finding reasonable suspicion where officer observed exchange of drugs and money); United States v. Garrett, 1007 (DC Cir.1992) (holding that there was reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant based on his presence in an area known for heavy narcotics trafficking and his flight upon seeing police officers", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthat she had known McCray for approximately only one to two years. Moreover, the officers' testimony is equally, if not more, contradictory. Thus, the court will not discredit Wallace’s testimony. 8 .If the officers had observed some sort of exchange among the parties that might be an objective factor which would give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the parties were engaged in criminal activity. See United States v. Ruiz, No.Crim. A. 98-120, 1998 WL 622405, at *2 (E.D.Pa. Sept. 15, 1998) (finding officer had reasonable suspicion after observing money exchange hands in a high drug area). See also United States v. Williams, 139 F.3d 628, 630 (8th Cir.1998) (finding reasonable suspicion where officer observed exchange of drugs and money); United States v. Garrett, 1007 (DC Cir.1992) (holding that an officers observation of exchange of small object and money in a known drug trafficking area constituted reasonable suspicion" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\ngrown by independent farmers were processed by the employer prevented it from receiving the “secondary agriculture” exemption); Skipper v. Superior Dairies, Inc., 512 F.2d 409, 411-12 (5th Cir.1975) (employees who delivered and disposed of dairy products did not fit within the primary or secondary meaning of agriculture); Brennan v. Sugar Cane Groivers Co-op. of Fla., 486 F.2d 1006, 1011 (5th Cir.1973) (camp cooks for sugar cane workers fell within the secondary meaning of agriculture); Hodgson v. Ewing, 451 F.2d 526 (5th Cir.1971) (clerical work performed for a contractor primarily engaged in leveling agricultural land was not within the secondary meaning of agriculture, as most of that clerical work took place off the farm); NLRB v. Hudson Farms, Inc., 681 F.2d 1105, 1106 (8th Cir.) (holding that farm workers who voluntarily choose to ride employers bus to and from field were engaged in noncompensable travel", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\ngrown by independent farmers were processed by the employer prevented it from receiving the “secondary agriculture” exemption); Skipper v. Superior Dairies, Inc., 512 F.2d 409, 411-12 (5th Cir.1975) (employees who delivered and disposed of dairy products did not fit within the primary or secondary meaning of agriculture); Brennan v. Sugar Cane Groivers Co-op. of Fla., 486 F.2d 1006, 1011 (5th Cir.1973) (camp cooks for sugar cane workers fell within the secondary meaning of agriculture); Hodgson v. Ewing, 451 F.2d 526 (5th Cir.1971) (clerical work performed for a contractor primarily engaged in leveling agricultural land was not within the secondary meaning of agriculture, as most of that clerical work took place off the farm); NLRB v. Hudson Farms, Inc., 681 F.2d 1105, 1106 (8th Cir.) (holding that employees who transported live poultry from an independent growers farm to their employers processing plant were not agricultural laborers", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\ngrown by independent farmers were processed by the employer prevented it from receiving the “secondary agriculture” exemption); Skipper v. Superior Dairies, Inc., 512 F.2d 409, 411-12 (5th Cir.1975) (employees who delivered and disposed of dairy products did not fit within the primary or secondary meaning of agriculture); Brennan v. Sugar Cane Groivers Co-op. of Fla., 486 F.2d 1006, 1011 (5th Cir.1973) (camp cooks for sugar cane workers fell within the secondary meaning of agriculture); Hodgson v. Ewing, 451 F.2d 526 (5th Cir.1971) (clerical work performed for a contractor primarily engaged in leveling agricultural land was not within the secondary meaning of agriculture, as most of that clerical work took place off the farm); NLRB v. Hudson Farms, Inc., 681 F.2d 1105, 1106 (8th Cir.) (holding that the antiretaliation provision must protect employees who complain about violations to their employers", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\ngrown by independent farmers were processed by the employer prevented it from receiving the “secondary agriculture” exemption); Skipper v. Superior Dairies, Inc., 512 F.2d 409, 411-12 (5th Cir.1975) (employees who delivered and disposed of dairy products did not fit within the primary or secondary meaning of agriculture); Brennan v. Sugar Cane Groivers Co-op. of Fla., 486 F.2d 1006, 1011 (5th Cir.1973) (camp cooks for sugar cane workers fell within the secondary meaning of agriculture); Hodgson v. Ewing, 451 F.2d 526 (5th Cir.1971) (clerical work performed for a contractor primarily engaged in leveling agricultural land was not within the secondary meaning of agriculture, as most of that clerical work took place off the farm); NLRB v. Hudson Farms, Inc., 681 F.2d 1105, 1106 (8th Cir.) (holding that employers are not liable for conduct of ordinary employees because an ordinary employees conduct will normally be so unrelated to the employers business that it cannot be deemed in furtherance thereof", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\ngrown by independent farmers were processed by the employer prevented it from receiving the “secondary agriculture” exemption); Skipper v. Superior Dairies, Inc., 512 F.2d 409, 411-12 (5th Cir.1975) (employees who delivered and disposed of dairy products did not fit within the primary or secondary meaning of agriculture); Brennan v. Sugar Cane Groivers Co-op. of Fla., 486 F.2d 1006, 1011 (5th Cir.1973) (camp cooks for sugar cane workers fell within the secondary meaning of agriculture); Hodgson v. Ewing, 451 F.2d 526 (5th Cir.1971) (clerical work performed for a contractor primarily engaged in leveling agricultural land was not within the secondary meaning of agriculture, as most of that clerical work took place off the farm); NLRB v. Hudson Farms, Inc., 681 F.2d 1105, 1106 (8th Cir.) (holding that atwill employees have no contractual relationship with their employers to support a cause of action under section 1981" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nfurther notes that the jury was given extensive instructions on evaluating inconsistent statements and evaluating the credibility of witnesses generally, which, collectively, sufficiently addressed the conflicts in the cooperator testimony. Id. at 138. The Court has assessed the testimony summarized by Demerieux and concludes that the conflicts in testimony do not rise to the level of a due process violation. Demerieux correctly states that, under Napue, a “conviction obtained through the use of false evidence ... must fall under [the Due Process Clause],” and that “it is of no consequence that the falsehood bore upon the witness’ credibility rather than directly upon defendant’s guilt.” See Napue, 360 U.S. at 269-70, 79 S.Ct. 1173; see also Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103, 96 S.Ct. 2392 (holding that false arrest and false imprisonment claim were not duplicative", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nfurther notes that the jury was given extensive instructions on evaluating inconsistent statements and evaluating the credibility of witnesses generally, which, collectively, sufficiently addressed the conflicts in the cooperator testimony. Id. at 138. The Court has assessed the testimony summarized by Demerieux and concludes that the conflicts in testimony do not rise to the level of a due process violation. Demerieux correctly states that, under Napue, a “conviction obtained through the use of false evidence ... must fall under [the Due Process Clause],” and that “it is of no consequence that the falsehood bore upon the witness’ credibility rather than directly upon defendant’s guilt.” See Napue, 360 U.S. at 269-70, 79 S.Ct. 1173; see also Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103, 96 S.Ct. 2392 (holding that a conviction obtained through the knowing reckless or negligent use of false testimony must be set aside if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nfurther notes that the jury was given extensive instructions on evaluating inconsistent statements and evaluating the credibility of witnesses generally, which, collectively, sufficiently addressed the conflicts in the cooperator testimony. Id. at 138. The Court has assessed the testimony summarized by Demerieux and concludes that the conflicts in testimony do not rise to the level of a due process violation. Demerieux correctly states that, under Napue, a “conviction obtained through the use of false evidence ... must fall under [the Due Process Clause],” and that “it is of no consequence that the falsehood bore upon the witness’ credibility rather than directly upon defendant’s guilt.” See Napue, 360 U.S. at 269-70, 79 S.Ct. 1173; see also Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103, 96 S.Ct. 2392 (holding that false arrest is one means of committing false imprisonment", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nfurther notes that the jury was given extensive instructions on evaluating inconsistent statements and evaluating the credibility of witnesses generally, which, collectively, sufficiently addressed the conflicts in the cooperator testimony. Id. at 138. The Court has assessed the testimony summarized by Demerieux and concludes that the conflicts in testimony do not rise to the level of a due process violation. Demerieux correctly states that, under Napue, a “conviction obtained through the use of false evidence ... must fall under [the Due Process Clause],” and that “it is of no consequence that the falsehood bore upon the witness’ credibility rather than directly upon defendant’s guilt.” See Napue, 360 U.S. at 269-70, 79 S.Ct. 1173; see also Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103, 96 S.Ct. 2392 (holding that prosecutor cannot obtain conviction with the aid of false testimony where the prosecutor knows such testimony is false", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nfurther notes that the jury was given extensive instructions on evaluating inconsistent statements and evaluating the credibility of witnesses generally, which, collectively, sufficiently addressed the conflicts in the cooperator testimony. Id. at 138. The Court has assessed the testimony summarized by Demerieux and concludes that the conflicts in testimony do not rise to the level of a due process violation. Demerieux correctly states that, under Napue, a “conviction obtained through the use of false evidence ... must fall under [the Due Process Clause],” and that “it is of no consequence that the falsehood bore upon the witness’ credibility rather than directly upon defendant’s guilt.” See Napue, 360 U.S. at 269-70, 79 S.Ct. 1173; see also Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103, 96 S.Ct. 2392 (holding that the knowing use of false testimony to obtain a conviction violates due process" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwitness list (contrary to his assertion at trial that the presiding officer “didn’t say anything”) this was not an arraignment. Rather, this was a preliminary and informal meet ing to establish what would be required for the SCM trial proceeding. We find this to be no different than a military judge requiring counsel to submit a docketing request that includes anticipated pleas and forum, and proposed trial dates. See Army Reg. 27-10, Legal Services, Military Justice, para. 5-21 (16 Nov. 2005). As indicated by the lack of a recorder and the informality of the meeting, the purpose of the initial meeting was not to formally call upon appellant to enter pleas, but to properly prepare the presiding officer for what he would need in order to conduct the SCM. See Jackson, 41 C.M.R. at 681 (holding that a discussion concerning pleas at an offtherecord rcm802 session did not constitute an arraignment", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwitness list (contrary to his assertion at trial that the presiding officer “didn’t say anything”) this was not an arraignment. Rather, this was a preliminary and informal meet ing to establish what would be required for the SCM trial proceeding. We find this to be no different than a military judge requiring counsel to submit a docketing request that includes anticipated pleas and forum, and proposed trial dates. See Army Reg. 27-10, Legal Services, Military Justice, para. 5-21 (16 Nov. 2005). As indicated by the lack of a recorder and the informality of the meeting, the purpose of the initial meeting was not to formally call upon appellant to enter pleas, but to properly prepare the presiding officer for what he would need in order to conduct the SCM. See Jackson, 41 C.M.R. at 681 (holding that an additional remedy does not constitute an additional requirement", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwitness list (contrary to his assertion at trial that the presiding officer “didn’t say anything”) this was not an arraignment. Rather, this was a preliminary and informal meet ing to establish what would be required for the SCM trial proceeding. We find this to be no different than a military judge requiring counsel to submit a docketing request that includes anticipated pleas and forum, and proposed trial dates. See Army Reg. 27-10, Legal Services, Military Justice, para. 5-21 (16 Nov. 2005). As indicated by the lack of a recorder and the informality of the meeting, the purpose of the initial meeting was not to formally call upon appellant to enter pleas, but to properly prepare the presiding officer for what he would need in order to conduct the SCM. See Jackson, 41 C.M.R. at 681 (holding that the claim that the defendants negligently provided investment advice did not constitute an accident", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwitness list (contrary to his assertion at trial that the presiding officer “didn’t say anything”) this was not an arraignment. Rather, this was a preliminary and informal meet ing to establish what would be required for the SCM trial proceeding. We find this to be no different than a military judge requiring counsel to submit a docketing request that includes anticipated pleas and forum, and proposed trial dates. See Army Reg. 27-10, Legal Services, Military Justice, para. 5-21 (16 Nov. 2005). As indicated by the lack of a recorder and the informality of the meeting, the purpose of the initial meeting was not to formally call upon appellant to enter pleas, but to properly prepare the presiding officer for what he would need in order to conduct the SCM. See Jackson, 41 C.M.R. at 681 (holding that the injunction did not constitute a claim", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwitness list (contrary to his assertion at trial that the presiding officer “didn’t say anything”) this was not an arraignment. Rather, this was a preliminary and informal meet ing to establish what would be required for the SCM trial proceeding. We find this to be no different than a military judge requiring counsel to submit a docketing request that includes anticipated pleas and forum, and proposed trial dates. See Army Reg. 27-10, Legal Services, Military Justice, para. 5-21 (16 Nov. 2005). As indicated by the lack of a recorder and the informality of the meeting, the purpose of the initial meeting was not to formally call upon appellant to enter pleas, but to properly prepare the presiding officer for what he would need in order to conduct the SCM. See Jackson, 41 C.M.R. at 681 (holding that district courts discussion of an alternative ground for its decision did not undermine its ruling that appellants claim was untimely raised" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nmeans is consistent with its goals. The purpose of the Civil Service Act is “to secure efficient fire and police departments composed of capable personnel who are free from political influence and who have permanent employment tenure as public servants.” Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. § 143.001(a). Courts have interpreted the Civil Service Act in a manner consistent with a legislative intent to protect the rights of persons serving as officers and employees of police departments and shield them from harassment. See Bichsel v. Carver, 159 Tex. 393, 321 S.W.2d 284, 286 (1959) (recognizing legislative intent to shield “police and similar employees from harassment” and interpreting Civil Service Act accordingly); Carrollton v. Popescu, 806 S.W.2d 268, 272 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1991, no writ) (holding that legislative consent to suit must be by clear and unambiguous language in either a statute or by other express legislative permission", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nmeans is consistent with its goals. The purpose of the Civil Service Act is “to secure efficient fire and police departments composed of capable personnel who are free from political influence and who have permanent employment tenure as public servants.” Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. § 143.001(a). Courts have interpreted the Civil Service Act in a manner consistent with a legislative intent to protect the rights of persons serving as officers and employees of police departments and shield them from harassment. See Bichsel v. Carver, 159 Tex. 393, 321 S.W.2d 284, 286 (1959) (recognizing legislative intent to shield “police and similar employees from harassment” and interpreting Civil Service Act accordingly); Carrollton v. Popescu, 806 S.W.2d 268, 272 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1991, no writ) (holding that lands held by a municipality in its governmental capacity may not be lost by adverse possession", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nmeans is consistent with its goals. The purpose of the Civil Service Act is “to secure efficient fire and police departments composed of capable personnel who are free from political influence and who have permanent employment tenure as public servants.” Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. § 143.001(a). Courts have interpreted the Civil Service Act in a manner consistent with a legislative intent to protect the rights of persons serving as officers and employees of police departments and shield them from harassment. See Bichsel v. Carver, 159 Tex. 393, 321 S.W.2d 284, 286 (1959) (recognizing legislative intent to shield “police and similar employees from harassment” and interpreting Civil Service Act accordingly); Carrollton v. Popescu, 806 S.W.2d 268, 272 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1991, no writ) (holding that action of city legislative body may be judicially examined in light of its surrounding circumstances prior and subsequent actions of such legislative body and public policy in order to determine good faith of questioned action", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nmeans is consistent with its goals. The purpose of the Civil Service Act is “to secure efficient fire and police departments composed of capable personnel who are free from political influence and who have permanent employment tenure as public servants.” Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. § 143.001(a). Courts have interpreted the Civil Service Act in a manner consistent with a legislative intent to protect the rights of persons serving as officers and employees of police departments and shield them from harassment. See Bichsel v. Carver, 159 Tex. 393, 321 S.W.2d 284, 286 (1959) (recognizing legislative intent to shield “police and similar employees from harassment” and interpreting Civil Service Act accordingly); Carrollton v. Popescu, 806 S.W.2d 268, 272 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1991, no writ) (holding that statements and charges by municipality may not be amended in light of legislative purpose of shielding police and similar employees from harassment", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nmeans is consistent with its goals. The purpose of the Civil Service Act is “to secure efficient fire and police departments composed of capable personnel who are free from political influence and who have permanent employment tenure as public servants.” Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. § 143.001(a). Courts have interpreted the Civil Service Act in a manner consistent with a legislative intent to protect the rights of persons serving as officers and employees of police departments and shield them from harassment. See Bichsel v. Carver, 159 Tex. 393, 321 S.W.2d 284, 286 (1959) (recognizing legislative intent to shield “police and similar employees from harassment” and interpreting Civil Service Act accordingly); Carrollton v. Popescu, 806 S.W.2d 268, 272 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1991, no writ) (holding that a municipality may be held liable as a person under 1983" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nand the application paragraph on murder as a party, neither specifically explained to the jury which facts it could properly consider to convict appellant as a party. In fact, the instructions were worse than that because, rather than merely withholding information from the jury, the application paragraph affirmatively misled the jury by telling the jury it could convict appellant for a murder committed by Jermarxian Green-even if appellant was not a party to the murder. This was a legally incorrect instruction that completely misstated the law, and to worsen matters, we cannot tell if the jury convicted appellant as a party based on the legally incorrect instruction or as a principal. See id. at 171-73; Guevara v. State, 191 S.W.3d 203, 207 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2005, pet. ref'd) (holding no legal duty exists to prevent unforeseeable criminal acts", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nand the application paragraph on murder as a party, neither specifically explained to the jury which facts it could properly consider to convict appellant as a party. In fact, the instructions were worse than that because, rather than merely withholding information from the jury, the application paragraph affirmatively misled the jury by telling the jury it could convict appellant for a murder committed by Jermarxian Green-even if appellant was not a party to the murder. This was a legally incorrect instruction that completely misstated the law, and to worsen matters, we cannot tell if the jury convicted appellant as a party based on the legally incorrect instruction or as a principal. See id. at 171-73; Guevara v. State, 191 S.W.3d 203, 207 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2005, pet. ref'd) (holding that the trial court committed reversible error in instructing the jury on a principals theory because there was no evidence that the appellant acted in concert with anyone in committing the charged offenses", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nand the application paragraph on murder as a party, neither specifically explained to the jury which facts it could properly consider to convict appellant as a party. In fact, the instructions were worse than that because, rather than merely withholding information from the jury, the application paragraph affirmatively misled the jury by telling the jury it could convict appellant for a murder committed by Jermarxian Green-even if appellant was not a party to the murder. This was a legally incorrect instruction that completely misstated the law, and to worsen matters, we cannot tell if the jury convicted appellant as a party based on the legally incorrect instruction or as a principal. See id. at 171-73; Guevara v. State, 191 S.W.3d 203, 207 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2005, pet. ref'd) (holding that instructing the jury on a legal duty theory when appellant had no legal duty to prevent the commission of the offense was error", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nand the application paragraph on murder as a party, neither specifically explained to the jury which facts it could properly consider to convict appellant as a party. In fact, the instructions were worse than that because, rather than merely withholding information from the jury, the application paragraph affirmatively misled the jury by telling the jury it could convict appellant for a murder committed by Jermarxian Green-even if appellant was not a party to the murder. This was a legally incorrect instruction that completely misstated the law, and to worsen matters, we cannot tell if the jury convicted appellant as a party based on the legally incorrect instruction or as a principal. See id. at 171-73; Guevara v. State, 191 S.W.3d 203, 207 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2005, pet. ref'd) (holding that the failure to plead a particular legal theory when the plaintiff pled two related legal theories was not a bar to recovery", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nand the application paragraph on murder as a party, neither specifically explained to the jury which facts it could properly consider to convict appellant as a party. In fact, the instructions were worse than that because, rather than merely withholding information from the jury, the application paragraph affirmatively misled the jury by telling the jury it could convict appellant for a murder committed by Jermarxian Green-even if appellant was not a party to the murder. This was a legally incorrect instruction that completely misstated the law, and to worsen matters, we cannot tell if the jury convicted appellant as a party based on the legally incorrect instruction or as a principal. See id. at 171-73; Guevara v. State, 191 S.W.3d 203, 207 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2005, pet. ref'd) (holding that counsel was not ineffective in failing to request a charge on the lesserincluded offense when the evidence showed either the commission of the completed offense as charged or the commission of no offense such that the defendant was not entitled to a charge on the lesser offense" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nplain error review available for errors relating to alleged improper remarks being made during closing argument, our prior case law relating to the waiver of issues on appeal stemming from improper closing arguments that were not objected to at trial remains unaffected by OCGA § 24-1-103 of Georgia’s new Evidence Code.”). Further, this Court is unswayed by Durden’s claim that the prosecutor’s statement in closing argument amounts to an infringement on Durden’s constitutional right to remain silent. Because Durden did not, in fact, testify at trial, the prosecutor’s rejoinder was a permissible attempt to correct defense counsel’s misstatement, rather than an impermissible effort to comment on Durden’s failure to testify. See Jones v. State, 123 Ga. App. 310, 311 (180 SE2d 603) (1971) (holding that the judges entry into the jury room constituted reversible error", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nplain error review available for errors relating to alleged improper remarks being made during closing argument, our prior case law relating to the waiver of issues on appeal stemming from improper closing arguments that were not objected to at trial remains unaffected by OCGA § 24-1-103 of Georgia’s new Evidence Code.”). Further, this Court is unswayed by Durden’s claim that the prosecutor’s statement in closing argument amounts to an infringement on Durden’s constitutional right to remain silent. Because Durden did not, in fact, testify at trial, the prosecutor’s rejoinder was a permissible attempt to correct defense counsel’s misstatement, rather than an impermissible effort to comment on Durden’s failure to testify. See Jones v. State, 123 Ga. App. 310, 311 (180 SE2d 603) (1971) (holding that error in denying such challenge is reversible error without demonstration of prejudice", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nplain error review available for errors relating to alleged improper remarks being made during closing argument, our prior case law relating to the waiver of issues on appeal stemming from improper closing arguments that were not objected to at trial remains unaffected by OCGA § 24-1-103 of Georgia’s new Evidence Code.”). Further, this Court is unswayed by Durden’s claim that the prosecutor’s statement in closing argument amounts to an infringement on Durden’s constitutional right to remain silent. Because Durden did not, in fact, testify at trial, the prosecutor’s rejoinder was a permissible attempt to correct defense counsel’s misstatement, rather than an impermissible effort to comment on Durden’s failure to testify. See Jones v. State, 123 Ga. App. 310, 311 (180 SE2d 603) (1971) (recognizing potential reversible error by disclosing defendants prior jury conviction", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nplain error review available for errors relating to alleged improper remarks being made during closing argument, our prior case law relating to the waiver of issues on appeal stemming from improper closing arguments that were not objected to at trial remains unaffected by OCGA § 24-1-103 of Georgia’s new Evidence Code.”). Further, this Court is unswayed by Durden’s claim that the prosecutor’s statement in closing argument amounts to an infringement on Durden’s constitutional right to remain silent. Because Durden did not, in fact, testify at trial, the prosecutor’s rejoinder was a permissible attempt to correct defense counsel’s misstatement, rather than an impermissible effort to comment on Durden’s failure to testify. See Jones v. State, 123 Ga. App. 310, 311 (180 SE2d 603) (1971) (recognizing that the mere fact that the jury is made aware that the defendant is making an unsworn statement does not result in reversible error", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nplain error review available for errors relating to alleged improper remarks being made during closing argument, our prior case law relating to the waiver of issues on appeal stemming from improper closing arguments that were not objected to at trial remains unaffected by OCGA § 24-1-103 of Georgia’s new Evidence Code.”). Further, this Court is unswayed by Durden’s claim that the prosecutor’s statement in closing argument amounts to an infringement on Durden’s constitutional right to remain silent. Because Durden did not, in fact, testify at trial, the prosecutor’s rejoinder was a permissible attempt to correct defense counsel’s misstatement, rather than an impermissible effort to comment on Durden’s failure to testify. See Jones v. State, 123 Ga. App. 310, 311 (180 SE2d 603) (1971) (holding that a failure to instruct the jury on additional uncharged conspiracies is not reversible error so long as the jury is instructed that the government has the burden to prove the charged conspiracy" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nof a firearm during and in relation to the drug conspiracy and a carjacking incident) and Count 10 (knowingly possessing a firearm in furtherance of the drug conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute). The pre-sentence report stated that the mandatory minimum terms for these convictions were ten and five years, respectively. The Government objected, arguing that Count 10 constituted a second conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and therefore the mandatory minimum for Count 10 should be 25 years. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(C)(i) (“In the case of a second or subsequent conviction under [18 U.S.C. § 924], the person shall ... be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 25 years.... ”); Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 131-33, 113 S.Ct. 1993, 124 L.Ed.2d 44 (1993) (holding that 924cs enhanced penalty for a second or subsequent conviction applies when the defendant is convicted of multiple 924c counts in a single proceeding", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nof a firearm during and in relation to the drug conspiracy and a carjacking incident) and Count 10 (knowingly possessing a firearm in furtherance of the drug conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute). The pre-sentence report stated that the mandatory minimum terms for these convictions were ten and five years, respectively. The Government objected, arguing that Count 10 constituted a second conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and therefore the mandatory minimum for Count 10 should be 25 years. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(C)(i) (“In the case of a second or subsequent conviction under [18 U.S.C. § 924], the person shall ... be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 25 years.... ”); Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 131-33, 113 S.Ct. 1993, 124 L.Ed.2d 44 (1993) (holding that post conviction hearing act is not available to juvenile proceeding since the child is not convicted of a crime", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nof a firearm during and in relation to the drug conspiracy and a carjacking incident) and Count 10 (knowingly possessing a firearm in furtherance of the drug conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute). The pre-sentence report stated that the mandatory minimum terms for these convictions were ten and five years, respectively. The Government objected, arguing that Count 10 constituted a second conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and therefore the mandatory minimum for Count 10 should be 25 years. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(C)(i) (“In the case of a second or subsequent conviction under [18 U.S.C. § 924], the person shall ... be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 25 years.... ”); Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 131-33, 113 S.Ct. 1993, 124 L.Ed.2d 44 (1993) (holding that issues underlying all counts were sufficiently intertwined that the separate appeal of the summary judgment counts would complicate the trial of the remaining counts", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nof a firearm during and in relation to the drug conspiracy and a carjacking incident) and Count 10 (knowingly possessing a firearm in furtherance of the drug conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute). The pre-sentence report stated that the mandatory minimum terms for these convictions were ten and five years, respectively. The Government objected, arguing that Count 10 constituted a second conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and therefore the mandatory minimum for Count 10 should be 25 years. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(C)(i) (“In the case of a second or subsequent conviction under [18 U.S.C. § 924], the person shall ... be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 25 years.... ”); Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 131-33, 113 S.Ct. 1993, 124 L.Ed.2d 44 (1993) (holding that where a statute provides for an enhanced penalty based on a defendants prior conviction the fact of conviction is a sentencing factor to be determined by the court rather than a jury", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nof a firearm during and in relation to the drug conspiracy and a carjacking incident) and Count 10 (knowingly possessing a firearm in furtherance of the drug conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute). The pre-sentence report stated that the mandatory minimum terms for these convictions were ten and five years, respectively. The Government objected, arguing that Count 10 constituted a second conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and therefore the mandatory minimum for Count 10 should be 25 years. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(C)(i) (“In the case of a second or subsequent conviction under [18 U.S.C. § 924], the person shall ... be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 25 years.... ”); Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 131-33, 113 S.Ct. 1993, 124 L.Ed.2d 44 (1993) (holding that severance was not required when a defendant was charged with five counts of forcible rape two counts of felonious restraint three counts of kidnapping two counts of armed criminal action two counts of forcible sodomy one count of second degree assault one count of first degree robbery and one count of stealing" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\ncaused the plaintiffs’ injuries. JA 21. There was no further development of this bare assertion in the Complaint regarding any specific Municipality actions undertaken pursuant to its customs and policies. In Rosaura Building Corp. v. Municipality of Mayaguez, 778 F.3d 55 (1st Cir. 2015), this court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of “claims against the municipal government under Monell, after it found that Rosaura failed to plead a scintilla of facts against that government entity ... [about the] execution of a government’s policy or custom.” Id. at 61-62, 69 (citation omitted). Here, given the record, we similarly conclude that there is no sufficient allegation that the Municipality acted under color of law. In summary, for purposes of a motion to dismiss, we c h Cir. 1955) (holding that a termination of a government contract does not constitute a taking of the plaintiffs property without just compensation or without due process of law", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\ncaused the plaintiffs’ injuries. JA 21. There was no further development of this bare assertion in the Complaint regarding any specific Municipality actions undertaken pursuant to its customs and policies. In Rosaura Building Corp. v. Municipality of Mayaguez, 778 F.3d 55 (1st Cir. 2015), this court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of “claims against the municipal government under Monell, after it found that Rosaura failed to plead a scintilla of facts against that government entity ... [about the] execution of a government’s policy or custom.” Id. at 61-62, 69 (citation omitted). Here, given the record, we similarly conclude that there is no sufficient allegation that the Municipality acted under color of law. In summary, for purposes of a motion to dismiss, we c h Cir. 1955) (holding that californias mandatory iota program does not involve a taking of property without just compensation as prohibited by the fifth amendment to the united states constitution", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\ncaused the plaintiffs’ injuries. JA 21. There was no further development of this bare assertion in the Complaint regarding any specific Municipality actions undertaken pursuant to its customs and policies. In Rosaura Building Corp. v. Municipality of Mayaguez, 778 F.3d 55 (1st Cir. 2015), this court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of “claims against the municipal government under Monell, after it found that Rosaura failed to plead a scintilla of facts against that government entity ... [about the] execution of a government’s policy or custom.” Id. at 61-62, 69 (citation omitted). Here, given the record, we similarly conclude that there is no sufficient allegation that the Municipality acted under color of law. In summary, for purposes of a motion to dismiss, we c h Cir. 1955) (holding that a patent confers upon the patentee an exclusive property in the patented invention which cannot be appropriated or used by the government itself without just compensation", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\ncaused the plaintiffs’ injuries. JA 21. There was no further development of this bare assertion in the Complaint regarding any specific Municipality actions undertaken pursuant to its customs and policies. In Rosaura Building Corp. v. Municipality of Mayaguez, 778 F.3d 55 (1st Cir. 2015), this court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of “claims against the municipal government under Monell, after it found that Rosaura failed to plead a scintilla of facts against that government entity ... [about the] execution of a government’s policy or custom.” Id. at 61-62, 69 (citation omitted). Here, given the record, we similarly conclude that there is no sufficient allegation that the Municipality acted under color of law. In summary, for purposes of a motion to dismiss, we c h Cir. 1955) (holding that a statute requiring a natural gas producer to make gas available to pump water for agriculture irrigation at a price fixed by the corporation commission is not a regulation under the police power but a taking of the producers property without due process of law and an appropriation of the producers property without just compensation", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\ncaused the plaintiffs’ injuries. JA 21. There was no further development of this bare assertion in the Complaint regarding any specific Municipality actions undertaken pursuant to its customs and policies. In Rosaura Building Corp. v. Municipality of Mayaguez, 778 F.3d 55 (1st Cir. 2015), this court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of “claims against the municipal government under Monell, after it found that Rosaura failed to plead a scintilla of facts against that government entity ... [about the] execution of a government’s policy or custom.” Id. at 61-62, 69 (citation omitted). Here, given the record, we similarly conclude that there is no sufficient allegation that the Municipality acted under color of law. In summary, for purposes of a motion to dismiss, we c h Cir. 1955) (holding that district court may order hearing as remedy for termination of public employee without due process" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe obviousness analysis, the problem examined is not the specific problem solved by the invention but the general problem that confronted the inventor before the invention was made.”). The problem is not properly framed as creating an internal regenerating dryer for a IMS detector device designed for field use that is capable of regenerating while the detector operates (i.e., is capable of continuous use), nor is it properly framed in reference to an IMS detector dryer that never needs to have its desiccant replaced. Such constructions would improperly rely on hindsight to define the problem, and in actuality, come closer to defining the problem as it existed for Smiths while it tried to play “catch-up” after Morpho’s Itemizer 3 product was commercialized. See Mintz, 679 F.3d at 1377 (holding that the district court committed legal error by using a survey to define the meaning of a phrase and then insisting that verification meet the standards thus established", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe obviousness analysis, the problem examined is not the specific problem solved by the invention but the general problem that confronted the inventor before the invention was made.”). The problem is not properly framed as creating an internal regenerating dryer for a IMS detector device designed for field use that is capable of regenerating while the detector operates (i.e., is capable of continuous use), nor is it properly framed in reference to an IMS detector dryer that never needs to have its desiccant replaced. Such constructions would improperly rely on hindsight to define the problem, and in actuality, come closer to defining the problem as it existed for Smiths while it tried to play “catch-up” after Morpho’s Itemizer 3 product was commercialized. See Mintz, 679 F.3d at 1377 (holding that district court error was not clear error because no prior ninth circuit authority prohibited the course taken by the district court", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe obviousness analysis, the problem examined is not the specific problem solved by the invention but the general problem that confronted the inventor before the invention was made.”). The problem is not properly framed as creating an internal regenerating dryer for a IMS detector device designed for field use that is capable of regenerating while the detector operates (i.e., is capable of continuous use), nor is it properly framed in reference to an IMS detector dryer that never needs to have its desiccant replaced. Such constructions would improperly rely on hindsight to define the problem, and in actuality, come closer to defining the problem as it existed for Smiths while it tried to play “catch-up” after Morpho’s Itemizer 3 product was commercialized. See Mintz, 679 F.3d at 1377 (holding the district court committed reversible error by certifying a class with respect to fraud claim", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe obviousness analysis, the problem examined is not the specific problem solved by the invention but the general problem that confronted the inventor before the invention was made.”). The problem is not properly framed as creating an internal regenerating dryer for a IMS detector device designed for field use that is capable of regenerating while the detector operates (i.e., is capable of continuous use), nor is it properly framed in reference to an IMS detector dryer that never needs to have its desiccant replaced. Such constructions would improperly rely on hindsight to define the problem, and in actuality, come closer to defining the problem as it existed for Smiths while it tried to play “catch-up” after Morpho’s Itemizer 3 product was commercialized. See Mintz, 679 F.3d at 1377 (holding that a reviewing court must first ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe obviousness analysis, the problem examined is not the specific problem solved by the invention but the general problem that confronted the inventor before the invention was made.”). The problem is not properly framed as creating an internal regenerating dryer for a IMS detector device designed for field use that is capable of regenerating while the detector operates (i.e., is capable of continuous use), nor is it properly framed in reference to an IMS detector dryer that never needs to have its desiccant replaced. Such constructions would improperly rely on hindsight to define the problem, and in actuality, come closer to defining the problem as it existed for Smiths while it tried to play “catch-up” after Morpho’s Itemizer 3 product was commercialized. See Mintz, 679 F.3d at 1377 (holding that the district court committed error by using the invention to define the problem that the invention solves" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nhas failed to assert a valid claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment reads in pertinent part: “No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law....” Thus, by its terms, the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to the States; it does not apply to the Federal Government or the District of Columbia. See San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 543 n. 21, 107 S.Ct. 2971, 97 L.Ed.2d 427 (1987) (“The Fourteenth Amendment applies to actions by a State. The claimed association in this case is between the [defendant] and the Federal Government. Therefore, the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply.”); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498, 74 S.Ct. 693, 98 L.Ed. 884 (1954) (holding that the fourteenth amendment does not apply to the district of columbia", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nhas failed to assert a valid claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment reads in pertinent part: “No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law....” Thus, by its terms, the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to the States; it does not apply to the Federal Government or the District of Columbia. See San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 543 n. 21, 107 S.Ct. 2971, 97 L.Ed.2d 427 (1987) (“The Fourteenth Amendment applies to actions by a State. The claimed association in this case is between the [defendant] and the Federal Government. Therefore, the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply.”); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498, 74 S.Ct. 693, 98 L.Ed. 884 (1954) (holding that the plaintiff has a good faith basis to believe a putative defendant may be a district of columbia resident if a geolocation service places his her ip address within the district of columbia or within a city located within 30 miles of the district of columbia", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nhas failed to assert a valid claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment reads in pertinent part: “No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law....” Thus, by its terms, the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to the States; it does not apply to the Federal Government or the District of Columbia. See San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 543 n. 21, 107 S.Ct. 2971, 97 L.Ed.2d 427 (1987) (“The Fourteenth Amendment applies to actions by a State. The claimed association in this case is between the [defendant] and the Federal Government. Therefore, the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply.”); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498, 74 S.Ct. 693, 98 L.Ed. 884 (1954) (holding the fourteenth amendment does not apply to the actions of the federal government", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nhas failed to assert a valid claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment reads in pertinent part: “No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law....” Thus, by its terms, the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to the States; it does not apply to the Federal Government or the District of Columbia. See San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 543 n. 21, 107 S.Ct. 2971, 97 L.Ed.2d 427 (1987) (“The Fourteenth Amendment applies to actions by a State. The claimed association in this case is between the [defendant] and the Federal Government. Therefore, the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply.”); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498, 74 S.Ct. 693, 98 L.Ed. 884 (1954) (holding that under the law of the district of columbia the filing of a complaint does not toll the statute of limitations on a counterclaim", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nhas failed to assert a valid claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment reads in pertinent part: “No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law....” Thus, by its terms, the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to the States; it does not apply to the Federal Government or the District of Columbia. See San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 543 n. 21, 107 S.Ct. 2971, 97 L.Ed.2d 427 (1987) (“The Fourteenth Amendment applies to actions by a State. The claimed association in this case is between the [defendant] and the Federal Government. Therefore, the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply.”); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498, 74 S.Ct. 693, 98 L.Ed. 884 (1954) (holding that the fourteenth amendment only applies to state action" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nfor a sentence of fifteen years in prison with ten years suspended and to be served on probation. After Marckman entered his plea, the court granted him a one-week furlough. The court informed Marckman that it would sentence him to thirty years as an HFO if he got arrested on a new charge while out on the furlough or failed to appear for sentencing. Marckman agreed to this additional term, and trial counsel amended his change of plea form accordingly. Marckman failed to appear for sentencing and was subsequently arrested for failure to appear and for a new charge. The trial court sentenced Marckman to thirty years in prison as an HFO with ten years suspended and to be served on probation. In ground four of his postconviction motion, Marckman argued that the trial cour d DCA 2006) (holding that an involuntary plea claim is cognizable in a rule 3850 motion", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nfor a sentence of fifteen years in prison with ten years suspended and to be served on probation. After Marckman entered his plea, the court granted him a one-week furlough. The court informed Marckman that it would sentence him to thirty years as an HFO if he got arrested on a new charge while out on the furlough or failed to appear for sentencing. Marckman agreed to this additional term, and trial counsel amended his change of plea form accordingly. Marckman failed to appear for sentencing and was subsequently arrested for failure to appear and for a new charge. The trial court sentenced Marckman to thirty years in prison as an HFO with ten years suspended and to be served on probation. In ground four of his postconviction motion, Marckman argued that the trial cour d DCA 2006) (holding that claim that plea was involuntary because the court failed to comply with rule 3172c was cognizable in a rule 3850 motion", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nfor a sentence of fifteen years in prison with ten years suspended and to be served on probation. After Marckman entered his plea, the court granted him a one-week furlough. The court informed Marckman that it would sentence him to thirty years as an HFO if he got arrested on a new charge while out on the furlough or failed to appear for sentencing. Marckman agreed to this additional term, and trial counsel amended his change of plea form accordingly. Marckman failed to appear for sentencing and was subsequently arrested for failure to appear and for a new charge. The trial court sentenced Marckman to thirty years in prison as an HFO with ten years suspended and to be served on probation. In ground four of his postconviction motion, Marckman argued that the trial cour d DCA 2006) (holding that rule 3850 motion was not time barred where the order did not place any time limitation on when the defendant would refile his rule 3850 motion", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nfor a sentence of fifteen years in prison with ten years suspended and to be served on probation. After Marckman entered his plea, the court granted him a one-week furlough. The court informed Marckman that it would sentence him to thirty years as an HFO if he got arrested on a new charge while out on the furlough or failed to appear for sentencing. Marckman agreed to this additional term, and trial counsel amended his change of plea form accordingly. Marckman failed to appear for sentencing and was subsequently arrested for failure to appear and for a new charge. The trial court sentenced Marckman to thirty years in prison as an HFO with ten years suspended and to be served on probation. In ground four of his postconviction motion, Marckman argued that the trial cour d DCA 2006) (holding that defendants 3850 motion for postconviction relief was procedurally barred as successive where the defendants current rule 3850 motion is one that could have or should have been raised in his first rule 3850 motion", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nfor a sentence of fifteen years in prison with ten years suspended and to be served on probation. After Marckman entered his plea, the court granted him a one-week furlough. The court informed Marckman that it would sentence him to thirty years as an HFO if he got arrested on a new charge while out on the furlough or failed to appear for sentencing. Marckman agreed to this additional term, and trial counsel amended his change of plea form accordingly. Marckman failed to appear for sentencing and was subsequently arrested for failure to appear and for a new charge. The trial court sentenced Marckman to thirty years in prison as an HFO with ten years suspended and to be served on probation. In ground four of his postconviction motion, Marckman argued that the trial cour d DCA 2006) (holding defendant was not barred from raising sentencing issue in rule 3850 motion by virtue of prior rule 3850 motion which did not raise any sentencing issues" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nto rule on a motion and therefore forgot to rule on a motion to strike. Reply at 2. The court finds this argument speculative at best. In light of the “relative unseemliness of a court’s altering a legal ruling as to the same litigants,” Zdanok, 327 F.2d at 953, the court needs greater justification to re visit Judge Johnson’s ruling than conjecture about whether she forgot something or felt rushed. Because the defendant fails to offer such justification, its motion for reconsiderat 650 F.2d 663, 666 (5th Cir.1981) (finding that the grant of summary judgment for the defendant \"was so inconsistent with the plaintiff's request for leave to amend to state a new claim for relief as implicitly to deny the motion to amend”); Wimberly v. Clark Controller Co., 364 F.2d 225, 227 (6th Cir.1966) (holding that wjhile it is certainly the better practice to specifically rule on all pending motions the determination of a motion need not always be expressed but may be implied by an entiy of an order inconsistent with granting the relief sought", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nto rule on a motion and therefore forgot to rule on a motion to strike. Reply at 2. The court finds this argument speculative at best. In light of the “relative unseemliness of a court’s altering a legal ruling as to the same litigants,” Zdanok, 327 F.2d at 953, the court needs greater justification to re visit Judge Johnson’s ruling than conjecture about whether she forgot something or felt rushed. Because the defendant fails to offer such justification, its motion for reconsiderat 650 F.2d 663, 666 (5th Cir.1981) (finding that the grant of summary judgment for the defendant \"was so inconsistent with the plaintiff's request for leave to amend to state a new claim for relief as implicitly to deny the motion to amend”); Wimberly v. Clark Controller Co., 364 F.2d 225, 227 (6th Cir.1966) (holding death sentence need not be pending in order for this court to engage in review of issues on appeal", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nto rule on a motion and therefore forgot to rule on a motion to strike. Reply at 2. The court finds this argument speculative at best. In light of the “relative unseemliness of a court’s altering a legal ruling as to the same litigants,” Zdanok, 327 F.2d at 953, the court needs greater justification to re visit Judge Johnson’s ruling than conjecture about whether she forgot something or felt rushed. Because the defendant fails to offer such justification, its motion for reconsiderat 650 F.2d 663, 666 (5th Cir.1981) (finding that the grant of summary judgment for the defendant \"was so inconsistent with the plaintiff's request for leave to amend to state a new claim for relief as implicitly to deny the motion to amend”); Wimberly v. Clark Controller Co., 364 F.2d 225, 227 (6th Cir.1966) (holding order granting motion to withdraw plea to be the functional equivalent of an order granting a new trial because like a postverdict mistrial it returns case to posture it had been before trial", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nto rule on a motion and therefore forgot to rule on a motion to strike. Reply at 2. The court finds this argument speculative at best. In light of the “relative unseemliness of a court’s altering a legal ruling as to the same litigants,” Zdanok, 327 F.2d at 953, the court needs greater justification to re visit Judge Johnson’s ruling than conjecture about whether she forgot something or felt rushed. Because the defendant fails to offer such justification, its motion for reconsiderat 650 F.2d 663, 666 (5th Cir.1981) (finding that the grant of summary judgment for the defendant \"was so inconsistent with the plaintiff's request for leave to amend to state a new claim for relief as implicitly to deny the motion to amend”); Wimberly v. Clark Controller Co., 364 F.2d 225, 227 (6th Cir.1966) (holding that the scheduling order merely prescribes the date by which all motions to amend shall be filed the date on the scheduling order does not confine the district courts consideration of the merits of such motions and does not preclude it from finding that an amendment would result in prejudice", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nto rule on a motion and therefore forgot to rule on a motion to strike. Reply at 2. The court finds this argument speculative at best. In light of the “relative unseemliness of a court’s altering a legal ruling as to the same litigants,” Zdanok, 327 F.2d at 953, the court needs greater justification to re visit Judge Johnson’s ruling than conjecture about whether she forgot something or felt rushed. Because the defendant fails to offer such justification, its motion for reconsiderat 650 F.2d 663, 666 (5th Cir.1981) (finding that the grant of summary judgment for the defendant \"was so inconsistent with the plaintiff's request for leave to amend to state a new claim for relief as implicitly to deny the motion to amend”); Wimberly v. Clark Controller Co., 364 F.2d 225, 227 (6th Cir.1966) (holding interpretation may not be inconsistent with regulation" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nlaw. The fact that the state could have adopted a Luce-type rule and warned a defendant of its consequences without violating his constitutional rights does not mean, as the majority appears to believe, that the state’s violation was one of state law only. There are a number of actions a state may take without violating a defendant’s federal constitutional rights if a state statute or rule provides for them l constitutional right to testify in his own defense by the trial court’s unlawful threat to permit the prosecutor to introduce his prior conviction, that waiver is constitutionally invalid as a matter of federal law despite the fact that the state could have adopted such a rule constitutionally had it chosen to do so. Cf. Caputo v. Henderson, 541 F.2d 979, 982-84 (2nd Cir. 1976) (holding that it is not", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nlaw. The fact that the state could have adopted a Luce-type rule and warned a defendant of its consequences without violating his constitutional rights does not mean, as the majority appears to believe, that the state’s violation was one of state law only. There are a number of actions a state may take without violating a defendant’s federal constitutional rights if a state statute or rule provides for them l constitutional right to testify in his own defense by the trial court’s unlawful threat to permit the prosecutor to introduce his prior conviction, that waiver is constitutionally invalid as a matter of federal law despite the fact that the state could have adopted such a rule constitutionally had it chosen to do so. Cf. Caputo v. Henderson, 541 F.2d 979, 982-84 (2nd Cir. 1976) (recognizing that where a guilty plea is shown to be constitutionally invalid leave to withdraw the plea is constitutionally mandated", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nlaw. The fact that the state could have adopted a Luce-type rule and warned a defendant of its consequences without violating his constitutional rights does not mean, as the majority appears to believe, that the state’s violation was one of state law only. There are a number of actions a state may take without violating a defendant’s federal constitutional rights if a state statute or rule provides for them l constitutional right to testify in his own defense by the trial court’s unlawful threat to permit the prosecutor to introduce his prior conviction, that waiver is constitutionally invalid as a matter of federal law despite the fact that the state could have adopted such a rule constitutionally had it chosen to do so. Cf. Caputo v. Henderson, 541 F.2d 979, 982-84 (2nd Cir. 1976) (holding that a defendants guilty plea is not knowingly made and is hence constitutionally invalid and subject to reversal on habeas if it is based upon erroneous sentencing information provided by the judge", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nlaw. The fact that the state could have adopted a Luce-type rule and warned a defendant of its consequences without violating his constitutional rights does not mean, as the majority appears to believe, that the state’s violation was one of state law only. There are a number of actions a state may take without violating a defendant’s federal constitutional rights if a state statute or rule provides for them l constitutional right to testify in his own defense by the trial court’s unlawful threat to permit the prosecutor to introduce his prior conviction, that waiver is constitutionally invalid as a matter of federal law despite the fact that the state could have adopted such a rule constitutionally had it chosen to do so. Cf. Caputo v. Henderson, 541 F.2d 979, 982-84 (2nd Cir. 1976) (holding that the defendants guilty plea was entered into knowingly voluntarily and intelligently", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nlaw. The fact that the state could have adopted a Luce-type rule and warned a defendant of its consequences without violating his constitutional rights does not mean, as the majority appears to believe, that the state’s violation was one of state law only. There are a number of actions a state may take without violating a defendant’s federal constitutional rights if a state statute or rule provides for them l constitutional right to testify in his own defense by the trial court’s unlawful threat to permit the prosecutor to introduce his prior conviction, that waiver is constitutionally invalid as a matter of federal law despite the fact that the state could have adopted such a rule constitutionally had it chosen to do so. Cf. Caputo v. Henderson, 541 F.2d 979, 982-84 (2nd Cir. 1976) (holding that a sentence is subject to reversal if the trial judge selects a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nto make ... antitrust claims ... inappropriate for arbitration.” American Safety Equipment Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 827-28 (2d Cir.1968). Since that time the foundations of the American Safety doctrine have been significantly eroded. Gemco Latinoamerica, Inc. v. Seiko Time Corp., 671 F.Supp. 972 (S.D.N.Y.1987), adhered to, in part, dismissed, in part, on reconsideration, 685 F.Supp. 400 (S.D.N.Y.1988). The Supreme Court has held that nothing in the federal antitrust laws prohibits parties from agreeing to arbitrate antitrust claims arising out of international commercial transactions. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 105 S.Ct. 3346, 87 L.Ed.2d 444 (1985). Finding it “unneces U.S. 220, 107 S.Ct. 2332, 96 L.Ed.2d 185 (1987) (holding that claims under the securities act of 1933 are arbitrable", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nto make ... antitrust claims ... inappropriate for arbitration.” American Safety Equipment Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 827-28 (2d Cir.1968). Since that time the foundations of the American Safety doctrine have been significantly eroded. Gemco Latinoamerica, Inc. v. Seiko Time Corp., 671 F.Supp. 972 (S.D.N.Y.1987), adhered to, in part, dismissed, in part, on reconsideration, 685 F.Supp. 400 (S.D.N.Y.1988). The Supreme Court has held that nothing in the federal antitrust laws prohibits parties from agreeing to arbitrate antitrust claims arising out of international commercial transactions. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 105 S.Ct. 3346, 87 L.Ed.2d 444 (1985). Finding it “unneces U.S. 220, 107 S.Ct. 2332, 96 L.Ed.2d 185 (1987) (holding that claims under 10b of the securities exchange act of 1934 were arbitrable under a predispute arbitration agreement", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nto make ... antitrust claims ... inappropriate for arbitration.” American Safety Equipment Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 827-28 (2d Cir.1968). Since that time the foundations of the American Safety doctrine have been significantly eroded. Gemco Latinoamerica, Inc. v. Seiko Time Corp., 671 F.Supp. 972 (S.D.N.Y.1987), adhered to, in part, dismissed, in part, on reconsideration, 685 F.Supp. 400 (S.D.N.Y.1988). The Supreme Court has held that nothing in the federal antitrust laws prohibits parties from agreeing to arbitrate antitrust claims arising out of international commercial transactions. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 105 S.Ct. 3346, 87 L.Ed.2d 444 (1985). Finding it “unneces U.S. 220, 107 S.Ct. 2332, 96 L.Ed.2d 185 (1987) (holding that claims under the securities act of 1934 and the rico statutes are arbitrable", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nto make ... antitrust claims ... inappropriate for arbitration.” American Safety Equipment Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 827-28 (2d Cir.1968). Since that time the foundations of the American Safety doctrine have been significantly eroded. Gemco Latinoamerica, Inc. v. Seiko Time Corp., 671 F.Supp. 972 (S.D.N.Y.1987), adhered to, in part, dismissed, in part, on reconsideration, 685 F.Supp. 400 (S.D.N.Y.1988). The Supreme Court has held that nothing in the federal antitrust laws prohibits parties from agreeing to arbitrate antitrust claims arising out of international commercial transactions. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 105 S.Ct. 3346, 87 L.Ed.2d 444 (1985). Finding it “unneces U.S. 220, 107 S.Ct. 2332, 96 L.Ed.2d 185 (1987) (holding that claims brought under section 10b of the securities exchange act and rico claims were arbitrable", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nto make ... antitrust claims ... inappropriate for arbitration.” American Safety Equipment Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 827-28 (2d Cir.1968). Since that time the foundations of the American Safety doctrine have been significantly eroded. Gemco Latinoamerica, Inc. v. Seiko Time Corp., 671 F.Supp. 972 (S.D.N.Y.1987), adhered to, in part, dismissed, in part, on reconsideration, 685 F.Supp. 400 (S.D.N.Y.1988). The Supreme Court has held that nothing in the federal antitrust laws prohibits parties from agreeing to arbitrate antitrust claims arising out of international commercial transactions. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 105 S.Ct. 3346, 87 L.Ed.2d 444 (1985). Finding it “unneces U.S. 220, 107 S.Ct. 2332, 96 L.Ed.2d 185 (1987) (holding that claims under the securities act of 1933 were arbitrable under a predispute arbitration agreement" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nrather, it was an action for equitable apportionment of response costs already incurred by a PRP, who was unable to seek relief under § 107. Id. To accept the holding of the Tenth Circuit in Sun Company, the W.R. Grace court reasoned, would result in two separate statute of limitations periods and accrual mechanisms for CERCLA contribution actions. Id. “If a gap exists in the statute of limitations for CERCLA actions under § 113(f)(1), it is one to be resolved by Congress.” Id.; see also Reichhold Chemicals, Inc. v. Textron, Inc., 888 F.Supp. 1116, 1125 (N.D.Fla.1995) (refusing to borrow another statute of limitations where no triggering event under § 113(g)(3) had occurred or was likely to occur); Gould Inc. v. A & M Battery and Tire Service, 901 F.Supp. 906, 914 (M.D.Pa.1995) (holding that the evidence was insufficient for the statute of limitations to bar recovery of a quantum meruit cause of action", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nrather, it was an action for equitable apportionment of response costs already incurred by a PRP, who was unable to seek relief under § 107. Id. To accept the holding of the Tenth Circuit in Sun Company, the W.R. Grace court reasoned, would result in two separate statute of limitations periods and accrual mechanisms for CERCLA contribution actions. Id. “If a gap exists in the statute of limitations for CERCLA actions under § 113(f)(1), it is one to be resolved by Congress.” Id.; see also Reichhold Chemicals, Inc. v. Textron, Inc., 888 F.Supp. 1116, 1125 (N.D.Fla.1995) (refusing to borrow another statute of limitations where no triggering event under § 113(g)(3) had occurred or was likely to occur); Gould Inc. v. A & M Battery and Tire Service, 901 F.Supp. 906, 914 (M.D.Pa.1995) (holding that the uccs fouryear statute of limitations provision which barred an action by the plaintiff did not bar a thirdparty contribution and indemnity claim", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nrather, it was an action for equitable apportionment of response costs already incurred by a PRP, who was unable to seek relief under § 107. Id. To accept the holding of the Tenth Circuit in Sun Company, the W.R. Grace court reasoned, would result in two separate statute of limitations periods and accrual mechanisms for CERCLA contribution actions. Id. “If a gap exists in the statute of limitations for CERCLA actions under § 113(f)(1), it is one to be resolved by Congress.” Id.; see also Reichhold Chemicals, Inc. v. Textron, Inc., 888 F.Supp. 1116, 1125 (N.D.Fla.1995) (refusing to borrow another statute of limitations where no triggering event under § 113(g)(3) had occurred or was likely to occur); Gould Inc. v. A & M Battery and Tire Service, 901 F.Supp. 906, 914 (M.D.Pa.1995) (holding that plaintiffs entering into a consent agreement with the epa did not trigger the running of the statute of limitations under 113g3 for purposes of a 113f1 contribution action and further distinguishing a 113f1 contribution action from a cost recovery action to which the limitations periods of 113g2 would apply", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nrather, it was an action for equitable apportionment of response costs already incurred by a PRP, who was unable to seek relief under § 107. Id. To accept the holding of the Tenth Circuit in Sun Company, the W.R. Grace court reasoned, would result in two separate statute of limitations periods and accrual mechanisms for CERCLA contribution actions. Id. “If a gap exists in the statute of limitations for CERCLA actions under § 113(f)(1), it is one to be resolved by Congress.” Id.; see also Reichhold Chemicals, Inc. v. Textron, Inc., 888 F.Supp. 1116, 1125 (N.D.Fla.1995) (refusing to borrow another statute of limitations where no triggering event under § 113(g)(3) had occurred or was likely to occur); Gould Inc. v. A & M Battery and Tire Service, 901 F.Supp. 906, 914 (M.D.Pa.1995) (holding that the running of the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nrather, it was an action for equitable apportionment of response costs already incurred by a PRP, who was unable to seek relief under § 107. Id. To accept the holding of the Tenth Circuit in Sun Company, the W.R. Grace court reasoned, would result in two separate statute of limitations periods and accrual mechanisms for CERCLA contribution actions. Id. “If a gap exists in the statute of limitations for CERCLA actions under § 113(f)(1), it is one to be resolved by Congress.” Id.; see also Reichhold Chemicals, Inc. v. Textron, Inc., 888 F.Supp. 1116, 1125 (N.D.Fla.1995) (refusing to borrow another statute of limitations where no triggering event under § 113(g)(3) had occurred or was likely to occur); Gould Inc. v. A & M Battery and Tire Service, 901 F.Supp. 906, 914 (M.D.Pa.1995) (holding that ignorance or misunderstanding of the law would not toll the running of the statute of limitations" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nto lay any foundation at all for the documents and, thus, the trial court did not err in excluding them from evidence. We also agree that, when evidence is excluded, counsel generally may make an effective offer of proof by summarizing the excluded evidence. Benchmark Properties v. Hipolito, 161 Or App 598, 605, 984 P2d 927 (1999). However, that rule does not mean that an offer of proof is sufficient if counsel represents that a document has a certain identity but in addition (1) fails to represent that he or she is prepared to lay a foundation establishing its authenticity and, if the court excludes the document from evidence, (2) fails to request that the document be identified and placed in the record as an offer of proof. See State v. Busby, 315 Or 292, 298, 844 P2d 897 (1993) (holding timely and sufficiently specific objection is required to preserve error", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nto lay any foundation at all for the documents and, thus, the trial court did not err in excluding them from evidence. We also agree that, when evidence is excluded, counsel generally may make an effective offer of proof by summarizing the excluded evidence. Benchmark Properties v. Hipolito, 161 Or App 598, 605, 984 P2d 927 (1999). However, that rule does not mean that an offer of proof is sufficient if counsel represents that a document has a certain identity but in addition (1) fails to represent that he or she is prepared to lay a foundation establishing its authenticity and, if the court excludes the document from evidence, (2) fails to request that the document be identified and placed in the record as an offer of proof. See State v. Busby, 315 Or 292, 298, 844 P2d 897 (1993) (holding defendant failed to preserve burden of proof issue for appeal", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nto lay any foundation at all for the documents and, thus, the trial court did not err in excluding them from evidence. We also agree that, when evidence is excluded, counsel generally may make an effective offer of proof by summarizing the excluded evidence. Benchmark Properties v. Hipolito, 161 Or App 598, 605, 984 P2d 927 (1999). However, that rule does not mean that an offer of proof is sufficient if counsel represents that a document has a certain identity but in addition (1) fails to represent that he or she is prepared to lay a foundation establishing its authenticity and, if the court excludes the document from evidence, (2) fails to request that the document be identified and placed in the record as an offer of proof. See State v. Busby, 315 Or 292, 298, 844 P2d 897 (1993) (holding that an offer of proof is not necessary to preserve an issue for appeal when the asserted error does not relate primarily to the admissibility of particular evidence but involves an underlying legal ruling that results in the exclusion of evidence as a consequence", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nto lay any foundation at all for the documents and, thus, the trial court did not err in excluding them from evidence. We also agree that, when evidence is excluded, counsel generally may make an effective offer of proof by summarizing the excluded evidence. Benchmark Properties v. Hipolito, 161 Or App 598, 605, 984 P2d 927 (1999). However, that rule does not mean that an offer of proof is sufficient if counsel represents that a document has a certain identity but in addition (1) fails to represent that he or she is prepared to lay a foundation establishing its authenticity and, if the court excludes the document from evidence, (2) fails to request that the document be identified and placed in the record as an offer of proof. See State v. Busby, 315 Or 292, 298, 844 P2d 897 (1993) (holding that an adequate offer of proof is normally required to preserve error when a trial court excludes evidence", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nto lay any foundation at all for the documents and, thus, the trial court did not err in excluding them from evidence. We also agree that, when evidence is excluded, counsel generally may make an effective offer of proof by summarizing the excluded evidence. Benchmark Properties v. Hipolito, 161 Or App 598, 605, 984 P2d 927 (1999). However, that rule does not mean that an offer of proof is sufficient if counsel represents that a document has a certain identity but in addition (1) fails to represent that he or she is prepared to lay a foundation establishing its authenticity and, if the court excludes the document from evidence, (2) fails to request that the document be identified and placed in the record as an offer of proof. See State v. Busby, 315 Or 292, 298, 844 P2d 897 (1993) (holding that to properly preserve an objection to the trial courts imposing a time limit for the presentation of evidence the objecting party must make a specific and definite offer of proof informing the trial court of the evidence that is being excluded by the limitation" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nfirms or corporations liable” is unambiguous and discharges all potential tortfeasors from liability. See, e.g., Battle v. Clanton, 27 N.C.App. 616, 220 S.E.2d 97, 99 (1975), cert. denied, 289 N.C. 613, 223 S.E.2d 391 (1976); Hasselrode v. Gnagey, 404 Pa. 549, 172 A.2d 764, 765 (1961). The parties t ic evidence of intent must be considered); Hurt v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 380 So.2d 432, 433-34 (Fla.1980) (adopting intent rule and holding that release containing handwritten and preprinted terms was inherently ambiguous); Cram v. Toum of Northbridge, 410 Mass. 800, 575 N.E.2d 747, 749 (1991) (reversing summary judgment because accident victim filed an affidavit in which she stated she intended to discharge only the driver who injured her); Wells, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 521, 526 N.E.2d at 12 (holding that extrinsic evidence of the parties course of conduct may be considered where the contract language is ambiguous", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nfirms or corporations liable” is unambiguous and discharges all potential tortfeasors from liability. See, e.g., Battle v. Clanton, 27 N.C.App. 616, 220 S.E.2d 97, 99 (1975), cert. denied, 289 N.C. 613, 223 S.E.2d 391 (1976); Hasselrode v. Gnagey, 404 Pa. 549, 172 A.2d 764, 765 (1961). The parties t ic evidence of intent must be considered); Hurt v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 380 So.2d 432, 433-34 (Fla.1980) (adopting intent rule and holding that release containing handwritten and preprinted terms was inherently ambiguous); Cram v. Toum of Northbridge, 410 Mass. 800, 575 N.E.2d 747, 749 (1991) (reversing summary judgment because accident victim filed an affidavit in which she stated she intended to discharge only the driver who injured her); Wells, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 521, 526 N.E.2d at 12 (holding that a court may consider extrinsic evidence to determine whether a contract is ambiguous", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nfirms or corporations liable” is unambiguous and discharges all potential tortfeasors from liability. See, e.g., Battle v. Clanton, 27 N.C.App. 616, 220 S.E.2d 97, 99 (1975), cert. denied, 289 N.C. 613, 223 S.E.2d 391 (1976); Hasselrode v. Gnagey, 404 Pa. 549, 172 A.2d 764, 765 (1961). The parties t ic evidence of intent must be considered); Hurt v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 380 So.2d 432, 433-34 (Fla.1980) (adopting intent rule and holding that release containing handwritten and preprinted terms was inherently ambiguous); Cram v. Toum of Northbridge, 410 Mass. 800, 575 N.E.2d 747, 749 (1991) (reversing summary judgment because accident victim filed an affidavit in which she stated she intended to discharge only the driver who injured her); Wells, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 521, 526 N.E.2d at 12 (holding that court must determine intent of parties by reference to language of release turning to extrinsic evidence only when it determines as a matter of law that terms are ambiguous", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nfirms or corporations liable” is unambiguous and discharges all potential tortfeasors from liability. See, e.g., Battle v. Clanton, 27 N.C.App. 616, 220 S.E.2d 97, 99 (1975), cert. denied, 289 N.C. 613, 223 S.E.2d 391 (1976); Hasselrode v. Gnagey, 404 Pa. 549, 172 A.2d 764, 765 (1961). The parties t ic evidence of intent must be considered); Hurt v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 380 So.2d 432, 433-34 (Fla.1980) (adopting intent rule and holding that release containing handwritten and preprinted terms was inherently ambiguous); Cram v. Toum of Northbridge, 410 Mass. 800, 575 N.E.2d 747, 749 (1991) (reversing summary judgment because accident victim filed an affidavit in which she stated she intended to discharge only the driver who injured her); Wells, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 521, 526 N.E.2d at 12 (holding that court may not use extrinsic evidence unless contract language is ambiguous", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nfirms or corporations liable” is unambiguous and discharges all potential tortfeasors from liability. See, e.g., Battle v. Clanton, 27 N.C.App. 616, 220 S.E.2d 97, 99 (1975), cert. denied, 289 N.C. 613, 223 S.E.2d 391 (1976); Hasselrode v. Gnagey, 404 Pa. 549, 172 A.2d 764, 765 (1961). The parties t ic evidence of intent must be considered); Hurt v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 380 So.2d 432, 433-34 (Fla.1980) (adopting intent rule and holding that release containing handwritten and preprinted terms was inherently ambiguous); Cram v. Toum of Northbridge, 410 Mass. 800, 575 N.E.2d 747, 749 (1991) (reversing summary judgment because accident victim filed an affidavit in which she stated she intended to discharge only the driver who injured her); Wells, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 521, 526 N.E.2d at 12 (holding that extrinsic evidence admissible to determine intent of parties" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nevidence of these matters is not required to sustain a conviction. Indeed, the “affirmative links” analysis is a way “to explain why the circumstantial evidence in a particular case [is] sufficient for conviction.” Brown, 911 S.W.2d at 747. In addition, the trial court, as trier of fact, was the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and could have disbelieved the defense witnesses’ testimony that others had used Wiley’s car. See Dewberry, 4 S.W.3d at 740. In such a case, there would be no basis for considering Wiley’s possession of the car to be shared with others. Wiley also relies on Miller v. State, 627 S.W.2d 235, 237 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1981, pet. ref'd), for the proposition that evidence that the defendant possessed keys to pp.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. ref'd) (holding that there was insufficient evidence to establish that defendant had knowledge of firearm in close proximity to him when he was driving the car for the cars owner who was a passenger", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nevidence of these matters is not required to sustain a conviction. Indeed, the “affirmative links” analysis is a way “to explain why the circumstantial evidence in a particular case [is] sufficient for conviction.” Brown, 911 S.W.2d at 747. In addition, the trial court, as trier of fact, was the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and could have disbelieved the defense witnesses’ testimony that others had used Wiley’s car. See Dewberry, 4 S.W.3d at 740. In such a case, there would be no basis for considering Wiley’s possession of the car to be shared with others. Wiley also relies on Miller v. State, 627 S.W.2d 235, 237 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1981, pet. ref'd), for the proposition that evidence that the defendant possessed keys to pp.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. ref'd) (holding evidence that showed only that defendant drove car in which cocaine was found was insufficient to connect him to it especially in light of his attempts to dissociate himself from passenger who was high and in possession of pop at time of arrest", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nevidence of these matters is not required to sustain a conviction. Indeed, the “affirmative links” analysis is a way “to explain why the circumstantial evidence in a particular case [is] sufficient for conviction.” Brown, 911 S.W.2d at 747. In addition, the trial court, as trier of fact, was the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and could have disbelieved the defense witnesses’ testimony that others had used Wiley’s car. See Dewberry, 4 S.W.3d at 740. In such a case, there would be no basis for considering Wiley’s possession of the car to be shared with others. Wiley also relies on Miller v. State, 627 S.W.2d 235, 237 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1981, pet. ref'd), for the proposition that evidence that the defendant possessed keys to pp.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. ref'd) (holding evidence did not connect defendant to narcotics found in individual bags inside a larger bag in a car following the defendants car when the only connection was his fingerprints on outer bag and when the driver and passenger of the car in which the drugs were found exhibited nervousness and other factors indicating consciousness of guilt", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nevidence of these matters is not required to sustain a conviction. Indeed, the “affirmative links” analysis is a way “to explain why the circumstantial evidence in a particular case [is] sufficient for conviction.” Brown, 911 S.W.2d at 747. In addition, the trial court, as trier of fact, was the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and could have disbelieved the defense witnesses’ testimony that others had used Wiley’s car. See Dewberry, 4 S.W.3d at 740. In such a case, there would be no basis for considering Wiley’s possession of the car to be shared with others. Wiley also relies on Miller v. State, 627 S.W.2d 235, 237 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1981, pet. ref'd), for the proposition that evidence that the defendant possessed keys to pp.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. ref'd) (holding that defendant who was a passenger in a car had joint constructive possession of drugs found next to the defendants luggage in truck of car even where she disclaimed ownership of the drugs", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nevidence of these matters is not required to sustain a conviction. Indeed, the “affirmative links” analysis is a way “to explain why the circumstantial evidence in a particular case [is] sufficient for conviction.” Brown, 911 S.W.2d at 747. In addition, the trial court, as trier of fact, was the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and could have disbelieved the defense witnesses’ testimony that others had used Wiley’s car. See Dewberry, 4 S.W.3d at 740. In such a case, there would be no basis for considering Wiley’s possession of the car to be shared with others. Wiley also relies on Miller v. State, 627 S.W.2d 235, 237 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1981, pet. ref'd), for the proposition that evidence that the defendant possessed keys to pp.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. ref'd) (holding that evidence was insufficient to prove constructive possession where the defendant was in jail at the time the drugs were seized from his residence" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthat \"gender\" connotes cultural or attitudinal characteristics distinctive to the sexes, as opposed to their physical characteristics. See, e.g., Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender Prom Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 Yale L.J. 1 (1995) (\"gender [is] to sex what masculine and feminine are to male and female”). See also JEB v. Alabama, - U.S. -, -n. 1, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 1436 n. 1, 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting). While it may be useful to disaggregate the definition of \"gender” from \"sex” for some purposes, in this opinion we make no such effort, using the terms interchangeably to refer to whether an employee is a man or a woman. 2 . Compare, e.g., Sardinia v. Dellwood Foods, Inc., 1995 WL 640502 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (holding that samcscx sexual harassment claims are actionable under title vii", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthat \"gender\" connotes cultural or attitudinal characteristics distinctive to the sexes, as opposed to their physical characteristics. See, e.g., Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender Prom Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 Yale L.J. 1 (1995) (\"gender [is] to sex what masculine and feminine are to male and female”). See also JEB v. Alabama, - U.S. -, -n. 1, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 1436 n. 1, 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting). While it may be useful to disaggregate the definition of \"gender” from \"sex” for some purposes, in this opinion we make no such effort, using the terms interchangeably to refer to whether an employee is a man or a woman. 2 . Compare, e.g., Sardinia v. Dellwood Foods, Inc., 1995 WL 640502 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (holding that samesex sexual harassment claims are not actionable under title vii", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthat \"gender\" connotes cultural or attitudinal characteristics distinctive to the sexes, as opposed to their physical characteristics. See, e.g., Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender Prom Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 Yale L.J. 1 (1995) (\"gender [is] to sex what masculine and feminine are to male and female”). See also JEB v. Alabama, - U.S. -, -n. 1, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 1436 n. 1, 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting). While it may be useful to disaggregate the definition of \"gender” from \"sex” for some purposes, in this opinion we make no such effort, using the terms interchangeably to refer to whether an employee is a man or a woman. 2 . Compare, e.g., Sardinia v. Dellwood Foods, Inc., 1995 WL 640502 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (holding that sexual harassment need not take the form of sexual advances or other explicitly sexual conduct in order to be actionable under title vii", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthat \"gender\" connotes cultural or attitudinal characteristics distinctive to the sexes, as opposed to their physical characteristics. See, e.g., Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender Prom Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 Yale L.J. 1 (1995) (\"gender [is] to sex what masculine and feminine are to male and female”). See also JEB v. Alabama, - U.S. -, -n. 1, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 1436 n. 1, 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting). While it may be useful to disaggregate the definition of \"gender” from \"sex” for some purposes, in this opinion we make no such effort, using the terms interchangeably to refer to whether an employee is a man or a woman. 2 . Compare, e.g., Sardinia v. Dellwood Foods, Inc., 1995 WL 640502 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (holding that noneconomic injury resulting from a hostile environment based on discriminatory sexual harassment is actionable under title vii", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthat \"gender\" connotes cultural or attitudinal characteristics distinctive to the sexes, as opposed to their physical characteristics. See, e.g., Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender Prom Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 Yale L.J. 1 (1995) (\"gender [is] to sex what masculine and feminine are to male and female”). See also JEB v. Alabama, - U.S. -, -n. 1, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 1436 n. 1, 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting). While it may be useful to disaggregate the definition of \"gender” from \"sex” for some purposes, in this opinion we make no such effort, using the terms interchangeably to refer to whether an employee is a man or a woman. 2 . Compare, e.g., Sardinia v. Dellwood Foods, Inc., 1995 WL 640502 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (holding that title vii does not protect employees from harassment based on sexual orientation" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ntrial court erred in denying appellant’s motion and opting for venue in Harris County. While both statutes contain language of mandatory effect, the receivership venue section contained in the insurance code was amended subsequent to the workers’ compensation venue provision and its language is specific that exclusive venue for insurance companies in receivership lies in Travis County. The language contained in section 4(h) — “shall have exclusive venue” — could not be clearer in expressing the Legislature’s intent. Other cases examining this issue outside of the workers’ compensation area are analogously supportive of this conclusion. Whitson v. Harris, 792 S.W.2d 206, 209 (Tex.App.—Austin 1990, no writ). See also Langdeau v. Burke Investment Co., 163 Tex. 526, 358 S.W.2d 553 (1962) (holding that adverse inferences are permissive not mandatory", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ntrial court erred in denying appellant’s motion and opting for venue in Harris County. While both statutes contain language of mandatory effect, the receivership venue section contained in the insurance code was amended subsequent to the workers’ compensation venue provision and its language is specific that exclusive venue for insurance companies in receivership lies in Travis County. The language contained in section 4(h) — “shall have exclusive venue” — could not be clearer in expressing the Legislature’s intent. Other cases examining this issue outside of the workers’ compensation area are analogously supportive of this conclusion. Whitson v. Harris, 792 S.W.2d 206, 209 (Tex.App.—Austin 1990, no writ). See also Langdeau v. Burke Investment Co., 163 Tex. 526, 358 S.W.2d 553 (1962) (holding that the predecessor to local rule 561b3 provides the only acceptable means of presenting additional facts to the district court", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ntrial court erred in denying appellant’s motion and opting for venue in Harris County. While both statutes contain language of mandatory effect, the receivership venue section contained in the insurance code was amended subsequent to the workers’ compensation venue provision and its language is specific that exclusive venue for insurance companies in receivership lies in Travis County. The language contained in section 4(h) — “shall have exclusive venue” — could not be clearer in expressing the Legislature’s intent. Other cases examining this issue outside of the workers’ compensation area are analogously supportive of this conclusion. Whitson v. Harris, 792 S.W.2d 206, 209 (Tex.App.—Austin 1990, no writ). See also Langdeau v. Burke Investment Co., 163 Tex. 526, 358 S.W.2d 553 (1962) (holding that predecessor statute to section 4h provides for permissive venue", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ntrial court erred in denying appellant’s motion and opting for venue in Harris County. While both statutes contain language of mandatory effect, the receivership venue section contained in the insurance code was amended subsequent to the workers’ compensation venue provision and its language is specific that exclusive venue for insurance companies in receivership lies in Travis County. The language contained in section 4(h) — “shall have exclusive venue” — could not be clearer in expressing the Legislature’s intent. Other cases examining this issue outside of the workers’ compensation area are analogously supportive of this conclusion. Whitson v. Harris, 792 S.W.2d 206, 209 (Tex.App.—Austin 1990, no writ). See also Langdeau v. Burke Investment Co., 163 Tex. 526, 358 S.W.2d 553 (1962) (holding that the statute was ambiguous because it provides no definition of the term violation and provides no specific direction as to the proper unit of prosecution", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ntrial court erred in denying appellant’s motion and opting for venue in Harris County. While both statutes contain language of mandatory effect, the receivership venue section contained in the insurance code was amended subsequent to the workers’ compensation venue provision and its language is specific that exclusive venue for insurance companies in receivership lies in Travis County. The language contained in section 4(h) — “shall have exclusive venue” — could not be clearer in expressing the Legislature’s intent. Other cases examining this issue outside of the workers’ compensation area are analogously supportive of this conclusion. Whitson v. Harris, 792 S.W.2d 206, 209 (Tex.App.—Austin 1990, no writ). See also Langdeau v. Burke Investment Co., 163 Tex. 526, 358 S.W.2d 553 (1962) (holding that pursuant to rule 2a2 a party may appeal an order denying a motion for permissive intervention" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nunder 28 U.S.C. § 1291.” Wheeler Mach. Co. v. Mountain States Mineral Ent., Inc., 696 F.2d 787, 789 (10th Cir.1983)(per curiam). See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2004)(providing that “[t]he courts of appeals ... shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States ... except where a direct review maybe had in the Supreme Court”). The Court may alter or amend an interlocutory order at any time before the filing of the final judgment. See Raytheon Constructors Inc. v. Asarco Inc., 368 F.3d at 1217. This approach is in accord with other Judges’ opinions from this District. See Hunt v. Green, 2005 WL 1661732, 376 F.Supp.2d 1043, 1049 (D.N.M.2005)(Browning, J.); Shannon v. United States, No. CIV 02-717, at 3-4 (D.N.M. August 11, 2004)(Black, J.)(holding prior order was interlocutory and subject to change at any time because all claims not yet litigated", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nunder 28 U.S.C. § 1291.” Wheeler Mach. Co. v. Mountain States Mineral Ent., Inc., 696 F.2d 787, 789 (10th Cir.1983)(per curiam). See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2004)(providing that “[t]he courts of appeals ... shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States ... except where a direct review maybe had in the Supreme Court”). The Court may alter or amend an interlocutory order at any time before the filing of the final judgment. See Raytheon Constructors Inc. v. Asarco Inc., 368 F.3d at 1217. This approach is in accord with other Judges’ opinions from this District. See Hunt v. Green, 2005 WL 1661732, 376 F.Supp.2d 1043, 1049 (D.N.M.2005)(Browning, J.); Shannon v. United States, No. CIV 02-717, at 3-4 (D.N.M. August 11, 2004)(Black, J.)(holding that a rehearing order is interlocutory and not appealable", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nunder 28 U.S.C. § 1291.” Wheeler Mach. Co. v. Mountain States Mineral Ent., Inc., 696 F.2d 787, 789 (10th Cir.1983)(per curiam). See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2004)(providing that “[t]he courts of appeals ... shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States ... except where a direct review maybe had in the Supreme Court”). The Court may alter or amend an interlocutory order at any time before the filing of the final judgment. See Raytheon Constructors Inc. v. Asarco Inc., 368 F.3d at 1217. This approach is in accord with other Judges’ opinions from this District. See Hunt v. Green, 2005 WL 1661732, 376 F.Supp.2d 1043, 1049 (D.N.M.2005)(Browning, J.); Shannon v. United States, No. CIV 02-717, at 3-4 (D.N.M. August 11, 2004)(Black, J.)(holding that all matters litigated or which could have been litigated in al foreclosure action are forever at rest ", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nunder 28 U.S.C. § 1291.” Wheeler Mach. Co. v. Mountain States Mineral Ent., Inc., 696 F.2d 787, 789 (10th Cir.1983)(per curiam). See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2004)(providing that “[t]he courts of appeals ... shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States ... except where a direct review maybe had in the Supreme Court”). The Court may alter or amend an interlocutory order at any time before the filing of the final judgment. See Raytheon Constructors Inc. v. Asarco Inc., 368 F.3d at 1217. This approach is in accord with other Judges’ opinions from this District. See Hunt v. Green, 2005 WL 1661732, 376 F.Supp.2d 1043, 1049 (D.N.M.2005)(Browning, J.); Shannon v. United States, No. CIV 02-717, at 3-4 (D.N.M. August 11, 2004)(Black, J.)(holding that a case should not proceed as a b2 action where virtually all of the issues would have to be litigated individually in order to determine whether a particular alleged class member was entitled to any damages at all", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nunder 28 U.S.C. § 1291.” Wheeler Mach. Co. v. Mountain States Mineral Ent., Inc., 696 F.2d 787, 789 (10th Cir.1983)(per curiam). See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2004)(providing that “[t]he courts of appeals ... shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States ... except where a direct review maybe had in the Supreme Court”). The Court may alter or amend an interlocutory order at any time before the filing of the final judgment. See Raytheon Constructors Inc. v. Asarco Inc., 368 F.3d at 1217. This approach is in accord with other Judges’ opinions from this District. See Hunt v. Green, 2005 WL 1661732, 376 F.Supp.2d 1043, 1049 (D.N.M.2005)(Browning, J.); Shannon v. United States, No. CIV 02-717, at 3-4 (D.N.M. August 11, 2004)(Black, J.)(holding that burden was on nonmoving party to show issue was not litigated where moving party presented arbitrators order showing issue had been litigated" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nquestion as to the power of a Circuit Justice[, or the Court itself,] to dissolve a stay entered by a court of appeals.” Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. British American Commodity Options Corp., 434 U.S. 1316, 1319, 98 S.Ct. 10, 54 L.Ed.2d 28 (1977); Petition of Johnson, 72 S.Ct. 1028, 1031-32, 96 L.Ed. 1377 (1952) (discussing power of Circuit Justice to stay execution of judgment). The exercise of that power does not, however, constitute a decision on the merits. See Messer v. Kemp, 831 F.2d 946, 957 (11th Cir.1987). Nor does it necessarily deprive a lower court of jurisdiction. Cf. Johnson, 72 S.Ct. at 1031-32 (suggesting that stay of execution of district court judgment could be entered by Circuit Justice pending resolution of case by court of appeals); Messer, 831 F.2d at 957 (holding that filing of appeal to federal circuit divests this court of jurisdiction to consider motion to stay court order pending appeal", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nquestion as to the power of a Circuit Justice[, or the Court itself,] to dissolve a stay entered by a court of appeals.” Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. British American Commodity Options Corp., 434 U.S. 1316, 1319, 98 S.Ct. 10, 54 L.Ed.2d 28 (1977); Petition of Johnson, 72 S.Ct. 1028, 1031-32, 96 L.Ed. 1377 (1952) (discussing power of Circuit Justice to stay execution of judgment). The exercise of that power does not, however, constitute a decision on the merits. See Messer v. Kemp, 831 F.2d 946, 957 (11th Cir.1987). Nor does it necessarily deprive a lower court of jurisdiction. Cf. Johnson, 72 S.Ct. at 1031-32 (suggesting that stay of execution of district court judgment could be entered by Circuit Justice pending resolution of case by court of appeals); Messer, 831 F.2d at 957 (holding that notice of appeal did not divest the district court of jurisdiction at the time it was filed because a motion for reconsideration was pending", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nquestion as to the power of a Circuit Justice[, or the Court itself,] to dissolve a stay entered by a court of appeals.” Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. British American Commodity Options Corp., 434 U.S. 1316, 1319, 98 S.Ct. 10, 54 L.Ed.2d 28 (1977); Petition of Johnson, 72 S.Ct. 1028, 1031-32, 96 L.Ed. 1377 (1952) (discussing power of Circuit Justice to stay execution of judgment). The exercise of that power does not, however, constitute a decision on the merits. See Messer v. Kemp, 831 F.2d 946, 957 (11th Cir.1987). Nor does it necessarily deprive a lower court of jurisdiction. Cf. Johnson, 72 S.Ct. at 1031-32 (suggesting that stay of execution of district court judgment could be entered by Circuit Justice pending resolution of case by court of appeals); Messer, 831 F.2d at 957 (holding that supreme courts stay of execution did not divest court of appeals of jurisdiction to consider petitioners appeal en banc", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nquestion as to the power of a Circuit Justice[, or the Court itself,] to dissolve a stay entered by a court of appeals.” Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. British American Commodity Options Corp., 434 U.S. 1316, 1319, 98 S.Ct. 10, 54 L.Ed.2d 28 (1977); Petition of Johnson, 72 S.Ct. 1028, 1031-32, 96 L.Ed. 1377 (1952) (discussing power of Circuit Justice to stay execution of judgment). The exercise of that power does not, however, constitute a decision on the merits. See Messer v. Kemp, 831 F.2d 946, 957 (11th Cir.1987). Nor does it necessarily deprive a lower court of jurisdiction. Cf. Johnson, 72 S.Ct. at 1031-32 (suggesting that stay of execution of district court judgment could be entered by Circuit Justice pending resolution of case by court of appeals); Messer, 831 F.2d at 957 (holding that the pendency of a petitioners federal habeas corpus petition does not divest a trial court of jurisdiction to address a pcra petition", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nquestion as to the power of a Circuit Justice[, or the Court itself,] to dissolve a stay entered by a court of appeals.” Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. British American Commodity Options Corp., 434 U.S. 1316, 1319, 98 S.Ct. 10, 54 L.Ed.2d 28 (1977); Petition of Johnson, 72 S.Ct. 1028, 1031-32, 96 L.Ed. 1377 (1952) (discussing power of Circuit Justice to stay execution of judgment). The exercise of that power does not, however, constitute a decision on the merits. See Messer v. Kemp, 831 F.2d 946, 957 (11th Cir.1987). Nor does it necessarily deprive a lower court of jurisdiction. Cf. Johnson, 72 S.Ct. at 1031-32 (suggesting that stay of execution of district court judgment could be entered by Circuit Justice pending resolution of case by court of appeals); Messer, 831 F.2d at 957 (holding that a federal district court has jurisdiction to stay an execution prior to the filing of a formal habeas corpus petition" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nother equitable relief, costs, and attorneys fees (Doc. 115) is granted in part and denied in part as follows: plaintiff shall recover from defendant back pay in the amount of $8,063, with prejudgment interest thereon in the amount of $1,363; plaintiffs costs and reasonable attorney’s fees; compensatory damages as found by the jury in the amount of $1,000; pecuniary damages as found by the jury in the amount of $12,000; and punitive damages as found by the jury in the amount of $20,000. 1 . 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. 2 . See Whatley v. Skaggs Cos., 707 F.2d 1129, 1138 (10th Cir.1983) (\"title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) leaves to the discretion of the trial court the amount of back pay to be awarded a successful plaintiff in an employment discriminatio 61 F.Supp.2d 1219 (D.Kan.2001) (holding that an award of back pay under title vii remains an equitable remedy to be awarded by the district court in its discretion", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nother equitable relief, costs, and attorneys fees (Doc. 115) is granted in part and denied in part as follows: plaintiff shall recover from defendant back pay in the amount of $8,063, with prejudgment interest thereon in the amount of $1,363; plaintiffs costs and reasonable attorney’s fees; compensatory damages as found by the jury in the amount of $1,000; pecuniary damages as found by the jury in the amount of $12,000; and punitive damages as found by the jury in the amount of $20,000. 1 . 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. 2 . See Whatley v. Skaggs Cos., 707 F.2d 1129, 1138 (10th Cir.1983) (\"title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) leaves to the discretion of the trial court the amount of back pay to be awarded a successful plaintiff in an employment discriminatio 61 F.Supp.2d 1219 (D.Kan.2001) (holding that an award of back pay is an issue for the court", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nother equitable relief, costs, and attorneys fees (Doc. 115) is granted in part and denied in part as follows: plaintiff shall recover from defendant back pay in the amount of $8,063, with prejudgment interest thereon in the amount of $1,363; plaintiffs costs and reasonable attorney’s fees; compensatory damages as found by the jury in the amount of $1,000; pecuniary damages as found by the jury in the amount of $12,000; and punitive damages as found by the jury in the amount of $20,000. 1 . 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. 2 . See Whatley v. Skaggs Cos., 707 F.2d 1129, 1138 (10th Cir.1983) (\"title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) leaves to the discretion of the trial court the amount of back pay to be awarded a successful plaintiff in an employment discriminatio 61 F.Supp.2d 1219 (D.Kan.2001) (holding that an arbitral award of back pay that continued beyond the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement was perfectly appropriate because the agreement contained no provision restricting back pay to the term of the agreement", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nother equitable relief, costs, and attorneys fees (Doc. 115) is granted in part and denied in part as follows: plaintiff shall recover from defendant back pay in the amount of $8,063, with prejudgment interest thereon in the amount of $1,363; plaintiffs costs and reasonable attorney’s fees; compensatory damages as found by the jury in the amount of $1,000; pecuniary damages as found by the jury in the amount of $12,000; and punitive damages as found by the jury in the amount of $20,000. 1 . 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. 2 . See Whatley v. Skaggs Cos., 707 F.2d 1129, 1138 (10th Cir.1983) (\"title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) leaves to the discretion of the trial court the amount of back pay to be awarded a successful plaintiff in an employment discriminatio 61 F.Supp.2d 1219 (D.Kan.2001) (holding that back pay may be awarded to the date of judgment", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nother equitable relief, costs, and attorneys fees (Doc. 115) is granted in part and denied in part as follows: plaintiff shall recover from defendant back pay in the amount of $8,063, with prejudgment interest thereon in the amount of $1,363; plaintiffs costs and reasonable attorney’s fees; compensatory damages as found by the jury in the amount of $1,000; pecuniary damages as found by the jury in the amount of $12,000; and punitive damages as found by the jury in the amount of $20,000. 1 . 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. 2 . See Whatley v. Skaggs Cos., 707 F.2d 1129, 1138 (10th Cir.1983) (\"title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) leaves to the discretion of the trial court the amount of back pay to be awarded a successful plaintiff in an employment discriminatio 61 F.Supp.2d 1219 (D.Kan.2001) (recognizing equitable nature of back pay award under age discrimination in employment act" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nclaims are defaulted, but Louisiana prisoners can benefit from the Martinez/Trevino exception to the procedural-default, rule if they can show that they have a substantial IATC claim and received IAC from state habeas counsel. As an appellate court, we cannot adequately evaluate, in the first instance, Coleman’s factual allegations against his trial and state habeas lawyers. Therefore, the judgment dismissing the petition is REVERSED, and the matter is REMANDED. The distinct court should determine whether Coleman has satisfied the remaining two requirements to show cause for procedural default under Martinez and Trevino and should conduct proceedings as needed. We express no view on what decisions the court should make on remand. 1 . State v. Ratcliff, 416 So.2d 528, 530 (La. 1982) (holding court unable to rule on issue when the record fails to include copies of the evidence needed to decide issue on appeal", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nclaims are defaulted, but Louisiana prisoners can benefit from the Martinez/Trevino exception to the procedural-default, rule if they can show that they have a substantial IATC claim and received IAC from state habeas counsel. As an appellate court, we cannot adequately evaluate, in the first instance, Coleman’s factual allegations against his trial and state habeas lawyers. Therefore, the judgment dismissing the petition is REVERSED, and the matter is REMANDED. The distinct court should determine whether Coleman has satisfied the remaining two requirements to show cause for procedural default under Martinez and Trevino and should conduct proceedings as needed. We express no view on what decisions the court should make on remand. 1 . State v. Ratcliff, 416 So.2d 528, 530 (La. 1982) (holding that an issue not raised on appeal is waived", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nclaims are defaulted, but Louisiana prisoners can benefit from the Martinez/Trevino exception to the procedural-default, rule if they can show that they have a substantial IATC claim and received IAC from state habeas counsel. As an appellate court, we cannot adequately evaluate, in the first instance, Coleman’s factual allegations against his trial and state habeas lawyers. Therefore, the judgment dismissing the petition is REVERSED, and the matter is REMANDED. The distinct court should determine whether Coleman has satisfied the remaining two requirements to show cause for procedural default under Martinez and Trevino and should conduct proceedings as needed. We express no view on what decisions the court should make on remand. 1 . State v. Ratcliff, 416 So.2d 528, 530 (La. 1982) (holding issue not raised in the bankruptcy court was waived on appeal", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nclaims are defaulted, but Louisiana prisoners can benefit from the Martinez/Trevino exception to the procedural-default, rule if they can show that they have a substantial IATC claim and received IAC from state habeas counsel. As an appellate court, we cannot adequately evaluate, in the first instance, Coleman’s factual allegations against his trial and state habeas lawyers. Therefore, the judgment dismissing the petition is REVERSED, and the matter is REMANDED. The distinct court should determine whether Coleman has satisfied the remaining two requirements to show cause for procedural default under Martinez and Trevino and should conduct proceedings as needed. We express no view on what decisions the court should make on remand. 1 . State v. Ratcliff, 416 So.2d 528, 530 (La. 1982) (holding that if the record discloses evidence needed to decide the issue of iac and that issue was raised by assignment of error on appeal it can be decided on appeal in the interest of judicial economy", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nclaims are defaulted, but Louisiana prisoners can benefit from the Martinez/Trevino exception to the procedural-default, rule if they can show that they have a substantial IATC claim and received IAC from state habeas counsel. As an appellate court, we cannot adequately evaluate, in the first instance, Coleman’s factual allegations against his trial and state habeas lawyers. Therefore, the judgment dismissing the petition is REVERSED, and the matter is REMANDED. The distinct court should determine whether Coleman has satisfied the remaining two requirements to show cause for procedural default under Martinez and Trevino and should conduct proceedings as needed. We express no view on what decisions the court should make on remand. 1 . State v. Ratcliff, 416 So.2d 528, 530 (La. 1982) (holding that an issue is preserved for appeal where the issue was sufficiently raised for the court to rule on it " ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\napplying the legal “tax” definition utilized by courts under the Act. In arriving at this conclusion, the court determined that the assessment involved an “involuntary pecuniary burden,” because the marketing order involved statutory, rather than contractual, obligations. Id. at 387. Also, the assessment was found to be for a public purpose, since the funds were utilized “to defray the necessary expenses incurred by the director in the formulation, issuance, administration and enforcement of each marketing order.” Id. at 388. However, contrary to the Farmers Frozen Food decision, courts under the Code have not hesitated to determine certain assessments to be “fees,” despite the fact that they stemmed from statutory obligations. In re Jenny Lynn Mining, 780 F.2d 585, 588 (6th Cir.1986) (holding that the countys permit fee violated the first amendment", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\napplying the legal “tax” definition utilized by courts under the Act. In arriving at this conclusion, the court determined that the assessment involved an “involuntary pecuniary burden,” because the marketing order involved statutory, rather than contractual, obligations. Id. at 387. Also, the assessment was found to be for a public purpose, since the funds were utilized “to defray the necessary expenses incurred by the director in the formulation, issuance, administration and enforcement of each marketing order.” Id. at 388. However, contrary to the Farmers Frozen Food decision, courts under the Code have not hesitated to determine certain assessments to be “fees,” despite the fact that they stemmed from statutory obligations. In re Jenny Lynn Mining, 780 F.2d 585, 588 (6th Cir.1986) (holding that background check assessments required by statute are not taxes under the code", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\napplying the legal “tax” definition utilized by courts under the Act. In arriving at this conclusion, the court determined that the assessment involved an “involuntary pecuniary burden,” because the marketing order involved statutory, rather than contractual, obligations. Id. at 387. Also, the assessment was found to be for a public purpose, since the funds were utilized “to defray the necessary expenses incurred by the director in the formulation, issuance, administration and enforcement of each marketing order.” Id. at 388. However, contrary to the Farmers Frozen Food decision, courts under the Code have not hesitated to determine certain assessments to be “fees,” despite the fact that they stemmed from statutory obligations. In re Jenny Lynn Mining, 780 F.2d 585, 588 (6th Cir.1986) (holding that permit fee assessments required by statute are not taxes under the code", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\napplying the legal “tax” definition utilized by courts under the Act. In arriving at this conclusion, the court determined that the assessment involved an “involuntary pecuniary burden,” because the marketing order involved statutory, rather than contractual, obligations. Id. at 387. Also, the assessment was found to be for a public purpose, since the funds were utilized “to defray the necessary expenses incurred by the director in the formulation, issuance, administration and enforcement of each marketing order.” Id. at 388. However, contrary to the Farmers Frozen Food decision, courts under the Code have not hesitated to determine certain assessments to be “fees,” despite the fact that they stemmed from statutory obligations. In re Jenny Lynn Mining, 780 F.2d 585, 588 (6th Cir.1986) (holding that permit fees imposed by statute were not taxes", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\napplying the legal “tax” definition utilized by courts under the Act. In arriving at this conclusion, the court determined that the assessment involved an “involuntary pecuniary burden,” because the marketing order involved statutory, rather than contractual, obligations. Id. at 387. Also, the assessment was found to be for a public purpose, since the funds were utilized “to defray the necessary expenses incurred by the director in the formulation, issuance, administration and enforcement of each marketing order.” Id. at 388. However, contrary to the Farmers Frozen Food decision, courts under the Code have not hesitated to determine certain assessments to be “fees,” despite the fact that they stemmed from statutory obligations. In re Jenny Lynn Mining, 780 F.2d 585, 588 (6th Cir.1986) (holding unemployment taxes accrued when employees were terminated not when the amount of compensation taxes are determinable" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwith complete waiver as the penalty imposed for any untimely filed claims. Rule 24.035(b), (g); Dorris v. State, 360 S.W.3d 260, 268 (Mo. banc 2012) (“By failing to timely file, the movant has completely waived his right to proceed on his post-conviction relief claims.”). Finally, Rule 24.035 restricts the authorized scope o.f appellate review “to a determination of whether the findings and conclusions of the trial court are clearly erroneous.” Rule 24.035(k); see also Dobbins v. State, 187 S.W.3d 865, 866 (Mo. banc 2006). These Rules combine to prohibit appellate review of any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel that is not timely raised in a Rule 24.035 motion. State v. Kelley, 953 S.W.2d 73, 92 (Mo.App.S.D.1997) (cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1151, 118 S.Ct. 1173, 140 L.Ed.2d 182) (holding that an issue not raised on appeal is waived", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwith complete waiver as the penalty imposed for any untimely filed claims. Rule 24.035(b), (g); Dorris v. State, 360 S.W.3d 260, 268 (Mo. banc 2012) (“By failing to timely file, the movant has completely waived his right to proceed on his post-conviction relief claims.”). Finally, Rule 24.035 restricts the authorized scope o.f appellate review “to a determination of whether the findings and conclusions of the trial court are clearly erroneous.” Rule 24.035(k); see also Dobbins v. State, 187 S.W.3d 865, 866 (Mo. banc 2006). These Rules combine to prohibit appellate review of any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel that is not timely raised in a Rule 24.035 motion. State v. Kelley, 953 S.W.2d 73, 92 (Mo.App.S.D.1997) (cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1151, 118 S.Ct. 1173, 140 L.Ed.2d 182) (holding that a claim is proeedurally barred where it was not raised in the defendants motion for postconviction relief", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwith complete waiver as the penalty imposed for any untimely filed claims. Rule 24.035(b), (g); Dorris v. State, 360 S.W.3d 260, 268 (Mo. banc 2012) (“By failing to timely file, the movant has completely waived his right to proceed on his post-conviction relief claims.”). Finally, Rule 24.035 restricts the authorized scope o.f appellate review “to a determination of whether the findings and conclusions of the trial court are clearly erroneous.” Rule 24.035(k); see also Dobbins v. State, 187 S.W.3d 865, 866 (Mo. banc 2006). These Rules combine to prohibit appellate review of any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel that is not timely raised in a Rule 24.035 motion. State v. Kelley, 953 S.W.2d 73, 92 (Mo.App.S.D.1997) (cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1151, 118 S.Ct. 1173, 140 L.Ed.2d 182) (holding that claims not raised in a timely postconviction motion are waived", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwith complete waiver as the penalty imposed for any untimely filed claims. Rule 24.035(b), (g); Dorris v. State, 360 S.W.3d 260, 268 (Mo. banc 2012) (“By failing to timely file, the movant has completely waived his right to proceed on his post-conviction relief claims.”). Finally, Rule 24.035 restricts the authorized scope o.f appellate review “to a determination of whether the findings and conclusions of the trial court are clearly erroneous.” Rule 24.035(k); see also Dobbins v. State, 187 S.W.3d 865, 866 (Mo. banc 2006). These Rules combine to prohibit appellate review of any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel that is not timely raised in a Rule 24.035 motion. State v. Kelley, 953 S.W.2d 73, 92 (Mo.App.S.D.1997) (cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1151, 118 S.Ct. 1173, 140 L.Ed.2d 182) (holding that a ground for relief not pled in a motion for postconviction relief is waived and cannot be raised on appeal", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwith complete waiver as the penalty imposed for any untimely filed claims. Rule 24.035(b), (g); Dorris v. State, 360 S.W.3d 260, 268 (Mo. banc 2012) (“By failing to timely file, the movant has completely waived his right to proceed on his post-conviction relief claims.”). Finally, Rule 24.035 restricts the authorized scope o.f appellate review “to a determination of whether the findings and conclusions of the trial court are clearly erroneous.” Rule 24.035(k); see also Dobbins v. State, 187 S.W.3d 865, 866 (Mo. banc 2006). These Rules combine to prohibit appellate review of any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel that is not timely raised in a Rule 24.035 motion. State v. Kelley, 953 S.W.2d 73, 92 (Mo.App.S.D.1997) (cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1151, 118 S.Ct. 1173, 140 L.Ed.2d 182) (holding an issue not preserved when one ground is raised to the trial court and another ground is raised on appeal" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nlaw that we í’eview de novo. United States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 168 (4th Cir.2005). The transcript of the plea hearing reveals that Simmons, a twenty-nine-year-old high school graduate, understood the waiver provision in his plea agreement. In his plea agreement, Simmons specifically waived the right to challenge his sentence on appeal, reserving only the right to challenge an upward departure from the Guidelines range established at sentencing, and Simmons averred at his Rule 11 hearing that he read and understood the plea agreement. We therefore conclude that Simmons knowingly and intelligently waived the right to appeal his sentence. Turning to the scope of the waiver, the sentencing claims Simmons raises on appeal fall within the scope of the waiver provision. See id. at 169-70 (holding that blakely and united states v booker 543 us 220 125 sct 738 160 led2d 621 2005 are not retroactive on collateral review", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nlaw that we í’eview de novo. United States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 168 (4th Cir.2005). The transcript of the plea hearing reveals that Simmons, a twenty-nine-year-old high school graduate, understood the waiver provision in his plea agreement. In his plea agreement, Simmons specifically waived the right to challenge his sentence on appeal, reserving only the right to challenge an upward departure from the Guidelines range established at sentencing, and Simmons averred at his Rule 11 hearing that he read and understood the plea agreement. We therefore conclude that Simmons knowingly and intelligently waived the right to appeal his sentence. Turning to the scope of the waiver, the sentencing claims Simmons raises on appeal fall within the scope of the waiver provision. See id. at 169-70 (holding that the changes in sentencing law imposed by united states v booker 543 us 220 125 sct 738 160 led2d 621 2005 did not render waiver of appeal involuntary and unknowing", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nlaw that we í’eview de novo. United States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 168 (4th Cir.2005). The transcript of the plea hearing reveals that Simmons, a twenty-nine-year-old high school graduate, understood the waiver provision in his plea agreement. In his plea agreement, Simmons specifically waived the right to challenge his sentence on appeal, reserving only the right to challenge an upward departure from the Guidelines range established at sentencing, and Simmons averred at his Rule 11 hearing that he read and understood the plea agreement. We therefore conclude that Simmons knowingly and intelligently waived the right to appeal his sentence. Turning to the scope of the waiver, the sentencing claims Simmons raises on appeal fall within the scope of the waiver provision. See id. at 169-70 (holding that united states v booker 543 us 220 125 sct 738 160 led2d 621 2005 does not provide a basis for a sentence reduction under 18 usc 3582c", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nlaw that we í’eview de novo. United States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 168 (4th Cir.2005). The transcript of the plea hearing reveals that Simmons, a twenty-nine-year-old high school graduate, understood the waiver provision in his plea agreement. In his plea agreement, Simmons specifically waived the right to challenge his sentence on appeal, reserving only the right to challenge an upward departure from the Guidelines range established at sentencing, and Simmons averred at his Rule 11 hearing that he read and understood the plea agreement. We therefore conclude that Simmons knowingly and intelligently waived the right to appeal his sentence. Turning to the scope of the waiver, the sentencing claims Simmons raises on appeal fall within the scope of the waiver provision. See id. at 169-70 (holding that united states v booker 543 us 220 125 sct 738 160 led2d 621 2005 did not alter the standard of review for the interpretation and application of the guidelines", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nlaw that we í’eview de novo. United States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 168 (4th Cir.2005). The transcript of the plea hearing reveals that Simmons, a twenty-nine-year-old high school graduate, understood the waiver provision in his plea agreement. In his plea agreement, Simmons specifically waived the right to challenge his sentence on appeal, reserving only the right to challenge an upward departure from the Guidelines range established at sentencing, and Simmons averred at his Rule 11 hearing that he read and understood the plea agreement. We therefore conclude that Simmons knowingly and intelligently waived the right to appeal his sentence. Turning to the scope of the waiver, the sentencing claims Simmons raises on appeal fall within the scope of the waiver provision. See id. at 169-70 (holding that waiver of right to appeal sentence in plea agreement accepted before decision in united states v booker 543 us 220 125 sct 738 160 led2d 621 2005 was not invalidated by change in law" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nan action in equity, tried by the judge alone, ... this Court has jurisdiction to find facts in accordance with its views of the preponderance of the evidence.” Stackhouse v. Cook, 271 S.C. 518, 521, 248 S.E.2d 482, 484 (1978). LAW/ANALYSIS I. Express Trust Settlemeyer argues the circuit court erred by denying relief on his claim of an express trust. We disagree. The statute of frauds r Settlemeyer relief on his claim of an express trust. The remaining issues are affirmed pursuant to Rule 220, SCACR and the following authorities: As to Issue II: Smith v. South Carolina Ret. Sys., 336 S.C. 505, 529, 520 S.E.2d 339, 352 (Ct.App.1999) (“In general, a constructive trust may be imposed when a party obtains a benefit ‘which does not equitably belong to him a , 249, 489 S.E.2d 472, 476 (1997) (recognizing duty of parent to control conduct of child", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nan action in equity, tried by the judge alone, ... this Court has jurisdiction to find facts in accordance with its views of the preponderance of the evidence.” Stackhouse v. Cook, 271 S.C. 518, 521, 248 S.E.2d 482, 484 (1978). LAW/ANALYSIS I. Express Trust Settlemeyer argues the circuit court erred by denying relief on his claim of an express trust. We disagree. The statute of frauds r Settlemeyer relief on his claim of an express trust. The remaining issues are affirmed pursuant to Rule 220, SCACR and the following authorities: As to Issue II: Smith v. South Carolina Ret. Sys., 336 S.C. 505, 529, 520 S.E.2d 339, 352 (Ct.App.1999) (“In general, a constructive trust may be imposed when a party obtains a benefit ‘which does not equitably belong to him a , 249, 489 S.E.2d 472, 476 (1997) (recognizing that third party may not recover contribution against parent where child has no cause of action against parent for negligent supervision", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nan action in equity, tried by the judge alone, ... this Court has jurisdiction to find facts in accordance with its views of the preponderance of the evidence.” Stackhouse v. Cook, 271 S.C. 518, 521, 248 S.E.2d 482, 484 (1978). LAW/ANALYSIS I. Express Trust Settlemeyer argues the circuit court erred by denying relief on his claim of an express trust. We disagree. The statute of frauds r Settlemeyer relief on his claim of an express trust. The remaining issues are affirmed pursuant to Rule 220, SCACR and the following authorities: As to Issue II: Smith v. South Carolina Ret. Sys., 336 S.C. 505, 529, 520 S.E.2d 339, 352 (Ct.App.1999) (“In general, a constructive trust may be imposed when a party obtains a benefit ‘which does not equitably belong to him a , 249, 489 S.E.2d 472, 476 (1997) (recognizing that a foster parent may attain the status of psychological parent when the relationship is not temporary in duration and exists with the consent and encouragement of a childs legal parent or guardian", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nan action in equity, tried by the judge alone, ... this Court has jurisdiction to find facts in accordance with its views of the preponderance of the evidence.” Stackhouse v. Cook, 271 S.C. 518, 521, 248 S.E.2d 482, 484 (1978). LAW/ANALYSIS I. Express Trust Settlemeyer argues the circuit court erred by denying relief on his claim of an express trust. We disagree. The statute of frauds r Settlemeyer relief on his claim of an express trust. The remaining issues are affirmed pursuant to Rule 220, SCACR and the following authorities: As to Issue II: Smith v. South Carolina Ret. Sys., 336 S.C. 505, 529, 520 S.E.2d 339, 352 (Ct.App.1999) (“In general, a constructive trust may be imposed when a party obtains a benefit ‘which does not equitably belong to him a , 249, 489 S.E.2d 472, 476 (1997) (holding when real estate is conveyed to a child and consideration is paid by the parent the presumption is that the purchase was a gift to the child and thus no resulting trust arises", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nan action in equity, tried by the judge alone, ... this Court has jurisdiction to find facts in accordance with its views of the preponderance of the evidence.” Stackhouse v. Cook, 271 S.C. 518, 521, 248 S.E.2d 482, 484 (1978). LAW/ANALYSIS I. Express Trust Settlemeyer argues the circuit court erred by denying relief on his claim of an express trust. We disagree. The statute of frauds r Settlemeyer relief on his claim of an express trust. The remaining issues are affirmed pursuant to Rule 220, SCACR and the following authorities: As to Issue II: Smith v. South Carolina Ret. Sys., 336 S.C. 505, 529, 520 S.E.2d 339, 352 (Ct.App.1999) (“In general, a constructive trust may be imposed when a party obtains a benefit ‘which does not equitably belong to him a , 249, 489 S.E.2d 472, 476 (1997) (holding when real estate is conveyed to a child and consideration is paid by the parent the parent has the burden of proving a gift was not intended" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof Singh are inapposite. In the present case, unlike Singh, the defendant expressed his views of the veracity of the state’s witnesses during his direct examination. Thus, the defendant opened the door for cross-examination on the subject of the credibility of the state’s witnesses. See State v. Morascini, 62 Conn. App. 758, 766, 772 A.2d 703, cert. denied, 256 Conn. 921, 774 A.2d 141 (2001). “As a general rule . . . if a party delves into a particular subject during examination, he is said to have ‘opened the door’ for further examination regarding that subject.” Id. Once that door was opened, the prosecutor had the right to inquire into the defendant’s statement and ask whether all the witnesses in the case were lying. Cf. State v. Burton, 258 Conn. 153, 169, 778 A.2d 955 (2001) (holding trial court free to evaluate credibility of witnesses", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof Singh are inapposite. In the present case, unlike Singh, the defendant expressed his views of the veracity of the state’s witnesses during his direct examination. Thus, the defendant opened the door for cross-examination on the subject of the credibility of the state’s witnesses. See State v. Morascini, 62 Conn. App. 758, 766, 772 A.2d 703, cert. denied, 256 Conn. 921, 774 A.2d 141 (2001). “As a general rule . . . if a party delves into a particular subject during examination, he is said to have ‘opened the door’ for further examination regarding that subject.” Id. Once that door was opened, the prosecutor had the right to inquire into the defendant’s statement and ask whether all the witnesses in the case were lying. Cf. State v. Burton, 258 Conn. 153, 169, 778 A.2d 955 (2001) (holding that material for witnesses need not be produced to defendant where the witnesses were not called as government witnesses at trial", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof Singh are inapposite. In the present case, unlike Singh, the defendant expressed his views of the veracity of the state’s witnesses during his direct examination. Thus, the defendant opened the door for cross-examination on the subject of the credibility of the state’s witnesses. See State v. Morascini, 62 Conn. App. 758, 766, 772 A.2d 703, cert. denied, 256 Conn. 921, 774 A.2d 141 (2001). “As a general rule . . . if a party delves into a particular subject during examination, he is said to have ‘opened the door’ for further examination regarding that subject.” Id. Once that door was opened, the prosecutor had the right to inquire into the defendant’s statement and ask whether all the witnesses in the case were lying. Cf. State v. Burton, 258 Conn. 153, 169, 778 A.2d 955 (2001) (holding that in light of defendants attack on credibility of states witnesses prosecutor did not commit misconduct during closing argument when he implied states witnesses were credible", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof Singh are inapposite. In the present case, unlike Singh, the defendant expressed his views of the veracity of the state’s witnesses during his direct examination. Thus, the defendant opened the door for cross-examination on the subject of the credibility of the state’s witnesses. See State v. Morascini, 62 Conn. App. 758, 766, 772 A.2d 703, cert. denied, 256 Conn. 921, 774 A.2d 141 (2001). “As a general rule . . . if a party delves into a particular subject during examination, he is said to have ‘opened the door’ for further examination regarding that subject.” Id. Once that door was opened, the prosecutor had the right to inquire into the defendant’s statement and ask whether all the witnesses in the case were lying. Cf. State v. Burton, 258 Conn. 153, 169, 778 A.2d 955 (2001) (holding a prosecutors comments indicating his personal belief in the states witnesses was a fair reply to defense counsels attack on the veracity of the states witnesses", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof Singh are inapposite. In the present case, unlike Singh, the defendant expressed his views of the veracity of the state’s witnesses during his direct examination. Thus, the defendant opened the door for cross-examination on the subject of the credibility of the state’s witnesses. See State v. Morascini, 62 Conn. App. 758, 766, 772 A.2d 703, cert. denied, 256 Conn. 921, 774 A.2d 141 (2001). “As a general rule . . . if a party delves into a particular subject during examination, he is said to have ‘opened the door’ for further examination regarding that subject.” Id. Once that door was opened, the prosecutor had the right to inquire into the defendant’s statement and ask whether all the witnesses in the case were lying. Cf. State v. Burton, 258 Conn. 153, 169, 778 A.2d 955 (2001) (holding that review by certiorari was available to remedy a trial court order that improperly struck two of the states witnesses as a sanction for the states failure to disclose the address of one of the witnesses in discovery" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n“personal” to some creditors or “general” as to all is relevant only “after a claim has been analyzed to determine whether it is properly assertable by the debtor or creditor, and not as a substitute for the analysis itself.” In re Seven Seas Petroleum, 522 F.3d at 588 (construing In re Schimmelpenninck, 183 F.3d 347 (5th Cir.1999) (emphasis added)). For instance, a claim that would ordinarily be brought by creditors nonetheless belongs to the debtor’s estate if it pursues property in which the debtor retains an equitable interest, see, e.g., In re MortgageAmerica Corp., 714 F.2d 1266, 1275 (5th Cir.1983) (construing a fraudulent transfer claim to belong to the debtor’s estate), or if the debtor itself could have brought the claim under applicable state law, see, e.g., id. at 1276-77 (holding that where the entity was incorporated in texas and the shareholders reside in texas and the bankruptcy case is pending in texas texas law not arizona law should be applied", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n“personal” to some creditors or “general” as to all is relevant only “after a claim has been analyzed to determine whether it is properly assertable by the debtor or creditor, and not as a substitute for the analysis itself.” In re Seven Seas Petroleum, 522 F.3d at 588 (construing In re Schimmelpenninck, 183 F.3d 347 (5th Cir.1999) (emphasis added)). For instance, a claim that would ordinarily be brought by creditors nonetheless belongs to the debtor’s estate if it pursues property in which the debtor retains an equitable interest, see, e.g., In re MortgageAmerica Corp., 714 F.2d 1266, 1275 (5th Cir.1983) (construing a fraudulent transfer claim to belong to the debtor’s estate), or if the debtor itself could have brought the claim under applicable state law, see, e.g., id. at 1276-77 (holding an alter ego action could be brought by the debtor corporation under texas law", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n“personal” to some creditors or “general” as to all is relevant only “after a claim has been analyzed to determine whether it is properly assertable by the debtor or creditor, and not as a substitute for the analysis itself.” In re Seven Seas Petroleum, 522 F.3d at 588 (construing In re Schimmelpenninck, 183 F.3d 347 (5th Cir.1999) (emphasis added)). For instance, a claim that would ordinarily be brought by creditors nonetheless belongs to the debtor’s estate if it pursues property in which the debtor retains an equitable interest, see, e.g., In re MortgageAmerica Corp., 714 F.2d 1266, 1275 (5th Cir.1983) (construing a fraudulent transfer claim to belong to the debtor’s estate), or if the debtor itself could have brought the claim under applicable state law, see, e.g., id. at 1276-77 (holding that a fraudulent transfer claim against a corporate debtors control person belongs to the corporate debtor not to specific creditors", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n“personal” to some creditors or “general” as to all is relevant only “after a claim has been analyzed to determine whether it is properly assertable by the debtor or creditor, and not as a substitute for the analysis itself.” In re Seven Seas Petroleum, 522 F.3d at 588 (construing In re Schimmelpenninck, 183 F.3d 347 (5th Cir.1999) (emphasis added)). For instance, a claim that would ordinarily be brought by creditors nonetheless belongs to the debtor’s estate if it pursues property in which the debtor retains an equitable interest, see, e.g., In re MortgageAmerica Corp., 714 F.2d 1266, 1275 (5th Cir.1983) (construing a fraudulent transfer claim to belong to the debtor’s estate), or if the debtor itself could have brought the claim under applicable state law, see, e.g., id. at 1276-77 (recognizing a cause of action under texas law for misappropriation", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n“personal” to some creditors or “general” as to all is relevant only “after a claim has been analyzed to determine whether it is properly assertable by the debtor or creditor, and not as a substitute for the analysis itself.” In re Seven Seas Petroleum, 522 F.3d at 588 (construing In re Schimmelpenninck, 183 F.3d 347 (5th Cir.1999) (emphasis added)). For instance, a claim that would ordinarily be brought by creditors nonetheless belongs to the debtor’s estate if it pursues property in which the debtor retains an equitable interest, see, e.g., In re MortgageAmerica Corp., 714 F.2d 1266, 1275 (5th Cir.1983) (construing a fraudulent transfer claim to belong to the debtor’s estate), or if the debtor itself could have brought the claim under applicable state law, see, e.g., id. at 1276-77 (holding texas law permits a corporate debtor to bring a trust fund denuding action" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwith leaving his property unprotected by a properly applied chemical treatment barrier.” But as plaintiff readily acknowledges, he filed this suit a mere eight days after purchasing Terminate, despite the fact that the Terminate label specifically advised, under the heading, “IMPORTANT USAGE NOTES”: Results depend upon the species involved, weather, moisture, time of year, and may take 1-4 months or longer. Time required for effectiveness depends upon how quickly the terminates enter the stake and feed upon the bait. While for reasons undisclosed -by plaintiff in his complaint or otherwise, plaintiff may have suspected, within a- mere week of his purchase of the Terminate, that the product ultimately would not perform as represented and that his property 66 Cal.Rptr. 106 (1990) (holding the mda did not preempt plaintiffs state common law claims for defective design defective manufacture and failure to warn", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwith leaving his property unprotected by a properly applied chemical treatment barrier.” But as plaintiff readily acknowledges, he filed this suit a mere eight days after purchasing Terminate, despite the fact that the Terminate label specifically advised, under the heading, “IMPORTANT USAGE NOTES”: Results depend upon the species involved, weather, moisture, time of year, and may take 1-4 months or longer. Time required for effectiveness depends upon how quickly the terminates enter the stake and feed upon the bait. While for reasons undisclosed -by plaintiff in his complaint or otherwise, plaintiff may have suspected, within a- mere week of his purchase of the Terminate, that the product ultimately would not perform as represented and that his property 66 Cal.Rptr. 106 (1990) (holding that plaintiffs failure to prove that the subject air valve had not been altered in some way invalidated their design defect claim", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwith leaving his property unprotected by a properly applied chemical treatment barrier.” But as plaintiff readily acknowledges, he filed this suit a mere eight days after purchasing Terminate, despite the fact that the Terminate label specifically advised, under the heading, “IMPORTANT USAGE NOTES”: Results depend upon the species involved, weather, moisture, time of year, and may take 1-4 months or longer. Time required for effectiveness depends upon how quickly the terminates enter the stake and feed upon the bait. While for reasons undisclosed -by plaintiff in his complaint or otherwise, plaintiff may have suspected, within a- mere week of his purchase of the Terminate, that the product ultimately would not perform as represented and that his property 66 Cal.Rptr. 106 (1990) (holding that plaintiff had failed to state a claim for relief under section 1983", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwith leaving his property unprotected by a properly applied chemical treatment barrier.” But as plaintiff readily acknowledges, he filed this suit a mere eight days after purchasing Terminate, despite the fact that the Terminate label specifically advised, under the heading, “IMPORTANT USAGE NOTES”: Results depend upon the species involved, weather, moisture, time of year, and may take 1-4 months or longer. Time required for effectiveness depends upon how quickly the terminates enter the stake and feed upon the bait. While for reasons undisclosed -by plaintiff in his complaint or otherwise, plaintiff may have suspected, within a- mere week of his purchase of the Terminate, that the product ultimately would not perform as represented and that his property 66 Cal.Rptr. 106 (1990) (holding that to prevail on strict liability claim for a defective product plaintiff must show the product was defective when it left the defendants possession and control", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwith leaving his property unprotected by a properly applied chemical treatment barrier.” But as plaintiff readily acknowledges, he filed this suit a mere eight days after purchasing Terminate, despite the fact that the Terminate label specifically advised, under the heading, “IMPORTANT USAGE NOTES”: Results depend upon the species involved, weather, moisture, time of year, and may take 1-4 months or longer. Time required for effectiveness depends upon how quickly the terminates enter the stake and feed upon the bait. While for reasons undisclosed -by plaintiff in his complaint or otherwise, plaintiff may have suspected, within a- mere week of his purchase of the Terminate, that the product ultimately would not perform as represented and that his property 66 Cal.Rptr. 106 (1990) (holding plaintiff with inherently defective heart valve failed to state a claim unless the valve malfunctioned" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nmandatory sentence prescribed ' in subsection (b). Any other reading of HRS § 712-1200(4) would produce an absurd result, Franks, 74 Haw. at 341, 843 P.2d at 674, and contradict the obvious meaning of the statute. State v. Paaluhi, 70 Haw. 237, 240, 768 P.2d 235, 237 (1989). Id. at 395-96, 885 P.2d at 1135-36 (emphasis in original). Because we were satisfied that an absurd result could only be avoided by employing the “plain meaning” approach to the construction of the term “subsequent of fense,” we noted in Ramela that resort to the legislative history was “not necessary to our analysis,” although we observed, in a footnote, that the legislative history supported our construction. Id. at 396 n. 3, 885 P.2d at 1136 n. 3. See also State v. Simpson, 9 Haw.App. 165, 827 P.2d 1156 (1992) (holding that a second offense was subsequent for purposes of hrs 71212004 inasmuch as it was subsequent in terms of both commission and ascertainment of guilt notwithstanding that the two convictions had occurred simultaneously in the course of the same proceeding", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nmandatory sentence prescribed ' in subsection (b). Any other reading of HRS § 712-1200(4) would produce an absurd result, Franks, 74 Haw. at 341, 843 P.2d at 674, and contradict the obvious meaning of the statute. State v. Paaluhi, 70 Haw. 237, 240, 768 P.2d 235, 237 (1989). Id. at 395-96, 885 P.2d at 1135-36 (emphasis in original). Because we were satisfied that an absurd result could only be avoided by employing the “plain meaning” approach to the construction of the term “subsequent of fense,” we noted in Ramela that resort to the legislative history was “not necessary to our analysis,” although we observed, in a footnote, that the legislative history supported our construction. Id. at 396 n. 3, 885 P.2d at 1136 n. 3. See also State v. Simpson, 9 Haw.App. 165, 827 P.2d 1156 (1992) (holding that counsel was not ineffective in failing to request a charge on the lesserincluded offense when the evidence showed either the commission of the completed offense as charged or the commission of no offense such that the defendant was not entitled to a charge on the lesser offense", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nmandatory sentence prescribed ' in subsection (b). Any other reading of HRS § 712-1200(4) would produce an absurd result, Franks, 74 Haw. at 341, 843 P.2d at 674, and contradict the obvious meaning of the statute. State v. Paaluhi, 70 Haw. 237, 240, 768 P.2d 235, 237 (1989). Id. at 395-96, 885 P.2d at 1135-36 (emphasis in original). Because we were satisfied that an absurd result could only be avoided by employing the “plain meaning” approach to the construction of the term “subsequent of fense,” we noted in Ramela that resort to the legislative history was “not necessary to our analysis,” although we observed, in a footnote, that the legislative history supported our construction. Id. at 396 n. 3, 885 P.2d at 1136 n. 3. See also State v. Simpson, 9 Haw.App. 165, 827 P.2d 1156 (1992) (holding that the greater offense is by definition the same for purposes of double jeopardy as any lesser offense included in it", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nmandatory sentence prescribed ' in subsection (b). Any other reading of HRS § 712-1200(4) would produce an absurd result, Franks, 74 Haw. at 341, 843 P.2d at 674, and contradict the obvious meaning of the statute. State v. Paaluhi, 70 Haw. 237, 240, 768 P.2d 235, 237 (1989). Id. at 395-96, 885 P.2d at 1135-36 (emphasis in original). Because we were satisfied that an absurd result could only be avoided by employing the “plain meaning” approach to the construction of the term “subsequent of fense,” we noted in Ramela that resort to the legislative history was “not necessary to our analysis,” although we observed, in a footnote, that the legislative history supported our construction. Id. at 396 n. 3, 885 P.2d at 1136 n. 3. See also State v. Simpson, 9 Haw.App. 165, 827 P.2d 1156 (1992) (holding that notwithstanding code 182231s application to successive trials conviction of both the completed substantive offense and the underlying conspiracy are permitted in virginia provided the convictions occurred as here in a single trial", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nmandatory sentence prescribed ' in subsection (b). Any other reading of HRS § 712-1200(4) would produce an absurd result, Franks, 74 Haw. at 341, 843 P.2d at 674, and contradict the obvious meaning of the statute. State v. Paaluhi, 70 Haw. 237, 240, 768 P.2d 235, 237 (1989). Id. at 395-96, 885 P.2d at 1135-36 (emphasis in original). Because we were satisfied that an absurd result could only be avoided by employing the “plain meaning” approach to the construction of the term “subsequent of fense,” we noted in Ramela that resort to the legislative history was “not necessary to our analysis,” although we observed, in a footnote, that the legislative history supported our construction. Id. at 396 n. 3, 885 P.2d at 1136 n. 3. See also State v. Simpson, 9 Haw.App. 165, 827 P.2d 1156 (1992) (holding that two offenses are separate for the purposes of 4a12a1 where all the elements of the first offense occurred before any activity forming the basis of the second offense" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nMedia of Ill., L.L.C. v. City of Des Plaines, Ill., 391 F.Supp.2d 682, 687 (N.D.Ill.2005) (quoting United States v. Holm, 326 F.3d 872, 875 (7th Cir.2003)). Parties challenging a statute on First Amendment grounds may represent the interests of third parties “whose protected expression is prohibited or substantially burdened by the regulation.” Schultz v. City of Cumberland, 228 F.3d 831, 848 (7th Cir.2000). Additionally, businesses may represent their customers’ constitutional rights. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 195, 97 S.Ct. 451, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976) (beer vendors may challenge an alcohol regulation on equal protection grounds on behalf of their customers); Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 536, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925) (holding that courts may rely solely on affidavits in granting preliminary injunctions", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nMedia of Ill., L.L.C. v. City of Des Plaines, Ill., 391 F.Supp.2d 682, 687 (N.D.Ill.2005) (quoting United States v. Holm, 326 F.3d 872, 875 (7th Cir.2003)). Parties challenging a statute on First Amendment grounds may represent the interests of third parties “whose protected expression is prohibited or substantially burdened by the regulation.” Schultz v. City of Cumberland, 228 F.3d 831, 848 (7th Cir.2000). Additionally, businesses may represent their customers’ constitutional rights. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 195, 97 S.Ct. 451, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976) (beer vendors may challenge an alcohol regulation on equal protection grounds on behalf of their customers); Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 536, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925) (holding that a litigant may not claim standing to assert the rights of a third party", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nMedia of Ill., L.L.C. v. City of Des Plaines, Ill., 391 F.Supp.2d 682, 687 (N.D.Ill.2005) (quoting United States v. Holm, 326 F.3d 872, 875 (7th Cir.2003)). Parties challenging a statute on First Amendment grounds may represent the interests of third parties “whose protected expression is prohibited or substantially burdened by the regulation.” Schultz v. City of Cumberland, 228 F.3d 831, 848 (7th Cir.2000). Additionally, businesses may represent their customers’ constitutional rights. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 195, 97 S.Ct. 451, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976) (beer vendors may challenge an alcohol regulation on equal protection grounds on behalf of their customers); Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 536, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925) (holding that school district policy requiring that students obtain the review and approval of school officials prior to distributing any written material violated free speech rights of students", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nMedia of Ill., L.L.C. v. City of Des Plaines, Ill., 391 F.Supp.2d 682, 687 (N.D.Ill.2005) (quoting United States v. Holm, 326 F.3d 872, 875 (7th Cir.2003)). Parties challenging a statute on First Amendment grounds may represent the interests of third parties “whose protected expression is prohibited or substantially burdened by the regulation.” Schultz v. City of Cumberland, 228 F.3d 831, 848 (7th Cir.2000). Additionally, businesses may represent their customers’ constitutional rights. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 195, 97 S.Ct. 451, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976) (beer vendors may challenge an alcohol regulation on equal protection grounds on behalf of their customers); Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 536, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925) (holding that school officials may not limit the first amendment rights of students and teachers to freedom of speech and expression", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nMedia of Ill., L.L.C. v. City of Des Plaines, Ill., 391 F.Supp.2d 682, 687 (N.D.Ill.2005) (quoting United States v. Holm, 326 F.3d 872, 875 (7th Cir.2003)). Parties challenging a statute on First Amendment grounds may represent the interests of third parties “whose protected expression is prohibited or substantially burdened by the regulation.” Schultz v. City of Cumberland, 228 F.3d 831, 848 (7th Cir.2000). Additionally, businesses may represent their customers’ constitutional rights. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 195, 97 S.Ct. 451, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976) (beer vendors may challenge an alcohol regulation on equal protection grounds on behalf of their customers); Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 536, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925) (holding that a school may assert the rights of its students parents and gathering cases granting injunctions to businesses on behalf of customers" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nCourt subsequent to his trial. Effecting a significant change in Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court ruled in 2004 that in criminal prosecutions, unless a declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine him, the Confrontation Clause forbids use against the defendant of the declarant’s out-of-court testimonial statements admitted for their truth. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68-69, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). The Government does not dispute that the pleas, allocutions, and post-arrest statement made at a proffer session constitute “testimonial statements” of the sort barred by Crawford. We assume without deciding that this characterization is correct. Cf. United States v. McClain, 377 F.3d 219, 222 (2d Cir.2004) (holding that in order to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support a judgment based on a plea of guilty or no contest a defendant must bring forward a full statement of facts including a transcription of the plea proceedings", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nCourt subsequent to his trial. Effecting a significant change in Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court ruled in 2004 that in criminal prosecutions, unless a declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine him, the Confrontation Clause forbids use against the defendant of the declarant’s out-of-court testimonial statements admitted for their truth. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68-69, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). The Government does not dispute that the pleas, allocutions, and post-arrest statement made at a proffer session constitute “testimonial statements” of the sort barred by Crawford. We assume without deciding that this characterization is correct. Cf. United States v. McClain, 377 F.3d 219, 222 (2d Cir.2004) (holding that a plea allocution is a testimonial statement", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nCourt subsequent to his trial. Effecting a significant change in Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court ruled in 2004 that in criminal prosecutions, unless a declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine him, the Confrontation Clause forbids use against the defendant of the declarant’s out-of-court testimonial statements admitted for their truth. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68-69, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). The Government does not dispute that the pleas, allocutions, and post-arrest statement made at a proffer session constitute “testimonial statements” of the sort barred by Crawford. We assume without deciding that this characterization is correct. Cf. United States v. McClain, 377 F.3d 219, 222 (2d Cir.2004) (holding that the defendant was entitled to have his plea accepted absent a sound reason for rejecting the plea", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nCourt subsequent to his trial. Effecting a significant change in Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court ruled in 2004 that in criminal prosecutions, unless a declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine him, the Confrontation Clause forbids use against the defendant of the declarant’s out-of-court testimonial statements admitted for their truth. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68-69, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). The Government does not dispute that the pleas, allocutions, and post-arrest statement made at a proffer session constitute “testimonial statements” of the sort barred by Crawford. We assume without deciding that this characterization is correct. Cf. United States v. McClain, 377 F.3d 219, 222 (2d Cir.2004) (holding that plea of guilty or nolo contendere is not rendered involuntary because it is a product of plea bargaining an accepted plea bargain must be recorded and court may accept a bargained plea to a lesser offense reasonably related to a charged offense", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nCourt subsequent to his trial. Effecting a significant change in Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court ruled in 2004 that in criminal prosecutions, unless a declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine him, the Confrontation Clause forbids use against the defendant of the declarant’s out-of-court testimonial statements admitted for their truth. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68-69, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). The Government does not dispute that the pleas, allocutions, and post-arrest statement made at a proffer session constitute “testimonial statements” of the sort barred by Crawford. We assume without deciding that this characterization is correct. Cf. United States v. McClain, 377 F.3d 219, 222 (2d Cir.2004) (recognizing that a voluntary and understanding guilty plea entered without the benefit of a plea bargain waives all nonjurisdictional defects that occurred before the entry of the plea" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nSee Michaels, 1998 WL 882848, at *14 (“[Defendant’s] transformative use of the Tape excerpts to produce an entertainment news story does not affect Lee’s market for the same service, because Lee is not in such a market.”). Balancing of Harm and Public Interest Similarly, it is doubtful that the balancing of harm and public interest warrant preliminary injunctive relief. The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that even minimal interference with the First Amendment freedom of the press causes an irreparable injury. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 49 L.Ed.2d 683 (1976); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373-74, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976); see also Barbnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 531-32, 121 S.Ct. 1753, 149 L.Ed.2d 787 (2001) (recognizing as a privacy right the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nSee Michaels, 1998 WL 882848, at *14 (“[Defendant’s] transformative use of the Tape excerpts to produce an entertainment news story does not affect Lee’s market for the same service, because Lee is not in such a market.”). Balancing of Harm and Public Interest Similarly, it is doubtful that the balancing of harm and public interest warrant preliminary injunctive relief. The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that even minimal interference with the First Amendment freedom of the press causes an irreparable injury. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 49 L.Ed.2d 683 (1976); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373-74, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976); see also Barbnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 531-32, 121 S.Ct. 1753, 149 L.Ed.2d 787 (2001) (holding that bargaining unit employees have some nontrivial privacy interest in nondisclosure of their home addresses under the freedom of information act and concluding that that interest substantially outweighed the virtually nonexistent public interest in disclosure under foia and the privacy act not the nlra", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nSee Michaels, 1998 WL 882848, at *14 (“[Defendant’s] transformative use of the Tape excerpts to produce an entertainment news story does not affect Lee’s market for the same service, because Lee is not in such a market.”). Balancing of Harm and Public Interest Similarly, it is doubtful that the balancing of harm and public interest warrant preliminary injunctive relief. The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that even minimal interference with the First Amendment freedom of the press causes an irreparable injury. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 49 L.Ed.2d 683 (1976); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373-74, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976); see also Barbnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 531-32, 121 S.Ct. 1753, 149 L.Ed.2d 787 (2001) (holding that first amendment interest in publishing matters of public importance outweighed conversants privacy rights given fact that media outlet had played no part in illegal reception", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nSee Michaels, 1998 WL 882848, at *14 (“[Defendant’s] transformative use of the Tape excerpts to produce an entertainment news story does not affect Lee’s market for the same service, because Lee is not in such a market.”). Balancing of Harm and Public Interest Similarly, it is doubtful that the balancing of harm and public interest warrant preliminary injunctive relief. The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that even minimal interference with the First Amendment freedom of the press causes an irreparable injury. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 49 L.Ed.2d 683 (1976); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373-74, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976); see also Barbnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 531-32, 121 S.Ct. 1753, 149 L.Ed.2d 787 (2001) (holding that issues involving the local board of education were matters of public importance", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nSee Michaels, 1998 WL 882848, at *14 (“[Defendant’s] transformative use of the Tape excerpts to produce an entertainment news story does not affect Lee’s market for the same service, because Lee is not in such a market.”). Balancing of Harm and Public Interest Similarly, it is doubtful that the balancing of harm and public interest warrant preliminary injunctive relief. The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that even minimal interference with the First Amendment freedom of the press causes an irreparable injury. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 49 L.Ed.2d 683 (1976); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373-74, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976); see also Barbnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 531-32, 121 S.Ct. 1753, 149 L.Ed.2d 787 (2001) (recognizing a public employees first amendment right to address matters of legitimate public concern" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nlaw upon which they had been relying to sue the RAC defendants on statutory grounds. See Brief for Appellants at 71. Prior to the notification, the crux of the concern of the RAC plaintiffs was that RAC officials failed to communicate federal rights to minority applicants. The RAC defendants provide no assurances, other than this notification, that the same behavior has not and will not continue. In fact, the plaintiffs provide some evidence, through the Warda Thomas and Felicia Stokes testimony and the RAC handouts, that RAC has not complied with this notification. Even assuming the defendants had ceased the allegedly illegal conduct, we will not dismiss the claims as moot if the harm is “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” Southern Pacific, 219 U.S. at 515, 31 S.Ct. at 283 (holding ease not moot when challenged administrative order expired because icc proceedings are continuing and their consideration ought not be defeated by short term orders capable of repetition yet evading review", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nlaw upon which they had been relying to sue the RAC defendants on statutory grounds. See Brief for Appellants at 71. Prior to the notification, the crux of the concern of the RAC plaintiffs was that RAC officials failed to communicate federal rights to minority applicants. The RAC defendants provide no assurances, other than this notification, that the same behavior has not and will not continue. In fact, the plaintiffs provide some evidence, through the Warda Thomas and Felicia Stokes testimony and the RAC handouts, that RAC has not complied with this notification. Even assuming the defendants had ceased the allegedly illegal conduct, we will not dismiss the claims as moot if the harm is “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” Southern Pacific, 219 U.S. at 515, 31 S.Ct. at 283 (holding that challenge to expired fiveyear npdes permits originally issued eight years earlier was capable of repetition yet evading review", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nlaw upon which they had been relying to sue the RAC defendants on statutory grounds. See Brief for Appellants at 71. Prior to the notification, the crux of the concern of the RAC plaintiffs was that RAC officials failed to communicate federal rights to minority applicants. The RAC defendants provide no assurances, other than this notification, that the same behavior has not and will not continue. In fact, the plaintiffs provide some evidence, through the Warda Thomas and Felicia Stokes testimony and the RAC handouts, that RAC has not complied with this notification. Even assuming the defendants had ceased the allegedly illegal conduct, we will not dismiss the claims as moot if the harm is “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” Southern Pacific, 219 U.S. at 515, 31 S.Ct. at 283 (recognizing a mootness exception for abortion litigation because pregnancy truly could be capable of repetition yet evading review ", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nlaw upon which they had been relying to sue the RAC defendants on statutory grounds. See Brief for Appellants at 71. Prior to the notification, the crux of the concern of the RAC plaintiffs was that RAC officials failed to communicate federal rights to minority applicants. The RAC defendants provide no assurances, other than this notification, that the same behavior has not and will not continue. In fact, the plaintiffs provide some evidence, through the Warda Thomas and Felicia Stokes testimony and the RAC handouts, that RAC has not complied with this notification. Even assuming the defendants had ceased the allegedly illegal conduct, we will not dismiss the claims as moot if the harm is “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” Southern Pacific, 219 U.S. at 515, 31 S.Ct. at 283 (holding that we have no difficulty concluding that challenge to expired fiveyear npdes permit was capable of repetition yet evading review", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nlaw upon which they had been relying to sue the RAC defendants on statutory grounds. See Brief for Appellants at 71. Prior to the notification, the crux of the concern of the RAC plaintiffs was that RAC officials failed to communicate federal rights to minority applicants. The RAC defendants provide no assurances, other than this notification, that the same behavior has not and will not continue. In fact, the plaintiffs provide some evidence, through the Warda Thomas and Felicia Stokes testimony and the RAC handouts, that RAC has not complied with this notification. Even assuming the defendants had ceased the allegedly illegal conduct, we will not dismiss the claims as moot if the harm is “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” Southern Pacific, 219 U.S. at 515, 31 S.Ct. at 283 (holding that a party may not invoke the capable of repetition yet evading review exception where its failure to obtain prompt relief has prevented judicial review" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfor the State. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430 94 (“We can see no substantial difference between the function of the agency attorney in presenting evidence in an agency hearing and the function of the prosecutor who brings evidence before a court.”). Moreover, the absolute immunity the defendants enjoy for offering the composite tape into evidence is not defeated by Cig-netti’s allegations that they did so maliciously or in bad-faith because they knew or should have known that the composite tape was fabricated. See e.g. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 409, 96 S.Ct. 984 (concluding that absolute prosecutorial immunity precluded a § 1983 claim alleging that a prosecutor had knowingly used perjured testimony and deliberately suppressed exculpatory material at trial); Burns, 500 U.S. at 478, 111 S.Ct. 1934 (holding that an officer applying for a warrant without probable cause may be entitled to qualified immunity but is not entitled to absolute immunity", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfor the State. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430 94 (“We can see no substantial difference between the function of the agency attorney in presenting evidence in an agency hearing and the function of the prosecutor who brings evidence before a court.”). Moreover, the absolute immunity the defendants enjoy for offering the composite tape into evidence is not defeated by Cig-netti’s allegations that they did so maliciously or in bad-faith because they knew or should have known that the composite tape was fabricated. See e.g. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 409, 96 S.Ct. 984 (concluding that absolute prosecutorial immunity precluded a § 1983 claim alleging that a prosecutor had knowingly used perjured testimony and deliberately suppressed exculpatory material at trial); Burns, 500 U.S. at 478, 111 S.Ct. 1934 (holding that while a witness and prosecutor were protected by absolute immunity for their participation in judicial proceedings they were not entitled to absolute immunity on a 1983 claim that they conspired to present false testimony", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfor the State. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430 94 (“We can see no substantial difference between the function of the agency attorney in presenting evidence in an agency hearing and the function of the prosecutor who brings evidence before a court.”). Moreover, the absolute immunity the defendants enjoy for offering the composite tape into evidence is not defeated by Cig-netti’s allegations that they did so maliciously or in bad-faith because they knew or should have known that the composite tape was fabricated. See e.g. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 409, 96 S.Ct. 984 (concluding that absolute prosecutorial immunity precluded a § 1983 claim alleging that a prosecutor had knowingly used perjured testimony and deliberately suppressed exculpatory material at trial); Burns, 500 U.S. at 478, 111 S.Ct. 1934 (holding prosecutor had absolute immunity for claim for eliciting misleading testimony in a probable cause hearing", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfor the State. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430 94 (“We can see no substantial difference between the function of the agency attorney in presenting evidence in an agency hearing and the function of the prosecutor who brings evidence before a court.”). Moreover, the absolute immunity the defendants enjoy for offering the composite tape into evidence is not defeated by Cig-netti’s allegations that they did so maliciously or in bad-faith because they knew or should have known that the composite tape was fabricated. See e.g. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 409, 96 S.Ct. 984 (concluding that absolute prosecutorial immunity precluded a § 1983 claim alleging that a prosecutor had knowingly used perjured testimony and deliberately suppressed exculpatory material at trial); Burns, 500 U.S. at 478, 111 S.Ct. 1934 (holding that prosecutor retained absolute immunity despite allegations of witness intimidation in attempt to suppress testimony", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfor the State. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430 94 (“We can see no substantial difference between the function of the agency attorney in presenting evidence in an agency hearing and the function of the prosecutor who brings evidence before a court.”). Moreover, the absolute immunity the defendants enjoy for offering the composite tape into evidence is not defeated by Cig-netti’s allegations that they did so maliciously or in bad-faith because they knew or should have known that the composite tape was fabricated. See e.g. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 409, 96 S.Ct. 984 (concluding that absolute prosecutorial immunity precluded a § 1983 claim alleging that a prosecutor had knowingly used perjured testimony and deliberately suppressed exculpatory material at trial); Burns, 500 U.S. at 478, 111 S.Ct. 1934 (holding that a prosecutor accused of knowingly presenting false testimony at trial is protected by absolute immunity" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nlimestone on right of way); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 158 (1965) (defining trespass as unauthorized entry by “thing” or person); W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 13 at 70 (5th ed.1984) (same). When such a tangible invasion occurred, the element of damages was presumed. Longenecker v. Zimmerman, 175 Kan. 719, 721, 267 P.2d 543, 545 (Kan.1954). As the bankruptcy and district courts noted, however, some courts have adopted a “modern” view of trespass that recognizes intangible invasions. See, e.g., Public Service Co. of Colo. v. Van Wyk, 27 P.3d 377, 390 (Colo.2001) (“[W]e now hold that, in Colorado, an intangible intrusion may give rise to claim for trespass.... ”); Bradley v. Am. Smelting & Refining Co., 104 Wash.2d 677, 686-88, 709 P.2d 782, 788-89 (Wash.1985) (recognizing that an expression of opinion about monetary value is not a representation of fact which gives rise to an action for fraud", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nlimestone on right of way); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 158 (1965) (defining trespass as unauthorized entry by “thing” or person); W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 13 at 70 (5th ed.1984) (same). When such a tangible invasion occurred, the element of damages was presumed. Longenecker v. Zimmerman, 175 Kan. 719, 721, 267 P.2d 543, 545 (Kan.1954). As the bankruptcy and district courts noted, however, some courts have adopted a “modern” view of trespass that recognizes intangible invasions. See, e.g., Public Service Co. of Colo. v. Van Wyk, 27 P.3d 377, 390 (Colo.2001) (“[W]e now hold that, in Colorado, an intangible intrusion may give rise to claim for trespass.... ”); Bradley v. Am. Smelting & Refining Co., 104 Wash.2d 677, 686-88, 709 P.2d 782, 788-89 (Wash.1985) (holding deposit of microscopic particulates gives rise to action for trespass", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nlimestone on right of way); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 158 (1965) (defining trespass as unauthorized entry by “thing” or person); W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 13 at 70 (5th ed.1984) (same). When such a tangible invasion occurred, the element of damages was presumed. Longenecker v. Zimmerman, 175 Kan. 719, 721, 267 P.2d 543, 545 (Kan.1954). As the bankruptcy and district courts noted, however, some courts have adopted a “modern” view of trespass that recognizes intangible invasions. See, e.g., Public Service Co. of Colo. v. Van Wyk, 27 P.3d 377, 390 (Colo.2001) (“[W]e now hold that, in Colorado, an intangible intrusion may give rise to claim for trespass.... ”); Bradley v. Am. Smelting & Refining Co., 104 Wash.2d 677, 686-88, 709 P.2d 782, 788-89 (Wash.1985) (holding that the unique nature of psychotherapistpatient relationship gives rise to a duty of care to the patient", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nlimestone on right of way); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 158 (1965) (defining trespass as unauthorized entry by “thing” or person); W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 13 at 70 (5th ed.1984) (same). When such a tangible invasion occurred, the element of damages was presumed. Longenecker v. Zimmerman, 175 Kan. 719, 721, 267 P.2d 543, 545 (Kan.1954). As the bankruptcy and district courts noted, however, some courts have adopted a “modern” view of trespass that recognizes intangible invasions. See, e.g., Public Service Co. of Colo. v. Van Wyk, 27 P.3d 377, 390 (Colo.2001) (“[W]e now hold that, in Colorado, an intangible intrusion may give rise to claim for trespass.... ”); Bradley v. Am. Smelting & Refining Co., 104 Wash.2d 677, 686-88, 709 P.2d 782, 788-89 (Wash.1985) (holding that the failure to act in good faith does not amount to an independent tort the breach of the implied duty under the ucc gives rise only to a cause of action for breach of contract", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nlimestone on right of way); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 158 (1965) (defining trespass as unauthorized entry by “thing” or person); W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 13 at 70 (5th ed.1984) (same). When such a tangible invasion occurred, the element of damages was presumed. Longenecker v. Zimmerman, 175 Kan. 719, 721, 267 P.2d 543, 545 (Kan.1954). As the bankruptcy and district courts noted, however, some courts have adopted a “modern” view of trespass that recognizes intangible invasions. See, e.g., Public Service Co. of Colo. v. Van Wyk, 27 P.3d 377, 390 (Colo.2001) (“[W]e now hold that, in Colorado, an intangible intrusion may give rise to claim for trespass.... ”); Bradley v. Am. Smelting & Refining Co., 104 Wash.2d 677, 686-88, 709 P.2d 782, 788-89 (Wash.1985) (holding that repudiation alone gives rise to a claim for damages for total breach" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nagainst whom a claim is asserted if the foregoing provision (2) is satisfied and, within the period provided by Rule 4(m) for service of the summons and complaint, the party to be brought in by amendment (A) has received such notice of the institution of the action that the party will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits, and (B) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against the party.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c). Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m), which is mentioned, provides for a 120-day period. Nobles and Hales’s proposed amended complaint could relate back if it met the requirements of either Rule 15(c)(1) or Rule 15(c)(3). Saxton v. ACF Industries, Inc., 254 F.3d 959, 966 n. 11 (11th Cir.2001) (recognizing strictness of maryland rule in a diversity case", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nagainst whom a claim is asserted if the foregoing provision (2) is satisfied and, within the period provided by Rule 4(m) for service of the summons and complaint, the party to be brought in by amendment (A) has received such notice of the institution of the action that the party will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits, and (B) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against the party.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c). Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m), which is mentioned, provides for a 120-day period. Nobles and Hales’s proposed amended complaint could relate back if it met the requirements of either Rule 15(c)(1) or Rule 15(c)(3). Saxton v. ACF Industries, Inc., 254 F.3d 959, 966 n. 11 (11th Cir.2001) (holding that a proposed amendment seeking to change a defendant in a diversity case could relate back under either rule 15c1 or 15c3", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nagainst whom a claim is asserted if the foregoing provision (2) is satisfied and, within the period provided by Rule 4(m) for service of the summons and complaint, the party to be brought in by amendment (A) has received such notice of the institution of the action that the party will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits, and (B) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against the party.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c). Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m), which is mentioned, provides for a 120-day period. Nobles and Hales’s proposed amended complaint could relate back if it met the requirements of either Rule 15(c)(1) or Rule 15(c)(3). Saxton v. ACF Industries, Inc., 254 F.3d 959, 966 n. 11 (11th Cir.2001) (holding that in order for a defendant to remove a case to federal court based upon diversity jurisdiction there must be complete diversity of citizenship both at the time that the case is commenced and at the time that the notice of removal is filed", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nagainst whom a claim is asserted if the foregoing provision (2) is satisfied and, within the period provided by Rule 4(m) for service of the summons and complaint, the party to be brought in by amendment (A) has received such notice of the institution of the action that the party will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits, and (B) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against the party.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c). Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m), which is mentioned, provides for a 120-day period. Nobles and Hales’s proposed amended complaint could relate back if it met the requirements of either Rule 15(c)(1) or Rule 15(c)(3). Saxton v. ACF Industries, Inc., 254 F.3d 959, 966 n. 11 (11th Cir.2001) (holding that state law provides the standard of review for a denial of a rule 50 motion in a diversity case", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nagainst whom a claim is asserted if the foregoing provision (2) is satisfied and, within the period provided by Rule 4(m) for service of the summons and complaint, the party to be brought in by amendment (A) has received such notice of the institution of the action that the party will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits, and (B) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against the party.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c). Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m), which is mentioned, provides for a 120-day period. Nobles and Hales’s proposed amended complaint could relate back if it met the requirements of either Rule 15(c)(1) or Rule 15(c)(3). Saxton v. ACF Industries, Inc., 254 F.3d 959, 966 n. 11 (11th Cir.2001) (holding that statutory change in diversity requirements is not other paper" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nboth Sergeant Boggs’ and Sheriff Peters’ testimony that they did not initially consider Davis a suspect as a factor in its analysis. See Davis, 554 So.2d at 1101. Because neither Sergeant Boggs nor Sheriff Peters communicated his belief to Davis, the court agrees with Davis that the officers’ subjective intent is not relevant to the objective question of whether Davis was in custody. See Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 323-25, 114 S.Ct. 1526. Even if the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals’ statement, when taken in isolation, is inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent, however, the court is confident that the state appellate court’s decision, as a whole, constitutes a proper application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. Cf. Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1233 (9th Cir.2002) (holding that pursuant to 28 usc 2254d1 if the state court reached the correct result with respect to petitioners claim of constitutional violation even if on erroneous reasoning that is the end of our inquiry", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nboth Sergeant Boggs’ and Sheriff Peters’ testimony that they did not initially consider Davis a suspect as a factor in its analysis. See Davis, 554 So.2d at 1101. Because neither Sergeant Boggs nor Sheriff Peters communicated his belief to Davis, the court agrees with Davis that the officers’ subjective intent is not relevant to the objective question of whether Davis was in custody. See Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 323-25, 114 S.Ct. 1526. Even if the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals’ statement, when taken in isolation, is inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent, however, the court is confident that the state appellate court’s decision, as a whole, constitutes a proper application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. Cf. Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1233 (9th Cir.2002) (holding that where the statutory scheme is clear the inquiry should end", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nboth Sergeant Boggs’ and Sheriff Peters’ testimony that they did not initially consider Davis a suspect as a factor in its analysis. See Davis, 554 So.2d at 1101. Because neither Sergeant Boggs nor Sheriff Peters communicated his belief to Davis, the court agrees with Davis that the officers’ subjective intent is not relevant to the objective question of whether Davis was in custody. See Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 323-25, 114 S.Ct. 1526. Even if the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals’ statement, when taken in isolation, is inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent, however, the court is confident that the state appellate court’s decision, as a whole, constitutes a proper application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. Cf. Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1233 (9th Cir.2002) (holding that review under 2254d1 is limited to the record before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits rejecting the petitioners claim that the federal habeas court could consider evidence introduced in an evidentiary hearing", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nboth Sergeant Boggs’ and Sheriff Peters’ testimony that they did not initially consider Davis a suspect as a factor in its analysis. See Davis, 554 So.2d at 1101. Because neither Sergeant Boggs nor Sheriff Peters communicated his belief to Davis, the court agrees with Davis that the officers’ subjective intent is not relevant to the objective question of whether Davis was in custody. See Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 323-25, 114 S.Ct. 1526. Even if the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals’ statement, when taken in isolation, is inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent, however, the court is confident that the state appellate court’s decision, as a whole, constitutes a proper application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. Cf. Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1233 (9th Cir.2002) (recognizing an appellate court may affirm a trial courts decision that reached the right result regardless of the trial courts reasoning", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nboth Sergeant Boggs’ and Sheriff Peters’ testimony that they did not initially consider Davis a suspect as a factor in its analysis. See Davis, 554 So.2d at 1101. Because neither Sergeant Boggs nor Sheriff Peters communicated his belief to Davis, the court agrees with Davis that the officers’ subjective intent is not relevant to the objective question of whether Davis was in custody. See Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 323-25, 114 S.Ct. 1526. Even if the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals’ statement, when taken in isolation, is inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent, however, the court is confident that the state appellate court’s decision, as a whole, constitutes a proper application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. Cf. Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1233 (9th Cir.2002) (holding that it is axiomatic that this court can affirm a circuit court if the right result is reached even if for a different reason" ]