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[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n110, 113 (1993)). The Court essentially held that even though the action was termed a breach of contract, the action had elements of tort because the plaintiff had to prove that the construction was substandard or negligently performed. Therefore, it seems that there cannot be a blanket prohibition of the application of the collateral source rule to contract claims as the defendant suggests. Even if such a claim could be sustained, it is not clear that there is not an element of tort in Plaintiffs claim, despite its title as a “Breach of Contract”. (Rec. Doc. 1-2, at 1). Violations of section 1220 or 658 generally sound in tort, and therefore, there is an element of a tort claim to Plaintiffs action. See Stokes v. Allstate Indem. Co., No. 06-1053, 2007 WL 1875847 (E.D.La. June 28, 2007)(holding that section 1220 provides an exclusive remedy for tort like actions against an insurer", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n110, 113 (1993)). The Court essentially held that even though the action was termed a breach of contract, the action had elements of tort because the plaintiff had to prove that the construction was substandard or negligently performed. Therefore, it seems that there cannot be a blanket prohibition of the application of the collateral source rule to contract claims as the defendant suggests. Even if such a claim could be sustained, it is not clear that there is not an element of tort in Plaintiffs claim, despite its title as a “Breach of Contract”. (Rec. Doc. 1-2, at 1). Violations of section 1220 or 658 generally sound in tort, and therefore, there is an element of a tort claim to Plaintiffs action. See Stokes v. Allstate Indem. Co., No. 06-1053, 2007 WL 1875847 (E.D.La. June 28, 2007)(holding that once the workers compensation act provides a remedy it is exclusive and the employee has no right to bring an action in commonlaw negligence against his employer", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n110, 113 (1993)). The Court essentially held that even though the action was termed a breach of contract, the action had elements of tort because the plaintiff had to prove that the construction was substandard or negligently performed. Therefore, it seems that there cannot be a blanket prohibition of the application of the collateral source rule to contract claims as the defendant suggests. Even if such a claim could be sustained, it is not clear that there is not an element of tort in Plaintiffs claim, despite its title as a “Breach of Contract”. (Rec. Doc. 1-2, at 1). Violations of section 1220 or 658 generally sound in tort, and therefore, there is an element of a tort claim to Plaintiffs action. See Stokes v. Allstate Indem. Co., No. 06-1053, 2007 WL 1875847 (E.D.La. June 28, 2007)(holding that title vii provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in federal employment", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n110, 113 (1993)). The Court essentially held that even though the action was termed a breach of contract, the action had elements of tort because the plaintiff had to prove that the construction was substandard or negligently performed. Therefore, it seems that there cannot be a blanket prohibition of the application of the collateral source rule to contract claims as the defendant suggests. Even if such a claim could be sustained, it is not clear that there is not an element of tort in Plaintiffs claim, despite its title as a “Breach of Contract”. (Rec. Doc. 1-2, at 1). Violations of section 1220 or 658 generally sound in tort, and therefore, there is an element of a tort claim to Plaintiffs action. See Stokes v. Allstate Indem. Co., No. 06-1053, 2007 WL 1875847 (E.D.La. June 28, 2007)(holding that an employer who commits an intentional tort against his employee cannot claim that the act was accidental so that workers compensation is the employees exclusive remedy", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n110, 113 (1993)). The Court essentially held that even though the action was termed a breach of contract, the action had elements of tort because the plaintiff had to prove that the construction was substandard or negligently performed. Therefore, it seems that there cannot be a blanket prohibition of the application of the collateral source rule to contract claims as the defendant suggests. Even if such a claim could be sustained, it is not clear that there is not an element of tort in Plaintiffs claim, despite its title as a “Breach of Contract”. (Rec. Doc. 1-2, at 1). Violations of section 1220 or 658 generally sound in tort, and therefore, there is an element of a tort claim to Plaintiffs action. See Stokes v. Allstate Indem. Co., No. 06-1053, 2007 WL 1875847 (E.D.La. June 28, 2007)(holding that it is not enough that an employees job provides an opportunity to commit an intentional tort" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nPolice Dep’t v. United Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 40, 120 S.Ct. 483, 145 L.Ed.2d 451 (1999). For instance, a state law placing conditions on public access to arrestees’ home addresses is not subject to a facial challenge on free speech grounds because the government is under no obligation to make those addresses public at all. Id. Here, however, CNS asserts its First Amendment right of access to judicial and other public proceedings. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1, 106 S.Ct. 2735, 92 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986). It is highly doubtful that “California could decide not to give out [the complaints] at all without violating the First Amendment.” Id. (emphasis added); cf. Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir.1988) (holding that the rigorous first amendment standard should also apply to documents filed in connection with a summary judgment motion in a civil case", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nPolice Dep’t v. United Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 40, 120 S.Ct. 483, 145 L.Ed.2d 451 (1999). For instance, a state law placing conditions on public access to arrestees’ home addresses is not subject to a facial challenge on free speech grounds because the government is under no obligation to make those addresses public at all. Id. Here, however, CNS asserts its First Amendment right of access to judicial and other public proceedings. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1, 106 S.Ct. 2735, 92 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986). It is highly doubtful that “California could decide not to give out [the complaints] at all without violating the First Amendment.” Id. (emphasis added); cf. Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir.1988) (holding that the first amendment secures for the public and the press a right of access to civil proceedings", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nPolice Dep’t v. United Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 40, 120 S.Ct. 483, 145 L.Ed.2d 451 (1999). For instance, a state law placing conditions on public access to arrestees’ home addresses is not subject to a facial challenge on free speech grounds because the government is under no obligation to make those addresses public at all. Id. Here, however, CNS asserts its First Amendment right of access to judicial and other public proceedings. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1, 106 S.Ct. 2735, 92 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986). It is highly doubtful that “California could decide not to give out [the complaints] at all without violating the First Amendment.” Id. (emphasis added); cf. Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir.1988) (holding that there is no first amendment right of access to presentence reports", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nPolice Dep’t v. United Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 40, 120 S.Ct. 483, 145 L.Ed.2d 451 (1999). For instance, a state law placing conditions on public access to arrestees’ home addresses is not subject to a facial challenge on free speech grounds because the government is under no obligation to make those addresses public at all. Id. Here, however, CNS asserts its First Amendment right of access to judicial and other public proceedings. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1, 106 S.Ct. 2735, 92 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986). It is highly doubtful that “California could decide not to give out [the complaints] at all without violating the First Amendment.” Id. (emphasis added); cf. Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir.1988) (recognizing a right of access to civil proceedings", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nPolice Dep’t v. United Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 40, 120 S.Ct. 483, 145 L.Ed.2d 451 (1999). For instance, a state law placing conditions on public access to arrestees’ home addresses is not subject to a facial challenge on free speech grounds because the government is under no obligation to make those addresses public at all. Id. Here, however, CNS asserts its First Amendment right of access to judicial and other public proceedings. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1, 106 S.Ct. 2735, 92 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986). It is highly doubtful that “California could decide not to give out [the complaints] at all without violating the First Amendment.” Id. (emphasis added); cf. Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir.1988) (holding that the first amendment right of access applies to a summary judgment motion in a civil case" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof section 13-305 of the Consumer Protection Act. The court was notified that the same legal issue was one of several issues that would be subject to the Division’s authority to provide injunctive relief after the determination of the administrative action. Thus, even after obtaining declaratory judgment in its favor as to the validity of the proposed advertisement, Luskin’s could still be subject to an adverse administrative order enjoining the implementation of the proposed advertisement. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the circuit court should not have granted declaratory judgment because it would not “serve to terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding.” Id.; see, e.g., Brohawn v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 276 Md. 396, 406, 347 A.2d 842 (1975) (holding that an insurer will not be estopped from denying coverage merely because the underlying case proceeds to judgment before the declaratory judgment action is resolved", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof section 13-305 of the Consumer Protection Act. The court was notified that the same legal issue was one of several issues that would be subject to the Division’s authority to provide injunctive relief after the determination of the administrative action. Thus, even after obtaining declaratory judgment in its favor as to the validity of the proposed advertisement, Luskin’s could still be subject to an adverse administrative order enjoining the implementation of the proposed advertisement. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the circuit court should not have granted declaratory judgment because it would not “serve to terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding.” Id.; see, e.g., Brohawn v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 276 Md. 396, 406, 347 A.2d 842 (1975) (holding that the declaratory judgment act is remedial only and the party seeking declaratory relief must have an underlying cause of action", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof section 13-305 of the Consumer Protection Act. The court was notified that the same legal issue was one of several issues that would be subject to the Division’s authority to provide injunctive relief after the determination of the administrative action. Thus, even after obtaining declaratory judgment in its favor as to the validity of the proposed advertisement, Luskin’s could still be subject to an adverse administrative order enjoining the implementation of the proposed advertisement. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the circuit court should not have granted declaratory judgment because it would not “serve to terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding.” Id.; see, e.g., Brohawn v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 276 Md. 396, 406, 347 A.2d 842 (1975) (holding that in a declaratory judgment action it is the character of the impending action not the plaintiffs defense that determines whether there is federal question jurisdiction", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof section 13-305 of the Consumer Protection Act. The court was notified that the same legal issue was one of several issues that would be subject to the Division’s authority to provide injunctive relief after the determination of the administrative action. Thus, even after obtaining declaratory judgment in its favor as to the validity of the proposed advertisement, Luskin’s could still be subject to an adverse administrative order enjoining the implementation of the proposed advertisement. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the circuit court should not have granted declaratory judgment because it would not “serve to terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding.” Id.; see, e.g., Brohawn v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 276 Md. 396, 406, 347 A.2d 842 (1975) (holding that where the question to be resolved in the declaratory judgment action will be decided in a pending action it is inappropriate to grant a declaratory judgment", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof section 13-305 of the Consumer Protection Act. The court was notified that the same legal issue was one of several issues that would be subject to the Division’s authority to provide injunctive relief after the determination of the administrative action. Thus, even after obtaining declaratory judgment in its favor as to the validity of the proposed advertisement, Luskin’s could still be subject to an adverse administrative order enjoining the implementation of the proposed advertisement. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the circuit court should not have granted declaratory judgment because it would not “serve to terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding.” Id.; see, e.g., Brohawn v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 276 Md. 396, 406, 347 A.2d 842 (1975) (holding that filing of infringement action twelve days after complaint for declaratory judgment obviated the need for a declaratory judgment in this case" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nraise a substantial question regarding the appellant’s guilty plea. United States v. Inabinette, 66 M.J. 320, 322 (C.A.A.F.2008). “By pleading guilty, an accused does more than admit that he [committed] the various acts alleged in a specification; “he is admitting guilt of a substantive crime.’” United States v. Campbell, 68 M.J. 217, 219 (C.A.A.F.2009) (quoting United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 570, 109 S.Ct. 757, 102 L.Ed.2d 927 (1989)). During the plea inquiry, Appellant admitted under oath each of the elements of the offense of indecent exposure, including that he exposed himself to public view. When an accused pleads guilty, there is no requirement that the government establish the factual predicate for the plea. United States v. Faircloth, 45 M.J. 172, 174 (C.A.A.F.1996) (holding that in a guilty plea ease the court would not speculate as to the true victim of larceny with respect to copayees on a check", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nraise a substantial question regarding the appellant’s guilty plea. United States v. Inabinette, 66 M.J. 320, 322 (C.A.A.F.2008). “By pleading guilty, an accused does more than admit that he [committed] the various acts alleged in a specification; “he is admitting guilt of a substantive crime.’” United States v. Campbell, 68 M.J. 217, 219 (C.A.A.F.2009) (quoting United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 570, 109 S.Ct. 757, 102 L.Ed.2d 927 (1989)). During the plea inquiry, Appellant admitted under oath each of the elements of the offense of indecent exposure, including that he exposed himself to public view. When an accused pleads guilty, there is no requirement that the government establish the factual predicate for the plea. United States v. Faircloth, 45 M.J. 172, 174 (C.A.A.F.1996) (holding that the defendants guilty plea was valid where the district court carefully questioned the defendant about whether he understood the consequences of his guilty plea", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nraise a substantial question regarding the appellant’s guilty plea. United States v. Inabinette, 66 M.J. 320, 322 (C.A.A.F.2008). “By pleading guilty, an accused does more than admit that he [committed] the various acts alleged in a specification; “he is admitting guilt of a substantive crime.’” United States v. Campbell, 68 M.J. 217, 219 (C.A.A.F.2009) (quoting United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 570, 109 S.Ct. 757, 102 L.Ed.2d 927 (1989)). During the plea inquiry, Appellant admitted under oath each of the elements of the offense of indecent exposure, including that he exposed himself to public view. When an accused pleads guilty, there is no requirement that the government establish the factual predicate for the plea. United States v. Faircloth, 45 M.J. 172, 174 (C.A.A.F.1996) (holding that the defendant remains the master of his case particularly with respect to the entry of a guilty plea", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nraise a substantial question regarding the appellant’s guilty plea. United States v. Inabinette, 66 M.J. 320, 322 (C.A.A.F.2008). “By pleading guilty, an accused does more than admit that he [committed] the various acts alleged in a specification; “he is admitting guilt of a substantive crime.’” United States v. Campbell, 68 M.J. 217, 219 (C.A.A.F.2009) (quoting United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 570, 109 S.Ct. 757, 102 L.Ed.2d 927 (1989)). During the plea inquiry, Appellant admitted under oath each of the elements of the offense of indecent exposure, including that he exposed himself to public view. When an accused pleads guilty, there is no requirement that the government establish the factual predicate for the plea. United States v. Faircloth, 45 M.J. 172, 174 (C.A.A.F.1996) (holding entry of guilty plea waives challenges to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea emphasis added", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nraise a substantial question regarding the appellant’s guilty plea. United States v. Inabinette, 66 M.J. 320, 322 (C.A.A.F.2008). “By pleading guilty, an accused does more than admit that he [committed] the various acts alleged in a specification; “he is admitting guilt of a substantive crime.’” United States v. Campbell, 68 M.J. 217, 219 (C.A.A.F.2009) (quoting United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 570, 109 S.Ct. 757, 102 L.Ed.2d 927 (1989)). During the plea inquiry, Appellant admitted under oath each of the elements of the offense of indecent exposure, including that he exposed himself to public view. When an accused pleads guilty, there is no requirement that the government establish the factual predicate for the plea. United States v. Faircloth, 45 M.J. 172, 174 (C.A.A.F.1996) (holding that a defendants guilty plea was unconditional where the guilty plea was not in writing and the government did not consent to it being conditional" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nbound by the rules and regulations in the MHSAA’s handbook. Trail, 163 So.3d at 276. Although the MHSAA is a private, voluntary association, it is uniquely situated due to its substantial entwinement with government. By statute, the local school boards are empowered to regulate athletic programs. Miss.Code Ann. § S7-7-301(q). (Rev.2013). But the school-boards have delegated their statutory authority to regulate athletics to the MHSAA. Miss. High Sch. Activities Ass’n. v. Coleman, 631 So.2d 768, 774 (Miss.1994). And because the MHSAA’s authority is derived from statutory authority, its actions are “state action for the purpose of constitutional analysis.” Id.; see also Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 291, 298, 121 S.Ct. 924, 148 L.Ed.2d 807 (2001) (holding that expert report that sufficiently addressed certain claims against doctor employed by professional association was sufficient as to claims against professional association based on doctors negligence because the doctors negligence is imputed to the association under the professional association act", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nbound by the rules and regulations in the MHSAA’s handbook. Trail, 163 So.3d at 276. Although the MHSAA is a private, voluntary association, it is uniquely situated due to its substantial entwinement with government. By statute, the local school boards are empowered to regulate athletic programs. Miss.Code Ann. § S7-7-301(q). (Rev.2013). But the school-boards have delegated their statutory authority to regulate athletics to the MHSAA. Miss. High Sch. Activities Ass’n. v. Coleman, 631 So.2d 768, 774 (Miss.1994). And because the MHSAA’s authority is derived from statutory authority, its actions are “state action for the purpose of constitutional analysis.” Id.; see also Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 291, 298, 121 S.Ct. 924, 148 L.Ed.2d 807 (2001) (holding a condominium association had no duty to a woman who had committed suicide after the association removed the womans dog because while the association knew the dog was essential to the womans will to live the association had no authority to prevent the womans suicide", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nbound by the rules and regulations in the MHSAA’s handbook. Trail, 163 So.3d at 276. Although the MHSAA is a private, voluntary association, it is uniquely situated due to its substantial entwinement with government. By statute, the local school boards are empowered to regulate athletic programs. Miss.Code Ann. § S7-7-301(q). (Rev.2013). But the school-boards have delegated their statutory authority to regulate athletics to the MHSAA. Miss. High Sch. Activities Ass’n. v. Coleman, 631 So.2d 768, 774 (Miss.1994). And because the MHSAA’s authority is derived from statutory authority, its actions are “state action for the purpose of constitutional analysis.” Id.; see also Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 291, 298, 121 S.Ct. 924, 148 L.Ed.2d 807 (2001) (recognizing the irony that a state officials conduct may be considered state action for fourteenth amendment purposes yet not for purposes of the eleventh amendment", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nbound by the rules and regulations in the MHSAA’s handbook. Trail, 163 So.3d at 276. Although the MHSAA is a private, voluntary association, it is uniquely situated due to its substantial entwinement with government. By statute, the local school boards are empowered to regulate athletic programs. Miss.Code Ann. § S7-7-301(q). (Rev.2013). But the school-boards have delegated their statutory authority to regulate athletics to the MHSAA. Miss. High Sch. Activities Ass’n. v. Coleman, 631 So.2d 768, 774 (Miss.1994). And because the MHSAA’s authority is derived from statutory authority, its actions are “state action for the purpose of constitutional analysis.” Id.; see also Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 291, 298, 121 S.Ct. 924, 148 L.Ed.2d 807 (2001) (holding that the fourteenth amendment only applies to state action", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nbound by the rules and regulations in the MHSAA’s handbook. Trail, 163 So.3d at 276. Although the MHSAA is a private, voluntary association, it is uniquely situated due to its substantial entwinement with government. By statute, the local school boards are empowered to regulate athletic programs. Miss.Code Ann. § S7-7-301(q). (Rev.2013). But the school-boards have delegated their statutory authority to regulate athletics to the MHSAA. Miss. High Sch. Activities Ass’n. v. Coleman, 631 So.2d 768, 774 (Miss.1994). And because the MHSAA’s authority is derived from statutory authority, its actions are “state action for the purpose of constitutional analysis.” Id.; see also Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 291, 298, 121 S.Ct. 924, 148 L.Ed.2d 807 (2001) (holding that regulatory enforcement by a highschool athletic association was state action for the purposes of the fourteenth amendment due to the pervasive entwinement between the athletic association and public schools and officials" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwithout notice, and against all subsequent bona fide purchasers and mortgagees for valuable consideration, not having notice thereof, whose deed shall have been first duly recorded or whose mortgage shall have been first duly recorded or registered; but my such deed or instrument shall be valid and operative, although not recorded, except as against such subsequent judgment creditors, purchasers and mortgagees. [N.J.S.A. 46:22-1 (emphasis added). See also Tobar, supra, 293 N.J.Super. at 413, 680 A2.d 1121 (noting that “actual or constructive notice is n the position that it is among the protected classes generally entitled to recording notice under N.J.S.A. 46:22-1. See C.D. v. Div. of Med. Assistance and Health Servs., 93 N.J.A.R.2d 91,1993 WL 471193 (Div. of Med. Assistance) (holding that limitations period on employment discrimination claim triggered on date of discharge not on date of discovery of discriminatory intent", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwithout notice, and against all subsequent bona fide purchasers and mortgagees for valuable consideration, not having notice thereof, whose deed shall have been first duly recorded or whose mortgage shall have been first duly recorded or registered; but my such deed or instrument shall be valid and operative, although not recorded, except as against such subsequent judgment creditors, purchasers and mortgagees. [N.J.S.A. 46:22-1 (emphasis added). See also Tobar, supra, 293 N.J.Super. at 413, 680 A2.d 1121 (noting that “actual or constructive notice is n the position that it is among the protected classes generally entitled to recording notice under N.J.S.A. 46:22-1. See C.D. v. Div. of Med. Assistance and Health Servs., 93 N.J.A.R.2d 91,1993 WL 471193 (Div. of Med. Assistance) (holding that the date of the federal indictment not the date of the state arrest was the triggering date for the speedytrial act", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwithout notice, and against all subsequent bona fide purchasers and mortgagees for valuable consideration, not having notice thereof, whose deed shall have been first duly recorded or whose mortgage shall have been first duly recorded or registered; but my such deed or instrument shall be valid and operative, although not recorded, except as against such subsequent judgment creditors, purchasers and mortgagees. [N.J.S.A. 46:22-1 (emphasis added). See also Tobar, supra, 293 N.J.Super. at 413, 680 A2.d 1121 (noting that “actual or constructive notice is n the position that it is among the protected classes generally entitled to recording notice under N.J.S.A. 46:22-1. See C.D. v. Div. of Med. Assistance and Health Servs., 93 N.J.A.R.2d 91,1993 WL 471193 (Div. of Med. Assistance) (holding that dmahs is not among classes protected by njsa 46221 and concluding that property was transferred on date that deed was signed not on recording date", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwithout notice, and against all subsequent bona fide purchasers and mortgagees for valuable consideration, not having notice thereof, whose deed shall have been first duly recorded or whose mortgage shall have been first duly recorded or registered; but my such deed or instrument shall be valid and operative, although not recorded, except as against such subsequent judgment creditors, purchasers and mortgagees. [N.J.S.A. 46:22-1 (emphasis added). See also Tobar, supra, 293 N.J.Super. at 413, 680 A2.d 1121 (noting that “actual or constructive notice is n the position that it is among the protected classes generally entitled to recording notice under N.J.S.A. 46:22-1. See C.D. v. Div. of Med. Assistance and Health Servs., 93 N.J.A.R.2d 91,1993 WL 471193 (Div. of Med. Assistance) (holding that the date of discrimination is the date on which a decision not to hire a plaintiff becomes effective", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwithout notice, and against all subsequent bona fide purchasers and mortgagees for valuable consideration, not having notice thereof, whose deed shall have been first duly recorded or whose mortgage shall have been first duly recorded or registered; but my such deed or instrument shall be valid and operative, although not recorded, except as against such subsequent judgment creditors, purchasers and mortgagees. [N.J.S.A. 46:22-1 (emphasis added). See also Tobar, supra, 293 N.J.Super. at 413, 680 A2.d 1121 (noting that “actual or constructive notice is n the position that it is among the protected classes generally entitled to recording notice under N.J.S.A. 46:22-1. See C.D. v. Div. of Med. Assistance and Health Servs., 93 N.J.A.R.2d 91,1993 WL 471193 (Div. of Med. Assistance) (holding that the date of transfer should be measured by the date that the transfer was good as against a subsequent bona fide purchaser or judgement holder which in accordance with applicable state law was the date of recordation as opposed to the date the deed was signed" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ntestimony just generally describes the limitation caused by her condition. When asked whether her congenital heart disease causes any restrictions on her day-today activities, Plaintiff responded that she was instructed to “stay off her feet as much as possible.” (First Reis Depo. at 16-17). In contrast, the deposition testimony of Plaintiff shows that she was able to perform activities involving standing. Plaintiff testified that she was able to feed herself, bathe herself, and prepare her own meals. (Id. at 16). She also testified that she was able to walk and go up and down escalators and elevators. (Id.). Furthermore, Plaintiff acted as a substitute teacher of young children without special consideration or assistance. (Id. at 14-15, 17). She testified th 1311, 1319 (8th Cir.1996) (holding that a lifting restriction of ten pounds did not constitute a physical impairment that substantially limited a major life activity", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ntestimony just generally describes the limitation caused by her condition. When asked whether her congenital heart disease causes any restrictions on her day-today activities, Plaintiff responded that she was instructed to “stay off her feet as much as possible.” (First Reis Depo. at 16-17). In contrast, the deposition testimony of Plaintiff shows that she was able to perform activities involving standing. Plaintiff testified that she was able to feed herself, bathe herself, and prepare her own meals. (Id. at 16). She also testified that she was able to walk and go up and down escalators and elevators. (Id.). Furthermore, Plaintiff acted as a substitute teacher of young children without special consideration or assistance. (Id. at 14-15, 17). She testified th 1311, 1319 (8th Cir.1996) (holding that a permanent lifting restriction of no more than twentyfive pounds on a continuous basis is not substantially limiting", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ntestimony just generally describes the limitation caused by her condition. When asked whether her congenital heart disease causes any restrictions on her day-today activities, Plaintiff responded that she was instructed to “stay off her feet as much as possible.” (First Reis Depo. at 16-17). In contrast, the deposition testimony of Plaintiff shows that she was able to perform activities involving standing. Plaintiff testified that she was able to feed herself, bathe herself, and prepare her own meals. (Id. at 16). She also testified that she was able to walk and go up and down escalators and elevators. (Id.). Furthermore, Plaintiff acted as a substitute teacher of young children without special consideration or assistance. (Id. at 14-15, 17). She testified th 1311, 1319 (8th Cir.1996) (holding that a lifting restriction did not substantially limit a computer technicians ability to engage in the major life activity of working", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ntestimony just generally describes the limitation caused by her condition. When asked whether her congenital heart disease causes any restrictions on her day-today activities, Plaintiff responded that she was instructed to “stay off her feet as much as possible.” (First Reis Depo. at 16-17). In contrast, the deposition testimony of Plaintiff shows that she was able to perform activities involving standing. Plaintiff testified that she was able to feed herself, bathe herself, and prepare her own meals. (Id. at 16). She also testified that she was able to walk and go up and down escalators and elevators. (Id.). Furthermore, Plaintiff acted as a substitute teacher of young children without special consideration or assistance. (Id. at 14-15, 17). She testified th 1311, 1319 (8th Cir.1996) (holding that a twentyfive pounds lifting restriction did not substantially limit any major life activities", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ntestimony just generally describes the limitation caused by her condition. When asked whether her congenital heart disease causes any restrictions on her day-today activities, Plaintiff responded that she was instructed to “stay off her feet as much as possible.” (First Reis Depo. at 16-17). In contrast, the deposition testimony of Plaintiff shows that she was able to perform activities involving standing. Plaintiff testified that she was able to feed herself, bathe herself, and prepare her own meals. (Id. at 16). She also testified that she was able to walk and go up and down escalators and elevators. (Id.). Furthermore, Plaintiff acted as a substitute teacher of young children without special consideration or assistance. (Id. at 14-15, 17). She testified th 1311, 1319 (8th Cir.1996) (holding that restriction limiting continuous lifting of containers weighing fortyfour to fiftysix pounds does not substantially limit any major life activity" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe Board ... shall be considered by the court, unless the failure or neglect to urge such objection shall be excused because of extraordinary circumstances.”). Given that none of the Board precedents discussing the impact of a public-to-private change on the issue of successorship addresses the right-to-strike point, there was no reason for the Board to suspect that this was the objection Dean was raising. Dean’s general reference to the different statutory schemes was therefore insufficient to put the Board on “ ‘adequate notice’ of the argument [the company now] seeks to advance on review,” and we are barred from considering it. Highlands Hosp. Corp., Inc. v. NLRB, 508 F.3d 28, 33 (D.C.Cir.2007) (quoting American Postal Workers Union v. NLRB, 370 F.3d 25, 28 (D.C.Cir.2004)); cf. id. (holding that notice of judgment was insufficient", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe Board ... shall be considered by the court, unless the failure or neglect to urge such objection shall be excused because of extraordinary circumstances.”). Given that none of the Board precedents discussing the impact of a public-to-private change on the issue of successorship addresses the right-to-strike point, there was no reason for the Board to suspect that this was the objection Dean was raising. Dean’s general reference to the different statutory schemes was therefore insufficient to put the Board on “ ‘adequate notice’ of the argument [the company now] seeks to advance on review,” and we are barred from considering it. Highlands Hosp. Corp., Inc. v. NLRB, 508 F.3d 28, 33 (D.C.Cir.2007) (quoting American Postal Workers Union v. NLRB, 370 F.3d 25, 28 (D.C.Cir.2004)); cf. id. (holding that the denial of petitioners appeal to the bia would have put a reasonable person in the petitioners position on notice that something was wrong with his attorneys preparation for the removal hearing", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe Board ... shall be considered by the court, unless the failure or neglect to urge such objection shall be excused because of extraordinary circumstances.”). Given that none of the Board precedents discussing the impact of a public-to-private change on the issue of successorship addresses the right-to-strike point, there was no reason for the Board to suspect that this was the objection Dean was raising. Dean’s general reference to the different statutory schemes was therefore insufficient to put the Board on “ ‘adequate notice’ of the argument [the company now] seeks to advance on review,” and we are barred from considering it. Highlands Hosp. Corp., Inc. v. NLRB, 508 F.3d 28, 33 (D.C.Cir.2007) (quoting American Postal Workers Union v. NLRB, 370 F.3d 25, 28 (D.C.Cir.2004)); cf. id. (holding that a petitioners generalized reference to the excessive breadth of a remedy with multiple parts was insufficient to put the board on notice that the petitioner was challenging the adequacy of the justification for an affirmative bargaining order", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe Board ... shall be considered by the court, unless the failure or neglect to urge such objection shall be excused because of extraordinary circumstances.”). Given that none of the Board precedents discussing the impact of a public-to-private change on the issue of successorship addresses the right-to-strike point, there was no reason for the Board to suspect that this was the objection Dean was raising. Dean’s general reference to the different statutory schemes was therefore insufficient to put the Board on “ ‘adequate notice’ of the argument [the company now] seeks to advance on review,” and we are barred from considering it. Highlands Hosp. Corp., Inc. v. NLRB, 508 F.3d 28, 33 (D.C.Cir.2007) (quoting American Postal Workers Union v. NLRB, 370 F.3d 25, 28 (D.C.Cir.2004)); cf. id. (holding that petitioners reliance on a case which concluded that a defendants right to a fair trial was violated was insufficient to place court on notice that petitioner was advancing a constitutional due process claim because the decision was based on state law", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe Board ... shall be considered by the court, unless the failure or neglect to urge such objection shall be excused because of extraordinary circumstances.”). Given that none of the Board precedents discussing the impact of a public-to-private change on the issue of successorship addresses the right-to-strike point, there was no reason for the Board to suspect that this was the objection Dean was raising. Dean’s general reference to the different statutory schemes was therefore insufficient to put the Board on “ ‘adequate notice’ of the argument [the company now] seeks to advance on review,” and we are barred from considering it. Highlands Hosp. Corp., Inc. v. NLRB, 508 F.3d 28, 33 (D.C.Cir.2007) (quoting American Postal Workers Union v. NLRB, 370 F.3d 25, 28 (D.C.Cir.2004)); cf. id. (holding that generalized notice of copyright infringements was insufficient to establish knowledge for the purpose of contributory liability" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nremoval, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Zhiyun Thang, No. A094 798 077 (B.I.A. Apr. 14, 2010), af'g No. A094 798 077 (Immig.CtN.Y.City May 2, 2008). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case. Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed the decision of the IJ as supplemented by the BIA. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir.2005). The applicable standards of review are well-established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir.2009). The BIA reasonably concluded that Thang failed to demonstrate past persecut hang and his wife will have additional children in China is speculative. See Jian Xing Huang v. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir.2005) (holding that absent solid support in the record for the petitioners assertion that he would be subjected to persecution his fear was speculative at best", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nremoval, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Zhiyun Thang, No. A094 798 077 (B.I.A. Apr. 14, 2010), af'g No. A094 798 077 (Immig.CtN.Y.City May 2, 2008). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case. Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed the decision of the IJ as supplemented by the BIA. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir.2005). The applicable standards of review are well-established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir.2009). The BIA reasonably concluded that Thang failed to demonstrate past persecut hang and his wife will have additional children in China is speculative. See Jian Xing Huang v. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir.2005) (holding that in the absence of solid support in the record for an applicants assertion that she would be persecuted the bia did not err in denying asylum because her fear was speculative at best", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nremoval, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Zhiyun Thang, No. A094 798 077 (B.I.A. Apr. 14, 2010), af'g No. A094 798 077 (Immig.CtN.Y.City May 2, 2008). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case. Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed the decision of the IJ as supplemented by the BIA. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir.2005). The applicable standards of review are well-established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir.2009). The BIA reasonably concluded that Thang failed to demonstrate past persecut hang and his wife will have additional children in China is speculative. See Jian Xing Huang v. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir.2005) (holding that a fear of future persecution is not objectively reasonable if it lacks solid support in the record and is merely speculative at best", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nremoval, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Zhiyun Thang, No. A094 798 077 (B.I.A. Apr. 14, 2010), af'g No. A094 798 077 (Immig.CtN.Y.City May 2, 2008). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case. Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed the decision of the IJ as supplemented by the BIA. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir.2005). The applicable standards of review are well-established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir.2009). The BIA reasonably concluded that Thang failed to demonstrate past persecut hang and his wife will have additional children in China is speculative. See Jian Xing Huang v. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir.2005) (holding that in the absence of solid support in the record for an applicants assertion that he will be persecuted his fear is speculative at best", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nremoval, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Zhiyun Thang, No. A094 798 077 (B.I.A. Apr. 14, 2010), af'g No. A094 798 077 (Immig.CtN.Y.City May 2, 2008). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case. Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed the decision of the IJ as supplemented by the BIA. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir.2005). The applicable standards of review are well-established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir.2009). The BIA reasonably concluded that Thang failed to demonstrate past persecut hang and his wife will have additional children in China is speculative. See Jian Xing Huang v. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir.2005) (holding that absent solid support in the record that a fear is objectively reasonable a claim of future persecution is speculative at best" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nshield to justice.” We find no authority on which to do so and Plaintiff provides us with none. {33} This Court previously indicated, although not specifically addressing an argument concerning conflicting public policies created by the Legislature, that negligence arising out of the violation of a statutory duty does not change the immunity granted under the Tort Claims Act. See Rubio v. Carlsbad Mun. Sch. Dist., 106 N.M. 446, 449, 744 P.2d 919, 922 (Ct.App.1987) (denying education malpractice claim based on duties under the Certified School Personnel Act, stating the claim was “a form of negligence and the courts of this state would have no jurisdiction over the claim unless there was a waiver of immunity”); Begay v. State, 104 N.M. 483, 487-88, 723 P.2d 252, 256-57 (Ct.App.1985) (holding that plaintiffs claim that medical providers did not comply with baker act was not subject to medical malpractice statutes ajlthough a medical diagnosis is necessary in order to involuntarily commit a patient the process of complying with the statute does not require medical skill or judgment", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nshield to justice.” We find no authority on which to do so and Plaintiff provides us with none. {33} This Court previously indicated, although not specifically addressing an argument concerning conflicting public policies created by the Legislature, that negligence arising out of the violation of a statutory duty does not change the immunity granted under the Tort Claims Act. See Rubio v. Carlsbad Mun. Sch. Dist., 106 N.M. 446, 449, 744 P.2d 919, 922 (Ct.App.1987) (denying education malpractice claim based on duties under the Certified School Personnel Act, stating the claim was “a form of negligence and the courts of this state would have no jurisdiction over the claim unless there was a waiver of immunity”); Begay v. State, 104 N.M. 483, 487-88, 723 P.2d 252, 256-57 (Ct.App.1985) (holding that general statement of intent does not override plain language of statute", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nshield to justice.” We find no authority on which to do so and Plaintiff provides us with none. {33} This Court previously indicated, although not specifically addressing an argument concerning conflicting public policies created by the Legislature, that negligence arising out of the violation of a statutory duty does not change the immunity granted under the Tort Claims Act. See Rubio v. Carlsbad Mun. Sch. Dist., 106 N.M. 446, 449, 744 P.2d 919, 922 (Ct.App.1987) (denying education malpractice claim based on duties under the Certified School Personnel Act, stating the claim was “a form of negligence and the courts of this state would have no jurisdiction over the claim unless there was a waiver of immunity”); Begay v. State, 104 N.M. 483, 487-88, 723 P.2d 252, 256-57 (Ct.App.1985) (holding state medical examiner immune from alleged violation of autopsy statute stating even if the statute does create a private cause of action it does not override the medical investigators grant of immunity under the tort claims act", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nshield to justice.” We find no authority on which to do so and Plaintiff provides us with none. {33} This Court previously indicated, although not specifically addressing an argument concerning conflicting public policies created by the Legislature, that negligence arising out of the violation of a statutory duty does not change the immunity granted under the Tort Claims Act. See Rubio v. Carlsbad Mun. Sch. Dist., 106 N.M. 446, 449, 744 P.2d 919, 922 (Ct.App.1987) (denying education malpractice claim based on duties under the Certified School Personnel Act, stating the claim was “a form of negligence and the courts of this state would have no jurisdiction over the claim unless there was a waiver of immunity”); Begay v. State, 104 N.M. 483, 487-88, 723 P.2d 252, 256-57 (Ct.App.1985) (holding that the ada does not create a remedy for medical malpractice", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nshield to justice.” We find no authority on which to do so and Plaintiff provides us with none. {33} This Court previously indicated, although not specifically addressing an argument concerning conflicting public policies created by the Legislature, that negligence arising out of the violation of a statutory duty does not change the immunity granted under the Tort Claims Act. See Rubio v. Carlsbad Mun. Sch. Dist., 106 N.M. 446, 449, 744 P.2d 919, 922 (Ct.App.1987) (denying education malpractice claim based on duties under the Certified School Personnel Act, stating the claim was “a form of negligence and the courts of this state would have no jurisdiction over the claim unless there was a waiver of immunity”); Begay v. State, 104 N.M. 483, 487-88, 723 P.2d 252, 256-57 (Ct.App.1985) (holding at least under the facts of the case that the statute of limitations in a medical malpractice action did not begin to run until the plaintiff secured a specific medical diagnosis" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe knowledge or consent of that owner.” 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) & (7) (brackets conform to subsection (7)). “Innocent owners are those who have no knowledge of the illegal activities and who have not consented to the illegal activities.” United States v. One Single Family Residence, 995 F.2d 1558, 1560 (11th Cir.1993) (quoting United States v. 15603 85th Ave. North, Lake Park, 933 F.2d 976, 981 (11th Cir.1991)). Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit has adopted the Calero-Toledo standard for purposes of defining the innocent owner exceptions contained' in § 881(a)(6) and (7). United States v. One Parcel of Real Estate, 963 F.2d 1496, 1504 (11th Cir.1992) (applying the Calero-Toledo standard to § 881(a)(7) proceeding); United States v. 15603 85th Avenue North, 933 F.2d 976, 982 (11th Cir.1991) (holding 2254 applies to administrative proceedings", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe knowledge or consent of that owner.” 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) & (7) (brackets conform to subsection (7)). “Innocent owners are those who have no knowledge of the illegal activities and who have not consented to the illegal activities.” United States v. One Single Family Residence, 995 F.2d 1558, 1560 (11th Cir.1993) (quoting United States v. 15603 85th Ave. North, Lake Park, 933 F.2d 976, 981 (11th Cir.1991)). Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit has adopted the Calero-Toledo standard for purposes of defining the innocent owner exceptions contained' in § 881(a)(6) and (7). United States v. One Parcel of Real Estate, 963 F.2d 1496, 1504 (11th Cir.1992) (applying the Calero-Toledo standard to § 881(a)(7) proceeding); United States v. 15603 85th Avenue North, 933 F.2d 976, 982 (11th Cir.1991) (holding that the doctrine of issue preclusion applies in removal proceedings", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe knowledge or consent of that owner.” 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) & (7) (brackets conform to subsection (7)). “Innocent owners are those who have no knowledge of the illegal activities and who have not consented to the illegal activities.” United States v. One Single Family Residence, 995 F.2d 1558, 1560 (11th Cir.1993) (quoting United States v. 15603 85th Ave. North, Lake Park, 933 F.2d 976, 981 (11th Cir.1991)). Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit has adopted the Calero-Toledo standard for purposes of defining the innocent owner exceptions contained' in § 881(a)(6) and (7). United States v. One Parcel of Real Estate, 963 F.2d 1496, 1504 (11th Cir.1992) (applying the Calero-Toledo standard to § 881(a)(7) proceeding); United States v. 15603 85th Avenue North, 933 F.2d 976, 982 (11th Cir.1991) (holding that the reasonably possible language of calerotoledo applies to 881a6 proceedings", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe knowledge or consent of that owner.” 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) & (7) (brackets conform to subsection (7)). “Innocent owners are those who have no knowledge of the illegal activities and who have not consented to the illegal activities.” United States v. One Single Family Residence, 995 F.2d 1558, 1560 (11th Cir.1993) (quoting United States v. 15603 85th Ave. North, Lake Park, 933 F.2d 976, 981 (11th Cir.1991)). Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit has adopted the Calero-Toledo standard for purposes of defining the innocent owner exceptions contained' in § 881(a)(6) and (7). United States v. One Parcel of Real Estate, 963 F.2d 1496, 1504 (11th Cir.1992) (applying the Calero-Toledo standard to § 881(a)(7) proceeding); United States v. 15603 85th Avenue North, 933 F.2d 976, 982 (11th Cir.1991) (holding that exclusionary rule applies to civil forfeiture proceedings", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe knowledge or consent of that owner.” 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) & (7) (brackets conform to subsection (7)). “Innocent owners are those who have no knowledge of the illegal activities and who have not consented to the illegal activities.” United States v. One Single Family Residence, 995 F.2d 1558, 1560 (11th Cir.1993) (quoting United States v. 15603 85th Ave. North, Lake Park, 933 F.2d 976, 981 (11th Cir.1991)). Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit has adopted the Calero-Toledo standard for purposes of defining the innocent owner exceptions contained' in § 881(a)(6) and (7). United States v. One Parcel of Real Estate, 963 F.2d 1496, 1504 (11th Cir.1992) (applying the Calero-Toledo standard to § 881(a)(7) proceeding); United States v. 15603 85th Avenue North, 933 F.2d 976, 982 (11th Cir.1991) (holding that the doctrine of res judicata applies to deportation proceedings" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthat was not his writing. Contrary to Overton’s assertion that the cross-examination was insufficient, Overton’s counsel attacked the alleged broken chain of custody with regard to both the brown paper bag and the envelopes that contained the clippings. Finally, we conclude that the decision by Overton’s counsel to not address a potential degradation of the DNA evidence during the Frye hearing on the basis of an alleged broken chain of custody was reasonable. First, notwithstanding that Over- ton’s counsel had not conceded at the time of the Frye hearing that the DNA evidence taken from the scene belonged to Overton, the location of DNA evidence matching Overton would be consistent with his theory that his DNA had been planted there. See McDonald v. State, 952 So.2d 484, 495 (Fla.2006) (holding that the erroneous admission of dna evidence is never harmless", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthat was not his writing. Contrary to Overton’s assertion that the cross-examination was insufficient, Overton’s counsel attacked the alleged broken chain of custody with regard to both the brown paper bag and the envelopes that contained the clippings. Finally, we conclude that the decision by Overton’s counsel to not address a potential degradation of the DNA evidence during the Frye hearing on the basis of an alleged broken chain of custody was reasonable. First, notwithstanding that Over- ton’s counsel had not conceded at the time of the Frye hearing that the DNA evidence taken from the scene belonged to Overton, the location of DNA evidence matching Overton would be consistent with his theory that his DNA had been planted there. See McDonald v. State, 952 So.2d 484, 495 (Fla.2006) (recognizing that in prior decisions the court had used the term inconclusive to mean that dna evidence did not exclude an individual but clarifying that in the future the term inconclusive would be used only when a dna sample does not contain enough dna to draw a conclusion dna is degraded or for other reasons a dna test yields no results or the examiner draws no conclusion", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthat was not his writing. Contrary to Overton’s assertion that the cross-examination was insufficient, Overton’s counsel attacked the alleged broken chain of custody with regard to both the brown paper bag and the envelopes that contained the clippings. Finally, we conclude that the decision by Overton’s counsel to not address a potential degradation of the DNA evidence during the Frye hearing on the basis of an alleged broken chain of custody was reasonable. First, notwithstanding that Over- ton’s counsel had not conceded at the time of the Frye hearing that the DNA evidence taken from the scene belonged to Overton, the location of DNA evidence matching Overton would be consistent with his theory that his DNA had been planted there. See McDonald v. State, 952 So.2d 484, 495 (Fla.2006) (holding that there was no ineffective assistance for failing to hire a dna expert because the defenses theory was that the defendants dna was planted so the dna evidence would not seem to be an issue", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthat was not his writing. Contrary to Overton’s assertion that the cross-examination was insufficient, Overton’s counsel attacked the alleged broken chain of custody with regard to both the brown paper bag and the envelopes that contained the clippings. Finally, we conclude that the decision by Overton’s counsel to not address a potential degradation of the DNA evidence during the Frye hearing on the basis of an alleged broken chain of custody was reasonable. First, notwithstanding that Over- ton’s counsel had not conceded at the time of the Frye hearing that the DNA evidence taken from the scene belonged to Overton, the location of DNA evidence matching Overton would be consistent with his theory that his DNA had been planted there. See McDonald v. State, 952 So.2d 484, 495 (Fla.2006) (holding that admission of evidence that defendants dna profile was consistent with dna profiles from mixed blood samples was plain error warranting reversal because no testimony was provided to explain the statistical significance of a potential match", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthat was not his writing. Contrary to Overton’s assertion that the cross-examination was insufficient, Overton’s counsel attacked the alleged broken chain of custody with regard to both the brown paper bag and the envelopes that contained the clippings. Finally, we conclude that the decision by Overton’s counsel to not address a potential degradation of the DNA evidence during the Frye hearing on the basis of an alleged broken chain of custody was reasonable. First, notwithstanding that Over- ton’s counsel had not conceded at the time of the Frye hearing that the DNA evidence taken from the scene belonged to Overton, the location of DNA evidence matching Overton would be consistent with his theory that his DNA had been planted there. See McDonald v. State, 952 So.2d 484, 495 (Fla.2006) (holding that retroactively applying new version of dna act authorizing collection of defendants dna as a condition of supervised release did not constitute a sentence in excess of the statutory maximum" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe property damage occurred during a Liberty policy period. I. What Constitutes One Occurrence In Lombard v. Sewerage & Water Board of New Orleans, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that, in cases where different parties are damaged by a series of events, the damage to each party is a separate “occurrence” for purposes of an insurance c 1225-26 (La.Ct.App.1995) (“The differential settlement resulted from each home’s continuous or repeated exposure to the injurious conditions over a course of time, but the effects of the excessive settlement did not become ‘damage’ until it was discovered by the homeowners.”); see also, e.g., New Orleans Assets, L.L.C. v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co., Nos. Civ.A. 01-2171, Civ.A. 02-974, 2002 WL 32121257, at *2-3 (E.D.La. Sept.12, 2002) (Feldman, J.) (holding that property damage occurred when mold contamination first manifested", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe property damage occurred during a Liberty policy period. I. What Constitutes One Occurrence In Lombard v. Sewerage & Water Board of New Orleans, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that, in cases where different parties are damaged by a series of events, the damage to each party is a separate “occurrence” for purposes of an insurance c 1225-26 (La.Ct.App.1995) (“The differential settlement resulted from each home’s continuous or repeated exposure to the injurious conditions over a course of time, but the effects of the excessive settlement did not become ‘damage’ until it was discovered by the homeowners.”); see also, e.g., New Orleans Assets, L.L.C. v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co., Nos. Civ.A. 01-2171, Civ.A. 02-974, 2002 WL 32121257, at *2-3 (E.D.La. Sept.12, 2002) (Feldman, J.) (holding that continuous trigger will be applicable when environmental contamination claimant is able to show that damage like asbestosis occurred on continuing basis", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe property damage occurred during a Liberty policy period. I. What Constitutes One Occurrence In Lombard v. Sewerage & Water Board of New Orleans, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that, in cases where different parties are damaged by a series of events, the damage to each party is a separate “occurrence” for purposes of an insurance c 1225-26 (La.Ct.App.1995) (“The differential settlement resulted from each home’s continuous or repeated exposure to the injurious conditions over a course of time, but the effects of the excessive settlement did not become ‘damage’ until it was discovered by the homeowners.”); see also, e.g., New Orleans Assets, L.L.C. v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co., Nos. Civ.A. 01-2171, Civ.A. 02-974, 2002 WL 32121257, at *2-3 (E.D.La. Sept.12, 2002) (Feldman, J.) (holding that property damage occurred when homeowners noticed damage not when house was improperly constructed", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe property damage occurred during a Liberty policy period. I. What Constitutes One Occurrence In Lombard v. Sewerage & Water Board of New Orleans, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that, in cases where different parties are damaged by a series of events, the damage to each party is a separate “occurrence” for purposes of an insurance c 1225-26 (La.Ct.App.1995) (“The differential settlement resulted from each home’s continuous or repeated exposure to the injurious conditions over a course of time, but the effects of the excessive settlement did not become ‘damage’ until it was discovered by the homeowners.”); see also, e.g., New Orleans Assets, L.L.C. v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co., Nos. Civ.A. 01-2171, Civ.A. 02-974, 2002 WL 32121257, at *2-3 (E.D.La. Sept.12, 2002) (Feldman, J.) (holding groundwater contamination is continuous process in which the property damage is evenly distributed over the period of time from the first contamination to the end of the last triggered policy", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe property damage occurred during a Liberty policy period. I. What Constitutes One Occurrence In Lombard v. Sewerage & Water Board of New Orleans, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that, in cases where different parties are damaged by a series of events, the damage to each party is a separate “occurrence” for purposes of an insurance c 1225-26 (La.Ct.App.1995) (“The differential settlement resulted from each home’s continuous or repeated exposure to the injurious conditions over a course of time, but the effects of the excessive settlement did not become ‘damage’ until it was discovered by the homeowners.”); see also, e.g., New Orleans Assets, L.L.C. v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co., Nos. Civ.A. 01-2171, Civ.A. 02-974, 2002 WL 32121257, at *2-3 (E.D.La. Sept.12, 2002) (Feldman, J.) (holding a cause of action accrues once an injury has occurred and manifested itself" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe division of authority between federal and state governments,’ the inquiries under the Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment ‘are mirror images of each other.’ Specifically, the Court noted as follows: “ ‘If a power is delegated to Congress in the Constitution, the Tenth Amendment expressly disclaims any reservation of that power to the States; if a power is an attribute of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, it is necessarily a power the Constitution has not conferred on Congress.’ “Id “Thus, even if plaintiffs are correct in their assertion that § 601 intrudes upon a domain traditionally left to the states, it is constitutional as long as it falls within the commerce power. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460, 111 S.Ct. 2395, 2400-01, 115 L.Ed.2d 410 [ (1991) ] (recognizing that constitution grants authority for congress to enact 4248 as necessary and proper for carrying into execution the powers vested by the constitution internal quotation marks omitted", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe division of authority between federal and state governments,’ the inquiries under the Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment ‘are mirror images of each other.’ Specifically, the Court noted as follows: “ ‘If a power is delegated to Congress in the Constitution, the Tenth Amendment expressly disclaims any reservation of that power to the States; if a power is an attribute of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, it is necessarily a power the Constitution has not conferred on Congress.’ “Id “Thus, even if plaintiffs are correct in their assertion that § 601 intrudes upon a domain traditionally left to the states, it is constitutional as long as it falls within the commerce power. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460, 111 S.Ct. 2395, 2400-01, 115 L.Ed.2d 410 [ (1991) ] (holding that as long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority a court should not vacate his decision", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe division of authority between federal and state governments,’ the inquiries under the Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment ‘are mirror images of each other.’ Specifically, the Court noted as follows: “ ‘If a power is delegated to Congress in the Constitution, the Tenth Amendment expressly disclaims any reservation of that power to the States; if a power is an attribute of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, it is necessarily a power the Constitution has not conferred on Congress.’ “Id “Thus, even if plaintiffs are correct in their assertion that § 601 intrudes upon a domain traditionally left to the states, it is constitutional as long as it falls within the commerce power. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460, 111 S.Ct. 2395, 2400-01, 115 L.Ed.2d 410 [ (1991) ] (holding that congress may impose its will on the states as long as it is acting within the powers granted by the constitution", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe division of authority between federal and state governments,’ the inquiries under the Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment ‘are mirror images of each other.’ Specifically, the Court noted as follows: “ ‘If a power is delegated to Congress in the Constitution, the Tenth Amendment expressly disclaims any reservation of that power to the States; if a power is an attribute of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, it is necessarily a power the Constitution has not conferred on Congress.’ “Id “Thus, even if plaintiffs are correct in their assertion that § 601 intrudes upon a domain traditionally left to the states, it is constitutional as long as it falls within the commerce power. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460, 111 S.Ct. 2395, 2400-01, 115 L.Ed.2d 410 [ (1991) ] (holding that where the state has entered into a contract fairly authorized by the powers granted by general law the defense of sovereign immunity will not protect the state from an action arising from the states breach of that contract", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe division of authority between federal and state governments,’ the inquiries under the Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment ‘are mirror images of each other.’ Specifically, the Court noted as follows: “ ‘If a power is delegated to Congress in the Constitution, the Tenth Amendment expressly disclaims any reservation of that power to the States; if a power is an attribute of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, it is necessarily a power the Constitution has not conferred on Congress.’ “Id “Thus, even if plaintiffs are correct in their assertion that § 601 intrudes upon a domain traditionally left to the states, it is constitutional as long as it falls within the commerce power. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460, 111 S.Ct. 2395, 2400-01, 115 L.Ed.2d 410 [ (1991) ] (holding that the land under navigable waters was not granted by the constitution to the united states but was reserved to the states respectively and that new states have the same rights jurisdiction and sovereignty over the soil under navigable water as the original states" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nuntil amended motion for new trial); Short v. State, 995 S.W.2d 948, 953 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1999, pet. ref'd)(failure to raise in pari materia claim before trial waives the complaint for appellate review); Haywood v. State, 344 S.W.3d 454, 465 n. 2 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2011, pet. ref'd)(same). M.L.M. would not have had any occasion to raise this issue before, or even during the adjudication hearing, as there was no suggestion that the State was asking for a finding under a lesser included offense. But the bifurcated nature of the juvenile proceedings provided M.L.M. the opportunity to object to the referee’s finding on the lesser included offense before or dur ing the disposition hearing held sixteen days later. See In re A.C., 48 S.W.3d 899, 905 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. denied)(holding that defendant waived ineffective assistance claim based on trial counsels failure to emphasize certain evidence where amended motion for new trial did not assert claim of ineffectiveness on that ground and no argument related to the asserted ground was made at the motion for new trial hearing", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nuntil amended motion for new trial); Short v. State, 995 S.W.2d 948, 953 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1999, pet. ref'd)(failure to raise in pari materia claim before trial waives the complaint for appellate review); Haywood v. State, 344 S.W.3d 454, 465 n. 2 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2011, pet. ref'd)(same). M.L.M. would not have had any occasion to raise this issue before, or even during the adjudication hearing, as there was no suggestion that the State was asking for a finding under a lesser included offense. But the bifurcated nature of the juvenile proceedings provided M.L.M. the opportunity to object to the referee’s finding on the lesser included offense before or dur ing the disposition hearing held sixteen days later. See In re A.C., 48 S.W.3d 899, 905 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. denied)(holding that claims raised by appellant for first time in motion for new trial were untimely and therefore waived", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nuntil amended motion for new trial); Short v. State, 995 S.W.2d 948, 953 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1999, pet. ref'd)(failure to raise in pari materia claim before trial waives the complaint for appellate review); Haywood v. State, 344 S.W.3d 454, 465 n. 2 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2011, pet. ref'd)(same). M.L.M. would not have had any occasion to raise this issue before, or even during the adjudication hearing, as there was no suggestion that the State was asking for a finding under a lesser included offense. But the bifurcated nature of the juvenile proceedings provided M.L.M. the opportunity to object to the referee’s finding on the lesser included offense before or dur ing the disposition hearing held sixteen days later. See In re A.C., 48 S.W.3d 899, 905 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. denied)(holding that the trial court properly struck the amended complaint when the plaintiff offered no reason to refute the trial courts finding that the new allegations in the amended complaint were based on facts the plaintiff had known since the beginning of the action", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nuntil amended motion for new trial); Short v. State, 995 S.W.2d 948, 953 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1999, pet. ref'd)(failure to raise in pari materia claim before trial waives the complaint for appellate review); Haywood v. State, 344 S.W.3d 454, 465 n. 2 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2011, pet. ref'd)(same). M.L.M. would not have had any occasion to raise this issue before, or even during the adjudication hearing, as there was no suggestion that the State was asking for a finding under a lesser included offense. But the bifurcated nature of the juvenile proceedings provided M.L.M. the opportunity to object to the referee’s finding on the lesser included offense before or dur ing the disposition hearing held sixteen days later. See In re A.C., 48 S.W.3d 899, 905 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. denied)(holding appellants issue was rendered moot because appellant was given the opportunity to make a record in support of his motion for new trial and appellate court considered that record in disposing of only issue raised in the motion for new trial", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nuntil amended motion for new trial); Short v. State, 995 S.W.2d 948, 953 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1999, pet. ref'd)(failure to raise in pari materia claim before trial waives the complaint for appellate review); Haywood v. State, 344 S.W.3d 454, 465 n. 2 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2011, pet. ref'd)(same). M.L.M. would not have had any occasion to raise this issue before, or even during the adjudication hearing, as there was no suggestion that the State was asking for a finding under a lesser included offense. But the bifurcated nature of the juvenile proceedings provided M.L.M. the opportunity to object to the referee’s finding on the lesser included offense before or dur ing the disposition hearing held sixteen days later. See In re A.C., 48 S.W.3d 899, 905 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. denied)(holding complaint made first in amended motion for new trial when juvenile had notice of the issue before trial and during both phases was untimely" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nDefendants Heiser and Spencer in both their official and individual capacities. He sued Defendant McClure only in his individual capacity. Defendants filed motions for summary judgment. The district court assumed, solely for the purpose of its decision, that Mr. Umbehr “would have been protected from termination in retaliation for his statements” had he been a government employee, that his “comments did motivate the votes in favor of terminating [Mr. Umbehr’s] contract with Wabaunsee County,” and that he suffered damages as a result of the termination. Umbehr v. McClure, 840 F.Supp. 837, 839 (D.Kan.1993). It then granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the ground that “the First Amendment does not prohibit defendants from considering p 843 F.Supp. 1231, 1234 (N.D.Ill.1994) (holding that independent contractor claiming removal from city towing rotation list because of political affiliation was not protected by first amendment", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nDefendants Heiser and Spencer in both their official and individual capacities. He sued Defendant McClure only in his individual capacity. Defendants filed motions for summary judgment. The district court assumed, solely for the purpose of its decision, that Mr. Umbehr “would have been protected from termination in retaliation for his statements” had he been a government employee, that his “comments did motivate the votes in favor of terminating [Mr. Umbehr’s] contract with Wabaunsee County,” and that he suffered damages as a result of the termination. Umbehr v. McClure, 840 F.Supp. 837, 839 (D.Kan.1993). It then granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the ground that “the First Amendment does not prohibit defendants from considering p 843 F.Supp. 1231, 1234 (N.D.Ill.1994) (holding that independent contractor claiming loss of and denial of contracts because of political affiliation was not protected by first amendment", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nDefendants Heiser and Spencer in both their official and individual capacities. He sued Defendant McClure only in his individual capacity. Defendants filed motions for summary judgment. The district court assumed, solely for the purpose of its decision, that Mr. Umbehr “would have been protected from termination in retaliation for his statements” had he been a government employee, that his “comments did motivate the votes in favor of terminating [Mr. Umbehr’s] contract with Wabaunsee County,” and that he suffered damages as a result of the termination. Umbehr v. McClure, 840 F.Supp. 837, 839 (D.Kan.1993). It then granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the ground that “the First Amendment does not prohibit defendants from considering p 843 F.Supp. 1231, 1234 (N.D.Ill.1994) (holding that independent contractor claiming denial of public contract because of political affiliation was not protected by first amendment", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nDefendants Heiser and Spencer in both their official and individual capacities. He sued Defendant McClure only in his individual capacity. Defendants filed motions for summary judgment. The district court assumed, solely for the purpose of its decision, that Mr. Umbehr “would have been protected from termination in retaliation for his statements” had he been a government employee, that his “comments did motivate the votes in favor of terminating [Mr. Umbehr’s] contract with Wabaunsee County,” and that he suffered damages as a result of the termination. Umbehr v. McClure, 840 F.Supp. 837, 839 (D.Kan.1993). It then granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the ground that “the First Amendment does not prohibit defendants from considering p 843 F.Supp. 1231, 1234 (N.D.Ill.1994) (holding that it was not clearly established that independent contractor claiming denial of public contract because of political affiliation was protected under first amendment", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nDefendants Heiser and Spencer in both their official and individual capacities. He sued Defendant McClure only in his individual capacity. Defendants filed motions for summary judgment. The district court assumed, solely for the purpose of its decision, that Mr. Umbehr “would have been protected from termination in retaliation for his statements” had he been a government employee, that his “comments did motivate the votes in favor of terminating [Mr. Umbehr’s] contract with Wabaunsee County,” and that he suffered damages as a result of the termination. Umbehr v. McClure, 840 F.Supp. 837, 839 (D.Kan.1993). It then granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the ground that “the First Amendment does not prohibit defendants from considering p 843 F.Supp. 1231, 1234 (N.D.Ill.1994) (holding that independent contractor claiming termination of contract because of political affiliation not protected by first amendment" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfile additional motions, he may move for extensions of time when necessary. IT IS SO ORDERED. 1 . The Supreme Court has granted certiorari sub nom United States v. Ursery, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 762, 133 L.Ed.2d 707 (1996). 2 . Chevron’s three-factor analysis still applies when a court announces a new rule but does not apply it to the litigants before it. Holt v. Shalala, 35 F.3d 376, 380 n. 3 (9th Cir.1994). 3 . Dowell ultimately refused to grant relief because the movant had not appealed the judgment in question. He had essentially waived his right to relief. 4 . In re Pacific Far East Lines, Inc., 889 F.2d 242, 249 (9th Cir.1989), followed this rule in the bankruptcy context, holding that a clarification of the law may, in conjunction with other c . 1892, 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989) (holding the double jeopardy clause applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfile additional motions, he may move for extensions of time when necessary. IT IS SO ORDERED. 1 . The Supreme Court has granted certiorari sub nom United States v. Ursery, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 762, 133 L.Ed.2d 707 (1996). 2 . Chevron’s three-factor analysis still applies when a court announces a new rule but does not apply it to the litigants before it. Holt v. Shalala, 35 F.3d 376, 380 n. 3 (9th Cir.1994). 3 . Dowell ultimately refused to grant relief because the movant had not appealed the judgment in question. He had essentially waived his right to relief. 4 . In re Pacific Far East Lines, Inc., 889 F.2d 242, 249 (9th Cir.1989), followed this rule in the bankruptcy context, holding that a clarification of the law may, in conjunction with other c . 1892, 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989) (holding double jeopardy clause applicable to civil penalties under the false claims act", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfile additional motions, he may move for extensions of time when necessary. IT IS SO ORDERED. 1 . The Supreme Court has granted certiorari sub nom United States v. Ursery, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 762, 133 L.Ed.2d 707 (1996). 2 . Chevron’s three-factor analysis still applies when a court announces a new rule but does not apply it to the litigants before it. Holt v. Shalala, 35 F.3d 376, 380 n. 3 (9th Cir.1994). 3 . Dowell ultimately refused to grant relief because the movant had not appealed the judgment in question. He had essentially waived his right to relief. 4 . In re Pacific Far East Lines, Inc., 889 F.2d 242, 249 (9th Cir.1989), followed this rule in the bankruptcy context, holding that a clarification of the law may, in conjunction with other c . 1892, 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989) (holding that unlike under the federal constitution a civil forfeiture is punishment under the new mexico double jeopardy clause", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfile additional motions, he may move for extensions of time when necessary. IT IS SO ORDERED. 1 . The Supreme Court has granted certiorari sub nom United States v. Ursery, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 762, 133 L.Ed.2d 707 (1996). 2 . Chevron’s three-factor analysis still applies when a court announces a new rule but does not apply it to the litigants before it. Holt v. Shalala, 35 F.3d 376, 380 n. 3 (9th Cir.1994). 3 . Dowell ultimately refused to grant relief because the movant had not appealed the judgment in question. He had essentially waived his right to relief. 4 . In re Pacific Far East Lines, Inc., 889 F.2d 242, 249 (9th Cir.1989), followed this rule in the bankruptcy context, holding that a clarification of the law may, in conjunction with other c . 1892, 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989) (holding that the double jeopardy clause prohibits courts from imposing greater penalties than the legislature intended", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfile additional motions, he may move for extensions of time when necessary. IT IS SO ORDERED. 1 . The Supreme Court has granted certiorari sub nom United States v. Ursery, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 762, 133 L.Ed.2d 707 (1996). 2 . Chevron’s three-factor analysis still applies when a court announces a new rule but does not apply it to the litigants before it. Holt v. Shalala, 35 F.3d 376, 380 n. 3 (9th Cir.1994). 3 . Dowell ultimately refused to grant relief because the movant had not appealed the judgment in question. He had essentially waived his right to relief. 4 . In re Pacific Far East Lines, Inc., 889 F.2d 242, 249 (9th Cir.1989), followed this rule in the bankruptcy context, holding that a clarification of the law may, in conjunction with other c . 1892, 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989) (holding that double jeopardy clause did not apply to forfeiture proceeding before the court" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nunder § 523(a)(4). Cobham appeals. We review the judgment of a district court sitting in review of a bankruptcy court de novo, applying the same standards of review that were applied in the district court. In re Shangra-La, Inc., 167 F.3d 843, 847 (4th Cir. 1999). Specifically, the bankruptcy court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error, and legal determinations are reviewed de novo. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8013; In re K & L Lakeland, Inc., 128 F.3d 203, 206 (4th Cir. 1997). We have reviewed the record included on appeal, and the parties’ briefs, and find that the bankruptcy court correctly determined that LeCann met her burden of establishing that the debt at issue is non-dischargeable under § 523(a)(6). See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 291, 111 S.Ct. 654, 112 L.Ed.2d 755 (1991) (holding that appellant bears burden of establishing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nunder § 523(a)(4). Cobham appeals. We review the judgment of a district court sitting in review of a bankruptcy court de novo, applying the same standards of review that were applied in the district court. In re Shangra-La, Inc., 167 F.3d 843, 847 (4th Cir. 1999). Specifically, the bankruptcy court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error, and legal determinations are reviewed de novo. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8013; In re K & L Lakeland, Inc., 128 F.3d 203, 206 (4th Cir. 1997). We have reviewed the record included on appeal, and the parties’ briefs, and find that the bankruptcy court correctly determined that LeCann met her burden of establishing that the debt at issue is non-dischargeable under § 523(a)(6). See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 291, 111 S.Ct. 654, 112 L.Ed.2d 755 (1991) (holding that the defendant bears the burden of proving outside contact with the jury", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nunder § 523(a)(4). Cobham appeals. We review the judgment of a district court sitting in review of a bankruptcy court de novo, applying the same standards of review that were applied in the district court. In re Shangra-La, Inc., 167 F.3d 843, 847 (4th Cir. 1999). Specifically, the bankruptcy court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error, and legal determinations are reviewed de novo. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8013; In re K & L Lakeland, Inc., 128 F.3d 203, 206 (4th Cir. 1997). We have reviewed the record included on appeal, and the parties’ briefs, and find that the bankruptcy court correctly determined that LeCann met her burden of establishing that the debt at issue is non-dischargeable under § 523(a)(6). See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 291, 111 S.Ct. 654, 112 L.Ed.2d 755 (1991) (holding that the party challenging the dischargeability of a debt bears the burden of proving the debt nondischargeable by a preponderance of the evidence", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nunder § 523(a)(4). Cobham appeals. We review the judgment of a district court sitting in review of a bankruptcy court de novo, applying the same standards of review that were applied in the district court. In re Shangra-La, Inc., 167 F.3d 843, 847 (4th Cir. 1999). Specifically, the bankruptcy court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error, and legal determinations are reviewed de novo. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8013; In re K & L Lakeland, Inc., 128 F.3d 203, 206 (4th Cir. 1997). We have reviewed the record included on appeal, and the parties’ briefs, and find that the bankruptcy court correctly determined that LeCann met her burden of establishing that the debt at issue is non-dischargeable under § 523(a)(6). See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 291, 111 S.Ct. 654, 112 L.Ed.2d 755 (1991) (holding that a creditor objecting to the dischargeability of a debt under 523a must prove its case by a preponderance of the evidence", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nunder § 523(a)(4). Cobham appeals. We review the judgment of a district court sitting in review of a bankruptcy court de novo, applying the same standards of review that were applied in the district court. In re Shangra-La, Inc., 167 F.3d 843, 847 (4th Cir. 1999). Specifically, the bankruptcy court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error, and legal determinations are reviewed de novo. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8013; In re K & L Lakeland, Inc., 128 F.3d 203, 206 (4th Cir. 1997). We have reviewed the record included on appeal, and the parties’ briefs, and find that the bankruptcy court correctly determined that LeCann met her burden of establishing that the debt at issue is non-dischargeable under § 523(a)(6). See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 291, 111 S.Ct. 654, 112 L.Ed.2d 755 (1991) (holding that effect of discharge of debt under bankruptcy code is the same as it was under the 1898 bankruptcy act it is not an extinguishment of the debt but only a bar to enforcement of the debt as a personal obligation of the debt or" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nthere is consensus about a starting point. Courts agree that a “market” rate of interest should apply. See Koopmans, 102 F.3d at 874-75; In re Smithwick, 121 F.3d at 214; In re Valenti, 105 F.3d at 63; GMAC, 999 F.2d at 66-67; United Carolina Bank, 993 F.2d at 1129-30; In re Fowler, 903 F.2d 694, 697 (9th Cir.1990); In re Hardzog, 901 F.2d at 859-60; Arnold, 878 F.2d at 927-28; see also Pearson, supra at 40-41; Epstein, supra at 443. There is disagreement, however, about what rate of interest will adequately ensure that the creditor receives full value of his secured claim. 1. Under one approach, known as the “cost of funds method,” the interest rate is set at the rate the creditor would have to pay to borrow the amount equal to the collateral’s value. See In re Valenti 105 F.3d at 64 (holding that although cost of funds approach more appropriately reflects the present value of a creditors allowed claim it is difficult to administer and therefore the interest rate should be fixed at the rate on a united states treasury instrument with a maturity equivalent to the repayment schedule under the debtors reorganization plan", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nthere is consensus about a starting point. Courts agree that a “market” rate of interest should apply. See Koopmans, 102 F.3d at 874-75; In re Smithwick, 121 F.3d at 214; In re Valenti, 105 F.3d at 63; GMAC, 999 F.2d at 66-67; United Carolina Bank, 993 F.2d at 1129-30; In re Fowler, 903 F.2d 694, 697 (9th Cir.1990); In re Hardzog, 901 F.2d at 859-60; Arnold, 878 F.2d at 927-28; see also Pearson, supra at 40-41; Epstein, supra at 443. There is disagreement, however, about what rate of interest will adequately ensure that the creditor receives full value of his secured claim. 1. Under one approach, known as the “cost of funds method,” the interest rate is set at the rate the creditor would have to pay to borrow the amount equal to the collateral’s value. See In re Valenti 105 F.3d at 64 (holding that bankruptcy plan of reorganization rather than 1961 controlled the setting of the interest rate", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nthere is consensus about a starting point. Courts agree that a “market” rate of interest should apply. See Koopmans, 102 F.3d at 874-75; In re Smithwick, 121 F.3d at 214; In re Valenti, 105 F.3d at 63; GMAC, 999 F.2d at 66-67; United Carolina Bank, 993 F.2d at 1129-30; In re Fowler, 903 F.2d 694, 697 (9th Cir.1990); In re Hardzog, 901 F.2d at 859-60; Arnold, 878 F.2d at 927-28; see also Pearson, supra at 40-41; Epstein, supra at 443. There is disagreement, however, about what rate of interest will adequately ensure that the creditor receives full value of his secured claim. 1. Under one approach, known as the “cost of funds method,” the interest rate is set at the rate the creditor would have to pay to borrow the amount equal to the collateral’s value. See In re Valenti 105 F.3d at 64 (holding that the petitioner can claim no rate as a legal right other than the filed rate whether fixed or merely accepted by the agency commission", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nthere is consensus about a starting point. Courts agree that a “market” rate of interest should apply. See Koopmans, 102 F.3d at 874-75; In re Smithwick, 121 F.3d at 214; In re Valenti, 105 F.3d at 63; GMAC, 999 F.2d at 66-67; United Carolina Bank, 993 F.2d at 1129-30; In re Fowler, 903 F.2d 694, 697 (9th Cir.1990); In re Hardzog, 901 F.2d at 859-60; Arnold, 878 F.2d at 927-28; see also Pearson, supra at 40-41; Epstein, supra at 443. There is disagreement, however, about what rate of interest will adequately ensure that the creditor receives full value of his secured claim. 1. Under one approach, known as the “cost of funds method,” the interest rate is set at the rate the creditor would have to pay to borrow the amount equal to the collateral’s value. See In re Valenti 105 F.3d at 64 (holding that once a rate is filed with the appropriate agency except for review of the agencys orders the courts can assume no right to a different rate on that ground that in its opinion it is the only or the more reasonable rate", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nthere is consensus about a starting point. Courts agree that a “market” rate of interest should apply. See Koopmans, 102 F.3d at 874-75; In re Smithwick, 121 F.3d at 214; In re Valenti, 105 F.3d at 63; GMAC, 999 F.2d at 66-67; United Carolina Bank, 993 F.2d at 1129-30; In re Fowler, 903 F.2d 694, 697 (9th Cir.1990); In re Hardzog, 901 F.2d at 859-60; Arnold, 878 F.2d at 927-28; see also Pearson, supra at 40-41; Epstein, supra at 443. There is disagreement, however, about what rate of interest will adequately ensure that the creditor receives full value of his secured claim. 1. Under one approach, known as the “cost of funds method,” the interest rate is set at the rate the creditor would have to pay to borrow the amount equal to the collateral’s value. See In re Valenti 105 F.3d at 64 (holding that the proper rate for prejudgment interest is the rate fixed by the parties in a contract" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nconclude that any of the Reports’ non-g'overnment contributors directly observed the matters that were the subjects of the Reports, or much less had a “duty to report” such observations (as the statute requires). See § 90.803(8), Fla. Stat.; Yisrael, 993 So.2d at 959. The Lee case is dispositive of this issue. There, a party used as evidence an investigative report prepared by a government employee containing “statements of witnesses, as well as [the employee’s] opinions and conclusions.” 698 So.2d at 1197. The Florida Supreme Court found that this report was inadmissible “under , the public record and reports exception to the hearsay rule.” Id. at 1200. After addressing the two categories of the public, records exception, the court explained that “[i]n adopting this ex . 5th DCA 2003) (holding that agency reports ofgovernment investigations containing witness interviews were not admissible under public records exception because statements in reports were not based upon personal knowledge of government agent", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nconclude that any of the Reports’ non-g'overnment contributors directly observed the matters that were the subjects of the Reports, or much less had a “duty to report” such observations (as the statute requires). See § 90.803(8), Fla. Stat.; Yisrael, 993 So.2d at 959. The Lee case is dispositive of this issue. There, a party used as evidence an investigative report prepared by a government employee containing “statements of witnesses, as well as [the employee’s] opinions and conclusions.” 698 So.2d at 1197. The Florida Supreme Court found that this report was inadmissible “under , the public record and reports exception to the hearsay rule.” Id. at 1200. After addressing the two categories of the public, records exception, the court explained that “[i]n adopting this ex . 5th DCA 2003) (holding corporate officer liable as aider and abettor in filing of false reports even though reports were not authorized or approved of by officers", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nconclude that any of the Reports’ non-g'overnment contributors directly observed the matters that were the subjects of the Reports, or much less had a “duty to report” such observations (as the statute requires). See § 90.803(8), Fla. Stat.; Yisrael, 993 So.2d at 959. The Lee case is dispositive of this issue. There, a party used as evidence an investigative report prepared by a government employee containing “statements of witnesses, as well as [the employee’s] opinions and conclusions.” 698 So.2d at 1197. The Florida Supreme Court found that this report was inadmissible “under , the public record and reports exception to the hearsay rule.” Id. at 1200. After addressing the two categories of the public, records exception, the court explained that “[i]n adopting this ex . 5th DCA 2003) (holding that municipal court records were admissible under official records or public documents exception", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nconclude that any of the Reports’ non-g'overnment contributors directly observed the matters that were the subjects of the Reports, or much less had a “duty to report” such observations (as the statute requires). See § 90.803(8), Fla. Stat.; Yisrael, 993 So.2d at 959. The Lee case is dispositive of this issue. There, a party used as evidence an investigative report prepared by a government employee containing “statements of witnesses, as well as [the employee’s] opinions and conclusions.” 698 So.2d at 1197. The Florida Supreme Court found that this report was inadmissible “under , the public record and reports exception to the hearsay rule.” Id. at 1200. After addressing the two categories of the public, records exception, the court explained that “[i]n adopting this ex . 5th DCA 2003) (holding that expert reports were not required to mention the defendant hospital because reports were based upon the actions of hospital physicians", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nconclude that any of the Reports’ non-g'overnment contributors directly observed the matters that were the subjects of the Reports, or much less had a “duty to report” such observations (as the statute requires). See § 90.803(8), Fla. Stat.; Yisrael, 993 So.2d at 959. The Lee case is dispositive of this issue. There, a party used as evidence an investigative report prepared by a government employee containing “statements of witnesses, as well as [the employee’s] opinions and conclusions.” 698 So.2d at 1197. The Florida Supreme Court found that this report was inadmissible “under , the public record and reports exception to the hearsay rule.” Id. at 1200. After addressing the two categories of the public, records exception, the court explained that “[i]n adopting this ex . 5th DCA 2003) (holding that police report containing victim affidavit was not admissible under public records exception" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the factual allegations in the complaint are accepted to be true for purposes of these motions, and all reasonable inferences are drawn therefrom in favor of plaintiff. Cargo Partner AG v. Albatrans, Inc., 352 F.3d 41, 44 (2d Cir.2003). The issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether he or she is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Villager Pond, Inc. v. Town of Darien, 56 F.3d 375, 378 (2d Cir.1995). III. Statute of Limitations A. Police Defendants This Court first examines the timeliness of the Plaintiffs claims. Section 1983 claims arising in the State of New York are governed by a three-year statute of limitations. Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50, 109 S.Ct. 573, 102 L.Ed.2d 594 (1989) (holding that the appropriate state statute of limitations to borrow for section 1983 actions is that for recovery of damages for personal injuries", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the factual allegations in the complaint are accepted to be true for purposes of these motions, and all reasonable inferences are drawn therefrom in favor of plaintiff. Cargo Partner AG v. Albatrans, Inc., 352 F.3d 41, 44 (2d Cir.2003). The issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether he or she is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Villager Pond, Inc. v. Town of Darien, 56 F.3d 375, 378 (2d Cir.1995). III. Statute of Limitations A. Police Defendants This Court first examines the timeliness of the Plaintiffs claims. Section 1983 claims arising in the State of New York are governed by a three-year statute of limitations. Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50, 109 S.Ct. 573, 102 L.Ed.2d 594 (1989) (recognizing that wilson v garcia requires all 1983 actions to be characterized as personal injury tort actions for statute of limitations purposes", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the factual allegations in the complaint are accepted to be true for purposes of these motions, and all reasonable inferences are drawn therefrom in favor of plaintiff. Cargo Partner AG v. Albatrans, Inc., 352 F.3d 41, 44 (2d Cir.2003). The issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether he or she is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Villager Pond, Inc. v. Town of Darien, 56 F.3d 375, 378 (2d Cir.1995). III. Statute of Limitations A. Police Defendants This Court first examines the timeliness of the Plaintiffs claims. Section 1983 claims arising in the State of New York are governed by a three-year statute of limitations. Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50, 109 S.Ct. 573, 102 L.Ed.2d 594 (1989) (holding that if state law provides multiple statutes of limitations for personal injury actions the general or residual statute for personal injury actions should be used for 1983 actions", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the factual allegations in the complaint are accepted to be true for purposes of these motions, and all reasonable inferences are drawn therefrom in favor of plaintiff. Cargo Partner AG v. Albatrans, Inc., 352 F.3d 41, 44 (2d Cir.2003). The issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether he or she is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Villager Pond, Inc. v. Town of Darien, 56 F.3d 375, 378 (2d Cir.1995). III. Statute of Limitations A. Police Defendants This Court first examines the timeliness of the Plaintiffs claims. Section 1983 claims arising in the State of New York are governed by a three-year statute of limitations. Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50, 109 S.Ct. 573, 102 L.Ed.2d 594 (1989) (holding that warranty actions for personal injury damages or tortious injury to personal property are governed by general nonucc limitations periods", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the factual allegations in the complaint are accepted to be true for purposes of these motions, and all reasonable inferences are drawn therefrom in favor of plaintiff. Cargo Partner AG v. Albatrans, Inc., 352 F.3d 41, 44 (2d Cir.2003). The issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether he or she is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Villager Pond, Inc. v. Town of Darien, 56 F.3d 375, 378 (2d Cir.1995). III. Statute of Limitations A. Police Defendants This Court first examines the timeliness of the Plaintiffs claims. Section 1983 claims arising in the State of New York are governed by a three-year statute of limitations. Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50, 109 S.Ct. 573, 102 L.Ed.2d 594 (1989) (holding that in actions brought under 42 usc 1983 federal courts apply the states statute of limitation for personal injury" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nHowever, Pe-trohawk filed suit against J.P. Morgan, a corporate trustee, and we have already concluded that based on the plain language of section 115.001, any proceeding brought against a trustee falls within section 115.001. Therefore, sections 115.001 and 115.002 are applicable. We conclude mandamus relief is appropriate in this case. Chapter 15 authorizes parties to seek mandamus relief to enforce its mandatory venue provisions. Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem.Code Ann. § 15.0642. Although section 115.002 of the Texas Property Code is found outside Chapter 15 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, it is still a mandatory venue provision for which mandamus relief is available to enforce the provision. In re Transcon. Realty Investors, Inc., 271 S.W.3d 270, 271 (Tex.2008) (orig. proceeding) (holding that venue in the district identified in 9 was mandatory", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nHowever, Pe-trohawk filed suit against J.P. Morgan, a corporate trustee, and we have already concluded that based on the plain language of section 115.001, any proceeding brought against a trustee falls within section 115.001. Therefore, sections 115.001 and 115.002 are applicable. We conclude mandamus relief is appropriate in this case. Chapter 15 authorizes parties to seek mandamus relief to enforce its mandatory venue provisions. Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem.Code Ann. § 15.0642. Although section 115.002 of the Texas Property Code is found outside Chapter 15 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, it is still a mandatory venue provision for which mandamus relief is available to enforce the provision. In re Transcon. Realty Investors, Inc., 271 S.W.3d 270, 271 (Tex.2008) (orig. proceeding) (holding that the statute is mandatory", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nHowever, Pe-trohawk filed suit against J.P. Morgan, a corporate trustee, and we have already concluded that based on the plain language of section 115.001, any proceeding brought against a trustee falls within section 115.001. Therefore, sections 115.001 and 115.002 are applicable. We conclude mandamus relief is appropriate in this case. Chapter 15 authorizes parties to seek mandamus relief to enforce its mandatory venue provisions. Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem.Code Ann. § 15.0642. Although section 115.002 of the Texas Property Code is found outside Chapter 15 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, it is still a mandatory venue provision for which mandamus relief is available to enforce the provision. In re Transcon. Realty Investors, Inc., 271 S.W.3d 270, 271 (Tex.2008) (orig. proceeding) (recognizing that due on sale clauses are enforceable in texas", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nHowever, Pe-trohawk filed suit against J.P. Morgan, a corporate trustee, and we have already concluded that based on the plain language of section 115.001, any proceeding brought against a trustee falls within section 115.001. Therefore, sections 115.001 and 115.002 are applicable. We conclude mandamus relief is appropriate in this case. Chapter 15 authorizes parties to seek mandamus relief to enforce its mandatory venue provisions. Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem.Code Ann. § 15.0642. Although section 115.002 of the Texas Property Code is found outside Chapter 15 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, it is still a mandatory venue provision for which mandamus relief is available to enforce the provision. In re Transcon. Realty Investors, Inc., 271 S.W.3d 270, 271 (Tex.2008) (orig. proceeding) (holding that where the entity was incorporated in texas and the shareholders reside in texas and the bankruptcy case is pending in texas texas law not arizona law should be applied", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nHowever, Pe-trohawk filed suit against J.P. Morgan, a corporate trustee, and we have already concluded that based on the plain language of section 115.001, any proceeding brought against a trustee falls within section 115.001. Therefore, sections 115.001 and 115.002 are applicable. We conclude mandamus relief is appropriate in this case. Chapter 15 authorizes parties to seek mandamus relief to enforce its mandatory venue provisions. Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem.Code Ann. § 15.0642. Although section 115.002 of the Texas Property Code is found outside Chapter 15 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, it is still a mandatory venue provision for which mandamus relief is available to enforce the provision. In re Transcon. Realty Investors, Inc., 271 S.W.3d 270, 271 (Tex.2008) (orig. proceeding) (holding that section 21013 of the texas property code is a mandatory venue statute and is enforceable by mandamus" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\ncannot be sustained, as the plaintiffs’ complaint is limited by the scope of the EEOC investigation which could reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination. Here, the EEOC letter of determination states that the charging party \"alleges discrimination based on race and/or national origin.” Consequently, the plaintiffs are barred from alleging gender discrimination. See Rush v. McDonald's Corp., 966 F.2d 1104, 1110 (7th Cir.1992) (\"an aggrieved employee may not complain to the EEOC of only certain instances of discrimination, then seek judicial relief for different instances of discrimination”). Likewise, the plaintiffs’ gender discrimination claim under the FCRA is barred. See Trumbull v. Health Care and Retirement Corp. of Am., 756 F.Supp. 532, 535 (M.D.Fla.1991) (holding that substantive aspects of claims under federal discrimination statutes and fcra are identical", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\ncannot be sustained, as the plaintiffs’ complaint is limited by the scope of the EEOC investigation which could reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination. Here, the EEOC letter of determination states that the charging party \"alleges discrimination based on race and/or national origin.” Consequently, the plaintiffs are barred from alleging gender discrimination. See Rush v. McDonald's Corp., 966 F.2d 1104, 1110 (7th Cir.1992) (\"an aggrieved employee may not complain to the EEOC of only certain instances of discrimination, then seek judicial relief for different instances of discrimination”). Likewise, the plaintiffs’ gender discrimination claim under the FCRA is barred. See Trumbull v. Health Care and Retirement Corp. of Am., 756 F.Supp. 532, 535 (M.D.Fla.1991) (holding that in diversity cases federal courts are to apply state substantive law and federal procedural law", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\ncannot be sustained, as the plaintiffs’ complaint is limited by the scope of the EEOC investigation which could reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination. Here, the EEOC letter of determination states that the charging party \"alleges discrimination based on race and/or national origin.” Consequently, the plaintiffs are barred from alleging gender discrimination. See Rush v. McDonald's Corp., 966 F.2d 1104, 1110 (7th Cir.1992) (\"an aggrieved employee may not complain to the EEOC of only certain instances of discrimination, then seek judicial relief for different instances of discrimination”). Likewise, the plaintiffs’ gender discrimination claim under the FCRA is barred. See Trumbull v. Health Care and Retirement Corp. of Am., 756 F.Supp. 532, 535 (M.D.Fla.1991) (holding that statutes of limitations are considered substantive matters for purposes of the erie doctrine", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\ncannot be sustained, as the plaintiffs’ complaint is limited by the scope of the EEOC investigation which could reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination. Here, the EEOC letter of determination states that the charging party \"alleges discrimination based on race and/or national origin.” Consequently, the plaintiffs are barred from alleging gender discrimination. See Rush v. McDonald's Corp., 966 F.2d 1104, 1110 (7th Cir.1992) (\"an aggrieved employee may not complain to the EEOC of only certain instances of discrimination, then seek judicial relief for different instances of discrimination”). Likewise, the plaintiffs’ gender discrimination claim under the FCRA is barred. See Trumbull v. Health Care and Retirement Corp. of Am., 756 F.Supp. 532, 535 (M.D.Fla.1991) (holding that federal courts should apply state substantive law", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\ncannot be sustained, as the plaintiffs’ complaint is limited by the scope of the EEOC investigation which could reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination. Here, the EEOC letter of determination states that the charging party \"alleges discrimination based on race and/or national origin.” Consequently, the plaintiffs are barred from alleging gender discrimination. See Rush v. McDonald's Corp., 966 F.2d 1104, 1110 (7th Cir.1992) (\"an aggrieved employee may not complain to the EEOC of only certain instances of discrimination, then seek judicial relief for different instances of discrimination”). Likewise, the plaintiffs’ gender discrimination claim under the FCRA is barred. See Trumbull v. Health Care and Retirement Corp. of Am., 756 F.Supp. 532, 535 (M.D.Fla.1991) (recognizing that the two statutes are nearly identical" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\ncase, Defendant established legitimate reasons for its actions, and the record does not permit an inference of pretext. See id. (holding that once the employee makes its prima facie showing the burden then shifts to the employer to prove that legitimate reasons supported the termination", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\ncase, Defendant established legitimate reasons for its actions, and the record does not permit an inference of pretext. See id. (holding that if the plaintiff makes a prima facie case the defendant employer must then articulate some legitimate nonretaliatory reason for the adverse action and the employee must then have a fair opportunity to show pretext that is that a discriminatory intent motivated the employers action", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\ncase, Defendant established legitimate reasons for its actions, and the record does not permit an inference of pretext. See id. (holding that if the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of age discrimination the employer must show that the discharge was based on reasonable factors other than age and if the employer meets that burden the plaintiff must show that age was a determining factor in the discharge", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\ncase, Defendant established legitimate reasons for its actions, and the record does not permit an inference of pretext. See id. (recognizing that whether the employee uses the mcdonnell douglas framework or other evidence to create a prima facie case when the employer offers a legitimate nondiseriminatory reason for its adverse action the question is whether a rational trier of fact could conclude that the employers action was taken for impermissibly discriminatory reasons", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\ncase, Defendant established legitimate reasons for its actions, and the record does not permit an inference of pretext. See id. (holding that in title vii disparate treatment case in order for a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case the plaintiff must proffer evidence among other things that she performed her job according to her employers legitimate expectations if the plaintiff establishes the prima facie case the presumption shifts the burden to the employer to produce a legitimate nondiseriminatory reason for its actions" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nPressure is secondary when its target is some employer other than the one engaged in a labor dispute with the union applying the pressure. To make this distinction, courts inquire into the “object” of a union’s activity. If “the object of the union’s conduct, taken as a whole, is to bring indirect pressure on the primary employer by involving neutral or secondary employers in the dispute, the conduct is secondary and prohibited.” Abreen Corp. v. Laborers’ Int’l Union, 709 F.2d 748, 754-55 (1st Cir.1983). A plaintiff need not prove that the union’s sole or primary object is to employ secondary pressure, only that one of its objects is the use of secondary pressure. See Pye v. Teamsters Local Union No. 122, 61 F.3d 1013, 1023 (1st Cir.1995); see also Abreen Corp., 709 F.2d at 755 (holding that plain tiff must show that the secondary pressure is not merely incidental to the pressure imposed on the primary employer", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nPressure is secondary when its target is some employer other than the one engaged in a labor dispute with the union applying the pressure. To make this distinction, courts inquire into the “object” of a union’s activity. If “the object of the union’s conduct, taken as a whole, is to bring indirect pressure on the primary employer by involving neutral or secondary employers in the dispute, the conduct is secondary and prohibited.” Abreen Corp. v. Laborers’ Int’l Union, 709 F.2d 748, 754-55 (1st Cir.1983). A plaintiff need not prove that the union’s sole or primary object is to employ secondary pressure, only that one of its objects is the use of secondary pressure. See Pye v. Teamsters Local Union No. 122, 61 F.3d 1013, 1023 (1st Cir.1995); see also Abreen Corp., 709 F.2d at 755 (holding that new evidence must be evidence that is not merely cumulative", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nPressure is secondary when its target is some employer other than the one engaged in a labor dispute with the union applying the pressure. To make this distinction, courts inquire into the “object” of a union’s activity. If “the object of the union’s conduct, taken as a whole, is to bring indirect pressure on the primary employer by involving neutral or secondary employers in the dispute, the conduct is secondary and prohibited.” Abreen Corp. v. Laborers’ Int’l Union, 709 F.2d 748, 754-55 (1st Cir.1983). A plaintiff need not prove that the union’s sole or primary object is to employ secondary pressure, only that one of its objects is the use of secondary pressure. See Pye v. Teamsters Local Union No. 122, 61 F.3d 1013, 1023 (1st Cir.1995); see also Abreen Corp., 709 F.2d at 755 (holding that government must merely show that defendant knew that it was a bank that he intended to influence", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nPressure is secondary when its target is some employer other than the one engaged in a labor dispute with the union applying the pressure. To make this distinction, courts inquire into the “object” of a union’s activity. If “the object of the union’s conduct, taken as a whole, is to bring indirect pressure on the primary employer by involving neutral or secondary employers in the dispute, the conduct is secondary and prohibited.” Abreen Corp. v. Laborers’ Int’l Union, 709 F.2d 748, 754-55 (1st Cir.1983). A plaintiff need not prove that the union’s sole or primary object is to employ secondary pressure, only that one of its objects is the use of secondary pressure. See Pye v. Teamsters Local Union No. 122, 61 F.3d 1013, 1023 (1st Cir.1995); see also Abreen Corp., 709 F.2d at 755 (holding that if the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of age discrimination the employer must show that the discharge was based on reasonable factors other than age and if the employer meets that burden the plaintiff must show that age was a determining factor in the discharge", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nPressure is secondary when its target is some employer other than the one engaged in a labor dispute with the union applying the pressure. To make this distinction, courts inquire into the “object” of a union’s activity. If “the object of the union’s conduct, taken as a whole, is to bring indirect pressure on the primary employer by involving neutral or secondary employers in the dispute, the conduct is secondary and prohibited.” Abreen Corp. v. Laborers’ Int’l Union, 709 F.2d 748, 754-55 (1st Cir.1983). A plaintiff need not prove that the union’s sole or primary object is to employ secondary pressure, only that one of its objects is the use of secondary pressure. See Pye v. Teamsters Local Union No. 122, 61 F.3d 1013, 1023 (1st Cir.1995); see also Abreen Corp., 709 F.2d at 755 (holding a parsonage taxable where the use of the property to accomplish religious purposes was only incidental or secondary to the primary purpose of providing a residence for the pastor and his family" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nto which Buyer has received the professional advilele and expertise of a certified public accountant retained by Buyer. Defendants argue that this provision (the Satisfaction Clause) is sufficient to preclude Plaintiffs from asserting mistake as a basis for rescinding the contract. 1 38 The Satisfaction Clause may well have been an attempt to allocate to Plaintiffs the risk that the value of the Kendall Agency might be lower than either party believed. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 154(a). Alternatively, this clause may evidence an acknowledgment by Plaintiffs that they deemed their limited knowledge on this issue sufficient, thereby negating any later claim of mistake. See id. § 154(b); see also Deep Creek Ranch, LLC v. Utah State Armory Bd., 2008 UT 8, 118, 178 P.3d 886 (holding that the office of recovery services of the utah dept of social services was free to collect its postpetition debt for child support from a tax refund that was not dedicated to the plan and therefore vested in the debtors upon confirmation", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nto which Buyer has received the professional advilele and expertise of a certified public accountant retained by Buyer. Defendants argue that this provision (the Satisfaction Clause) is sufficient to preclude Plaintiffs from asserting mistake as a basis for rescinding the contract. 1 38 The Satisfaction Clause may well have been an attempt to allocate to Plaintiffs the risk that the value of the Kendall Agency might be lower than either party believed. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 154(a). Alternatively, this clause may evidence an acknowledgment by Plaintiffs that they deemed their limited knowledge on this issue sufficient, thereby negating any later claim of mistake. See id. § 154(b); see also Deep Creek Ranch, LLC v. Utah State Armory Bd., 2008 UT 8, 118, 178 P.3d 886 (holding that under contract armory assumed the risk as to utah general services agency", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nto which Buyer has received the professional advilele and expertise of a certified public accountant retained by Buyer. Defendants argue that this provision (the Satisfaction Clause) is sufficient to preclude Plaintiffs from asserting mistake as a basis for rescinding the contract. 1 38 The Satisfaction Clause may well have been an attempt to allocate to Plaintiffs the risk that the value of the Kendall Agency might be lower than either party believed. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 154(a). Alternatively, this clause may evidence an acknowledgment by Plaintiffs that they deemed their limited knowledge on this issue sufficient, thereby negating any later claim of mistake. See id. § 154(b); see also Deep Creek Ranch, LLC v. Utah State Armory Bd., 2008 UT 8, 118, 178 P.3d 886 (holding that nonsignatories to a contract have no rights under the contract and thus no standing to assert claims under the contract", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nto which Buyer has received the professional advilele and expertise of a certified public accountant retained by Buyer. Defendants argue that this provision (the Satisfaction Clause) is sufficient to preclude Plaintiffs from asserting mistake as a basis for rescinding the contract. 1 38 The Satisfaction Clause may well have been an attempt to allocate to Plaintiffs the risk that the value of the Kendall Agency might be lower than either party believed. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 154(a). Alternatively, this clause may evidence an acknowledgment by Plaintiffs that they deemed their limited knowledge on this issue sufficient, thereby negating any later claim of mistake. See id. § 154(b); see also Deep Creek Ranch, LLC v. Utah State Armory Bd., 2008 UT 8, 118, 178 P.3d 886 (recognizing this as the general rule", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nto which Buyer has received the professional advilele and expertise of a certified public accountant retained by Buyer. Defendants argue that this provision (the Satisfaction Clause) is sufficient to preclude Plaintiffs from asserting mistake as a basis for rescinding the contract. 1 38 The Satisfaction Clause may well have been an attempt to allocate to Plaintiffs the risk that the value of the Kendall Agency might be lower than either party believed. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 154(a). Alternatively, this clause may evidence an acknowledgment by Plaintiffs that they deemed their limited knowledge on this issue sufficient, thereby negating any later claim of mistake. See id. § 154(b); see also Deep Creek Ranch, LLC v. Utah State Armory Bd., 2008 UT 8, 118, 178 P.3d 886 (recognizing utah counties as legal subdivisions" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthat was printed on the reverse side of the Consent Form. Further, although the Consent Form generally allowed defendant to make unilateral changes to any of its policies, the arbitration policy was explicitly excluded from this provision: “I agree and understand that AIMCO has the right to and may modify, rescind or cancel all or any part of these policies, or add new rules of conduct, at any time, in its sole discretion ... except the Arbitration policy, which can only be amended by AIMCO’s and my mutual agreement.” Because an employer’s unilateral act of making changes to an employment handbook does not constitute mutual consent, the court finds that the arbitration agreement is still in full force. Robinson v. Ada S. McKinley Comm. Services, Inc., 19 F.3d 359, 364 (7th Cir.1994) (holding that an arbitration agreement in an employee handbook was illusory where the employer expressly reserved a right to unilaterally rescind any provisions of the handbook", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthat was printed on the reverse side of the Consent Form. Further, although the Consent Form generally allowed defendant to make unilateral changes to any of its policies, the arbitration policy was explicitly excluded from this provision: “I agree and understand that AIMCO has the right to and may modify, rescind or cancel all or any part of these policies, or add new rules of conduct, at any time, in its sole discretion ... except the Arbitration policy, which can only be amended by AIMCO’s and my mutual agreement.” Because an employer’s unilateral act of making changes to an employment handbook does not constitute mutual consent, the court finds that the arbitration agreement is still in full force. Robinson v. Ada S. McKinley Comm. Services, Inc., 19 F.3d 359, 364 (7th Cir.1994) (holding that contractual relationship between student and university did not include terms of the handbook because university retained right to unilaterally modify terms of handbook without notice plaintiff neither negotiated for nor assented to terms of contract and relevant correspondence did not call special attention to handbook", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthat was printed on the reverse side of the Consent Form. Further, although the Consent Form generally allowed defendant to make unilateral changes to any of its policies, the arbitration policy was explicitly excluded from this provision: “I agree and understand that AIMCO has the right to and may modify, rescind or cancel all or any part of these policies, or add new rules of conduct, at any time, in its sole discretion ... except the Arbitration policy, which can only be amended by AIMCO’s and my mutual agreement.” Because an employer’s unilateral act of making changes to an employment handbook does not constitute mutual consent, the court finds that the arbitration agreement is still in full force. Robinson v. Ada S. McKinley Comm. Services, Inc., 19 F.3d 359, 364 (7th Cir.1994) (holding that no modification of the original employment contract occurred when the employer unilaterally issued a new handbook", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthat was printed on the reverse side of the Consent Form. Further, although the Consent Form generally allowed defendant to make unilateral changes to any of its policies, the arbitration policy was explicitly excluded from this provision: “I agree and understand that AIMCO has the right to and may modify, rescind or cancel all or any part of these policies, or add new rules of conduct, at any time, in its sole discretion ... except the Arbitration policy, which can only be amended by AIMCO’s and my mutual agreement.” Because an employer’s unilateral act of making changes to an employment handbook does not constitute mutual consent, the court finds that the arbitration agreement is still in full force. Robinson v. Ada S. McKinley Comm. Services, Inc., 19 F.3d 359, 364 (7th Cir.1994) (holding that an agreement to arbitrate is illusory if as here the employer can unilaterally modify the contract", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthat was printed on the reverse side of the Consent Form. Further, although the Consent Form generally allowed defendant to make unilateral changes to any of its policies, the arbitration policy was explicitly excluded from this provision: “I agree and understand that AIMCO has the right to and may modify, rescind or cancel all or any part of these policies, or add new rules of conduct, at any time, in its sole discretion ... except the Arbitration policy, which can only be amended by AIMCO’s and my mutual agreement.” Because an employer’s unilateral act of making changes to an employment handbook does not constitute mutual consent, the court finds that the arbitration agreement is still in full force. Robinson v. Ada S. McKinley Comm. Services, Inc., 19 F.3d 359, 364 (7th Cir.1994) (holding that employee handbook did not give rise to implied contract where it stated that it was not a contract and that employment was terminable at will" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nclerk’s practice of almost always granting deferrals to jurors who requested them introduced a substantial element of voluntariness into jury service, and meant that the pool of K jurors consisted of individuals who had decided for various reasons not to serve at the time that their names were drawn from the divisional qualified wheels. As the former Fifth Circuit explained, “That the introduction of predilections of prospective jurors affects the random nature of the selection process cannot be gainsaid. Surely a district would be in substantial violation of the statute [JSSA] if it selected all its jurors by randomly drawing names from the qualified wheel and allowing those selected to opt in or out at will.” Id.; see also United States v. Branscome, 682 F.2d 484, 485 (4th Cir.1982) (holding the connection is an element", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nclerk’s practice of almost always granting deferrals to jurors who requested them introduced a substantial element of voluntariness into jury service, and meant that the pool of K jurors consisted of individuals who had decided for various reasons not to serve at the time that their names were drawn from the divisional qualified wheels. As the former Fifth Circuit explained, “That the introduction of predilections of prospective jurors affects the random nature of the selection process cannot be gainsaid. Surely a district would be in substantial violation of the statute [JSSA] if it selected all its jurors by randomly drawing names from the qualified wheel and allowing those selected to opt in or out at will.” Id.; see also United States v. Branscome, 682 F.2d 484, 485 (4th Cir.1982) (holding that use of volunteer jurors introduced an impermissible subjective element into jury selection", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nclerk’s practice of almost always granting deferrals to jurors who requested them introduced a substantial element of voluntariness into jury service, and meant that the pool of K jurors consisted of individuals who had decided for various reasons not to serve at the time that their names were drawn from the divisional qualified wheels. As the former Fifth Circuit explained, “That the introduction of predilections of prospective jurors affects the random nature of the selection process cannot be gainsaid. Surely a district would be in substantial violation of the statute [JSSA] if it selected all its jurors by randomly drawing names from the qualified wheel and allowing those selected to opt in or out at will.” Id.; see also United States v. Branscome, 682 F.2d 484, 485 (4th Cir.1982) (recognizing that observations made during a psychiatric examination contain a subjective element", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nclerk’s practice of almost always granting deferrals to jurors who requested them introduced a substantial element of voluntariness into jury service, and meant that the pool of K jurors consisted of individuals who had decided for various reasons not to serve at the time that their names were drawn from the divisional qualified wheels. As the former Fifth Circuit explained, “That the introduction of predilections of prospective jurors affects the random nature of the selection process cannot be gainsaid. Surely a district would be in substantial violation of the statute [JSSA] if it selected all its jurors by randomly drawing names from the qualified wheel and allowing those selected to opt in or out at will.” Id.; see also United States v. Branscome, 682 F.2d 484, 485 (4th Cir.1982) (holding that a jury instruction directing the verdict on one element deprived defendant of the right to a jury determination on every element of the charged offense and thus constituted structural error", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nclerk’s practice of almost always granting deferrals to jurors who requested them introduced a substantial element of voluntariness into jury service, and meant that the pool of K jurors consisted of individuals who had decided for various reasons not to serve at the time that their names were drawn from the divisional qualified wheels. As the former Fifth Circuit explained, “That the introduction of predilections of prospective jurors affects the random nature of the selection process cannot be gainsaid. Surely a district would be in substantial violation of the statute [JSSA] if it selected all its jurors by randomly drawing names from the qualified wheel and allowing those selected to opt in or out at will.” Id.; see also United States v. Branscome, 682 F.2d 484, 485 (4th Cir.1982) (holding that knowledge element could not be deemed in favor of plaintiff where defendant objected to the omission of that element from the jury charge" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nAmendment. Berge alleged that Shatto, Milburn, and Lamack “were all [adequately] involved in this case as well.” Berge was detained three months until charges were dropped. The district court held that Berge failed to state a violation of a constitutional or federal statutory right, and dismissed his complaint. The district court did not rule on Berge’s pending motion for appointment of counsel. A complaint must include only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” See Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Here, Berge’s complaint can fairly be read as alleging that VanLangen knew the information provided in the affidavit was false and thus a violation of Berge’s Fourth Amendment rights. See Lambert v. City of Dumas, 187 F.3d 931, 935 (8th Cir.1999) (holding that the fourth amendment protects people not places", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nAmendment. Berge alleged that Shatto, Milburn, and Lamack “were all [adequately] involved in this case as well.” Berge was detained three months until charges were dropped. The district court held that Berge failed to state a violation of a constitutional or federal statutory right, and dismissed his complaint. The district court did not rule on Berge’s pending motion for appointment of counsel. A complaint must include only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” See Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Here, Berge’s complaint can fairly be read as alleging that VanLangen knew the information provided in the affidavit was false and thus a violation of Berge’s Fourth Amendment rights. See Lambert v. City of Dumas, 187 F.3d 931, 935 (8th Cir.1999) (holding that under fourth amendment standards for determining probable cause for arrest and probable cause for search and seizure are same", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nAmendment. Berge alleged that Shatto, Milburn, and Lamack “were all [adequately] involved in this case as well.” Berge was detained three months until charges were dropped. The district court held that Berge failed to state a violation of a constitutional or federal statutory right, and dismissed his complaint. The district court did not rule on Berge’s pending motion for appointment of counsel. A complaint must include only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” See Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Here, Berge’s complaint can fairly be read as alleging that VanLangen knew the information provided in the affidavit was false and thus a violation of Berge’s Fourth Amendment rights. See Lambert v. City of Dumas, 187 F.3d 931, 935 (8th Cir.1999) (holding fourth amendment protects right to be free from arrest without probable cause", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nAmendment. Berge alleged that Shatto, Milburn, and Lamack “were all [adequately] involved in this case as well.” Berge was detained three months until charges were dropped. The district court held that Berge failed to state a violation of a constitutional or federal statutory right, and dismissed his complaint. The district court did not rule on Berge’s pending motion for appointment of counsel. A complaint must include only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” See Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Here, Berge’s complaint can fairly be read as alleging that VanLangen knew the information provided in the affidavit was false and thus a violation of Berge’s Fourth Amendment rights. See Lambert v. City of Dumas, 187 F.3d 931, 935 (8th Cir.1999) (holding that warrantless arrest based on probable cause did not violate the fourth amendment", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nAmendment. Berge alleged that Shatto, Milburn, and Lamack “were all [adequately] involved in this case as well.” Berge was detained three months until charges were dropped. The district court held that Berge failed to state a violation of a constitutional or federal statutory right, and dismissed his complaint. The district court did not rule on Berge’s pending motion for appointment of counsel. A complaint must include only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” See Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Here, Berge’s complaint can fairly be read as alleging that VanLangen knew the information provided in the affidavit was false and thus a violation of Berge’s Fourth Amendment rights. See Lambert v. City of Dumas, 187 F.3d 931, 935 (8th Cir.1999) (recognizing that an alleged deprivation of the right to be free from prosecution without probable cause might be judged under the fourth amendment" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nof evidence’ is insufficient to defeat summary judgment.”); Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A) (\"A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by ... citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations ..., admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials....”). 8 .U.S. Bank Nat’l Assoc. v. U.S. Rent a Car, Inc., 2011 WL 3648225 at *3 (D.Minn. Aug. 17, 2011) (not reported) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). 9 . Id. (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 578, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)). 10 . Nessan v. Lovald 932) (holding that any defect in removal procedure must be cured within the 30day removal period or it is fatal to the removal and defendants failure to attach exhibits to the notice of removal within that time required remand", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nof evidence’ is insufficient to defeat summary judgment.”); Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A) (\"A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by ... citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations ..., admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials....”). 8 .U.S. Bank Nat’l Assoc. v. U.S. Rent a Car, Inc., 2011 WL 3648225 at *3 (D.Minn. Aug. 17, 2011) (not reported) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). 9 . Id. (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 578, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)). 10 . Nessan v. Lovald 932) (holding that the appellant had failed to overcome the rule regarding abandonment for this reason", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nof evidence’ is insufficient to defeat summary judgment.”); Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A) (\"A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by ... citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations ..., admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials....”). 8 .U.S. Bank Nat’l Assoc. v. U.S. Rent a Car, Inc., 2011 WL 3648225 at *3 (D.Minn. Aug. 17, 2011) (not reported) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). 9 . Id. (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 578, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)). 10 . Nessan v. Lovald 932) (holding that the relevant intent is not the intent to return ultimately but the intent to return to the united states within a relatively short period", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nof evidence’ is insufficient to defeat summary judgment.”); Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A) (\"A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by ... citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations ..., admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials....”). 8 .U.S. Bank Nat’l Assoc. v. U.S. Rent a Car, Inc., 2011 WL 3648225 at *3 (D.Minn. Aug. 17, 2011) (not reported) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). 9 . Id. (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 578, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)). 10 . Nessan v. Lovald 932) (holding that removal for temporary employment with intent to return was not abandonment", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nof evidence’ is insufficient to defeat summary judgment.”); Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A) (\"A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by ... citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations ..., admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials....”). 8 .U.S. Bank Nat’l Assoc. v. U.S. Rent a Car, Inc., 2011 WL 3648225 at *3 (D.Minn. Aug. 17, 2011) (not reported) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). 9 . Id. (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 578, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)). 10 . Nessan v. Lovald 932) (holding that the general rule is that temporary absence from the premises will not itself cause an abandonment of the homestead but to retain the homestead exemption one leaving the homestead must in good faith intend to return albeit the intent to return need not be at any particular time in the future" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndecision. C. Whether the RFC accounts for all of Mr. Candelario’s limitations. Mr. Candelario testified that, about one year prior to the June 2002 hearing, he began to need to lie down five or six times a day for up to one hour each time. See Aplt.App. at 374. When the ALJ asked the VE to assume a person had to lie down five or six times a day for up to one-half hour, a lesser limitation, the VE testified that none of the jobs he identified would be available. As the ALJ recognized, however, the asserted limitation began after the relevant time period. Even if it was relevant, the ALJ explained that the limitation was inconsistent with the record evidence. Accordingly, he properly disregarded the VE’s testimony on this point. See Gay v. Sullivan, 986 F.2d 1336, 1341 (10th Cir.1993) (holding that an alj is entitled to rely on vocational experts testimony that is based on assumptions that are supported by evidence in the record", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndecision. C. Whether the RFC accounts for all of Mr. Candelario’s limitations. Mr. Candelario testified that, about one year prior to the June 2002 hearing, he began to need to lie down five or six times a day for up to one hour each time. See Aplt.App. at 374. When the ALJ asked the VE to assume a person had to lie down five or six times a day for up to one-half hour, a lesser limitation, the VE testified that none of the jobs he identified would be available. As the ALJ recognized, however, the asserted limitation began after the relevant time period. Even if it was relevant, the ALJ explained that the limitation was inconsistent with the record evidence. Accordingly, he properly disregarded the VE’s testimony on this point. See Gay v. Sullivan, 986 F.2d 1336, 1341 (10th Cir.1993) (holding that testimo ny premised on limitations unsupported by the evidence is not binding on an alj", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndecision. C. Whether the RFC accounts for all of Mr. Candelario’s limitations. Mr. Candelario testified that, about one year prior to the June 2002 hearing, he began to need to lie down five or six times a day for up to one hour each time. See Aplt.App. at 374. When the ALJ asked the VE to assume a person had to lie down five or six times a day for up to one-half hour, a lesser limitation, the VE testified that none of the jobs he identified would be available. As the ALJ recognized, however, the asserted limitation began after the relevant time period. Even if it was relevant, the ALJ explained that the limitation was inconsistent with the record evidence. Accordingly, he properly disregarded the VE’s testimony on this point. See Gay v. Sullivan, 986 F.2d 1336, 1341 (10th Cir.1993) (holding that the alj properly relied on medical evidence undermining claimants subjective assessment of limitations", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndecision. C. Whether the RFC accounts for all of Mr. Candelario’s limitations. Mr. Candelario testified that, about one year prior to the June 2002 hearing, he began to need to lie down five or six times a day for up to one hour each time. See Aplt.App. at 374. When the ALJ asked the VE to assume a person had to lie down five or six times a day for up to one-half hour, a lesser limitation, the VE testified that none of the jobs he identified would be available. As the ALJ recognized, however, the asserted limitation began after the relevant time period. Even if it was relevant, the ALJ explained that the limitation was inconsistent with the record evidence. Accordingly, he properly disregarded the VE’s testimony on this point. See Gay v. Sullivan, 986 F.2d 1336, 1341 (10th Cir.1993) (holding that arbitration award is binding on the parties", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndecision. C. Whether the RFC accounts for all of Mr. Candelario’s limitations. Mr. Candelario testified that, about one year prior to the June 2002 hearing, he began to need to lie down five or six times a day for up to one hour each time. See Aplt.App. at 374. When the ALJ asked the VE to assume a person had to lie down five or six times a day for up to one-half hour, a lesser limitation, the VE testified that none of the jobs he identified would be available. As the ALJ recognized, however, the asserted limitation began after the relevant time period. Even if it was relevant, the ALJ explained that the limitation was inconsistent with the record evidence. Accordingly, he properly disregarded the VE’s testimony on this point. See Gay v. Sullivan, 986 F.2d 1336, 1341 (10th Cir.1993) (recognizing that the findings of the circuit court on factual issues arising on a motion to quash service of process for lack of jurisdiction are binding on the appellate court unless wholly unsupported by the evidence or controlled by error of law" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nit effectively reduced the rate of future benefit accruals. Foot Locker submits that the version of ERISA in effect at the time of the challenged notice did not require such disclosure, that any deficiency was cured by subsequent summary plan descriptions, and, in any event, that Osberg’s § 204(h) claim is time-barred. Here, we need not determine whether Osberg’s § 204(h) notice claim is either timely or valid because § 204(h) does not, in any event, afford him the remedy he seeks, i.e., a pension benefit calculated under the cash balance plan but “with an opening balance equal to the value of the retirement annuity he had already earned under the old formula.” Appellant’s Reply Br. 5. See 10 Ellicott Square Court Corp. v. Mountain Valley Indem. Co., 634 F.3d 112, 125 (2d Cir.2011) (recognizing this court may affirm for any reason supported by the record", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nit effectively reduced the rate of future benefit accruals. Foot Locker submits that the version of ERISA in effect at the time of the challenged notice did not require such disclosure, that any deficiency was cured by subsequent summary plan descriptions, and, in any event, that Osberg’s § 204(h) claim is time-barred. Here, we need not determine whether Osberg’s § 204(h) notice claim is either timely or valid because § 204(h) does not, in any event, afford him the remedy he seeks, i.e., a pension benefit calculated under the cash balance plan but “with an opening balance equal to the value of the retirement annuity he had already earned under the old formula.” Appellant’s Reply Br. 5. See 10 Ellicott Square Court Corp. v. Mountain Valley Indem. Co., 634 F.3d 112, 125 (2d Cir.2011) (holding that we may affirm a district court if its holding was right for any reason", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nit effectively reduced the rate of future benefit accruals. Foot Locker submits that the version of ERISA in effect at the time of the challenged notice did not require such disclosure, that any deficiency was cured by subsequent summary plan descriptions, and, in any event, that Osberg’s § 204(h) claim is time-barred. Here, we need not determine whether Osberg’s § 204(h) notice claim is either timely or valid because § 204(h) does not, in any event, afford him the remedy he seeks, i.e., a pension benefit calculated under the cash balance plan but “with an opening balance equal to the value of the retirement annuity he had already earned under the old formula.” Appellant’s Reply Br. 5. See 10 Ellicott Square Court Corp. v. Mountain Valley Indem. Co., 634 F.3d 112, 125 (2d Cir.2011) (recognizing that the court of appeals can affirm a grant on summary judgment on any basis made apparent by the record", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nit effectively reduced the rate of future benefit accruals. Foot Locker submits that the version of ERISA in effect at the time of the challenged notice did not require such disclosure, that any deficiency was cured by subsequent summary plan descriptions, and, in any event, that Osberg’s § 204(h) claim is time-barred. Here, we need not determine whether Osberg’s § 204(h) notice claim is either timely or valid because § 204(h) does not, in any event, afford him the remedy he seeks, i.e., a pension benefit calculated under the cash balance plan but “with an opening balance equal to the value of the retirement annuity he had already earned under the old formula.” Appellant’s Reply Br. 5. See 10 Ellicott Square Court Corp. v. Mountain Valley Indem. Co., 634 F.3d 112, 125 (2d Cir.2011) (recognizing that this court may affirm on any grounds apparent from the record quotation omitted", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nit effectively reduced the rate of future benefit accruals. Foot Locker submits that the version of ERISA in effect at the time of the challenged notice did not require such disclosure, that any deficiency was cured by subsequent summary plan descriptions, and, in any event, that Osberg’s § 204(h) claim is time-barred. Here, we need not determine whether Osberg’s § 204(h) notice claim is either timely or valid because § 204(h) does not, in any event, afford him the remedy he seeks, i.e., a pension benefit calculated under the cash balance plan but “with an opening balance equal to the value of the retirement annuity he had already earned under the old formula.” Appellant’s Reply Br. 5. See 10 Ellicott Square Court Corp. v. Mountain Valley Indem. Co., 634 F.3d 112, 125 (2d Cir.2011) (recognizing ability to affirm for any reason that finds support in record" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nany person or the United States from pursuing any other remedy, civil or criminal, which may be available for the vindication or enforcement of any law prohibiting discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin or economic status in the selection of persons for service on grand or petit juries. The Fifth and the Eighth Circuits read § 1867 to mean a defendant pursing a constitutional challenge to a jury pool need not comply with its provisions. See United States v. De Alba-Conrado, 481 F.2d 1266, 1270 n. 5 (5th Cir.1973) (citing the plain language of the statute and the legislative history in holding the procedures set forth in the Act are not applicable to constitutional challenges to a jury venire); United States v. Jones, 687 F.2d 1265, 1269 (8th Cir.1982) (holding failure to comply with 851b was harmless error in part because defendant did not comply with 851c procedures for challenging prior convictions", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nany person or the United States from pursuing any other remedy, civil or criminal, which may be available for the vindication or enforcement of any law prohibiting discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin or economic status in the selection of persons for service on grand or petit juries. The Fifth and the Eighth Circuits read § 1867 to mean a defendant pursing a constitutional challenge to a jury pool need not comply with its provisions. See United States v. De Alba-Conrado, 481 F.2d 1266, 1270 n. 5 (5th Cir.1973) (citing the plain language of the statute and the legislative history in holding the procedures set forth in the Act are not applicable to constitutional challenges to a jury venire); United States v. Jones, 687 F.2d 1265, 1269 (8th Cir.1982) (holding the failure to comply with the act does not bar defendant from raising a constitutional challenge to jury selection procedures", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nany person or the United States from pursuing any other remedy, civil or criminal, which may be available for the vindication or enforcement of any law prohibiting discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin or economic status in the selection of persons for service on grand or petit juries. The Fifth and the Eighth Circuits read § 1867 to mean a defendant pursing a constitutional challenge to a jury pool need not comply with its provisions. See United States v. De Alba-Conrado, 481 F.2d 1266, 1270 n. 5 (5th Cir.1973) (citing the plain language of the statute and the legislative history in holding the procedures set forth in the Act are not applicable to constitutional challenges to a jury venire); United States v. Jones, 687 F.2d 1265, 1269 (8th Cir.1982) (holding that plaintiffs failure to exhaust available grievance procedures does not bar her title vii claims", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nany person or the United States from pursuing any other remedy, civil or criminal, which may be available for the vindication or enforcement of any law prohibiting discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin or economic status in the selection of persons for service on grand or petit juries. The Fifth and the Eighth Circuits read § 1867 to mean a defendant pursing a constitutional challenge to a jury pool need not comply with its provisions. See United States v. De Alba-Conrado, 481 F.2d 1266, 1270 n. 5 (5th Cir.1973) (citing the plain language of the statute and the legislative history in holding the procedures set forth in the Act are not applicable to constitutional challenges to a jury venire); United States v. Jones, 687 F.2d 1265, 1269 (8th Cir.1982) (holding that failure to include an issue in statement of issues did not bar the appellant from raising the issue in its opening brief", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nany person or the United States from pursuing any other remedy, civil or criminal, which may be available for the vindication or enforcement of any law prohibiting discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin or economic status in the selection of persons for service on grand or petit juries. The Fifth and the Eighth Circuits read § 1867 to mean a defendant pursing a constitutional challenge to a jury pool need not comply with its provisions. See United States v. De Alba-Conrado, 481 F.2d 1266, 1270 n. 5 (5th Cir.1973) (citing the plain language of the statute and the legislative history in holding the procedures set forth in the Act are not applicable to constitutional challenges to a jury venire); United States v. Jones, 687 F.2d 1265, 1269 (8th Cir.1982) (holding that the failure to file a proper motion to dismiss raising a constitutional challenge to a criminal statute waives the issue on appeal" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\na union election, explaining that “[t]he plaintiff voluntarily-thrust himself into the controversy- by campaigning for .reelection to the position of secretary-treasurer of Local-526” and that “[i]n the context of a union election campaign, the plaintiff, as an incumbent, should expect criticism of his record.” Materia v. Huff, 394 Mass. 328, 475 N.E.2d 1212, 1215 (1985) (collecting cases). New Jersey’s intermediate appellate court held that a candidate in an election for a seat on the board of a condominium association was a public figure for the limited purpose of statements made in the context of his election because he chose to involve himself in a “hotly contested” race. Gulrajaney v. Petricha, 381 N.J.Super. 241, 885 A.2d 496, 505 (App. Div. 2005); accord Verna, 852 A.2d at 214 (holding that a candidate for a planned unit development associations board was a limited purpose public figure because as a candidate for election to the associations board of directors plaintiff thrust himself into a spotlight which justified viewing him as a public figure for the limited purpose of his candidacy", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\na union election, explaining that “[t]he plaintiff voluntarily-thrust himself into the controversy- by campaigning for .reelection to the position of secretary-treasurer of Local-526” and that “[i]n the context of a union election campaign, the plaintiff, as an incumbent, should expect criticism of his record.” Materia v. Huff, 394 Mass. 328, 475 N.E.2d 1212, 1215 (1985) (collecting cases). New Jersey’s intermediate appellate court held that a candidate in an election for a seat on the board of a condominium association was a public figure for the limited purpose of statements made in the context of his election because he chose to involve himself in a “hotly contested” race. Gulrajaney v. Petricha, 381 N.J.Super. 241, 885 A.2d 496, 505 (App. Div. 2005); accord Verna, 852 A.2d at 214 (holding that taxpayer could not have presented substantive due process claim to the board of assessment review because of the limited jurisdiction of that board", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\na union election, explaining that “[t]he plaintiff voluntarily-thrust himself into the controversy- by campaigning for .reelection to the position of secretary-treasurer of Local-526” and that “[i]n the context of a union election campaign, the plaintiff, as an incumbent, should expect criticism of his record.” Materia v. Huff, 394 Mass. 328, 475 N.E.2d 1212, 1215 (1985) (collecting cases). New Jersey’s intermediate appellate court held that a candidate in an election for a seat on the board of a condominium association was a public figure for the limited purpose of statements made in the context of his election because he chose to involve himself in a “hotly contested” race. Gulrajaney v. Petricha, 381 N.J.Super. 241, 885 A.2d 496, 505 (App. Div. 2005); accord Verna, 852 A.2d at 214 (holding candidate for house of representatives had standing to challenge election regulation exempting opponents of selffinancing candidates from certain campaigncontribution limits where plaintiff candidate had declared his candidacy and was demonstrably a selffinancing candidate whose opponents would imminently receive expanded access to campaign funding", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\na union election, explaining that “[t]he plaintiff voluntarily-thrust himself into the controversy- by campaigning for .reelection to the position of secretary-treasurer of Local-526” and that “[i]n the context of a union election campaign, the plaintiff, as an incumbent, should expect criticism of his record.” Materia v. Huff, 394 Mass. 328, 475 N.E.2d 1212, 1215 (1985) (collecting cases). New Jersey’s intermediate appellate court held that a candidate in an election for a seat on the board of a condominium association was a public figure for the limited purpose of statements made in the context of his election because he chose to involve himself in a “hotly contested” race. Gulrajaney v. Petricha, 381 N.J.Super. 241, 885 A.2d 496, 505 (App. Div. 2005); accord Verna, 852 A.2d at 214 (holding that candidate for state medical board voluntarily placed herself in position of public attention given strong public interest in board appointees qualifications", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\na union election, explaining that “[t]he plaintiff voluntarily-thrust himself into the controversy- by campaigning for .reelection to the position of secretary-treasurer of Local-526” and that “[i]n the context of a union election campaign, the plaintiff, as an incumbent, should expect criticism of his record.” Materia v. Huff, 394 Mass. 328, 475 N.E.2d 1212, 1215 (1985) (collecting cases). New Jersey’s intermediate appellate court held that a candidate in an election for a seat on the board of a condominium association was a public figure for the limited purpose of statements made in the context of his election because he chose to involve himself in a “hotly contested” race. Gulrajaney v. Petricha, 381 N.J.Super. 241, 885 A.2d 496, 505 (App. Div. 2005); accord Verna, 852 A.2d at 214 (holding that an associations president who was not a party before the board of appeals was not entitled to appeal the boards decision granting a zoning application that his association had opposed in the board proceedings" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nThere must be some “clear indication that the trial court intended the order to completely dispose of the entire case.\" Id. at 205. More specifically, a judgment is final for purposes of appeal when (1) a judgment expressly disposes of some, but not all defendants, (2) the only remaining defendants have not been served or answered, and (3) nothing in the record indicates that plaintiff ever expected to obtain service on the unserved defendants, such that the case “stands as if there had been a discontinuance” as to the unserved defendants. In re Sheppard, 193 S.W.3d 181,187 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, orig. proceeding) (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Penn, 363 S.W.2d 230, 232 (Tex.1962)); see also M.O. Dental Lab v. Rape, 139 S.W.3d 671, 674-75 (Tex.2004) (per curiam) (recognizing that the existence of a copy of a decision in a bill file along with numerous references to a decision of the court of appeals in the legislative history indicated that an amendment was made in response to that decision", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nThere must be some “clear indication that the trial court intended the order to completely dispose of the entire case.\" Id. at 205. More specifically, a judgment is final for purposes of appeal when (1) a judgment expressly disposes of some, but not all defendants, (2) the only remaining defendants have not been served or answered, and (3) nothing in the record indicates that plaintiff ever expected to obtain service on the unserved defendants, such that the case “stands as if there had been a discontinuance” as to the unserved defendants. In re Sheppard, 193 S.W.3d 181,187 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, orig. proceeding) (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Penn, 363 S.W.2d 230, 232 (Tex.1962)); see also M.O. Dental Lab v. Rape, 139 S.W.3d 671, 674-75 (Tex.2004) (per curiam) (holding that the decision in mcmillan survives apprendi", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nThere must be some “clear indication that the trial court intended the order to completely dispose of the entire case.\" Id. at 205. More specifically, a judgment is final for purposes of appeal when (1) a judgment expressly disposes of some, but not all defendants, (2) the only remaining defendants have not been served or answered, and (3) nothing in the record indicates that plaintiff ever expected to obtain service on the unserved defendants, such that the case “stands as if there had been a discontinuance” as to the unserved defendants. In re Sheppard, 193 S.W.3d 181,187 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, orig. proceeding) (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Penn, 363 S.W.2d 230, 232 (Tex.1962)); see also M.O. Dental Lab v. Rape, 139 S.W.3d 671, 674-75 (Tex.2004) (per curiam) (holding that an award of sanctions under rule 11 survives despite a later determination that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nThere must be some “clear indication that the trial court intended the order to completely dispose of the entire case.\" Id. at 205. More specifically, a judgment is final for purposes of appeal when (1) a judgment expressly disposes of some, but not all defendants, (2) the only remaining defendants have not been served or answered, and (3) nothing in the record indicates that plaintiff ever expected to obtain service on the unserved defendants, such that the case “stands as if there had been a discontinuance” as to the unserved defendants. In re Sheppard, 193 S.W.3d 181,187 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, orig. proceeding) (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Penn, 363 S.W.2d 230, 232 (Tex.1962)); see also M.O. Dental Lab v. Rape, 139 S.W.3d 671, 674-75 (Tex.2004) (per curiam) (holding that evidence contrary to an administrators decision does not make the decision arbitrary and capricious so long as a reasonable basis appears for the decision", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nThere must be some “clear indication that the trial court intended the order to completely dispose of the entire case.\" Id. at 205. More specifically, a judgment is final for purposes of appeal when (1) a judgment expressly disposes of some, but not all defendants, (2) the only remaining defendants have not been served or answered, and (3) nothing in the record indicates that plaintiff ever expected to obtain service on the unserved defendants, such that the case “stands as if there had been a discontinuance” as to the unserved defendants. In re Sheppard, 193 S.W.3d 181,187 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, orig. proceeding) (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Penn, 363 S.W.2d 230, 232 (Tex.1962)); see also M.O. Dental Lab v. Rape, 139 S.W.3d 671, 674-75 (Tex.2004) (per curiam) (holding that decision in penn survives lehmann" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthe office during normal business hours. Rev. Breen Deck ¶¶ 22-24. This creates a genuine issue of material fact. See Walsh v. United Parcel Serv., 201 F.3d 718, 726 (6th Cir.2000) (noting that employer’s allowance of medical -leave to other employees created genuine issue of fact as to whether grant of leave to plaintiff would have constituted reasonable accommodation); Swanks v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 179 F.3d 929, 934 (D.C.Cir.1999) (observing that an employer “ ‘may not obtain summary judgment by declaring it has a policy when [the employee] may have evidence that [the employer] follows the policy ... selectively ” (quoting Baert v. Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626, 632 (7th Cir.1998)) (brackets in original)); Woodman v. Runyon, 132 F.3d 1330, 1346 (10th Cir.1997) (holding that an employer is not liable where it takes reasonable steps to provide an accommodation and the employee is responsible for a breakdown in the process of identifying a reasonable accommodation", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthe office during normal business hours. Rev. Breen Deck ¶¶ 22-24. This creates a genuine issue of material fact. See Walsh v. United Parcel Serv., 201 F.3d 718, 726 (6th Cir.2000) (noting that employer’s allowance of medical -leave to other employees created genuine issue of fact as to whether grant of leave to plaintiff would have constituted reasonable accommodation); Swanks v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 179 F.3d 929, 934 (D.C.Cir.1999) (observing that an employer “ ‘may not obtain summary judgment by declaring it has a policy when [the employee] may have evidence that [the employer] follows the policy ... selectively ” (quoting Baert v. Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626, 632 (7th Cir.1998)) (brackets in original)); Woodman v. Runyon, 132 F.3d 1330, 1346 (10th Cir.1997) (holding in a similar factual situation that the bankruptcy court had no jurisdiction because it had no actual or constructive possession of the letters of credit involved", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthe office during normal business hours. Rev. Breen Deck ¶¶ 22-24. This creates a genuine issue of material fact. See Walsh v. United Parcel Serv., 201 F.3d 718, 726 (6th Cir.2000) (noting that employer’s allowance of medical -leave to other employees created genuine issue of fact as to whether grant of leave to plaintiff would have constituted reasonable accommodation); Swanks v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 179 F.3d 929, 934 (D.C.Cir.1999) (observing that an employer “ ‘may not obtain summary judgment by declaring it has a policy when [the employee] may have evidence that [the employer] follows the policy ... selectively ” (quoting Baert v. Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626, 632 (7th Cir.1998)) (brackets in original)); Woodman v. Runyon, 132 F.3d 1330, 1346 (10th Cir.1997) (holding that because the employee had engaged in similar religious conduct on prior occasions employer had notice of the conflict", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthe office during normal business hours. Rev. Breen Deck ¶¶ 22-24. This creates a genuine issue of material fact. See Walsh v. United Parcel Serv., 201 F.3d 718, 726 (6th Cir.2000) (noting that employer’s allowance of medical -leave to other employees created genuine issue of fact as to whether grant of leave to plaintiff would have constituted reasonable accommodation); Swanks v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 179 F.3d 929, 934 (D.C.Cir.1999) (observing that an employer “ ‘may not obtain summary judgment by declaring it has a policy when [the employee] may have evidence that [the employer] follows the policy ... selectively ” (quoting Baert v. Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626, 632 (7th Cir.1998)) (brackets in original)); Woodman v. Runyon, 132 F.3d 1330, 1346 (10th Cir.1997) (holding that the employer must offer a medical leave of absence in order to satisfy the requirement of providing a reasonable accommodation", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthe office during normal business hours. Rev. Breen Deck ¶¶ 22-24. This creates a genuine issue of material fact. See Walsh v. United Parcel Serv., 201 F.3d 718, 726 (6th Cir.2000) (noting that employer’s allowance of medical -leave to other employees created genuine issue of fact as to whether grant of leave to plaintiff would have constituted reasonable accommodation); Swanks v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 179 F.3d 929, 934 (D.C.Cir.1999) (observing that an employer “ ‘may not obtain summary judgment by declaring it has a policy when [the employee] may have evidence that [the employer] follows the policy ... selectively ” (quoting Baert v. Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626, 632 (7th Cir.1998)) (brackets in original)); Woodman v. Runyon, 132 F.3d 1330, 1346 (10th Cir.1997) (holding that plaintiff demonstrated factual dispute by providing evidence that employer had granted another employee the requested accommodation in a similar situation" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nand whether PGM was a party to a fraudulent transfer. ¶ 15 WE CONCUR: PAMELA T. GREENWOOD, Presiding Judge, and RUSSELL W. BENCH, Judge. 1 . PGM also argues that Westchester failed to show that the alter ego and fraudulent transfer issues were fully and fairly litigated because Westchester did not supply the trial court with the full record from the Paria litigation. Cf. Stevensen v. Goodson, 924 P.2d 339, 353 (Utah 1996). However, this court has held that, when the moving party produces documents that make a facial showing that a particular issue was litigated, the burden falls to the nonmoving party to show that the record before the court did not establish that the issue was in fact litigated. See Macris & Assocs., Inc. v. Images & Attitude, 941 P.2d 636, 640-41 (Utah Ct.App.1997) (recognizing that the burden on summary judgment shifts to the nonmoving party once the moving party has met its initial responsibility of showing the absence of a triable issue of fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment if the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of the case", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nand whether PGM was a party to a fraudulent transfer. ¶ 15 WE CONCUR: PAMELA T. GREENWOOD, Presiding Judge, and RUSSELL W. BENCH, Judge. 1 . PGM also argues that Westchester failed to show that the alter ego and fraudulent transfer issues were fully and fairly litigated because Westchester did not supply the trial court with the full record from the Paria litigation. Cf. Stevensen v. Goodson, 924 P.2d 339, 353 (Utah 1996). However, this court has held that, when the moving party produces documents that make a facial showing that a particular issue was litigated, the burden falls to the nonmoving party to show that the record before the court did not establish that the issue was in fact litigated. See Macris & Assocs., Inc. v. Images & Attitude, 941 P.2d 636, 640-41 (Utah Ct.App.1997) (holding that burden was on nonmoving party to show issue was not litigated where moving party presented arbitrators order showing issue had been litigated", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nand whether PGM was a party to a fraudulent transfer. ¶ 15 WE CONCUR: PAMELA T. GREENWOOD, Presiding Judge, and RUSSELL W. BENCH, Judge. 1 . PGM also argues that Westchester failed to show that the alter ego and fraudulent transfer issues were fully and fairly litigated because Westchester did not supply the trial court with the full record from the Paria litigation. Cf. Stevensen v. Goodson, 924 P.2d 339, 353 (Utah 1996). However, this court has held that, when the moving party produces documents that make a facial showing that a particular issue was litigated, the burden falls to the nonmoving party to show that the record before the court did not establish that the issue was in fact litigated. See Macris & Assocs., Inc. v. Images & Attitude, 941 P.2d 636, 640-41 (Utah Ct.App.1997) (holding that once the moving party meets its burden the nonmoving party is obliged to produce evidence in response", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nand whether PGM was a party to a fraudulent transfer. ¶ 15 WE CONCUR: PAMELA T. GREENWOOD, Presiding Judge, and RUSSELL W. BENCH, Judge. 1 . PGM also argues that Westchester failed to show that the alter ego and fraudulent transfer issues were fully and fairly litigated because Westchester did not supply the trial court with the full record from the Paria litigation. Cf. Stevensen v. Goodson, 924 P.2d 339, 353 (Utah 1996). However, this court has held that, when the moving party produces documents that make a facial showing that a particular issue was litigated, the burden falls to the nonmoving party to show that the record before the court did not establish that the issue was in fact litigated. See Macris & Assocs., Inc. v. Images & Attitude, 941 P.2d 636, 640-41 (Utah Ct.App.1997) (holding that all matters litigated or which could have been litigated in al foreclosure action are forever at rest ", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nand whether PGM was a party to a fraudulent transfer. ¶ 15 WE CONCUR: PAMELA T. GREENWOOD, Presiding Judge, and RUSSELL W. BENCH, Judge. 1 . PGM also argues that Westchester failed to show that the alter ego and fraudulent transfer issues were fully and fairly litigated because Westchester did not supply the trial court with the full record from the Paria litigation. Cf. Stevensen v. Goodson, 924 P.2d 339, 353 (Utah 1996). However, this court has held that, when the moving party produces documents that make a facial showing that a particular issue was litigated, the burden falls to the nonmoving party to show that the record before the court did not establish that the issue was in fact litigated. See Macris & Assocs., Inc. v. Images & Attitude, 941 P.2d 636, 640-41 (Utah Ct.App.1997) (holding that trial by consent requires that the parties actually recognize the issue to have been litigated" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\n712 F.2d at 135. Thus, the criminal defendants’ Fifth Amendment rights weigh heavily in favor of a stay to avoid prejudice to the other civil parties, especially The Hartford. See Holden Roofing, Inc., 2007 WL 1173634, at *1 (finding that if depositions were permitted in a civil case related to a pending criminal ease, a significant portion of questions posed to the defendants would likely result in the defendants asserting their Fifth Amendment rights, which weighed heavily in favor of a stay). The civil action should also be stayed because Hoeffner, a criminal defendant, seeks discovery as a civil plaintiff. As a matter of equity and public policy, a criminal defendant may not institute a civil action to obtain discovery relating to the criminal case. See Campbell, 307 F.2d at 487 (holding that liberal civil discovery procedures are not a back door to information otherwise beyond reach under the criminal discovery rules", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\n712 F.2d at 135. Thus, the criminal defendants’ Fifth Amendment rights weigh heavily in favor of a stay to avoid prejudice to the other civil parties, especially The Hartford. See Holden Roofing, Inc., 2007 WL 1173634, at *1 (finding that if depositions were permitted in a civil case related to a pending criminal ease, a significant portion of questions posed to the defendants would likely result in the defendants asserting their Fifth Amendment rights, which weighed heavily in favor of a stay). The civil action should also be stayed because Hoeffner, a criminal defendant, seeks discovery as a civil plaintiff. As a matter of equity and public policy, a criminal defendant may not institute a civil action to obtain discovery relating to the criminal case. See Campbell, 307 F.2d at 487 (recognizing that while summary judgment is improper if the nonmovant is not afforded a sufficient opportunity for discovery it is the nonmovants responsibility to inform the district court of the need for discovery by filing an affidavit pursuant to rule 56f of the federal rules of civil procedure or filing a motion requesting additional discovery", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\n712 F.2d at 135. Thus, the criminal defendants’ Fifth Amendment rights weigh heavily in favor of a stay to avoid prejudice to the other civil parties, especially The Hartford. See Holden Roofing, Inc., 2007 WL 1173634, at *1 (finding that if depositions were permitted in a civil case related to a pending criminal ease, a significant portion of questions posed to the defendants would likely result in the defendants asserting their Fifth Amendment rights, which weighed heavily in favor of a stay). The civil action should also be stayed because Hoeffner, a criminal defendant, seeks discovery as a civil plaintiff. As a matter of equity and public policy, a criminal defendant may not institute a civil action to obtain discovery relating to the criminal case. See Campbell, 307 F.2d at 487 (holding discovery rules apply to civil forfeiture proceedings", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\n712 F.2d at 135. Thus, the criminal defendants’ Fifth Amendment rights weigh heavily in favor of a stay to avoid prejudice to the other civil parties, especially The Hartford. See Holden Roofing, Inc., 2007 WL 1173634, at *1 (finding that if depositions were permitted in a civil case related to a pending criminal ease, a significant portion of questions posed to the defendants would likely result in the defendants asserting their Fifth Amendment rights, which weighed heavily in favor of a stay). The civil action should also be stayed because Hoeffner, a criminal defendant, seeks discovery as a civil plaintiff. As a matter of equity and public policy, a criminal defendant may not institute a civil action to obtain discovery relating to the criminal case. See Campbell, 307 F.2d at 487 (holding that discovery under the federal rules of civil procedure is broad in scope and freely permitted", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\n712 F.2d at 135. Thus, the criminal defendants’ Fifth Amendment rights weigh heavily in favor of a stay to avoid prejudice to the other civil parties, especially The Hartford. See Holden Roofing, Inc., 2007 WL 1173634, at *1 (finding that if depositions were permitted in a civil case related to a pending criminal ease, a significant portion of questions posed to the defendants would likely result in the defendants asserting their Fifth Amendment rights, which weighed heavily in favor of a stay). The civil action should also be stayed because Hoeffner, a criminal defendant, seeks discovery as a civil plaintiff. As a matter of equity and public policy, a criminal defendant may not institute a civil action to obtain discovery relating to the criminal case. See Campbell, 307 F.2d at 487 (holding that a discovery exception to a statute of limitation applies only to the discovery of facts not discovery of the law" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nAbraham-son insists they are distinct companies observing all corporate formalities. (6/29/10 Abrahamson Dec. ¶ 4, 6.) 3 .As discussed below, the Court concludes that transfer of this action is appropriate. Accordingly, the standards for evaluating the other portions of Defendants' Motion — concerning personal jurisdiction and improper venue — will not be recited herein. Notably, the Court may transfer this action regardless of whether venue is proper in this district or whether it enjoys personal jurisdiction over the moving Defendants. See 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (even if action is filed in improper venue, district court may transfer it to \"any district or division in which it might have been brought”); Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 466, 82 S.Ct. 913, 8 L.Ed.2d 39 (1962) (holding district lacking personal jurisdiction over defendant not one in which suit might have been brought under section 1404a", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nAbraham-son insists they are distinct companies observing all corporate formalities. (6/29/10 Abrahamson Dec. ¶ 4, 6.) 3 .As discussed below, the Court concludes that transfer of this action is appropriate. Accordingly, the standards for evaluating the other portions of Defendants' Motion — concerning personal jurisdiction and improper venue — will not be recited herein. Notably, the Court may transfer this action regardless of whether venue is proper in this district or whether it enjoys personal jurisdiction over the moving Defendants. See 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (even if action is filed in improper venue, district court may transfer it to \"any district or division in which it might have been brought”); Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 466, 82 S.Ct. 913, 8 L.Ed.2d 39 (1962) (holding that personal jurisdiction was lacking when the only contact by defendant with forum state was initiated by plaintiffs counsels paralegal for the sole purpose of establishing personal jurisdiction", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nAbraham-son insists they are distinct companies observing all corporate formalities. (6/29/10 Abrahamson Dec. ¶ 4, 6.) 3 .As discussed below, the Court concludes that transfer of this action is appropriate. Accordingly, the standards for evaluating the other portions of Defendants' Motion — concerning personal jurisdiction and improper venue — will not be recited herein. Notably, the Court may transfer this action regardless of whether venue is proper in this district or whether it enjoys personal jurisdiction over the moving Defendants. See 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (even if action is filed in improper venue, district court may transfer it to \"any district or division in which it might have been brought”); Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 466, 82 S.Ct. 913, 8 L.Ed.2d 39 (1962) (holding that transfer most appropriate under 28 usc 1406a", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nAbraham-son insists they are distinct companies observing all corporate formalities. (6/29/10 Abrahamson Dec. ¶ 4, 6.) 3 .As discussed below, the Court concludes that transfer of this action is appropriate. Accordingly, the standards for evaluating the other portions of Defendants' Motion — concerning personal jurisdiction and improper venue — will not be recited herein. Notably, the Court may transfer this action regardless of whether venue is proper in this district or whether it enjoys personal jurisdiction over the moving Defendants. See 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (even if action is filed in improper venue, district court may transfer it to \"any district or division in which it might have been brought”); Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 466, 82 S.Ct. 913, 8 L.Ed.2d 39 (1962) (holding that section 1406a grants district courts power to transfer cases even where personal jurisdiction is lacking", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nAbraham-son insists they are distinct companies observing all corporate formalities. (6/29/10 Abrahamson Dec. ¶ 4, 6.) 3 .As discussed below, the Court concludes that transfer of this action is appropriate. Accordingly, the standards for evaluating the other portions of Defendants' Motion — concerning personal jurisdiction and improper venue — will not be recited herein. Notably, the Court may transfer this action regardless of whether venue is proper in this district or whether it enjoys personal jurisdiction over the moving Defendants. See 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (even if action is filed in improper venue, district court may transfer it to \"any district or division in which it might have been brought”); Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 466, 82 S.Ct. 913, 8 L.Ed.2d 39 (1962) (recognizing conflicting case law regarding whether waiver under rule 12b3 extends to a request for a transfer under 1406a given that such a transfer is premised on venue being improper in this district" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\n985 (3d Cir. 1988). In this case, it is evident that Prive’s injury occurred in the context of Dr. Fabian’s business activities. Clearly if Prive had tripped while in Dr. Fabian’s office, see also Harad, supra at 985, had been exposed to disease because Dr. Fabian had improperly labeled laboratory samples, see Doe v. Doctors Bryan, Hatcher, Vick and Gastings, 623 So.2d 722 (Ct.App.La. 1993), or had injured herself moving a patient, see Duprey v. Shane, 249 P.2d 8, 13 (Ca. 1952), a medical malpractice action would not be warranted. As these cases recognize, the proper recourse for a physician’s negligence toward nonpatients is a common law claim for negligence rather than a claim for medical malpractice. See Doe, supra at 723; see also Roe v. Federal Ins. Co., 412 Mass. 43, 49-50 (1992) (holding that a patients settlement of a prior action brought against him by doctors for payment of a bill did not bar medical malpractice action against doctors", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\n985 (3d Cir. 1988). In this case, it is evident that Prive’s injury occurred in the context of Dr. Fabian’s business activities. Clearly if Prive had tripped while in Dr. Fabian’s office, see also Harad, supra at 985, had been exposed to disease because Dr. Fabian had improperly labeled laboratory samples, see Doe v. Doctors Bryan, Hatcher, Vick and Gastings, 623 So.2d 722 (Ct.App.La. 1993), or had injured herself moving a patient, see Duprey v. Shane, 249 P.2d 8, 13 (Ca. 1952), a medical malpractice action would not be warranted. As these cases recognize, the proper recourse for a physician’s negligence toward nonpatients is a common law claim for negligence rather than a claim for medical malpractice. See Doe, supra at 723; see also Roe v. Federal Ins. Co., 412 Mass. 43, 49-50 (1992) (holding that doctors conduct toward patient that does not come within penumbra of doctorpatient relationship cannot form basis for malpractice action", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\n985 (3d Cir. 1988). In this case, it is evident that Prive’s injury occurred in the context of Dr. Fabian’s business activities. Clearly if Prive had tripped while in Dr. Fabian’s office, see also Harad, supra at 985, had been exposed to disease because Dr. Fabian had improperly labeled laboratory samples, see Doe v. Doctors Bryan, Hatcher, Vick and Gastings, 623 So.2d 722 (Ct.App.La. 1993), or had injured herself moving a patient, see Duprey v. Shane, 249 P.2d 8, 13 (Ca. 1952), a medical malpractice action would not be warranted. As these cases recognize, the proper recourse for a physician’s negligence toward nonpatients is a common law claim for negligence rather than a claim for medical malpractice. See Doe, supra at 723; see also Roe v. Federal Ins. Co., 412 Mass. 43, 49-50 (1992) (holding that doctors may limit the extent of their responsibility to patients by narrowing the scope of the doctorpatient relationship", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\n985 (3d Cir. 1988). In this case, it is evident that Prive’s injury occurred in the context of Dr. Fabian’s business activities. Clearly if Prive had tripped while in Dr. Fabian’s office, see also Harad, supra at 985, had been exposed to disease because Dr. Fabian had improperly labeled laboratory samples, see Doe v. Doctors Bryan, Hatcher, Vick and Gastings, 623 So.2d 722 (Ct.App.La. 1993), or had injured herself moving a patient, see Duprey v. Shane, 249 P.2d 8, 13 (Ca. 1952), a medical malpractice action would not be warranted. As these cases recognize, the proper recourse for a physician’s negligence toward nonpatients is a common law claim for negligence rather than a claim for medical malpractice. See Doe, supra at 723; see also Roe v. Federal Ins. Co., 412 Mass. 43, 49-50 (1992) (holding that provision would not be enforced due to that fact that the doctorpatient relationship is special and entitled to unique protection", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\n985 (3d Cir. 1988). In this case, it is evident that Prive’s injury occurred in the context of Dr. Fabian’s business activities. Clearly if Prive had tripped while in Dr. Fabian’s office, see also Harad, supra at 985, had been exposed to disease because Dr. Fabian had improperly labeled laboratory samples, see Doe v. Doctors Bryan, Hatcher, Vick and Gastings, 623 So.2d 722 (Ct.App.La. 1993), or had injured herself moving a patient, see Duprey v. Shane, 249 P.2d 8, 13 (Ca. 1952), a medical malpractice action would not be warranted. As these cases recognize, the proper recourse for a physician’s negligence toward nonpatients is a common law claim for negligence rather than a claim for medical malpractice. See Doe, supra at 723; see also Roe v. Federal Ins. Co., 412 Mass. 43, 49-50 (1992) (holding that an obligation imposed by statute cannot form the basis for a statutory employer relationship" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nbright line rule designed to exclude the use of state wrongful death statutes for deaths occurring within territorial waters. See, e.g., Moragne, supra, 398 U.S. at 401, n. 15, 90 S.Ct. at 1788 n. 15; Neal v. Barisich, Inc., supra at 866-867; Matter of S.S. Helena, 529 F.2d 744, 752 (5 Cir.1976). However, “it appears that [that] choice of law question is not relevant to disposition of [the now pending] summary judgment motion ... [because plaintiffs’ state claims] are not permitted [in any event] where they would be in conflict with the applicable substantive admiralty law”. Icelandic Coast Guard v. United Technologies Corp., 722 F.Supp. 942, 949 (D.Conn.1989) (Cabranes, J.); see also Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 222, 106 S.Ct. 2485, 2494, 91 L.Ed.2d 174 (1986) (holding that wrongful death actions asserted under admiralty jurisdiction lie under general maritime law for death caused by violation of maritime duties and are not limited to standards of liability created by state law", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nbright line rule designed to exclude the use of state wrongful death statutes for deaths occurring within territorial waters. See, e.g., Moragne, supra, 398 U.S. at 401, n. 15, 90 S.Ct. at 1788 n. 15; Neal v. Barisich, Inc., supra at 866-867; Matter of S.S. Helena, 529 F.2d 744, 752 (5 Cir.1976). However, “it appears that [that] choice of law question is not relevant to disposition of [the now pending] summary judgment motion ... [because plaintiffs’ state claims] are not permitted [in any event] where they would be in conflict with the applicable substantive admiralty law”. Icelandic Coast Guard v. United Technologies Corp., 722 F.Supp. 942, 949 (D.Conn.1989) (Cabranes, J.); see also Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 222, 106 S.Ct. 2485, 2494, 91 L.Ed.2d 174 (1986) (holding that federal courts should apply state substantive law", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nbright line rule designed to exclude the use of state wrongful death statutes for deaths occurring within territorial waters. See, e.g., Moragne, supra, 398 U.S. at 401, n. 15, 90 S.Ct. at 1788 n. 15; Neal v. Barisich, Inc., supra at 866-867; Matter of S.S. Helena, 529 F.2d 744, 752 (5 Cir.1976). However, “it appears that [that] choice of law question is not relevant to disposition of [the now pending] summary judgment motion ... [because plaintiffs’ state claims] are not permitted [in any event] where they would be in conflict with the applicable substantive admiralty law”. Icelandic Coast Guard v. United Technologies Corp., 722 F.Supp. 942, 949 (D.Conn.1989) (Cabranes, J.); see also Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 222, 106 S.Ct. 2485, 2494, 91 L.Ed.2d 174 (1986) (holding that reverseerie doctrine requires that substantive remedies afforded by state law conform to federal maritime standards", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nbright line rule designed to exclude the use of state wrongful death statutes for deaths occurring within territorial waters. See, e.g., Moragne, supra, 398 U.S. at 401, n. 15, 90 S.Ct. at 1788 n. 15; Neal v. Barisich, Inc., supra at 866-867; Matter of S.S. Helena, 529 F.2d 744, 752 (5 Cir.1976). However, “it appears that [that] choice of law question is not relevant to disposition of [the now pending] summary judgment motion ... [because plaintiffs’ state claims] are not permitted [in any event] where they would be in conflict with the applicable substantive admiralty law”. Icelandic Coast Guard v. United Technologies Corp., 722 F.Supp. 942, 949 (D.Conn.1989) (Cabranes, J.); see also Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 222, 106 S.Ct. 2485, 2494, 91 L.Ed.2d 174 (1986) (holding that general maritime law preempts state law", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nbright line rule designed to exclude the use of state wrongful death statutes for deaths occurring within territorial waters. See, e.g., Moragne, supra, 398 U.S. at 401, n. 15, 90 S.Ct. at 1788 n. 15; Neal v. Barisich, Inc., supra at 866-867; Matter of S.S. Helena, 529 F.2d 744, 752 (5 Cir.1976). However, “it appears that [that] choice of law question is not relevant to disposition of [the now pending] summary judgment motion ... [because plaintiffs’ state claims] are not permitted [in any event] where they would be in conflict with the applicable substantive admiralty law”. Icelandic Coast Guard v. United Technologies Corp., 722 F.Supp. 942, 949 (D.Conn.1989) (Cabranes, J.); see also Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 222, 106 S.Ct. 2485, 2494, 91 L.Ed.2d 174 (1986) (holding that jurisdiction must be resolved before applying the act of state doctrine because that doctrine is a substantive rule of law" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\npublic interest.” Administrative agencies are far better suited than áre courts to make determinations based on the broad policy question of what is in the “public interest.” Third, § 925(c) contains a restriction on the consideration of new evidence by the district courts, stating; “The court may in its discretion admit additional evidence where failure to do so would result in a miscarriage of justice.” This constraint on the admission of evidence suggests that the initial adjudication of applications is limited to the Secretary of the Treasury. We therefore conclude that Congress in tended for district court review to be contingent on an initial consideration of an application by the Secretary. See Saccacio v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 211 F.3d 102, 104 (4th Cir.2000) (holding that persons seeking restoration of federal firearms privileges need not exhaust administrative remedies to invoke the judicial review provision of section 925c", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\npublic interest.” Administrative agencies are far better suited than áre courts to make determinations based on the broad policy question of what is in the “public interest.” Third, § 925(c) contains a restriction on the consideration of new evidence by the district courts, stating; “The court may in its discretion admit additional evidence where failure to do so would result in a miscarriage of justice.” This constraint on the admission of evidence suggests that the initial adjudication of applications is limited to the Secretary of the Treasury. We therefore conclude that Congress in tended for district court review to be contingent on an initial consideration of an application by the Secretary. See Saccacio v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 211 F.3d 102, 104 (4th Cir.2000) (holding that congress clearly intended to suspend 925c relief by denial of funding for investigating and processing applications under the statute and denying writ of mandamus", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\npublic interest.” Administrative agencies are far better suited than áre courts to make determinations based on the broad policy question of what is in the “public interest.” Third, § 925(c) contains a restriction on the consideration of new evidence by the district courts, stating; “The court may in its discretion admit additional evidence where failure to do so would result in a miscarriage of justice.” This constraint on the admission of evidence suggests that the initial adjudication of applications is limited to the Secretary of the Treasury. We therefore conclude that Congress in tended for district court review to be contingent on an initial consideration of an application by the Secretary. See Saccacio v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 211 F.3d 102, 104 (4th Cir.2000) (holding that section 925c authorizes judicial review of only the denial of an application for relief", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\npublic interest.” Administrative agencies are far better suited than áre courts to make determinations based on the broad policy question of what is in the “public interest.” Third, § 925(c) contains a restriction on the consideration of new evidence by the district courts, stating; “The court may in its discretion admit additional evidence where failure to do so would result in a miscarriage of justice.” This constraint on the admission of evidence suggests that the initial adjudication of applications is limited to the Secretary of the Treasury. We therefore conclude that Congress in tended for district court review to be contingent on an initial consideration of an application by the Secretary. See Saccacio v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 211 F.3d 102, 104 (4th Cir.2000) (holding that the only role for the judiciary is judicial review of a denial of relief under 925c", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\npublic interest.” Administrative agencies are far better suited than áre courts to make determinations based on the broad policy question of what is in the “public interest.” Third, § 925(c) contains a restriction on the consideration of new evidence by the district courts, stating; “The court may in its discretion admit additional evidence where failure to do so would result in a miscarriage of justice.” This constraint on the admission of evidence suggests that the initial adjudication of applications is limited to the Secretary of the Treasury. We therefore conclude that Congress in tended for district court review to be contingent on an initial consideration of an application by the Secretary. See Saccacio v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 211 F.3d 102, 104 (4th Cir.2000) (holding that the standard of review is abuse of discretion and an appeal from denial of rule 60b relief does not bring up the underlying judgment for review" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwarnings. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Chapman, 388 N.E.2d 541, 553 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979). The court reasoned that the competency of an expert witness has never been limited to only those facts he or she has learned from personal demonstration. Instead, the court explained, \"where a witness exhibits such a degree of knowledge, gained from experiments, observation, standard books, or other reliable source, as to make it appear that his opinion is of some value, he is entitled to testify.\" Id. Exide cites several cases as support for the proposition that \"mere practical knowledge and frequent use of a product does not qualify the user as an expert on ... warnings.\" However, none of these cases support this proposition. See, e.g., McCullock v. H.B. Fuller Co., 981 F.2d 656 (2nd Cir. 1992) (holding that warnings given to a witness by the trial court and the prosecutor concerning the possibility that testifying could place the witness in jeopardy of revocation of his plea agreement and charges of perjury or false statement did not violate the defendants due process rights because the warnings merely corroborated in a straightforward and nonthreatening manner the information given by the witness attorney", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwarnings. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Chapman, 388 N.E.2d 541, 553 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979). The court reasoned that the competency of an expert witness has never been limited to only those facts he or she has learned from personal demonstration. Instead, the court explained, \"where a witness exhibits such a degree of knowledge, gained from experiments, observation, standard books, or other reliable source, as to make it appear that his opinion is of some value, he is entitled to testify.\" Id. Exide cites several cases as support for the proposition that \"mere practical knowledge and frequent use of a product does not qualify the user as an expert on ... warnings.\" However, none of these cases support this proposition. See, e.g., McCullock v. H.B. Fuller Co., 981 F.2d 656 (2nd Cir. 1992) (holding witness was not qualified to opine on the adequacy of the warnings of a specialized glue because he lacked expertise in either the product was not a chemical engineer toxicologist or an environmental engineer or the design of warning labels", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwarnings. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Chapman, 388 N.E.2d 541, 553 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979). The court reasoned that the competency of an expert witness has never been limited to only those facts he or she has learned from personal demonstration. Instead, the court explained, \"where a witness exhibits such a degree of knowledge, gained from experiments, observation, standard books, or other reliable source, as to make it appear that his opinion is of some value, he is entitled to testify.\" Id. Exide cites several cases as support for the proposition that \"mere practical knowledge and frequent use of a product does not qualify the user as an expert on ... warnings.\" However, none of these cases support this proposition. See, e.g., McCullock v. H.B. Fuller Co., 981 F.2d 656 (2nd Cir. 1992) (holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding testimony of mechanical engineer in products liability case involving automobile because expert did not have specific experience regarding subject matter of lawsuit", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwarnings. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Chapman, 388 N.E.2d 541, 553 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979). The court reasoned that the competency of an expert witness has never been limited to only those facts he or she has learned from personal demonstration. Instead, the court explained, \"where a witness exhibits such a degree of knowledge, gained from experiments, observation, standard books, or other reliable source, as to make it appear that his opinion is of some value, he is entitled to testify.\" Id. Exide cites several cases as support for the proposition that \"mere practical knowledge and frequent use of a product does not qualify the user as an expert on ... warnings.\" However, none of these cases support this proposition. See, e.g., McCullock v. H.B. Fuller Co., 981 F.2d 656 (2nd Cir. 1992) (holding that the shape of a product was not an advertising idea because there was no allegation in the complaint that the design itself was a trademark or was intended to distinguish the product from others that might enter the market citation omitted", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwarnings. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Chapman, 388 N.E.2d 541, 553 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979). The court reasoned that the competency of an expert witness has never been limited to only those facts he or she has learned from personal demonstration. Instead, the court explained, \"where a witness exhibits such a degree of knowledge, gained from experiments, observation, standard books, or other reliable source, as to make it appear that his opinion is of some value, he is entitled to testify.\" Id. Exide cites several cases as support for the proposition that \"mere practical knowledge and frequent use of a product does not qualify the user as an expert on ... warnings.\" However, none of these cases support this proposition. See, e.g., McCullock v. H.B. Fuller Co., 981 F.2d 656 (2nd Cir. 1992) (holding that it was not an abuse of discretion for district court to allow a mechanical engineer to give expert testimony about a machine with which the engineer had no design experience" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nBankruptcy Act of 1898 provided in relevant part: \"A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable debts, whether allowable in full or in part, except such as ... are liabilities for obtaining money or property by false pretenses or false representations....” 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(2) (re pealed 1978). The commentary in Collier on Bankruptcy suggests that the addition of \"actual fraud” simply clarifies the limited scope of the fraud exception: The addition of the words “or actual fraud” probably makes no change in the law as it existed prior to enactment of the [Bankruptcy Act of 1978] because false pretenses and representations were construed to mean acts involving moral turpitude or intentional wrong.... In any event, section 523(a)(2)(A) was intend (7th Cir.) (holding that jurys determination is not binding on courts ch 93a decision", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nBankruptcy Act of 1898 provided in relevant part: \"A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable debts, whether allowable in full or in part, except such as ... are liabilities for obtaining money or property by false pretenses or false representations....” 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(2) (re pealed 1978). The commentary in Collier on Bankruptcy suggests that the addition of \"actual fraud” simply clarifies the limited scope of the fraud exception: The addition of the words “or actual fraud” probably makes no change in the law as it existed prior to enactment of the [Bankruptcy Act of 1978] because false pretenses and representations were construed to mean acts involving moral turpitude or intentional wrong.... In any event, section 523(a)(2)(A) was intend (7th Cir.) (holding that injunctive relief was unwarranted when the jurys award already included prospective relief", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nBankruptcy Act of 1898 provided in relevant part: \"A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable debts, whether allowable in full or in part, except such as ... are liabilities for obtaining money or property by false pretenses or false representations....” 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(2) (re pealed 1978). The commentary in Collier on Bankruptcy suggests that the addition of \"actual fraud” simply clarifies the limited scope of the fraud exception: The addition of the words “or actual fraud” probably makes no change in the law as it existed prior to enactment of the [Bankruptcy Act of 1978] because false pretenses and representations were construed to mean acts involving moral turpitude or intentional wrong.... In any event, section 523(a)(2)(A) was intend (7th Cir.) (holding damages do not constitute other equitable relief", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nBankruptcy Act of 1898 provided in relevant part: \"A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable debts, whether allowable in full or in part, except such as ... are liabilities for obtaining money or property by false pretenses or false representations....” 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(2) (re pealed 1978). The commentary in Collier on Bankruptcy suggests that the addition of \"actual fraud” simply clarifies the limited scope of the fraud exception: The addition of the words “or actual fraud” probably makes no change in the law as it existed prior to enactment of the [Bankruptcy Act of 1978] because false pretenses and representations were construed to mean acts involving moral turpitude or intentional wrong.... In any event, section 523(a)(2)(A) was intend (7th Cir.) (holding jurys finding of liability on partys claim does not bestow prevailing party status when party received no relief on that claim", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nBankruptcy Act of 1898 provided in relevant part: \"A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable debts, whether allowable in full or in part, except such as ... are liabilities for obtaining money or property by false pretenses or false representations....” 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(2) (re pealed 1978). The commentary in Collier on Bankruptcy suggests that the addition of \"actual fraud” simply clarifies the limited scope of the fraud exception: The addition of the words “or actual fraud” probably makes no change in the law as it existed prior to enactment of the [Bankruptcy Act of 1978] because false pretenses and representations were construed to mean acts involving moral turpitude or intentional wrong.... In any event, section 523(a)(2)(A) was intend (7th Cir.) (holding that jurys finding was binding on court considering claim for equitable relief" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nmembership dues were actually waived by the Local and that membership status was conferred without any payments. Furthermore, it is clear that the IBT and the Local did not consider or treat the nurses as members since they paid the striking nurses “Out-of-W0rk” benefits at the “non-member” rate. Plaintiffs argue that the president of Local 803 had at least apparent authority, if not actual authority as a union agent, to waive dues and confer membership status upon the plaintiffs, and that Local 803 and the IBT ratified his actions. Thus, they contend, the Local and the IBT should be estopped from disclaiming plaintiffs’ membership status now. Agency theory may well apply to some acts of union officials. See Rodonich v. House Wreckers Union Local 95, 817 F.2d 967, 972 (2d Cir.1987) (holding that the breach occurs when the union acts against the interest of its members", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nmembership dues were actually waived by the Local and that membership status was conferred without any payments. Furthermore, it is clear that the IBT and the Local did not consider or treat the nurses as members since they paid the striking nurses “Out-of-W0rk” benefits at the “non-member” rate. Plaintiffs argue that the president of Local 803 had at least apparent authority, if not actual authority as a union agent, to waive dues and confer membership status upon the plaintiffs, and that Local 803 and the IBT ratified his actions. Thus, they contend, the Local and the IBT should be estopped from disclaiming plaintiffs’ membership status now. Agency theory may well apply to some acts of union officials. See Rodonich v. House Wreckers Union Local 95, 817 F.2d 967, 972 (2d Cir.1987) (holding union members state law claims for defamation against union preempted", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nmembership dues were actually waived by the Local and that membership status was conferred without any payments. Furthermore, it is clear that the IBT and the Local did not consider or treat the nurses as members since they paid the striking nurses “Out-of-W0rk” benefits at the “non-member” rate. Plaintiffs argue that the president of Local 803 had at least apparent authority, if not actual authority as a union agent, to waive dues and confer membership status upon the plaintiffs, and that Local 803 and the IBT ratified his actions. Thus, they contend, the Local and the IBT should be estopped from disclaiming plaintiffs’ membership status now. Agency theory may well apply to some acts of union officials. See Rodonich v. House Wreckers Union Local 95, 817 F.2d 967, 972 (2d Cir.1987) (recognizing that union members interests are adequately represented by the union", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nmembership dues were actually waived by the Local and that membership status was conferred without any payments. Furthermore, it is clear that the IBT and the Local did not consider or treat the nurses as members since they paid the striking nurses “Out-of-W0rk” benefits at the “non-member” rate. Plaintiffs argue that the president of Local 803 had at least apparent authority, if not actual authority as a union agent, to waive dues and confer membership status upon the plaintiffs, and that Local 803 and the IBT ratified his actions. Thus, they contend, the Local and the IBT should be estopped from disclaiming plaintiffs’ membership status now. Agency theory may well apply to some acts of union officials. See Rodonich v. House Wreckers Union Local 95, 817 F.2d 967, 972 (2d Cir.1987) (holding that ratification by a union of disciplinary acts of the local leadership against members would occur if the union affirmed the discipline with full knowledge that it was part of an overall scheme to suppress dissent in violation of the lmrda", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nmembership dues were actually waived by the Local and that membership status was conferred without any payments. Furthermore, it is clear that the IBT and the Local did not consider or treat the nurses as members since they paid the striking nurses “Out-of-W0rk” benefits at the “non-member” rate. Plaintiffs argue that the president of Local 803 had at least apparent authority, if not actual authority as a union agent, to waive dues and confer membership status upon the plaintiffs, and that Local 803 and the IBT ratified his actions. Thus, they contend, the Local and the IBT should be estopped from disclaiming plaintiffs’ membership status now. Agency theory may well apply to some acts of union officials. See Rodonich v. House Wreckers Union Local 95, 817 F.2d 967, 972 (2d Cir.1987) (holding that the plaintiffs acted on behalf of all union members and reimbursing the attorneys fees from the union treasury such that all union members in effect equally contributed to the costs of litigation" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nwho commits any felony has the requisite mens rea to commit first-degree murder is a legal fiction we no longer can support. In felony murder cases where the felony is a first-degree felony such a presumption is appropriate, but not where the felony is of a lesser degree. This presumption is inappropriate today for lesser-degree felonies where moral, social, and penal considerations dictate that criminal liability should be imposed according to moral culpability. Thu 494 (1958) (stating that the mere violation of a traffic safety statute is an insufficient predicate for felonious slaying, that it requires “recklessness of probable consequences of a dangerous nature, when tested by the rule of reasonable prevision”); State v. Collins, 67 Ohio St.3d 115, 616 N.E.2d 224, 226 (Ohio 1993) (holding that a conclusion that reasonable suspicion supported the stop of a vehicle was subsumed within the trial courts ruling that the officer had probable cause for the stop", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nwho commits any felony has the requisite mens rea to commit first-degree murder is a legal fiction we no longer can support. In felony murder cases where the felony is a first-degree felony such a presumption is appropriate, but not where the felony is of a lesser degree. This presumption is inappropriate today for lesser-degree felonies where moral, social, and penal considerations dictate that criminal liability should be imposed according to moral culpability. Thu 494 (1958) (stating that the mere violation of a traffic safety statute is an insufficient predicate for felonious slaying, that it requires “recklessness of probable consequences of a dangerous nature, when tested by the rule of reasonable prevision”); State v. Collins, 67 Ohio St.3d 115, 616 N.E.2d 224, 226 (Ohio 1993) (holding that the constitutional reasonableness of a traffic stop did not depend on the actual motivation of the officer involved as long as the officer articulated a lawful reason for the stop", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nwho commits any felony has the requisite mens rea to commit first-degree murder is a legal fiction we no longer can support. In felony murder cases where the felony is a first-degree felony such a presumption is appropriate, but not where the felony is of a lesser degree. This presumption is inappropriate today for lesser-degree felonies where moral, social, and penal considerations dictate that criminal liability should be imposed according to moral culpability. Thu 494 (1958) (stating that the mere violation of a traffic safety statute is an insufficient predicate for felonious slaying, that it requires “recklessness of probable consequences of a dangerous nature, when tested by the rule of reasonable prevision”); State v. Collins, 67 Ohio St.3d 115, 616 N.E.2d 224, 226 (Ohio 1993) (holding that the forceable stop at issue was an investigatory stop rather than an arrest", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nwho commits any felony has the requisite mens rea to commit first-degree murder is a legal fiction we no longer can support. In felony murder cases where the felony is a first-degree felony such a presumption is appropriate, but not where the felony is of a lesser degree. This presumption is inappropriate today for lesser-degree felonies where moral, social, and penal considerations dictate that criminal liability should be imposed according to moral culpability. Thu 494 (1958) (stating that the mere violation of a traffic safety statute is an insufficient predicate for felonious slaying, that it requires “recklessness of probable consequences of a dangerous nature, when tested by the rule of reasonable prevision”); State v. Collins, 67 Ohio St.3d 115, 616 N.E.2d 224, 226 (Ohio 1993) (holding that the misdemeanormanslaughter rule requires a showing of intent or the commission of an act in such a maimer as to make the killing of deceased a natural or probable result of such conduct", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nwho commits any felony has the requisite mens rea to commit first-degree murder is a legal fiction we no longer can support. In felony murder cases where the felony is a first-degree felony such a presumption is appropriate, but not where the felony is of a lesser degree. This presumption is inappropriate today for lesser-degree felonies where moral, social, and penal considerations dictate that criminal liability should be imposed according to moral culpability. Thu 494 (1958) (stating that the mere violation of a traffic safety statute is an insufficient predicate for felonious slaying, that it requires “recklessness of probable consequences of a dangerous nature, when tested by the rule of reasonable prevision”); State v. Collins, 67 Ohio St.3d 115, 616 N.E.2d 224, 226 (Ohio 1993) (holding that a minormisdemeanor such as the failure to stop at a stop sign could not be a predicate offence for misdemeanormanslaughter because it did not show the necessary intent or recklessness" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nafter Wisconsin adopted § 904.085 in 1993, for example, contains an express exception allowing a party to admit evidence of mediation communications for the purpose of “prov[ing] a claim to rescind or reform or a defense to avoid liability on a contract arising out of the mediation.” See Uniform Mediation Act, The National Conference of Commis sioners on Uniform State Laws, § 6(b)(2), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/ Act.aspx?title=Mediation Act (last visited Oct. 30, 2014)'. Although one might contend it is unjust that a person like Doe cannot recover if he was in fact fraudulently induced into signing a settlement agreement, our task is to apply the Wisconsin statute as it is written. Cf. Rojas v. Superior Court, 33 Cal.4th 407, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 643, 93 P.3d 260, 265 (2004) (recognizing the validity of a rule 26c confidentiality order entered on good cause", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nafter Wisconsin adopted § 904.085 in 1993, for example, contains an express exception allowing a party to admit evidence of mediation communications for the purpose of “prov[ing] a claim to rescind or reform or a defense to avoid liability on a contract arising out of the mediation.” See Uniform Mediation Act, The National Conference of Commis sioners on Uniform State Laws, § 6(b)(2), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/ Act.aspx?title=Mediation Act (last visited Oct. 30, 2014)'. Although one might contend it is unjust that a person like Doe cannot recover if he was in fact fraudulently induced into signing a settlement agreement, our task is to apply the Wisconsin statute as it is written. Cf. Rojas v. Superior Court, 33 Cal.4th 407, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 643, 93 P.3d 260, 265 (2004) (recognizing a corporations legal rights to confidentiality and privilege", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nafter Wisconsin adopted § 904.085 in 1993, for example, contains an express exception allowing a party to admit evidence of mediation communications for the purpose of “prov[ing] a claim to rescind or reform or a defense to avoid liability on a contract arising out of the mediation.” See Uniform Mediation Act, The National Conference of Commis sioners on Uniform State Laws, § 6(b)(2), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/ Act.aspx?title=Mediation Act (last visited Oct. 30, 2014)'. Although one might contend it is unjust that a person like Doe cannot recover if he was in fact fraudulently induced into signing a settlement agreement, our task is to apply the Wisconsin statute as it is written. Cf. Rojas v. Superior Court, 33 Cal.4th 407, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 643, 93 P.3d 260, 265 (2004) (recognizing a federal mediation privilege", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nafter Wisconsin adopted § 904.085 in 1993, for example, contains an express exception allowing a party to admit evidence of mediation communications for the purpose of “prov[ing] a claim to rescind or reform or a defense to avoid liability on a contract arising out of the mediation.” See Uniform Mediation Act, The National Conference of Commis sioners on Uniform State Laws, § 6(b)(2), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/ Act.aspx?title=Mediation Act (last visited Oct. 30, 2014)'. Although one might contend it is unjust that a person like Doe cannot recover if he was in fact fraudulently induced into signing a settlement agreement, our task is to apply the Wisconsin statute as it is written. Cf. Rojas v. Superior Court, 33 Cal.4th 407, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 643, 93 P.3d 260, 265 (2004) (holding california mediation privilege was not subject to good cause exception because only exceptions to mediation confidentiality were those expressly provided in statute", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nafter Wisconsin adopted § 904.085 in 1993, for example, contains an express exception allowing a party to admit evidence of mediation communications for the purpose of “prov[ing] a claim to rescind or reform or a defense to avoid liability on a contract arising out of the mediation.” See Uniform Mediation Act, The National Conference of Commis sioners on Uniform State Laws, § 6(b)(2), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/ Act.aspx?title=Mediation Act (last visited Oct. 30, 2014)'. Although one might contend it is unjust that a person like Doe cannot recover if he was in fact fraudulently induced into signing a settlement agreement, our task is to apply the Wisconsin statute as it is written. Cf. Rojas v. Superior Court, 33 Cal.4th 407, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 643, 93 P.3d 260, 265 (2004) (recognizing an exception to a california announcement and entry statute" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nSummary Judgment (Doc. 41) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Mr. Aubin is entitled to summary judgment on his state law false arrest claim. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Strike (Doc. 81) is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (Doc. 119) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Plaintiffs’ state law failure to train claim is DISMISSED. 1 . Plaintiffs state law failure to train claim is dismissed because it is expressly barred by La. R.S. § 9:2798. 1(B), which provides public officials with immunity for discretionary functions like training. See Smith v. Lafayette Parish Sheriffs Dpt., 874 So.2d 863, 867 (La. Ct. App. 2004); Hoffpauir v. Columbia Cas. Co., No. 12-CV-403, 2013 WL 5934699, at *12 (M. D. La. Nov. 5, 2013) (holding that public officials are immune from suit for discretionary functions like training under louisiana law", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nSummary Judgment (Doc. 41) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Mr. Aubin is entitled to summary judgment on his state law false arrest claim. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Strike (Doc. 81) is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (Doc. 119) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Plaintiffs’ state law failure to train claim is DISMISSED. 1 . Plaintiffs state law failure to train claim is dismissed because it is expressly barred by La. R.S. § 9:2798. 1(B), which provides public officials with immunity for discretionary functions like training. See Smith v. Lafayette Parish Sheriffs Dpt., 874 So.2d 863, 867 (La. Ct. App. 2004); Hoffpauir v. Columbia Cas. Co., No. 12-CV-403, 2013 WL 5934699, at *12 (M. D. La. Nov. 5, 2013) (holding that quasijudicial immunity extends only to officials who perform discretionary functions", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nSummary Judgment (Doc. 41) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Mr. Aubin is entitled to summary judgment on his state law false arrest claim. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Strike (Doc. 81) is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (Doc. 119) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Plaintiffs’ state law failure to train claim is DISMISSED. 1 . Plaintiffs state law failure to train claim is dismissed because it is expressly barred by La. R.S. § 9:2798. 1(B), which provides public officials with immunity for discretionary functions like training. See Smith v. Lafayette Parish Sheriffs Dpt., 874 So.2d 863, 867 (La. Ct. App. 2004); Hoffpauir v. Columbia Cas. Co., No. 12-CV-403, 2013 WL 5934699, at *12 (M. D. La. Nov. 5, 2013) (holding state immune from suit brought in state court", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nSummary Judgment (Doc. 41) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Mr. Aubin is entitled to summary judgment on his state law false arrest claim. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Strike (Doc. 81) is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (Doc. 119) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Plaintiffs’ state law failure to train claim is DISMISSED. 1 . Plaintiffs state law failure to train claim is dismissed because it is expressly barred by La. R.S. § 9:2798. 1(B), which provides public officials with immunity for discretionary functions like training. See Smith v. Lafayette Parish Sheriffs Dpt., 874 So.2d 863, 867 (La. Ct. App. 2004); Hoffpauir v. Columbia Cas. Co., No. 12-CV-403, 2013 WL 5934699, at *12 (M. D. La. Nov. 5, 2013) (holding that qualified immunity extends to government officials performing discretionary functions", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nSummary Judgment (Doc. 41) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Mr. Aubin is entitled to summary judgment on his state law false arrest claim. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Strike (Doc. 81) is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (Doc. 119) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Plaintiffs’ state law failure to train claim is DISMISSED. 1 . Plaintiffs state law failure to train claim is dismissed because it is expressly barred by La. R.S. § 9:2798. 1(B), which provides public officials with immunity for discretionary functions like training. See Smith v. Lafayette Parish Sheriffs Dpt., 874 So.2d 863, 867 (La. Ct. App. 2004); Hoffpauir v. Columbia Cas. Co., No. 12-CV-403, 2013 WL 5934699, at *12 (M. D. La. Nov. 5, 2013) (holding state immune from suit involving a federal question" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n(5th Cir.1968)). With that said, however, revisions in the law of the case occur “very infrequently” when one court is asked to review the decision of a coordinate court. See Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Computervision Corp., 732 F.2d 888, 900 (Fed.Cir.1984). Although the case at hand is not a “transfer” case in the typical sense of the term, it is nonetheless a case which was decided by a previous coordinate court on a rule of law — subject matter jurisdiction — which the Ohio District Court should have respected and used as a basis to dismiss the case. In other words, the district court should have dismissed Plaintiffs case under the law of the case doctrine based upon the rulings from the Kansas District Court. See Hayman Cash Register Co. v. Sarokin, 669 F.2d 162, 166—69 (3d Cir.1982) (holding that under the law of the case doctrine an issue of fact or law decided on appeal may not be reexamined by the appellate court on a subsequent appeal", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n(5th Cir.1968)). With that said, however, revisions in the law of the case occur “very infrequently” when one court is asked to review the decision of a coordinate court. See Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Computervision Corp., 732 F.2d 888, 900 (Fed.Cir.1984). Although the case at hand is not a “transfer” case in the typical sense of the term, it is nonetheless a case which was decided by a previous coordinate court on a rule of law — subject matter jurisdiction — which the Ohio District Court should have respected and used as a basis to dismiss the case. In other words, the district court should have dismissed Plaintiffs case under the law of the case doctrine based upon the rulings from the Kansas District Court. See Hayman Cash Register Co. v. Sarokin, 669 F.2d 162, 166—69 (3d Cir.1982) (holding that law of the case prevented the new jersey district court from redetermining jurisdictional issue previously decided by the district of columbia district court and noting that the principles of comity among courts of the same level of the federal system provide further reason why an issue already decided by a court of equal authority should not be reexamined", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n(5th Cir.1968)). With that said, however, revisions in the law of the case occur “very infrequently” when one court is asked to review the decision of a coordinate court. See Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Computervision Corp., 732 F.2d 888, 900 (Fed.Cir.1984). Although the case at hand is not a “transfer” case in the typical sense of the term, it is nonetheless a case which was decided by a previous coordinate court on a rule of law — subject matter jurisdiction — which the Ohio District Court should have respected and used as a basis to dismiss the case. In other words, the district court should have dismissed Plaintiffs case under the law of the case doctrine based upon the rulings from the Kansas District Court. See Hayman Cash Register Co. v. Sarokin, 669 F.2d 162, 166—69 (3d Cir.1982) (holding that where the district court decided two issues in the certified order but identified only the damages issue as the controlling question of law the court of appeals could nonetheless address the other issue", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n(5th Cir.1968)). With that said, however, revisions in the law of the case occur “very infrequently” when one court is asked to review the decision of a coordinate court. See Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Computervision Corp., 732 F.2d 888, 900 (Fed.Cir.1984). Although the case at hand is not a “transfer” case in the typical sense of the term, it is nonetheless a case which was decided by a previous coordinate court on a rule of law — subject matter jurisdiction — which the Ohio District Court should have respected and used as a basis to dismiss the case. In other words, the district court should have dismissed Plaintiffs case under the law of the case doctrine based upon the rulings from the Kansas District Court. See Hayman Cash Register Co. v. Sarokin, 669 F.2d 162, 166—69 (3d Cir.1982) (holding that district court lacked power to decide personal jurisdiction issue already decided by district of columbia superior court", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n(5th Cir.1968)). With that said, however, revisions in the law of the case occur “very infrequently” when one court is asked to review the decision of a coordinate court. See Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Computervision Corp., 732 F.2d 888, 900 (Fed.Cir.1984). Although the case at hand is not a “transfer” case in the typical sense of the term, it is nonetheless a case which was decided by a previous coordinate court on a rule of law — subject matter jurisdiction — which the Ohio District Court should have respected and used as a basis to dismiss the case. In other words, the district court should have dismissed Plaintiffs case under the law of the case doctrine based upon the rulings from the Kansas District Court. See Hayman Cash Register Co. v. Sarokin, 669 F.2d 162, 166—69 (3d Cir.1982) (holding that law of the case acts as a bar only when the issue in question was actually considered and decided by the first court" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nRule 29(c)). 9 . 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) states, in relevant part; It shall be unlawful for any person — (1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year; ... to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce. 10 .It is not clear whether the government attempted to demonstrate that the pistol and rifle were acquired separately and at different times or places. If they did not make such a showing, the indictment under which Alanis was charged would be duplicitous under our recent holding in United States v. Buchmeier, 255 F.3d 415, 422 (7th Cir.2001) (holding that without such a showing the government may only charge the defendant with one violation of 922g1 regardless of the actual quantity of firearms involved", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nRule 29(c)). 9 . 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) states, in relevant part; It shall be unlawful for any person — (1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year; ... to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce. 10 .It is not clear whether the government attempted to demonstrate that the pistol and rifle were acquired separately and at different times or places. If they did not make such a showing, the indictment under which Alanis was charged would be duplicitous under our recent holding in United States v. Buchmeier, 255 F.3d 415, 422 (7th Cir.2001) (holding that when the indictment charges that a certain minimum quantity of drugs is involved in the offense proof of that quantity is a fourth element of the offense", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nRule 29(c)). 9 . 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) states, in relevant part; It shall be unlawful for any person — (1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year; ... to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce. 10 .It is not clear whether the government attempted to demonstrate that the pistol and rifle were acquired separately and at different times or places. If they did not make such a showing, the indictment under which Alanis was charged would be duplicitous under our recent holding in United States v. Buchmeier, 255 F.3d 415, 422 (7th Cir.2001) (holding that a prior conviction ie one for which the civil right to possess a firearm has not been restored is an element of a 922g1 violation", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nRule 29(c)). 9 . 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) states, in relevant part; It shall be unlawful for any person — (1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year; ... to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce. 10 .It is not clear whether the government attempted to demonstrate that the pistol and rifle were acquired separately and at different times or places. If they did not make such a showing, the indictment under which Alanis was charged would be duplicitous under our recent holding in United States v. Buchmeier, 255 F.3d 415, 422 (7th Cir.2001) (holding that the quantity of drugs involved in an offense does not support a downward departure because the legislature intended the quantity of drugs to be a determining factor in varying penalties", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nRule 29(c)). 9 . 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) states, in relevant part; It shall be unlawful for any person — (1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year; ... to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce. 10 .It is not clear whether the government attempted to demonstrate that the pistol and rifle were acquired separately and at different times or places. If they did not make such a showing, the indictment under which Alanis was charged would be duplicitous under our recent holding in United States v. Buchmeier, 255 F.3d 415, 422 (7th Cir.2001) (holding that because a jury need only agree that a defendant possessed a firearm in order to find a defendant guilty of violating 922g1 a unanimity instruction was not required where defendant was charged with one count of violating 922g1 and multiple firearms were listed in that count" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nnot limited to claiming an abstract concept or algorithm (i.e., a mental process) may not be subject to the same requirements. 13 . See also Diehr, 450 U.S. at 184, 101 S.Ct. 1048 (\"Industrial processes ... are the types which have historically been eligible to receive the protection of our patent laws.” (emphasis added)); Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 722, 26 L.Ed. 279 (1880) (‘‘A manufacturing process is clearly an art, within the meaning of the law.” (emphasis added)); Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788, 24 L.Ed. 139 (1876) (\"A process is a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a given result. It is an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a different state or thing.”). 14 . See AT & T, 172 F.3d at 1355, 1358 (holding that the trier of fact must consider the length of time and manner of use of trade dress the nature and extent of its use and efforts made in order to promote a conscious connection in the publics mind between the mark and the particular source of origin", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nnot limited to claiming an abstract concept or algorithm (i.e., a mental process) may not be subject to the same requirements. 13 . See also Diehr, 450 U.S. at 184, 101 S.Ct. 1048 (\"Industrial processes ... are the types which have historically been eligible to receive the protection of our patent laws.” (emphasis added)); Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 722, 26 L.Ed. 279 (1880) (‘‘A manufacturing process is clearly an art, within the meaning of the law.” (emphasis added)); Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788, 24 L.Ed. 139 (1876) (\"A process is a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a given result. It is an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a different state or thing.”). 14 . See AT & T, 172 F.3d at 1355, 1358 (holding the measure of damages is the difference between the value of the automobile prior to the upset and its value when prepared and presented to the plaintiff for acceptance", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nnot limited to claiming an abstract concept or algorithm (i.e., a mental process) may not be subject to the same requirements. 13 . See also Diehr, 450 U.S. at 184, 101 S.Ct. 1048 (\"Industrial processes ... are the types which have historically been eligible to receive the protection of our patent laws.” (emphasis added)); Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 722, 26 L.Ed. 279 (1880) (‘‘A manufacturing process is clearly an art, within the meaning of the law.” (emphasis added)); Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788, 24 L.Ed. 139 (1876) (\"A process is a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a given result. It is an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a different state or thing.”). 14 . See AT & T, 172 F.3d at 1355, 1358 (holding the aggregate value of the land and its improvements is the controlling value", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nnot limited to claiming an abstract concept or algorithm (i.e., a mental process) may not be subject to the same requirements. 13 . See also Diehr, 450 U.S. at 184, 101 S.Ct. 1048 (\"Industrial processes ... are the types which have historically been eligible to receive the protection of our patent laws.” (emphasis added)); Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 722, 26 L.Ed. 279 (1880) (‘‘A manufacturing process is clearly an art, within the meaning of the law.” (emphasis added)); Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788, 24 L.Ed. 139 (1876) (\"A process is a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a given result. It is an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a different state or thing.”). 14 . See AT & T, 172 F.3d at 1355, 1358 (holding that to establish a claim for abuse of process a claimant must demonstrate an act in the use of the process not proper in the regular prosecution of the proceedings", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nnot limited to claiming an abstract concept or algorithm (i.e., a mental process) may not be subject to the same requirements. 13 . See also Diehr, 450 U.S. at 184, 101 S.Ct. 1048 (\"Industrial processes ... are the types which have historically been eligible to receive the protection of our patent laws.” (emphasis added)); Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 722, 26 L.Ed. 279 (1880) (‘‘A manufacturing process is clearly an art, within the meaning of the law.” (emphasis added)); Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788, 24 L.Ed. 139 (1876) (\"A process is a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a given result. It is an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a different state or thing.”). 14 . See AT & T, 172 F.3d at 1355, 1358 (holding patentable a process that uses the boolean principle in order to determine the value of the pic indicator and that required the use of switches and computers" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nThose requirements include: (1) written notice to the parolee of the alleged parole violations, (2) disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him, (3) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence, (4) right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, (5) neutral and detached hearing body, and (6) written statement by the fact-finder as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole. Moreover, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that the requirements of due process include informing a defendant of the range of penalties involved in the crime with which he is being charged. Commonwealth v. Zanine, 444 Pa. 361, 282 A.2d 367 (1971); see, e.g., United States v. Wadsworth, 830 F.2d 1500, 1504 (9th Cir.1987) (emphasis added) (holding that waiver of counsel during pcr review requires a judicial inquiry into whether defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nThose requirements include: (1) written notice to the parolee of the alleged parole violations, (2) disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him, (3) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence, (4) right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, (5) neutral and detached hearing body, and (6) written statement by the fact-finder as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole. Moreover, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that the requirements of due process include informing a defendant of the range of penalties involved in the crime with which he is being charged. Commonwealth v. Zanine, 444 Pa. 361, 282 A.2d 367 (1971); see, e.g., United States v. Wadsworth, 830 F.2d 1500, 1504 (9th Cir.1987) (emphasis added) (holding that one must voluntarily and intelligently waive the right to counsel", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nThose requirements include: (1) written notice to the parolee of the alleged parole violations, (2) disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him, (3) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence, (4) right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, (5) neutral and detached hearing body, and (6) written statement by the fact-finder as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole. Moreover, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that the requirements of due process include informing a defendant of the range of penalties involved in the crime with which he is being charged. Commonwealth v. Zanine, 444 Pa. 361, 282 A.2d 367 (1971); see, e.g., United States v. Wadsworth, 830 F.2d 1500, 1504 (9th Cir.1987) (emphasis added) (holding that a defendant can knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel only after his sic is aware of the nature of the charges against him the possible penalties and the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nThose requirements include: (1) written notice to the parolee of the alleged parole violations, (2) disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him, (3) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence, (4) right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, (5) neutral and detached hearing body, and (6) written statement by the fact-finder as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole. Moreover, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that the requirements of due process include informing a defendant of the range of penalties involved in the crime with which he is being charged. Commonwealth v. Zanine, 444 Pa. 361, 282 A.2d 367 (1971); see, e.g., United States v. Wadsworth, 830 F.2d 1500, 1504 (9th Cir.1987) (emphasis added) (holding that written waivers referring only in general terms to potential advantages of representation by counsel and potential disadvantages of selfrepresentation did not sufficiently demonstrate awareness of the dangers of selfrepresentation", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nThose requirements include: (1) written notice to the parolee of the alleged parole violations, (2) disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him, (3) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence, (4) right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, (5) neutral and detached hearing body, and (6) written statement by the fact-finder as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole. Moreover, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that the requirements of due process include informing a defendant of the range of penalties involved in the crime with which he is being charged. Commonwealth v. Zanine, 444 Pa. 361, 282 A.2d 367 (1971); see, e.g., United States v. Wadsworth, 830 F.2d 1500, 1504 (9th Cir.1987) (emphasis added) (holding that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel even though the exchange between the magistrate and the defendant was inadequate standing alone to inform the defendant of the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nmay have led to discovery of admissible evidence, they present no intelligible explanation of how that is so, nor can we detect any; the requests have every indicia of the quintessential fishing expedition.”). Therefore, as Defendant’s subpoenas, seeking Plaintiffs entire employment file from his former employers, are not limited to seeking only those documents relevant to this FLSA overtime compensation action or the claims based upon an oral employment contract, they are overly broad on their face. See Hendricks, 275 F.R.D. at 255-56 (finding subpoenas to be overbroad because “compli anee with the subpoenas will result in defendants receiving a plethora of documents, the vast majority of which would be completely unrelated to any possible issue in this case”); Pena, slip op. at 3-4 (holding that records relating to a student court were not education records", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nmay have led to discovery of admissible evidence, they present no intelligible explanation of how that is so, nor can we detect any; the requests have every indicia of the quintessential fishing expedition.”). Therefore, as Defendant’s subpoenas, seeking Plaintiffs entire employment file from his former employers, are not limited to seeking only those documents relevant to this FLSA overtime compensation action or the claims based upon an oral employment contract, they are overly broad on their face. See Hendricks, 275 F.R.D. at 255-56 (finding subpoenas to be overbroad because “compli anee with the subpoenas will result in defendants receiving a plethora of documents, the vast majority of which would be completely unrelated to any possible issue in this case”); Pena, slip op. at 3-4 (recognizing a general right to inspect and copy public records and documents including judicial records and documents", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nmay have led to discovery of admissible evidence, they present no intelligible explanation of how that is so, nor can we detect any; the requests have every indicia of the quintessential fishing expedition.”). Therefore, as Defendant’s subpoenas, seeking Plaintiffs entire employment file from his former employers, are not limited to seeking only those documents relevant to this FLSA overtime compensation action or the claims based upon an oral employment contract, they are overly broad on their face. See Hendricks, 275 F.R.D. at 255-56 (finding subpoenas to be overbroad because “compli anee with the subpoenas will result in defendants receiving a plethora of documents, the vast majority of which would be completely unrelated to any possible issue in this case”); Pena, slip op. at 3-4 (holding that subpoenas seeking any and all documents files and records reflecting or relating to the employment of each plaintiff were overly broad on their face", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nmay have led to discovery of admissible evidence, they present no intelligible explanation of how that is so, nor can we detect any; the requests have every indicia of the quintessential fishing expedition.”). Therefore, as Defendant’s subpoenas, seeking Plaintiffs entire employment file from his former employers, are not limited to seeking only those documents relevant to this FLSA overtime compensation action or the claims based upon an oral employment contract, they are overly broad on their face. See Hendricks, 275 F.R.D. at 255-56 (finding subpoenas to be overbroad because “compli anee with the subpoenas will result in defendants receiving a plethora of documents, the vast majority of which would be completely unrelated to any possible issue in this case”); Pena, slip op. at 3-4 (holding that subpoenas seeking the complete employment file of plaintiff including employment application payroll records medical records evaluations correspondence and all other records omitting nothing were overbroad and could be quashed on that basis alone", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nmay have led to discovery of admissible evidence, they present no intelligible explanation of how that is so, nor can we detect any; the requests have every indicia of the quintessential fishing expedition.”). Therefore, as Defendant’s subpoenas, seeking Plaintiffs entire employment file from his former employers, are not limited to seeking only those documents relevant to this FLSA overtime compensation action or the claims based upon an oral employment contract, they are overly broad on their face. See Hendricks, 275 F.R.D. at 255-56 (finding subpoenas to be overbroad because “compli anee with the subpoenas will result in defendants receiving a plethora of documents, the vast majority of which would be completely unrelated to any possible issue in this case”); Pena, slip op. at 3-4 (holding that municipal court records were admissible under official records or public documents exception" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nof status because he “lacked both an approved visa petition and an approved labor certification.” (Oct. 8, 2004 BIA Op. at 1.) The BIA found that the IJ did not err in denying the continuance request, and that in light of his failure to establish eligibility for adjustment of status, Faustino did not demonstrate any prejudice that would constitute a due process violation. The instant petition followed. II. Standard of Review We have jurisdiction to review final orders of the BIA under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2). Ponce-Leiva v. Ashcroft, 331 F.3d 369, 371 (3d Cir.2003). We review the BIA’s affirmance of the IJ’s denial of a continuance request for abuse of discretion. Id. at 377. Under an abuse of discretion standard, the BIA’s decision should only be reversed if it is arbitrary, .1990) (holding no abuse of discretion where ij denied aliens request for continuance because alien had no immigrant visa available and it was unlikely attorney general would exercise discretion to permit excludable alien to stay", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nof status because he “lacked both an approved visa petition and an approved labor certification.” (Oct. 8, 2004 BIA Op. at 1.) The BIA found that the IJ did not err in denying the continuance request, and that in light of his failure to establish eligibility for adjustment of status, Faustino did not demonstrate any prejudice that would constitute a due process violation. The instant petition followed. II. Standard of Review We have jurisdiction to review final orders of the BIA under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2). Ponce-Leiva v. Ashcroft, 331 F.3d 369, 371 (3d Cir.2003). We review the BIA’s affirmance of the IJ’s denial of a continuance request for abuse of discretion. Id. at 377. Under an abuse of discretion standard, the BIA’s decision should only be reversed if it is arbitrary, .1990) (holding that the ij did not abuse his discretion in denying request for further continuance where the ij granted previous request", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nof status because he “lacked both an approved visa petition and an approved labor certification.” (Oct. 8, 2004 BIA Op. at 1.) The BIA found that the IJ did not err in denying the continuance request, and that in light of his failure to establish eligibility for adjustment of status, Faustino did not demonstrate any prejudice that would constitute a due process violation. The instant petition followed. II. Standard of Review We have jurisdiction to review final orders of the BIA under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2). Ponce-Leiva v. Ashcroft, 331 F.3d 369, 371 (3d Cir.2003). We review the BIA’s affirmance of the IJ’s denial of a continuance request for abuse of discretion. Id. at 377. Under an abuse of discretion standard, the BIA’s decision should only be reversed if it is arbitrary, .1990) (holding denial of continuance to be an abuse of discretion", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nof status because he “lacked both an approved visa petition and an approved labor certification.” (Oct. 8, 2004 BIA Op. at 1.) The BIA found that the IJ did not err in denying the continuance request, and that in light of his failure to establish eligibility for adjustment of status, Faustino did not demonstrate any prejudice that would constitute a due process violation. The instant petition followed. II. Standard of Review We have jurisdiction to review final orders of the BIA under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2). Ponce-Leiva v. Ashcroft, 331 F.3d 369, 371 (3d Cir.2003). We review the BIA’s affirmance of the IJ’s denial of a continuance request for abuse of discretion. Id. at 377. Under an abuse of discretion standard, the BIA’s decision should only be reversed if it is arbitrary, .1990) (holding failure to exercise discretion is abuse of discretion", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nof status because he “lacked both an approved visa petition and an approved labor certification.” (Oct. 8, 2004 BIA Op. at 1.) The BIA found that the IJ did not err in denying the continuance request, and that in light of his failure to establish eligibility for adjustment of status, Faustino did not demonstrate any prejudice that would constitute a due process violation. The instant petition followed. II. Standard of Review We have jurisdiction to review final orders of the BIA under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2). Ponce-Leiva v. Ashcroft, 331 F.3d 369, 371 (3d Cir.2003). We review the BIA’s affirmance of the IJ’s denial of a continuance request for abuse of discretion. Id. at 377. Under an abuse of discretion standard, the BIA’s decision should only be reversed if it is arbitrary, .1990) (holding that there was no abuse of discretion in allowing a defendants surprise fact witness to testify because the plaintiff did not request a continuance" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nstudent’s education, “including] the conduct and development of evaluations, eligibility determinations, IEPs, and educational placement.” Michael C. ex rel Stephen C. v. Radnor Twp. Sch. Dist., 202 F.3d 642, 654 (3d Cir.2000). No such proceeding concerning E.M.’s education has been initiated. Although the Majority devotes pages to discussing whether this case is a “proceeding” under § 1415, the proper inquiry is whether there exists a separate pending § 1415 proceeding, such as a due process complaint or an appeal of a ruling on such a complaint. Because “stay put” operates only “Muring the pendency” of such a proceeding, and no such proceeding has been initiated, § 1415’s “stay put” provision simply does not apply. See Moss by Mutakabbir v. Smith, 794 F.Supp. 11, 14 (D.D.C.1992) (holding that the stay put provision establishes a strong preference but not a statutory duty for maintenance of the status quo", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nstudent’s education, “including] the conduct and development of evaluations, eligibility determinations, IEPs, and educational placement.” Michael C. ex rel Stephen C. v. Radnor Twp. Sch. Dist., 202 F.3d 642, 654 (3d Cir.2000). No such proceeding concerning E.M.’s education has been initiated. Although the Majority devotes pages to discussing whether this case is a “proceeding” under § 1415, the proper inquiry is whether there exists a separate pending § 1415 proceeding, such as a due process complaint or an appeal of a ruling on such a complaint. Because “stay put” operates only “Muring the pendency” of such a proceeding, and no such proceeding has been initiated, § 1415’s “stay put” provision simply does not apply. See Moss by Mutakabbir v. Smith, 794 F.Supp. 11, 14 (D.D.C.1992) (holding that a federal action to enforce the stay put provision is not itself a pending proceeding under 1415 that triggers stay put", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nstudent’s education, “including] the conduct and development of evaluations, eligibility determinations, IEPs, and educational placement.” Michael C. ex rel Stephen C. v. Radnor Twp. Sch. Dist., 202 F.3d 642, 654 (3d Cir.2000). No such proceeding concerning E.M.’s education has been initiated. Although the Majority devotes pages to discussing whether this case is a “proceeding” under § 1415, the proper inquiry is whether there exists a separate pending § 1415 proceeding, such as a due process complaint or an appeal of a ruling on such a complaint. Because “stay put” operates only “Muring the pendency” of such a proceeding, and no such proceeding has been initiated, § 1415’s “stay put” provision simply does not apply. See Moss by Mutakabbir v. Smith, 794 F.Supp. 11, 14 (D.D.C.1992) (holding that insurance guarantee association stay statute did not suspend limitation period because action was not pending when stay was entered", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nstudent’s education, “including] the conduct and development of evaluations, eligibility determinations, IEPs, and educational placement.” Michael C. ex rel Stephen C. v. Radnor Twp. Sch. Dist., 202 F.3d 642, 654 (3d Cir.2000). No such proceeding concerning E.M.’s education has been initiated. Although the Majority devotes pages to discussing whether this case is a “proceeding” under § 1415, the proper inquiry is whether there exists a separate pending § 1415 proceeding, such as a due process complaint or an appeal of a ruling on such a complaint. Because “stay put” operates only “Muring the pendency” of such a proceeding, and no such proceeding has been initiated, § 1415’s “stay put” provision simply does not apply. See Moss by Mutakabbir v. Smith, 794 F.Supp. 11, 14 (D.D.C.1992) (holding that the automatic stay did not bar the filing of a proof of claim where the debtor actively litigated a separate action during the pending bankruptcy proceeding because to permit the automatic stay provision to be used as a trump card played after an unfavorable result was reached would be inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the automatic stay", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nstudent’s education, “including] the conduct and development of evaluations, eligibility determinations, IEPs, and educational placement.” Michael C. ex rel Stephen C. v. Radnor Twp. Sch. Dist., 202 F.3d 642, 654 (3d Cir.2000). No such proceeding concerning E.M.’s education has been initiated. Although the Majority devotes pages to discussing whether this case is a “proceeding” under § 1415, the proper inquiry is whether there exists a separate pending § 1415 proceeding, such as a due process complaint or an appeal of a ruling on such a complaint. Because “stay put” operates only “Muring the pendency” of such a proceeding, and no such proceeding has been initiated, § 1415’s “stay put” provision simply does not apply. See Moss by Mutakabbir v. Smith, 794 F.Supp. 11, 14 (D.D.C.1992) (holding that use of the preliminary injunction equitable factors would dilute the statutory framework under the stay put provision" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\npromptly. See Def.’s Mem. Ex. H (Memorandum of Counseling, Sept. 7, 2007) at 2. It closed by warning that “[t]his time ... is just a counseling but if this happen[s] again, we will take the appropriate action.” Given that the memorandum itself made clear that disciplinary action was not forthcoming as a result of its issuance — and that “mere speculation that a letter of reprimand may lead to future punishment is insufficient to establish an adverse employment action,” Coleman v. District of Columbia, 2006 WL 2434926, at *4 (D.D.C. Aug. 22, 2006) — the Court cannot conclude that a reasonable employee would have been deterred from pursuing a claim of discrimination by the prospect of receiving a memorandum like this one. See Baloch, 550 F.3d at 1199; Herbert, 766 F.Supp.2d at 75 (holding that counseling sessions and written criticisms of employees work performance did not fall within the types of materially adverse employment actions", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\npromptly. See Def.’s Mem. Ex. H (Memorandum of Counseling, Sept. 7, 2007) at 2. It closed by warning that “[t]his time ... is just a counseling but if this happen[s] again, we will take the appropriate action.” Given that the memorandum itself made clear that disciplinary action was not forthcoming as a result of its issuance — and that “mere speculation that a letter of reprimand may lead to future punishment is insufficient to establish an adverse employment action,” Coleman v. District of Columbia, 2006 WL 2434926, at *4 (D.D.C. Aug. 22, 2006) — the Court cannot conclude that a reasonable employee would have been deterred from pursuing a claim of discrimination by the prospect of receiving a memorandum like this one. See Baloch, 550 F.3d at 1199; Herbert, 766 F.Supp.2d at 75 (holding that a job transfer was not an adverse employment action because the plaintiff enjoyed the same rate of pay and benefits and her duties were not materially modified", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\npromptly. See Def.’s Mem. Ex. H (Memorandum of Counseling, Sept. 7, 2007) at 2. It closed by warning that “[t]his time ... is just a counseling but if this happen[s] again, we will take the appropriate action.” Given that the memorandum itself made clear that disciplinary action was not forthcoming as a result of its issuance — and that “mere speculation that a letter of reprimand may lead to future punishment is insufficient to establish an adverse employment action,” Coleman v. District of Columbia, 2006 WL 2434926, at *4 (D.D.C. Aug. 22, 2006) — the Court cannot conclude that a reasonable employee would have been deterred from pursuing a claim of discrimination by the prospect of receiving a memorandum like this one. See Baloch, 550 F.3d at 1199; Herbert, 766 F.Supp.2d at 75 (holding that allegations that employee was yelled at for complaining about his discriminatory treatment and criticized were not materially adverse actions", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\npromptly. See Def.’s Mem. Ex. H (Memorandum of Counseling, Sept. 7, 2007) at 2. It closed by warning that “[t]his time ... is just a counseling but if this happen[s] again, we will take the appropriate action.” Given that the memorandum itself made clear that disciplinary action was not forthcoming as a result of its issuance — and that “mere speculation that a letter of reprimand may lead to future punishment is insufficient to establish an adverse employment action,” Coleman v. District of Columbia, 2006 WL 2434926, at *4 (D.D.C. Aug. 22, 2006) — the Court cannot conclude that a reasonable employee would have been deterred from pursuing a claim of discrimination by the prospect of receiving a memorandum like this one. See Baloch, 550 F.3d at 1199; Herbert, 766 F.Supp.2d at 75 (holding that a similar written reprimand provided to an architect of the capitol employee was not materially adverse because it merely criticized his job performance", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\npromptly. See Def.’s Mem. Ex. H (Memorandum of Counseling, Sept. 7, 2007) at 2. It closed by warning that “[t]his time ... is just a counseling but if this happen[s] again, we will take the appropriate action.” Given that the memorandum itself made clear that disciplinary action was not forthcoming as a result of its issuance — and that “mere speculation that a letter of reprimand may lead to future punishment is insufficient to establish an adverse employment action,” Coleman v. District of Columbia, 2006 WL 2434926, at *4 (D.D.C. Aug. 22, 2006) — the Court cannot conclude that a reasonable employee would have been deterred from pursuing a claim of discrimination by the prospect of receiving a memorandum like this one. See Baloch, 550 F.3d at 1199; Herbert, 766 F.Supp.2d at 75 (holding that the decision to reprimand or transfer an employee if rescinded before the employee suffers a tangible harm is not an adverse employment action" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nat 16-17.) He said that common practice in the school district would be to make a referral to MCDJFS after a child had missed a certain number of school days. Mr. Schumacher testified that he could not recall talking to MCDJFS about Timothy at all, but if he did, it would have been about attendance. {Id. at 18-20.) 25 . Mr. Koslik testified at his deposition that, in January 2008, his brother-in-law, the former Director of MCDJFS, revealed the identity of the individual who made the complaint, and it was not someone employed by, related to or involved with the School District. The Court views this information as inadmissible hearsay under Rule 56, and declines to rely on it in rendering its decision here. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 61, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987) (holding that where a public official takes discretionary action that the official knows will directly benefit a financial interest that the official has concealed in violation of a state criminal law that official has deprived the public of his honest services under 1346", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nat 16-17.) He said that common practice in the school district would be to make a referral to MCDJFS after a child had missed a certain number of school days. Mr. Schumacher testified that he could not recall talking to MCDJFS about Timothy at all, but if he did, it would have been about attendance. {Id. at 18-20.) 25 . Mr. Koslik testified at his deposition that, in January 2008, his brother-in-law, the former Director of MCDJFS, revealed the identity of the individual who made the complaint, and it was not someone employed by, related to or involved with the School District. The Court views this information as inadmissible hearsay under Rule 56, and declines to rely on it in rendering its decision here. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 61, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987) (holding that municipal court records were admissible under official records or public documents exception", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nat 16-17.) He said that common practice in the school district would be to make a referral to MCDJFS after a child had missed a certain number of school days. Mr. Schumacher testified that he could not recall talking to MCDJFS about Timothy at all, but if he did, it would have been about attendance. {Id. at 18-20.) 25 . Mr. Koslik testified at his deposition that, in January 2008, his brother-in-law, the former Director of MCDJFS, revealed the identity of the individual who made the complaint, and it was not someone employed by, related to or involved with the School District. The Court views this information as inadmissible hearsay under Rule 56, and declines to rely on it in rendering its decision here. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 61, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987) (recognizing records material to selfdefense claim outweigh victims interest in confidentiality", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nat 16-17.) He said that common practice in the school district would be to make a referral to MCDJFS after a child had missed a certain number of school days. Mr. Schumacher testified that he could not recall talking to MCDJFS about Timothy at all, but if he did, it would have been about attendance. {Id. at 18-20.) 25 . Mr. Koslik testified at his deposition that, in January 2008, his brother-in-law, the former Director of MCDJFS, revealed the identity of the individual who made the complaint, and it was not someone employed by, related to or involved with the School District. The Court views this information as inadmissible hearsay under Rule 56, and declines to rely on it in rendering its decision here. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 61, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987) (recognizing the public interest exception", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nat 16-17.) He said that common practice in the school district would be to make a referral to MCDJFS after a child had missed a certain number of school days. Mr. Schumacher testified that he could not recall talking to MCDJFS about Timothy at all, but if he did, it would have been about attendance. {Id. at 18-20.) 25 . Mr. Koslik testified at his deposition that, in January 2008, his brother-in-law, the former Director of MCDJFS, revealed the identity of the individual who made the complaint, and it was not someone employed by, related to or involved with the School District. The Court views this information as inadmissible hearsay under Rule 56, and declines to rely on it in rendering its decision here. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 61, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987) (recognizing strong public interest in maintaining confidentiality of official records concerning child abuse" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nproof or admission of an act of dishonesty or false statement by the witness. See Fed. R.Evid. 609(a)(2). Here, the prosecutor used Lester Jones’s prior conviction for misdemeanor possession of marijuana for impeachment. Lester Jones’s narcotic offense does not fall under Rule 609(a)(2)’s ambit because it did not involve an act of dishonesty or false statement. See United States v. Galati, 230 F.3d 254, 261 n. 5 (7th Cir.2000) (“A person’s past drug possession does not necessarily implicate dishonesty....”); United States v. Thompson, 559 F.2d 552, 554 (9th Cir.1977) (finding that the history of Rule 609(a) indicated that Congress sought to exempt from its purview crimes such as misdemeanor narcotics convictions); see also United States v. McDonald, 905 F.2d 871, 875 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding prior use of one type of drug is not relevant to establish use of another type of drug on a different occasion", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nproof or admission of an act of dishonesty or false statement by the witness. See Fed. R.Evid. 609(a)(2). Here, the prosecutor used Lester Jones’s prior conviction for misdemeanor possession of marijuana for impeachment. Lester Jones’s narcotic offense does not fall under Rule 609(a)(2)’s ambit because it did not involve an act of dishonesty or false statement. See United States v. Galati, 230 F.3d 254, 261 n. 5 (7th Cir.2000) (“A person’s past drug possession does not necessarily implicate dishonesty....”); United States v. Thompson, 559 F.2d 552, 554 (9th Cir.1977) (finding that the history of Rule 609(a) indicated that Congress sought to exempt from its purview crimes such as misdemeanor narcotics convictions); see also United States v. McDonald, 905 F.2d 871, 875 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that evidence of prior drug sales was sufficiently similar to the crimes charged to be probative of the fact that the defendant was not merely an innocent driver who was involved in the drug transaction by accident", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nproof or admission of an act of dishonesty or false statement by the witness. See Fed. R.Evid. 609(a)(2). Here, the prosecutor used Lester Jones’s prior conviction for misdemeanor possession of marijuana for impeachment. Lester Jones’s narcotic offense does not fall under Rule 609(a)(2)’s ambit because it did not involve an act of dishonesty or false statement. See United States v. Galati, 230 F.3d 254, 261 n. 5 (7th Cir.2000) (“A person’s past drug possession does not necessarily implicate dishonesty....”); United States v. Thompson, 559 F.2d 552, 554 (9th Cir.1977) (finding that the history of Rule 609(a) indicated that Congress sought to exempt from its purview crimes such as misdemeanor narcotics convictions); see also United States v. McDonald, 905 F.2d 871, 875 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding the use of a drug that carries a higher sentence rather than another drug does not amount to sentencing factor manipulation", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nproof or admission of an act of dishonesty or false statement by the witness. See Fed. R.Evid. 609(a)(2). Here, the prosecutor used Lester Jones’s prior conviction for misdemeanor possession of marijuana for impeachment. Lester Jones’s narcotic offense does not fall under Rule 609(a)(2)’s ambit because it did not involve an act of dishonesty or false statement. See United States v. Galati, 230 F.3d 254, 261 n. 5 (7th Cir.2000) (“A person’s past drug possession does not necessarily implicate dishonesty....”); United States v. Thompson, 559 F.2d 552, 554 (9th Cir.1977) (finding that the history of Rule 609(a) indicated that Congress sought to exempt from its purview crimes such as misdemeanor narcotics convictions); see also United States v. McDonald, 905 F.2d 871, 875 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that drug use is not probative of character for truthfulness", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nproof or admission of an act of dishonesty or false statement by the witness. See Fed. R.Evid. 609(a)(2). Here, the prosecutor used Lester Jones’s prior conviction for misdemeanor possession of marijuana for impeachment. Lester Jones’s narcotic offense does not fall under Rule 609(a)(2)’s ambit because it did not involve an act of dishonesty or false statement. See United States v. Galati, 230 F.3d 254, 261 n. 5 (7th Cir.2000) (“A person’s past drug possession does not necessarily implicate dishonesty....”); United States v. Thompson, 559 F.2d 552, 554 (9th Cir.1977) (finding that the history of Rule 609(a) indicated that Congress sought to exempt from its purview crimes such as misdemeanor narcotics convictions); see also United States v. McDonald, 905 F.2d 871, 875 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding a fiveyear old drug conviction is probative of a defendants state of mind in a drug conspiracy case" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nprocess to convict a defendant when he is legally incompetent. United States v. Mason, 52 F.3d 1286, 1289 (4th Cir.1995). “Congress has safeguarded this [due process] right by providing that trial courts conduct competency hearings” under specified circumstances. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a)). Of relevance here, when neither party to a criminal trial moves for a competency hearing, the district court shall order such a hearing on its own motion[ ] if there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense. § 4241(a); see also Mason, 52 F.3d at 1289 (holding that the existence of probable cause in a 1983 case is a jury question", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nprocess to convict a defendant when he is legally incompetent. United States v. Mason, 52 F.3d 1286, 1289 (4th Cir.1995). “Congress has safeguarded this [due process] right by providing that trial courts conduct competency hearings” under specified circumstances. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a)). Of relevance here, when neither party to a criminal trial moves for a competency hearing, the district court shall order such a hearing on its own motion[ ] if there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense. § 4241(a); see also Mason, 52 F.3d at 1289 (recognizing the existence of the special relationship", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nprocess to convict a defendant when he is legally incompetent. United States v. Mason, 52 F.3d 1286, 1289 (4th Cir.1995). “Congress has safeguarded this [due process] right by providing that trial courts conduct competency hearings” under specified circumstances. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a)). Of relevance here, when neither party to a criminal trial moves for a competency hearing, the district court shall order such a hearing on its own motion[ ] if there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense. § 4241(a); see also Mason, 52 F.3d at 1289 (recognizing the cause of action", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nprocess to convict a defendant when he is legally incompetent. United States v. Mason, 52 F.3d 1286, 1289 (4th Cir.1995). “Congress has safeguarded this [due process] right by providing that trial courts conduct competency hearings” under specified circumstances. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a)). Of relevance here, when neither party to a criminal trial moves for a competency hearing, the district court shall order such a hearing on its own motion[ ] if there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense. § 4241(a); see also Mason, 52 F.3d at 1289 (recognizing that the existence of reasonable cause requires the sua sponte ordering of a competency hearing", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nprocess to convict a defendant when he is legally incompetent. United States v. Mason, 52 F.3d 1286, 1289 (4th Cir.1995). “Congress has safeguarded this [due process] right by providing that trial courts conduct competency hearings” under specified circumstances. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a)). Of relevance here, when neither party to a criminal trial moves for a competency hearing, the district court shall order such a hearing on its own motion[ ] if there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense. § 4241(a); see also Mason, 52 F.3d at 1289 (recognizing cause of action" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nYeota Christie contends that she received demands for mortgage payments from several entities that did not have the authority to make such demands: The Bank of New York Mellon, N.A, as Trustee for the CWALT Pass-Through Certificates CWALT Series 2007-OA3 (the “CWALT Trust”); Bank of America, N.A.; BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP; and Re-conTrust Company, N.A. (collectively, “Ap-pellees”). Christie alleges that unauthorized and inauthentic assignments of her loan have rendered her Note (9th Cir.1990) (holding that when applying state law this court follows the decision of the highest state court or in the absence of such a decision and any indication that the highest court would rule differently the decisions of the states intermediate courts", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nYeota Christie contends that she received demands for mortgage payments from several entities that did not have the authority to make such demands: The Bank of New York Mellon, N.A, as Trustee for the CWALT Pass-Through Certificates CWALT Series 2007-OA3 (the “CWALT Trust”); Bank of America, N.A.; BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP; and Re-conTrust Company, N.A. (collectively, “Ap-pellees”). Christie alleges that unauthorized and inauthentic assignments of her loan have rendered her Note (9th Cir.1990) (holding federal courts are bound to follow intermediate state appellate court decisions unless there is persuasive evidence that the states highest court would rule otherwise", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nYeota Christie contends that she received demands for mortgage payments from several entities that did not have the authority to make such demands: The Bank of New York Mellon, N.A, as Trustee for the CWALT Pass-Through Certificates CWALT Series 2007-OA3 (the “CWALT Trust”); Bank of America, N.A.; BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP; and Re-conTrust Company, N.A. (collectively, “Ap-pellees”). Christie alleges that unauthorized and inauthentic assignments of her loan have rendered her Note (9th Cir.1990) (holding that federal courts must accept the decision of the states highest court even if it is an erroneous one", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nYeota Christie contends that she received demands for mortgage payments from several entities that did not have the authority to make such demands: The Bank of New York Mellon, N.A, as Trustee for the CWALT Pass-Through Certificates CWALT Series 2007-OA3 (the “CWALT Trust”); Bank of America, N.A.; BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP; and Re-conTrust Company, N.A. (collectively, “Ap-pellees”). Christie alleges that unauthorized and inauthentic assignments of her loan have rendered her Note (9th Cir.1990) (holding that when applying state law a federal court is bound to follow the highest court in the state", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nYeota Christie contends that she received demands for mortgage payments from several entities that did not have the authority to make such demands: The Bank of New York Mellon, N.A, as Trustee for the CWALT Pass-Through Certificates CWALT Series 2007-OA3 (the “CWALT Trust”); Bank of America, N.A.; BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP; and Re-conTrust Company, N.A. (collectively, “Ap-pellees”). Christie alleges that unauthorized and inauthentic assignments of her loan have rendered her Note (9th Cir.1990) (holding that when there is no ruling by the states highest court it is the duty of the federal court to determine as best it can what the highest court of the state would decide" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nas intrusive as that in this case would threaten to swallow the general rule that Fourth Amendment seizurcs are 'reasonable' only if based on probable cause.” Id. at 213, 99 S.Ct. 2248. The Court cautioned that \"detention for custodial interrogation—regardless of its label—intrudes so severely on interests protected by the Fourth Amendment as necessarily to trigger the traditional safeguards against illegal arrest.” Id. at 219, 99 S.Ct. 2248. To the extent that the record in this case supports an inference that Acosta was brought to the customs detention area and placed in an interrogation room in order to effect a transfer of \"custody\" to and permit questioning by the DEA, the rule of Dunaway arguably comes into play. Cf. United States v. Codd, 956 F.2d 1109, 1111 (11th Cir.1992) (holding that when a judicial office is created by legislative act or municipal ordinance the office is regarded as a de facto office until the act or ordinance is declared invalid", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nas intrusive as that in this case would threaten to swallow the general rule that Fourth Amendment seizurcs are 'reasonable' only if based on probable cause.” Id. at 213, 99 S.Ct. 2248. The Court cautioned that \"detention for custodial interrogation—regardless of its label—intrudes so severely on interests protected by the Fourth Amendment as necessarily to trigger the traditional safeguards against illegal arrest.” Id. at 219, 99 S.Ct. 2248. To the extent that the record in this case supports an inference that Acosta was brought to the customs detention area and placed in an interrogation room in order to effect a transfer of \"custody\" to and permit questioning by the DEA, the rule of Dunaway arguably comes into play. Cf. United States v. Codd, 956 F.2d 1109, 1111 (11th Cir.1992) (holding that two and onehalf hour detention at airport police office was analogous to the de facto arrest in dunaway", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nas intrusive as that in this case would threaten to swallow the general rule that Fourth Amendment seizurcs are 'reasonable' only if based on probable cause.” Id. at 213, 99 S.Ct. 2248. The Court cautioned that \"detention for custodial interrogation—regardless of its label—intrudes so severely on interests protected by the Fourth Amendment as necessarily to trigger the traditional safeguards against illegal arrest.” Id. at 219, 99 S.Ct. 2248. To the extent that the record in this case supports an inference that Acosta was brought to the customs detention area and placed in an interrogation room in order to effect a transfer of \"custody\" to and permit questioning by the DEA, the rule of Dunaway arguably comes into play. Cf. United States v. Codd, 956 F.2d 1109, 1111 (11th Cir.1992) (recognizing a nonresident who receives the most votes for elected office does not hold the office but not discussing the de facto officer doctrine", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nas intrusive as that in this case would threaten to swallow the general rule that Fourth Amendment seizurcs are 'reasonable' only if based on probable cause.” Id. at 213, 99 S.Ct. 2248. The Court cautioned that \"detention for custodial interrogation—regardless of its label—intrudes so severely on interests protected by the Fourth Amendment as necessarily to trigger the traditional safeguards against illegal arrest.” Id. at 219, 99 S.Ct. 2248. To the extent that the record in this case supports an inference that Acosta was brought to the customs detention area and placed in an interrogation room in order to effect a transfer of \"custody\" to and permit questioning by the DEA, the rule of Dunaway arguably comes into play. Cf. United States v. Codd, 956 F.2d 1109, 1111 (11th Cir.1992) (holding that the defendant was placed in official detention when two police officers approached him and told him that he was under arrest as the defendant could not reasonably have believed that he was free to leave", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nas intrusive as that in this case would threaten to swallow the general rule that Fourth Amendment seizurcs are 'reasonable' only if based on probable cause.” Id. at 213, 99 S.Ct. 2248. The Court cautioned that \"detention for custodial interrogation—regardless of its label—intrudes so severely on interests protected by the Fourth Amendment as necessarily to trigger the traditional safeguards against illegal arrest.” Id. at 219, 99 S.Ct. 2248. To the extent that the record in this case supports an inference that Acosta was brought to the customs detention area and placed in an interrogation room in order to effect a transfer of \"custody\" to and permit questioning by the DEA, the rule of Dunaway arguably comes into play. Cf. United States v. Codd, 956 F.2d 1109, 1111 (11th Cir.1992) (holding that a de facto arrest had occurred where petitioner was not questioned briefly where he was found but rather was taken to a police car transported to a police station and placed in an interrogation room" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nserved as its Chief Executive Officer, and sat on its Board of Directors. According to the Fund, Mr. Reynolds actively participated in the day-to-day management of Greystone and made “decisions related to its operations and eventual closure in 2011.” Even accepting the Fund’s assertion that Mr. Reynolds actively managed Grey-stone, an assertion he denies, the Fund cannot show the necessary minimum contacts. The Fund argues that any actions Mr. Reynolds took in his official capacity as an owner and operator of Coleridge and Jelniki are attributable to Coleridge and Jelniki. The record, however, contains no credible allegations Mr. Reynplds routinely acted on behalf of Coleridge and Jelniki when he discharged any of his duties as an officer and director of Greystone. See id. at 943 (holding that to establish that subsidiary is agent of parent for jurisdictional purposes the parent must exert control that is so pervasive and continual that the subsidiary may be considered an agent or instrumentality of the parent notwithstanding the maintenance of corporate formalities", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nserved as its Chief Executive Officer, and sat on its Board of Directors. According to the Fund, Mr. Reynolds actively participated in the day-to-day management of Greystone and made “decisions related to its operations and eventual closure in 2011.” Even accepting the Fund’s assertion that Mr. Reynolds actively managed Grey-stone, an assertion he denies, the Fund cannot show the necessary minimum contacts. The Fund argues that any actions Mr. Reynolds took in his official capacity as an owner and operator of Coleridge and Jelniki are attributable to Coleridge and Jelniki. The record, however, contains no credible allegations Mr. Reynplds routinely acted on behalf of Coleridge and Jelniki when he discharged any of his duties as an officer and director of Greystone. See id. at 943 (holding that under north carolina law a corporate parent cannot be held liable for the acts of its subsidiary unless the corporate structure is a sham", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nserved as its Chief Executive Officer, and sat on its Board of Directors. According to the Fund, Mr. Reynolds actively participated in the day-to-day management of Greystone and made “decisions related to its operations and eventual closure in 2011.” Even accepting the Fund’s assertion that Mr. Reynolds actively managed Grey-stone, an assertion he denies, the Fund cannot show the necessary minimum contacts. The Fund argues that any actions Mr. Reynolds took in his official capacity as an owner and operator of Coleridge and Jelniki are attributable to Coleridge and Jelniki. The record, however, contains no credible allegations Mr. Reynplds routinely acted on behalf of Coleridge and Jelniki when he discharged any of his duties as an officer and director of Greystone. See id. at 943 (holding that because the corporate parent and subsidiary defendants before it observed all of the corporate formalities necessary to maintain corporate separateness notwithstanding the parents active involvement in the subsidiaries operations the evidence did not establish that the entities were alter egos of one another", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nserved as its Chief Executive Officer, and sat on its Board of Directors. According to the Fund, Mr. Reynolds actively participated in the day-to-day management of Greystone and made “decisions related to its operations and eventual closure in 2011.” Even accepting the Fund’s assertion that Mr. Reynolds actively managed Grey-stone, an assertion he denies, the Fund cannot show the necessary minimum contacts. The Fund argues that any actions Mr. Reynolds took in his official capacity as an owner and operator of Coleridge and Jelniki are attributable to Coleridge and Jelniki. The record, however, contains no credible allegations Mr. Reynplds routinely acted on behalf of Coleridge and Jelniki when he discharged any of his duties as an officer and director of Greystone. See id. at 943 (holding constitutional due process requires that personal jurisdiction cannot be premised on corporate affiliation or stock ownership alone where corporate formalities are substantially observed and the parent does not exercise an usually high degree of control over the subsidiary", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nserved as its Chief Executive Officer, and sat on its Board of Directors. According to the Fund, Mr. Reynolds actively participated in the day-to-day management of Greystone and made “decisions related to its operations and eventual closure in 2011.” Even accepting the Fund’s assertion that Mr. Reynolds actively managed Grey-stone, an assertion he denies, the Fund cannot show the necessary minimum contacts. The Fund argues that any actions Mr. Reynolds took in his official capacity as an owner and operator of Coleridge and Jelniki are attributable to Coleridge and Jelniki. The record, however, contains no credible allegations Mr. Reynplds routinely acted on behalf of Coleridge and Jelniki when he discharged any of his duties as an officer and director of Greystone. See id. at 943 (holding that a parent must exercise some control over the subsidiarys activities which does not require that the subsidiary be controlled to an ultimate degree by its parent although something more than mere passive investment by the parent is required the parent must have and exercise control and direction over the affairs of its subsidiary in order for venue to be proper" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthe existence of that state of facts at the time that the law was enacted must be assumed.”). The judicial deference which must be given to the legislature under “rational basis” review is illustrated by case law. For instance, in Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 69 S.Ct. 463, 93 L.Ed. 533 (1949), the Court upheld an ordinance on Equal Protection grounds which banned advertising on trucks, but exempted those trucks advertising their own products. The Court stated that the law was designed to promote public safety and that the city “may well have concluded” that those advertising their own products would not present the same traffic problem. Id. at 110, 69 S.Ct. 463. See also Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 101 S.Ct. 715, 66 L.Ed.2d 659 (1981) (holding that lprs are entitled to the protection of the equal protection clause", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthe existence of that state of facts at the time that the law was enacted must be assumed.”). The judicial deference which must be given to the legislature under “rational basis” review is illustrated by case law. For instance, in Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 69 S.Ct. 463, 93 L.Ed. 533 (1949), the Court upheld an ordinance on Equal Protection grounds which banned advertising on trucks, but exempted those trucks advertising their own products. The Court stated that the law was designed to promote public safety and that the city “may well have concluded” that those advertising their own products would not present the same traffic problem. Id. at 110, 69 S.Ct. 463. See also Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 101 S.Ct. 715, 66 L.Ed.2d 659 (1981) (holding that a state ban on nonreturnable milk containers while permitting the use of other nonreturnable containers did not offend the equal protection clause since the legislature might have determined that even a limited ban would promote greater use of environmentally desirable alternative containers", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthe existence of that state of facts at the time that the law was enacted must be assumed.”). The judicial deference which must be given to the legislature under “rational basis” review is illustrated by case law. For instance, in Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 69 S.Ct. 463, 93 L.Ed. 533 (1949), the Court upheld an ordinance on Equal Protection grounds which banned advertising on trucks, but exempted those trucks advertising their own products. The Court stated that the law was designed to promote public safety and that the city “may well have concluded” that those advertising their own products would not present the same traffic problem. Id. at 110, 69 S.Ct. 463. See also Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 101 S.Ct. 715, 66 L.Ed.2d 659 (1981) (holding that the states reapportionment plan might violate the equal protection clause", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthe existence of that state of facts at the time that the law was enacted must be assumed.”). The judicial deference which must be given to the legislature under “rational basis” review is illustrated by case law. For instance, in Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 69 S.Ct. 463, 93 L.Ed. 533 (1949), the Court upheld an ordinance on Equal Protection grounds which banned advertising on trucks, but exempted those trucks advertising their own products. The Court stated that the law was designed to promote public safety and that the city “may well have concluded” that those advertising their own products would not present the same traffic problem. Id. at 110, 69 S.Ct. 463. See also Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 101 S.Ct. 715, 66 L.Ed.2d 659 (1981) (holding that a state weapons ban did not violate equal protection principles because the plaintiffs challenge related to classifications among weapons not persons", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthe existence of that state of facts at the time that the law was enacted must be assumed.”). The judicial deference which must be given to the legislature under “rational basis” review is illustrated by case law. For instance, in Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 69 S.Ct. 463, 93 L.Ed. 533 (1949), the Court upheld an ordinance on Equal Protection grounds which banned advertising on trucks, but exempted those trucks advertising their own products. The Court stated that the law was designed to promote public safety and that the city “may well have concluded” that those advertising their own products would not present the same traffic problem. Id. at 110, 69 S.Ct. 463. See also Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 101 S.Ct. 715, 66 L.Ed.2d 659 (1981) (holding that racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\noverturned unless no reasonable juror could have found that the govern ment disproved either element of entrapment beyond a reasonable doubt, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. United States v. Jones, 976 F.2d 176, 180 (4th Cir.1992). In this case, the Government produced evidence that undercut at least the element of predisposition. Whether to believe this evidence or accept Mannar’s conflicting evidence was a question for the jury. United States v. Murphy, 35 F.3d 143, 148 (4th Cir.1994). The fact that the jury could not reach a verdict on the first count does not amount to a finding of entrapment; even if it did, it would not preclude a rejection of that defense for the second count. See United States v. Vaughn, 80 F.3d 549, 552-53 (D.C.Cir. 1996) (holding that jury finding of entrapment in may and june offenses did not extend to august offense", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\noverturned unless no reasonable juror could have found that the govern ment disproved either element of entrapment beyond a reasonable doubt, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. United States v. Jones, 976 F.2d 176, 180 (4th Cir.1992). In this case, the Government produced evidence that undercut at least the element of predisposition. Whether to believe this evidence or accept Mannar’s conflicting evidence was a question for the jury. United States v. Murphy, 35 F.3d 143, 148 (4th Cir.1994). The fact that the jury could not reach a verdict on the first count does not amount to a finding of entrapment; even if it did, it would not preclude a rejection of that defense for the second count. See United States v. Vaughn, 80 F.3d 549, 552-53 (D.C.Cir. 1996) (holding that erroneous exclusion of evidence regarding defendants lack of criminal record was not harmless in prosecution for drug offenses in which defendant asserted entrapment", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\noverturned unless no reasonable juror could have found that the govern ment disproved either element of entrapment beyond a reasonable doubt, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. United States v. Jones, 976 F.2d 176, 180 (4th Cir.1992). In this case, the Government produced evidence that undercut at least the element of predisposition. Whether to believe this evidence or accept Mannar’s conflicting evidence was a question for the jury. United States v. Murphy, 35 F.3d 143, 148 (4th Cir.1994). The fact that the jury could not reach a verdict on the first count does not amount to a finding of entrapment; even if it did, it would not preclude a rejection of that defense for the second count. See United States v. Vaughn, 80 F.3d 549, 552-53 (D.C.Cir. 1996) (holding that where jury was instructed on both a greater offense and lesserincluded offense and the jury convicted on the lesserincluded offense the double jeopardy provision prohibited retrial on the greater offense", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\noverturned unless no reasonable juror could have found that the govern ment disproved either element of entrapment beyond a reasonable doubt, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. United States v. Jones, 976 F.2d 176, 180 (4th Cir.1992). In this case, the Government produced evidence that undercut at least the element of predisposition. Whether to believe this evidence or accept Mannar’s conflicting evidence was a question for the jury. United States v. Murphy, 35 F.3d 143, 148 (4th Cir.1994). The fact that the jury could not reach a verdict on the first count does not amount to a finding of entrapment; even if it did, it would not preclude a rejection of that defense for the second count. See United States v. Vaughn, 80 F.3d 549, 552-53 (D.C.Cir. 1996) (holding that in the conviction and sentencing for criminal offenses committed in the course of one criminal episode it is the intent of the legislature that there be a separate conviction and sentence for each criminal offense unless one of the offenses is a degree of the other a necessarily included lesser offense subsumed in the other or both offenses are identical", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\noverturned unless no reasonable juror could have found that the govern ment disproved either element of entrapment beyond a reasonable doubt, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. United States v. Jones, 976 F.2d 176, 180 (4th Cir.1992). In this case, the Government produced evidence that undercut at least the element of predisposition. Whether to believe this evidence or accept Mannar’s conflicting evidence was a question for the jury. United States v. Murphy, 35 F.3d 143, 148 (4th Cir.1994). The fact that the jury could not reach a verdict on the first count does not amount to a finding of entrapment; even if it did, it would not preclude a rejection of that defense for the second count. See United States v. Vaughn, 80 F.3d 549, 552-53 (D.C.Cir. 1996) (holding that state may charge separately for the same offense but the convictions for more than one of the offenses cannot stand" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nPersonal Ins. Co., 79 A.3d 1141, 1148 (Pa.Super.Ct.2013) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 7 . Id. at 1149 (citations omitted). 8 . Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 316 (3d Cir.2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 9 . See Rhodes v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 21 A.3d 1253, 1263 (Pa.Super.Ct.2011). 10 . Post v. St. Paul Travelers Ins. Co., 691 F.3d 500, 523 (3d Cir.2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 11 . Condio v. Erie Ins. Exch., 899 A.2d 1136, 1145 (Pa.Super.Ct.2006). 12 . To the extent the Miezejewskis argue the claim representative was not permitted to make an initial offer pending further discovery on the basis of the information already submitted to the insurer, they misconstrue Pennsylvania law. See id. at 1151 (holding insurer not liable for bad faith when it denied insureds claim based on a good faith dispute regarding the interpretation of a rule", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nPersonal Ins. Co., 79 A.3d 1141, 1148 (Pa.Super.Ct.2013) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 7 . Id. at 1149 (citations omitted). 8 . Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 316 (3d Cir.2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 9 . See Rhodes v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 21 A.3d 1253, 1263 (Pa.Super.Ct.2011). 10 . Post v. St. Paul Travelers Ins. Co., 691 F.3d 500, 523 (3d Cir.2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 11 . Condio v. Erie Ins. Exch., 899 A.2d 1136, 1145 (Pa.Super.Ct.2006). 12 . To the extent the Miezejewskis argue the claim representative was not permitted to make an initial offer pending further discovery on the basis of the information already submitted to the insurer, they misconstrue Pennsylvania law. See id. at 1151 (holding that a bad faith claim is a tort", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nPersonal Ins. Co., 79 A.3d 1141, 1148 (Pa.Super.Ct.2013) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 7 . Id. at 1149 (citations omitted). 8 . Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 316 (3d Cir.2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 9 . See Rhodes v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 21 A.3d 1253, 1263 (Pa.Super.Ct.2011). 10 . Post v. St. Paul Travelers Ins. Co., 691 F.3d 500, 523 (3d Cir.2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 11 . Condio v. Erie Ins. Exch., 899 A.2d 1136, 1145 (Pa.Super.Ct.2006). 12 . To the extent the Miezejewskis argue the claim representative was not permitted to make an initial offer pending further discovery on the basis of the information already submitted to the insurer, they misconstrue Pennsylvania law. See id. at 1151 (holding that insurer did not engage in bad faith by relying on the equivocal contents of a police report in taking an initial position pending further investigation and evaluation that claimant was not entitled to uim benefits", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nPersonal Ins. Co., 79 A.3d 1141, 1148 (Pa.Super.Ct.2013) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 7 . Id. at 1149 (citations omitted). 8 . Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 316 (3d Cir.2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 9 . See Rhodes v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 21 A.3d 1253, 1263 (Pa.Super.Ct.2011). 10 . Post v. St. Paul Travelers Ins. Co., 691 F.3d 500, 523 (3d Cir.2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 11 . Condio v. Erie Ins. Exch., 899 A.2d 1136, 1145 (Pa.Super.Ct.2006). 12 . To the extent the Miezejewskis argue the claim representative was not permitted to make an initial offer pending further discovery on the basis of the information already submitted to the insurer, they misconstrue Pennsylvania law. See id. at 1151 (holding insurer was not acting in bad faith in denying underinsured motorist benefits where denial was based on an issue of law unsettled in iowa and on which other jurisdictions disagreed", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nPersonal Ins. Co., 79 A.3d 1141, 1148 (Pa.Super.Ct.2013) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 7 . Id. at 1149 (citations omitted). 8 . Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 316 (3d Cir.2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 9 . See Rhodes v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 21 A.3d 1253, 1263 (Pa.Super.Ct.2011). 10 . Post v. St. Paul Travelers Ins. Co., 691 F.3d 500, 523 (3d Cir.2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 11 . Condio v. Erie Ins. Exch., 899 A.2d 1136, 1145 (Pa.Super.Ct.2006). 12 . To the extent the Miezejewskis argue the claim representative was not permitted to make an initial offer pending further discovery on the basis of the information already submitted to the insurer, they misconstrue Pennsylvania law. See id. at 1151 (holding that insured may recover attorneys fees from insurer where insurer acts in bad faith" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nJackson. Schreiber argues that Daily’s alleged conflict of interest caused Daily’s (and presumably Neary’s) failure to pursue Jackson’s assertion that she was intimidated. Schreiber also alleges eight other grounds that allegedly show Daily was ineffective. Schreiber did present these other grounds to the court of appeals in a pro se brief, but he was represented by counsel, and the court apparently chose to evaluate only counsel’s arguments. Because Schreiber’s appellate attorney presented only the juror intimidation issue to the court of appeals, and because the court of appeals only addressed that argument in respect to its decision on prejudice, that is the only ground of its decision this Court may review pursuant to § 2254. See Myartt v. Frank, 395 F.3d 782, 785 (7th Cir.2005) (recognizing that 2254d by its own terms applies only to claims previously adjudicated on the merits in statecourt proceedings", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nJackson. Schreiber argues that Daily’s alleged conflict of interest caused Daily’s (and presumably Neary’s) failure to pursue Jackson’s assertion that she was intimidated. Schreiber also alleges eight other grounds that allegedly show Daily was ineffective. Schreiber did present these other grounds to the court of appeals in a pro se brief, but he was represented by counsel, and the court apparently chose to evaluate only counsel’s arguments. Because Schreiber’s appellate attorney presented only the juror intimidation issue to the court of appeals, and because the court of appeals only addressed that argument in respect to its decision on prejudice, that is the only ground of its decision this Court may review pursuant to § 2254. See Myartt v. Frank, 395 F.3d 782, 785 (7th Cir.2005) (holding that aedpa limits a federal habeas court to the record before the state court where a claim has been adjudicated on the merits by the state court", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nJackson. Schreiber argues that Daily’s alleged conflict of interest caused Daily’s (and presumably Neary’s) failure to pursue Jackson’s assertion that she was intimidated. Schreiber also alleges eight other grounds that allegedly show Daily was ineffective. Schreiber did present these other grounds to the court of appeals in a pro se brief, but he was represented by counsel, and the court apparently chose to evaluate only counsel’s arguments. Because Schreiber’s appellate attorney presented only the juror intimidation issue to the court of appeals, and because the court of appeals only addressed that argument in respect to its decision on prejudice, that is the only ground of its decision this Court may review pursuant to § 2254. See Myartt v. Frank, 395 F.3d 782, 785 (7th Cir.2005) (holding that a claim brought in a pro se brief that the state court did not address was not adjudicated on the merits as required by 2254d", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nJackson. Schreiber argues that Daily’s alleged conflict of interest caused Daily’s (and presumably Neary’s) failure to pursue Jackson’s assertion that she was intimidated. Schreiber also alleges eight other grounds that allegedly show Daily was ineffective. Schreiber did present these other grounds to the court of appeals in a pro se brief, but he was represented by counsel, and the court apparently chose to evaluate only counsel’s arguments. Because Schreiber’s appellate attorney presented only the juror intimidation issue to the court of appeals, and because the court of appeals only addressed that argument in respect to its decision on prejudice, that is the only ground of its decision this Court may review pursuant to § 2254. See Myartt v. Frank, 395 F.3d 782, 785 (7th Cir.2005) (holding that aedpa only applies where the state court adjudicated the constitutional issue on the merits", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nJackson. Schreiber argues that Daily’s alleged conflict of interest caused Daily’s (and presumably Neary’s) failure to pursue Jackson’s assertion that she was intimidated. Schreiber also alleges eight other grounds that allegedly show Daily was ineffective. Schreiber did present these other grounds to the court of appeals in a pro se brief, but he was represented by counsel, and the court apparently chose to evaluate only counsel’s arguments. Because Schreiber’s appellate attorney presented only the juror intimidation issue to the court of appeals, and because the court of appeals only addressed that argument in respect to its decision on prejudice, that is the only ground of its decision this Court may review pursuant to § 2254. See Myartt v. Frank, 395 F.3d 782, 785 (7th Cir.2005) (holding that this court will not address the merits of an issue presented for the first time in a reply brief" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nof lien interests is “first in time is first in right”). Second, even if the trial court had the authority to declare the Association’s lien superior to the mortgage lien as a sanction, the fact remains that the issue of lien priority was never actually litigated. See Goodman v. Aldrich & Ramsey Enters., Inc., 804 So.2d 544, 547 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (providing that for collateral estoppel to apply, the issue “must have been actually litigated”). Nor would it change the fact that PNC Bank, as the holder of the mortgage who obtained title to the subject property via foreclosure sale, qualified as a first mortgagee regardless of the fact that the Association’s assessment lien survived the foreclosure action. See Beltway Capital, LLC v. Greens GOA Inc., 153 So.3d 330, 333 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) (holding that because the bank held the mortgage when it acquired title by foreclosure it was entitled to safe harbor as a first mortgagee without further regard to whether it was also an assignee", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nof lien interests is “first in time is first in right”). Second, even if the trial court had the authority to declare the Association’s lien superior to the mortgage lien as a sanction, the fact remains that the issue of lien priority was never actually litigated. See Goodman v. Aldrich & Ramsey Enters., Inc., 804 So.2d 544, 547 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (providing that for collateral estoppel to apply, the issue “must have been actually litigated”). Nor would it change the fact that PNC Bank, as the holder of the mortgage who obtained title to the subject property via foreclosure sale, qualified as a first mortgagee regardless of the fact that the Association’s assessment lien survived the foreclosure action. See Beltway Capital, LLC v. Greens GOA Inc., 153 So.3d 330, 333 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) (holding that in a case in which an omitted junior mortgagee foreclosed its mortgage the junior mortgagee had the absolute right to redeem from the senior mortgagee who had purchased the property at a sale following foreclosure of the senior mortgage", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nof lien interests is “first in time is first in right”). Second, even if the trial court had the authority to declare the Association’s lien superior to the mortgage lien as a sanction, the fact remains that the issue of lien priority was never actually litigated. See Goodman v. Aldrich & Ramsey Enters., Inc., 804 So.2d 544, 547 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (providing that for collateral estoppel to apply, the issue “must have been actually litigated”). Nor would it change the fact that PNC Bank, as the holder of the mortgage who obtained title to the subject property via foreclosure sale, qualified as a first mortgagee regardless of the fact that the Association’s assessment lien survived the foreclosure action. See Beltway Capital, LLC v. Greens GOA Inc., 153 So.3d 330, 333 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) (holding that foreclosure of prior mortgage extinguished second mortgage", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nof lien interests is “first in time is first in right”). Second, even if the trial court had the authority to declare the Association’s lien superior to the mortgage lien as a sanction, the fact remains that the issue of lien priority was never actually litigated. See Goodman v. Aldrich & Ramsey Enters., Inc., 804 So.2d 544, 547 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (providing that for collateral estoppel to apply, the issue “must have been actually litigated”). Nor would it change the fact that PNC Bank, as the holder of the mortgage who obtained title to the subject property via foreclosure sale, qualified as a first mortgagee regardless of the fact that the Association’s assessment lien survived the foreclosure action. See Beltway Capital, LLC v. Greens GOA Inc., 153 So.3d 330, 333 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) (holding that the mortgagee named in the mortgage at the time of the mortgages execution acquired the legal title to the property", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nof lien interests is “first in time is first in right”). Second, even if the trial court had the authority to declare the Association’s lien superior to the mortgage lien as a sanction, the fact remains that the issue of lien priority was never actually litigated. See Goodman v. Aldrich & Ramsey Enters., Inc., 804 So.2d 544, 547 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (providing that for collateral estoppel to apply, the issue “must have been actually litigated”). Nor would it change the fact that PNC Bank, as the holder of the mortgage who obtained title to the subject property via foreclosure sale, qualified as a first mortgagee regardless of the fact that the Association’s assessment lien survived the foreclosure action. See Beltway Capital, LLC v. Greens GOA Inc., 153 So.3d 330, 333 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) (holding that rookerfeldman barred a debtors action to rescind a mortgage because it was inextricably intertwined with a state courts foreclosure judgment which was premised on the existence of a valid mortgage" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nof the estoppel depends on “the inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the amendment.” Id. at 1840, 62 USPQ2d at 1712. A patentee is not barred from asserting “equivalents unforeseeable at the time of the amendment and beyond a fair interpretation of wh .3d 1570, 1583, 34 USPQ2d 1673, 1683 (Fed.Cir.1995). It is apparent from the record that numerous amendments of the claim limitations were made during prosecution of the ’220 patent. Also, in its October 3, 1991 response, Allen made numerous arguments respecting the patentability of the claims as amended. On remand, the district court must consider whether any of these amendments and arguments gives rise to prosecution history estoppel limiting resort to the doctrine of equivalents. Festo, 122 S.Ct. at 1839, 62 USPQ2d at 1711-12 (holding inter alia that a voluntary amendment may give rise to prosecution history estoppel", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nof the estoppel depends on “the inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the amendment.” Id. at 1840, 62 USPQ2d at 1712. A patentee is not barred from asserting “equivalents unforeseeable at the time of the amendment and beyond a fair interpretation of wh .3d 1570, 1583, 34 USPQ2d 1673, 1683 (Fed.Cir.1995). It is apparent from the record that numerous amendments of the claim limitations were made during prosecution of the ’220 patent. Also, in its October 3, 1991 response, Allen made numerous arguments respecting the patentability of the claims as amended. On remand, the district court must consider whether any of these amendments and arguments gives rise to prosecution history estoppel limiting resort to the doctrine of equivalents. Festo, 122 S.Ct. at 1839, 62 USPQ2d at 1711-12 (holding that alleged violations of a state statute did not give rise to federal constitutional claims", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nof the estoppel depends on “the inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the amendment.” Id. at 1840, 62 USPQ2d at 1712. A patentee is not barred from asserting “equivalents unforeseeable at the time of the amendment and beyond a fair interpretation of wh .3d 1570, 1583, 34 USPQ2d 1673, 1683 (Fed.Cir.1995). It is apparent from the record that numerous amendments of the claim limitations were made during prosecution of the ’220 patent. Also, in its October 3, 1991 response, Allen made numerous arguments respecting the patentability of the claims as amended. On remand, the district court must consider whether any of these amendments and arguments gives rise to prosecution history estoppel limiting resort to the doctrine of equivalents. Festo, 122 S.Ct. at 1839, 62 USPQ2d at 1711-12 (holding that a narrowing amendment made to satisfy any requirement of the patent act may give rise to an estoppel", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nof the estoppel depends on “the inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the amendment.” Id. at 1840, 62 USPQ2d at 1712. A patentee is not barred from asserting “equivalents unforeseeable at the time of the amendment and beyond a fair interpretation of wh .3d 1570, 1583, 34 USPQ2d 1673, 1683 (Fed.Cir.1995). It is apparent from the record that numerous amendments of the claim limitations were made during prosecution of the ’220 patent. Also, in its October 3, 1991 response, Allen made numerous arguments respecting the patentability of the claims as amended. On remand, the district court must consider whether any of these amendments and arguments gives rise to prosecution history estoppel limiting resort to the doctrine of equivalents. Festo, 122 S.Ct. at 1839, 62 USPQ2d at 1711-12 (holding that failure to record an assignment does not give rise to a cause of action", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nof the estoppel depends on “the inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the amendment.” Id. at 1840, 62 USPQ2d at 1712. A patentee is not barred from asserting “equivalents unforeseeable at the time of the amendment and beyond a fair interpretation of wh .3d 1570, 1583, 34 USPQ2d 1673, 1683 (Fed.Cir.1995). It is apparent from the record that numerous amendments of the claim limitations were made during prosecution of the ’220 patent. Also, in its October 3, 1991 response, Allen made numerous arguments respecting the patentability of the claims as amended. On remand, the district court must consider whether any of these amendments and arguments gives rise to prosecution history estoppel limiting resort to the doctrine of equivalents. Festo, 122 S.Ct. at 1839, 62 USPQ2d at 1711-12 (holding that the first amendment does not by itself give rise to a cause of action for damages" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nThe appeals system had been set up specifically to deal with a dispute over an individual’s entitlement to disability benefits. See id. at 424-26. Not all of Appellant’s allegations serving as a basis for his Bivens claim involve individual action leading to final agency decisions reviewable pursuant to the APA. For example, Appellant’s allegations that some Defendants denied him certain rights pursuant to his management plan is properly challenged in an administrative proceeding. Therefore, a Bivens claim for that particular allegation is precluded. However, several of Appellant’s allegations of Defendants’ intentional misconduct are unrelated to any final agency action and are therefore properly within the scope of a Bivens claim. See, e.g., Zephyr Aviation, 247 F.3d at 572-573 (holding that a bivens cause of action cannot be maintained against a federal agency", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nThe appeals system had been set up specifically to deal with a dispute over an individual’s entitlement to disability benefits. See id. at 424-26. Not all of Appellant’s allegations serving as a basis for his Bivens claim involve individual action leading to final agency decisions reviewable pursuant to the APA. For example, Appellant’s allegations that some Defendants denied him certain rights pursuant to his management plan is properly challenged in an administrative proceeding. Therefore, a Bivens claim for that particular allegation is precluded. However, several of Appellant’s allegations of Defendants’ intentional misconduct are unrelated to any final agency action and are therefore properly within the scope of a Bivens claim. See, e.g., Zephyr Aviation, 247 F.3d at 572-573 (holding that social security regulations and procedures precluded a bivens action", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nThe appeals system had been set up specifically to deal with a dispute over an individual’s entitlement to disability benefits. See id. at 424-26. Not all of Appellant’s allegations serving as a basis for his Bivens claim involve individual action leading to final agency decisions reviewable pursuant to the APA. For example, Appellant’s allegations that some Defendants denied him certain rights pursuant to his management plan is properly challenged in an administrative proceeding. Therefore, a Bivens claim for that particular allegation is precluded. However, several of Appellant’s allegations of Defendants’ intentional misconduct are unrelated to any final agency action and are therefore properly within the scope of a Bivens claim. See, e.g., Zephyr Aviation, 247 F.3d at 572-573 (holding that court would not imply a bivens cause of action for a prisoner held in a private prison facility", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nThe appeals system had been set up specifically to deal with a dispute over an individual’s entitlement to disability benefits. See id. at 424-26. Not all of Appellant’s allegations serving as a basis for his Bivens claim involve individual action leading to final agency decisions reviewable pursuant to the APA. For example, Appellant’s allegations that some Defendants denied him certain rights pursuant to his management plan is properly challenged in an administrative proceeding. Therefore, a Bivens claim for that particular allegation is precluded. However, several of Appellant’s allegations of Defendants’ intentional misconduct are unrelated to any final agency action and are therefore properly within the scope of a Bivens claim. See, e.g., Zephyr Aviation, 247 F.3d at 572-573 (recognizing potential of bivens action for extraprocedural and unconstitutional actions by faa inspectors while acknowledging that a bivens action would be unavailable to challenge the faas attachment of condition notice to companys airplane", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nThe appeals system had been set up specifically to deal with a dispute over an individual’s entitlement to disability benefits. See id. at 424-26. Not all of Appellant’s allegations serving as a basis for his Bivens claim involve individual action leading to final agency decisions reviewable pursuant to the APA. For example, Appellant’s allegations that some Defendants denied him certain rights pursuant to his management plan is properly challenged in an administrative proceeding. Therefore, a Bivens claim for that particular allegation is precluded. However, several of Appellant’s allegations of Defendants’ intentional misconduct are unrelated to any final agency action and are therefore properly within the scope of a Bivens claim. See, e.g., Zephyr Aviation, 247 F.3d at 572-573 (holding that a bivens claim cannot be brought against a federal agency" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nCarlson v. State, 798 P.2d 1269, 1274 (Alaska 1990) (“[License fees which discriminate against nonresidents sere-prima facie a violation of [the Privileges and Immunities Clause].”). Further, an unbroken line of authority characterizes commercial fishing as a “common calling” that is protected by.the Privileges and Immunities. Clause. See Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S. 415, 417-19, 72 S.Ct. 428, 96 L.Ed. 458 (1952) (striking down Alaska’s differentials for commercial fishing licenses as violating the Privileges and Immunities Clause); Toomer, 334 U.S. at 403, 68 S.Ct. 1156 (“[Commercial shrimping in the marginal sea, like other common callings, is within the purview of the privileges and immunities clause.”); Connecticut ex rel. Blumenthal v. Crotty, 346 F.3d 84, 96 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding an arbitration tribunal fell within the purview of section 1782", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nCarlson v. State, 798 P.2d 1269, 1274 (Alaska 1990) (“[License fees which discriminate against nonresidents sere-prima facie a violation of [the Privileges and Immunities Clause].”). Further, an unbroken line of authority characterizes commercial fishing as a “common calling” that is protected by.the Privileges and Immunities. Clause. See Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S. 415, 417-19, 72 S.Ct. 428, 96 L.Ed. 458 (1952) (striking down Alaska’s differentials for commercial fishing licenses as violating the Privileges and Immunities Clause); Toomer, 334 U.S. at 403, 68 S.Ct. 1156 (“[Commercial shrimping in the marginal sea, like other common callings, is within the purview of the privileges and immunities clause.”); Connecticut ex rel. Blumenthal v. Crotty, 346 F.3d 84, 96 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that commercial lobstering falls within the purview of the privileges and immunities clause", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nCarlson v. State, 798 P.2d 1269, 1274 (Alaska 1990) (“[License fees which discriminate against nonresidents sere-prima facie a violation of [the Privileges and Immunities Clause].”). Further, an unbroken line of authority characterizes commercial fishing as a “common calling” that is protected by.the Privileges and Immunities. Clause. See Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S. 415, 417-19, 72 S.Ct. 428, 96 L.Ed. 458 (1952) (striking down Alaska’s differentials for commercial fishing licenses as violating the Privileges and Immunities Clause); Toomer, 334 U.S. at 403, 68 S.Ct. 1156 (“[Commercial shrimping in the marginal sea, like other common callings, is within the purview of the privileges and immunities clause.”); Connecticut ex rel. Blumenthal v. Crotty, 346 F.3d 84, 96 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that the flsa is not within the purview of section 5 of the fourteenth amendment", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nCarlson v. State, 798 P.2d 1269, 1274 (Alaska 1990) (“[License fees which discriminate against nonresidents sere-prima facie a violation of [the Privileges and Immunities Clause].”). Further, an unbroken line of authority characterizes commercial fishing as a “common calling” that is protected by.the Privileges and Immunities. Clause. See Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S. 415, 417-19, 72 S.Ct. 428, 96 L.Ed. 458 (1952) (striking down Alaska’s differentials for commercial fishing licenses as violating the Privileges and Immunities Clause); Toomer, 334 U.S. at 403, 68 S.Ct. 1156 (“[Commercial shrimping in the marginal sea, like other common callings, is within the purview of the privileges and immunities clause.”); Connecticut ex rel. Blumenthal v. Crotty, 346 F.3d 84, 96 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding issues within scope of administrative hearing are within the reviewing courts purview", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nCarlson v. State, 798 P.2d 1269, 1274 (Alaska 1990) (“[License fees which discriminate against nonresidents sere-prima facie a violation of [the Privileges and Immunities Clause].”). Further, an unbroken line of authority characterizes commercial fishing as a “common calling” that is protected by.the Privileges and Immunities. Clause. See Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S. 415, 417-19, 72 S.Ct. 428, 96 L.Ed. 458 (1952) (striking down Alaska’s differentials for commercial fishing licenses as violating the Privileges and Immunities Clause); Toomer, 334 U.S. at 403, 68 S.Ct. 1156 (“[Commercial shrimping in the marginal sea, like other common callings, is within the purview of the privileges and immunities clause.”); Connecticut ex rel. Blumenthal v. Crotty, 346 F.3d 84, 96 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that licensing fee for nonresident commercial fishermen constituted discriminatory tax in violation of privileges and immunities clause" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ntrial court entered a summary judgment in favor of the defendant attorneys on the counts premised on the alleged breach of the Disciplinary Rules. In affirming the summary judgment, this Court stated: “The Alabama courts, state and federal, have never addressed the issue of whether a breach of a Disciplinary Rule under the Code of Professional Responsibility provides the basis for a private cause of action. However, courts in other jurisdictions which have confronted this issue have expressly held that a violation of a Disciplinary Rule does not create a private cause of action. Tew v. Arky, Freed, Stearns, Watson, Greer, Weaver, & Harris, P.A., 655 F.Supp. 1573 (S.D.Fla.1987); Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F.Supp. 1376 (N.D.Iowa 1978), aff'd mem., 590 F.2d 341 (8th So.2d 363, 367 (Ala.1996) (holding that a breach of the rules of professional conduct would not justify setting aside a divorce judgment and citing terry cove north for the proposition that the sole remedy for a violation of the rules of professional conduct was the imposition of disciplinary measures", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ntrial court entered a summary judgment in favor of the defendant attorneys on the counts premised on the alleged breach of the Disciplinary Rules. In affirming the summary judgment, this Court stated: “The Alabama courts, state and federal, have never addressed the issue of whether a breach of a Disciplinary Rule under the Code of Professional Responsibility provides the basis for a private cause of action. However, courts in other jurisdictions which have confronted this issue have expressly held that a violation of a Disciplinary Rule does not create a private cause of action. Tew v. Arky, Freed, Stearns, Watson, Greer, Weaver, & Harris, P.A., 655 F.Supp. 1573 (S.D.Fla.1987); Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F.Supp. 1376 (N.D.Iowa 1978), aff'd mem., 590 F.2d 341 (8th So.2d 363, 367 (Ala.1996) (holding that the disciplinary rules of the code of professional responsibility are not laws of the state of texas for purposes of statute which excludes the admission of evidence obtained in violation of law", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ntrial court entered a summary judgment in favor of the defendant attorneys on the counts premised on the alleged breach of the Disciplinary Rules. In affirming the summary judgment, this Court stated: “The Alabama courts, state and federal, have never addressed the issue of whether a breach of a Disciplinary Rule under the Code of Professional Responsibility provides the basis for a private cause of action. However, courts in other jurisdictions which have confronted this issue have expressly held that a violation of a Disciplinary Rule does not create a private cause of action. Tew v. Arky, Freed, Stearns, Watson, Greer, Weaver, & Harris, P.A., 655 F.Supp. 1573 (S.D.Fla.1987); Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F.Supp. 1376 (N.D.Iowa 1978), aff'd mem., 590 F.2d 341 (8th So.2d 363, 367 (Ala.1996) (holding that the rules of professional conduct are selfimposed internal regulations and do not play a role in determining the admissi bility of evidence and citing terry cove north for the proposition that the sole remedy for a violation of the rules of professional conduct was the imposition of disciplinary measures", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ntrial court entered a summary judgment in favor of the defendant attorneys on the counts premised on the alleged breach of the Disciplinary Rules. In affirming the summary judgment, this Court stated: “The Alabama courts, state and federal, have never addressed the issue of whether a breach of a Disciplinary Rule under the Code of Professional Responsibility provides the basis for a private cause of action. However, courts in other jurisdictions which have confronted this issue have expressly held that a violation of a Disciplinary Rule does not create a private cause of action. Tew v. Arky, Freed, Stearns, Watson, Greer, Weaver, & Harris, P.A., 655 F.Supp. 1573 (S.D.Fla.1987); Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F.Supp. 1376 (N.D.Iowa 1978), aff'd mem., 590 F.2d 341 (8th So.2d 363, 367 (Ala.1996) (holding violation of the rules of professional conduct does not create a legal duty on the part of the lawyer nor constitute negligence per se although it may be used as some evidence of negligence", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ntrial court entered a summary judgment in favor of the defendant attorneys on the counts premised on the alleged breach of the Disciplinary Rules. In affirming the summary judgment, this Court stated: “The Alabama courts, state and federal, have never addressed the issue of whether a breach of a Disciplinary Rule under the Code of Professional Responsibility provides the basis for a private cause of action. However, courts in other jurisdictions which have confronted this issue have expressly held that a violation of a Disciplinary Rule does not create a private cause of action. Tew v. Arky, Freed, Stearns, Watson, Greer, Weaver, & Harris, P.A., 655 F.Supp. 1573 (S.D.Fla.1987); Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F.Supp. 1376 (N.D.Iowa 1978), aff'd mem., 590 F.2d 341 (8th So.2d 363, 367 (Ala.1996) (holding professional rules do not provide basis for civil liability" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nto the Petitioning Creditor. Despite this acknowledgement, this Court finds the Instant Memo to be insufficient to prove the existence of an enforceable contract because it makes no reference to the essential terms of whatever loan agreement that may exist between the parties. Mackay v. Mackay, 984 A.2d 529, 534 (Pa.Super.2009) (recognizing that when a party seeks to enforce an oral agreement, the party must establish the essential terms and conditions of the alleged agreement); CoreStates Bank, N.A. v. Cutillo, 723 A.2d 1053, 1058 (Pa.Super.1999) (stating that a party must establish the essential terms of a contract in order to state a claim for breach of contract); Estate of Rodgers v. Morris Chapel Missionary Baptist Church, No. 04-1577, 2005 WL 3602536 (Pa.Ct.Com.Pl. Dec. 14, 2005) (recognizing that the elements of a claim for breach of contract are 1 existence of a valid contract and 2 breach of the terms of that contract", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nto the Petitioning Creditor. Despite this acknowledgement, this Court finds the Instant Memo to be insufficient to prove the existence of an enforceable contract because it makes no reference to the essential terms of whatever loan agreement that may exist between the parties. Mackay v. Mackay, 984 A.2d 529, 534 (Pa.Super.2009) (recognizing that when a party seeks to enforce an oral agreement, the party must establish the essential terms and conditions of the alleged agreement); CoreStates Bank, N.A. v. Cutillo, 723 A.2d 1053, 1058 (Pa.Super.1999) (stating that a party must establish the essential terms of a contract in order to state a claim for breach of contract); Estate of Rodgers v. Morris Chapel Missionary Baptist Church, No. 04-1577, 2005 WL 3602536 (Pa.Ct.Com.Pl. Dec. 14, 2005) (holding part performance of an oral agreement necessary to take the oral agreement out of the statute of frauds must be consistent only with the existence of the alleged oral contract", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nto the Petitioning Creditor. Despite this acknowledgement, this Court finds the Instant Memo to be insufficient to prove the existence of an enforceable contract because it makes no reference to the essential terms of whatever loan agreement that may exist between the parties. Mackay v. Mackay, 984 A.2d 529, 534 (Pa.Super.2009) (recognizing that when a party seeks to enforce an oral agreement, the party must establish the essential terms and conditions of the alleged agreement); CoreStates Bank, N.A. v. Cutillo, 723 A.2d 1053, 1058 (Pa.Super.1999) (stating that a party must establish the essential terms of a contract in order to state a claim for breach of contract); Estate of Rodgers v. Morris Chapel Missionary Baptist Church, No. 04-1577, 2005 WL 3602536 (Pa.Ct.Com.Pl. Dec. 14, 2005) (holding that defendant did not breach oral agreement because among other things the plaintiff had not established that the term in question was part of the oral contract", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nto the Petitioning Creditor. Despite this acknowledgement, this Court finds the Instant Memo to be insufficient to prove the existence of an enforceable contract because it makes no reference to the essential terms of whatever loan agreement that may exist between the parties. Mackay v. Mackay, 984 A.2d 529, 534 (Pa.Super.2009) (recognizing that when a party seeks to enforce an oral agreement, the party must establish the essential terms and conditions of the alleged agreement); CoreStates Bank, N.A. v. Cutillo, 723 A.2d 1053, 1058 (Pa.Super.1999) (stating that a party must establish the essential terms of a contract in order to state a claim for breach of contract); Estate of Rodgers v. Morris Chapel Missionary Baptist Church, No. 04-1577, 2005 WL 3602536 (Pa.Ct.Com.Pl. Dec. 14, 2005) (holding summary dismissal of breach of implied employment contract claim inappropriate where factual issue over existence of oral policy", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nto the Petitioning Creditor. Despite this acknowledgement, this Court finds the Instant Memo to be insufficient to prove the existence of an enforceable contract because it makes no reference to the essential terms of whatever loan agreement that may exist between the parties. Mackay v. Mackay, 984 A.2d 529, 534 (Pa.Super.2009) (recognizing that when a party seeks to enforce an oral agreement, the party must establish the essential terms and conditions of the alleged agreement); CoreStates Bank, N.A. v. Cutillo, 723 A.2d 1053, 1058 (Pa.Super.1999) (stating that a party must establish the essential terms of a contract in order to state a claim for breach of contract); Estate of Rodgers v. Morris Chapel Missionary Baptist Church, No. 04-1577, 2005 WL 3602536 (Pa.Ct.Com.Pl. Dec. 14, 2005) (holding failure to establish terms of an oral loan agreement precluded the existence of a breach of contract claim" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nof some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged. As in Po-ohina, the District Court’s sua sponte dismissal of the charges was not based on a decision on the merits of the case or a decision as to the guilt of Clemente. Instead, the District Court dismissed the charges as a sanction against the State because the District Court mistakenly believed that the State’s witness, Officer Tallion, would not be appearing as ordered. Because the District Court’s dismissal of the charges did not constitute an acquittal, the District Court had the authority to reconsider and overturn its dismissal ruling without violating the protection against double jeopardy. See Poohina, 97 Hawai'i at 509-10, 40 P.3d at 911-12; Commonwealth v. Adams, 349 Pa.Super. 200, 502 A.2d 1345, 1347-52 (1986) (recognizing the specific need for an appropriate double jeopardy review when an appeal is taken by the state from a lower courts dismissal of the criminal charges", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nof some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged. As in Po-ohina, the District Court’s sua sponte dismissal of the charges was not based on a decision on the merits of the case or a decision as to the guilt of Clemente. Instead, the District Court dismissed the charges as a sanction against the State because the District Court mistakenly believed that the State’s witness, Officer Tallion, would not be appearing as ordered. Because the District Court’s dismissal of the charges did not constitute an acquittal, the District Court had the authority to reconsider and overturn its dismissal ruling without violating the protection against double jeopardy. See Poohina, 97 Hawai'i at 509-10, 40 P.3d at 911-12; Commonwealth v. Adams, 349 Pa.Super. 200, 502 A.2d 1345, 1347-52 (1986) (holding that defendant waived double jeopardy claim by obtaining severance of charges at first trial", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nof some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged. As in Po-ohina, the District Court’s sua sponte dismissal of the charges was not based on a decision on the merits of the case or a decision as to the guilt of Clemente. Instead, the District Court dismissed the charges as a sanction against the State because the District Court mistakenly believed that the State’s witness, Officer Tallion, would not be appearing as ordered. Because the District Court’s dismissal of the charges did not constitute an acquittal, the District Court had the authority to reconsider and overturn its dismissal ruling without violating the protection against double jeopardy. See Poohina, 97 Hawai'i at 509-10, 40 P.3d at 911-12; Commonwealth v. Adams, 349 Pa.Super. 200, 502 A.2d 1345, 1347-52 (1986) (holding that a sua sponte dismissal of the charges during trial was not an acquittal that barred retrial based on double jeopardy", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nof some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged. As in Po-ohina, the District Court’s sua sponte dismissal of the charges was not based on a decision on the merits of the case or a decision as to the guilt of Clemente. Instead, the District Court dismissed the charges as a sanction against the State because the District Court mistakenly believed that the State’s witness, Officer Tallion, would not be appearing as ordered. Because the District Court’s dismissal of the charges did not constitute an acquittal, the District Court had the authority to reconsider and overturn its dismissal ruling without violating the protection against double jeopardy. See Poohina, 97 Hawai'i at 509-10, 40 P.3d at 911-12; Commonwealth v. Adams, 349 Pa.Super. 200, 502 A.2d 1345, 1347-52 (1986) (holding that the trial courts dismissal of the charges after jeopardy had attached based on the prosecution witnesses failure to appear was not an acquittal and therefore double jeopardy did not prevent the court from reconsidering its decision and reinstating the charges", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nof some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged. As in Po-ohina, the District Court’s sua sponte dismissal of the charges was not based on a decision on the merits of the case or a decision as to the guilt of Clemente. Instead, the District Court dismissed the charges as a sanction against the State because the District Court mistakenly believed that the State’s witness, Officer Tallion, would not be appearing as ordered. Because the District Court’s dismissal of the charges did not constitute an acquittal, the District Court had the authority to reconsider and overturn its dismissal ruling without violating the protection against double jeopardy. See Poohina, 97 Hawai'i at 509-10, 40 P.3d at 911-12; Commonwealth v. Adams, 349 Pa.Super. 200, 502 A.2d 1345, 1347-52 (1986) (holding that the dismissal of criminal charges for evidentiary insufficiency is an acquittal for purposes of the double jeopardy clause" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe employer need not persuade the court that the proffered reason was the actual reason for its decision.” Tarshis v. Riese Org., 211 F.3d 30, 36 (2d Cir.2000). Finally, after the employer justifies its action, the burden of production shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the employer’s reason was merely a pretext for discrimination. See Abdu-Brisson, 239 F.3d at 469; see also Chambers, 43 F.3d at 38. Pretext can be shown by either presenting additional evidence showing that the employer’s justification is “unworthy of credence” or relying solely on the “evidence comprising the prima facie case.” See Chambers, 43 F.3d at 38 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, 101 S.Ct. 1089). There is no categorical rule that the plaintiff must offer, in addition to his prima fa 90 (2d Cir.1997) (holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe employer need not persuade the court that the proffered reason was the actual reason for its decision.” Tarshis v. Riese Org., 211 F.3d 30, 36 (2d Cir.2000). Finally, after the employer justifies its action, the burden of production shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the employer’s reason was merely a pretext for discrimination. See Abdu-Brisson, 239 F.3d at 469; see also Chambers, 43 F.3d at 38. Pretext can be shown by either presenting additional evidence showing that the employer’s justification is “unworthy of credence” or relying solely on the “evidence comprising the prima facie case.” See Chambers, 43 F.3d at 38 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, 101 S.Ct. 1089). There is no categorical rule that the plaintiff must offer, in addition to his prima fa 90 (2d Cir.1997) (holding that downgrade of evaluation among other factors raised a genuine issue of material fact with respect to adverse employment action", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe employer need not persuade the court that the proffered reason was the actual reason for its decision.” Tarshis v. Riese Org., 211 F.3d 30, 36 (2d Cir.2000). Finally, after the employer justifies its action, the burden of production shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the employer’s reason was merely a pretext for discrimination. See Abdu-Brisson, 239 F.3d at 469; see also Chambers, 43 F.3d at 38. Pretext can be shown by either presenting additional evidence showing that the employer’s justification is “unworthy of credence” or relying solely on the “evidence comprising the prima facie case.” See Chambers, 43 F.3d at 38 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, 101 S.Ct. 1089). There is no categorical rule that the plaintiff must offer, in addition to his prima fa 90 (2d Cir.1997) (holding that an adverse party must state specific facts showing there is a genuine issue of fact for trial", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe employer need not persuade the court that the proffered reason was the actual reason for its decision.” Tarshis v. Riese Org., 211 F.3d 30, 36 (2d Cir.2000). Finally, after the employer justifies its action, the burden of production shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the employer’s reason was merely a pretext for discrimination. See Abdu-Brisson, 239 F.3d at 469; see also Chambers, 43 F.3d at 38. Pretext can be shown by either presenting additional evidence showing that the employer’s justification is “unworthy of credence” or relying solely on the “evidence comprising the prima facie case.” See Chambers, 43 F.3d at 38 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, 101 S.Ct. 1089). There is no categorical rule that the plaintiff must offer, in addition to his prima fa 90 (2d Cir.1997) (holding that plaintiff failed to show genuine issue of material fact on equitable estoppel claim", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe employer need not persuade the court that the proffered reason was the actual reason for its decision.” Tarshis v. Riese Org., 211 F.3d 30, 36 (2d Cir.2000). Finally, after the employer justifies its action, the burden of production shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the employer’s reason was merely a pretext for discrimination. See Abdu-Brisson, 239 F.3d at 469; see also Chambers, 43 F.3d at 38. Pretext can be shown by either presenting additional evidence showing that the employer’s justification is “unworthy of credence” or relying solely on the “evidence comprising the prima facie case.” See Chambers, 43 F.3d at 38 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, 101 S.Ct. 1089). There is no categorical rule that the plaintiff must offer, in addition to his prima fa 90 (2d Cir.1997) (holding nonmoving partys affidavit created genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of an employment relationship" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\npresented for our consideration concern attorney’s fees and costs and whether the trial court erred in failing to reserve jurisdiction over the charging lien filed by the Former Wife’s counsel. We affirm the amended final judgment with the following exception. The Former Wife raises several arguments regarding the propriety of the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees and costs. We dismiss for lack of jurisdiction her challenge to the award because, not only is the amended final judgment ambiguous regarding entitlement, the trial court reserved jurisdiction to determine the amount of fees to be awarded. Because the amount has not been determined, that portion of the amended final judgment is nonfinal and nonappealable. See McIlveen v. McIlveen, 644 So.2d 612, 612 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (holding dismissal without prejudice to refile a facially sufficient motion is a nonappealable nonfinal order", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\npresented for our consideration concern attorney’s fees and costs and whether the trial court erred in failing to reserve jurisdiction over the charging lien filed by the Former Wife’s counsel. We affirm the amended final judgment with the following exception. The Former Wife raises several arguments regarding the propriety of the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees and costs. We dismiss for lack of jurisdiction her challenge to the award because, not only is the amended final judgment ambiguous regarding entitlement, the trial court reserved jurisdiction to determine the amount of fees to be awarded. Because the amount has not been determined, that portion of the amended final judgment is nonfinal and nonappealable. See McIlveen v. McIlveen, 644 So.2d 612, 612 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (holding that an order granting a motion or application to compel arbitration is nonappealable because it is not listed in the uaa arbitration provision and because it is not a final order", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\npresented for our consideration concern attorney’s fees and costs and whether the trial court erred in failing to reserve jurisdiction over the charging lien filed by the Former Wife’s counsel. We affirm the amended final judgment with the following exception. The Former Wife raises several arguments regarding the propriety of the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees and costs. We dismiss for lack of jurisdiction her challenge to the award because, not only is the amended final judgment ambiguous regarding entitlement, the trial court reserved jurisdiction to determine the amount of fees to be awarded. Because the amount has not been determined, that portion of the amended final judgment is nonfinal and nonappealable. See McIlveen v. McIlveen, 644 So.2d 612, 612 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (holding that although the trial courts failure to determine amount of fees does not render underlying order nonfinal the fee award itself is not reviewable until the amount is determined", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\npresented for our consideration concern attorney’s fees and costs and whether the trial court erred in failing to reserve jurisdiction over the charging lien filed by the Former Wife’s counsel. We affirm the amended final judgment with the following exception. The Former Wife raises several arguments regarding the propriety of the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees and costs. We dismiss for lack of jurisdiction her challenge to the award because, not only is the amended final judgment ambiguous regarding entitlement, the trial court reserved jurisdiction to determine the amount of fees to be awarded. Because the amount has not been determined, that portion of the amended final judgment is nonfinal and nonappealable. See McIlveen v. McIlveen, 644 So.2d 612, 612 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (holding that an order that determines only the right to attorneys fees without setting the amount is a nonappealable nonfinal order", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\npresented for our consideration concern attorney’s fees and costs and whether the trial court erred in failing to reserve jurisdiction over the charging lien filed by the Former Wife’s counsel. We affirm the amended final judgment with the following exception. The Former Wife raises several arguments regarding the propriety of the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees and costs. We dismiss for lack of jurisdiction her challenge to the award because, not only is the amended final judgment ambiguous regarding entitlement, the trial court reserved jurisdiction to determine the amount of fees to be awarded. Because the amount has not been determined, that portion of the amended final judgment is nonfinal and nonappealable. See McIlveen v. McIlveen, 644 So.2d 612, 612 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (holding that the dismissal of a complaint ordinarily is a nonfinal nonappealable order since amendment generally is available while dismissal of the entire action ordinarily is final" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nDPUC’s rules will deprive Berkshire of the claimed rights that it seeks to protect. While Berkshire remained an applicant, the DPUC’s rules realistically threatened to harm Berkshire’s rights or interests as an operator; now that Berkshire is no longer an applicant, such a threat no longer exists. Further, in spite of our specific inquiry, Berkshire has failed to show how its dissatisfaction with the requirements significantly affected its own application, or the outcome. Berkshire accepts this reasoning in respect to its “taking without compensation” claim. But, it says that the “controversy” in respect to its First Amendment claims continues, and that the case is therefore\" not moot. See Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515, 31 S.Ct. 279, 283, 55 L.Ed. 310 (1911) (holding that issues as to whether declaratory relief should be granted had become moot and would be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction but that under hallman the entire appeal was not moot because there still was a live controversy as to whether appellee was entitled to recover attorneys fees under the declaratory judgments act and therefore issues regarding attorneys fees were not moot and would be decided", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nDPUC’s rules will deprive Berkshire of the claimed rights that it seeks to protect. While Berkshire remained an applicant, the DPUC’s rules realistically threatened to harm Berkshire’s rights or interests as an operator; now that Berkshire is no longer an applicant, such a threat no longer exists. Further, in spite of our specific inquiry, Berkshire has failed to show how its dissatisfaction with the requirements significantly affected its own application, or the outcome. Berkshire accepts this reasoning in respect to its “taking without compensation” claim. But, it says that the “controversy” in respect to its First Amendment claims continues, and that the case is therefore\" not moot. See Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515, 31 S.Ct. 279, 283, 55 L.Ed. 310 (1911) (holding that a trial court may deny a confirmation motion when satisfaction has rendered the controversy moot", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nDPUC’s rules will deprive Berkshire of the claimed rights that it seeks to protect. While Berkshire remained an applicant, the DPUC’s rules realistically threatened to harm Berkshire’s rights or interests as an operator; now that Berkshire is no longer an applicant, such a threat no longer exists. Further, in spite of our specific inquiry, Berkshire has failed to show how its dissatisfaction with the requirements significantly affected its own application, or the outcome. Berkshire accepts this reasoning in respect to its “taking without compensation” claim. But, it says that the “controversy” in respect to its First Amendment claims continues, and that the case is therefore\" not moot. See Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515, 31 S.Ct. 279, 283, 55 L.Ed. 310 (1911) (holding a case becomes moot when a ruling will have no practical effect upon the existing controversy", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nDPUC’s rules will deprive Berkshire of the claimed rights that it seeks to protect. While Berkshire remained an applicant, the DPUC’s rules realistically threatened to harm Berkshire’s rights or interests as an operator; now that Berkshire is no longer an applicant, such a threat no longer exists. Further, in spite of our specific inquiry, Berkshire has failed to show how its dissatisfaction with the requirements significantly affected its own application, or the outcome. Berkshire accepts this reasoning in respect to its “taking without compensation” claim. But, it says that the “controversy” in respect to its First Amendment claims continues, and that the case is therefore\" not moot. See Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515, 31 S.Ct. 279, 283, 55 L.Ed. 310 (1911) (holding appeal moot on this basis", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nDPUC’s rules will deprive Berkshire of the claimed rights that it seeks to protect. While Berkshire remained an applicant, the DPUC’s rules realistically threatened to harm Berkshire’s rights or interests as an operator; now that Berkshire is no longer an applicant, such a threat no longer exists. Further, in spite of our specific inquiry, Berkshire has failed to show how its dissatisfaction with the requirements significantly affected its own application, or the outcome. Berkshire accepts this reasoning in respect to its “taking without compensation” claim. But, it says that the “controversy” in respect to its First Amendment claims continues, and that the case is therefore\" not moot. See Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515, 31 S.Ct. 279, 283, 55 L.Ed. 310 (1911) (holding continuing controversy not moot" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthe brief of a pro se appellant, Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 225 (5th Cir.1993), and thus read Hulsey's brief to argue that Owens and Green are not immune from suit or liability for damages. 2 . Heck v. Humphrey prevents an action for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when the complaint, directly or indirectly, challenges the legality of the complainant's conviction or imprisonment. Id. at-, 114 S.Ct. at 2372. A § 1983 plaintiff must first prove that his conviction or sentence has been invalidated in a proper pro ceeding prior to bringing a § 1983 action. Id. If the sentence or conviction has not been invalidated there can be no action for damages under § 1983, and the statute of limitations does not begin to run. Id.; see also Stephenson v. Reno, 28 F.3d 26, 27 (5th Cir.1994) (holding that that if the success of a 1983 damages claim brought by a prisoner would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence the prisoner may only bring the claim where the conviction or sentence has been invalidated", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthe brief of a pro se appellant, Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 225 (5th Cir.1993), and thus read Hulsey's brief to argue that Owens and Green are not immune from suit or liability for damages. 2 . Heck v. Humphrey prevents an action for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when the complaint, directly or indirectly, challenges the legality of the complainant's conviction or imprisonment. Id. at-, 114 S.Ct. at 2372. A § 1983 plaintiff must first prove that his conviction or sentence has been invalidated in a proper pro ceeding prior to bringing a § 1983 action. Id. If the sentence or conviction has not been invalidated there can be no action for damages under § 1983, and the statute of limitations does not begin to run. Id.; see also Stephenson v. Reno, 28 F.3d 26, 27 (5th Cir.1994) (recognizing that 1983 action does not accrue until conviction or sentence has been invalidated", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthe brief of a pro se appellant, Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 225 (5th Cir.1993), and thus read Hulsey's brief to argue that Owens and Green are not immune from suit or liability for damages. 2 . Heck v. Humphrey prevents an action for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when the complaint, directly or indirectly, challenges the legality of the complainant's conviction or imprisonment. Id. at-, 114 S.Ct. at 2372. A § 1983 plaintiff must first prove that his conviction or sentence has been invalidated in a proper pro ceeding prior to bringing a § 1983 action. Id. If the sentence or conviction has not been invalidated there can be no action for damages under § 1983, and the statute of limitations does not begin to run. Id.; see also Stephenson v. Reno, 28 F.3d 26, 27 (5th Cir.1994) (holding that right to payment does not accrue until condition precedent has been fulfilled", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthe brief of a pro se appellant, Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 225 (5th Cir.1993), and thus read Hulsey's brief to argue that Owens and Green are not immune from suit or liability for damages. 2 . Heck v. Humphrey prevents an action for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when the complaint, directly or indirectly, challenges the legality of the complainant's conviction or imprisonment. Id. at-, 114 S.Ct. at 2372. A § 1983 plaintiff must first prove that his conviction or sentence has been invalidated in a proper pro ceeding prior to bringing a § 1983 action. Id. If the sentence or conviction has not been invalidated there can be no action for damages under § 1983, and the statute of limitations does not begin to run. Id.; see also Stephenson v. Reno, 28 F.3d 26, 27 (5th Cir.1994) (holding that a claim for damages that would invalidate a conviction or sentence that has not already been invalidated or reversed on direct appeal by executive order by an authorized state tribunal or by a writ of habeas corpus is not cognizable under 1983", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthe brief of a pro se appellant, Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 225 (5th Cir.1993), and thus read Hulsey's brief to argue that Owens and Green are not immune from suit or liability for damages. 2 . Heck v. Humphrey prevents an action for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when the complaint, directly or indirectly, challenges the legality of the complainant's conviction or imprisonment. Id. at-, 114 S.Ct. at 2372. A § 1983 plaintiff must first prove that his conviction or sentence has been invalidated in a proper pro ceeding prior to bringing a § 1983 action. Id. If the sentence or conviction has not been invalidated there can be no action for damages under § 1983, and the statute of limitations does not begin to run. Id.; see also Stephenson v. Reno, 28 F.3d 26, 27 (5th Cir.1994) (holding that a plaintiff requesting relief under 1983 had no cause of action unless and until the conviction or sentence is reversed expunged invalidated or impugned by the grant of a writ of habeas corpus" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nand Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 9.2(a) (5th ed. 2012) (discussing Terry as permitting a stop or seizure when an officer reasonably suspects a person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime). As noted above, the officer who frisked Terry did so not because he believed Terry had committed a crime, but because he believed Terry was going to do so. Accordingly, if an officer reasonably suspects a person is about to commit a crime, a protective pat search is warranted in the interests of officer and community safety. United States v. Peep, 490 F.2d 903, 905 (8th Cir. 1974) (concluding a pat search for weapons reasonable when officers knew the defendant had bragged about shooting a police officer); State v. Gobely, 366 N.W.2d 600, 602-03 (Minn. 1985) (holding noknock search unconstitutional where there was no testimony or evidence that either of the suspects were violent or were known to keep weapons in their home", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nand Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 9.2(a) (5th ed. 2012) (discussing Terry as permitting a stop or seizure when an officer reasonably suspects a person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime). As noted above, the officer who frisked Terry did so not because he believed Terry had committed a crime, but because he believed Terry was going to do so. Accordingly, if an officer reasonably suspects a person is about to commit a crime, a protective pat search is warranted in the interests of officer and community safety. United States v. Peep, 490 F.2d 903, 905 (8th Cir. 1974) (concluding a pat search for weapons reasonable when officers knew the defendant had bragged about shooting a police officer); State v. Gobely, 366 N.W.2d 600, 602-03 (Minn. 1985) (holding that the 2d11b1 enhancement was proper where a firearm and drugrelated items were found in the defendants residence where he had also engaged in conspiratorial conversations", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nand Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 9.2(a) (5th ed. 2012) (discussing Terry as permitting a stop or seizure when an officer reasonably suspects a person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime). As noted above, the officer who frisked Terry did so not because he believed Terry had committed a crime, but because he believed Terry was going to do so. Accordingly, if an officer reasonably suspects a person is about to commit a crime, a protective pat search is warranted in the interests of officer and community safety. United States v. Peep, 490 F.2d 903, 905 (8th Cir. 1974) (concluding a pat search for weapons reasonable when officers knew the defendant had bragged about shooting a police officer); State v. Gobely, 366 N.W.2d 600, 602-03 (Minn. 1985) (holding pat search for weapons justified where defendant was in home where stolen items were found and informant reported that in at least one robbery the participants had been armed", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nand Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 9.2(a) (5th ed. 2012) (discussing Terry as permitting a stop or seizure when an officer reasonably suspects a person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime). As noted above, the officer who frisked Terry did so not because he believed Terry had committed a crime, but because he believed Terry was going to do so. Accordingly, if an officer reasonably suspects a person is about to commit a crime, a protective pat search is warranted in the interests of officer and community safety. United States v. Peep, 490 F.2d 903, 905 (8th Cir. 1974) (concluding a pat search for weapons reasonable when officers knew the defendant had bragged about shooting a police officer); State v. Gobely, 366 N.W.2d 600, 602-03 (Minn. 1985) (holding that a warrant authorizing the search of a residence vehicles at the residence and all persons found in the residence was not overly broad given that search was limited to places were drugs or weapons might be found", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nand Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 9.2(a) (5th ed. 2012) (discussing Terry as permitting a stop or seizure when an officer reasonably suspects a person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime). As noted above, the officer who frisked Terry did so not because he believed Terry had committed a crime, but because he believed Terry was going to do so. Accordingly, if an officer reasonably suspects a person is about to commit a crime, a protective pat search is warranted in the interests of officer and community safety. United States v. Peep, 490 F.2d 903, 905 (8th Cir. 1974) (concluding a pat search for weapons reasonable when officers knew the defendant had bragged about shooting a police officer); State v. Gobely, 366 N.W.2d 600, 602-03 (Minn. 1985) (holding search of armed robbery defendants suitcases and between mattresses of hotel room proper where at time of arrest officers were aware that the defendants had used several different weapons during the robberies and that one weapon a loaded revolver was in plain view concluding officers reasonably feared that someone else was going to come to the room who knew where the other weapons were or that the defendants would position themselves to take advantage of any hidden weapons or instrumentalities" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nRoberts but before Crawford, the Supreme Court expressly relied on Roberts. The Court reasoned that “the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule [Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) ] is firmly enough rooted in our jurisprudence that, under this Court’s holding in Roberts, a court need not inde1 pendently inquire into the reliability of such statements.” Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 183, 107 S.Ct. 2775. Brist is therefore correct that the Court has rejected Bour-jaily’s underlying reasoning by now requiring courts to conduct a separate Confrontation Clause analysis for out-of-court “testimonial” statements, even when the statements at issue otherwise satisfy a firmly-rooted hearsay exception. See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, —, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 2540, 174 L.Ed.2d 314 (2009) (holding that confrontation clause issues are subject to harmless error analysis", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nRoberts but before Crawford, the Supreme Court expressly relied on Roberts. The Court reasoned that “the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule [Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) ] is firmly enough rooted in our jurisprudence that, under this Court’s holding in Roberts, a court need not inde1 pendently inquire into the reliability of such statements.” Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 183, 107 S.Ct. 2775. Brist is therefore correct that the Court has rejected Bour-jaily’s underlying reasoning by now requiring courts to conduct a separate Confrontation Clause analysis for out-of-court “testimonial” statements, even when the statements at issue otherwise satisfy a firmly-rooted hearsay exception. See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, —, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 2540, 174 L.Ed.2d 314 (2009) (holding confrontation clause violations subject to harmless error analysis", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nRoberts but before Crawford, the Supreme Court expressly relied on Roberts. The Court reasoned that “the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule [Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) ] is firmly enough rooted in our jurisprudence that, under this Court’s holding in Roberts, a court need not inde1 pendently inquire into the reliability of such statements.” Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 183, 107 S.Ct. 2775. Brist is therefore correct that the Court has rejected Bour-jaily’s underlying reasoning by now requiring courts to conduct a separate Confrontation Clause analysis for out-of-court “testimonial” statements, even when the statements at issue otherwise satisfy a firmly-rooted hearsay exception. See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, —, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 2540, 174 L.Ed.2d 314 (2009) (holding that certificates of analysis produced by forensic scientists who conducted a chemical analysis of drugs seized from the defendant are subject to confrontation clause challenge wjhether or not they qualify as business or official records", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nRoberts but before Crawford, the Supreme Court expressly relied on Roberts. The Court reasoned that “the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule [Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) ] is firmly enough rooted in our jurisprudence that, under this Court’s holding in Roberts, a court need not inde1 pendently inquire into the reliability of such statements.” Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 183, 107 S.Ct. 2775. Brist is therefore correct that the Court has rejected Bour-jaily’s underlying reasoning by now requiring courts to conduct a separate Confrontation Clause analysis for out-of-court “testimonial” statements, even when the statements at issue otherwise satisfy a firmly-rooted hearsay exception. See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, —, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 2540, 174 L.Ed.2d 314 (2009) (recognizing that statements admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule may be inadmissible when tested against the confrontation clause because confrontation clause analysis differs from hearsay rule analysis", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nRoberts but before Crawford, the Supreme Court expressly relied on Roberts. The Court reasoned that “the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule [Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) ] is firmly enough rooted in our jurisprudence that, under this Court’s holding in Roberts, a court need not inde1 pendently inquire into the reliability of such statements.” Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 183, 107 S.Ct. 2775. Brist is therefore correct that the Court has rejected Bour-jaily’s underlying reasoning by now requiring courts to conduct a separate Confrontation Clause analysis for out-of-court “testimonial” statements, even when the statements at issue otherwise satisfy a firmly-rooted hearsay exception. See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, —, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 2540, 174 L.Ed.2d 314 (2009) (holding that admission of business records does not violate the confrontation clause under roberts" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nreport falls into this category, then the 21-day deadline to object to the report was never triggered, and the trial court was required to dismiss Haskell’s suit. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 74.851(b) (requiring claim against defendant who has not been timely served with expert report must be dismissed); Scoresby, 346 S.W.3d at 549 (defining minimum requirements for document to be considered expert report). If we hold that Haskell’s report is not so deficient as to constitute no report at all, then any objections to the report have been waived and the trial court lacked the authority to dismiss Haskell’s suit. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 74.351(a) (providing 21-day deadline to object to deficient expert report); Ogletree v. Matthews, 262 S.W.3d 316, 322 (Tex.2007) (holding that although a defendant filed a motion in limine on an evidentiary issue a failure to object to the evidence at trial waives the issue for appeal", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nreport falls into this category, then the 21-day deadline to object to the report was never triggered, and the trial court was required to dismiss Haskell’s suit. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 74.851(b) (requiring claim against defendant who has not been timely served with expert report must be dismissed); Scoresby, 346 S.W.3d at 549 (defining minimum requirements for document to be considered expert report). If we hold that Haskell’s report is not so deficient as to constitute no report at all, then any objections to the report have been waived and the trial court lacked the authority to dismiss Haskell’s suit. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 74.351(a) (providing 21-day deadline to object to deficient expert report); Ogletree v. Matthews, 262 S.W.3d 316, 322 (Tex.2007) (holding that a partys failure to raise objections to the report and recommendation waives the partys right to review in the district court", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nreport falls into this category, then the 21-day deadline to object to the report was never triggered, and the trial court was required to dismiss Haskell’s suit. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 74.851(b) (requiring claim against defendant who has not been timely served with expert report must be dismissed); Scoresby, 346 S.W.3d at 549 (defining minimum requirements for document to be considered expert report). If we hold that Haskell’s report is not so deficient as to constitute no report at all, then any objections to the report have been waived and the trial court lacked the authority to dismiss Haskell’s suit. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 74.351(a) (providing 21-day deadline to object to deficient expert report); Ogletree v. Matthews, 262 S.W.3d 316, 322 (Tex.2007) (holding that the failure to file a proper motion to dismiss raising a constitutional challenge to a criminal statute waives the issue on appeal", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nreport falls into this category, then the 21-day deadline to object to the report was never triggered, and the trial court was required to dismiss Haskell’s suit. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 74.851(b) (requiring claim against defendant who has not been timely served with expert report must be dismissed); Scoresby, 346 S.W.3d at 549 (defining minimum requirements for document to be considered expert report). If we hold that Haskell’s report is not so deficient as to constitute no report at all, then any objections to the report have been waived and the trial court lacked the authority to dismiss Haskell’s suit. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 74.351(a) (providing 21-day deadline to object to deficient expert report); Ogletree v. Matthews, 262 S.W.3d 316, 322 (Tex.2007) (holding defendants failure to object timely waives its right to challenge expert report", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nreport falls into this category, then the 21-day deadline to object to the report was never triggered, and the trial court was required to dismiss Haskell’s suit. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 74.851(b) (requiring claim against defendant who has not been timely served with expert report must be dismissed); Scoresby, 346 S.W.3d at 549 (defining minimum requirements for document to be considered expert report). If we hold that Haskell’s report is not so deficient as to constitute no report at all, then any objections to the report have been waived and the trial court lacked the authority to dismiss Haskell’s suit. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 74.351(a) (providing 21-day deadline to object to deficient expert report); Ogletree v. Matthews, 262 S.W.3d 316, 322 (Tex.2007) (holding failure to object within 21day deadline waives objections and trial court must deny motion to dismiss" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nrights,” not determinative.) [original emphasis]. Numerous decisions support this Court’s conclusion that the defendant’s waiver was not knowingly and intelligently made. See, e.g., Tennell v State, 348 So.2d 937 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977) (only interrogating police officer and fourteen year old boy present when Miranda rights given and defendant signed written waiver, and officer “satisfy[ied] himself that the appellant understood [his rights].”); C.J. v State, 376 So.2d 911, 912 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (eleven year old boy held not to have understood rights he waived); Fields v State, 402 So.2d 46, 47 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) (“while a juvenile may waive his Miranda rights, the state bears a ‘heavy burden’ in establishing that the waiver is valid.”); Hall v State, 421 So.2d 571, 573 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (recognizing that the defendant bears the burden of establishing that plain error was prejudicial", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nrights,” not determinative.) [original emphasis]. Numerous decisions support this Court’s conclusion that the defendant’s waiver was not knowingly and intelligently made. See, e.g., Tennell v State, 348 So.2d 937 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977) (only interrogating police officer and fourteen year old boy present when Miranda rights given and defendant signed written waiver, and officer “satisfy[ied] himself that the appellant understood [his rights].”); C.J. v State, 376 So.2d 911, 912 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (eleven year old boy held not to have understood rights he waived); Fields v State, 402 So.2d 46, 47 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) (“while a juvenile may waive his Miranda rights, the state bears a ‘heavy burden’ in establishing that the waiver is valid.”); Hall v State, 421 So.2d 571, 573 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (recognizing that distinguishing trespassers from nontrespassers is a heavy burden", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nrights,” not determinative.) [original emphasis]. Numerous decisions support this Court’s conclusion that the defendant’s waiver was not knowingly and intelligently made. See, e.g., Tennell v State, 348 So.2d 937 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977) (only interrogating police officer and fourteen year old boy present when Miranda rights given and defendant signed written waiver, and officer “satisfy[ied] himself that the appellant understood [his rights].”); C.J. v State, 376 So.2d 911, 912 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (eleven year old boy held not to have understood rights he waived); Fields v State, 402 So.2d 46, 47 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) (“while a juvenile may waive his Miranda rights, the state bears a ‘heavy burden’ in establishing that the waiver is valid.”); Hall v State, 421 So.2d 571, 573 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (recognizing burden", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nrights,” not determinative.) [original emphasis]. Numerous decisions support this Court’s conclusion that the defendant’s waiver was not knowingly and intelligently made. See, e.g., Tennell v State, 348 So.2d 937 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977) (only interrogating police officer and fourteen year old boy present when Miranda rights given and defendant signed written waiver, and officer “satisfy[ied] himself that the appellant understood [his rights].”); C.J. v State, 376 So.2d 911, 912 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (eleven year old boy held not to have understood rights he waived); Fields v State, 402 So.2d 46, 47 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) (“while a juvenile may waive his Miranda rights, the state bears a ‘heavy burden’ in establishing that the waiver is valid.”); Hall v State, 421 So.2d 571, 573 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (holding defendant was not entitled to jury instructions on lesserincluded offenses because his request did not constitute a waiver of the statute of limitations on those offenses such a waiver must be knowingly intelligently and voluntarily made", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nrights,” not determinative.) [original emphasis]. Numerous decisions support this Court’s conclusion that the defendant’s waiver was not knowingly and intelligently made. See, e.g., Tennell v State, 348 So.2d 937 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977) (only interrogating police officer and fourteen year old boy present when Miranda rights given and defendant signed written waiver, and officer “satisfy[ied] himself that the appellant understood [his rights].”); C.J. v State, 376 So.2d 911, 912 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (eleven year old boy held not to have understood rights he waived); Fields v State, 402 So.2d 46, 47 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) (“while a juvenile may waive his Miranda rights, the state bears a ‘heavy burden’ in establishing that the waiver is valid.”); Hall v State, 421 So.2d 571, 573 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (recognizing states heavy burden of establishing that the waiver was intelligently made" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe victim of a crime prevents a sentencing court from ordering restitution. The other circuits, however, have generally held that “a release by the victim does not preclude or cap restitution of losses as part of criminal sentencing in a case where there is no double recovery.” United States v. Parsons, 141 F.3d 386, 393 (1st Cir.1998) (citing United States v. Savoie, 985 F.2d 612, 619 (1st Cir.1993)); see also United States v. Sheinbaum, 136 F.3d 443, 448 (5th Cir.1998) (concluding “that district courts possess the discretion to impose restitution orders in spite of civil settlements” because of “the rehabilitative and retributive functions” of restitution), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1133, 119 S.Ct. 1808, 143 L.Ed.2d 1011 (1999); United States v. Vetter, 895 F.2d 456, 459 (8th Cir.1990) (holding that the plaintiffs lawsuit which was filed despite a general release in the parties settlement agreement constituted a material breach of the settlement agreement", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe victim of a crime prevents a sentencing court from ordering restitution. The other circuits, however, have generally held that “a release by the victim does not preclude or cap restitution of losses as part of criminal sentencing in a case where there is no double recovery.” United States v. Parsons, 141 F.3d 386, 393 (1st Cir.1998) (citing United States v. Savoie, 985 F.2d 612, 619 (1st Cir.1993)); see also United States v. Sheinbaum, 136 F.3d 443, 448 (5th Cir.1998) (concluding “that district courts possess the discretion to impose restitution orders in spite of civil settlements” because of “the rehabilitative and retributive functions” of restitution), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1133, 119 S.Ct. 1808, 143 L.Ed.2d 1011 (1999); United States v. Vetter, 895 F.2d 456, 459 (8th Cir.1990) (holding that a district court may order restitution despite a settlement agreement", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe victim of a crime prevents a sentencing court from ordering restitution. The other circuits, however, have generally held that “a release by the victim does not preclude or cap restitution of losses as part of criminal sentencing in a case where there is no double recovery.” United States v. Parsons, 141 F.3d 386, 393 (1st Cir.1998) (citing United States v. Savoie, 985 F.2d 612, 619 (1st Cir.1993)); see also United States v. Sheinbaum, 136 F.3d 443, 448 (5th Cir.1998) (concluding “that district courts possess the discretion to impose restitution orders in spite of civil settlements” because of “the rehabilitative and retributive functions” of restitution), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1133, 119 S.Ct. 1808, 143 L.Ed.2d 1011 (1999); United States v. Vetter, 895 F.2d 456, 459 (8th Cir.1990) (holding that the existence of a prior bankruptcy settlement does not preclude a subsequent criminal restitution order", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe victim of a crime prevents a sentencing court from ordering restitution. The other circuits, however, have generally held that “a release by the victim does not preclude or cap restitution of losses as part of criminal sentencing in a case where there is no double recovery.” United States v. Parsons, 141 F.3d 386, 393 (1st Cir.1998) (citing United States v. Savoie, 985 F.2d 612, 619 (1st Cir.1993)); see also United States v. Sheinbaum, 136 F.3d 443, 448 (5th Cir.1998) (concluding “that district courts possess the discretion to impose restitution orders in spite of civil settlements” because of “the rehabilitative and retributive functions” of restitution), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1133, 119 S.Ct. 1808, 143 L.Ed.2d 1011 (1999); United States v. Vetter, 895 F.2d 456, 459 (8th Cir.1990) (holding that a settlement agreement is not a court order and therefore a violation of the settlement agreement would not subject a party to contempt", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe victim of a crime prevents a sentencing court from ordering restitution. The other circuits, however, have generally held that “a release by the victim does not preclude or cap restitution of losses as part of criminal sentencing in a case where there is no double recovery.” United States v. Parsons, 141 F.3d 386, 393 (1st Cir.1998) (citing United States v. Savoie, 985 F.2d 612, 619 (1st Cir.1993)); see also United States v. Sheinbaum, 136 F.3d 443, 448 (5th Cir.1998) (concluding “that district courts possess the discretion to impose restitution orders in spite of civil settlements” because of “the rehabilitative and retributive functions” of restitution), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1133, 119 S.Ct. 1808, 143 L.Ed.2d 1011 (1999); United States v. Vetter, 895 F.2d 456, 459 (8th Cir.1990) (holding that equitable restitution is available but that legal restitution is not" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nnot testify as a nonexpert fact witness about what he did and directly observed during the reenactment. Relying on several out-of-state cases, the court concluded that the relevant legal inquiry for admissibility of reenactment evidence generally is whether the reenactment was conducted under conditions substantially similar to those existing at the time of the event in question, otherwise the evidence would be excluded as irrelevant and likely to mislead the jury. See Loevsky v. Carter, 773 P.2d 1120, 1125 (Haw. 1989) (“[W]hen a test or experiment is an attempt to reenact the original happening, the essential elements of the experiment must be substantially similar to those existing at the time of the accident.”) (quotation omitted); State v. Leroux, 584 A.2d 778, 780-81 (N.H. 1990) (holding that trial court could properly have found testimony explaining a videotaped reenactment was substantially more likely to mislead the jury than to be probative under rule 403", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nnot testify as a nonexpert fact witness about what he did and directly observed during the reenactment. Relying on several out-of-state cases, the court concluded that the relevant legal inquiry for admissibility of reenactment evidence generally is whether the reenactment was conducted under conditions substantially similar to those existing at the time of the event in question, otherwise the evidence would be excluded as irrelevant and likely to mislead the jury. See Loevsky v. Carter, 773 P.2d 1120, 1125 (Haw. 1989) (“[W]hen a test or experiment is an attempt to reenact the original happening, the essential elements of the experiment must be substantially similar to those existing at the time of the accident.”) (quotation omitted); State v. Leroux, 584 A.2d 778, 780-81 (N.H. 1990) (holding that although the instruction at issue could have been worded more specifically the jury instructions as a whole did not mislead the jury as to the law", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nnot testify as a nonexpert fact witness about what he did and directly observed during the reenactment. Relying on several out-of-state cases, the court concluded that the relevant legal inquiry for admissibility of reenactment evidence generally is whether the reenactment was conducted under conditions substantially similar to those existing at the time of the event in question, otherwise the evidence would be excluded as irrelevant and likely to mislead the jury. See Loevsky v. Carter, 773 P.2d 1120, 1125 (Haw. 1989) (“[W]hen a test or experiment is an attempt to reenact the original happening, the essential elements of the experiment must be substantially similar to those existing at the time of the accident.”) (quotation omitted); State v. Leroux, 584 A.2d 778, 780-81 (N.H. 1990) (holding that although portion of trial courts jury charge was inapplicable any error in providing it was harmless in light of the fact that charge considered as a whole was not likely to confuse or mislead the jury", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nnot testify as a nonexpert fact witness about what he did and directly observed during the reenactment. Relying on several out-of-state cases, the court concluded that the relevant legal inquiry for admissibility of reenactment evidence generally is whether the reenactment was conducted under conditions substantially similar to those existing at the time of the event in question, otherwise the evidence would be excluded as irrelevant and likely to mislead the jury. See Loevsky v. Carter, 773 P.2d 1120, 1125 (Haw. 1989) (“[W]hen a test or experiment is an attempt to reenact the original happening, the essential elements of the experiment must be substantially similar to those existing at the time of the accident.”) (quotation omitted); State v. Leroux, 584 A.2d 778, 780-81 (N.H. 1990) (holding that evidence necessary to the governments rebuttal of a defendants case could not be excluded under rule 403 but could have been if it was introduced only to bolster the prosecutions case", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nnot testify as a nonexpert fact witness about what he did and directly observed during the reenactment. Relying on several out-of-state cases, the court concluded that the relevant legal inquiry for admissibility of reenactment evidence generally is whether the reenactment was conducted under conditions substantially similar to those existing at the time of the event in question, otherwise the evidence would be excluded as irrelevant and likely to mislead the jury. See Loevsky v. Carter, 773 P.2d 1120, 1125 (Haw. 1989) (“[W]hen a test or experiment is an attempt to reenact the original happening, the essential elements of the experiment must be substantially similar to those existing at the time of the accident.”) (quotation omitted); State v. Leroux, 584 A.2d 778, 780-81 (N.H. 1990) (holding that admission of a summary chart was harmless because it was clear that the summary did not mislead the jury and the evidence introduced at trial was more than sufficient to prove the elements as to each defendant" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nthe same argument in the context of the Exemption 6 inquiry above. See Section III. B.l, supra (collecting cases and explaining that individuals do not lose their privacy interests simply because they are known to the public). Moreover, the names of third-parties in law enforcement records are almost always exempt from disclosure. See SafeCard Servs., Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1206 (D.C.Cir.1991) (“[w]e now hold categorically that, unless access to the names and addresses of private individuals appearing in files within the ambit of Exemption 7(C) is necessary in order to confirm or refute compelling evidence that the agency is engaged in illegal activity, such information is exempt from disclosure”). See also Sussman v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 494 F.3d 1106, 1115 (D.C.Cir.2007) (holding that names and address of private individuals appearing in files within the ambit of exemption 7c are exempt from disclosure", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nthe same argument in the context of the Exemption 6 inquiry above. See Section III. B.l, supra (collecting cases and explaining that individuals do not lose their privacy interests simply because they are known to the public). Moreover, the names of third-parties in law enforcement records are almost always exempt from disclosure. See SafeCard Servs., Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1206 (D.C.Cir.1991) (“[w]e now hold categorically that, unless access to the names and addresses of private individuals appearing in files within the ambit of Exemption 7(C) is necessary in order to confirm or refute compelling evidence that the agency is engaged in illegal activity, such information is exempt from disclosure”). See also Sussman v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 494 F.3d 1106, 1115 (D.C.Cir.2007) (holding the governments prior disclosure of requested information could not waive individuals privacy interests under exemption 6 and collecting cases involving exemption 7c", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nthe same argument in the context of the Exemption 6 inquiry above. See Section III. B.l, supra (collecting cases and explaining that individuals do not lose their privacy interests simply because they are known to the public). Moreover, the names of third-parties in law enforcement records are almost always exempt from disclosure. See SafeCard Servs., Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1206 (D.C.Cir.1991) (“[w]e now hold categorically that, unless access to the names and addresses of private individuals appearing in files within the ambit of Exemption 7(C) is necessary in order to confirm or refute compelling evidence that the agency is engaged in illegal activity, such information is exempt from disclosure”). See also Sussman v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 494 F.3d 1106, 1115 (D.C.Cir.2007) (holding that exemption 7c protects the privacy interests of all persons mentioned in law enforcement records whether they be investigators suspects witnesses or informants and their names are generally exempt from disclosure ", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nthe same argument in the context of the Exemption 6 inquiry above. See Section III. B.l, supra (collecting cases and explaining that individuals do not lose their privacy interests simply because they are known to the public). Moreover, the names of third-parties in law enforcement records are almost always exempt from disclosure. See SafeCard Servs., Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1206 (D.C.Cir.1991) (“[w]e now hold categorically that, unless access to the names and addresses of private individuals appearing in files within the ambit of Exemption 7(C) is necessary in order to confirm or refute compelling evidence that the agency is engaged in illegal activity, such information is exempt from disclosure”). See also Sussman v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 494 F.3d 1106, 1115 (D.C.Cir.2007) (holding that in light of the stigma potentially associated with law enforcement investigations exemption 7c affords broad privacy rights to suspects witnesses and investigators", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nthe same argument in the context of the Exemption 6 inquiry above. See Section III. B.l, supra (collecting cases and explaining that individuals do not lose their privacy interests simply because they are known to the public). Moreover, the names of third-parties in law enforcement records are almost always exempt from disclosure. See SafeCard Servs., Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1206 (D.C.Cir.1991) (“[w]e now hold categorically that, unless access to the names and addresses of private individuals appearing in files within the ambit of Exemption 7(C) is necessary in order to confirm or refute compelling evidence that the agency is engaged in illegal activity, such information is exempt from disclosure”). See also Sussman v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 494 F.3d 1106, 1115 (D.C.Cir.2007) (holding that nigcs individual background files are law enforcement records subject to exemption 7c and that in the absence of a waiver disclosure is not required by foia because individuals mentioned in law enforcement investigatory reports have a presumptive privacy interest in keeping their names undisclosed" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe structure of drug trafficking organizations and the role of drug couriers. Cira testified that a drug distributor would not have allowed the quantity of drugs in this case out of his control, and that, in his experience, he had never encountered a courier who did not know what was in his vehicle. Martinez never objected to the admission of Cira’s testimony in district court. Therefore, we review this claim for plain error. See United States v. Jones, 266 F.3d 804, 814 (8th Cir.2001). Relying on Ninth Circuit precedent, Martinez contends admission of the testimony was error because he was not charged with conspiracy to import drugs and no evidence was presented to link him to an actual drug trafficking organization. See United States v. Vallejo, 237 F.3d 1008, 1012 (9th Cir.2001) (holding that expert testimony concerning the structure of drug trafficking organizations is inadmissible where the defendant is not charged with a conspiracy to import drugs or where such evidence is not otherwise probative of a matter properly before the court", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe structure of drug trafficking organizations and the role of drug couriers. Cira testified that a drug distributor would not have allowed the quantity of drugs in this case out of his control, and that, in his experience, he had never encountered a courier who did not know what was in his vehicle. Martinez never objected to the admission of Cira’s testimony in district court. Therefore, we review this claim for plain error. See United States v. Jones, 266 F.3d 804, 814 (8th Cir.2001). Relying on Ninth Circuit precedent, Martinez contends admission of the testimony was error because he was not charged with conspiracy to import drugs and no evidence was presented to link him to an actual drug trafficking organization. See United States v. Vallejo, 237 F.3d 1008, 1012 (9th Cir.2001) (holding a fiveyear old drug conviction is probative of a defendants state of mind in a drug conspiracy case", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe structure of drug trafficking organizations and the role of drug couriers. Cira testified that a drug distributor would not have allowed the quantity of drugs in this case out of his control, and that, in his experience, he had never encountered a courier who did not know what was in his vehicle. Martinez never objected to the admission of Cira’s testimony in district court. Therefore, we review this claim for plain error. See United States v. Jones, 266 F.3d 804, 814 (8th Cir.2001). Relying on Ninth Circuit precedent, Martinez contends admission of the testimony was error because he was not charged with conspiracy to import drugs and no evidence was presented to link him to an actual drug trafficking organization. See United States v. Vallejo, 237 F.3d 1008, 1012 (9th Cir.2001) (holding that the district court committed prejudicial error in admitting expert testimony about the structure of drug trafficking organizations because the testimony portrayed the defendant as a member of such an organization and implied the defendant knew the drugs were in his vehicle", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe structure of drug trafficking organizations and the role of drug couriers. Cira testified that a drug distributor would not have allowed the quantity of drugs in this case out of his control, and that, in his experience, he had never encountered a courier who did not know what was in his vehicle. Martinez never objected to the admission of Cira’s testimony in district court. Therefore, we review this claim for plain error. See United States v. Jones, 266 F.3d 804, 814 (8th Cir.2001). Relying on Ninth Circuit precedent, Martinez contends admission of the testimony was error because he was not charged with conspiracy to import drugs and no evidence was presented to link him to an actual drug trafficking organization. See United States v. Vallejo, 237 F.3d 1008, 1012 (9th Cir.2001) (holding that expert testimony regarding the structure of drug trafficking organizations was inadmissible in a nonconspiracy importation case", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe structure of drug trafficking organizations and the role of drug couriers. Cira testified that a drug distributor would not have allowed the quantity of drugs in this case out of his control, and that, in his experience, he had never encountered a courier who did not know what was in his vehicle. Martinez never objected to the admission of Cira’s testimony in district court. Therefore, we review this claim for plain error. See United States v. Jones, 266 F.3d 804, 814 (8th Cir.2001). Relying on Ninth Circuit precedent, Martinez contends admission of the testimony was error because he was not charged with conspiracy to import drugs and no evidence was presented to link him to an actual drug trafficking organization. See United States v. Vallejo, 237 F.3d 1008, 1012 (9th Cir.2001) (holding that the district court complied with the requirements of lb13alb where it made specific references to testimony in the record relating to the scope of the defendants involvement in the drug trafficking conspiracy noted that the relevant testimony was unrefuted and stated that the testimony was internally consistent" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n§ TR 16-205.1. See Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Shepard, 399 Md. 241, 255, 923 A.2d 100 (2007) (“The purpose of [TR § 16-205.1 ] was to reduce the incidence of drunk driving and to protect public safety by encouraging drivers to take alcohol concentration tests; the statute was not meant to protect drivers.”); Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Jones, 380 Md. 164, 178, 844 A.2d 388 (2004) (stating that “the Legislature intended ‘to create procedures that would be an expedient and effective deterrent and sanction against drunk driving.’ ”) (citation omitted); Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Richards, 356 Md. 356, 373, 739 A.2d 58 (1999) (stating that the suspension of a license serves a remedial purpose, including protection of the public); Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Shrader, 324 Md. 454, 475, 597 A.2d 939 (1991) (recognizing that in interpreting a statute our primary purpose is to ascertain the intent of the legislature", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n§ TR 16-205.1. See Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Shepard, 399 Md. 241, 255, 923 A.2d 100 (2007) (“The purpose of [TR § 16-205.1 ] was to reduce the incidence of drunk driving and to protect public safety by encouraging drivers to take alcohol concentration tests; the statute was not meant to protect drivers.”); Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Jones, 380 Md. 164, 178, 844 A.2d 388 (2004) (stating that “the Legislature intended ‘to create procedures that would be an expedient and effective deterrent and sanction against drunk driving.’ ”) (citation omitted); Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Richards, 356 Md. 356, 373, 739 A.2d 58 (1999) (stating that the suspension of a license serves a remedial purpose, including protection of the public); Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Shrader, 324 Md. 454, 475, 597 A.2d 939 (1991) (holding that contracts where the primary purpose is to restrain trade are void", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n§ TR 16-205.1. See Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Shepard, 399 Md. 241, 255, 923 A.2d 100 (2007) (“The purpose of [TR § 16-205.1 ] was to reduce the incidence of drunk driving and to protect public safety by encouraging drivers to take alcohol concentration tests; the statute was not meant to protect drivers.”); Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Jones, 380 Md. 164, 178, 844 A.2d 388 (2004) (stating that “the Legislature intended ‘to create procedures that would be an expedient and effective deterrent and sanction against drunk driving.’ ”) (citation omitted); Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Richards, 356 Md. 356, 373, 739 A.2d 58 (1999) (stating that the suspension of a license serves a remedial purpose, including protection of the public); Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Shrader, 324 Md. 454, 475, 597 A.2d 939 (1991) (holding that the determination and assessment of damages are not the primary purpose of a declaratory action", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n§ TR 16-205.1. See Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Shepard, 399 Md. 241, 255, 923 A.2d 100 (2007) (“The purpose of [TR § 16-205.1 ] was to reduce the incidence of drunk driving and to protect public safety by encouraging drivers to take alcohol concentration tests; the statute was not meant to protect drivers.”); Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Jones, 380 Md. 164, 178, 844 A.2d 388 (2004) (stating that “the Legislature intended ‘to create procedures that would be an expedient and effective deterrent and sanction against drunk driving.’ ”) (citation omitted); Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Richards, 356 Md. 356, 373, 739 A.2d 58 (1999) (stating that the suspension of a license serves a remedial purpose, including protection of the public); Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Shrader, 324 Md. 454, 475, 597 A.2d 939 (1991) (recognizing that the sentence imposed should be consistent with the protection of the public", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n§ TR 16-205.1. See Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Shepard, 399 Md. 241, 255, 923 A.2d 100 (2007) (“The purpose of [TR § 16-205.1 ] was to reduce the incidence of drunk driving and to protect public safety by encouraging drivers to take alcohol concentration tests; the statute was not meant to protect drivers.”); Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Jones, 380 Md. 164, 178, 844 A.2d 388 (2004) (stating that “the Legislature intended ‘to create procedures that would be an expedient and effective deterrent and sanction against drunk driving.’ ”) (citation omitted); Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Richards, 356 Md. 356, 373, 739 A.2d 58 (1999) (stating that the suspension of a license serves a remedial purpose, including protection of the public); Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Shrader, 324 Md. 454, 475, 597 A.2d 939 (1991) (recognizing that the primary purpose of tr 162051 is protection of the public" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nit, upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.’ ”). A fact is “material” for purposes of summary judgment when proof of that fact would establish or refute an essential element of the claim or a defense advanced by either party. Kendall v. Hoover Co., 751 F.2d 171, 174 (6th Cir.1984) (citation omitted). A patent enjoys a presumption of validity pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 282. “Consequently, ‘a moving party seeking to invalidate a patent at summary judgment must submit such clear and convincing evidence of invalidity so that no reasonable jury could find otherwise.’ ” Chrimar Sys. v. Cisco Sys., 318 F.Supp.2d 476, 491 (E.D.Mich.2004) (quoting Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., 251 F.3d 955, 962 (Fed.Cir. 2001) ); see also Beckson Marine, Inc. v. NFM, Inc., 292 F.3d 718, 725 (Fed.Cir. 2002) (holding in part that party seeking reformation of deed must show the original intent or agreement of parties by clear and convincing evidence", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nit, upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.’ ”). A fact is “material” for purposes of summary judgment when proof of that fact would establish or refute an essential element of the claim or a defense advanced by either party. Kendall v. Hoover Co., 751 F.2d 171, 174 (6th Cir.1984) (citation omitted). A patent enjoys a presumption of validity pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 282. “Consequently, ‘a moving party seeking to invalidate a patent at summary judgment must submit such clear and convincing evidence of invalidity so that no reasonable jury could find otherwise.’ ” Chrimar Sys. v. Cisco Sys., 318 F.Supp.2d 476, 491 (E.D.Mich.2004) (quoting Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., 251 F.3d 955, 962 (Fed.Cir. 2001) ); see also Beckson Marine, Inc. v. NFM, Inc., 292 F.3d 718, 725 (Fed.Cir. 2002) (recognizing presumption and finding that it was overcome", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nit, upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.’ ”). A fact is “material” for purposes of summary judgment when proof of that fact would establish or refute an essential element of the claim or a defense advanced by either party. Kendall v. Hoover Co., 751 F.2d 171, 174 (6th Cir.1984) (citation omitted). A patent enjoys a presumption of validity pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 282. “Consequently, ‘a moving party seeking to invalidate a patent at summary judgment must submit such clear and convincing evidence of invalidity so that no reasonable jury could find otherwise.’ ” Chrimar Sys. v. Cisco Sys., 318 F.Supp.2d 476, 491 (E.D.Mich.2004) (quoting Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., 251 F.3d 955, 962 (Fed.Cir. 2001) ); see also Beckson Marine, Inc. v. NFM, Inc., 292 F.3d 718, 725 (Fed.Cir. 2002) (holding presumption overcome based on competent substantial record evidence which the judge could reasonably find to be clear and convincing", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nit, upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.’ ”). A fact is “material” for purposes of summary judgment when proof of that fact would establish or refute an essential element of the claim or a defense advanced by either party. Kendall v. Hoover Co., 751 F.2d 171, 174 (6th Cir.1984) (citation omitted). A patent enjoys a presumption of validity pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 282. “Consequently, ‘a moving party seeking to invalidate a patent at summary judgment must submit such clear and convincing evidence of invalidity so that no reasonable jury could find otherwise.’ ” Chrimar Sys. v. Cisco Sys., 318 F.Supp.2d 476, 491 (E.D.Mich.2004) (quoting Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., 251 F.3d 955, 962 (Fed.Cir. 2001) ); see also Beckson Marine, Inc. v. NFM, Inc., 292 F.3d 718, 725 (Fed.Cir. 2002) (holding that a party seeking to establish particular claims as invalid must overcome the presumption of validity in 35 usc 282 by clear and convincing evidence", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nit, upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.’ ”). A fact is “material” for purposes of summary judgment when proof of that fact would establish or refute an essential element of the claim or a defense advanced by either party. Kendall v. Hoover Co., 751 F.2d 171, 174 (6th Cir.1984) (citation omitted). A patent enjoys a presumption of validity pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 282. “Consequently, ‘a moving party seeking to invalidate a patent at summary judgment must submit such clear and convincing evidence of invalidity so that no reasonable jury could find otherwise.’ ” Chrimar Sys. v. Cisco Sys., 318 F.Supp.2d 476, 491 (E.D.Mich.2004) (quoting Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., 251 F.3d 955, 962 (Fed.Cir. 2001) ); see also Beckson Marine, Inc. v. NFM, Inc., 292 F.3d 718, 725 (Fed.Cir. 2002) (holding that the presumption of validity and its concomitant clear and convincing evidence standard does not apply to section 101 claims the court reasoned because no evidence outside the pleadings is considered in deciding a motion to dismiss it makes little sense to apply a clear and convincing standard a burden of proof to such motions citation omitted" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nin accordance with another provision of this code. See Act of May 10, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 290, § 1, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 548, 548-51 (repealed and recodified 2003) (current version at Tex. Ins. Code Ann. §§ 541.051-.061). 9 . See, e.g., Benchmark Bank v. Crowder, 919 S.W.2d 657, 663 (Tex.1996); Goswami v. Metro. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 751 S.W.2d 487, 491 n. 1 (Tex.1988); IN A of Tex. v. Bryant, 686 S.W.2d 614, 615 (Tex.1985); Conte v. Ditta, No. 14-02-00482-CV, 2003 WL 21191296, at *4 n. 5 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] May 22, 2003, no pet.) (mem.op.) (presuming that trial court did not consider a late-filed affidavit where the record showed only that the trial court considered the response). But see Durbin v. Culberson County, 132 S.W.3d 650, 656 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2004, no pet.) (holding the fourteenth amendment does not apply to the actions of the federal government", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nin accordance with another provision of this code. See Act of May 10, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 290, § 1, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 548, 548-51 (repealed and recodified 2003) (current version at Tex. Ins. Code Ann. §§ 541.051-.061). 9 . See, e.g., Benchmark Bank v. Crowder, 919 S.W.2d 657, 663 (Tex.1996); Goswami v. Metro. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 751 S.W.2d 487, 491 n. 1 (Tex.1988); IN A of Tex. v. Bryant, 686 S.W.2d 614, 615 (Tex.1985); Conte v. Ditta, No. 14-02-00482-CV, 2003 WL 21191296, at *4 n. 5 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] May 22, 2003, no pet.) (mem.op.) (presuming that trial court did not consider a late-filed affidavit where the record showed only that the trial court considered the response). But see Durbin v. Culberson County, 132 S.W.3d 650, 656 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2004, no pet.) (holding that in ruling on a summaryjudgment motion record evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to nonmovant", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nin accordance with another provision of this code. See Act of May 10, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 290, § 1, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 548, 548-51 (repealed and recodified 2003) (current version at Tex. Ins. Code Ann. §§ 541.051-.061). 9 . See, e.g., Benchmark Bank v. Crowder, 919 S.W.2d 657, 663 (Tex.1996); Goswami v. Metro. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 751 S.W.2d 487, 491 n. 1 (Tex.1988); IN A of Tex. v. Bryant, 686 S.W.2d 614, 615 (Tex.1985); Conte v. Ditta, No. 14-02-00482-CV, 2003 WL 21191296, at *4 n. 5 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] May 22, 2003, no pet.) (mem.op.) (presuming that trial court did not consider a late-filed affidavit where the record showed only that the trial court considered the response). But see Durbin v. Culberson County, 132 S.W.3d 650, 656 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2004, no pet.) (holding that the confrontation clause does not apply to the sentencing hearing", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nin accordance with another provision of this code. See Act of May 10, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 290, § 1, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 548, 548-51 (repealed and recodified 2003) (current version at Tex. Ins. Code Ann. §§ 541.051-.061). 9 . See, e.g., Benchmark Bank v. Crowder, 919 S.W.2d 657, 663 (Tex.1996); Goswami v. Metro. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 751 S.W.2d 487, 491 n. 1 (Tex.1988); IN A of Tex. v. Bryant, 686 S.W.2d 614, 615 (Tex.1985); Conte v. Ditta, No. 14-02-00482-CV, 2003 WL 21191296, at *4 n. 5 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] May 22, 2003, no pet.) (mem.op.) (presuming that trial court did not consider a late-filed affidavit where the record showed only that the trial court considered the response). But see Durbin v. Culberson County, 132 S.W.3d 650, 656 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2004, no pet.) (holding that the sevenday limit before submission in which a nonmovant may submit summaryjudgment evidence does not apply to the movants reply", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nin accordance with another provision of this code. See Act of May 10, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 290, § 1, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 548, 548-51 (repealed and recodified 2003) (current version at Tex. Ins. Code Ann. §§ 541.051-.061). 9 . See, e.g., Benchmark Bank v. Crowder, 919 S.W.2d 657, 663 (Tex.1996); Goswami v. Metro. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 751 S.W.2d 487, 491 n. 1 (Tex.1988); IN A of Tex. v. Bryant, 686 S.W.2d 614, 615 (Tex.1985); Conte v. Ditta, No. 14-02-00482-CV, 2003 WL 21191296, at *4 n. 5 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] May 22, 2003, no pet.) (mem.op.) (presuming that trial court did not consider a late-filed affidavit where the record showed only that the trial court considered the response). But see Durbin v. Culberson County, 132 S.W.3d 650, 656 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2004, no pet.) (holding that title ii does not apply to the states" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nStates v. Comstock, 551 F.3d 274 (4th Cir.2009) (“Comstock I”). In 2007, a district court in this Circuit struck down the commitment scheme of § 4248 on two constitutional grounds: that (1) Congress lacked the authority to enact § 4248; and (2) § 4248’s clear and convincing burden of proof contravened the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See United States v. Comstock, 507 F.Supp.2d 522 (E.D.N.C.2007). On appeal, we agreed with the district court that enactment of § 4248 exceeded congressional authority, without reaching the due process issue. See Comstock I, 551 F.3d at 276. In May 2010, the Supreme Court reversed our Comstock I decision, holding that Article I of the Constitution conferred sufficient authority for Congress to enact § 4248. See Comstock, 130 S.Ct. at 1954 (recognizing that constitution grants authority for congress to enact 4248 as necessary and proper for carrying into execution the powers vested by the constitution internal quotation marks omitted", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nStates v. Comstock, 551 F.3d 274 (4th Cir.2009) (“Comstock I”). In 2007, a district court in this Circuit struck down the commitment scheme of § 4248 on two constitutional grounds: that (1) Congress lacked the authority to enact § 4248; and (2) § 4248’s clear and convincing burden of proof contravened the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See United States v. Comstock, 507 F.Supp.2d 522 (E.D.N.C.2007). On appeal, we agreed with the district court that enactment of § 4248 exceeded congressional authority, without reaching the due process issue. See Comstock I, 551 F.3d at 276. In May 2010, the Supreme Court reversed our Comstock I decision, holding that Article I of the Constitution conferred sufficient authority for Congress to enact § 4248. See Comstock, 130 S.Ct. at 1954 (holding that congress may impose its will on the states as long as it is acting within the powers granted by the constitution", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nStates v. Comstock, 551 F.3d 274 (4th Cir.2009) (“Comstock I”). In 2007, a district court in this Circuit struck down the commitment scheme of § 4248 on two constitutional grounds: that (1) Congress lacked the authority to enact § 4248; and (2) § 4248’s clear and convincing burden of proof contravened the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See United States v. Comstock, 507 F.Supp.2d 522 (E.D.N.C.2007). On appeal, we agreed with the district court that enactment of § 4248 exceeded congressional authority, without reaching the due process issue. See Comstock I, 551 F.3d at 276. In May 2010, the Supreme Court reversed our Comstock I decision, holding that Article I of the Constitution conferred sufficient authority for Congress to enact § 4248. See Comstock, 130 S.Ct. at 1954 (recognizing that provisions of the colorado constitution should be construed in the context of the constitution as a whole", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nStates v. Comstock, 551 F.3d 274 (4th Cir.2009) (“Comstock I”). In 2007, a district court in this Circuit struck down the commitment scheme of § 4248 on two constitutional grounds: that (1) Congress lacked the authority to enact § 4248; and (2) § 4248’s clear and convincing burden of proof contravened the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See United States v. Comstock, 507 F.Supp.2d 522 (E.D.N.C.2007). On appeal, we agreed with the district court that enactment of § 4248 exceeded congressional authority, without reaching the due process issue. See Comstock I, 551 F.3d at 276. In May 2010, the Supreme Court reversed our Comstock I decision, holding that Article I of the Constitution conferred sufficient authority for Congress to enact § 4248. See Comstock, 130 S.Ct. at 1954 (recognizing that conflict preemption precludes laws that under the circumstances of a particular case stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of congress omission alteration internal quotation marks and citation omitted", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nStates v. Comstock, 551 F.3d 274 (4th Cir.2009) (“Comstock I”). In 2007, a district court in this Circuit struck down the commitment scheme of § 4248 on two constitutional grounds: that (1) Congress lacked the authority to enact § 4248; and (2) § 4248’s clear and convincing burden of proof contravened the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See United States v. Comstock, 507 F.Supp.2d 522 (E.D.N.C.2007). On appeal, we agreed with the district court that enactment of § 4248 exceeded congressional authority, without reaching the due process issue. See Comstock I, 551 F.3d at 276. In May 2010, the Supreme Court reversed our Comstock I decision, holding that Article I of the Constitution conferred sufficient authority for Congress to enact § 4248. See Comstock, 130 S.Ct. at 1954 (recognizing that a tax enactment will not be invalidated unless it clearly palpably and plainly violates the constitution internal quotation marks and citation omitted" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndistrict courts should handle motions by the government to reconsider suppression orders. When the government seeks reconsideration of a suppression order based on a new legal argument or evidence, the Eleventh and D.C. Circuits require the government to justify its failure to present this legal argument or evidence in the earlier proceedings. See United States v. Villabona-Gamica, 63 F.3d 1051, 1055 (11th Cir. 1995) (“By failing to raise an issue at a suppression hearing without offering any justification therefor, the government waives its right to assert it in subsequent proceedings.” (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted) (quoting, in parenthetical, United States v. Thompson, 710 F.2d 1500, 1504 (11th Cir.1983))); McRae v. United States, 420 F.2d 1283, 1288 (D.C.Cir.1969) (holding that our court will not consider an issue of whether a defendant has standing to seek suppression of evidence if the issue was not raised in the lower court", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndistrict courts should handle motions by the government to reconsider suppression orders. When the government seeks reconsideration of a suppression order based on a new legal argument or evidence, the Eleventh and D.C. Circuits require the government to justify its failure to present this legal argument or evidence in the earlier proceedings. See United States v. Villabona-Gamica, 63 F.3d 1051, 1055 (11th Cir. 1995) (“By failing to raise an issue at a suppression hearing without offering any justification therefor, the government waives its right to assert it in subsequent proceedings.” (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted) (quoting, in parenthetical, United States v. Thompson, 710 F.2d 1500, 1504 (11th Cir.1983))); McRae v. United States, 420 F.2d 1283, 1288 (D.C.Cir.1969) (holding that where an issue is raised in the district court but raised late and the district court declines to deem the issue waived the issue may be raised on appeal", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndistrict courts should handle motions by the government to reconsider suppression orders. When the government seeks reconsideration of a suppression order based on a new legal argument or evidence, the Eleventh and D.C. Circuits require the government to justify its failure to present this legal argument or evidence in the earlier proceedings. See United States v. Villabona-Gamica, 63 F.3d 1051, 1055 (11th Cir. 1995) (“By failing to raise an issue at a suppression hearing without offering any justification therefor, the government waives its right to assert it in subsequent proceedings.” (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted) (quoting, in parenthetical, United States v. Thompson, 710 F.2d 1500, 1504 (11th Cir.1983))); McRae v. United States, 420 F.2d 1283, 1288 (D.C.Cir.1969) (holding that suppression issue not raised to the district court was waived under rule 12", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndistrict courts should handle motions by the government to reconsider suppression orders. When the government seeks reconsideration of a suppression order based on a new legal argument or evidence, the Eleventh and D.C. Circuits require the government to justify its failure to present this legal argument or evidence in the earlier proceedings. See United States v. Villabona-Gamica, 63 F.3d 1051, 1055 (11th Cir. 1995) (“By failing to raise an issue at a suppression hearing without offering any justification therefor, the government waives its right to assert it in subsequent proceedings.” (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted) (quoting, in parenthetical, United States v. Thompson, 710 F.2d 1500, 1504 (11th Cir.1983))); McRae v. United States, 420 F.2d 1283, 1288 (D.C.Cir.1969) (holding that an issue is preserved for appeal where the issue was sufficiently raised for the court to rule on it ", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndistrict courts should handle motions by the government to reconsider suppression orders. When the government seeks reconsideration of a suppression order based on a new legal argument or evidence, the Eleventh and D.C. Circuits require the government to justify its failure to present this legal argument or evidence in the earlier proceedings. See United States v. Villabona-Gamica, 63 F.3d 1051, 1055 (11th Cir. 1995) (“By failing to raise an issue at a suppression hearing without offering any justification therefor, the government waives its right to assert it in subsequent proceedings.” (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted) (quoting, in parenthetical, United States v. Thompson, 710 F.2d 1500, 1504 (11th Cir.1983))); McRae v. United States, 420 F.2d 1283, 1288 (D.C.Cir.1969) (holding that the government was obligated to advance stronger justification for relitigating a suppression issue where the issue raised was clear and a considered ruling had been made" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nappears to be no major gender difference in the overall frequency of Delusional Disorder. American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition, Text Revision (DSM-IV-TR) (2000), 297.1, atp. 326. 92 . FEH Transcript, testimony of Dr. Mary Alice Conroy, atpp. 145-50. 93 . Id., at p. 151. 94 . FEH Transcript, testimony of Dr. Mary Alice Conroy, atpp. 153-54. 95 . Id.., atpp. 154-58. 96 . Id., atpp. 170-71. 97 . Id., atpp. 172-73. 98 . Id., atpp. 180-81. 99 . FEH Transcript, testimony of Dr. Michael A. Roman, atp. 183. 100 . Id.., at p. 188. 101 . Id., at pp. 200-03. 102 . Id., at p. 203. 103 . Id., at pp. 206-07. 104 . Id., at pp. 209-10. 105 . I'd., at pp. 211-12. 106 . See Morris v. State, 301 S.W.3d 281, 300 n. 25 (Tex.Crim.App.2009)(holding that defense counsel validly waived a double jeopardy claim by assenting to a mistrial after defendant was found incompetent to stand trial in the midst of trial", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nappears to be no major gender difference in the overall frequency of Delusional Disorder. American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition, Text Revision (DSM-IV-TR) (2000), 297.1, atp. 326. 92 . FEH Transcript, testimony of Dr. Mary Alice Conroy, atpp. 145-50. 93 . Id., at p. 151. 94 . FEH Transcript, testimony of Dr. Mary Alice Conroy, atpp. 153-54. 95 . Id.., atpp. 154-58. 96 . Id., atpp. 170-71. 97 . Id., atpp. 172-73. 98 . Id., atpp. 180-81. 99 . FEH Transcript, testimony of Dr. Michael A. Roman, atp. 183. 100 . Id.., at p. 188. 101 . Id., at pp. 200-03. 102 . Id., at p. 203. 103 . Id., at pp. 206-07. 104 . Id., at pp. 209-10. 105 . I'd., at pp. 211-12. 106 . See Morris v. State, 301 S.W.3d 281, 300 n. 25 (Tex.Crim.App.2009)(holding that the due process clause prohibits the trial of a person who is incompetent", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nappears to be no major gender difference in the overall frequency of Delusional Disorder. American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition, Text Revision (DSM-IV-TR) (2000), 297.1, atp. 326. 92 . FEH Transcript, testimony of Dr. Mary Alice Conroy, atpp. 145-50. 93 . Id., at p. 151. 94 . FEH Transcript, testimony of Dr. Mary Alice Conroy, atpp. 153-54. 95 . Id.., atpp. 154-58. 96 . Id., atpp. 170-71. 97 . Id., atpp. 172-73. 98 . Id., atpp. 180-81. 99 . FEH Transcript, testimony of Dr. Michael A. Roman, atp. 183. 100 . Id.., at p. 188. 101 . Id., at pp. 200-03. 102 . Id., at p. 203. 103 . Id., at pp. 206-07. 104 . Id., at pp. 209-10. 105 . I'd., at pp. 211-12. 106 . See Morris v. State, 301 S.W.3d 281, 300 n. 25 (Tex.Crim.App.2009)(holding that the state does not have to prove a defendants competency to stand trial", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nappears to be no major gender difference in the overall frequency of Delusional Disorder. American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition, Text Revision (DSM-IV-TR) (2000), 297.1, atp. 326. 92 . FEH Transcript, testimony of Dr. Mary Alice Conroy, atpp. 145-50. 93 . Id., at p. 151. 94 . FEH Transcript, testimony of Dr. Mary Alice Conroy, atpp. 153-54. 95 . Id.., atpp. 154-58. 96 . Id., atpp. 170-71. 97 . Id., atpp. 172-73. 98 . Id., atpp. 180-81. 99 . FEH Transcript, testimony of Dr. Michael A. Roman, atp. 183. 100 . Id.., at p. 188. 101 . Id., at pp. 200-03. 102 . Id., at p. 203. 103 . Id., at pp. 206-07. 104 . Id., at pp. 209-10. 105 . I'd., at pp. 211-12. 106 . See Morris v. State, 301 S.W.3d 281, 300 n. 25 (Tex.Crim.App.2009)(holding that the burden is on the plaintiff", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nappears to be no major gender difference in the overall frequency of Delusional Disorder. American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition, Text Revision (DSM-IV-TR) (2000), 297.1, atp. 326. 92 . FEH Transcript, testimony of Dr. Mary Alice Conroy, atpp. 145-50. 93 . Id., at p. 151. 94 . FEH Transcript, testimony of Dr. Mary Alice Conroy, atpp. 153-54. 95 . Id.., atpp. 154-58. 96 . Id., atpp. 170-71. 97 . Id., atpp. 172-73. 98 . Id., atpp. 180-81. 99 . FEH Transcript, testimony of Dr. Michael A. Roman, atp. 183. 100 . Id.., at p. 188. 101 . Id., at pp. 200-03. 102 . Id., at p. 203. 103 . Id., at pp. 206-07. 104 . Id., at pp. 209-10. 105 . I'd., at pp. 211-12. 106 . See Morris v. State, 301 S.W.3d 281, 300 n. 25 (Tex.Crim.App.2009)(holding the statutory burden is on the defendant to prove he is incompetent to stand trial" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\ndid not file a return to this motion. The trial court granted the motion to alter or amend, finding the district court decision was binding on all parties to this action. It vacated the consent judgment and restored the case to the trial docket. Payne filed a motion to reconsider, which the trial court denied. This appeal followed. LAW/ANALYSIS The Pocisks assert the order granting Rule 60(b) relief is not immediately appealable. We agree. The determination of whether a party may immediately appeal an order issued before or during trial is governed primarily by statute. S.C.Code Ann. § 14-3-330 (1976 & Supp. 2007); Hagood v. Sommerville, 362 S.C. 191, 195, 607 S.E.2d 707, 70 part of a pleading in the action. Therefore, neither subsections (a) nor (c) apply to this order. P (1980) (holding that the denial of a motion to remand is interlocutory and not immediately appealable", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\ndid not file a return to this motion. The trial court granted the motion to alter or amend, finding the district court decision was binding on all parties to this action. It vacated the consent judgment and restored the case to the trial docket. Payne filed a motion to reconsider, which the trial court denied. This appeal followed. LAW/ANALYSIS The Pocisks assert the order granting Rule 60(b) relief is not immediately appealable. We agree. The determination of whether a party may immediately appeal an order issued before or during trial is governed primarily by statute. S.C.Code Ann. § 14-3-330 (1976 & Supp. 2007); Hagood v. Sommerville, 362 S.C. 191, 195, 607 S.E.2d 707, 70 part of a pleading in the action. Therefore, neither subsections (a) nor (c) apply to this order. P (1980) (holding an order denying a motion for summary judgment is interlocutory and not appealable", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\ndid not file a return to this motion. The trial court granted the motion to alter or amend, finding the district court decision was binding on all parties to this action. It vacated the consent judgment and restored the case to the trial docket. Payne filed a motion to reconsider, which the trial court denied. This appeal followed. LAW/ANALYSIS The Pocisks assert the order granting Rule 60(b) relief is not immediately appealable. We agree. The determination of whether a party may immediately appeal an order issued before or during trial is governed primarily by statute. S.C.Code Ann. § 14-3-330 (1976 & Supp. 2007); Hagood v. Sommerville, 362 S.C. 191, 195, 607 S.E.2d 707, 70 part of a pleading in the action. Therefore, neither subsections (a) nor (c) apply to this order. P (1980) (holding an order allowing a motion under rule 60b is not immediately appealable because it is interlocutory and does not affect a substantial right", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\ndid not file a return to this motion. The trial court granted the motion to alter or amend, finding the district court decision was binding on all parties to this action. It vacated the consent judgment and restored the case to the trial docket. Payne filed a motion to reconsider, which the trial court denied. This appeal followed. LAW/ANALYSIS The Pocisks assert the order granting Rule 60(b) relief is not immediately appealable. We agree. The determination of whether a party may immediately appeal an order issued before or during trial is governed primarily by statute. S.C.Code Ann. § 14-3-330 (1976 & Supp. 2007); Hagood v. Sommerville, 362 S.C. 191, 195, 607 S.E.2d 707, 70 part of a pleading in the action. Therefore, neither subsections (a) nor (c) apply to this order. P (1980) (holding that an order of consolidation is interlocutory and not immediately appealable", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\ndid not file a return to this motion. The trial court granted the motion to alter or amend, finding the district court decision was binding on all parties to this action. It vacated the consent judgment and restored the case to the trial docket. Payne filed a motion to reconsider, which the trial court denied. This appeal followed. LAW/ANALYSIS The Pocisks assert the order granting Rule 60(b) relief is not immediately appealable. We agree. The determination of whether a party may immediately appeal an order issued before or during trial is governed primarily by statute. S.C.Code Ann. § 14-3-330 (1976 & Supp. 2007); Hagood v. Sommerville, 362 S.C. 191, 195, 607 S.E.2d 707, 70 part of a pleading in the action. Therefore, neither subsections (a) nor (c) apply to this order. P (1980) (holding that overruling of motion to quash does not affect substantial right and is therefore not final appealable order" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nTo be actionable as fraud in Illinois, a “misrepresentation” must contain the following elements: (1) it must be a statement of material fact, as opposed to opinion; (2) it must be untrue; (3) the party making the statement must know or believe it to be untrue; (4) the person to whom the statement is made must believe and rely on it, and have a right to do so; (5) it must have been made for the purpose of inducing the other party to act; and (6) the reliance by the person or entity to whom the statement is made must lead to the claimed injury. See Mother Earth, Ltd. v. Strawberry Camel, Ltd, 72 Ill.App.3d 37, 28 Ill.Dec. 226, 390 N.E.2d 393, 403 (1979) (citing Broberg v. Mann, 66 Ill.App.2d 134, 213 N.E.2d 89, 91-92 (1965)) ; see also W.W. Vincent, 286 Ill.Dec. 734, 814 N.E.2d at 969 (holding that purchasing corporation stated valid claim of fraudulent misrepresentation by inducement based on knowingly false statements by transferring corporation that assets transferred to purchasing corporation included general agents contract", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nTo be actionable as fraud in Illinois, a “misrepresentation” must contain the following elements: (1) it must be a statement of material fact, as opposed to opinion; (2) it must be untrue; (3) the party making the statement must know or believe it to be untrue; (4) the person to whom the statement is made must believe and rely on it, and have a right to do so; (5) it must have been made for the purpose of inducing the other party to act; and (6) the reliance by the person or entity to whom the statement is made must lead to the claimed injury. See Mother Earth, Ltd. v. Strawberry Camel, Ltd, 72 Ill.App.3d 37, 28 Ill.Dec. 226, 390 N.E.2d 393, 403 (1979) (citing Broberg v. Mann, 66 Ill.App.2d 134, 213 N.E.2d 89, 91-92 (1965)) ; see also W.W. Vincent, 286 Ill.Dec. 734, 814 N.E.2d at 969 (holding that claims of corporation vest in corporation", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nTo be actionable as fraud in Illinois, a “misrepresentation” must contain the following elements: (1) it must be a statement of material fact, as opposed to opinion; (2) it must be untrue; (3) the party making the statement must know or believe it to be untrue; (4) the person to whom the statement is made must believe and rely on it, and have a right to do so; (5) it must have been made for the purpose of inducing the other party to act; and (6) the reliance by the person or entity to whom the statement is made must lead to the claimed injury. See Mother Earth, Ltd. v. Strawberry Camel, Ltd, 72 Ill.App.3d 37, 28 Ill.Dec. 226, 390 N.E.2d 393, 403 (1979) (citing Broberg v. Mann, 66 Ill.App.2d 134, 213 N.E.2d 89, 91-92 (1965)) ; see also W.W. Vincent, 286 Ill.Dec. 734, 814 N.E.2d at 969 (holding that in a merger shareholders are effectively purchasing shares in a new corporation while losing their status as shareholders in the previous corporation", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nTo be actionable as fraud in Illinois, a “misrepresentation” must contain the following elements: (1) it must be a statement of material fact, as opposed to opinion; (2) it must be untrue; (3) the party making the statement must know or believe it to be untrue; (4) the person to whom the statement is made must believe and rely on it, and have a right to do so; (5) it must have been made for the purpose of inducing the other party to act; and (6) the reliance by the person or entity to whom the statement is made must lead to the claimed injury. See Mother Earth, Ltd. v. Strawberry Camel, Ltd, 72 Ill.App.3d 37, 28 Ill.Dec. 226, 390 N.E.2d 393, 403 (1979) (citing Broberg v. Mann, 66 Ill.App.2d 134, 213 N.E.2d 89, 91-92 (1965)) ; see also W.W. Vincent, 286 Ill.Dec. 734, 814 N.E.2d at 969 (recognizing that agents of a corporation may be held criminally responsible for crimes committed in the name of the corporation", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nTo be actionable as fraud in Illinois, a “misrepresentation” must contain the following elements: (1) it must be a statement of material fact, as opposed to opinion; (2) it must be untrue; (3) the party making the statement must know or believe it to be untrue; (4) the person to whom the statement is made must believe and rely on it, and have a right to do so; (5) it must have been made for the purpose of inducing the other party to act; and (6) the reliance by the person or entity to whom the statement is made must lead to the claimed injury. See Mother Earth, Ltd. v. Strawberry Camel, Ltd, 72 Ill.App.3d 37, 28 Ill.Dec. 226, 390 N.E.2d 393, 403 (1979) (citing Broberg v. Mann, 66 Ill.App.2d 134, 213 N.E.2d 89, 91-92 (1965)) ; see also W.W. Vincent, 286 Ill.Dec. 734, 814 N.E.2d at 969 (holding that corporation and sole owner of corporation were separate legal entities and corporation was not party to contract signed by owner in individual capacity" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nbeing discharged. See NRDC v. EPA 822 F.2d 104,108. (D.C.Cir.1987); see also Waterkeeper All., 399 F.3d at 498 (discharge allowed “where ... permits ensure that every discharge of pollutants will comply with all applicable effluent limitations and standards”). This permit, known as a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”> permit, establishes enforceable effluent limitations, as well as monitoring and reporting requirements. NPDES permits, which are issued either by EPA or a state in a federally approved permitting system, see 33 U.S.C. § 1342, may be individual (issued to a specific entity to discharge y-forcing, meaning it should force agencies and permit applicants to adopt technologies that achieve the great est reductions in pollution. See NRDC, 822 F.2d at 124 (holding that cwa seeks not only to stimulate but to press development of new more efficient and effective technologies which is essential purpose of this series of progressively more demanding technologybased standards", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nbeing discharged. See NRDC v. EPA 822 F.2d 104,108. (D.C.Cir.1987); see also Waterkeeper All., 399 F.3d at 498 (discharge allowed “where ... permits ensure that every discharge of pollutants will comply with all applicable effluent limitations and standards”). This permit, known as a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”> permit, establishes enforceable effluent limitations, as well as monitoring and reporting requirements. NPDES permits, which are issued either by EPA or a state in a federally approved permitting system, see 33 U.S.C. § 1342, may be individual (issued to a specific entity to discharge y-forcing, meaning it should force agencies and permit applicants to adopt technologies that achieve the great est reductions in pollution. See NRDC, 822 F.2d at 124 (holding that the standard for withholding of removal is more demanding than the standard for asylum", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nbeing discharged. See NRDC v. EPA 822 F.2d 104,108. (D.C.Cir.1987); see also Waterkeeper All., 399 F.3d at 498 (discharge allowed “where ... permits ensure that every discharge of pollutants will comply with all applicable effluent limitations and standards”). This permit, known as a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”> permit, establishes enforceable effluent limitations, as well as monitoring and reporting requirements. NPDES permits, which are issued either by EPA or a state in a federally approved permitting system, see 33 U.S.C. § 1342, may be individual (issued to a specific entity to discharge y-forcing, meaning it should force agencies and permit applicants to adopt technologies that achieve the great est reductions in pollution. See NRDC, 822 F.2d at 124 (holding that more than notice to a defendant is required", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nbeing discharged. See NRDC v. EPA 822 F.2d 104,108. (D.C.Cir.1987); see also Waterkeeper All., 399 F.3d at 498 (discharge allowed “where ... permits ensure that every discharge of pollutants will comply with all applicable effluent limitations and standards”). This permit, known as a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”> permit, establishes enforceable effluent limitations, as well as monitoring and reporting requirements. NPDES permits, which are issued either by EPA or a state in a federally approved permitting system, see 33 U.S.C. § 1342, may be individual (issued to a specific entity to discharge y-forcing, meaning it should force agencies and permit applicants to adopt technologies that achieve the great est reductions in pollution. See NRDC, 822 F.2d at 124 (holding that the more transformative the new work the more likely the use of the old work is a fair one", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nbeing discharged. See NRDC v. EPA 822 F.2d 104,108. (D.C.Cir.1987); see also Waterkeeper All., 399 F.3d at 498 (discharge allowed “where ... permits ensure that every discharge of pollutants will comply with all applicable effluent limitations and standards”). This permit, known as a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”> permit, establishes enforceable effluent limitations, as well as monitoring and reporting requirements. NPDES permits, which are issued either by EPA or a state in a federally approved permitting system, see 33 U.S.C. § 1342, may be individual (issued to a specific entity to discharge y-forcing, meaning it should force agencies and permit applicants to adopt technologies that achieve the great est reductions in pollution. See NRDC, 822 F.2d at 124 (holding the aedpa standard is demanding but not insatiable" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nthat: Notwithstanding any other provision of law ... no term of imprisonment imposed on a person under this subsection shall run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment imposed on the person, including any term of imprisonment imposed for the crime of violence or drug trafficking crime during which the firearm was used, carried, or possessed. Id. § 924(c)(l)(D)(ii). These consecutive terms are imposed separately from, and in addition to, the enhanced penalty for use of a weapon already provided by the bank robbery statute itself. See 18 § U.S.C. 2118(d) (raising maximum penalty from 20 to 25 years if the offender “puts in jeopardy the life of any person by the use of a dangerous weapon or device”); United States v. Segarra, 582 F.3d 1269, 1272-73 (11th Cir.2009) (per curiam) (holding that 924es consecutive sentences apply even when the underlying crimes carry their own mandatory minimums", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nthat: Notwithstanding any other provision of law ... no term of imprisonment imposed on a person under this subsection shall run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment imposed on the person, including any term of imprisonment imposed for the crime of violence or drug trafficking crime during which the firearm was used, carried, or possessed. Id. § 924(c)(l)(D)(ii). These consecutive terms are imposed separately from, and in addition to, the enhanced penalty for use of a weapon already provided by the bank robbery statute itself. See 18 § U.S.C. 2118(d) (raising maximum penalty from 20 to 25 years if the offender “puts in jeopardy the life of any person by the use of a dangerous weapon or device”); United States v. Segarra, 582 F.3d 1269, 1272-73 (11th Cir.2009) (per curiam) (holding apprendi does not apply to consecutive sentencing", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nthat: Notwithstanding any other provision of law ... no term of imprisonment imposed on a person under this subsection shall run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment imposed on the person, including any term of imprisonment imposed for the crime of violence or drug trafficking crime during which the firearm was used, carried, or possessed. Id. § 924(c)(l)(D)(ii). These consecutive terms are imposed separately from, and in addition to, the enhanced penalty for use of a weapon already provided by the bank robbery statute itself. See 18 § U.S.C. 2118(d) (raising maximum penalty from 20 to 25 years if the offender “puts in jeopardy the life of any person by the use of a dangerous weapon or device”); United States v. Segarra, 582 F.3d 1269, 1272-73 (11th Cir.2009) (per curiam) (holding that consecutive sentences were warranted because of the multiple separate and distinct criminal acts", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nthat: Notwithstanding any other provision of law ... no term of imprisonment imposed on a person under this subsection shall run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment imposed on the person, including any term of imprisonment imposed for the crime of violence or drug trafficking crime during which the firearm was used, carried, or possessed. Id. § 924(c)(l)(D)(ii). These consecutive terms are imposed separately from, and in addition to, the enhanced penalty for use of a weapon already provided by the bank robbery statute itself. See 18 § U.S.C. 2118(d) (raising maximum penalty from 20 to 25 years if the offender “puts in jeopardy the life of any person by the use of a dangerous weapon or device”); United States v. Segarra, 582 F.3d 1269, 1272-73 (11th Cir.2009) (per curiam) (holding that mandatory minimums do not implicate apprendi", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nthat: Notwithstanding any other provision of law ... no term of imprisonment imposed on a person under this subsection shall run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment imposed on the person, including any term of imprisonment imposed for the crime of violence or drug trafficking crime during which the firearm was used, carried, or possessed. Id. § 924(c)(l)(D)(ii). These consecutive terms are imposed separately from, and in addition to, the enhanced penalty for use of a weapon already provided by the bank robbery statute itself. See 18 § U.S.C. 2118(d) (raising maximum penalty from 20 to 25 years if the offender “puts in jeopardy the life of any person by the use of a dangerous weapon or device”); United States v. Segarra, 582 F.3d 1269, 1272-73 (11th Cir.2009) (per curiam) (holding that the federal constitutional right to a jury trial does not apply to decisions to impose consecutive sentences" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nevade review. DEQ begins by observing that some federal courts have adopted a “rule of thumb” that two years is an adequate time to obtain a final judicial decision on a challenge to a federal administrative agency order. See, e.g., Fund for Animals, Inc., v. Hogan, 428 F3d 1059, 1064 (DC Cir 2005). The time it takes to fully litigate a challenge to a federal administrative agency order or rule, however, may be different from the time it would take to challenge an Oregon agency’s order or rule under the Oregon Administrative Procedure Act. Moreover, the “rule of thumb” that DEQ identifies does not appear to have been uniformly followed by federal courts, particularly in cases involving challenges to NPDES permits. See, e.g., Trustees for Alaska v. EPA, 749 F2d 549, 555 (9th Cir 1984) (recognizing a mootness exception for abortion litigation because pregnancy truly could be capable of repetition yet evading review ", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nevade review. DEQ begins by observing that some federal courts have adopted a “rule of thumb” that two years is an adequate time to obtain a final judicial decision on a challenge to a federal administrative agency order. See, e.g., Fund for Animals, Inc., v. Hogan, 428 F3d 1059, 1064 (DC Cir 2005). The time it takes to fully litigate a challenge to a federal administrative agency order or rule, however, may be different from the time it would take to challenge an Oregon agency’s order or rule under the Oregon Administrative Procedure Act. Moreover, the “rule of thumb” that DEQ identifies does not appear to have been uniformly followed by federal courts, particularly in cases involving challenges to NPDES permits. See, e.g., Trustees for Alaska v. EPA, 749 F2d 549, 555 (9th Cir 1984) (holding that a party may not invoke the capable of repetition yet evading review exception where its failure to obtain prompt relief has prevented judicial review", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nevade review. DEQ begins by observing that some federal courts have adopted a “rule of thumb” that two years is an adequate time to obtain a final judicial decision on a challenge to a federal administrative agency order. See, e.g., Fund for Animals, Inc., v. Hogan, 428 F3d 1059, 1064 (DC Cir 2005). The time it takes to fully litigate a challenge to a federal administrative agency order or rule, however, may be different from the time it would take to challenge an Oregon agency’s order or rule under the Oregon Administrative Procedure Act. Moreover, the “rule of thumb” that DEQ identifies does not appear to have been uniformly followed by federal courts, particularly in cases involving challenges to NPDES permits. See, e.g., Trustees for Alaska v. EPA, 749 F2d 549, 555 (9th Cir 1984) (holding ease not moot when challenged administrative order expired because icc proceedings are continuing and their consideration ought not be defeated by short term orders capable of repetition yet evading review", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nevade review. DEQ begins by observing that some federal courts have adopted a “rule of thumb” that two years is an adequate time to obtain a final judicial decision on a challenge to a federal administrative agency order. See, e.g., Fund for Animals, Inc., v. Hogan, 428 F3d 1059, 1064 (DC Cir 2005). The time it takes to fully litigate a challenge to a federal administrative agency order or rule, however, may be different from the time it would take to challenge an Oregon agency’s order or rule under the Oregon Administrative Procedure Act. Moreover, the “rule of thumb” that DEQ identifies does not appear to have been uniformly followed by federal courts, particularly in cases involving challenges to NPDES permits. See, e.g., Trustees for Alaska v. EPA, 749 F2d 549, 555 (9th Cir 1984) (holding that we have no difficulty concluding that challenge to expired fiveyear npdes permit was capable of repetition yet evading review", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nevade review. DEQ begins by observing that some federal courts have adopted a “rule of thumb” that two years is an adequate time to obtain a final judicial decision on a challenge to a federal administrative agency order. See, e.g., Fund for Animals, Inc., v. Hogan, 428 F3d 1059, 1064 (DC Cir 2005). The time it takes to fully litigate a challenge to a federal administrative agency order or rule, however, may be different from the time it would take to challenge an Oregon agency’s order or rule under the Oregon Administrative Procedure Act. Moreover, the “rule of thumb” that DEQ identifies does not appear to have been uniformly followed by federal courts, particularly in cases involving challenges to NPDES permits. See, e.g., Trustees for Alaska v. EPA, 749 F2d 549, 555 (9th Cir 1984) (holding that challenge to expired fiveyear npdes permits originally issued eight years earlier was capable of repetition yet evading review" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n717 (1910). In all of those situations, the conduct at issue occurred before a specific risk had been identified; the risk at issue was the inherent danger of gas or electricity. Here, in contrast, the risk at issue was not the inherent danger of mulch, but the unique and specific danger of the mulch surrounding these buildings and its known propensity to catch fire from careless disposal of smoking materials. See Shantigar Found. v. Bear Mt. Builders, 441 Mass. 131, 144, 804 N.E.2d 324 (2004) (“Massachusetts law recognizes that in the absence of a statutory duty to [take certain fire prevention measures], a jury could find such a duty when the owner knows of a ‘particular danger of fire.’ ”); accord Little v. Lynn & Marblehead Real Estate Co., 301 Mass. 156, 161, 16 N.E.2d 688 (1938) (holding that damage to building and personal property as a result of fire negligently caused by defendant was to be measured by reasonable cash market value of the property at the time it was destroyed by the fire or if it was not totally destroyed by the diminution in its fair market value before and after the fire", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n717 (1910). In all of those situations, the conduct at issue occurred before a specific risk had been identified; the risk at issue was the inherent danger of gas or electricity. Here, in contrast, the risk at issue was not the inherent danger of mulch, but the unique and specific danger of the mulch surrounding these buildings and its known propensity to catch fire from careless disposal of smoking materials. See Shantigar Found. v. Bear Mt. Builders, 441 Mass. 131, 144, 804 N.E.2d 324 (2004) (“Massachusetts law recognizes that in the absence of a statutory duty to [take certain fire prevention measures], a jury could find such a duty when the owner knows of a ‘particular danger of fire.’ ”); accord Little v. Lynn & Marblehead Real Estate Co., 301 Mass. 156, 161, 16 N.E.2d 688 (1938) (holding that the relationship between fire insurance regulation and rating fire loss fire prevention and fire investigation is rational and reasonable", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n717 (1910). In all of those situations, the conduct at issue occurred before a specific risk had been identified; the risk at issue was the inherent danger of gas or electricity. Here, in contrast, the risk at issue was not the inherent danger of mulch, but the unique and specific danger of the mulch surrounding these buildings and its known propensity to catch fire from careless disposal of smoking materials. See Shantigar Found. v. Bear Mt. Builders, 441 Mass. 131, 144, 804 N.E.2d 324 (2004) (“Massachusetts law recognizes that in the absence of a statutory duty to [take certain fire prevention measures], a jury could find such a duty when the owner knows of a ‘particular danger of fire.’ ”); accord Little v. Lynn & Marblehead Real Estate Co., 301 Mass. 156, 161, 16 N.E.2d 688 (1938) (holding that not having been shown to have knowledge of any particular danger of fire the defendant was not obliged to take precautions to guard against it", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n717 (1910). In all of those situations, the conduct at issue occurred before a specific risk had been identified; the risk at issue was the inherent danger of gas or electricity. Here, in contrast, the risk at issue was not the inherent danger of mulch, but the unique and specific danger of the mulch surrounding these buildings and its known propensity to catch fire from careless disposal of smoking materials. See Shantigar Found. v. Bear Mt. Builders, 441 Mass. 131, 144, 804 N.E.2d 324 (2004) (“Massachusetts law recognizes that in the absence of a statutory duty to [take certain fire prevention measures], a jury could find such a duty when the owner knows of a ‘particular danger of fire.’ ”); accord Little v. Lynn & Marblehead Real Estate Co., 301 Mass. 156, 161, 16 N.E.2d 688 (1938) (holding that even without expert testimony the grand jurors common knowledge of the nature of fire would have allowed them to conclude that a fire spreads and becomes more dangerous the longer it is left unattended", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n717 (1910). In all of those situations, the conduct at issue occurred before a specific risk had been identified; the risk at issue was the inherent danger of gas or electricity. Here, in contrast, the risk at issue was not the inherent danger of mulch, but the unique and specific danger of the mulch surrounding these buildings and its known propensity to catch fire from careless disposal of smoking materials. See Shantigar Found. v. Bear Mt. Builders, 441 Mass. 131, 144, 804 N.E.2d 324 (2004) (“Massachusetts law recognizes that in the absence of a statutory duty to [take certain fire prevention measures], a jury could find such a duty when the owner knows of a ‘particular danger of fire.’ ”); accord Little v. Lynn & Marblehead Real Estate Co., 301 Mass. 156, 161, 16 N.E.2d 688 (1938) (holding that the fact that the fire was communicated to other property may reasonably be inferred from common knowledge of the operation of the established laws of nature in the familiar forms of combustion and the effects of wind on fire " ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nafter conviction,” and (3) “multiple punishments for the same offense.” Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 498, 104 S.Ct. 2536, 81 L.Ed.2d 425 (1984) (citing Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977)); see also Morris v. Reynolds, 264 F.3d 38, 49 (2d Cir.2001) (“[T]he double jeopardy bar prohibits not only multiple punishments for the same offense, but also a second prosecution following conviction[.]”). The prohibition of multiple successive prosecutions, the double jeopardy claim at issue in this case as urged by defendant, serves two interests. First, it preserves the criminal defendant’s interest in the finality of judgment. See Brown, 432 U.S. at 165, 97 S.Ct. 2221 (“Where successive prosecutions are at stake, the guarantee ser 680, 97 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (holding that a codefendants prior statements made at his guilty plea hearing were not admissible to corroborate his trial testimony because the witnesss guilty plea hearing did not predate any improper motive he may have had to testify against the defendant", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nafter conviction,” and (3) “multiple punishments for the same offense.” Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 498, 104 S.Ct. 2536, 81 L.Ed.2d 425 (1984) (citing Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977)); see also Morris v. Reynolds, 264 F.3d 38, 49 (2d Cir.2001) (“[T]he double jeopardy bar prohibits not only multiple punishments for the same offense, but also a second prosecution following conviction[.]”). The prohibition of multiple successive prosecutions, the double jeopardy claim at issue in this case as urged by defendant, serves two interests. First, it preserves the criminal defendant’s interest in the finality of judgment. See Brown, 432 U.S. at 165, 97 S.Ct. 2221 (“Where successive prosecutions are at stake, the guarantee ser 680, 97 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (holding double jeopardy did not bar retrial where a jury could not render a verdict and a mistrial was granted", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nafter conviction,” and (3) “multiple punishments for the same offense.” Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 498, 104 S.Ct. 2536, 81 L.Ed.2d 425 (1984) (citing Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977)); see also Morris v. Reynolds, 264 F.3d 38, 49 (2d Cir.2001) (“[T]he double jeopardy bar prohibits not only multiple punishments for the same offense, but also a second prosecution following conviction[.]”). The prohibition of multiple successive prosecutions, the double jeopardy claim at issue in this case as urged by defendant, serves two interests. First, it preserves the criminal defendant’s interest in the finality of judgment. See Brown, 432 U.S. at 165, 97 S.Ct. 2221 (“Where successive prosecutions are at stake, the guarantee ser 680, 97 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (holding double jeopardy bar on subsequent prosecution did not apply even after defendant had been sentenced when he breached conditions of his guilty plea and refused to testify for a second time at codefendants retrial for murder", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nafter conviction,” and (3) “multiple punishments for the same offense.” Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 498, 104 S.Ct. 2536, 81 L.Ed.2d 425 (1984) (citing Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977)); see also Morris v. Reynolds, 264 F.3d 38, 49 (2d Cir.2001) (“[T]he double jeopardy bar prohibits not only multiple punishments for the same offense, but also a second prosecution following conviction[.]”). The prohibition of multiple successive prosecutions, the double jeopardy claim at issue in this case as urged by defendant, serves two interests. First, it preserves the criminal defendant’s interest in the finality of judgment. See Brown, 432 U.S. at 165, 97 S.Ct. 2221 (“Where successive prosecutions are at stake, the guarantee ser 680, 97 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (holding double jeopardy did not prohibit capital prosecution of defendant who pled guilty to seconddegree murder and agreed to testify against codefendants but violated plea agreement by refusing to testify at retrial and state properly sought new indictment for capital murder resulting in death sentence imposed at trial for firstdegree murder", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nafter conviction,” and (3) “multiple punishments for the same offense.” Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 498, 104 S.Ct. 2536, 81 L.Ed.2d 425 (1984) (citing Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977)); see also Morris v. Reynolds, 264 F.3d 38, 49 (2d Cir.2001) (“[T]he double jeopardy bar prohibits not only multiple punishments for the same offense, but also a second prosecution following conviction[.]”). The prohibition of multiple successive prosecutions, the double jeopardy claim at issue in this case as urged by defendant, serves two interests. First, it preserves the criminal defendant’s interest in the finality of judgment. See Brown, 432 U.S. at 165, 97 S.Ct. 2221 (“Where successive prosecutions are at stake, the guarantee ser 680, 97 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (holding that fact that conviction has been overturned at defendants behest removes double jeopardy bar to increased sentence after retrial" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nAlan Pardofigueroa appeals from the district court’s judgment and 27-month sentence imposed following his guilty-plea conviction to Conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, Fraud and Misuse of Documents, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a), and False Statements, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. Pardofigueroa contends that the district court erred by applying a preponderance of the evidence standard, rather than the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, when determining whether the factual predicate for a sentencing enhancement had been met. This contention is foreclosed by United States v. Kilby, 443 F.3d 1135, 1143 (9th Cir.2006) (holding guidelines to be only advisory", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nAlan Pardofigueroa appeals from the district court’s judgment and 27-month sentence imposed following his guilty-plea conviction to Conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, Fraud and Misuse of Documents, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a), and False Statements, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. Pardofigueroa contends that the district court erred by applying a preponderance of the evidence standard, rather than the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, when determining whether the factual predicate for a sentencing enhancement had been met. This contention is foreclosed by United States v. Kilby, 443 F.3d 1135, 1143 (9th Cir.2006) (holding that the preponderance standard is generally appropriate in guidelines sentencing", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nAlan Pardofigueroa appeals from the district court’s judgment and 27-month sentence imposed following his guilty-plea conviction to Conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, Fraud and Misuse of Documents, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a), and False Statements, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. Pardofigueroa contends that the district court erred by applying a preponderance of the evidence standard, rather than the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, when determining whether the factual predicate for a sentencing enhancement had been met. This contention is foreclosed by United States v. Kilby, 443 F.3d 1135, 1143 (9th Cir.2006) (recognizing that sentencing facts are based on the evidence and testimony presented at sentencing under a preponderance of the evidence standard", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nAlan Pardofigueroa appeals from the district court’s judgment and 27-month sentence imposed following his guilty-plea conviction to Conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, Fraud and Misuse of Documents, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a), and False Statements, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. Pardofigueroa contends that the district court erred by applying a preponderance of the evidence standard, rather than the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, when determining whether the factual predicate for a sentencing enhancement had been met. This contention is foreclosed by United States v. Kilby, 443 F.3d 1135, 1143 (9th Cir.2006) (holding that the district court determines the amount of loss under the preponderance of the evidence standard", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nAlan Pardofigueroa appeals from the district court’s judgment and 27-month sentence imposed following his guilty-plea conviction to Conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, Fraud and Misuse of Documents, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a), and False Statements, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. Pardofigueroa contends that the district court erred by applying a preponderance of the evidence standard, rather than the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, when determining whether the factual predicate for a sentencing enhancement had been met. This contention is foreclosed by United States v. Kilby, 443 F.3d 1135, 1143 (9th Cir.2006) (holding that under the advisory guidelines a district court should resolve factual disputes at sentencing by applying the preponderance of the evidence standard" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nCare Servs. v. Dobos, 380 So.2d 516, 518 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1980) (referring to rule as the “officious intermeddler doctrine”). In certain circumstances, however, restitution for services performed will be required even though the recipient did not request or voluntarily consent to receive such services. For example, section 116 of the Restatement of Restitution provides: A person who has supplied things or services to another, although acting without the other’s knowledge or consent, is entitled to restitution therefor from the other if (a) he acted unofficiously and with intent to charge therefor, and (b) the things or services were necessary to prevent the other from suffering serious bodily harm or pain, and (c) the person supplying them had no reason to know that 668, 675 (1996) (recognizing that a caregiver and patient relationship may be confidential", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nCare Servs. v. Dobos, 380 So.2d 516, 518 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1980) (referring to rule as the “officious intermeddler doctrine”). In certain circumstances, however, restitution for services performed will be required even though the recipient did not request or voluntarily consent to receive such services. For example, section 116 of the Restatement of Restitution provides: A person who has supplied things or services to another, although acting without the other’s knowledge or consent, is entitled to restitution therefor from the other if (a) he acted unofficiously and with intent to charge therefor, and (b) the things or services were necessary to prevent the other from suffering serious bodily harm or pain, and (c) the person supplying them had no reason to know that 668, 675 (1996) (holding that plaintiffs claim that medical providers did not comply with baker act was not subject to medical malpractice statutes ajlthough a medical diagnosis is necessary in order to involuntarily commit a patient the process of complying with the statute does not require medical skill or judgment", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nCare Servs. v. Dobos, 380 So.2d 516, 518 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1980) (referring to rule as the “officious intermeddler doctrine”). In certain circumstances, however, restitution for services performed will be required even though the recipient did not request or voluntarily consent to receive such services. For example, section 116 of the Restatement of Restitution provides: A person who has supplied things or services to another, although acting without the other’s knowledge or consent, is entitled to restitution therefor from the other if (a) he acted unofficiously and with intent to charge therefor, and (b) the things or services were necessary to prevent the other from suffering serious bodily harm or pain, and (c) the person supplying them had no reason to know that 668, 675 (1996) (holding that hospital had claim against patient based on implied contract for reasonable value of services rendered even though patient was not fully compensated by settlement with atfault party medical providers claim rests upon debtorcreditor relationship and cannot be extinguished by doctrine of subrogation", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nCare Servs. v. Dobos, 380 So.2d 516, 518 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1980) (referring to rule as the “officious intermeddler doctrine”). In certain circumstances, however, restitution for services performed will be required even though the recipient did not request or voluntarily consent to receive such services. For example, section 116 of the Restatement of Restitution provides: A person who has supplied things or services to another, although acting without the other’s knowledge or consent, is entitled to restitution therefor from the other if (a) he acted unofficiously and with intent to charge therefor, and (b) the things or services were necessary to prevent the other from suffering serious bodily harm or pain, and (c) the person supplying them had no reason to know that 668, 675 (1996) (holding evidence of apparent authority insufficient where patient sought services of particular doctor rather than services of hospital generally", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nCare Servs. v. Dobos, 380 So.2d 516, 518 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1980) (referring to rule as the “officious intermeddler doctrine”). In certain circumstances, however, restitution for services performed will be required even though the recipient did not request or voluntarily consent to receive such services. For example, section 116 of the Restatement of Restitution provides: A person who has supplied things or services to another, although acting without the other’s knowledge or consent, is entitled to restitution therefor from the other if (a) he acted unofficiously and with intent to charge therefor, and (b) the things or services were necessary to prevent the other from suffering serious bodily harm or pain, and (c) the person supplying them had no reason to know that 668, 675 (1996) (holding that a psychiatrist had no duty to detain a patient who killed himself and injured his wife because the patient was outside of the scope of the facilitys range of observation and control even when the psychiatrist agreed to treat the patient the patient had suicidal tendencies and the psychologist took the patient into custody but then later permitted him to leave" ]