PATENT CLAIM ANALYSIS

Application Number: 16149715
Application Type: Utility
Filing Date: 2018-10
Publication Date: 2019-04
Patent Classification: ["726", "006000"]

Abstract:
A secure hardware-based module or Security Electronic Control Unit (SECU) for a Controller Area Network (CAN) prevents an attacker from sending malicious messages through the CAN bus to take over control of a vehicle. The SECU shares a unique key and counter with each ECU on the CAN bus. When a legitimate ECU sends a message, it first compresses the message and then generates a MAC of the counter and a secret key. The counter is increased by one for each transmitted message. The ECU then fits the compressed message and the MAC into one CAN frame and sends it onto the CAN bus. The SECU performs the message verification on behalf of the intended receiver(s) of the message. If the verification passes, the receiver(s) simply decompress the message and use it as a normal CAN message. If the verification fails, the SECU will corrupt the CAN frame before it is fully received by the intended receiver(s). The corrupted CAN frame will be ignored by the intended receiver(s) as if it was never received. Therefore, a malicious message generated by an attacker will inflict no damage on the system.

Claim (Index 1):
A secure hardware-based module or Security Electronic Control Unit (SECU) for a Controller Area Network (CAN) to prevent an attacker from sending malicious messages through a CAN bus to take over control of a vehicle, the SECU sharing a unique key and counter with each ECU on the CAN bus,\n wherein when a legitimate ECU sends a message, the ECU performs the following steps:\n first compresses the message and then generates a Message Authentication Code (MAC) of the counter and the secret key; \n increases the counter by one for each transmitted message; and \n then fits the compressed message and the MAC into one CAN frame and sends it onto the CAN bus; \n wherein the SECU performs the following steps:\n message verification on behalf of the intended receiver(s) of the message; \n if the verification passes, the SECU allows the message to pass to the intended receiver(s) on the CAN bus; \n whereby the receiver(s) simply decompress the message and use it as a normal CAN message;\n if the verification fails, the SECU corrupts the CAN frame before it is fully received by the intended receiver(s) \n whereby the corrupted CAN frame will be ignored by the intended receiver(s) as if it was never received preventing a malicious message generated by the attacker from inflicting damage on the system.

Metadata:
- Claim Count in Document: 1.0
- Percentile: 97.0
- Lexical Diversity: 2.23469
- Patent Class: 726.0
- Transitional Phrase Type: none
- Component Type: 0
- Foreign Priority: False
- Related Applications: ['16020323', '14475404', '15727642', '15719071', '15835451']

Analysis Scores:
- 35 USC 101 Eligibility (BERT): 0.2571478391768863
- 35 USC 102 Novelty (BERT): 0.4889973288432893
- Combined Prediction Score: 0.2803327881435266
- Mean Citation Score: 188.049714
- Max Citation Score: 194.65823
- Similarity Product: 142.27193906229078

Labels:
- Claim Label 101: 1
- Claim Label 102: 1
- Claim Label 103: 0
- Claim Label 112: 0
- Combined Label: 1
- Label 101 Adjusted: 1

Dataset: test