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United States Supreme Court FOGARTY v. UNITED STATES(1950) No. 1669 Argued: October 10, 1950Decided: November 6, 1950 </s> In the circumstances of this case, held that the corporation of which petitioner is trustee in bankruptcy and which had contracts with the Navy Department for the production of war materials, did not, on or before August 14, 1945, file with the Navy Department a "written request for relief" within the meaning of 3 of the War Contract Hardship Claims Act of August 7, 1946, and therefore was not entitled to relief under that Act. Pp. 8-14. </s> (a) Congress intended the term "written request for relief" to mean written notice presented prior to August 14, 1945, to an agency which was authorized to grant relief under 201 of the First War Powers Act. P. 13. </s> (b) No particular from of notice is required; but, whatever the form of notice, it must be sufficient to apprise the agency that it was being asked to grant extra-legal relief under the First War Powers Act for losses sustained in the performance of war contracts. P. 13. </s> (c) Documents which sought payment as a matter of right, not relief as a matter of grace, were not sufficient to apprise the Navy Department that it was being asked to accord relief under the First War Powers Act. P. 14. </s> 176 F.2d 599, affirmed. </s> In a suit against the United States under the War Contract Hardship Claims Act of August 7, 1946, 60 Stat. 902, 41 U.S.C. 106, the District Court entered summary judgment for the United States. 80 F. Supp. 90. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 176 F.2d 599. This Court granted certiorari. 339 U.S. 909 . Affirmed, p. 14. </s> George M. Shkoler argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Henry S. Blum. [340 U.S. 8, 9] </s> Oscar H. Davis argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Assistant Attorney General Morison, Samuel D. Slade and Hubert H. Margolies. </s> Raoul Berger filed a brief for Howard Industries, Inc., as amicus curiae, supporting petitioner. </s> MR. JUSTICE MINTON delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> Petitioner, as trustee in bankruptcy of Inland Waterways, Inc., brought suit against the United States in the District Court of Minnesota, Fifth Division, under the War Contract Hardship Claims Act, popularly known as the Lucas Act, adopted August 7, 1946, 60 Stat. 902, 41 U.S.C. 106 note, to recover $328,804.42 as losses alleged to have been sustained under certain contracts with the Navy Department for the production of war supplies and materials. On motion, summary judgment was entered for the United States. 80 F. Supp. 90. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. 176 F.2d 599. The suit turns on the interpretation and meaning to be ascribed to parts of the federal statute. Because we deemed resolution of the issues important, especially in view of asserted conflicts of decision in the interpretation of the statute among other federal courts, certiorari was granted. 339 U.S. 909 . </s> The facts are not in dispute. Inland Waterways, financed by a Government guaranteed loan and advances under the contracts, entered into several contracts and supplemental agreements with the Navy Department, dated from September 18, 1941, to October 30, 1942, for the production of submarine chasers and plane rearming boats. Little progress had been made under the contracts when, on December 18, 1942, Inland Waterways filed a petition for reorganization in bankruptcy. Petitioner [340 U.S. 8, 10] was appointed trustee in bankruptcy. The United States filed claims in these proceedings based primarily on the unpaid balance of the loan plus interest, the cost of completing incomplete and defective work on ships delivered under the contracts, and decreased costs resulting from certain changes in the plans and specifications. Petitioner filed a counterclaim based primarily on payments due for progress in construction, overtime work, changes in plans and specifications and in wage rates involving increased cost to Inland Waterways, and the value of partially completed work requisitioned by the Government and the cost of its preservation. In support of his counterclaim, petitioner submitted to the bankruptcy court a petition for compensation for requisitioned property and a number of invoices purporting to bill the Navy Department for goods and services, all of which had previously been submitted to agencies of the Navy Department. On February 20, 1945, the Government and petitioner executed an agreement compromising these claims upon payment of some $16,000 by the United States to petitioner. The settlement agreement embodies a mutual general release in the broadest of terms and was approved by the bankruptcy court. </s> Petitioner initiated his efforts to secure relief under the Lucas Act on February 1, 1947, by filing a claim with the War Contracts Relief Board of the Navy Department based on the same matters which had been the subject of the compromise agreement effected some two years before in the bankruptcy proceedings. The same documents submitted in support of the counterclaim in the bankruptcy court, plus the counterclaim itself, were relied on by petitioner as showing a timely request for relief under the Lucas Act. The Board denied the claim. This suit followed under 6 of the Lucas Act. </s> The only question decided by the Court of Appeals was that petitioner did not file with the Navy Department [340 U.S. 8, 11] on or before August 14, 1945, a "written request for relief" within the meaning of 3 of the Lucas Act. We direct our attention to the correctness of that holding. Neither the Act nor the regulations of the President thereunder define the term. Pertinent parts of the Act are set forth in the margin. 1 </s> Shortly after Pearl Harbor, Congress granted to the President under 201 of the First War Powers Act, 55 Stat. 838, 839, 50 U.S.C. App. 611, the power to authorize Government agencies to make amendments and modifications of contracts for war supplies without regard to consideration if "such action would facilitate the prosecution of the war." Throughout the war, departments and agencies of the Government utilized the provisions of the Act and regulations thereunder to alleviate hardships encountered by war contractors in an economy geared to all-out war. After the termination of hostilities August 14, 1945, however, departments of the Government took different views of their powers under the Act and regulations. [340 U.S. 8, 12] Some continued to exercise those powers, while others took the position that they were no longer applicable, since the war was over and contract modifications could not "facilitate the prosecution of the war." This resulted in a disparity of treatment of claimants for the relief of the Act whose claims had been filed but not acted upon before August 14, 1945. Whether such a contractor was to be accorded relief under the Act depended on the view the department with which he had contracted took of the Act. This situation motivated congressional action. See S. Rep. No. 1669, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 accompanying S. 1477, which became the Lucas Act. </s> This legislative history illuminates, for purposes of the question at hand, the relation of the First War Powers and the Lucas Acts. The words of the Lucas Act itself shed further light on that subject. Like 201 of the First War Powers Act, the Lucas Act contemplates relief by grace and not in recognition of legal rights. It speaks in 1 of "equitable claims . . . for losses . . . in the performance of such contracts or subcontracts," and in 2, of "fair and equitable settlement of claims." Further, [340 U.S. 8, 13] the Act limits the departments and agencies which may grant relief to those which were authorized to grant relief under the First War Powers Act. Finally, it limits claims upon which relief may be granted to those which had been presented "on or before August 14, 1945." As we have seen, that date was the one around which departments and agencies adopted the differing views of the First War Powers Act which necessitated congressional action. </s> In the light of the foregoing considerations and the relation of the Lucas Act to the First War Powers Act, we think Congress intended the term "written request for relief" to mean written notice presented prior to August 14, 1945, to an agency which was authorized to grant relief under 201 of the First War Powers Act. Since there is no definition of the term in the Act or regulations, and since the legislative history of the Act does not show that any settled usage of the term was brought to the attention of Congress, no particular form of notice is required. But whatever the form of notice, it must be sufficient to apprise the agency that it was being asked to grant extra-legal relief under the First War Powers Act for losses sustained in the performance of war contracts. </s> Petitioner, in attempting to establish an interpretation of the Lucas Act which would allow him to maintain this suit, has placed much reliance on events which occurred in Congress subsequent to its enactment. The second session of the Eighty-first Congress passed H. R. 3436, which was vetoed by the President. 96 Cong. Rec. 8291, 8658, 9602. Thereafter, Congress passed S. 3906, which failed of enactment over another veto of the President. 96 Cong. Rec. 12911, 14652. Petitioner's arguments is that these bills and their legislative history show that Congress had a different intent in passing the Lucas Act than that attributed to it by its administrators and some of the courts. If there is anything in these subsequent [340 U.S. 8, 14] events at odds with our finding of the meaning of 3, it would not supplant the contemporaneous intent of the Congress which enacted the Lucas Act. Cf. United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 281 -282. </s> We do not think that the documents relied on by petitioner come within the meaning of the term "written request for relief." Neither the counterclaim in the bankruptcy court, nor the petition for compensation for requisitioned property, nor the invoices for extras, sought relief as a matter of grace. They sought payment as a matter of right. The counterclaim demanded judgment of the bankruptcy court. The petition for requisitioned property and the invoices were legal claims for compensation under contract. As such, they constituted a basis for suit in court. See, e. g., 28 U.S.C. 1346. That petitioner himself thought of them as judicially cognizable claims is evidenced by the fact that he included them in the counterclaim filed with the bankruptcy court, which obviously had no jurisdiction to award any extra-legal relief under the First War Powers Act. </s> None of the documents relied on by petitioner was sufficient to apprise the Navy Department that it was being asked to accord relief under the First War Powers Act. We must therefore agree with the Court of Appeals that no "written request for relief" was filed, and, therefore, that recovery was not available to petitioner under the Lucas Act. We do not reach alternative questions. The judgment is </s> Affirmed. </s> MR. JUSTICE BLACK concurs in the result. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 SEC. 1. ". . . where work, supplies, or services have been furnished between September 16, 1940, and August 14, 1945, under a contract or subcontract, for any department or agency of the Government which prior to the latter date was authorized to enter into contracts and amendments or modifications of contracts under section 201 of the First War Powers Act, 1941 . . . such departments and agencies are hereby authorized, in accordance with regulations to be prescribed by the President . . . to consider, adjust, and settle equitable claims . . . for losses (not including diminution of anticipated profits) incurred between September 16, 1940, and August 14, 1945, without fault or negligence on their part in the performance of such contracts or subcontracts. . . . </s> "SEC. 2. (a) In arriving at a fair and equitable settlement of claims under this Act . . . . </s> "SEC. 3. Claims for losses shall not be considered unless filed with the department or agency concerned within six months after the date of approval of this Act, and shall be limited to losses with respect to which a written request for relief was filed with such department or agency on or before August 14, 1945 . . . ." </s> [Footnote 2 "This bill, as amended, would afford financial relief to those contractors who suffered losses in the performance of war contracts in those cases where the claim would have received favorable consideration under the First War Powers Act and Executive Order No. 9001 if action had been taken by the Government prior to the capitulation of the Japanese Government. However, upon the capitulation, the position was taken by certain departments and agencies of the Government involved, that no relief should be granted under the authority which then existed, unless the action was required in order to insure continued production necessary to meet post VJ-day requirements. This was on the basis that the First War Powers Act was enacted to aid in the successful prosecution of the war and not as an aid to the contractors. As a result, a number of claims which were in process at the time of the surrender of the Japanese Government, or which had not been presented prior to such time, were denied even though the facts in a particular case would have justified favorable action if such action had been taken prior to surrender." </s> [340 U.S. 8, 15] | 6 | 1 | 3 |
United States Supreme Court PURKETT v. ELEM(1995) No. 94-802 Argued: Decided: May 15, 1995 </s> PER CURIAM. </s> Respondent was convicted of second-degree robbery in a Missouri court. During jury selection, he objected to the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to strike two black men from the jury panel, an objection arguably based on Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). The prosecutor explained his strikes: </s> "I struck [juror] number twenty-two because of his long hair. He had long curly hair. He had the longest hair of anybody on the panel by far. He appeared to not be a good juror for that fact, the fact that he had long hair hanging down shoulder length, curly, unkempt hair. Also, he had a mustache and a goatee type beard. And juror number twenty-four also has a mustache and goatee type beard. Those are the only two people on the jury . . . with facial hair . . . . And I don't like the way they looked, with the way the hair is cut, both of them. And the mustaches and the beards look suspicious to me." App. to pet. for Cert. A-41. </s> The prosecutor further explained that he feared that juror number 24, who had had a sawed-off shotgun pointed at him during a supermarket robbery, would believe that "to have a robbery you have to have a gun, and there is no gun in this case." Ibid. </s> The state trial court, without explanation, overruled </s> [ PURKETT v. ELEM, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 2] </s> respondent's objection and empaneled the jury. On direct appeal, respondent renewed his Batson claim. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that the "state's explanation constituted a legitimate `hunch'" and that "[t]he circumstances fail[ed] to raise the necessary inference of racial discrimination." State v. Elem, 747 S. W. 2d 772, 775 (Mo. App. 1988). </s> Respondent then filed a petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254, asserting this and other claims. Adopting the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, the District Court concluded that the Missouri courts' determination that there had been no purposeful discrimination was a factual finding entitled to a presumption of correctness under 2254(d). Since the finding had support in the record, the District Court denied respondent's claim. </s> The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to grant the writ of habeas corpus. It said: </s> "[W]here the prosecution strikes a prospective juror who is a member of the defendant's racial group, solely on the basis of factors which are facially irrelevant to the question of whether that person is qualified to serve as a juror in the particular case, the prosecution must at least articulate some plausible race-neutral reason for believing that those factors will somehow affect the person's ability to perform his or her duties as a juror. In the present case, the prosecutor's comments, `I don't like the way [he] look[s], with the way the hair is cut. . . . And the mustache[] and the beard[] look suspicious to me,' do not constitute such legitimate race-neutral reasons for striking juror 22." 25 F.3d 679, 683 (1994). </s> It concluded that the "prosecution's explanation for striking juror 22 . . . was pretextual," and that the state trial court had "clearly erred" in finding that striking juror number 22 had not been intentional discrimination. Id., at 684. </s> Under our Batson jurisprudence, once the opponent of a peremptory challenge has made out a prima facie case of racial discrimination (step 1), the burden of production shifts to the </s> [ PURKETT v. ELEM, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 3] </s> proponent of the strike to come forward with a race-neutral explanation (step 2). If a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must then decide (step 3) whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 358 -359 (1991) (plurality opinion); id., at 375 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment); Batson, supra, at 96-98. The second step of this process does not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible. "At this [second] step of the inquiry, the issue is the facial validity of the prosecutor's explanation. Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral." Hernandez, 500 U.S., at 360 (plurality opinion); id., at 374 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment). </s> The Court of Appeals erred by combining Batson's second and third steps into one, requiring that the justification tendered at the second step be not just neutral but also at least minimally persuasive, i.e., a "plausible" basis for believing that "the person's ability to perform his or her duties as a juror" will be affected. 25 F.3d, at 683. It is not until the third step that the persuasiveness of the justification becomes relevant - the step in which the trial court determines whether the opponent of the strike has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination. Batson, supra, at 98; Hernandez, supra, at 359 (plurality opinion). At that stage, implausible or fantastic justifications may (and probably will) be found to be pretexts for purposeful discrimination. But to say that a trial judge may choose to disbelieve a silly or superstitious reason at step 3 is quite different from saying that a trial judge must terminate the inquiry at step 2 when the race-neutral reason is silly or superstitious. The latter violates the principle that the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike. Cf. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. ___, ___ (1993) (slip op., at 7-8). </s> The Court of Appeals appears to have seized on our admonition in Batson that to rebut a prima facie case, the proponent of a strike "must give a `clear and reasonably specific' explanation of his `legitimate reasons' for exercising the challenges," Batson, 476 U.S., at 98 , n. 20 (quoting Texas Dept. of Community Affairs </s> [ PURKETT v. ELEM, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 4] </s> v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258 (1981)), and that the reason must be "related to the particular case to be tried," 476 U.S., at 98 . See 25 F.3d, at 682, 683. This warning was meant to refute the notion that a prosecutor could satisfy his burden of production by merely denying that he had a discriminatory motive or by merely affirming his good faith. What it means by a "legitimate reason" is not a reason that makes sense, but a reason that does not deny equal protection. See Hernandez, supra, at 359; cf. Burdine, supra, at 255 ("The explanation provided must be legally sufficient to justify a judgment for the defendant"). </s> The prosecutor's proffered explanation in this case - that he struck juror number 22 because he had long, unkempt hair, a mustache, and a beard - is race-neutral and satisfies the prosecution's step 2 burden of articulating a nondiscriminatory reason for the strike. "The wearing of beards is not a characteristic that is peculiar to any race." EEOC v. Greyhound Lines, Inc. 635 F.2d 188, 190, n. 3 (CA3 1980). And neither is the growing of long, unkempt hair. Thus, the inquiry properly proceeded to step 3, where the state court found that the prosecutor was not motivated by discriminatory intent. </s> In habeas proceedings in federal courts, the factual findings of state courts are presumed to be correct, and may be set aside, absent procedural error, only if they are "not fairly supported by the record." 28 U.S.C. 2254(d) (8). See Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 432 (1983). Here the Court of Appeals did not conclude or even attempt to conclude that the state court's finding of no racial motive was not fairly supported by the record. For its whole focus was upon the reasonableness of the asserted nonracial motive (which it thought required by step 2) rather than the genuineness of the motive. It gave no proper basis for overturning the state court's finding of no racial motive, a finding which turned primarily on an assessment of credibility, see Batson, supra, at 98, n. 21. Cf. Marshall, supra, at 434. </s> Accordingly, respondent's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari are granted. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. </s> [ PURKETT v. ELEM, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 5] </s> It is so ordered. </s> JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE BREYER joins, dissenting. </s> In my opinion it is unwise for the Court to announce a law-changing decision without first ordering full briefing and argument on the merits of the case. The Court does this today when it overrules a portion of our opinion in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 1 </s> In Batson, the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids a prosecutor to use peremptory challenges to exclude African Americans from jury service because of their race. The Court articulated a three-step process for proving such violations. First, a pattern of peremptory challenges of black jurors may establish a prima facie case of discriminatory purpose. Second, the prosecutor may rebut that prima face [facie] case by tendering a race-neutral explanation for the strikes. Third, the court must decide whether that explanation is pretextual. Id., at 96-98. At the second step of this inquiry, neither a mere denial of improper motive nor an incredible explanation will suffice to rebut the prima facie showing of discriminatory purpose. At a minimum, as the Court held in Batson, the prosecutor "must articulate a neutral explanation related to the particular case to be tried." Id., at 98. 2 </s> Today the Court holds that it did not mean what it said in Batson. Moreover, the Court resolves a novel procedural </s> [ PURKETT v. ELEM, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 6] </s> question without even recognizing its importance to the unusual facts of this case. </s> I </s> In the Missouri trial court, the judge rejected the defendant's Batson objection to the prosecutor's peremptory challenges of two jurors, juror number 22 and juror number 24, on the ground that the defendant had not made out a prima facie case of discrimination. Accordingly, because the defendant had failed at the first step of the Batson inquiry, the judge saw no need even to confirm the defendant's assertion that jurors 22 and 24 were black; 3 nor did the judge require the prosecutor to explain his challenges. The prosecutor nevertheless did volunteer an explanation, 4 but the judge evaluated neither its credibility nor its sufficiency. </s> The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed, relying partly on the ground that the use of one-third of the prosecutor's peremptories to strike black veniremen did not require an explanation, State v. Elem, 747 S. W. 2d 772, 774 (1988), and </s> [ PURKETT v. ELEM, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 7] </s> partly on the ground that if any rebuttal was necessary then the volunteered "explanation constituted a legitimate `hunch,'" id., at 775. The court thus relied, alternatively, on steps one and two of the Batson analysis without reaching the question whether the prosecutor's explanation might have been pretextual under step three. </s> The Federal District Court accepted a magistrate's recommendation to deny petitioner's petition for habeas corpus without conducting a hearing. The magistrate had reasoned that state-court findings on the issue of purposeful discrimination are entitled to deference. App. to Pet. for Cert. A-27. Even though the trial court had made no such findings, the magistrate treated the statement by the Missouri Court of Appeals that the prosecutor's reasons "constituted a legitimate `hunch'" as a finding of fact that was supported by the record. 5 When the case reached the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the parties apparently assumed that petitioner had satisfied the first step of the Batson analysis. 6 The disputed issue in the Court of Appeals was whether the trial judge's contrary finding was academic because the prosecutor's volunteered statement satisfied step two and had not been refuted in step three. </s> The Court of Appeals agreed with the State that excluding juror 24 was not error because the prosecutor's concern about that juror's status as a former victim of a robbery was related to the case at hand. 25 F.3d 679, 681, 682 (1994). The court did, however, find a Batson violation with respect to juror 22. In rejecting the prosecutor's "race-neutral" explanation for the strike, the Court of Appeals faithfully applied the standard that we articulated in Batson: The explanation was not "`related to the particular case to be tried.'" Id., at 683, quoting 476 U.S., at 98 (emphasis in Court of Appeals opinion). </s> [ PURKETT v. ELEM, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 8] </s> Before applying the Batson test, the Court of Appeals noted that its analysis was consistent with both the Missouri Supreme Court's interpretation of Batson in State v. Antwine, 743 S. W. 2d 51 (1987) (en banc), and this Court's intervening opinion in Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991). 25 F.3d, at 683. Referring to the second stage of the three-step analysis, the Antwine court had observed: </s> "We do not believe, however, that Batson is satisfied by `neutral explanations' which are no more than facially legitimate, reasonably specific and clear. Were facially neutral explanations sufficient without more, Batson would be meaningless. It would take little effort for prosecutors who are of such a mind to adopt rote `neutral explanations' which bear facial legitimacy but conceal a discriminatory motive. We do not believe the Supreme Court intended a charade when it announced Batson." 743 S. W. 2d at 65. </s> In Hernandez, this Court rejected a Batson claim stemming from a prosecutor's strikes of two Spanish-speaking Latino jurors. The prosecutor explained that he struck the jurors because he feared that they might not accept an interpreter's English translation of trial testimony given in Spanish. Because the prosecutor's explanation was directly related to the particular case to be tried, it satisfied the second prong of the Batson standard. Moreover, as the Court of Appeals noted, 25 F.3d, at 683, the plurality opinion in Hernandez expressly observed that striking all venirepersons who speak a given language, "without regard to the particular circumstances of the trial," might constitute a pretext for racial discrimination. 500 U.S., at 371 -372 (opinion of KENNEDY, J.). 7 Based on our precedent, the Court of Appeals was entirely correct to conclude that the peremptory strike of juror 22 </s> [ PURKETT v. ELEM, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 9] </s> violated Batson because the reason given was unrelated to the circumstances of the trial. 8 </s> Today, without argument, the Court replaces the Batson standard with the surprising announcement that any neutral explanation, no matter how "implausible or fantastic," ante, at 3, even if it is "silly or superstitious," ibid., is sufficient to rebut a prima facie case of discrimination. A trial court must accept that neutral explanation unless a separate "step three" inquiry leads to the conclusion that the peremptory challenge was racially motivated. The Court does not attempt to explain why a statement that "the juror had a beard," or "the juror's last name began with the letter `S'" should satisfy step two, though a statement that "I had a hunch" should not. See ante, at 4; Batson, 476 U.S., at 98 . It is not too much to ask that a prosecutor's explanation for his strikes be race neutral, reasonably specific, and trial related. Nothing less will serve to rebut the inference of race-based discrimination that arises when the defendant has made out a prima facie case. Cf. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). That, in any event, is what we decided in Batson. </s> [ PURKETT v. ELEM, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 10] </s> II </s> The Court's peremptory disposition of this case overlooks a tricky procedural problem. Ordinarily, a federal appeals court reviewing a claim of Batson error in a habeas corpus proceeding must evaluate, with appropriate deference, the factual findings and legal conclusions of the state trial court. But in this case, the only finding the trial judge made was that the defendant had failed to establish a prima facie case. Everyone now agrees that finding was incorrect. The state trial judge, holding that the defendant had failed at step one, made no finding with respect to the sufficiency or credibility of the prosecutor's explanation at step two. The question, then, is whether the reviewing court should (1) go on to decide the second step of the Batson inquiry, (2) reverse and remand to the District Court for further proceedings, or (3) grant the writ conditioned on a proper step-two and (if necessary) step-three hearing in the state trial court. This Court's opinion today implicitly ratifies the Court of Appeals' decision to evaluate on its own whether the prosecutor had satisfied step two. I think that is the correct resolution of this procedural question, but it deserves more consideration than the Court has provided. </s> In many cases, a state trial court or a federal district court will be in a better position to evaluate the facts surrounding peremptory strikes than a federal appeals court. But I would favor a rule giving the appeals court discretion, based on the sufficiency of the record, to evaluate a prosecutor's explanation of his strikes. In this case, I think review is justified because the prosecutor volunteered reasons for the challenges. The Court of Appeals reasonably assumed that these were the same reasons the prosecutor would have given had the trial court required him to respond to the prima facie case. The Court of Appeals, in its discretion, could thus evaluate the explanations for their sufficiency. This presents a pure legal question, and nothing is gained by remand if the appeals court can resolve that question on the facts before it. </s> Assuming the Court of Appeals did not err in reaching step two, a new problem arises when that court (or, as in today's case, this Court) conducts the step-two inquiry and decides that the prosecutor's explanation was sufficient. Who may evaluate </s> [ PURKETT v. ELEM, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 11] </s> whether the prosecutor's explanation was pretextual under step three of Batson? Again, I think the question whether the Court of Appeals decides, or whether it refers the question to a trial court, should depend on the state of the record before the Court of Appeals. Whatever procedure is contemplated, however, I think even this Court would acknowledge that some implausible, fantastic, and silly explanations could be found to be pretextual without any further evidence. Indeed, in Hernandez the Court explained that a trial judge could find pretext based on nothing more than a consistent policy of excluding all Spanish-speaking jurors if that characteristic was entirely unrelated to the case to be tried. 500 U.S., at 371 -372 (plurality opinion of Kennedy, J.). Parallel reasoning would justify a finding of pretext based on a policy of excusing jurors with beards if beards have nothing to do with the pending case. </s> In some cases, conceivably the length and unkempt character of a juror's hair and goatee-type beard might give rise to a concern that he is a nonconformist who might not be a good juror. In this case, however, the prosecutor did not identify any such concern. He merely said he did not "`like the way [the juror] looked,'" that the facial hair "`look[ed] suspicious.'" Ante, at 1. I think this explanation may well be pretextual as a matter of law; it has nothing to do with the case at hand, and it is just as evasive as "I had a hunch." Unless a reviewing court may evaluate such explanations when a trial judge fails to find that a prima facie case has been established, appellate or collateral review of Batson claims will amount to nothing more than the meaningless charade that the Missouri Supreme Court correctly understood Batson to disfavor. Antwine, 743 S. W. 2d, at 65. </s> In my opinion, preoccupation with the niceties of a three-step analysis should not foreclose meaningful judicial review of prosecutorial explanations that are entirely unrelated to the case to be tried. I would adhere to the Batson rule that such an explanation does not satisfy step two. Alternatively, I would hold that, in the absence of an explicit trial court finding on the issue, a reviewing court may hold that such an explanation is pretextual as a matter of law. The Court's unnecessary tolerance of silly, fantastic, and implausible explanations, together with its assumption that there </s> [ PURKETT v. ELEM, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 12] </s> is a difference of constitutional magnitude between a statement that "I had a hunch about this juror based on his appearance," and "I challenged this juror because he had a mustache," demeans the importance of the values vindicated by our decision in Batson. </s> I respectfully dissent. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 This is the second time this Term that the Court has misused its summary reversal authority in this way. See Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. ___, ___-___ (1995) (STEVENS, J., dissenting). </s> [Footnote 2 We explained: "Nor may the prosecutor rebut the defendant's case merely by denying that he had a discriminatory motive or `affirm[ing] [his] good faith in making individual selections.' Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S., at 632 . If these general assertions were accepted as rebutting a defendant's prima facie case, the Equal Protection Clause `would be but a vain and illusory requirement.' Norris v. Alabama, [294 U.S. 587, 598 (1935)]. The prosecutor therefore must articulate a neutral explanation related to the particular case to be tried. The trial court then will have the duty to determine if the defendant has established purposeful discrimination." Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S., at 97 -98 (footnotes omitted). </s> [Footnote 3 The following exchange took place between the defense attorney and the trial judge: </s> "MR. GOULET: Mr. Larner stated that the reason he struck was because of facial hair and long hair as prejudicial. Number twenty-four, Mr. William Hunt, was a victim in a robbery and he stated that he could give a fair and impartial hearing. To make this a proper record if the Court would like to call up these two individuals to ask them if they are black or will the Court take judicial notice that they are black individuals? </s> "THE COURT: I am not going to do that, no, sir." App. to Pet. for Cert. A-42. </s> [Footnote 4 The prosecutor stated: </s> "I struck number twenty-two because of his long hair. He had long curly hair. He had the longest hair of anybody on the panel by far. He appeared to me to not be a good juror for that fact, the fact that he had long hair hanging down shoulder length, curly, unkempt hair. Also, he had a mustache and a goatee-type beard. And juror number twenty-four also has a mustache and a goatee type beard. Those are the only two people on the jury, numbers twenty-two and twenty-four with facial hair of any kind of all the men and, of course, the women, those are the only two with the facial hair. And I don't like the way they looked, with the way the hair is cut, both of them. And the mustaches and the beards look suspicious to me. And number twenty-four had been in a robbery in a supermarket with a sawed-off shotgun pointed at his face, and I didn't want him on the jury as this case does not involve a shotgun, and maybe he would feel to have a robbery you have to have a gun, and there is no gun in this case." App. to Pet. for Cert. A-41. </s> [Footnote 5 The magistrate stated: "The Court of Appeals determined that the prosecutor's reasons for striking the men constituted a legitimate `hunch' . . . . The record supports the Missouri Court of Appeals' finding of no purposeful discrimination." App. to Pet. for Cert. A-27. </s> [Footnote 6 In this Court, at least, the State does not deny that the prosecutor's pattern of challenges established a prima facie case of discrimination. </s> [Footnote 7 True, the plurality opinion in Hernandez stated that explanations unrelated to the particular circumstances of the trial "may be found by the trial judge to be a pretext for racial discrimination," 500 U.S., at 372 , and thus it specifically referred to the third step in the Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), analysis. Nevertheless, if this comment was intended to modify the Batson standard for determining the sufficiency of the prosecutor's response to a prima facie case, it was certainly an obtuse method of changing the law. </s> [Footnote 8 In my opinion, it is disrespectful to the conscientious judges on the Court of Appeals who faithfully applied an unambiguous standard articulated in one of our opinions to say that they appear "to have seized on our admonition in Batson . . . that the reason must be `related to the particular case to be tried,' 476 U.S., at 98 ." Ante, at 4. Of course, they "seized on" that point because we told them to. The Court of Appeals was following Batson's clear mandate. To criticize those judges for doing their jobs is singularly inappropriate. </s> The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit is not the only court to have taken our admonition in Batson seriously. Numerous courts have acted on the assumption that we meant what we said when we required the prosecutor's neutral explanation to be "related to the particular case to be tried." See, e.g., Jones v. Ryan, 987 F.2d 960, 974 (CA3 1993); Ex parte Bird, 594 So.2d 676, 682-683 (Ala. 1991); State v. Henderson, 112 Ore. App. 451, 456, 829 P.2d 1025, 1028 (1992); Whitsey v. State, 796 S. W. 2d 707, 713-716 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989); Jackson v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 176, 186-187, 380 S. E. 2d 1, 6-7 (1989); State v. Butler, 731 S. W. 2d 265, 271 (Mo. App. 1987); Slappy v. State, 503 So.2d 350, 355 (Fla. App. 1987); Walker v. State, 611 So.2d 1133, 1142 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992); Huntley v. State, 627 So.2d 1011, 1012 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991). This Court today calls into question the reasoning of all of these decisions without even the courtesy of briefing and argument. Page I | 1 | 0 | 1 |
United States Supreme Court ALOHA AIRLINES, INC. v. DIRECTOR OF TAXATION(1983) No. 82-585 Argued: October 4, 1983Decided: November 1, 1983 </s> A Hawaii statute imposes a tax on the annual gross income of airlines operating within the State, and declares that such tax is a means of taxing an airline's personal property. Section 7(a) of the Airport Development Acceleration Act of 1973 (ADAA) prohibits a State from levying a tax, "directly or indirectly, on persons traveling in air commerce or on the carriage of persons traveling in air commerce or on the sale of air transportation or on the gross receipts derived therefrom," but provides that property taxes are not included in this prohibition. Appellant airlines each brought an action for refund of taxes assessed under the Hawaii statute, claiming that the statute was pre-empted by 7(a). The Hawaii Tax Appeal Court rejected this pre-emption argument, and the Hawaii Supreme Court affirmed. </s> Held: </s> Section 7(a) pre-empts the Hawaii statute. Pp. 11-15. </s> (a) When a federal statute unambiguously forbids a State to impose a particular kind of tax on an industry affecting interstate commerce, as 7(a) does here by its plain language, courts need not look beyond the federal statute's plain language to determine whether a state statute that imposes such a tax is pre-empted. P. 12. </s> (b) Moreover, nothing in the ADAA's legislative history suggests that Congress intended to limit 7(a)'s pre-emptive effect to taxes on airline passengers or to save gross receipts taxes such as the one Hawaii imposes. Although 7(a) was enacted to deal primarily with local head taxes on airline passengers, the legislative history contains many references to the fact that 7(a) pre-empts state taxes on gross receipts of airlines. Pp. 12-13. </s> (c) The fact that the Hawaii tax is styled as a property tax measured by gross receipts rather than as a straightforward gross receipts tax does not entitle the tax to escape pre-emption under 7(a)'s property tax exemption. Such styling of the tax does not mask the fact that the purpose and effect of the tax are to impose a levy upon the gross receipts [464 U.S. 7, 8] of airlines, thus making it at least an "indirect" tax on such receipts. Pp. 13-14. </s> 65 Haw. 1, 647 P.2d 263, reversed and remanded. </s> MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 82-586, Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Director of Taxation of Hawaii, also on appeal from the same court. </s> Richard L. Griffith argued the cause for appellants in both cases. With him on the briefs were Michael A. Shea, Richard R. Clifton, Hugh Shearer, and H. Mitchell D'Olier. </s> William D. Dexter argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was Kevin T. Wakayama.Fn </s> Fn [464 U.S. 7, 8] Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of Alaska et al. by Kenneth O. Eikenberry, Attorney General of Washington, and Jeffrey D. Goltz, Assistant Attorney General, Norman C. Gorsuch, Attorney General of Alaska, and Diane T. Colvin, Assistant Attorney General, Robert K. Corbin, Attorney General of Arizona, Michael C. Turpen, Attorney General of Oklahoma, Chauncey H. Browning, Attorney General of West Virginia, and Jack C. McClung, Deputy Attorney General; and for the Multistate Tax Commission et al. by Eugene F. Corrigan. </s> Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the State of New York by Robert Abrams, Attorney General, Peter H. Schiff, and Francis V. Dow, Assistant Attorney General; and for the Air Transport Association of America by Andrew C. Hartzell, Jr. </s> JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> These appeals present the question whether 49 U.S.C. 1513(a) pre-empts a Hawaii statute that imposes a tax on the gross income of airlines operating within the State. We conclude that the Hawaii tax is pre-empted. </s> I </s> In 1970, Congress committed the Federal Government to assisting States and localities in expanding and improving the Nation's air transportation system. See Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-258, 84 Stat. 219. In the same session, Congress established the Airport and Airway Trust Fund to funnel federal resources to local airport expansion and improvement projects. See Airport and Airway [464 U.S. 7, 9] Revenue Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-258, 208, 84 Stat. 250. As originally devised, the Trust Fund received its revenues from several federal aviation taxes, including an 8% tax on domestic airline tickets, a $3 head tax on international flights out of the United States, and a 5% tax on air freight. See 203, 204, 84 Stat. 238, 240 (codified, as amended, at 26 U.S.C. 4261, 4271 (1976 ed. and Supp. V)). See generally Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444 (1978). </s> Once the Airport and Airway Development Act was passed and the Trust Fund established, the question arose whether States and municipalities were still free to impose additional taxes on airlines and air travelers. In Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority Dist. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S. 707 (1972), this Court ruled that neither the Commerce Clause nor the Airport and Airway Development Act precluded state or local authorities from assessing head taxes on passengers boarding flights at state or local airports. In particular the Court noted: "No federal statute or specific congressional action or declaration evidences a congressional purpose to deny or pre-empt state and local power to levy charges designed to help defray the costs of airport construction and maintenance." Id., at 721. </s> Following the Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport decision, Committees in both Houses of Congress held hearings on local taxation of air transportation. 1 Both Committees concluded that the proliferation of local taxes burdened interstate air transportation, and, when coupled with the federal Trust Fund levies, imposed double taxation on air travelers. 2 To deal with these problems, Congress passed 7(a) of the [464 U.S. 7, 10] Airport Development Acceleration Act of 1973 (ADAA), the provision at issue in these appeals. See Pub. L. 93-44, 7(a), 87 Stat. 90. That section, which is currently codified at 49 U.S.C. 1513, 3 reads: </s> "(a) No State . . . shall levy or collect a tax, fee, head charge, or other charge, directly or indirectly, on persons traveling in air commerce or on the carriage of persons traveling in air commerce or on the sale of air transportation or on the gross receipts derived therefrom. . . . </s> "(b) Nothing in this section shall prohibit a State . . . from the levy or collection of taxes other than those enumerated in subsection (a) of this section, including property taxes, net income taxes, franchise taxes, and sales or use taxes on the sale of goods or services. . . ." </s> For States with taxes that were in effect prior to May 21, 1970, and would be pre-empted by 1513(a), Congress postponed the effective date of the section until December 31, 1973. Ibid. </s> II </s> Appellants Aloha Airlines, Inc., and Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., are both commercial airlines that carry passengers, freight, and mail among the islands of Hawaii. Throughout the periods relevant to these appeals, appellants have been Hawaii public service companies, see Haw. Rev. Stat. 239-2, 269-1 (1976 and Supp. 1982), and subject to the State's public service company tax, which provides: </s> "There shall be levied and assessed upon each airline a tax of four per cent of its gross income each year from the airline business . . . . The tax imposed by this section is a means of taxing the personal property of the airline or other carrier, tangible and intangible, including [464 U.S. 7, 11] going concern value, and is in lieu of the [general excise] tax imposed by chapter 237 but is not in lieu of any other tax." 239-6 (1976). </s> In 1978, appellant Aloha Airlines sought refunds for taxes assessed under this provision for the carriage of passengers between 1974 and 1977 on the ground that 49 U.S.C. 1513(a) had pre-empted Haw. Rev. Stat. 239-6 as of December 31, 1973. In 1979, appellant Hawaiian Airlines filed a similar action seeking a refund for taxes paid between 1974 and 1978. In separate decisions, the Tax Appeal Court of the State of Hawaii rejected appellants' pre-emption arguments, In re Aloha Airlines, Inc., No. 1772 (June 9, 1978); In re Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., Nos. 1853, 1868 (Jan. 4, 1980). On consolidated appeal, the Hawaii Supreme Court affirmed, one justice dissenting, In re Aloha Airlines, Inc., 65 Haw. 1, 647 P.2d 263 (1982). Appellants then filed timely notices of appeal, this Court noted probable jurisdiction, 459 U.S. 1101 (1983), and we now reverse. </s> III </s> The plain language of 49 U.S.C. 1513(a) would appear to invalidate Haw. Rev. Stat. 239-6. Section 1513(a) expressly pre-empts gross receipts taxes on the sale of air transportation or the carriage of persons traveling in air commerce, and Haw. Rev. Stat. 239-6 is a state tax on the gross receipts 4 of airlines selling air transportation and carrying persons traveling in air commerce. The Hawaii Supreme Court sought to avoid this direct conflict by looking beyond the language of 1513(a) to Congress' purpose in enacting the statute. The court concluded that Congress passed the ADAA to deal with the proliferation of local and state head taxes on airline passengers in the early 1970's. Since Haw. Rev. Stat. 239-6 is imposed upon air carriers [464 U.S. 7, 12] as opposed to air travelers, the Hawaii court reasoned that the provision did not come within the ambit of 1513(a)'s prohibitions. </s> We cannot agree with the Hawaii Supreme Court's analysis. First, when a federal statute unambiguously forbids the States to impose a particular kind of tax on an industry affecting interstate commerce, courts need not look beyond the plain language of the federal statute to determine whether a state statute that imposes such a tax is pre-empted. 5 Thus, the Hawaii Supreme Court erred in failing to give effect to the plain meaning of 1513(a). 6 </s> Second, even if the absence of an express proscription made it necessary to go beyond the plain language of 1513(a), [464 U.S. 7, 13] nothing in the legislative history of the ADAA suggests that Congress intended to limit 1513(a)'s pre-emptive effect to taxes on airline passengers or to save gross receipts taxes like 239-6. 7 Although Congress passed 1513(a) to deal primarily with local head taxes on airline passengers, the legislative history abounds with references to the fact that 1513(a) also pre-empts state taxes on the gross receipts of airlines. 8 For example, Senator Cannon, one of the ADAA's sponsors, clearly stated in floor debate: "The bill prohibits the levying of State or local head taxes, fees, gross receipts taxes or other such charges either on passengers or on the carriage of such passengers in interstate commerce." 119 Cong. Rec. 3349 (1973). </s> Finally, we are unpersuaded by appellee's contention that, because the Hawaii Legislature styled 239-6 as a property tax measured by gross receipts rather than a straightforward gross receipts tax, the provision should escape preemption under 1513(b)'s exemption for property taxes. The manner in which the state legislature has described and categorized 239-6 9 cannot mask the fact that the purpose [464 U.S. 7, 14] and effect of the provision are to impose a levy upon the gross receipts of airlines. Section 1513(a) expressly prohibits States from taxing "directly or indirectly" gross receipts derived from air transportation. Beyond question, a property tax that is measured by gross receipts constitutes at least an "indirect" tax on the gross receipts of airlines. A state statute that imposes such a tax is therefore pre-empted. 10 </s> IV </s> In conclusion, we join with state courts of Alaska and New York 11 in the view that 1513(a) proscribes the imposition of [464 U.S. 7, 15] state and local taxes on gross receipts derived from air transportation or the carriage of persons in air commerce. The judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of Hawaii is reversed, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. </s> It is so ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 See Hearings on S. 2397 et al. before the Subcommittee on Aviation of the Senate Committee on Commerce, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 129-198 (1972); Hearings on H. R. 2337 et al. before the Subcommittee on Transportation and Aeronautics of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). </s> [Footnote 2 See S. Rep. No. 93-12, pp. 17, 20-21 (1973); H. R. Rep. No. 93-157, pp. 4-5 (1973). </s> [Footnote 3 In 1982, Congress amended 49 U.S.C. 1513 to prohibit discriminatory property taxes imposed on air carriers. See Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-248, 532, 96 Stat. 701 (codified at 49 U.S.C. 1513(d) (1982 ed.)). Being enacted after the relevant periods, this amendment has no bearing on these appeals. </s> [Footnote 4 Appellee concedes that the phrase "gross income," under Haw. Rev. Stat. 239-6, is synonymous with the phrase "gross receipts" used in 49 U.S.C. 1513(a). See Brief for Appellee 7, n. 2. </s> [Footnote 5 The Hawaii Supreme Court apparently considered itself obliged by Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947), and its progeny to examine thoroughly Congress' intentions before declaring Haw. Rev. Stat. 239-6 pre-empted. In re Aloha Airlines, Inc., 65 Haw. 1, 13-16, 647 P.2d 263, 272-273 (1982). Rice and its progeny, however, involved the implicit pre-emption of state statutes. Rules developed in these cases apply when a court must decide whether a state law should be pre-empted even though Congress has not expressly legislated pre-emption. These rules, therefore, have little application when a court confronts a federal statute like 1513(a) that explicitly pre-empts state laws. </s> [Footnote 6 The Hawaii Supreme Court professed confusion over the "paradox" between 1513(a)'s prohibition on certain state taxes on air transportation and 1513(b)'s reservation of the States' primary sources of revenue, such as property taxes, net income taxes, franchise taxes, and sales or use taxes. In re Aloha Airlines, Inc., supra, at 16, 647 P.2d, at 273. We find no paradox between 1513(a) and 1513(b). Section 1513(a) pre-empts a limited number of state taxes, including gross receipts taxes imposed on the sale of air transportation or the carriage of persons traveling in air commerce. Section 1513(b) clarifies Congress' view that the States are still free to impose on airlines and air carriers "taxes other than those enumerated in subsection (a)," such as property taxes, net income taxes, and franchise taxes. While neither the statute nor its legislative history explains exactly why Congress chose to distinguish between gross receipts taxes imposed on airlines and the taxes reserved in 1513(b), the statute is quite clear that Congress chose to make the distinction, and the courts are obliged to honor this congressional choice. </s> [Footnote 7 Indeed, Congress was presented an opportunity to exempt gross receipts taxes from 1513(a), and declined to grant the exemption. During House hearings on the ADAA, a representative of the Ohio Tax Commission asked the Subcommittee responsible for the bill to expand 1513(b) to permit state "gross receipts taxes fairly apportioned to a State," so that Ohio could maintain a gross receipts tax similar to Hawaii's 239-6. See Hearings on H. R. 4082 before the Subcommittee on Transportation and Aeronautics of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 246-253 (1973). When Congress enacted the ADAA without Ohio's proposed amendment, the State Attorney General issued an opinion concluding that Ohio's gross receipts tax was preempted. See Ohio Op. Atty. Gen. No. 73-117 (Nov. 20, 1973). </s> [Footnote 8 See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 93-12, p. 6 (1973); H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-225. p. 5 (1973); 119 Cong. Rec. 18045 (1973) (statement of Sen. Cannon); id., at 17345 (statement of Rep. Devine). </s> [Footnote 9 The most likely explanation for the seemingly curious way in which the legislature characterized 239-6 is that, at one time, this Court distinguished between the manner in which a state statute was measured and [464 U.S. 7, 14] the subject matter of the tax when assessing the validity of the tax under the Commerce Clause. Compare Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 358 U.S. 434 (1959) (upholding a property tax measured by gross receipts), with Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 347 U.S. 359 (1954) (striking down a functionally equivalent business privilege tax). But cf. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977). The constitutionality of 239-6 is of course not at issue in these appeals. </s> [Footnote 10 The unambiguous proscription contained in 1513(a) compels us to conclude that it pre-empts Haw. Rev. Stat. 239-6 as well as other state taxes imposed on or measured by the gross receipts of airlines. Amici point out that several States have taxation statutes similar to 239-6 and that the ability of those States to retain revenues collected from airlines during the past decade will be affected by our decision today. We acknowledge that our interpretation of 1513(a) may result in the disruption of state systems of taxation; we are, however, bound by the plain language of the statute. Congress clearly has the authority to regulate state taxation of air transportation in interstate commerce, see Arizona Public Service Co. v. Snead, 441 U.S. 141, 150 (1979), and we trust that Congress will amend 1513(a) if it concludes, upon reconsideration, that the pre-emptive sweep of the current version is too great. </s> [Footnote 11 Wein Air Alaska, Inc. v. State, No. 3AN 81-8582 Civil (Alaska Super. Ct., May 6, 1983), appeal docketed (Alaska Sup. Ct.); Air Transport Assn. of America v. New York State Dept. of Taxation and Finance, 91 App. Div. 2d 169, 458 N. Y. S. 2d 709, aff'd, 59 N. Y. 2d 917, 453 N. E. 2d 548 (1983), cert. pending, No. 83-162; cf. State ex rel. Arizona Dept. of Revenue v. Cochise Airlines, 128 Ariz. 432, 626 P.2d 596 (App. 1980) ( 1513(a) pre-empts state gross receipts taxes on the carriage of passengers, but not freight, in air commerce); see also Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 453 Pa. 181, 309 A. 2d 157 (1973) (finding a Philadelphia head tax on air passengers pre-empted). </s> [464 U.S. 7, 16] | 9 | 1 | 3 |
United States Supreme Court SPINELLI v. UNITED STATES(1969) No. 8 Argued: Decided: January 27, 1969 </s> Petitioner was convicted of illegal interstate gambling activities despite his claim that the Commissioner's warrant authorizing the FBI search that uncovered evidence used at his trial violated the Fourth Amendment. He argued that the FBI agent's supporting affidavit did not afford probable cause for issuance of the warrant. The affidavit alleged that: the FBI had followed petitioner on five days, on four of which he had been seen crossing one of two bridges leading from Illinois to St. Louis, Missouri, and had been seen parking his car at a St. Louis apartment house parking lot; he was seen one day to enter a particular apartment; the apartment contained two telephones with specified numbers; petitioner was known to affiant as a gambler and associate of gamblers; and the FBI had "been informed by a confidential reliable informant" that petitioner was "operating a handbook and accepting wagers and disseminating wagering information by means of the telephones" which had been assigned the specified numbers. Viewing the information in the affidavit in its totality the Court of Appeals deemed the principles of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 , satisfied and upheld the conviction. Held: The informant's tip, an essential part of the affidavit in this case, was not sufficient (even as corroborated by other allegations) to provide the basis for a finding of probable cause that a crime was being committed. Pp. 412-420. </s> (a) The tip was inadequate under the standards of Aguilar, supra, since it did not set forth any reason to support the conclusion that the informant was "reliable" and did not sufficiently state the underlying circumstances from which the informant had concluded that petitioner was running a bookmaking operation or sufficiently detail his activities to enable the Commissioner to know that he was relying on more than casual rumor or general reputation. Cf. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 . Pp. 415-417. </s> (b) Nor was the tip's reliability sufficiently enhanced by the FBI's corroboration of certain limited aspects of the informant's report through the use of independent sources. Pp. 417-418. [393 U.S. 410, 411] </s> (c) The FBI's surveillance of petitioner and its investigation of the telephone company records do not independently suggest criminal conduct when taken by themselves. P. 418. </s> 382 F.2d 871, reversed and remanded. </s> Irl B. Baris argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner. </s> Joseph J. Connolly argued the cause for the United States, pro hac vice. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Vinson, Beatrice Rosenberg, and Sidney M. Glazer. </s> MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> William Spinelli was convicted under 18 U.S.C. 1952 1 of traveling to St. Louis, Missouri, from a nearby Illinois suburb with the intention of conducting gambling activities proscribed by Missouri law. See Mo. Rev. Stat. 563.360 (1959). At every appropriate stage in the proceedings in the lower courts, the petitioner challenged the constitutionality of the warrant which authorized the FBI search that uncovered the evidence necessary for his conviction. At each stage, Spinelli's challenge was treated in a different way. At a pretrial suppression hearing, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri held that Spinelli [393 U.S. 410, 412] lacked standing to raise a Fourth Amendment objection. A unanimous panel of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rejected the District Court's ground, a majority holding further that the warrant was issued without probable cause. After an en banc rehearing, the Court of Appeals sustained the warrant and affirmed the conviction by a vote of six to two. 382 F.2d 871. Both the majority and dissenting en banc opinions reflect a most conscientious effort to apply the principles we announced in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), to a factual situation whose basic characteristics have not been at all uncommon in recent search warrant cases. Believing it desirable that the principles of Aguilar should be further explicated, we granted certiorari, 390 U.S. 942 , our writ being later limited to the question of the constitutional validity of the search and seizure. 2 </s> 391 U.S. 933 . For reasons that follow we reverse. </s> In Aguilar, a search warrant had issued upon an affidavit of police officers who swore only that they had "received reliable information from a credible person and do believe" that narcotics were being illegally stored on the described premises. While recognizing that the constitutional requirement of probable cause can be satisfied by hearsay information, this Court held the [393 U.S. 410, 413] affidavit inadequate for two reasons. First, the application failed to set forth any of the "underlying circumstances" necessary to enable the magistrate independently to judge of the validity of the informant's conclusion that the narcotics were where he said they were. Second, the affiant-officers did not attempt to support their claim that their informant was "`credible' or his information `reliable.'" The Government is, however, quite right in saying that the FBI affidavit in the present case is more ample than that in Aguilar. Not only does it contain a report from an anonymous informant, but it also contains a report of an independent FBI investigation which is said to corroborate the informant's tip. We are, then, required to delineate the manner in which Aguilar's two-pronged test should be applied in these circumstances. </s> In essence, the affidavit, reproduced in full in the Appendix to this opinion, contained the following allegations: 3 </s> 1. The FBI had kept track of Spinelli's movements on five days during the month of August 1965. On four of these occasions, Spinelli was seen crossing one of two bridges leading from Illinois into St. Louis, Missouri, between 11 a. m. and 12:15 p. m. On four of the five days, Spinelli was also seen parking his car in a lot used by residents of an apartment house at 1108 Indian Circle Drive in St. Louis, between 3:30 p. m. and 4:45 p. m. 4 </s> [393 U.S. 410, 414] On one day, Spinelli was followed further and seen to enter a particular apartment in the building. </s> 2. An FBI check with the telephone company revealed that this apartment contained two telephones listed under the name of Grace P. Hagen, and carrying the numbers WYdown 4-0029 and WYdown 4-0136. </s> 3. The application stated that "William Spinelli is known to this affiant and to federal law enforcement agents and local law enforcement agents as a bookmaker, an associate of bookmakers, a gambler, and an associate of gamblers." </s> 4. Finally, it was stated that the FBI "has been informed by a confidential reliable informant that William Spinelli is operating a handbook and accepting wagers and disseminating wagering information by means of the telephones which have been assigned the numbers WYdown 4-0029 and WYdown 4-0136." </s> There can be no question that the last item mentioned, detailing the informant's tip, has a fundamental place in this warrant application. Without it, probable cause could not be established. The first two items reflect only innocent-seeming activity and data. Spinelli's travels to and from the apartment building and his entry into a particular apartment on one occasion could hardly be taken as bespeaking gambling activity; and there is surely nothing unusual about an apartment containing two separate telephones. Many a householder indulges himself in this petty luxury. Finally, the allegation that Spinelli was "known" to the affiant and to other federal and local law enforcement officers as a gambler and an associate of gamblers is but a bald and unilluminating assertion of suspicion that is entitled to no weight in appraising the magistrate's decision. Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, 46 (1933). [393 U.S. 410, 415] </s> So much indeed the Government does not deny. Rather, following the reasoning of the Court of Appeals, the Government claims that the informant's tip gives a suspicious color to the FBI's reports detailing Spinelli's innocent-seeming conduct and that, conversely, the FBI's surveillance corroborates the informant's tip, thereby entitling it to more weight. It is true, of course, that the magistrate is obligated to render a judgment based upon a common-sense reading of the entire affidavit. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965). We believe, however, that the "totality of circumstances" approach taken by the Court of Appeals paints with too broad a brush. Where, as here, the informer's tip is a necessary element in a finding of probable cause, its proper weight must be determined by a more precise analysis. </s> The informer's report must first be measured against Aguilar's standards so that its probative value can be assessed. If the tip is found inadequate under Aguilar, the other allegations which corroborate the information contained in the hearsay report should then be considered. At this stage as well, however, the standards enunciated in Aguilar must inform the magistrate's decision. He must ask: Can it fairly be said that the tip, even when certain parts of it have been corroborated by independent sources, is as trustworthy as a tip which would pass Aguilar's tests without independent corroboration? Aguilar is relevant at this stage of the inquiry as well because the tests it establishes were designed to implement the long-standing principle that probable cause must be determined by a "neutral and detached magistrate," and not by "the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). A magistrate cannot be said to have properly discharged his constitutional duty if he relies on an informer's tip which - even [393 U.S. 410, 416] when partially corroborated - is not as reliable as one which passes Aguilar's requirements when standing alone. </s> Applying these principles to the present case, we first consider the weight to be given the informer's tip when it is considered apart from the rest of the affidavit. It is clear that a Commissioner could not credit it without abdicating his constitutional function. Though the affiant swore that his confidant was "reliable," he offered the magistrate no reason in support of this conclusion. Perhaps even more important is the fact that Aguilar's other test has not been satisfied. The tip does not contain a sufficient statement of the underlying circumstances from which the informer concluded that Spinelli was running a bookmaking operation. We are not told how the FBI's source received his information - it is not alleged that the informant personally observed Spinelli at work or that he had ever placed a bet with him. Moreover, if the informant came by the information indirectly, he did not explain why his sources were reliable. Cf. Jaben v. United States, 381 U.S. 214 (1965). In the absence of a statement detailing the manner in which the information was gathered, it is especially important that the tip describe the accused's criminal activity in sufficient detail that the magistrate may know that he is relying on something more substantial than a casual rumor circulating in the underworld or an accusation based merely on an individual's general reputation. </s> The detail provided by the informant in Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959), provides a suitable benchmark. While Hereford, the Government's informer in that case, did not state the way in which he had obtained his information, he reported that Draper had gone to Chicago the day before by train and that he would return to Denver by train with three ounces of heroin on one of two specified mornings. Moreover, [393 U.S. 410, 417] Hereford went on to describe, with minute particularity, the clothes that Draper would be wearing upon his arrival at the Denver station. A magistrate, when confronted with such detail, could reasonably infer that the informant had gained his information in a reliable way. 5 Such an inference cannot be made in the present case. Here, the only facts supplied were that Spinelli was using two specified telephones and that these phones were being used in gambling operations. This meager report could easily have been obtained from an offhand remark heard at a neighborhood bar. </s> Nor do we believe that the patent doubts Aguilar raises as to the report's reliability are adequately resolved by a consideration of the allegations detailing the FBI's independent investigative efforts. At most, these allegations indicated that Spinelli could have used the telephones specified by the informant for some purpose. This cannot by itself be said to support both the inference that the informer was generally trustworthy and that he had made his charge against Spinelli on the basis of information obtained in a reliable way. Once again, Draper provides a relevant comparison. Independent police work in that case corroborated much more than one small detail that had been provided by the informant. There, the police, upon meeting the inbound Denver train on the second morning specified by informer Hereford, saw a man whose dress corresponded precisely to Hereford's detailed description. It was then apparent that the informant had not been fabricating his report out of whole cloth; since the report was of the sort which in common experience may be recognized as having been [393 U.S. 410, 418] obtained in a reliable way, it was perfectly clear that probable cause had been established. </s> We conclude, then, that in the present case the informant's tip - even when corroborated to the extent indicated - was not sufficient to provide the basis for a finding of probable cause. This is not to say that the tip was so insubstantial that it could not properly have counted in the magistrate's determination. Rather, it needed some further support. When we look to the other parts of the application, however, we find nothing alleged which would permit the suspicions engendered by the informant's report to ripen into a judgment that a crime was probably being committed. As we have already seen, the allegations detailing the FBI's surveillance of Spinelli and its investigation of the telephone company records contain no suggestion of criminal conduct when taken by themselves - and they are not endowed with an aura of suspicion by virtue of the informer's tip. Nor do we find that the FBI's reports take on a sinister color when read in light of common knowledge that bookmaking is often carried on over the telephone and from premises ostensibly used by others for perfectly normal purposes. Such an argument would carry weight in a situation in which the premises contain an unusual number of telephones or abnormal activity is observed, cf. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 302 (1967), but it does not fit this case where neither of these factors is present. 6 All that remains to be considered is the flat statement that Spinelli was "known" to the FBI and others as a gambler. But just as a simple assertion of police suspicion is not itself a sufficient basis for a magistrate's finding of probable cause, we do not believe it may be used to give [393 U.S. 410, 419] additional weight to allegations that would otherwise be insufficient. </s> The affidavit, then, falls short of the standards set forth in Aguilar, Draper, and our other decisions that give content to the notion of probable cause. 7 In holding as we have done, we do not retreat from the established propositions that only the probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity is the standard of probable cause, Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964); that affidavits of probable cause are tested by much less rigorous standards than those governing the admissibility of evidence at trial, McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 311 (1967); that in judging probable cause issuing magistrates are not to be confined by niggardly limitations or by restrictions on the use of their common sense, United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965); and that their determination of probable cause should be paid great deference by reviewing courts, Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 270 -271 (1960). But we cannot sustain this warrant without diluting important safeguards that assure that the judgment of a disinterested judicial officer will interpose itself between the police and the citizenry. 8 </s> [393 U.S. 410, 420] </s> The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. </s> It is so ordered. </s> MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. </s> APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT. </s> AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF SEARCH WARRANT. </s> I, Robert L. Bender, being duly sworn, depose and say that I am a Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and as such am authorized to make searches and seizures. </s> That on August 6, 1965, at approximately 11:44 a. m., William Spinelli was observed by an Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation driving a 1964 Ford convertible, Missouri license HC3-649, onto the Eastern approach of the Veterans Bridge leading from East St. Louis, Illinois, to St. Louis, Missouri. </s> That on August 11, 1965, at approximately 11:16 a. m., William Spinelli was observed by an Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation driving a 1964 Ford convertible, Missouri license HC3-649, onto the Eastern approach of the Eads Bridge leading from East St. Louis, Illinois, to St. Louis, Missouri. </s> Further, at approximately 11:18 a. m. on August 11, 1965, I observed William Spinelli driving the aforesaid Ford convertible from the Western approach of the Eads Bridge into St. Louis, Missouri. </s> Further, at approximately 4:40 p. m. on August 11, 1965, I observed the aforesaid Ford convertible, bearing Missouri license HC3-649, parked in a parking lot used by residents of The Chieftain Manor Apartments, approximately one block east of 1108 Indian Circle Drive. </s> On August 12, 1965, at approximately 12:07 p. m., [393 U.S. 410, 421] William Spinelli was observed by an Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation driving the aforesaid 1964 Ford convertible onto the Eastern approach of the Veterans Bridge from East St. Louis, Illinois, in the direction of St. Louis, Missouri. </s> Further, on August 12, 1965, at approximately 3:46 p. m., I observed William Spinelli driving the aforesaid 1964 Ford convertible onto the parking lot used by the residents of The Chieftain Manor Apartments approximately one block east of 1108 Indian Circle Drive. </s> Further, on August 12, 1965, at approximately 3:49 p. m., William Spinelli was observed by an Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation entering the front entrance of the two-story apartment building located at 1108 Indian Circle Drive, this building being one of The Chieftain Manor Apartments. </s> On August 13, 1965, at approximately 11:08 a. m., William Spinelli was observed by an Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation driving the aforesaid Ford convertible onto the Eastern approach of the Eads Bridge from East St. Louis, Illinois, heading towards St. Louis, Missouri. </s> Further, on August 13, 1965, at approximately 11:11 a. m., I observed William Spinelli driving the aforesaid Ford convertible from the Western approach of the Eads Bridge into St. Louis, Missouri. </s> Further, on August 13, 1965, at approximately 3:45 p. m., I observed William Spinelli driving the aforesaid 1964 Ford convertible onto the parking area used by residents of The Chieftain Manor Apartments, said parking area being approximately one block from 1108 Indian Circle Drive. </s> Further, on August 13, 1965, at approximately 3:55 p. m., William Spinelli was observed by an Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation entering the corner apartment located on the second floor in the southwest corner, known as Apartment F, of the two-story [393 U.S. 410, 422] apartment building known and numbered as 1108 Indian Circle Drive. </s> On August 16, 1965, at approximately 3:22 p. m., I observed William Spinelli driving the aforesaid Ford convertible onto the parking lot used by the residents of The Chieftain Manor Apartments approximately one block east of 1108 Indian Circle Drive. </s> Further, an Agent of the F. B. I. observed William Spinelli alight from the aforesaid Ford convertible and walk toward the apartment building located at 1108 Indian Circle Drive. </s> The records of the Southwestern Bell Telephone Company reflect that there are two telephones located in the southwest corner apartment on the second floor of the apartment building located at 1108 Indian Circle Drive under the name of Grace P. Hagen. The numbers listed in the Southwestern Bell Telephone Company records for the aforesaid telephones are WYdown 4-0029 and WYdown 4-0136. </s> William Spinelli is known to this affiant and to federal law enforcement agents and local law enforcement agents as a bookmaker, an associate of bookmakers, a gambler, and an associate of gamblers. </s> The Federal Bureau of Investigation has been informed by a confidential reliable informant that William Spinelli is operating a handbook and accepting wagers and disseminating wagering information by means of the telephones which have been assigned the numbers WYdown 4-0029 and WYdown 4-0136. </s> /s/ Robert L. Bender, Robert L. Bender, Special Agent, Federal Bureau of Investigation. </s> Subscribed and sworn to before me this 18th day of August, 1965, at St. Louis, Missouri. </s> /s/ William R. O'Toole. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 The relevant portion of the statute reads: </s> "(a) Whoever travels in interstate or foreign commerce or uses any facility in interstate . . . commerce . . . with intent to - </s> . . . . . </s> "(3) otherwise promote, manage, establish, carry on . . . any unlawful activity, and thereafter performs or attempts to perform any of the acts specified in subparagraphs (1), (2), and (3), shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both. </s> "(b) As used in this section `unlawful activity' means (1) any business enterprise involving gambling . . . in violation of the laws of the State in which they are committed or of the United States . . . ." </s> [Footnote 2 We agree with the Court of Appeals that Spinelli has standing to raise his Fourth Amendment claim. The issue arises because at the time the FBI searched the apartment in which Spinelli was alleged to be conducting his bookmaking operation, the petitioner was not on the premises. Instead, the agents did not execute their search warrant until Spinelli was seen to leave the apartment, lock the door, and enter the hallway. At that point, petitioner was arrested, the key to the apartment was demanded of him, and the search commenced. Since petitioner would plainly have standing if he had been arrested inside the apartment, Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 267 (1960), it cannot matter that the agents preferred to delay the arrest until petitioner stepped into the hallway - especially when the FBI only managed to gain entry into the apartment by requiring petitioner to surrender his key. </s> [Footnote 3 It is, of course, of no consequence that the agents might have had additional information which could have been given to the Commissioner. "It is elementary that in passing on the validity of a warrant, the reviewing court may consider only information brought to the magistrate's attention." Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 109 , n. 1 (emphasis in original). Since the Government does not argue that whatever additional information the agents may have possessed was sufficient to provide probable cause for the arrest, thereby justifying the resultant search as well, we need not consider that question. </s> [Footnote 4 No report was made as to Spinelli's movements during the period between his arrival in St. Louis at noon and his arrival at the parking [393 U.S. 410, 414] lot in the late afternoon. In fact, the evidence at trial indicated that Spinelli frequented the offices of his stockbroker during this period. </s> [Footnote 5 While Draper involved the question whether the police had probable cause for an arrest without a warrant, the analysis required for an answer to this question is basically similar to that demanded of a magistrate when he considers whether a search warrant should issue. </s> [Footnote 6 A box containing three uninstalled telephones was found in the apartment, but only after execution of the search warrant. </s> [Footnote 7 In those cases in which this Court has found probable cause established, the showing made was much more substantial than the one made here. Thus, in United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 104 (1965), FBI agents observed repeated deliveries of loads of sugar in 60-pound bags, smelled the odor of fermenting mash, and heard "`sounds similar to that of a motor or a pump coming from the direction of' Ventresca's house." Again, in McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 303 -304 (1967), the informant reported that McCray "`was selling narcotics and had narcotics on his person now in the vicinity of 47th and Calumet.'" When the police arrived at the intersection, they observed McCray engaging in various suspicious activities. 386 U.S., at 302 . </s> [Footnote 8 In the view we have taken of this case, it becomes unnecessary to decide whether the search warrant was properly executed, or whether it sufficiently described the things that were seized. [393 U.S. 410, 423] </s> MR. JUSTICE WHITE, concurring. </s> An investigator's affidavit that he has seen gambling equipment being moved into a house at a specified address will support the issuance of a search warrant. The oath affirms the honesty of the statement and negatives the lie or imagination. Personal observation attests to the facts asserted - that there is gambling equipment on the premises at the named address. </s> But if the officer simply avers, without more, that there is gambling paraphernalia on certain premises, the warrant should not issue, even though the belief of the officer is an honest one, as evidenced by his oath, and even though the magistrate knows him to be an experienced, intelligent officer who has been reliable in the past. This much was settled in Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933), where the Court held insufficient an officer's affidavit swearing he had cause to believe that there was illegal liquor on the premises for which the warrant was sought. The unsupported assertion or belief of the officer does not satisfy the requirement of probable cause. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 269 (1960); Grau v. United States, 287 U.S. 124 (1932); Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 29 (1927). </s> What is missing in Nathanson and like cases is a statement of the basis for the affiant's believing the facts contained in the affidavit - the good "cause" which the officer in Nathanson said he had. If an officer swears that there is gambling equipment at a certain address, the possibilities are (1) that he has seen the equipment; (2) that he has observed or perceived facts from which the presence of the equipment may reasonably be inferred; and (3) that he has obtained the information from someone else. If (1) is true, the affidavit is good. But in (2), the affidavit is insufficient unless the perceived facts are given, for it is the magistrate, not the [393 U.S. 410, 424] officer, who is to judge the existence of probable cause. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 486 (1958); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). With respect to (3), where the officer's information is hearsay, no warrant should issue absent good cause for crediting that hearsay. Because an affidavit asserting, without more, the location of gambling equipment at a particular address does not claim personal observation of any of the facts by the officer, and because of the likelihood that the information came from an unidentified third party, affidavits of this type are unacceptable. </s> Neither should the warrant issue if the officer states that there is gambling equipment in a particular apartment and that his information comes from an informant, named or unnamed, since the honesty of the informant and the basis for his report are unknown. Nor would the missing elements be completely supplied by the officer's oath that the informant has often furnished reliable information in the past. This attests to the honesty of the informant, but Aguilar v. Texas, supra, requires something more - did the information come from observation, or did the informant in turn receive it from another? Absent additional facts for believing the informant's report, his assertion stands no better than the oath of the officer to the same effect. Indeed, if the affidavit of an officer, known by the magistrate to be honest and experienced, stating that gambling equipment is located in a certain building is unacceptable, it would be quixotic if a similar statement from an honest informant were found to furnish probable cause. A strong argument can be made that both should be acceptable under the Fourth Amendment, but under our cases neither is. The past reliability of the informant can no more furnish probable cause for believing his [393 U.S. 410, 425] current report than can previous experience with the officer himself. </s> If the affidavit rests on hearsay - an informant's report - what is necessary under Aguilar is one of two things: the informant must declare either (1) that he has himself seen or perceived the fact or facts asserted; or (2) that his information is hearsay, but there is good reason for believing it - perhaps one of the usual grounds for crediting hearsay information. The first presents few problems: since the report, although hearsay, purports to be first-hand observation, remaining doubt centers on the honesty of the informant, and that worry is dissipated by the officer's previous experience with the informant. The other basis for accepting the informant's report is more complicated. But if, for example, the informer's hearsay comes from one of the actors in the crime in the nature of admission against interest, the affidavit giving this information should be held sufficient. </s> I am inclined to agree with the majority that there are limited special circumstances in which an "honest" informant's report, if sufficiently detailed, will in effect verify itself - that is, the magistrate when confronted with such detail could reasonably infer that the informant had gained his information in a reliable way. See ante, at 417. Detailed information may sometimes imply that the informant himself has observed the facts. Suppose an informant with whom an officer has had satisfactory experience states that there is gambling equipment in the living room of a specified apartment and describes in detail not only the equipment itself but also the appointments and furnishings in the apartment. Detail like this, if true at all, must rest on personal observation either of the informant or of someone else. If the latter, we know nothing of the third person's honesty or [393 U.S. 410, 426] sources; he may be making a wholly false report. But it is arguable that on these facts it was the informant himself who has perceived the facts, for the information reported is not usually the subject of casual, day-to-day conversation. Because the informant is honest and it is probable that he has viewed the facts, there is probable cause for the issuance of a warrant. </s> So too in the special circumstances of Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959), the kind of information related by the informant is not generally sent ahead of a person's arrival in a city except to those who are intimately connected with making careful arrangements for meeting him. The informant, posited as honest, somehow had the reported facts, very likely from one of the actors in the plan, or as one of them himself. The majority's suggestion is that a warrant could have been obtained based only on the informer's report. I am inclined to agree, although it seems quite plain that if it may be so easily inferred from the affidavit that the informant has himself observed the facts or has them from an actor in the event, no possible harm could come from requiring a statement to that effect, thereby removing the difficult and recurring questions which arise in such situations. </s> Of course, Draper itself did not proceed on this basis. Instead, the Court pointed out that when the officer saw a person getting off the train at the specified time, dressed and conducting himself precisely as the informant had predicted, all but the critical fact with respect to possessing narcotics had then been verified and for that reason the officer had "reasonable grounds" to believe also that Draper was carrying narcotics. Unquestionably, verification of arrival time, dress, and gait reinforced the honesty of the informant - he had not reported a made-up story. But if what Draper stands for is that the existence of the tenth and critical fact [393 U.S. 410, 427] is made sufficiently probable to justify the issuance of a warrant by verifying nine other facts coming from the same source, I have my doubts about that case. </s> In the first place, the proposition is not that the tenth fact may be logically inferred from the other nine or that the tenth fact is usually found in conjunction with the other nine. No one would suggest that just anyone getting off the 10:30 train dressed as Draper was, with a brisk walk and carrying a zipper bag, should be arrested for carrying narcotics. The thrust of Draper is not that the verified facts have independent significance with respect to proof of the tenth. The argument instead relates to the reliability of the source: because an informant is right about some things, he is more probably right about other facts, usually the critical, unverified facts. </s> But the Court's cases have already rejected for Fourth Amendment purposes the notion that the past reliability of an officer is sufficient reason for believing his current assertions. Nor would it suffice, I suppose, if a reliable informant states there is gambling equipment in Apartment 607 and then proceeds to describe in detail Apartment 201, a description which is verified before applying for the warrant. He was right about 201, but that hardly makes him more believable about the equipment in 607. But what if he states that there are narcotics locked in a safe in Apartment 300, which is described in detail, and the apartment manager verifies everything but the contents of the safe? I doubt that the report about the narcotics is made appreciably more believable by the verification. The informant could still have gotten his information concerning the safe from others about whom nothing is known or could have inferred the presence of narcotics from circumstances which a magistrate would find unacceptable. </s> The tension between Draper and the Nathanson-Aguilar line of cases is evident from the course followed [393 U.S. 410, 428] by the majority opinion. First, it is held that the report from a reliable informant that Spinelli is using two telephones with specified numbers to conduct a gambling business plus Spinelli's reputation in police circles as a gambler does not add up to probable cause. This is wholly consistent with Aguilar and Nathanson: the informant did not reveal whether he had personally observed the facts or heard them from another and, if the latter, no basis for crediting the hearsay was presented. Nor were the facts, as MR. JUSTICE HARLAN says, of such a nature that they normally would be obtainable only by the personal observation of the informant himself. The police, however, did not stop with the informant's report. Independently, they established the existence of two phones having the given numbers and located them in an apartment house which Spinelli was regularly frequenting away from his home. There remained little question but that Spinelli was using the phones, and it was a fair inference that the use was not for domestic but for business purposes. The informant had claimed the business involved gambling. Since his specific information about Spinelli using two phones with particular numbers had been verified, did not his allegation about gambling thereby become sufficiently more believable if the Draper principle is to be given any scope at all? I would think so, particularly since the information from the informant which was verified was not neutral, irrelevant information but was material to proving the gambling allegation: two phones with different numbers in an apartment used away from home indicates a business use in an operation, like bookmaking, where multiple phones are needed. The Draper approach would reasonably justify the issuance of a warrant in this case, particularly since the police had some awareness of Spinelli's past activities. The majority, however, [393 U.S. 410, 429] while seemingly embracing Draper, confines that case to its own facts. Pending full-scale reconsideration of that case, on the one hand, or of the Nathanson-Aguilar cases on the other, I join the opinion of the Court and the judgment of reversal, especially since a vote to affirm would produce an equally divided Court. </s> MR. JUSTICE BLACK, dissenting. </s> In my view, this Court's decision in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), was bad enough. That decision went very far toward elevating the magistrate's hearing for issuance of a search warrant to a full-fledged trial, where witnesses must be brought forward to attest personally to all the facts alleged. But not content with this, the Court today expands Aguilar to almost unbelievable proportions. Of course, it would strengthen the probable-cause presentation if eyewitnesses could testify that they saw the defendant commit the crime. It would be stronger still if these witnesses could explain in detail the nature of the sensual perceptions on which they based their "conclusion" that the person they had seen was the defendant and that he was responsible for the events they observed. Nothing in our Constitution, however, requires that the facts be established with that degree of certainty and with such elaborate specificity before a policeman can be authorized by a disinterested magistrate to conduct a carefully limited search. </s> The Fourth Amendment provides that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." In this case a search warrant was issued supported by an oath and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized. The supporting oath was [393 U.S. 410, 430] three printed pages and the full text of it is included in an Appendix to the Court's opinion. The magistrate, I think properly, held the information set forth sufficient facts to show "probable cause" that the defendant was violating the law. Six members of the Court of Appeals also agreed that the affidavit was sufficient to show probable cause. A majority of this Court today holds, however, that the magistrate and all of these judges were wrong. In doing so, they substitute their own opinion for that of the local magistrate and the circuit judges, and reject the en banc factual conclusion of the Eighth Circuit and reverse the judgment based upon that factual conclusion. I cannot join in any such disposition of an issue so vital to the administration of justice, and dissent as vigorously as I can. </s> I repeat my belief that the affidavit given the magistrate was more than ample to show probable cause of the petitioner's guilt. The affidavit meticulously set out facts sufficient to show the following: </s> 1. The petitioner had been shown going to and coming from a room in an apartment which contained two telephones listed under the name of another person. Nothing in the record indicates that the apartment was of that large and luxurious type which could only be occupied by a person to whom it would be a "petty luxury" to have two separate telephones, with different numbers, both listed under the name of a person who did not live there. </s> 2. The petitioner's car had been observed parked in the apartment's parking lot. This fact was, of course, highly relevant in showing that the petitioner was extremely interested in some enterprise which was located in the apartment. </s> 3. The FBI had been informed by a reliable informant that the petitioner was accepting wagering information by telephones - the particular telephones located in the [393 U.S. 410, 431] apartment the defendant had been repeatedly visiting. Unless the Court, going beyond the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, wishes to require magistrates to hold trials before issuing warrants, it is not necessary - as the Court holds - to have the affiant explain "the underlying circumstances from which the informer concluded that Spinelli was running a bookmaking operation." Ante, at 416. </s> 4. The petitioner was known by federal and local law enforcement agents as a bookmaker and an associate of gamblers. I cannot agree with the Court that this knowledge was only a "bald and unilluminating assertion of suspicion that is entitled to no weight in appraising the magistrate's decision." Ante, at 414. Although the statement is hearsay that might not be admissible in a regular trial, everyone knows, unless he shuts his eyes to the realities of life, that this is a relevant fact which, together with other circumstances, might indicate a factual probability that gambling is taking place. </s> The foregoing facts should be enough to constitute probable cause for anyone who does not believe that the only way to obtain a search warrant is to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant is guilty. Even Aguilar, on which the Court relies, cannot support the contrary result, at least as that decision was written before today's massive escalation of it. In Aguilar the Court dealt with an affidavit that stated only: </s> "Affiants have received reliable information from a credible person and do believe that heroin . . . and other narcotics and narcotic paraphernalia are being kept at the above described premises for the purpose of sale and use contrary to the provisions of the law." 378 U.S., at 109 . </s> The Court held, over the dissent of Mr. Justice Clark, MR. JUSTICE STEWART, and myself, that this unsupported conclusion of an unidentified informant provided no basis [393 U.S. 410, 432] for the magistrate to make an independent judgment as to the persuasiveness of the facts relied upon to show probable cause. Here, of course, we have much more, and the Court in Aguilar was careful to point out that additional information of the kind presented in the affidavit before us now would be highly relevant: </s> "If the fact and results of such a surveillance had been appropriately presented to the magistrate, this would, of course, present an entirely different case." 378 U.S., at 109 , n. 1. </s> In the present case even the two-judge minority of the court below recognized, as this Court seems to recognize today, that this additional information took the case beyond the rule of Aguilar. Six of the other circuit judges disagreed with the two dissenting judges, finding that all the circumstances considered together could support a reasonable judgment that gambling probably was taking place. I fully agree with this carefully considered opinion of the court below. </s> I regret to say I consider today's decision an indefensible departure from the principles of our former cases. Less than four years ago we reaffirmed these principles in United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965): </s> "If the teachings of the Court's cases are to be followed and the constitutional policy served, affidavits for search warrants . . . must be tested and interpreted by magistrates and courts in a commonsense and realistic fashion. . . . Technical requirements of elaborate specificity once exacted under common law pleadings have no proper place in this area." </s> See also Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694, 700 -701 (1931). </s> Departures of this kind are responsible for considerable uneasiness in our lower courts, and I must say I [393 U.S. 410, 433] am deeply troubled by the statements of Judge Gibson in the court below: </s> "I am, indeed, disturbed by decision after decision of our courts which place increasingly technical burdens upon law enforcement officials. I am disturbed by these decisions that appear to relentlessly chip away at the ever narrowing area of effective police operation. I believe the holdings in Aguilar, and Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528 (1964) are sufficient to protect the privacy of individuals from hastily conceived intrusions, and I do not think the limitations and requirements on the issuance of search warrants should be expanded by setting up over-technical requirements approaching the now discarded pitfalls of common law pleadings. Moreover, if we become increasingly technical and rigid in our demands upon police officers, I fear we make it increasingly easy for criminals to operate, detected but unpunished. I feel the significant movement of the law beyond its present state is unwarranted, unneeded, and dangerous to law enforcement efficiency." (Dissenting from panel opinion.) </s> The Court of Appeals in this case took a sensible view of the Fourth Amendment, and I would wholeheartedly affirm its decision. </s> Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , decided in 1961, held for the first time that the Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary rule of Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) are now applicable to the States. That Amendment provides that search warrants shall not be issued without probable cause. The existence of probable cause is a factual matter that calls for the determination of a factual question. While no statistics are immediately available, questions of probable cause to issue search [393 U.S. 410, 434] warrants and to make arrests are doubtless involved in many thousands of cases in state courts. All of those probable-cause state cases are now potentially reviewable by this Court. It is, of course, physically impossible for this Court to review the evidence in all or even a substantial percentage of those cases. Consequently, whether desirable or not, we must inevitably accept most of the fact findings of the state courts, particularly when, as here in a federal case, both the trial and appellate courts have decided the facts the same way. It cannot be said that the trial judge and six members of the Court of Appeals committed flagrant error in finding from evidence that the magistrate had probable cause to issue the search warrant here. It seems to me that this Court would best serve itself and the administration of justice by accepting the judgment of the two courts below. After all, they too are lawyers and judges, and much closer to the practical, everyday affairs of life than we are. </s> Notwithstanding the Court's belief to the contrary, I think that in holding as it does, the Court does: </s> "retreat from the established propositions that only the probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity is the standard of probable cause, Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964); that affidavits of probable cause are tested by much less rigorous standards than those governing the admissibility of evidence at trial, McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 311 (1967); that in judging probable cause issuing magistrates are not to be confined by niggardly limitations or by restrictions on the use of their common sense, United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965); and that their determination of probable cause should be paid great deference by reviewing courts, Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 270 -271 (1960)." Ante, at 419. [393 U.S. 410, 435] </s> In fact, I believe the Court is moving rapidly, through complex analyses and obfuscatory language, toward the holding that no magistrate can issue a warrant unless according to some unknown standard of proof he can be persuaded that the suspect defendant is actually guilty of a crime. I would affirm this conviction. </s> MR. JUSTICE FORTAS, dissenting. </s> My Brother HARLAN's opinion for the Court is animated by a conviction which I share that "[t]he security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police - which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment - is basic to a free society." Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949). </s> We may well insist upon a sympathetic and even an indulgent view of the latitude which must be accorded to the police for performance of their vital task; but only a foolish or careless people will deduce from this that the public welfare requires or permits the police to disregard the restraints on their actions which historic struggles for freedom have developed for the protection of liberty and dignity of citizens against arbitrary state power. </s> As Justice Jackson (dissenting) stated in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 -181 (1949): </s> "[The provisions of the Fourth Amendment] are not mere second-class rights but belong in the catalog of indispensable freedoms. Among deprivations of rights, none is so effective in cowing a population, crushing the spirit of the individual and putting terror in every heart. Uncontrolled search and seizure is one of the first and most effective weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary government. And one need only briefly to have dwelt and worked among a people possessed of many admirable qualities but deprived of these rights to know that the [393 U.S. 410, 436] human personality deteriorates and dignity and self-reliance disappear where homes, persons and possessions are subject at any hour to unheralded search and seizure by the police." </s> History 1 teaches us that this protection requires that the judgment of a judicial officer be interposed between the police, hot in pursuit of their appointed target, and the citizen; 2 that the judicial officer must judge and not merely rubber-stamp; and that his judgment must be based upon judicially reliable facts adequate to demonstrate that the search is justified by the probability that it will yield the fruits or instruments of crime - or, as this Court has only recently ruled, tangible evidence of its commission. 3 The exceptions to the requirement of a search warrant have always been narrowly restricted 4 because of this Court's long-standing awareness of the fundamental role of the magistrate's judgment in the preservation of a proper balance between individual freedom and state power. See Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 700 (1948). </s> Today's decision deals, not with the necessity of obtaining a warrant prior to search, but with the difficult problem of the nature of the showing that must be made [393 U.S. 410, 437] before the magistrate to justify his issuance of a search warrant. While I do not subscribe to the criticism of the majority expressed by my Brother BLACK in dissent, I believe - with all respect - that the majority is in error in holding that the affidavit supporting the warrant in this case is constitutionally inadequate. </s> The affidavit is unusually long and detailed. In fact, it recites so many minute and detailed facts developed in the course of the investigation of Spinelli that its substance is somewhat obscured. It is paradoxical that this very fullness of the affidavit may be the source of the constitutional infirmity that the majority finds. Stated in language more direct and less circumstantial than that used by the FBI agent who executed the affidavit, it sets forth that the FBI has been informed that Spinelli is accepting wagers by means of telephones numbered WY 4-0029 and WY 4-0136; that Spinelli is known to the affiant agent and to law enforcement agencies as a bookmaker; that telephones numbered WY 4-0029 and WY 4-0136 are located in a certain apartment; that Spinelli was placed under surveillance and his observed movements were such as to show his use of that apartment and to indicate that he frequented the apartment on a regular basis. </s> Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), holds that the reference in an affidavit to information described only as received from "a confidential reliable informant," standing alone, is not an adequate basis for issuance of a search warrant. The majority agrees that the "FBI affidavit in the present case is more ample than that in Aguilar," but concludes that it is nevertheless constitutionally inadequate. The majority states that the present affidavit fails to meet the "two-pronged test" of Aguilar because (a) it does not set forth the basis for the assertion that the informer is "reliable" and (b) it fails to state the "underlying circumstances" upon which the [393 U.S. 410, 438] informant based his conclusion that Spinelli was engaged in bookmaking. </s> The majority acknowledges, however, that its reference to a "two-pronged test" should not be understood as meaning that an affidavit deficient in these respects is necessarily inadequate to support a search warrant. Other facts and circumstances may be attested which will supply the evidence of probable cause needed to support the search warrant. On this general statement we are agreed. Our difference is that I believe such facts and circumstances are present in this case, and the majority arrives at the opposite conclusion. </s> Aguilar expressly recognized that if, in that case, the affidavit's conclusory report of the informant's story had been supplemented by "the fact and results of . . . a surveillance . . . this would, of course, present an entirely different case." 378 U.S., at 109 , n. 1. In the present case, as I view it, the affidavit showed not only relevant surveillance, entitled to some probative weight for purposes of the issuance of a search warrant, but also additional, specific facts of significance and adequate reliability: that Spinelli was using two telephone numbers, identified by an "informant" as being used for bookmaking, in his illegal operations; that these telephones were in an identified apartment; and that Spinelli, a known bookmaker, 5 frequented the apartment. Certainly, this is enough. </s> A policeman's affidavit should not be judged as an entry in an essay contest. It is not "abracadabra." 6 </s> [393 U.S. 410, 439] As the majority recognizes, a policeman's affidavit is entitled to common-sense evaluation. So viewed, I conclude that the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit should be affirmed. </s> [Footnote 1 "The knock at the door, whether by day or by night, as a prelude to a search, without authority of law but solely on the authority of the police, did not need the commentary of recent history to be condemned as inconsistent with the conception of human rights enshrined in the history and the basic constitutional documents of English-speaking peoples." Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949). See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 -70 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See generally with respect to the history of the Fourth Amendment N. Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution (1937). </s> [Footnote 2 See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 -14 (1948). </s> [Footnote 3 Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). </s> [Footnote 4 See Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 311 (1967) (concurring opinion). </s> [Footnote 5 Although Spinelli's reputation standing alone would not, of course, justify the search, this Court has held that such a reputation may make the informer's report "much less subject to scepticism than would be such a charge against one without such a history." Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960). </s> [Footnote 6 See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 418 (1967) (dissent) (relating to jury instructions). </s> MR. JUSTICE STEWART, dissenting. </s> For substantially the reasons stated by my Brothers BLACK and FORTAS, I believe the warrant in this case was supported by a sufficient showing of probable cause. I would therefore affirm the judgment. </s> [393 U.S. 410, 440] | 0 | 1 | 3 |
United States Supreme Court BOYNTON v. VIRGINIA(1960) No. 7 Argued: October 12, 1960Decided: December 5, 1960 </s> For refusing to leave the section reserved for white people in a restaurant in a bus terminal, petitioner, a Negro interstate bus passenger, was convicted in Virginia courts of violating a state statute making it a misdemeanor for any person "without authority of law" to remain upon the premises of another after having been forbidden to do so. On appeal, he contended that his conviction violated the Interstate Commerce Act and the Equal Protection, Due Process and Commerce Clauses of the Federal Constitution; but his conviction was sustained by the State Supreme Court. On petition for certiorari to this Court, he raised only the constitutional questions. Held: </s> 1. Notwithstanding the fact that the petition for certiorari presented only the constitutional questions, this Court will consider the statutory issue, which involves essentially the same problem - racial discrimination in interstate commerce. P. 457. </s> 2. Under 216 (d) of the Interstate Commerce Act, which forbids any interstate common carrier by motor vehicle to subject any person to unjust discrimination, petitioner had a federal right to remain in the white portion of the restaurant, he was there "under authority of law," and it was error to affirm his conviction. Pp. 457-463. </s> (a) When a bus carrier has volunteered to make terminal and restaurant facilities and services available to its interstate passengers as a regular part of their transportation, and the terminal and restaurant have acquiesced and cooperated in this undertaking, the terminal and restaurant must perform these services without discriminations prohibited by the Act. Pp. 457-461. </s> (b) Although the courts below made no findings of fact, the evidence in this case shows such a situation here. Pp. 461-463. </s> Reversed. </s> Thurgood Marshall argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Martin A. Martin, Clarence W. Newsome, Jack Greenberg, Louis H. Pollak and Constance Baker Motley. [364 U.S. 454, 455] </s> Walter E. Rogers, Special Assistant to the Attorney General of Virginia, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were A. S. Harrison, Jr., Attorney General of Virginia, and R. D. McIlwaine III, Assistant Attorney General. </s> Solicitor General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General Tyler, Philip Elman, Harold H. Greene and David Rubin filed a brief for the United States, as amicus curiae, urging reversal. </s> MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> The basic question presented in this case is whether an interstate bus passenger is denied a federal statutory or constitutional right when a restaurant in a bus terminal used by the carrier along its route discriminates in serving food to the passenger solely because of his color. </s> Petitioner, a Negro law student, bought a Trailways bus ticket from Washington, D.C., to Montgomery, Alabama. He boarded a bus at 8 p. m. which arrived at Richmond, Virginia, about 10:40 p. m. When the bus pulled up at the Richmond "Trailways Bus Terminal" the bus driver announced a forty-minute stopover there. Petitioner got off the bus and went into the bus terminal to get something to eat. In the station he found a restaurant in which one part was used to serve white people and one to serve Negroes. Disregarding this division, petitioner sat down on a stool in the white section. A waitress asked him to move over to the other section where there were "facilities" to serve colored people. Petitioner told her he was an interstate bus passenger, refused to move and ordered a sandwich and tea. The waitress then brought the Assistant Manager, who "instructed" petitioner to "leave the white portion of the restaurant and advised him he could be served in the colored portion." Upon petitioner's refusal to leave an officer was called and petitioner was arrested and later tried, convicted and [364 U.S. 454, 456] fined ten dollars in the Police Justice's Court of Richmond on a charge that he "Unlawfully did remain on the premises of the Bus Terminal Restaurant of Richmond, Inc. after having been forbidden to do so" by the Assistant Manager. (Emphasis supplied.) The charge was based on 18-225 of the Code of Virginia of 1950, as amended (1958), which provides in part: </s> "If any person shall without authority of law go upon or remain upon the lands or premises of another, after having been forbidden to do so by the owner, lessee, custodian or other person lawfully in charge of such land, . . . he shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars or by confinement in jail not exceeding thirty days, or by both such fine and imprisonment." (Emphasis supplied.) </s> Petitioner appealed his conviction to the Hustings Court of Richmond, where, as in the Police Court, he admitted that he had remained in the white portion of the Terminal Restaurant although ordered not to do so. His defense in both courts was that he had a federal right as an interstate passenger of Trailways to be served without discrimination by this restaurant used by the bus carrier for the accommodation of its interstate passengers. On this basis petitioner claimed he was on the restaurant premises lawfully, not "unlawfully" as charged, and that he remained there with, not "without authority of law." His federal claim to this effect was spelled out in a motion to dismiss the warrant in Hustings Court, which was overruled both before and after the evidence was heard. Pointing out that the restaurant was an integral part of the bus service for interstate passengers such as petitioner, and asserting that refusal to serve him was a discrimination based on color, the motion to dismiss charged [364 U.S. 454, 457] that application of the Virginia law to petitioner violated the Interstate Commerce Act and the Equal Protection, Due Process and Commerce Clauses of the Federal Constitution. On appeal the Virginia Supreme Court held that the conviction was "plainly right" and affirmed without opinion, thereby rejecting petitioner's assignments of error based on the same grounds of discrimination set out in his motion to dismiss in Hustings Court but not specifically charging that the discrimination violated the Interstate Commerce Act. We think, however, that the claims of discrimination previously made under the Act are sufficiently closely related to the assignments that were made to be considered within the scope of the issues presented to the State Supreme Court. We granted certiorari because of the serious federal questions raised concerning discrimination based on color. 361 U.S. 958 . </s> The petition for certiorari we granted presented only two questions: first, whether the conviction of petitioner is invalid as a burden on commerce in violation of Art. I, 8, cl. 3 of the Constitution; and second, whether the conviction violates the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Ordinarily we limit our review to the questions presented in an application for certiorari. We think there are persuasive reasons, however, why this case should be decided, if it can, on the Interstate Commerce Act contention raised in the Virginia courts. Discrimination because of color is the core of the two broad constitutional questions presented to us by petitioner, just as it is the core of the Interstate Commerce Act question presented to the Virginia courts. Under these circumstances we think it appropriate not to reach the constitutional questions but to proceed at once to the statutory issue. </s> The Interstate Commerce Act, as we have said, uses language of the broadest type to bar discriminations of all kinds. United States v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., [364 U.S. 454, 458] 333 U.S. 169, 175 , and cases cited. We have held that the Act forbids railroad dining cars to discriminate in service to passengers on account of their color. Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 ; see also Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80, 97 . </s> Section 216 (d) of Part II of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. 316 (d), which applies to motor carriers, provides in part: </s> "It shall be unlawful for any common carrier by motor vehicle engaged in interstate or foreign commerce to make, give, or cause any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person . . . in any respect whatsoever; or to subject any particular person . . . to any unjust discrimination or any unjust or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever . . . ." </s> So far as relevant to our problem, the provisions of 216 (d) quoted are the same as those in 3 (1) of the Act, 49 U.S.C. 3 (1), except that the latter refers to railroads as defined in Part I of the Act instead of motor carriers as defined in Part II. Section 3 (1) was the basis for this Court's holding in Henderson v. United States, supra, that it was an "undue or unreasonable prejudice" under that section for a railroad to divide its dining car by curtains, partitions and signs in order to separate passengers according to race. The Court said that under 3 (1) "[w]here a dining car is available to passengers holding tickets entitling them to use it, each such passenger is equally entitled to its facilities in accordance with reasonable regulations." Id., 339 U.S., at 824 . The Henderson case largely rested on Mitchell v. United States, supra, which pointed out that while the railroads might not be required by law to furnish dining car facilities, yet if they did, substantial equality of treatment of persons traveling [364 U.S. 454, 459] under like conditions could not be refused consistently with 3 (1). It is also of relevance that both cases upset Interstate Commerce Commission holdings, the Court stating in Mitchell that since the "discrimination shown was palpably unjust and forbidden by the Act" no room was left for administrative or expert judgment with reference to practical difficulties. Id., 313 U.S., at 97 . </s> It follows from the Mitchell and Henderson cases as a matter of course that should buses in transit decide to supply dining service, discrimination of the kind shown here would violate 216 (d). Cf. Williams v. Carolina Coach Co., 111 F. Supp. 329, aff'd, 207 F.2d 408, and Keys v. Carolina Coach Co., 64 M. C. C. 769. Although this Court has not decided whether the same result would follow from a similar discrimination in service by a restaurant in a railroad or bus terminal, we have no doubt that the reasoning underlying the Mitchell and Henderson cases would compel the same decision as to the unlawfulness of discrimination in transportation services against interstate passengers in terminals and terminal restaurants owned or operated or controlled by interstate carriers. This is true as to railroad terminals because they are expressly made carriers by 1 (3) (a) of the Act, 1 49 U.S.C. 1 (3) (a), and as to bus terminals because 203 (a) (19) of the Act, 49 U.S.C. 303 (a) (19), specifically includes interstate transportation facilities and property operated or controlled by a [364 U.S. 454, 460] motor carrier within the definition of the "services" and "transportation" to which the motor carrier provisions of the Act apply. 2 </s> Respondent correctly points out, however, that, whatever may be the facts, the evidence in this record does not show that the bus company owns or actively operates or directly controls the bus terminal or the restaurant in it. But the fact that 203 (a) (19) says that the protections of the motor carrier provisions of the Act extend to "include" facilities so operated or controlled by no means should be interpreted to exempt motor carriers from their statutory duty under 216 (d) not to discriminate should they choose to provide their interstate passengers with services that are an integral part of transportation through the use of facilities they neither own, control nor operate. The protections afforded by the Act against discriminatory transportation services are not so narrowly limited. We have held that a railroad cannot escape its statutory duty to treat its shippers alike either by use of facilities it does not own or by contractual arrangement with the owner of those facilities. United States v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., supra. And so here, without regard to contracts, if the bus carrier has volunteered to make terminal and restaurant facilities and services available to its interstate passengers as a regular part of their transportation, and the terminal and restaurant have acquiesced and cooperated in this undertaking, the terminal and restaurant must perform these services without discriminations prohibited by the Act. In the performance of these services [364 U.S. 454, 461] under such conditions the terminal and restaurant stand in the place of the bus company in the performance of its transportation obligations. Cf. Derrington v. Plummer, 240 F.2d 922, 925-926, cert. denied, 353 U.S. 924 . Although the courts below made no findings of fact, we think the evidence in this case shows such a relationship and situation here. </s> The manager of the restaurant testified that it was not affiliated in any way with the Trailways Bus Company and that the bus company had no control over the operation of the restaurant, but that while the restaurant had "quite a bit of business" from local people, it was primarily or partly for the service of the passengers on the Trailways bus. This last statement was perhaps much of an understatement, as shown by the lease agreement executed in writing and signed both by the "Trailways Bus Terminal, Inc.," as lessor, and the "Bus Terminal Restaurant of Richmond, Inc.," as lessee. The first part of the document showed that Trailways Terminal was then constructing a "bus station" with built-in facilities "for the operation of a restaurant, soda fountain, and news stand." Terminal covenanted to lease this space to Restaurant for its use; to grant Restaurant the exclusive right to sell foods and other things usually sold in restaurants, newsstands, soda fountains and lunch counters; to keep the terminal building in good repair and to furnish certain utilities. Restaurant on its part agreed to use its space for the sale of commodities agreed on at prices that are "just and reasonable"; to sell no commodities not usually sold or installed in a bus terminal concession without Terminal's permission; to discontinue the sale of any commodity objectionable to Terminal; to buy, maintain, and replace equipment subject to Terminal's approval in writing as to its quality; to make alterations and additions only after Terminal's written consent and approval; to make no "sales on buses [364 U.S. 454, 462] operating in and out said bus station" but only "through the windows of said buses"; to keep its employees neat and clean; to perform no terminal service other than that pertaining to the operation of its restaurant as agreed on; and that neither Restaurant nor its employees were to "sell transportation of any kind or give information pertaining to schedules, rates or transportation matters, but shall refer all such inquiries to the proper agents of" Terminal. In short, as Terminal and Restaurant agreed, "the operation of the restaurant and the said stands shall be in keeping with the character of service maintained in an up-to-date, modern bus terminal." </s> All of these things show that this terminal building, with its grounds, constituted one project for a single purpose, and that was to serve passengers of one or more bus companies - certainly Trailways' passengers. The restaurant area was specifically designed and built into the structure from the beginning to fill the needs of bus passengers in this "up-to-date, modern bus terminal." Whoever may have had technical title or immediate control of the details of the various activities in the terminal, such as waiting-room seating, furnishing of schedule information, ticket sales, and restaurant service, they were all geared to the service of bus companies and their passengers, even though local people who might happen to come into the terminal or its restaurant might also be accommodated. Thus we have a well-coordinated and smoothly functioning plan for continuous cooperative transportation services between the terminal, the restaurant and buses like Trailways that made stopovers there. All of this evidence plus Trailways' use on this occasion shows that Trailways was not utilizing the terminal and restaurant services merely on a sporadic or occasional basis. This bus terminal plainly was just as essential and necessary, and as available for that matter, to passengers and carriers like Trailways that used it, as though such carriers [364 U.S. 454, 463] had legal title and complete control over all of its activities. 3 Interstate passengers have to eat, and the very terms of the lease of the built-in restaurant space in this terminal constitute a recognition of the essential need of interstate passengers to be able to get food conveniently on their journey and an undertaking by the restaurant to fulfill that need. Such passengers in transit on a paid interstate Trailways journey had a right to expect that this essential 4 transportation food service voluntarily provided for them under such circumstances would be rendered without discrimination prohibited by the Interstate Commerce Act. Under the circumstances of this case, therefore, petitioner had a federal right to remain in the white portion of the restaurant. He was there under "authority of law" - the Interstate Commerce Act - and it was error for the Supreme Court of Virginia to affirm his conviction. </s> Because of some of the arguments made here it is necessary to say a word about what we are not deciding. We are not holding that every time a bus stops at a wholly independent roadside restaurant the Interstate Commerce Act requires that restaurant service be supplied in harmony with the provisions of that Act. We decide only this case, on its facts, where circumstances show that the terminal and restaurant operate as an integral part of the [364 U.S. 454, 464] bus carrier's transportation service for interstate passengers. Under such circumstances, an interstate passenger need not inquire into documents of title or contractual arrangements in order to determine whether he has a right to be served without discrimination. </s> The judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia is reversed and the cause is remanded to that Court for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. </s> Reversed and remanded. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 See National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. St. Louis-S. F. R. Co., 297 I. C. C. 335, 347-348, in which the Interstate Commerce Commission held that a railroad terminal discriminates in violation of 3 (1) if it maintains waiting rooms for the exclusive use of Negroes. The Commission regarded assignment to accommodations or facilities in a railroad terminal solely on the basis of race as an implication of inherent inferiority and found it to be unreasonable. </s> [Footnote 2 "The `services' and `transportation' to which this chapter applies include all vehicles operated by, for, or in the interest of any motor carrier irrespective of ownership or of contract, express or implied, together with all facilities and property operated or controlled by any such carrier or carriers, and used in the transportation of passengers or property in interstate or foreign commerce or in the performance of any service in connection therewith." </s> [Footnote 3 Cf. Atchison, Topeka & S. F. R. Co., 135 I. C. C. 633, 634-635, in which the Commission held that railroad-owned hotels and restaurants used for railroad passengers and employees, and as an incident to the operation and management of the railroad, should be accorded a common-carrier classification. </s> [Footnote 4 Because the evidence shows that this terminal restaurant was utilized as an integral part of the transportation of interstate passengers, we need not decide whether discrimination on the basis of color by a bus terminal lessee restaurant would violate 216 (d) in the absence of such circumstances. Cf. National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. St. Louis-S. F. R. Co., supra, at 343-344. </s> MR. JUSTICE WHITTAKER, with whom MR. JUSTICE CLARK joins, dissenting. </s> Neither in the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia nor in his petition for certiorari or in his brief on the merits in this Court did petitioner challenge the judgment on the ground that it was obtained in violation of the Interstate Commerce Act. I therefore respectfully submit that, under our rules and decisions, no such question is presented or open for consideration here. 1 But even if the Court properly may proceed, as it has proceeded, to decide the case under that Act, and not at all on the constitutional grounds solely relied on by petitioner. 2 I must say, with all deference, that the facts in this record do not show that petitioner was convicted of trespass in violation of that Act. </s> For me, the decisive question in this case is whether petitioner had a legal right to remain in the restaurant [364 U.S. 454, 465] involved after being ordered to leave it by the proprietor. If he did not have that legal right, however arising, he was guilty of trespass and, unless proscribed by some federal law, his conviction therefor was legally adjudged under 18-225 of the Code of Virginia. 3 </s> If the facts in this record could fairly be said to show that the restaurant was a facility "operated or controlled by any [motor] carrier or carriers, and used in the transportation of passengers or property in interstate or foreign commerce," 203 (a) (19) of Part II of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. 303 (a) (19), I would agree that petitioner had a legal right to remain in and to insist on service by that restaurant and, hence, was not guilty of trespass in so remaining and insisting though in defiance of the manager's order to leave, for 216 (d) of the Act, 49 U.S.C. 316 (d), makes it unlawful for a motor carrier while engaged in interstate commerce "to subject any particular person . . . to any unjust discrimination," and this Court has held that any discrimination by a carrier against its interstate passenger on account of his color in the use of its dining facilities is an unjust discrimination. Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 . Cf. Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80 . </s> But I respectfully submit that those are not the facts shown by this record. As I read it, there is no evidence in this record even tending to show that the restaurant was "operated or controlled by any such carrier," directly or indirectly. Instead, all of the relevant evidence, none [364 U.S. 454, 466] of which was contradicted, shows that the restaurant was owned and controlled by a noncarrier who alone operated it as a local and private enterprise. The evidence was very brief, consisting only of an exhibit (a lease) and the testimony of the assistant manager of the restaurant, of a police officer and of petitioner - all, except the exhibit, being contained on 10 pages of the printed record. The lease is in the usual and common form and terms. By it, the owner of the building, Trailways Bus Terminal, Inc., a Virginia corporation, as lessor, demised to the restaurant company, Bus Terminal Restaurant of Richmond, Inc., a Virginia corporation, as lessee, certain described "space" in the lessor's bus station building in Richmond, Virginia, "for use by Lessee as a restaurant, lunchroom, soda fountain and news stand," for a term of five years from December 2, 1953 (with an option in the lessee to renew, on the same terms, for an additional five-year term), at an annual rental of $30,000 (payable in equal monthly installments) plus 12% of lessee's gross receipts from the demised premises in excess of $275,000 (payable at the end of each year). 4 </s> [364 U.S. 454, 467] </s> There is not a word of evidence that any carrier had any interest in or control over the lessee or its restaurant. Nor is there any suggestion in the record that the lease or the lessee's restaurant operations under it were anything other than bona fide and for a legitimate and private business purpose. Indeed, there is not a word of evidence in the record tending to show that any carrier even had any interest in or control over the lessor corporation that owned the building. In truth, the record does not even show the name of the carrier on which petitioner was traveling or identify it other than as "Trailways." 5 On [364 U.S. 454, 468] the other hand, the assistant manager of the restaurant testified, without suggestion of contradiction, that "[t]he company that operates the restaurant is not affiliated in any way with the bus company," and that "[t]he bus company has no control over the operation of the restaurant." There was simply no evidence to the contrary. </s> The Court seems to agree that "[r]espondent correctly points out [that] . . . the evidence in this record does not show that the bus company owns or actively operates or directly controls the bus terminal or the restaurant in it." But it seems to hold, as I read its opinion, that a motor carrier's regular "use" of a restaurant, though it be "neither own[ed], control[led] nor operate[d]" by the motor carrier, makes the restaurant a facility "operated or controlled by [the motor] carrier or carriers" within the meaning of 203 (a) (19) of the Interstate Commerce Act. I must respectfully disagree. To me, it seems rather plain that when Congress, in 203 (a) (19), said that the "`services' and `transportation'" to which Part II of the Act applies shall include "all vehicles . . . together with all facilities and property operated or controlled by any such carrier or carriers, and used in the transportation of passengers or property in interstate or foreign commerce or in the performance of any service in connection therewith," it hardly meant to include a private restaurant, "neither owned, operated nor controlled" by a carrier. Surely such "use" of a private restaurant by a motor carrier as results from stopping and opening its buses in front of or near a restaurant does not make the restaurant a facility "operated or controlled by" the carrier, within the meaning of 203 (a) (19) or in any true sense. This simple, and I think obvious, principle was recognized and correctly applied by the Commission as recently as November 1955 in N. A. A. C. P. v. St. Louis, S. F. R. Co., 297 I. C. C. 335. There, the railroad terminal or station building in [364 U.S. 454, 469] Richmond, Virginia, was owned by Richmond Terminal Railway Company 6 - itself a carrier under 3 (1) of Part I of the Act - which had leased space in that building to Union News Company for a term of 10 years, but subject to termination at the option of either party on 90 days' notice, for use as a restaurant. 7 In rejecting the contention that the Union News Company's operation of the restaurant on a racially segregated basis violated 3 (1) of Part I of the Act, the Commission said: </s> "Unless the operation of the lunchrooms can be found to be that of a common carrier subject to part I of the act, it cannot be regulated under section 3 (1), and we are unable so to find on the facts before us." (Emphasis added.) Id., at 344. </s> and the Commission concluded: </s> "We further find that the operation by a lessee (noncarrier) of separate lunchroom facilities for white and colored persons in the railway station at Richmond, constitutes a function or service which is not within the jurisdiction of this Commission." (Emphasis added.) Id., at 348. [364 U.S. 454, 470] </s> I would agree with the Court that "if the bus carrier [had] volunteered to make . . . restaurant facilities and services available to its interstate passengers as a regular part of their transportation, and the . . . restaurant [had] acquiesced . . . in this undertaking," the restaurant would then have been bound to serve the carrier's interstate passengers without discrimination. For, in that case, the restaurant would have been made a facility of the carrier, within the meaning of 203 (a) (19), and 216 (d) would inhibit both the carrier and the restaurant from discriminating against the carrier's interstate passengers on account of their color, or on any other account, in the use of the restaurant facilities thus provided. Henderson v. United States, supra. But that is not this case. As we have shown, there is no evidence in this record that the carrier on which petitioner was traveling, whatever may have been its name, had "volunteered to make . . . restaurant facilities and services available to its interstate passengers" at this restaurant "as a regular part of their transportation," or that the proprietor of this restaurant ever "acquiesced" in any such "undertaking." There is no evidence of any agreement, express or implied, between the proprietor of this restaurant and any bus carrier. Instead, the undisputed evidence is that the restaurant was not in any way affiliated with or controlled by any bus carrier. On this evidence, I am unable to find any basis to support a conclusion that this restaurant was in some way made a facility of the bus carrier, or subject to Part II of the Interstate Commerce Act. </s> For these reasons, I cannot agree on this record that petitioner's conviction of trespass under 18-225 of the Code of Virginia was had in violation of the Interstate Commerce Act. Since the Court's opinion does not explore the constitutional grounds relied on by petitioner, I refrain from intimating any views on those subjects. </s> [Footnote 1 See our Rules 23 (1) (c) and 40 (1) (d) (1): Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339, 362 , n. 16, and cases cited. </s> [Footnote 2 The only grounds relied on by petitioner in the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia and in his petition for certiorari and brief on the merits in this Court were that his conviction is invalid as an undue burden on interstate commerce in violation of Art. I, 8, cl. 3, and also violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. </s> [Footnote 3 Section 18-225 of the Code of Virginia, in relevant part, provides: </s> "If any person shall without authority of law go upon or remain upon the lands or premises of another, after having been forbidden to do so by the owner, lessee, custodian or other person lawfully in charge of such land, . . . he shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars or by confinement in jail not exceeding thirty days, or by both such fine and imprisonment." </s> [Footnote 4 Under other provisions of the lease, the lessee covenanted, in substance, that it would acquire and install in the leased space, at its own expense, all things, including plumbing and wiring, which may be reasonably necessary to the equipment and operation of the restaurant; to provide and pay for all gas and electric current, except for overhead lights; to keep the premises and employees neat and clean and to operate the restaurant "in keeping with the character of service maintained in an up-to-date, modern bus terminal"; that it would not keep any coin-controlled machines or sell intoxicants on the demised premises nor make "any sales on buses operating in and out [of] said bus station"; that it would "comply with all the ordinances of the City of Richmond, and the laws of the United States and the State of Virginia in respect to the conduct of business of Lessee on the demised premises"; to take good care of the premises, and to surrender them at the end of the term in the same condition as when received "ordinary wear and tear excepted." </s> [Footnote 5 Obviously recognizing these glaring deficiencies in the evidence, counsel for petitioner and for the Government, as amicus curiae, have submitted with their briefs in this Court copies of certain Annual Reports of Virginia Stage Lines, Inc. (which probably was the carrier on which petitioner was traveling), Carolina Coach Company, and of Trailways Bus Terminal, Inc. (the owner of the building and lessor of the space occupied by the lessee's restaurant), to the State Corporation Commission of Virginia, purporting to show that those companies were doing business in Virginia in 1958 and 1959, and a copy of certain pages of the Annual Report filed by Virginia Stage Lines, Inc., with the Interstate Commerce Commission for the year 1959, purporting to show that the capital stock of Trailways Bus Terminal, Inc., was owned in equal parts by Virginia Stage Lines, Inc., and Carolina Coach Company. But none of those documents was put in evidence nor brought to the attention of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, and it appears, as contended by Virginia, that the Virginia court could not take judicial notice of those documents. See 8-264 and 8-266 of the Code of Virginia; Commonwealth v. Castner, 138 Va. 81, 121 S. E. 894; Sisk v. Town of Shenandoah, 200 Va. 277, 105 S. E. 2d 169; Bell v. Hagmann, 200 Va. 626, 107 S. E. 2d 426. In the light of these facts the proffered documents cannot be considered here. Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339, 354 ; Wolfe v. North Carolina, 364 U.S. 177 . But even if those documents could be considered here, they would not aid petitioner, for they do not purport to show that any carrier had any interest in or control over the restaurant involved or in or over Bus Terminal Restaurant of Richmond, the company that owned and operated the restaurant. </s> [Footnote 6 The Richmond Terminal Railway Company was controlled jointly by two railroads - the Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railway Co. and the Atlantic Coast Line. </s> [Footnote 7 The lease involved in that case was evidently similar to the one here. Speaking of that lease, the Commission said: </s> "The lease is silent as to racial segregation. The terminal has certain powers of supervision for a purpose which may be described as policing. The lessee is obligated to `comply with the requirements of the Department of Public Health, City of Richmond, and with all other lawful governmental rules and regulations.' The context, however, indicates that this requirement is for the purpose of keeping the premises in a neat, clean, and orderly condition, and does not render the lessee liable for violations of the Interstate Commerce Act." 297 I. C. C., at 343. </s> [364 U.S. 454, 471] | 1 | 1 | 3 |
"United States Supreme Court MORISSETTE v. UNITED STATES(1952) No. 12 Argued: Decided: January 7, 19(...TRUNCATED) | 0 | 1 | 3 |
"United States Supreme Court R. J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO CO. v. DURHAM COUNTY(1986) No. 85-1021 Argued: O(...TRUNCATED) | 6 | 1 | 3 |
"United States Supreme Court McADAMS v. McSURELY(1978) No. 76-1621 Argued: March 1, 1978Decided: Jun(...TRUNCATED) | 8 | 0 | 1 |
"United States Supreme Court MATSUSHITA ELEC. INDUSTRIAL CO. v. ZENITH RADIO(1986) No. 83-2004 Argue(...TRUNCATED) | 6 | 0 | 2 |
"United States Supreme Court VAN LARE v. HURLEY(1975) No. 74-453 Argued: March 26, 1975Decided: May (...TRUNCATED) | 1 | 1 | 1 |
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Dataset Card for the SCOTUS lifelong editing task
Dataset Summary
This dataset contains a relabeled sample from the SCOTUS dataset in fairlex as described in our paper
Citation Information
@article{hartvigsen2023aging,
title={Aging with GRACE: Lifelong Model Editing with Discrete Key-Value Adapters},
author={Hartvigsen, Thomas and Sankaranarayanan, Swami and Palangi, Hamid and Kim, Yoon and Ghassemi, Marzyeh},
journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:2211.11031},
year={2023}
}
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Homepage: https://github.com/Thartvigsen/GRACE
Homepage: https://github.com/Thartvigsen/GRACE
Repository: https://github.com/Thartvigsen/GRACE
Repository: https://github.com/Thartvigsen/GRACE
Paper: https://arxiv.org/abs/2211.11031
Paper: https://arxiv.org/abs/2211.11031
Point of Contact: Tom Hartvigsen (tomh@mit.edu)
Point of Contact: Tom Hartvigsen (tomh@mit.edu)
Size of downloaded dataset files:
77.7 MB
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37.8 MB
Number of rows:
1,673